Tournament: USC/Fullerton/Berkeley | Round:  | Opponent:  | Judge: 

1. They cannot justify the resolution OR their advocacy because State action perpetuates violence against the black body.  This evidence is enough to vote negative right here

Mills 1 (Charles W. Mills, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Chicago, 2001, “Faces of Environmental Racism: Confronting Issues of Global Justice (2nd ed.,), p. 84-89, MV)

Segregation by law is the clearest manifestation of the physical control of the space of an inferior group, a group excluded from full membership in the polity, a group that must be morally, politically, and physically contained. And such “containment” would become the policy in the North also. In their account of what they call “American apartheid,” Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton argue that before 1900, “blacks and whites were relatively integrated in both northern and southern cities.” But all this would change with Jim Crow and mass black migration from the South. Through “a series of self-conscious actions and purposeful institutional arrangements that continue today,.. .actions and practices that had the passive acceptance, if not the active support, of  most whites in the United States,” blacks were deliberately denied entry to white neighborhoods. By contrast, new European immigrants formed at worst “ethnic enclaves” rather than ghettoes. These enclaves were never homogeneous, were not particularly isolated, and unlike “permanent” black ghettoes, were “a fleeting, transitory stage in the process of immigrant assimilation.” Thus they were all eventually “spatially assimilated.” For blacks, on the other hand, the racial contract would inscribe—through neighborhood associations, real-estate dealers, redlining, restrictive covenants, and mob violence when necessary—a geography of aversion that would ultimately make blacks “the most spatially isolated population in U.S. history.”31Race, then, is the basic organizing spatial principle of the extended body of the polity. Fanon points out that “Consciousness of the body . . . is a third-person consciousness.”32 Similarly, Gail Weiss has devised the concept of “intercorporeality” to signify the multiple, reflexive interrelations between our bodies, our perceptions of our bodies, and the reciprocal shaping of those perceptions by seeing ourselves through the perceptions of others: “To describe embodiment as intercorporeality is to emphasize that the experience of being embodied is never a private affair, but is always already mediated by our continual interactions with other human and nonhuman bodies.” Our “body images” are thus “constructed through a series of corporeal exchanges that take place both within and outside of specific bodies.”33 Applying this concept to political theory, one could say that the white members of the body politic continually exchange their whiteness with each other, recognizing each others’ bodies in the light of their full membership in the polity, and so reciprocally creating that polity. As white, as a full citizen, one’s body mirrors the larger body. One walks with confidence in the knowledge that one’s citizenship will be recognized, since it is written on one’s body—it is one’s body. And the image of the white body politic is then extended through relations of equal intercorporeal recognition throughout a whitened space. There is a macro-body, the collective white body, sustained by intersubjective, artificial, “contractual” agreement between the full humans, whose space is the locus of the body politic proper. And it is recognized as appropriate, through relations of unequal corporeal exchange, that the black body—in a sense the “nonhuman body”—be excluded from the macro-body.Mainstream environmentalism is thus the environmentalism appropriate to this body—the normative body, the white body. Since white space has been historically privileged, white environmentalists can place their emphases on preservation and conservation, slogans appropriate for those whose spaces have benefited from full incorporation into the white macrobody. If the role of the sovereign, as “soul” (Hobbes) of the body politic, is to maintain the body’s health, then the role of the white sovereign is to ensure the health of the white body. For a state founded on the racial contract, this will mean the differential allocation of resources to the creation and protection of white spaces. And historically, the state has in fact made both space and race, through demarcating by law the populations coded as races, through enforcing segregation, and through divergent treatment of the respective divided spaces. Desmond King, an English political scientist, points out the disingenuousness of a mainstream U.S. political theory that “little acknowledges” the obvious fact that the federal government “constituted a powerful institution upholding arrangements privileging Whites and discriminating against Blacks.”34 The racial state acts on behalf of the white