# 1nc

### 1st Off

#### Text: The United State federal government should engage in a binding strategic energy dialogue with Brazil over whether the United States Executive branch should acquire electricity from mobile small modular nuclear reactors in the United States for the Marine Corps. The United States federal government will adopt the results of the consultation. We reserve the right to clarify.

#### Strategic energy dialogue with Brazil over the plan solves

BUSBC, 2012

[No date given but cites material from 2012, Brazil-US business council, Bolstering Security, Growth, and Job Creation, http://www.brazilcouncil.org/sites/default/files/Brazil\_EnergyReport.pdf] /Wyo-MB

On March 19, 2011, President Barack Obama and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff ¶ launched a U.S.-Brazil Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED), one of four presidentiallevel mechanisms between both countries to deepen their political and economic ¶ relations. The SED is the only dialogue labeled “strategic,” reflecting U.S. and Brazilian ¶ policymakers’ vision of a bold bilateral partnership with positive implications for ¶ energy security, economic growth, and job creation.¶ The SED, co-chaired by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian Ministry ¶ of Mines and Energy (MME), includes other government agencies in both countries. Its ¶ first meeting took place on August 17, 2011, in Brasília, Brazil, at the deputy secretary level.¶ The SED is a result of a decade-old effort to institutionalize the energy partnership ¶ between the United States and Brazil. In fact, it incorporates a two-track approach ¶ to bilateral cooperation. In 2003, the DOE and the MME established an all encompassing mechanism, including oil and gas, coal, nuclear, renewables, efficiency, ¶ and R&D. In 2007, a second, separate biofuels-only track was established under the ¶ leadership of the U.S. Department of State and the Brazilian Ministry of External ¶ Relations (MRE). The SED allows for more synergies between both tracks and ¶ greater priority for energy-related issues by both governments.

#### Counterplan is key to give relations direction- key forum

Hakim, 2012

[Peter, Inter-American Discord: Brazil and the United States, 10-22-12, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3115] /Wyo-MB

Relations are not getting worse, but they are not getting better either. The two countries are not cooperating more today than they were a dozen years ago—and their differences have extended to a wider range of issues. They certainly have not found many areas for collaboration. The agreements they have reached seem mostly to be insubstantial or peripheral to the relationship, or they have not been effectively implemented. They have not led to any particularly productive collaboration. On most fronts, relations seem to be drifting, propelled largely by inertia, without much direction or decision.

#### The counterplan uniquely revitalizes relations- energy key

Langevin, 2012

[Mark, Ph.D., Director of Brazil Works and Mark is also Associate Adjunct Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-University College, Energy and Brazil-United States Relations A Discussion Paper, 8-20-12, https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7MqlY1WLL8eZnJUNGxxZlpSQi1KcGRlYUlOeHRRZw/edit?pli=1] /Wyo-MB

Energy matters increasingly bring Brazil and the U.S. into a dynamic state of interdependence with geopolitical import. The energy security of both nations could be advanced through closer bilateral cooperation that expands bi-national investment and trade. Both nations’ centers of innovation, whether in the private or public sectors, would benefit from a strategic drive, fueled by presidential diplomacy, to establish and expand joint ventures to unleash further development of renewable and low carbon energy production and energy efficiency technologies. Intensifying bi-national energy interdependence also promises to bridge the political distance between the governments of Brazil and the U.S., creating the conditions for broader global cooperation on issues of governance, collective security, and development**.¶** If bilateral energy diplomacy remains locked down to consultations, then Brazil-U.S. relations will likely remain cordial and constructive, but wholly inadequate to overcome the challenges and seize the opportunities related to energy in the coming years. Moreover, the unwillingness or inability to directly negotiate greater cooperation will diminish the importance of the bilateral relationship precisely at a moment when a Brazil-U.S. strategic energy partnership could serve as a diplomatic cornerstone and geopolitical anchor for efforts that serve the cause of peace and prosperity, here, there, and around the world.

#### Key to security cooperation over terrorism

Brown, 2012

[Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence T. Brown, Restoring the “Unwritten Alliance” in Brazil—United States Relations, Strategy Research Project, 3-23-12, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560773] /Wyo-MB

