Natural gas development strong now – the plan is a direct trade-off. Jesse Jenkins, director of energy and climate policy at the Breakthrough Institute, previously worked as a Policy and Research Associate at the Renewable Northwest Project, 1-20-2012, “Avoiding a Natural Gas Bridge to Nowhere,” The Energy Collective, http://theenergycollective.com/breakthroughinstitut/74658/avoiding-natural-gas-bridge-nowhere
just as the history...invest in innovations
Domestic natural gas is critical to hegemony. Freeland 11 (Cadet Nathaniel, U.S. Military Academy – West Point, “The Strategic Importance of Shale Gas”, Issue Paper – Center for Strategic Leadership, August, http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/IP16_11.pdf) we have not...with natural gas
Global nuclear war Arbatov 7 (Alexei, Member – Russian Academy of Sciences and Editor – Russia in Global Affairs, “Is a New Cold War Imminent?”, Russia in Global Affairs, 5(3), July / September, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1130.html)
However, the low...capitals of the world
01/04/2013
Neolib K
Tournament: USC | Round: 6 | Opponent: Chico LP | Judge: Lemuel, Joel Nuclear production is subordinated to the neoliberal logic of consumption and technological solutions- locks in production mentality Malgorzata Maciejewska, institute of Sociology and Faculty of Social Sciences at Wroclaw University, and Marcin Marszalek, Wroclaw University, “Lack of power or lack of democracy: the case of the projected nuclear power plant in Poland,” Sept 2011 Economic and Environmental Studies Vol. 11, No.3, 235-248)
the mainstream discourse...the modern economy
Neolib makes extinction inevitable Santos in 2k3 (Boaventura de Sousa, director of the Center for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra, EUROZINE, COLLECTIVE SUICIDE OR GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW, http://www.eurozine.com/article/2003-03-26-santos-en.html) sacrificial genocide arises...for four years
The Alternative is to use this academic space to stand in opposition to neoliberalism. Starting with the alt is key to break down discursive borders that reproduce exclusionary mindsets- framing issues in terms of broader goals is key to build coalitions- failure to do so allows the exclusionary politics of neoliberalism to remove the appeal to democratic politics Di Chiro 8 (Giovanna, Mount Holyoke College Massachusetts, Living environmentalisms: coalition politics, social reproduction, and environmental justice, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09644010801936230) kc
according to aforementioned...sadly, environmentalism got it all wrong.
01/04/2013
Light K
Tournament: USC | Round: 2 | Opponent: Trinity MR | Judge: The aff is a narrative of a great culture hero that overcomes a chaos demon- the solar anus is used as a metaphor by the aff to signify light- this dooms their critique to failure- the retelling of the narrative of a light hero that overcomes a chaos demon is a classic mistake in human history- like a moth obsessed with the light we ignore our surroundings Berry 9 (Geoff, Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies Monash University, Under the Dominion of Light: an Ecocritical Mythography) kc
the symbol of light...his cultural values
Light’s inherent association with an ultimate good allows for the removal of meaning of the material world- this results in the worst forms of violence Berry 9 (Geoff, Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies Monash University, Under the Dominion of Light: an Ecocritical Mythography) kc
Light is mobilised as...the symbol of light
The alternative is to reconceptualize light as a spiritual force emanating from within the earth Berry 9 (Geoff, Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies Monash University, Under the Dominion of Light: an Ecocritical Mythography) kc
this introduction now...possible to consider such possibilities
01/04/2013
Movements K
Tournament: USC | Round: 2 | Opponent: Trinity | Judge: The 1AC must align itself with a social movement- academic inquiries should be tied to a politics Casas-Cortes, Osterweil and Powell 8 (Maria Isabel, Michal, Dana, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Anthropology Dept, Blurring Boundaries: Recognizing Knowledge-Practices in the Study of Social Movements, http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/anthropological_quarterly/v081/81.1cortes.html) kc
In recent years, ... epistemologies, more broadly.
Social movements produce knowledge- failure to align academic work with social movements dooms them to failure Casas-Cortes, Osterweil and Powell 8 (Maria Isabel, Michal, Dana, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Anthropology Dept, Blurring Boundaries: Recognizing Knowledge-Practices in the Study of Social Movements, http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/anthropological_quarterly/v081/81.1cortes.html) kc
Our impetus for ... call "knowledge-practice."