citizenry, pouring resources into the privileged white spaces—schools, infrastructure, job creation, highways, mortgage assistance, police protection—since they are our spaces, the spaces that we, the full citizens of the polity, inhabit. So there is no common space, as in the mythical raceless social contract. Rather, there are our spaces and their spaces. But even their spaces are in a sense ours—they are the spaces we concede to them, insofar as (short of outright expulsion) they have to occupy some space. Originally, it is explicit, then, that blacks do not have free range over the topography of the body politic. Rather, they are restricted to second-class spaces, as befitting their second-class, subperson status: Niggertown, Darktown, Bronzeville, the black belt, the ghetto, the inner city, in housing arrangements; and, when they are allowed to enter the public white space, the back of the bus, the seats in the balcony, the crowded car at the end of the train. These spaces become identified as black spaces, and are derogated as such, signaling their nomncorporation in the respectable flesh of the white body politic. King describes how: Prior to the end of segregation, the United States was subnationally a divided polity. Two political systems, mirroring two societies, the one democratic and the other oligarchic, existed side by side. . . . Segregation was an arrangement whereby Black Americans, as a minority, were systematically treated in a separate, but constitutionally sanctioned way. As the NAACP observed, they were treated “almost as lepers.”35 And this leprous flesh, the boundary of political, moral, and spatial exclusion from the body politic proper, marks the limits of the sovereign’s full responsibilities. As derogated space, inhabited by beings of lesser worth, it is a necessary functionalist space  analogous to the body parts below the belt, the ones we keep hidden. Since the normative body is the white body, the black body, or the unavoidable black parts of the white body—its WASTE PRODUCT, its excreta—need to be kept out of white sight. White space needs to be maintained in its character as white and preserved from contamination by the ever- threatening dark space—evil, shitty, savage, subproletananized. On the collective white macro-body, these spaces are literally blots on the landscape that we have to tolerate but that must not be allowed to trespass beyond their borders. The politics of racial space then requires that the line be drawn, the boundaries not crossed. These spaces must stay in their place. The racial contract is in part an agreement to maintain certain spatial relations, a certain spatial regime, the incarnation of the white body politic, the physical manifestation of the white Leviathan. In this revised conceptual framework, then, it becomes unsurprising that the United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice found in the first national study on the topic (1987):  Race is “the single most important factor (i.e., more important than income, home ownership rate, and property values) in the location of abandoned toxic waste sites.”36  Some black residents of these areas feel “We don’t have the complexion for protection.”37  A national investigation (1992) by the National Law Journal of Enviromnental Protection Agency cleanup efforts concluded “that the average fine imposed on polluters in white areas was 506 percent higher than the average fine imposed in minority communities” and that “cleanup took longer in minority communities, even though the efforts were often less intensive than those performed in white neighborhoods.”38  Mainstream white environmentalists are perceived as caring more about parks and owls than people of color.39  “Institutional resistance to providing information on environmental issues is likely to be greater for groups such as racial minorities.”  In general, “Public officials and private industry have, in many cases, responded to the NIMBY Not in My Black Yard phenomenon using the ‘PIBBY’ principle, ‘Place in Blacks’ Back Yards.’ “41 In effect, then, these spaces can be written off because these people can be written off. The devalued space interacts with its devalued inhabitants. They are “outside” the boundaries of empathy, not like us, not an equally valued body in the intercorporeal community that is the collective white body. As Bill Lawson points out in chapter 3, “Living for the City: Urban United States and Environmental Justice” (p. 41): “Racial and spatial difference marks important differences that must be given weight in our moral deliberation.. . . Environmentalists have a natural conception of pollution as a negative norm. If a place is thought to be already polluted by racial identifiers, we need to contain the pollution by keeping it in that area.” Since these are already waste spaces, it is only appropriate that the waste products of industrialization should be directed toward them. Like seeks like—throwaways on a throwaway population, dumping on the white body’s dumpsite.