Strengthened military relations naturally flow from improved diplomatic ones. As ¶ regional leaders, the United States and Brazil can focus their combined security efforts ¶ and resources against common threats to the two nations—and to the entire Western ¶ Hemisphere. Intelligence sharing during the upcoming World Cup and Olympic games, ¶ coordinated counterterrorism measures in the Tri-Border Area, and disrupting narcotrafficking between South America and Africa are among the more pressing security ¶ cooperation initiatives that can bring greater security to both countries and to the ¶ hemisphere. Close security and defense cooperation in the future, absent the historic ¶ shadow of U.S. imperialism, will help in re-establishing the “Unwritten Alliance” dynamic ¶ between the United States and Brazil that flourished in the first half of the 20¶ th¶ Century.¶ When Brazil hosts the World Cup and Olympics in a couple of years, it is in the ¶ U.S. national interest to assist Brazil’s efforts in countering terrorism, curbing drug 3¶ trafficking, and reducing international crime. This United States provided similar support ¶ to South Africa during the World Cup in 2010 – assisting the prevention of devastating ¶ terrorist attacks on that world stage. Averting another “Munich” is certainly in the interest ¶ of the United States and indeed of all world sporting events. For the 2010 World Cup, ¶ South African security services benefited from security grants and extensive training: ¶ “Specifically, Anti-Terrorism Assistance has provided Underwater Explosive, Critical¶ Incident, and Special Events Management, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, ¶ and related equipment training.”¶ 42¶ Both the 2006 World Cup in Germany and the ¶ following one in South Africa transpired successfully with low-key U.S. security ¶ assistance. There were no terrorist attacks, despite ongoing large-scale operations ¶ against terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time. When President Obama visited ¶ Brazil in 2011, one of the agreements resulting from the trip was a Memorandum of ¶ Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and Brazil concerning world sporting events¶ cooperation. Security was one of the MOU’s six focus areas of cooperation. This MOU ¶ is foundational for the U.S. Department of State and Defense to provide any future ¶ support desired by the Brazilian government.¶ 43¶ One of the great strengths of the United States resides in its intelligence ¶ databases, whose holdings and effectiveness have grown substantially since 9/11. For ¶ the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Brazil, an intelligence sharing ¶ mechanism would help deter terrorism threats. Successful physical or virtual sharing ¶ could continue afterwards to address other regional security threats, such as drug ¶ trafficking or organized crime. Of course, extending temporary intelligence sharing after ¶ the world sporting events may be problematic due to Brazilian memory from its 4¶ authoritarian past, when the military regime collected intelligence to deter internal ¶ dissent.¶ 44¶ U.S. officials have the next four years to convince the Brazilian government of ¶ its benign intentions. With less than two years before the opening kick of 2014 World ¶ Cup, beta testing of this provisional intelligence sharing arrangement should begin ¶ immediately to track terrorist threats likely to originate in the “Tri-Border Area” of South ¶ America. ¶ Exposed Southern Flank¶ The United States has long worried about the “Tri-Border Area” (The TBA is the ¶ name given to the area surrounding the border shared between Brazil, Argentina, and ¶ Paraguay). In these border towns, laws are minimally enforced, money is laundered, ¶ and weapons, drugs, and people are trafficked. Organized crime and Islamic extremism ¶ have thrived there due to a lack of effective law enforcement from the three border ¶ nations.¶ 45¶ Concerns increased after 9/11 that Al-Qaeda could transit potentially porous ¶ borders, perhaps through Mexico, to attack U.S. interests in North America.¶ 46¶ Today, as ¶ the specter of war with Iran rises because of its purported pursuit of nuclear weapons, ¶ the concern has moved from devastating attacks from Al-Qaeda to devastating attacks ¶ from Hezbollah and its patron Iran. As recently as October 2011, Iran was accused of ¶ authorizing and financing an assassination attempt against the Saudi Arabian ¶ Ambassador to the United States and of contemplating further attacks in Argentina.¶ 47¶ Successful terrorist attacks against Argentina were carried out in 1992 and 1994 by a ¶ Hezbollah militant organization supported by Iran. Terrorists exploited the TBA during¶ each operation.¶ 48¶ The most telling evidence of potential terrorist attacks out of the TBA ¶ surfaced during a Hezbollah militiaman’s interview by the Spanish television station 5¶ Telemundo. During the interview, the Hezbollah militant stated emphatically that if the ¶ United States attacked Iran, then Hezbollah would conduct retaliatory attacks inside the ¶ United States.¶ 49¶ One counterterrorism expert, Edward Luttwak, described Hezbollah’s ¶ most important base outside Lebanon as the TBA from which they have already ¶ supported terrorist attacks: “The northern region of Argentina, the eastern region of ¶ Paraguay and even Brazil are large terrains, and they have an organized training and ¶ recruitment camp for terrorists.”¶ 50¶ The historical evidence of terrorist activity emanating from the TBA is chilling. If ¶ the current crisis with Iran is not resolved by the time of the 2014 World Cup and the ¶ 2016 Olympics, then the Brazilian government will need substantial help in preventing¶ potential terrorist attacks to disrupt games that will attract a global audience. Even now, ¶ Hezbollah terrorists may be inclined to strike at Israeli or American targets in the ¶ Western Hemisphere in retaliation for a recent UNSC resolution that placed additional ¶ sanctions on Iran. Hezbollah attacked its targets in Argentina for lesser reasons in 1992 ¶ and 1994.¶ 51¶ This is why intelligence sharing with Brazil must start now. The last time the ¶ United States held a 3+1 Group Meeting (Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and the United ¶ States) on TBA security was in 2004.¶ 52¶ This Group should re-convene at the earliest ¶ opportunity to assess the current terrorist threat within the TBA and to determine the ¶ probabilities of Hezbollah becoming operational if Iran is attacked.¶ 53¶ Nevertheless, ¶ collaborative intelligence initiatives must extend to the World Cup and Olympic ¶ timeframes if Iran continues to violate UNSC resolutions concerning its nuclear ¶ program. It is in both countries national interests to prevent attacks against their ¶ homeland. Certainly, Brazil does not want its territory utilized as a springboard for 6¶ attacks within the region. Full cooperation in this security arena will assist in preventing ¶ the unthinkable until the Iran crisis over-dual use nuclear material is resolved.¶ Narco-Terrorist Connection¶ Cooperation in breaking the Brazil—West Africa narcotics connection is ¶ another area where national interests converge. In 2009, Brazil became the primary ¶ embarkation point for South American cocaine headed for West Africa. In West Africa, ¶ “there is evidence by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that Latin American ¶ traffickers are collaborating with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ¶ Hezbollah to smuggle cocaine to Europe.”¶ 54¶ The Executive Director of the U.N. Office of ¶ Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also confirmed that terrorists from Africa used money from ¶ drug trafficking to resource operations, purchase equipment, and provide salaries for ¶ their ranks.¶ 55¶ It is common knowledge that the United States conducts counterterrorist ¶ operations against AQIM, and seeks to stop any funding derived from the transshipment ¶ of cocaine from Latin America. Although Brazil itself does not produce significant¶ amounts of cocaine, it does have 10,500 miles of mostly unsecured coastline. In ¶ addition, three of the world’s top producers of cocaine border Brazil: Columbia, Peru, ¶ and Bolivia. Brazil has invested more heavily in enforcing its borders since the ¶ economic boom, but the United States could assist by continuing the same intelligence ¶ sharing mechanism that has been proposed for the World Cup and Olympics. ¶ Additionally, Brazil’s unmanned aerial surveillance (UAS) program is currently in its ¶ infancy; it could benefit from the experience and systems of the mature U.S. ¶ programs.¶ 56¶ Building on the predicted intelligence successes of the World Cup and¶ Olympics, this cooperation could perhaps expand to neighboring countries. Eventually, 7¶ it could evolve into a hemispheric security network serving the national interests of all ¶ participating nations.