The alternative is to discuss competing knowledge practices- this opens up the space to redefine knowledge and take it back from the ivory tower the aff locks themselves in Casas-Cortes, Osterweil and Powell 8 (Maria Isabel, Michal, Dana, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Anthropology Dept, Blurring Boundaries: Recognizing Knowledge-Practices in the Study of Social Movements, http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/anthropological_quarterly/v081/81.1cortes.html) kc
As will become ... constitutes "the social."
01/04/2013
emancipation K
Tournament: USC | Round: 2 | Opponent: Trinity | Judge: The aff’s interpretation of emancipation is one that maintains a Euro-masculinist view of the world- this attempt to flee from the realm of necessity prevents real emancipation to occur because a Euro-masculinist view of freedom necessitates domination of an other- turns case and makes violence inevitable- the alternative is to accept our very real dependence on the earth Mann 5 (Bonnie, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon in Eugene. Before returning to academia full-time she spent many years working in anti-domestic violence organizations, homeless shelters, and with a number of feminist activist groups, World Alienation in Feminist Thought: The Sublime Epistemology of Emphatic Anti-Essentialism, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v010/10.2mann.html) kc
In her book, ... such a re-examination.
01/08/2013
Complexity K
Tournament: Fullerton | Round: 5 | Opponent: George Mason DM | Judge: Ariel Kovacs The aff’s linear analysis of energy systems creates rigid explanations that bracket out a complex analysis of the linkages between energy systems that is necessary for creating sustainable energy futures Snyder and Schwab 2012 Neil Snyder-National Renewable Energy Laboratory and Amy Schwab-National Renewable Energy Laboratory APPROACHES FOR PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABLE ENERGY GROWTH IN A COMPLEX WORLD This work was supported by the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract No. DE-AC36-08-G028308 with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory. www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/54506.pdf 5. EXPLORING OUR ANALYTICAL TOOL KIT¶ Understanding the approaches used in the past to analyze ... shortcomings become apparent.
K turns the whole aff- impacts are impossible to quantify and unexpected events will undermine solvency Jervis, professor of international affairs – Columbia, ‘97 (Robert, “Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University) Ripples move through channels... took cover on August 6.
The alternative is a new predictive method that incorporates complexity – an ontological shift from simple to complex systems will open new paths to knowledge and generate different solutions to policy problems – status quo approaches inevitably fail Harrison 6 (Neil, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Wyoming, Founder and Executive Director of the Sustainable Development Institute, “Thinking About the World We Make,” in Complexity in World Politics ed. Neil E. Harrison, State University of New York Press, 2006, p. 1-2) ¶ Despite nearly a hundred years of... rest of the book.
01/08/2013
Politics DA
Tournament: Fullerton | Round: 5 | Opponent: Gerorge Mason | Judge: Ariel Kosac Comprehensive immigration reform will pass and it’s on top of the agenda CSM 12/28/2012 (Christian Science Monitor, Immigration reform: Is 'amnesty' a possibility now?; Congress seems primed ...t who can get on that path.
Increasing nuke funding costs capital- Fukushima, Tea Party Conolley 2011 (Heather, PhD Candidate in Political Science at UC- Santa Barbara, The Renaissance of Nuclear Energy in the Shadow of Climate Change, PhD Dissertation, proquest) With that loss, ... share their enthusiasm.
CIR key to the economy- recession inevitable without it Hinojosa-Ojeda 2012 (Raúl, Founding Director of the North American Integration¶ and Development Center at the University of California, Los Angeles, The Economic Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2012/1/cj32n1-12.pdf) The historical experience ... upward pressure on wages.
Econ decline causes nuclear war
Mead 9. 2/4, Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Only Makes You Stronger: Why the recession bolstered America, The New Republic None of which means...still have to fight.