Erasing the black body outweighs.  White Supremacy is the most vicious human rights violations because it stems from anti-blackness which creates the condition of possibility for humans to exist in the first place by destroying the non-human

Rabaka ‘07 (Reiland Rabaka, 4 August 2007, The Souls of White Folks, W.E.B. Du Bois’s Critique of White Supremacy and Contributions to Critical White Studies,Department of Ethnic Studies Center for Studies of Ethnicity and Race in America (CSERA), University of Colorado-Boulder, Ketchum)

Even in its mildest and most unconscious forms, white supremacy is one of the extremist and most vicious human rights violations in history because it plants false seeds of white superiority and black inferiority in the fertile ground of the future. It takes human beings and turns them into the subhuman things, making them colored means to a white imperial end. Du Bois’s critique of white supremacy then, registers as not only a radical criticism of an increasingly illusive and nebulous racism, but an affirmation of black humanity and an epoch-spanning assertion of Africana and other oppressed peoples’ inherent right to human and civil rights. Acknowledgements

State action and institutional ethics makes anti-blackness worse - erases the exploitation of the black body
Wilderson, award-winning author of Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid. He is one of two Americans to hold elected office in the African National Congress and is a former insurgent in the ANC’s armed wing, 2003 (Frank B. III “Introduction: Unspeakable Ethics” Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Strucure of U.S. Antagonisms, Pg 15-16) GG
Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims successfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analytic for cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today’s Blacks in the US as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully made on the State has come to pass. In other words, the election of a Black President aside, police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of HIV infection, and the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the lived experience of Black life. But such empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on “solid” ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to “facts,” the “historical record,” and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political science, history, and/or public policy debates would be the very rubric that I am calling into question: the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it. The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the “solid” plank of “work” is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of “claims against the state”—the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air. The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put another way: no slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a positionality against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews it coherence, its corporeal integrity; if the Slave is, to borrow from Patterson, generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of relationality, then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains how the Slave is of the world. The onus is not on one who posits the Master/Slave dichotomy, but on the one who argues there is a distinction between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits an answer.
The promotion of civil society and institutional ethics creates a state of emergency
Wilderson, Professor UCI, 2003 (Frank B., “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal”, Soc Justice 30 no2 2003, Accessed 8-4-12, MR)
In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon makes two moves with respect to civil society. First, he locates its genuine manifestation in Europe - the motherland. Then, with respect to the colony, he locates it only in the zone of the settler. This second move is vital for our understanding of Black positionality in America and for understanding the, at best, limnitations of radical social movements in America. For if we are to follow Fanon's analysis, and the gestures toward this understanding in some of the work of imprisoned intellectuals, then we have to come to grips with the fact that, for Black people, civil society itself- rather than its abuses or shortcomings - is a state of emergency. For Fanon, civil society is predicated on the Manicheasm of divided zones, opposed to each other "but not in service of a higher unity" (Fanon, 1968: 38-39). This is the basis of his later assertion that the two zones produce two different "species," between which "no conciliation is possible" (Ibid.). The phrase "not in service of a higher unity" dismisses any kind of dialectical optimism for a future synthesis. In "The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy," Martinot and Sexton assert the primacy of Fanon's Manichean zones (without the promise of higher unity), even in the face of American integration facticity. Fanon's specific colonial context does not share Martinot and Sexton's historical or national context. Common to both texts, however, is the settler/native dynamic, the differential zoning, and the gratuity (as opposed to the contingency) of violence that accrues to the blackened position. The dichotomy between white ethics the discourse of civil society and its irrelevance to the violence of police profiling is not dialectical; the two are incommensurable whenever one attempts to speak about the paradigm of policing, one is forced back into a discussion of particular events - high-profile homicides and their related courtroom battles, for instance (Martinot and Sexton, 2002: 6; emphasis added).
 