#### Extinction.

**ALEXANDER** (Dir. Inter-University Center for Terrorism) **2000**

[Yonah, “Terrorism in the 21st Century”, Depaul Business Law Journal, p. ln //wyo-tjc]

More specifically, present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of terror violence in terms of both threats and responses that has made clear that we have entered into an Age of Terrorism with all of its serious implications to national, regional, and global security concerns. n25 Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic [\*67] development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.

### 2nd Of

#### Nuke power tied to state militarization and weapons development

Plumwood, 1984

[Val, Presenting to the social control conference @ Sydney, “The state and the expansion of nuclear technology.” Online, http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/radicalideas/files/2010/11/Plumwood-1984-The-state-and-the-explanation-of-nuclear-technology-1.PDF] /Wyo-MB

Nuclear power's close connection with the state (here I'm going to recoup some data that will be familiar to a number of you) began of course with the development of the nuclear bomb. The bomb and the Manhattan Project was the result of the great mobilisation by the state of scientific expertise for the purposes of war. The development of nuclear weapons continued unabated after World War II however, fuelled by cold war rivalry. But the military program needed a 'peaceful', 'civilian' front, and civilian nuclear power in the Atoms for Peace program was developed in the 1950s, with the first reactor beginning operation in 1955.¶ There has been not only an initial but a continuing close link between the state military nuclear program and the civilian nuclear power industry. The technological basis - the equipment, skills and knowledge - used for the development of nuclear power is the same as that developed for nuclear weapons. Thus numerous countries, e.g. Pakistan and India in 1974, have been able to develop nuclear weapons on the basis of a so-called 'civilian' program, and others e.g. Argentina, Israel and now even Australia, are considering taking the same route. Civilian reactors have supplied plutonium for the weapons program (e.g. Calder Hall, in Great Britain), and the Hanford reactor in the U.S. is intended not only for power production but for plutonium production for the weapons program. Since plutonium for the stepped-up U.S. weapons program is in short supply this trend is likely to remain, and new technologies such as Laser Isotope Technology will make the links between civilian and nuclear programs even closer. Thus the first report of the Ranger Inquiry wrote:¶ All the main nuclear weapons states attained their supplies by means of special projects in military nuclear technology. The first nuclear reactors were built solely to produce weapons- grade plutonium, and the first enrichment plants were constructed to produce very highly enriched uranium for bombs. The nuclear power industry developed from these projects; indeed even today commercial enrichment capacity consists largely of plants originally built to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons' (p. 116, First Report, Ranger Uranium Enquiry).¶ Not only are the historical links with the military. and hence the state very close, but the state has continually and very vigorously promoted nuclear power over rivals which are often more 'economic'. This has been done through a variety of techniques including:¶ o heavy investment in research on nuclear over alternatives, and creation, maintenance and promotion of so-called 'regulatory' agencies, 'captured' bureaucracies.¶ o shouldering of the enormous financial risks associated with nuclear power e.g. by the U.S. Government in the Price-Anderson Act.¶ o straight subsidization drain, estimated to be as high as $100,000 million U.S. dollars.

#### The logic of security makes violence inevitable, and is the root cause of destructive features of contemporary modernity

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that **war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy** -- that it is **rather the** product of hegemonic forms of knowledge **about political action and community** -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. **Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies** I have described here in fact **dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states** and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that **the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing**, argues Heidegger, **'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing.**..the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that **the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the** most destructive features of contemporary modernity **-- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of** scientific and **political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe,** policymakers' choices become necessities**, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, **'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. **Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing'** and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how **the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making**; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, **even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.**88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. **When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined** (sometimes quite wilfully) **within the overarching strategic and security paradigms.** Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being **a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political.** But this **cannot be done without seizing alternatives** from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? **Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable**?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### The alternative is to reject the security discourse of the 1ac.

#### And the alt solves—need analysis of power relationships embedded in nuclear knowledge and structures—key to resist centralized development of knowledge and power

Plumwood, 1984

[Val, Presenting to the social control conference @ Sydney, “The state and the expansion of nuclear technology.” Online, http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/radicalideas/files/2010/11/Plumwood-1984-The-state-and-the-explanation-of-nuclear-technology-1.PDF] /Wyo-MB

What is clear from recent events in Australia is the importance of moving beyond a narrow, 'political' approach to the nuclear issue to one which is based on an analysis of the power structures embedded in it. This is important for the survival of the anti-nuclear movement as an important social force in Australia. The anti-nuclear movement in Australia has had great strength and by some criteria, great success. But the recent treatment of the issue at the hands of politicians illustrates vividly the ultimate bankruptcy of elite-oriented strategies for change based on appeals to decision-makers and working within a state and electoral framework. An inability to focus on alternative strategies will probably cause the death or serious weakening of the movement in the coming period of political confrontation, yet its demise as a widespread activist issue would be a serious loss. An alternative approach, stressing long-term strategies and institutional analysis, has great promise because the multiplicity of factors, critiques and sites of resistance to nuclear power gives the issue great potential. And such a social movement also has the ability to bring about or reinforce social awareness of the undemocratic character of social life and of the need for other sorts of fundamental changes in social relations, provided of course that the means adopted, for example, for working in groups, are themselves appropriate to these multiple goals and sufficiently challenging to day-to-day hierarchical social relationships and power structures e.g. sexist and racist ones. [9]¶ In this strategy then the critique of the role of the state is critical, but it must be combined with a critique of the wider power structure involved. What implications does this analysis have for anarchism itself? Does anarchism emerge as just another form of activism and critique, and anarchists as anti-state activists along with feminists as anti-patriarchy activists for example? This may seem quite threatening to many anarchists, since it threatens the claim to a more central or 'purer' position.¶ Such a view however ignores the relation between the different critiques - it assumes that they just coexist peacefully side-by-side as separate pieces of an overall puzzle, needing only to be assembled in their separate purity to providing a critique, not only of general power structures, but of the means and strategies adopted by other social movements. This concern with means and the stress on appropriate ways of pursuing other political goals, has been traditionally important in anarchist thought.¶ If anarchism is conceived, to a large extent at least, as involving another way of doing something else, of pursuing other social and political goals and effecting social changes in appropriate ways, rather than just as a utopian and unrealizable goal, disconnected from strategies and from other movements for social change, then there is an important relationship between anarchism and other social movements for change. Links with other activist groups become crucial, as does attention to the means by which particular resistances to particular forms of power are conducted. Stress on purity of anarchist doctrine, on 'keeping the hands clean' by not mixing it with less idealistic or utopian social movements must then be seen as sterile and self-defeating, and as removing this fertile area for achieving change. The real challenge to contemporary anarchism, conceived of as a general resistance to hierarchical and centralising structures, would then be in the struggle within movements for social change for appropriate non-hierarchical processes and to achieve alternative social relations, as well as for the adoption of non-centralising means for achieving particular social goals.¶ Anarchism in this picture has a crucial role to play for other social movements in maintaining the means/ends critique, and in promoting non-centralising and non state-strengthening strategies for other activist movements. Other social movements such as the anti-nuclear movement then provide a crucial 'field' for anarchism, which, to the extent that it is a general critique of power and of processes for achieving change, may still have some claim to a central (if not centralising or reductive) role.