Round Reports
Tournament
Round
Report
USC
3
Opponent: WakeForest | Judge: Parkinson, Alex
1NC, 1 off, case (2 advantages)
“Green” capitalism is a discursive tool used by the elite to justify neoliberal practices- the goal is always to stimulate innovation and development in specific industries Macneil and Paterson 12 (Robert and Matthew, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Neoliberal climate policy: from market fetishism to the developmental state, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09644016.2012.651900) kc
Our central claim is that, far from being in contradiction with the traditional view of the United States as a neoliberal state, these types of alternative policies are, in fact, constitutive elements of a neoliberalism that is highly disaggregated, containing multiple competing logics, and a range of pathdependent policy tools designed to work within and around reactionary legislative conditions. They have, in other words, been strategically selected by the combination of pre-existing patterns of state practice in the United States and the prevailing ideological hostility to overt legislation for system-wide regulation of the economy to address GHG emissions. Actors attempting to pursue emissions have thus been directed towards these elements – subnational action, use of executive authority, and perhaps most importantly in our view, deployment of the existing apparatus for stimulating high-tech RandD. While commodification schemes remain a key element of neoliberal environmental policy (and one which may still be established at the federal level in the United States), the ideological influences and logics pushing for their implementation remain one of many influences competing in a heterogeneous policy process, and are by no means the defining policy option of a modally altered political-economic context or state form. To date, the political-economic logic that has dominated climate policy in the United States has been a thirst for seeding domestic markets in advanced technologies, a general logic which has matured immensely in the United States’ neoliberal era. In the United States, this has involved a range of practices, at multiple levels, designed both to stimulate demand in particular sectors, and to stimulate innovation to maintain domestic competitive advantage in established and emergent technology sectors. Climate change has been interpreted within the context of these pre-existing practices, producing forms of intervention designed similarly to stimulate demand for particular technologies and maintain US advantages in the race for a ‘green economy’. Neolib makes extinction inevitable Santos in 2k3 (Boaventura de Sousa, director of the Center for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra, EUROZINE, COLLECTIVE SUICIDE OR GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW, http://www.eurozine.com/article/2003-03-26-santos-en.html) Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war against Iraq and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, - and much more if the costs of reconstruction are added - enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. The Alternative is to use this academic space to stand in opposition to neoliberalism. Starting with the alt is key to break down discursive borders that reproduce exclusionary mindsets- framing issues in terms of broader goals is key to build coalitions- failure to do so allows the exclusionary politics of neoliberalism to remove the appeal to democratic politics Di Chiro 8 (Giovanna, Mount Holyoke College Massachusetts, Living environmentalisms: coalition politics, social reproduction, and environmental justice, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09644010801936230) kc
According to the aforementioned ‘eco-morticians’ proclaiming environmentalism’s death, the major failure of the environmental movement has been its commitment to a narrow minded and objectivist practice of ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn 1999, Jasanoff 2005) bent on demarcating the definitional limitations of what counts as ‘the environment’, the entity which the movement has seen itself in the business of protecting and saving. In their essay, Shellenberger and Nordhaus provide a compelling instantiation of the perils of a ‘bounded environmentalism’ (Gottlieb 2001) that separates environmental issues from social ones. They recount the history of the US auto industry’s and the autoworker unions’ ruinous 1980s decision to tie their fortunes to the niche market of the gas-guzzling, landscape-shredding, pollution-spewing SUV, while the environmentalists went after fuel efficiency and global warming – neither group recognising the necessity or potential to hammer out a ‘win–win’ alliance (also see Bradsher 2002). The inability of the environmental groups to break out of their rigid environmental categories (by, for example, refusing to identify national health insurance as an ‘environmental’ issue, a public policy that would unshackle the auto companies from paying rising healthcare costs and allow them instead to invest in manufacturing fuel-efficient cars) resulted in a lost opportunity for environmentalists to unite with labour and to bring corporations into the fold in a mutually beneficial alliance combining the goals of environmental rationality and economic security. Defining what counts as an environmental problem and what doesn’t invites certain alliances and inhibits others, and the environmental movement has shot itself in the foot by adopting the definitional frontiers that delegate different issues as either inside or outside the environmental ‘frame’. The conceptual-ideological mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion, which draw clear distinctions between problems that are defined as ‘social’ (jobs, housing, transportation, public health, racial and sexual inequality, violence, poverty, reproductive freedom) and those termed ‘environmental’ (global warming, natural resource conservation, pollution, species extinction, overpopulation) have led to the