The world writ large and civil society are preconditioned on the destruction of those in the black positionality
Wilderson, Professor UCI, 2003 (Frank B., “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal”, Soc Justice 30 no2 2003, Accessed 8-4-12, MR)
There is something organic to black positionality that makes it essential to the destruction of civil society. There is nothing willful or speculative in this statement, for one could just as well state the claim the other way around: There is something organic to civil society that makes it essential to the destruction of the Black body. Blackness is a positionality of "absolute dereliction" (Fanon), abandonment, in the face of civil society, and therefore cannot establish itself, or be established, through hegemonic interventions. Blackness cannot become one of civil society's many junior partners: Black citizenship, or Black civic obligation, are oxymorons.
Addressing Anti-Blackness outweighs – scandalizes ethicality and sets the stage for all violnece
Wilderson, award-winning author of Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid. He is one of two Americans to hold elected office in the African National Congress and is a former insurgent in the ANC’s armed wing, 2003 (Frank B. III “Chapter One: The Ruse of Analogy” Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,) GG
Two tensions are at work here. One operates under the labor of ethical dilemmas-- “simple enough one has only not to be a nigger.” This, I submit, is the essence of being for the White and non-Black position: ontology scaled down to a global common denominator. The other tension is found in the impossibility of ethical dilemmas for the Black: “I am,” Fanon writes, “a slave not of an idea others have of me but of my own appearance.” Being can thus be thought of, in the first ontological instance, as non-niggerness; and slavery then as niggerness. The visual field, “my own appearance,” is the cut, the mechanism that elaborates the division between the non-niggerness and slavery, the difference between the living and the dead. Whereas Humans exist on some plane of being and thus can become existentially present through some struggle for/of/through recognition, Blacks cannot attain the plane of recognition (West 82). Spillers, Fanon, and Hartman maintain that the violence that has positioned and repetitively re-positions the Black as a void of historical movement is without analog in the suffering dynamics of the ontologically alive. The violence that turns the African into a thing is without analog because it does not simply oppress the Black through tactile and empirical technologies of oppression, like the “little family quarrels” which for Fanon exemplify the Jewish Holocaust. Rather, the gratuitous violence of the Black’s first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, “wiped out his/her metaphysics…his her customs and sources on which they are based” (BSWM 110). Jews went into Auschwitz and came out as Jews. Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks. The former is a Human holocaust; the latter is a Human and a metaphysical holocaust. That is why it makes little sense to attempt analogy: the Jews have the Dead (the Muselmenn) among them; the Dead have the Blacks among them.¶ This violence which turns a body into flesh, ripped apart literally and imaginatively, destroys the possibility of ontology because it positions the Black within an infinite and indeterminately horrifying and open vulnerability, an object made available (which is to say fungible) for any subject. As such, “the black has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man” (110) or, more precisely, in the eyes of Humanity
The alternative is to reject the affirmative and reorient ourselves towards the world through an unflinching paradigmatic analysis
Wilderson 10 Frank B. III, Ph.D., Associate Professor at UC Irvine, former ANC member, “on some guerilla shit”, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pages ix-x, OG
STRANGE AS it might seem, this book project began in South Africa. During the last years of apartheid I worked for revolutionary change in both an underground and above-ground capacity, for the Charterist Movement in general and the ANC in particular. During this period, I began to see how essential an unflinching paradigmatic analysis is to a movement dedicated to the complete overthrow of an existing order. The neoliberal compromises that the radical elements of the Chartist Movement made with the moderate elements were due, in large part, to our inability or unwillingness to hold the moderates' feet to the fire of a political agenda predicated on an unflinching paradigmatic analysis. Instead, we allowed our energies and points of attention to be displaced by and onto pragmatic considerations. Simply put, we abdicated the power to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all. Elsewhere, I have written about this unfortunate turn of events (Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid), so I'll not rehearse the details here. Suffice it to say, this book germinated in the many political and academic discussions and debates that I was fortunate enough to be a part of at a historic moment and in a place where the word revolution was spoken in earnest, free of qualifiers and irony. For their past and ongoing ideas and interventions, I extend solidarity and appreciation to comrades Amanda Alexander, Franco Barchiesi, Teresa Barnes, Patrick Bond, Ashwin Desai, Nigel Gibson, Steven Greenberg, Allan Horowitz, Bushy Kelebonye (deceased), Tefu Kelebonye, Ulrike Kistner, Kamogelo Lekubu, Andile Mngxitama, Prishani Naidoo, John Shai, and S'bu Zulu
Policing/Settler societies allow for the black body to be a magnet for gratuitous violence
Wilderson, Professor UCI, 2003 (Frank B., “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal”, Soc Justice 30 no2 2003, Accessed 8-4-12, MR)
It makes no difference that in the U.S. the "casbah" and the "European" zone are laid one on top of the other. What is being asserted here is an isomorphic schematic relation - the schematic interchangeability - between Fanon' s settler society and Martinot and Sexton's policing paradigm. For Fanon, it is the policeman and soldier (not the discursive, or hegemonic, agents) of colonialism that make one town white and the other Black. For Martinot and Sexton, this Manichean delirium manifests itself by way of the U.S. paradigm of policing that (re)produces, repetitively, the inside/outside, the civil society/Black world, by virtue of the difference between those bodies that do not magnetize bullets and those that do. "Police impunity serves to distinguish between the racial itself and the elsewhere that mandates it...the distinction between those whose human being is put permanently in question and those for whom it goes without saying" (Ibid.: 8). In such a paradigm, white people are, ipso facto, deputized in the face of Black people, whether they know it (consciously) or not. Whiteness, then, and by extension civil society, cannot be solely "represented" as some monumentalized coherence of phallic signifiers, but must first be understood as a social formation of contemporaries who do not magnetize bullets. This is the essence of their construction through an asignifying absence; their signifying presence is manifested by the fact that they are, if only by default, deputized against those who do magnetize bullets. In short, white people are not simply "protected" by the police, they are - in their very corporeality - the police. This ipso facto deputization of white people in the face of Black people accounts for Fanon's materiality, and Martinot and Sexton's Manichean delirium in America. What remains to be addressed, however, is the way in which the political contestation between civil society's junior partners (i.e., workers, white women, and immigrants), on the one hand, and white supremacist institutionality, on the other hand, is produced by, and reproductive of, a supplemental antiBlackness. Put another way: How is the production and accumulation of junior partner social capital dependent upon on an anti-Black rhetorical structure and a decomposed Black body?