#### We need to question the assumptions and language that frame policies. The alternative is a prerequisite to effective policies in the future and must come first

Bruce 96

(Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### 3rd Off

#### Immigration will pass: 90% there, but will compromise

Moody, 3-27

[Chris, “McCain: Nobody will be ‘totally happy’ with immigration bill,” Yahoo News, March 27, 2013, <http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/mccain-nobody-totally-happy-immigration-bill-195849266--politics.html> //uwyo-baj]

After wrapping a tour of the U.S.-Mexico border Wednesday, Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain and New York Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer said the bipartisan group crafting an immigration reform bill was "very close" to finishing the legislation. A draft, he noted, should be ready to be introduced when the Senate reconvenes after Easter. "The bottom line is, we're very close. I'd say we're 90 percent there. We have a few little problems to work on," Schumer told reporters in Arizona after a tour of the U.S. border enforcement facilities. "We're on track to meet our deadline of having a bill when we get back to Congress in April." Schumer and McCain are part of the team of eight senators tasked with crafting an immigration bill that can pass both chambers of Congress. The group unveiled a blueprint of its plan in January. They called it a "tough but fair" approach to solving the nation's illegal immigration problem. In a joint press conference Wednesday, Schumer and McCain reiterated that the bill would need to be "comprehensive" to survive, and would address new ways to secure the border, penalize businesses that hire illegal immigrants and provide a "path to citizenship" for illegal immigrants already in the country. On border security, Schumer said that the federal government doesn't necessarily need more boots on the ground along the border, but it will need to invest in new technology. "We have adequate manpower but not adequate technology," Schumer said. "You can't do it with just one fence or with people lined up." McCain emphasized that lawmakers would be required to make sacrifices to pass the bill, but that he and Schumer planned to use what they learned during their border visit to lobby their colleagues to support the plan. "Nobody is going to be totally happy with this legislation," McCain said. "No one will be because we are having to make compromises, and that's what makes good legislation."

#### PC key to keep both sides at the table-healthcare reform fight proves

Sink Feb. 19th

[Justin Sink, Feb. 19th, 2013, Obama seeks to repair rift with Republicans on immigration reform, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/283877-obama-seeks-to-repair-rift-with-with-gop-on-immigration#ixzz2LazOnYVM ,uwyo//amp]

A senior Democratic congressional aide close to the bipartisan immigration talks downplayed the criticism from Rubio and other Republicans about the leaked White House bill. The aide suggested it was all part of the complicated political dance that must take place to keep both liberals and conservatives at the table on immigration reform. “I don’t think it hurts the process at all,” the aide said. “It shows the president is serious, and he’s not going to wait forever for Congress to act.” The White House in recent weeks has made a public show of demonstrating that it has learned the lessons of its fight for healthcare reform in 2009. Then, Obama faced criticism for allowing bipartisan Senate talks to drag on for too long, wasting political momentum and allowing opposition to escalate into a firestorm. Now, the White House has offered repeated public reminders that it is prepared to submit its own bill if Congress dawdles, and the leak of parts of it over the weekend could serve as a spur for that process.“I wouldn’t say we were surprised” by the leak, the Democratic aide said. The aide did voice regret that the published proposal did not encompass the entirety of the principles Obama has laid out on immigration reform, which include enhancements to border security and reforms to the legal immigration system. “It’s unfortunate that only a piece of it was leaked out,” the aide said. Janet Murguía, head of the National Council of La Raza, an Hispanic civil-rights group, said there’s “some legitimacy” to Rubio’s criticisms of Obama. But she was quick to add that it’s also “legitimate and appropriate” for the president to remind lawmakers that he’ll push his own reforms if Congress fails to reach a deal on its own. She characterized the partisan barbs as “healthy tensions” that put pressure on both sides to secure comprehensive reforms this year.

#### Nuclear power has significant opposition – public and congressional

Andrew Freedman, Editor and Senior Science writer for Climate Central, “Feds Approve First Nuclear Reactors Since 1970s”, Climatecentral.org, February 9th, 2012.

By a v ote of 4 to 1 , the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approv ed the construction of the first new nuclear reactors to be built in the United States since 1 97 8. The reactors would be built at the Vogtle power plant near Way nesboro, Ga., which is a nuclear power plant operated by the Southern Company . As The Hill's E-2 Wire blog noted, the lone dissenting v ote was cast by NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko. The nuclear industry has faced numerous obstacles, most recently the backlash following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, in its efforts to build new nuclear plants in the U.S., and the Commission has issued recommendations on how to better protect U.S. reactors from earthquakes and floods. The country currently operates 1 04 nuclear reactors, but all were approv ed at least three decades ago. “This is a historic day ,” said Marv in Fertel, president of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry ’s trade group in a statement. “Today ’s licensing action sounds a clarion call to the world that the United States recognizes the importance of expanding nuclear energy as a key component of a low-carbon energy future that is central to job creation, div ersity of electricity supply and energy security .” Andrew Restuccia, writing for The Hill, noted the project still needs to ov ercome public opposition to nuclear power that may result in a lawsuit against the project, and congressional opposition to a hefty $8.3 billion federal conditional loan guarantee for reactor construction. "Some Democrats in Congress — noting that the loan guarantee is more than 1 5 times the size of the one granted to the failed solar firm Soly ndra — hav e called on Obama not to finalize the loan." “Ithink we are putting our taxpay er money at unnecessary risk giv en the unresolv ed safety issues and the lessons that hav e been learned from Fukushima,” Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), a senior Democrat on the House Energy and Commerce Committee and a v ocal critic of nuclear power, told The Hill Wednesday . The Obama administration has supported the dev elopment of new nuclear power plants as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissons and cut the use of fossil fuels.