endless fragmentation of progressive movements and to the dwindling appeal of liberal/democratic politics in the US. Sadly, environmentalism got it all wrong. Only a proactive public measure like the alternative can solve the environment – green neoliberal policies mask the destruction justified by neolib’s foundational assumptions Tanuro 12 (Daniel, certified agriculturalist and eco-socialist environmentalist, writes for “La gauche.” On the agenda: the relaunching… of social and ecological destruction. International Viewpoint IV Online magazine : IV449 - June 2012. http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?page=print_articleandid_article=2640) The technical potential of renewable energies is more than enough to make this energy transition successfully, but their economic potential (i.e. their competitiveness against fossil fuels) is and will very probably remain insufficient for two to three decades. In addition, the transition requires huge investments in a new decentralized energy system; these investments require energy and this energy, at the beginning of the transition… is mostly fossil, therefore an additional source of greenhouse gas...¶ Re-launching… of ecological destruction¶ Conclusion: green capitalism is as illusory as social capitalism, and the combination of the two amounts to pure and simple wishful thinking. Given the need for competitiveness and in the context of competition, the re-launching of capitalist growth implies not only a drastic increase in the neoliberal austerity offensive and a concomitant decline of democratic rights, but also a veritable eco-social disaster on such a scale that we can scarcely imagine the outlines of it.¶ It is not a question here of taking an eschatological approach, but of taking seriously the impact projections that have been developed on the basis of climate models, while pointing out that they are lower than the reality of the phenomena observed. Based on the present commitments of governments (but will they be respected?), we can project an increase in temperature of between 3.5 and 4°C in the next eighty years, in relation to the pre-industrial era. This leads us to fear a rise in the level of the oceans of one metre or more by the end of the century, a dramatic intensification of the problems of access to fresh water (which already concerns about a billion people), an increase in extreme weather events, a net loss of agricultural productivity on a global scale and an increased decline in biodiversity. A billion more people will thus face a worsening of their conditions of existence, and the very existence of hundreds of millions of them will be threatened. The vast majority of these victims will be - are already – the poor of the poor countries...who bear little or no responsibility for climate change.¶ An alternative model of development¶ The idea that even a partial solution of social and ecological problems could result from a re-launching of growth should therefore be abandoned. It is the opposite that is true. In particular, the scourge of permanent mass unemployment - 24 million unemployed recorded in the EU! -is not the product of a lack of economic growth: it is the result of the neo-liberal policies which mean that gains in productivity are used to increase the profits of shareholders, and not to reduce working time. As for the energy transition, it will not result from a mythical green capitalism - necessarily neoliberal - but only from a pro-active public plan for investment in energy efficiency and renewable energies. However, within the time frame prescribed by the IPCC, such a plan cannot be seriously envisaged without the cancellation of illegitimate debt and public ownership of the sectors of finance and energy, b nationalization without compensation or redemption for the major shareholders.¶ It is therefore necessary to break with neoliberalism… but that is the only really existing capitalism today. What is on the agenda, and can give a perspective to struggles, is the preparation of a completely different development model across Europe, an ecosocialist model. This implies, to stay with the example of the fight against unemployment, daring to lay down as a starting point that job creation comes from a radical redistribution of income, and not from growth. Therefore from a confrontation with capital, not by its "re-launching".¶ On the environmental level, in developed countries, this model of development involves sharing wealth, not increasing it. We need to go even further, and dare to pronounce the word "de-growth". Certainly not in the philosophic sense that some people give to this term, but in the literal sense. Indeed, for the reasons described above, the "phasing out" of fossil fuels in two generations is not feasible in these countries without a decrease in physical production and transport, which implies in particular political choices such as the suppression of unnecessary and harmful production, a vast relocation of the economy, the transition to proximity organic agriculture, etc.¶ It is the combination of the ecological crisis and the social crisis which gives the crisis of capitalism today a systemic, "civilizational" and historical dimension that is absolutely unprecedented. The Left, in its development of alternatives, must be up to the challenge. 1st advantage Better Studies Prove The Grid Can Handle 70% Wind Even With Current Transmission Infrastructure Todd Neff is editor of CleanEnergy.com May 18, 2012 NREL: Western U.S. Grid can handle up to 70 percent wind and solar power http://cleanenergy.com/solar-category/nrel-western-u-s-grid-can-handle-up-to-70-percent-wind-solar-power/ Even taking into account transmission limitations, the western U.S. power grid could take on more than 70 percent wind and solar energy while still matching loads, according to researchers at the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory.¶ That’s a lot higher than the 20 percent top end utility types general cite. Transmission problems related to the variability of renewable energy like wind and solar – as opposed to the steady/on-demand nature of electricity from fossil plants – is considered a major clean-energy roadblock.