#### CIR solves Latin American Relations

**Coates ’10** (Posted by David Coates at 1:38 pm August 25, 2010 1 COMMENT Immigration and the Problem of the Two-Legged Stool (co-authored with Peter Siavelis) David Coates holds the Worrell Chair in Anglo-American Studies. Born in the United Kingdom and educated at the universities of York and Oxford, he came to Wake Forest University in 1999, having previously held personal chairs at the universities of Leeds (in contemporary political economy) and Manchester (in labor studies). He has written extensively on UK labor politics, contemporary political economy and US public policy.

The diplomatic case for comprehensive immigration reform needs also to be factored in. The lack of comprehensive immigration reform imperils U.S. diplomacy in Latin America, undermining U.S. interests in the region and beyond. The U.S.’s immigration model has historically provided the best and brightest immigrants and students the chance to succeed, reinforcing the notion internationally of the U.S. as the land of opportunity. Workers who stay in the U.S. provide living proof of this reality and international students take back a positive image of the U.S. to their home countries. Tighter immigration has undermined both of these processes, and hurt the reputation of the United States internationally, as visitors become increasingly frustrated with the hostility and suspicion in the visa process. In more concrete terms, the lack of immigration reform has poisoned the well of U.S.-Latin American relations, and particularly U.S.-Mexican relations. Mexico is the U.S.’s second largest trading partner after Canada and an important gateway to markets farther south. The inability to achieve reform interferes with the deepening of mutually beneficial economic relations and complicates joint efforts at progress toward a solution to the scourge of narco-trafficking. The scathing condemnation of Arizona’s immigration law by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and a group of Cuban parliamentarians provides ample evidence of how the immigration impasse also provides negative diplomatic ammunition to avowed enemies of the U.S.

#### Latin American relations solves Amazon deforestation

**Zedillo et al ‘8** (Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission The Brookings Institution November 2008 Ernesto Zedillo Commission co-chair; Former President of Mexico Thomas R. Pickering Commission co-chair; Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Memb e r s o f the Par t n e r s h i p for t h e Ame r i cas Commi ssi o n Mauricio Cárdenas Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative, Brookings Leonardo Martinez-Diaz Deputy Director of the Commission; Political Economy Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings

The link between carbon-intensive activities and changes in the world’s climate is now well established, and the consequences will be felt across the hemisphere. According to figure 2, if current human activity remains unchanged, the hemisphere will likely suffer from a variety of ecological shocks, including declines in agricultural yields, water shortages, the loss of animal and plant species, and more frequent and destructive storms in the Caribbean Basin. These extreme weather events could bring devastation to Central America, the Caribbean, and the southeastern United States, imposing a heavy human and material toll. As we know from recent storms, the costs of replacing homes, businesses, and infrastructure—along with the higher costs of energy if refineries and offshore rigs are damaged—will be vast. Hemispheric Solutions Addressing the challenge of energy security will require making energy consumption more efficient and developing new energy sources, whereas addressing the challenge of climate change will require finding ways to control carbon emissions, helping the world shift away from carbon-intensive energy generation, and adapting to some aspects of changing ecosystems. Potential solutions to these problems exist in the Americas, but mobilizing them will require a sustained hemispheric partnership. Latin America has enormous potential to help meet the world’s growing thirst for energy, both in terms of hydrocarbons and alternative fuels. Latin America has about 10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Venezuela accounts for most of these, though Brazil’s oil reserves could increase from 12 to 70 billon barrels if recent discoveries can be developed. Bolivia is an important producer of natural gas, Mexico has great potential in solar energy generation, and several countries in the region could potentially produce much more hydroelectric power. Brazil is a world leader in sugarcane-based ethanol production, and the United States is a leader in corn-based ethanol (figure 3). Solar and wind power, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, remain underdeveloped. To expand the hemisphere’s energy capacity, massive infrastructure investments will be required. Major investments in oil production 13 (especially deep offshore), refining, and distribution will be needed to achieve the region’s potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil alone will cost $70–240 billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major investments are made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexico’s. Mexico also plans to connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central America. Power integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel imports. However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a variety of obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in South America have hindered regional cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the energy infrastructure, especially pipelines, remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better centralized and disseminated. Overcoming these obstacles will require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners. In addition to developing carbon-neutral sources of energy, the Western Hemisphere has other roles to play in combating climate change. The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other regions. However, minimizing the LAC region’s future carbon footprint will require new policies. Also, deforestation globally accounts for 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River Basin contains one of the world’s three most important rainforests, whose protection can therefore very significantly contribute to combating climate change. Brazil is pioneering the use of information technology to lessen deforestation in the Amazon.

#### Extinction

**Takacs ‘96** (David, The Idea Of Diversity: Philosophies Of Paradise, 1996, p. 200-1.)

So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion , loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's well­stocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where can­cer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.

### 4th Off

#### [A.] Uniqueness – US has ceded ground to china

Hall-Energy Digital-1/23/12

US to Explore Small Nuclear Reactor Designs

<http://www.energydigital.com/green_technology/us-to-explore-small-nuclear-reactor-designs>

In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster last year, technology companies are stepping up to develop safer, more economical nuclear reactors in an attempt to wean dependence on conventional, large-scale nuclear used all over the world today. After Bill Gates took his concepts to China—where regulations on nuclear plants are less stringent and innovations gain support—the DOE's announcement is a positive step in spurring more US manufacturing. “America’s choice is clear - we can either develop the next generation of clean energy technologies, which will help create thousands of new jobs and export opportunities here in America, or we can wait for other countries to take the lead,” said Energy Secretary Steven Chu. “The funding opportunity announced today is a significant step forward in designing, manufacturing, and exporting U.S. small modular reactors, advancing our competitive edge in the global clean energy race.”

#### [B.] plan trades off with Chinese leadership

Ferguson 10—President of the Federation of American Scientists. Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and an Adjunct Lecturer in the National Security Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University. (Charles, Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation: The Implications of Expanded Nuclear Energy in Asia, in Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued Purpose, Ed Tellis, Marble and Tanner, 146)

Although China began to develop commercial nuclear energy a decade or two after Japan and South Korea, Beijing is emulating the course charted by Tokyo and Seoul. If China achieves its ambitious goal of more than one hundred operating commercial reactors by 2030, it will likely become the state with the most nuclear power plants in the world unless a major surge in construction occurs in the United States. China may also emerge by then as a major supplier of nuclear technologies and may garner clients in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

#### That guts their soft power

Blank-prof strategic studies institute, Army War College-6/16/10

China puts down marker in nuclear power race<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LF16Cb01.html>

Therefore, China's recent nuclear exports to Pakistan and the future of its nuclear exports in general need to be examined in these three contexts. The first context is that of the overall growth of the assertiveness of China's diplomacy in general and efforts to use nuclear power and military instruments like missiles as sources of influence abroad. In the case of exports to Pakistan, a second context is the long-standing geopolitical rivalry among India, China and Pakistan in which China's "all-weather" friendship with Pakistan has been a deliberate and conscious Chinese strategy to inhibit the growth of Indian power. Finally, we must keep in mind that China is not only an exporter of nuclear energy, it also is a consumer of that energy and so it will be a key market for other exports from the likes of Russia, the United States, France, South Korea, and Japan. As an importer, it obviously will welcome the rivalry of exporters who wish to sell to it so that it can obtain more favorable terms. However, as an exporter of nuclear energy and a power that wants to export more of it for both economic and political gain, it cannot afford to let either its rivals outpace it in Asia or in other areas that China deems as essential to the pursuit of its larger strategic goals.

#### Key to all impacts

Zhang-professor at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations-9/4/12

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm

The rise of China's political soft power

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

### 5th Off

#### DOE will block natural gas exports – but demand shifts can change this

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

From the perspective of the U.S. federal government, the issue of implications is viewed in terms of “public interest.” Under existing legislation, exports of natural gas to countries with a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States are, by law, deemed to be in the public interest and authorization is required to be given without modification or delay. Projects looking for authorization to export LNG to countries without an FTA, which account for roughly 96 percent of current global LNG demand, are required to be approved by the Secretary of Energy unless, after public hearing, the Department of Energy finds that such exports are not in the public interest. 80 Although the legal definition of “public interest” is not explicitly given in existing legislation, according to public statements by officials from the Department of Energy, “public interest” includes:

• Adequate domestic natural gas supply;