¶ The key to blowing past the 20 percent barrier, says Victor Diakov, PhD, an NREL senior strategic analyst, is to exploit the immense, diverse geography of the western continental United States to create a self-balancing portfolio of wind and solar resources. Previous work has come to similar conclusion; the difference here is the NREL team modeled the possibilities of renewables in the West using new, fine-grained wind and solar data from across the region.¶ Diakov presented the lab’s results at the World Renewable Energy Forum in Denver; they had been published, in part, the prior week in the journal Wind Energy. He said the point of the study was “to try and fit in as much wind and PV as possible and still match the load.”¶ The team used data from 2004-2006; for wind, the input data came from the Western Wind and Solar Integration Study, which included three years of generation information from 32,000 potential 30-megawatt wind sites in the western United States. For solar, the used National Solar Radiation Data Base information for 250 western sites with a hypothetical capacity of 1,000 megawatts each.¶ Optimal wind site locations with (above) and without (below) transmission limitations. Red symbols represent selected sites, blue symbols – sites that are not selected for best load matching. With no transmission limitaitons, the turbines make more sense at the edges of the region, the model found. (Courtesy Victor Diakov/NREL)¶ Diakov and colleagues considered scenarios with and without large-scale transmission limitations. With no limitations, 80 percent of the West’s power load could be covered by wind and solar, with the balance from dispatchable sources like natural gas plants.¶ Adding in transmission constraints such as power and flow limits among the West’s 35 transmission regions, the percentage of wind and solar power drops – but not much, the NREL team found: dispatchable power still only accounted for 28 percent of total generation – meaning more than 70 percent of western electricity demand could, even with today’s transmission lines, could be sated by the wind and sun.¶ “So the numbers with transmission limitations don’t change much,” Diakov said. “That’s the major conclusion of the study.” No impact to Cyber terror—
Cyberterrorism is exaggerated—Multiple Reasons Weimann 4 (Gabriel, senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace and professor of communication at the University of Haifa, Israel; 2004¶ (“Cyberterrorism: How Real Is the Threat?” December 2004 | Special Report No. 119) http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html, issued in March 2004, which examined the variety of uses to which terrorists routinely put the Internet.) It seems fair to say that the current threat posed by cyberterrorism has been exaggerated. No single instance of cyberterrorism has yet been recorded; U.S. defense and intelligence computer systems are air-gapped and thus isolated from the Internet; the systems run by private companies are more vulnerable to attack but also more resilient than is often supposed; the vast majority of cyberattacks are launched by hackers with few, if any, political goals and no desire to cause the mayhem and carnage of which terrorists dream. So, then, why has so much concern been expressed over a relatively minor threat? The reasons are many. First, as Denning has observed, "cyberterrorism and cyberattacks are sexy right now. . . . [Cyberterrorism is] novel, original, it captures people's imagination." Second, the mass media frequently fail to distinguish between hacking and cyberterrorism and exaggerate the threat of the latter by reasoning from false analogies such as the following: "If a sixteen-year-old could do this, then what could a well-funded terrorist group do?" Ignorance is a third factor. Green argues that cyberterrorism merges two spheres—terrorism and technology—that many people, including most lawmakers and senior administration officials, do not fully understand and therefore tend to fear. Moreover, some groups are eager to exploit this ignorance. Numerous technology companies, still reeling from the collapse of the high-tech bubble, have sought to attract federal research grants by recasting themselves as innovators in computer security and thus vital contributors to national security. Law enforcement and security consultants are likewise highly motivated to have us believe that the threat to our nation's security is severe. A fourth reason is that some politicians, whether out of genuine conviction or out of a desire to stoke public anxiety about terrorism in order to advance their own agendas, have played the role of prophets of doom. And a fifth factor is ambiguity about the very meaning of "cyberterrorism," which has confused the public and given rise to countless myths. 2. The CIA solves Marks former CIA official 5 (Andrew Napolitano interviewing Ron, Fox News Reporter, former CiA official, The Big story with John Gibson, “Interview With Former CIA official Ron Marks”, May 26) NAPOLITANO: All right. How do these games work and what does the CIA think what is it planning for the bad guys might actually attack us? MARKS: Well, in the best of all possible worlds, these are the kinds of games where people are setup in A and B teams, where, in essence, you have someone who is defending the homeland and you have someone who’s attacking the homeland. In this case, what you’re looking for is what the vulnerabilities are. You want people. smart people, who know how the system is set up at this point to think about how they would attack you. And hopefully you have your A team, which is trying to defend this, not only defending it well, but also learning from the attack. Remember, you’ve got a pool of information here now on the Internet that is available throughout the world. Hackers working for the U.S. government have the same kind of information as hackers are working for Al Oaeda. So, you really want to get inside of these guys’ mind, try