• Domestic demand for natural gas proposed for export; Economic impacts of exports (on GDP, consumers, and industry); • U.S. energy security; • Job creation; • U.S. balance of trade; • International considerations; • Environmental considerations; • Consistency with DoE’s policy of promoting market competition through free negotiation of trade 81 The first two of these criteria were addressed in Part I. The remainder focus on the various domestic and international implications of U.S. LNG exports. domestic implications The domestic implications of U.S. LNG exports include their impact on natural gas prices, natural gas price volatility, jobs and competitiveness, and on overall energy security. Price of domestic natural Gas The domestic price impact of natural gas exports will be a significant factor in determining whether or not the United States should export LNG. While it is generally acknowledged that a domestic price increase will result from largescale LNG exports, the size of the price increase is the subject of debate, with a number of studies suggesting a range of possible outcomes. The important considerations when analyzing the results and conclusions of the various existing studies are the assumptions and models that are used when making price forecasts. Below are the results and methodologies of five major pricing studies done by the EIA and three consultancies: Deloitte, ICF International, and Navigant Consulting, which published two studies. 2012 Energy information Administration study In January 2012, the EIA published a study entitled “Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets.” 82 The study, conducted at the request of the Office of Fossil Energy of the Department of Energy, analyzed four different export scenarios across four different resource base or economic assumptions to project price responses to LNG exports. In addition to a “baseline” scenario, where no LNG is exported, the EIA model considered four different export scenarios: • A low export/slow growth scenario, where 6 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 1 bcf/day per year; • A low export/rapid growth scenario, where 6 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 3 bcf/day per year; • A high export/slow growth scenario, where 12 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 1 bcf/day per year; • A high export/rapid growth scenario, where 12 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 3 bcf/day per year Given the uncertainty over the actual size of the shale gas resource base and the future growth of the U.S. economy, each of these scenarios (both “baseline” and export) were applied to four alternate background cases: • A reference case, based on the EIA’s 2011 Annual Energy Outlook; • A low-shale estimated ultimate recovery (EUR) case, in which shale gas production from new, undrilled wells is 50 percent below the reference case scenario; • A high-shale EUR case, in which shale gas production from new, undrilled wells is 50 percent higher than the reference case; • A high economic growth case, in which U.S. GDP grows at 3.2 percent as opposed to the 2.7 percent assumed in the reference case. Given the range of assumptions, the range of results was unsurprisingly wide. The results range from a 9.6 percent increase (from $3.56 to $3.90/ mcf) in domestic natural gas prices in 2025 due to exports (in the case of high shale gas recovery, low export volumes and a slow rate of export growth) to a 32.5 percent increase (in the case of low shale gas recovery, high export volumes and a high rate of export growth). The percentage premium for domestic natural gas prices in 2025 for each scenario relative to the baseline scenario price estimate is detailed in table 3. In addition to the price premium for exporting natural gas that exists in each case, the EIA study projected a short-term spike in natural gas prices as a result of LNG exports. As figure 7 below illustrates, in 2015, the first year that LNG exports occur, domestic natural gas prices rise rapidly until total export capacity is reached. In the “lowrapid” scenario prices peak in 2016, after the 6 bcf/day of export capacity is built over 2 years; in the “high-slow” scenario, natural gas prices peak in 2026, after the 12 bcf/day of export capacity is built over 12 years. The immediate jump in price becomes more pronounced in the scenarios where LNG export capacity increases quickly. In the “low-rapid” scenario, the price of natural gas peaks at nearly 18 percent above the baseline case; in the “high-rapid” scenario, natural gas prices peak at 36 percent above the baseline case. This price impact is exacerbated in the Low Shale EUR and High Macroeconomic Growth cases, as LNG exports further tighten domestic natural gas markets. In the most extreme example, the high-rapid scenario for exports in a Low Shale EUR case, the price for natural gas peaks at more than 50 percent than the baseline case. 83 There are two factors that should be considered when interpreting the results of this price impact study. The first is the assumption regarding the rate at which LNG could be exported. The results of EIA’s analysis represent an extreme scenario for LNG exports. In the existing LNG market, it is particularly unlikely that either the “low-rapid” or the “high-rapid” scenarios would materialize. The former assumption stipulates that the United States would export 6 bcf/day of LNG by 2016. Given that, at the time of writing, only one facility has been approved to export 2.2 bcf/day to nonFTA countries starting in 2015, it is unlikely that another three plants would be approved and built in such a short time frame. 84 The latter scenario, that the United States would be exporting 12 bcf/ day of LNG by 2018, suggests that in the next several years, the United States would grow from exporting negligible volumes of LNG to having roughly one-third of the global LNG export capacity. Not only would this supply growth outpace growth in global LNG demand, but this capacity addition would also have to compete with roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian-origin LNG that is expected to hit the market around the same time. 85 The second issue is the model’s assumptions for incremental investment in natural gas production as a result of increased export capacity. The spike in price depicted in figure 7 occurs because investment from gas producers lags additional demand. In the model, producers respond to, rather than anticipate, additional demand. For this reason, prices peak once the export capacity is filled, before steadily decreasing. In reality, the expectation of future demand would likely induce gas producers to invest in additional production before incremental demand occurs. As a result, the increase in prices would likely begin earlier and peak at a lower level than suggested by the model. deloitte study An earlier study released in November 2011 from the Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions highlighted the producer-response in its model. In addition to finding that LNG exports would produce a smaller increase in gas prices than the EIA report suggests, the Deloitte study points out that “producers can develop more reserves in anticipation of demand growth, such as LNG exports. There will be ample notice and time in advance of the exports to make supplies available.” 86 Using a dynamic model, in which production increased in anticipation of new demand, the Deloitte study found that 6 bcf/day of exports of LNG would result in, on average, a 1.7 percent increase (from $7.09 to $7.21/MMBtu) in the price of natural gas between 2016 and 2035. Further, the Deloitte study noted that there would be regional variations to the increase in natural gas prices resulting from LNG exports. As most of the proposed liquefaction terminals are expected to be on the Gulf Coast, the price of Henry Hub gas, which is the key benchmark for natural gas from the Gulf Coast, will increase by $0.22/ MMBtu by 2035 as a result of U.S. LNG exports. This is more than double the price increase projected in regions further away from the LNG export terminals. In New York and Illinois, natural gas prices are projected to increase by less than $0.10/MMBtu. This is particularly important in the Northeast, which historically experiences some of the highest natural gas prices in the country, but will benefit from the development and consumption of natural gas from the nearby Marcellus shale play. other studies Three other studies of note have analyzed the price impacts of U.S. LNG exports. In August 2010, Navigant Consulting found that 2 bcf/day of LNG exports would cause a price increase of between 7 and 7.9 percent from 2015 to 2035 relative to a scenario with no gas exports. ICF International found in August 2011 that 6 bcf/day of exports would result in an 11 percent ($0.64/MMBtu) increase in natural gas prices over the same period. 87 More recently, Navigant released another study that analyzed the impact of two separate export scenarios. The first scenario modeled the impact of 3.6 bcf/day of LNG exports from three terminals in North America: Sabine Pass in Louisiana, Kitimat in British Columbia, and Coos Bay in Oregon. The second scenario modeled the impact of 6.6 bcf/day of LNG exports from the three aforementioned export projects and 2 bcf/day of added exports from the Gulf Coast and 1 bcf/day from Maryland. 88 This Navigant study found that 6.6 bcf/day of LNG exports would result in a 6 percent ($0.35/MMBtu) increase in natural gas prices from 2015 to 2035. As with the EIA and Deloitte studies, the results of both Navigant and ICF’s studies must be analyzed in the context of their respective methodologies and assumptions. Navigant’s first study uses a more static supply model, which, unlike dynamic supply models, does not fully take account of the effect that higher prices have on spurring additional production. As a result, it takes a conservative estimate of supply growth potential. The report acknowledges that the price outcomes modeled in its analysis “establish the upper range of impacts that exports […] might have on natural gas prices.” 