to figure out what kinds of areas they would attack, what types of systems they might be using. what types of software they might be using. This is important stuff. And to get inside of their minds, to be prepared for it, to harden our defenses, exactly what they should be doing. NAPOLITANO: Where are we most vulnerable, Ron? MARKS: Oh, the financial system clearly, the fact that the lntemet is as open as it is. I mean, we’ve all seen it here in the past few weeks, just people at the Bank of America and Wachovia up in -- up in New Jersey at this point giving information away. The Internet, really wild frontier in a lot of ways. It was an open highway. It was meant to be that way. But really it’s in the last few years I think people have come to realize how much that system can be abused. And certainly by people who are looking to hurt us, it can be very, very badly abused. NAPOLITANO: We only have a few seconds left. Would part of these games involve us going on the offensive in a cyber attack against the bad guys before they get to us? MARKS: You bet. You bet. This is not just about defense. This is about offense. This is about getting inside of their heads, figuring how out they’re doing things and then proceeding to disrupt and attack them as well. No impact to heg—
Heg solves nothing—Past two decades prove Mearsheimer 11 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis) One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism. 2. Heg decline doesn’t trigger war Buzan 11 (Barry, London School of Economics, Department of International Relations, "A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism") In 2004 I argued, in line with much mainstream thinking, that the most likely scenario for the coming decades was continuation of the US as the sole superpower accompanied by several great powers. This idea still forms the core of the debates about polarity. Its main theme is whether or not the US will be able to preserve its sole superpower status, or whether rising challengers, mainly China, will soon return the world order to bipolarity. It is typical of the Western part of this debate to be looking for ways to preserve US hegemony/leadership either by maintaining and exploiting a power advantage or by re- legitimizing its leading role using institutions to accommodate rising powers.1 My sec- ond most likely scenario from 2004 was one in which there would be no superpowers, only great powers, and I argued that this would produce a rather uncertain world. I now think that this scenario is becoming more likely, but can be seen in a more positive light. I argue here that it offers an alternative third way of thinking about the coming world order: not whether there will be one superpower or more, but no superpowers, only great powers. We may be heading quite quickly into such a world, and this may be no bad thing. The mainstream polarity debates typically ignore the fact that there is an alternative to having either to balance against the US or bandwagon with it. Others can, and increasingly do, use the diminished power and authority of the US as a reason to ignore or circumscribe it, and to carve their own pathways in regional and global politics.2 Continued US leadership is neither necessary nor, arguably, desirable to keep the world order from falling into 1930s-style imperial competition. 2nd advantage
No Middle East War Fettweis 7, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, (Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98) Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely. Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare. 2. No escalation Cook, Takeyh, and Maloney 7 (Douglas Dillon Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ray, Senior Fellow For Middle Eastern Studies at the CFR, Suzanne, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, June 28, , online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13702/why_the_iraq_war_wont_engulf_the_mideast.html, accessed December 25, 2007) Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East. Many threats pose a problem to Iraq’s stability including extremist groups.
Rand Institute 09 (Withdrawing fromIraq. Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98))
U.S. drawdown plans and risk-mitigation policies should be more concerned with keeping the major actors in the political process and away from using force than with the more likely but less dire threats of extremism and terrorism. These goals must include the sober recognition that the GoI and the ISF could play harmful as well as essential roles in Iraq’s security and stability. Extremists have been weakened politically and militarily but, one can assume, will continue violent attacks, including attacks that target U.S. forces and other personnel. Less likely but far more consequential is the danger that one or more of Iraq’s main factions could abandon peaceful politics in favor of violence. The drawdown of U.S. forces could make this more likely insofar as opposition groups see a greater opportunity for or a need to resort to force, especially as the ruling regime and its forces grow in power. However, this threat will not disappear before December 2011, and the United States may be able to maintain its honest broker/mediator role without large combat forces on the ground. A more authoritarian GoI, with a more muscular ISF as its partner, puppet, or puppet master, would likely be resisted with force by the Sunni and the Kurds and, 27 The International Monetary Fund reported in August 2008 that Iraq’s growth potential was high due to high global oil prices. 28 Kirkuk contains up to 13 percent of Iraq’s known oil supplies. Internal Security and Stability 67 possibly, by excluded Shi’a factions. At the same time, the resumption of armed resistance on the part of the Sunni or stepped-up encroachment by the Kurds would be likely to motivate greater GoI seizure and abuse of power. Although it is unlikely, a spiral of more-violent opposition and harsher authoritarianism could imperil Iraq’s new order and, with it, important U.S. interests.
Superpowers won’t go to war over the Middle East. Gelb ’10 – President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations Leslie, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, November/December Foreign Affairs, Proquest
Also reducing the likelihood of conflict today is that there is no arena in which the vital interests of great powers seriously clash. Indeed, the most worrisome security threats today-rogue states with nuclear weapons and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction-actually tend to unite the great powers more than divide them. In the past, and specifically during the first era of globalization, major powers would war over practically nothing. Back then, they fought over the Balkans, a region devoid of resources and geographic importance, a strategic zero. Today, they are unlikely to shoulder their arms over almost anything, even the highly strategic Middle East. All have much more to lose than to gain from turmoil in that region. To be sure, great powers such as China and Russia will tussle with one another for advantages, but they will stop well short of direct confrontation. To an unprecedented degree, the major powers now need one another to grow their economies, and they are loath to jeopardize this interdependence by allowing traditional military and strategic competitions to escalate into wars. In the past, U.S. enemies-such as the Soviet Union-would have rejoiced at the United States' losing a war in Afghanistan. Today, the United States and its enemies share an interest in blocking the spread of both Taliban extremism and the Afghan-based drug trade. China also looks to U.S. arms to protect its investments in Afghanistan, such as large natural-resource mines. More broadly, no great nation is challenging the balance of power in either Europe or Asia. Although nations may not help one another, they rarely oppose one another in explosive situations. Middle East war won’t escalate. Ferguson ‘6 – professor of history at Harvard. Niall Ferguson, professor of history @ Harvard. “WWIII? No, but still deadly and dangerous”. Los Angeles Times. July 24, 2006. Lexis.
Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can -- for now, at least -- safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors -- Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has been in no hurry to get to the scene (she is due to arrive in Israel today). Nor has she scheduled any visits to Arab capitals. Compare this leisurely response to the frenetic shuttle diplomacy of the Kissinger era. While striving to secure a settlement between Israel and Syria, Rice's predecessor traveled 24,230 miles in just 34 days. And yet there are other forms that an escalation of the Middle East conflict could conceivably take. A war between states may not be in the cards, much less a superpower conflict. What we must fear, however, is a spate of civil wars -- to be precise, ethnic conflicts -- across the region. Between 1975 and 1990, Lebanon's multiethnic society was torn apart in one of the bloodiest internecine conflicts of modern times. A repeat of that scenario cannot be ruled out as Beirut burns again. Elsewhere, ethnic conflict is already a reality. Israel's undeclared war against the Palestinians in the occupied territories shows every sign of escalating. There were lethal Israeli airstrikes on the Maghazi refugee camp in Gaza last week. Palestinians also were killed in Nablus on the West Bank. There is no longer a peace process, no road map toward peaceful coexistence. This is a war process, and the map that Israeli leader Ehud Olmert has in mind will create not a Palestinian state but Arab reservations. Yet the biggest ethnic conflict in the Middle East today is not between Jews and Arabs. It is between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. With every passing day, the character of violence in Iraq shifts from that of an anti-American insurgency to that of a sectarian civil war. More than 100 civilians a day were killed in Iraq last month, according to the United Nations, bringing the civilian death toll this year to a staggering 14,000-plus. A rising proportion of those being killed are victims of sectarian violence. For Israel, spiraling Sunni-Shiite conflict is a dark cloud with a silver lining. The worse it gets, the harder it will be for Israel's enemies to make common cause. (Fact: Syria is 74% Sunni; Iran is 89% Shiite.) But for the United States, such conflict, emanating from a country supposedly liberated by American arms, must surely be a cause for concern. It may not be World War III. But the current crisis nevertheless calls for a much more urgent diplomatic effort than the Bush administration seems to have in mind. No Iran influence-5 huge reasons Fournier and Katsoras 11(Pierre, geopolitical analysts, Angelo, Senior Associate, “beyond the ongoing turmoil in the middle east and north africa” http://mediaserver.fxstreet.com/Reports/f3614810-9563-4303-9afd-a0dd1e3641fd/240c2daf-e22a-40dd-bb14-d4e9a238be74.pdf, ad: 9-15-11, qm)
Internal opposition. Despite the fact that the Iranian regime has managed to clamp down on internal dissent for the time being , recent events have shown us how quickly things could change. Indeed, fearing the influence of events abroad, Iranian regime is all too aware of how governments can fall due to street protests because the in how current regime came to power in 1979. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Iran’s rulers still have a critical mass of supporters, especially among the lower classes. Syria hit by unrest. Syria, Iran’s closest ally has also been hit by unrest. It is closely aligned to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the gaza strip. A Syrian collapse would have strategic ramifications in the middle east, and in particular for iran.But unlike the militaries in Tunisia and Egypt, syria’s military is most likely to stand by the country’s leader, president basher al-assad. He, like his father before him, has filled key military posts with members of his alawite sect. followers of the alawite sect, an offshoot of shia islam, represent only 11% of the population, versus 74% for Sunni Muslims. It is only due to their control of the army that they have been able to maintain their grip on power. The sect of Syria’s leadership helps explains why a sunni majority country would have such a tight alliance with Shiite Iran. The Shiites are vastly outnumbered. In spite of Iran’s success sin broadening its sphere of influence over the last several years, its room for further growth in severely constrained by long standing Shiite/sunni tensions and the law of numbers. While Shiites represents 89% or irans population, they account for 10% muslims worldwide. A natural check to iran influence could come from the sunni majority countries Egypt (which is looking to regain its lost influence) and turkey. Thus does not, however, prelude iran form meddling in countries where shia muslims represent large segments of the population such as Iran, Yemen, Bahrain and Lebanon. Unemployment. Iran, like many other countries, is struggling withhigh unemployment (the official rate is 14.6% although it is likely much higher). Challenge posted by young population. Iran has a youthful population (median age 26.3 years) and many young Iranians are yearning for more freedom and democracy. Iran influence has been on a terminal decline since the uprisings-propaganda won’t work. Khalaji 11(Mehdi, 4-12, Senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on the politics of Iran and Shi’ite groups in the Middle East, “influence curtailed” http://www.al-majalla.com/en/Features/article355801.ece, qm)
Like all populist autocratic regimes, Iranian leaders seek to portray themselves as the advocates of the downtrodden everywhere. However, the recent Arab uprisings highlight Iran’s hypocrisy and inconsistency more than ever before. It seems that in the Islamic Republic only the authority of the ruling jurist is absolute; everything else is relative. For Iran, not only Islam but also Shi’ism is used as a tool to advance its ambitious agenda in the region, not more. Because Iran’s influence in the region stems mainly from its soft power and propaganda, the possibility that its propaganda might be weakened by the emergence of new democratic regimes in the Middle East has placed it in a very difficult situation. If democratic forces prevail in Arab nations, Islamism will lose its main forum for advocating state rule by Islamic ideology. Anti-American and anti-Israel discourse would be replaced by more practical demands and expectations, as we have already witnessed in the course of demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere. Iran would find little fertile ground for its old-fashioned propaganda that portrays itself as the leader of the anti-American world and the main patron of anti-Israel forces. Democratic systems would allow people to focus more on their personal lives, participate more fully in the shaping of their political future, and hold their ruling class more accountable for its actions, meaning that Iranian propaganda would no longer be needed in the struggle against rulers or their western allies.If the recent political movements in the Arab world lead to more free and liberal societies, this will promise the decline of Iranian influence in the region. For the current Iranian regime, democracy is no longer threatening only at home, but also abroad. Iran won’t strike Ayoob 2011(Mohammed, Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Michigan State University's James Madison College and the Department of Political Science. He is also Coordinator of the Muslim Studies Program at Michigan State University, Beyond the Democratic Wave: A Turko-Persian Future?, Middle East Policy Volume 18, Issue 2, pages 110–119, Summer 2011 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00489.x/full) Therefore, it is unlikely that the Egyptian revolution will have a major impact on the political and strategic landscape in the Middle East in the short and medium terms. This also means that the shift in the region's political center of gravity from the Arab heartland to what was once considered the non-Arab periphery will continue. It was becoming clearly discernible even before the recent upheaval in the Arab world. This transfer of power and influence from Egypt and the Fertile Crescent to Turkey and Iran commenced with the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967 and gained momentum with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. One began to see, however hazily, the contours of the emerging Turko-Persian future in 1991 with the decimation of Iraqi power in the First Gulf War, which provided both Iran and Turkey the political space to increase their influence in the Persian Gulf and the Fertile Crescent, respectively. It became a full-blown reality following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its allies between 2001 and 2003. To many Western analysts, the self-confidence demonstrated by Turkey and Iran in the international arena in the past decade appears to be an attempt to recreate the Ottoman Empire (hence the popularity of the term “neo-Ottomanism” in reference to Turkish foreign policy), on the one hand, and the emergence of a Shia crescent, on the other.2 To the more discerning observers of the Middle East, however, the emergence of Turkey and Iran as major regional players does not reveal such disconcerting trends. The political elites in Ankara and Tehran are not naïve enough to fall prey to such inflated aspirations. They are merely asserting their long-overdue roles as major regional actors.