89 This study also did not factor in the reemergence of the industrial sector as a major consumer of natural gas following the shale gas “revolution.” The study assumes that natural gas consumption by the industrial sector will decline by 0.3% per year to 2035. By contrast, the EIA model assumes that industrial sector demand will increase by roughly 1% per year over the same period. 90 The ICF study factors in various levels of production response from an increase in price. Under its 6 bcf/day export scenario, the price impact ranges from a $0.52/ MMBtu increase in a more responsive drilling activity scenario to a $0.75/MMBtu increase in a less responsive drilling activity scenario. which study is right? Given that these studies forecast natural gas prices two decades into the future, it is difficult to determine which study is most accurate. (table 4 shows a comparison of the price impact forecasts of the various models.) However, policymakers would benefit from having a better understanding of the results that are generated from each report. This includes choosing the most relevant results from each report. For instance, following the release of the EIA study, many commentators were quick to highlight that natural gas prices could increase by more than 50 percent as a result of LNG exports. However, this ignored the assumptions behind this number: it was based on the price of natural gas in one year under the most extreme assumptions of exports and domestic resource base. A more comprehensive analysis should include an assessment of the average price impact from 2015 to 2035. When distinguishing between the various studies, policymakers should identify which assumptions most resemble the existing natural gas market and its likely direction, and which models are most reflective of the complex nature of domestic and global natural gas trade. Assuming realistic volumes of natural gas exports as well as a reasonable supply response by natural gas producers are important considerations. It is important to note that the supply curves in the various studies reflect different interpretations of the economics of marginal production. The Power sector and industrial sector Part I indicated that the power-generation and industrial sectors would account for most of the demand for newly available natural gas resources. As shown above, LNG exports are likely to increase domestic prices of natural gas, suggesting negative consequences for these two competing sectors. In their analyses, both Deloitte and EIA found that the majority—63 percent, according to both studies—of the exported natural gas will come from new production as opposed to displaced consumption from other sectors. By contrast, between 17 and 38 percent of supply of natural gas for export would be met by reduced demand, as higher prices pushes some domestic consumers to use less gas. In the power generation and industrial sectors, the price impacts of LNG exports are likely to have modest impacts. In the power sector, natural gas has historically been used as a back up to coal and nuclear base-load generation. For such gas used at the margin, the increase in electricity prices as a result of LNG exports would be limited by its competitiveness relative to other fuels: as soon as it becomes more expensive than the alternative for back up generation, power producers will substitute away from gas. 91 According to ICF International, a $0.64/MMBtu increase in the price of natural gas would result in an electricity price increase of between $1.66 and $4.97/megawatt-hour (MWh), depending on how often gas is used as the marginal fuel for electricity. Deloitte estimates that the price increase of electricity would not be more than $1.65/MWh. 92 EIA estimates that electricity price impacts will be marginal as well (between $1.40/MWh and $2.90/MWh) except in the “highrapid” export scenario. 93 The EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2011 estimates that, without exporting LNG, the average price of electricity (across all fuels) in 2035 will be $92/MWh. 94 In the longer term, natural gas is itself likely to be used for more base-load generation. The rapid increase in shale gas production, coupled with the retirements of as much as 50 gigawatts (GW) of coal-fired electricity due to plant age or inability to adhere to possibly forthcoming EPA regulations is likely to increase the demand for natural gas in the power sector. According to some analysts, the near-term demand caused by the retirements of the oldest and least efficient coal-fired power plants could result in an additional natural gas demand of 2 bcf/day. 95 Given the lack of environmentally and economically viable alternatives, a moderate increase in gas prices is unlikely to result in a large move away from natural gas, although increased costs will be transferred to customers. Natural gas consumption in the power sector has been considered economic at prices much higher than those resulting from LNG exports in even the highest price-impact projections. Even prior to the shale gas “revolution,” when natural gas prices were high, natural gas demand was increasing in the power sector. The EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2005— published in a year when average well head prices were over $7/MMBTU—projected that natural gas demand in the electricity sector would increase by 70 percent between 2003 and 2015. 96 Unlike the power sector, which continued to build natural-gas fired generation during a period of increasing gas prices, the industrial sector was negatively affected by growing natural gas import dependence, high gas prices, and gas price volatility. Between 2000 and 2005, the price of natural gas increased by 99 percent and LNG imports more than doubled. 97 By 2005, the ratio of the price of oil to the price of natural gas was approximately 6:1, just below the 7:1 oil-to-gas price ratio at which U.S. petrochemical and plastics producers are globally competitive. 98 That same year Alan Greenspan, then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, noted that because of natural gas price increases “the North American gas-using industry [was] in a weakened competitive position.” 99 Since then the price of natural gas has collapsed. In 2011, the oil-to-natural gas price ratio was more than 24:1. In 2012 it has been even higher. The decline in natural gas prices has galvanized the industrial sector. A joint study by PwC and the National Association for Manufacturers, an industry trade group, found that the development of shale gas could save manufacturers as much as $11.6 billion per year in feedstock costs through 2025. 100 New investments in petrochemical and plastics producing facilities are occurring throughout the East and Southeast, largely predicated on the availability of inexpensive natural gas. Opponents of LNG exports contend that such investments would be deterred in the future as a result of increases in the price of natural gas. However, the evidence suggests that the competitive advantage of U.S. industrial producers relative to its competitors in Western Europe and Asia is not likely to be affected significantly by the projected increase in natural gas prices resulting from LNG exports. As European and many Asian petrochemical producers use oil-based products such as naphtha and fuel oil as feedstock, U.S. companies are more likely to enjoy a significant cost advantage over their overseas competitors. Even a one-third decline in the estimated price of crude oil in 2035 would result in an oil-to-gas ratio of 14:1. 101 There is also the potential for increased exports to help industrial consumers. Ethane, a liquid byproduct of natural gas production at several U.S. gas plays, is the primary feedstock of ethylene, a petrochemical product used to create a wide variety of products. According to a study by the American Chemistry Council, an industry trade body, a 25 percent increase in ethane production would yield a $32.8 billion increase in U.S. chemical production. By providing another market for cheap dry gas, LNG exports will encourage additional production of natural gas liquids (NGL) that are produced in association with dry gas. According to the EIA, ethane production increased by nearly 30 percent between 2009 and 2011 as natural gas production from shale started to grow substantially. Ethane production is now at an alltime high, with more than one million barrels per day of ethane being produced. 102 Increased gas production for exports results in increased production of such natural gas liquids, in which case exports can be seen as providing a benefit to the petrochemical industry. natural gas price volatility A major concern among domestic end users of natural gas is the possibility of an increase in natural gas price volatility resulting from an increase in U.S. LNG exports. As figure 8 demonstrates, the price volatility experienced during the 2000s was the highest the domestic gas market has experienced in the past three decades. The volatility of the natural gas market in the 2000s was largely caused by a tight supply-demand balance. Natural gas demand increased substantially as the U.S. economy grew and natural gas was viewed as environmentally preferable to coal for power generation. This increase in demand coincided with a reduction in domestic supply and an increased reliance on imports. The recent surge in U.S. natural gas production has resulted in less market volatility since 2010. According to EIA, the standard deviation of the price of natural gas (a general statistical indicator of volatility) between 2010 and 2011 was one-third what it was during the 2000s. 103 Potential exports of U.S. LNG concerns some domestic consumers for two principal reasons: greater volatility in domestic natural gas prices; and exposure of domestic natural gas prices to higher international prices resulting in a convergence between low U.S. prices and high international prices. There is an insufficient amount of data and quantitative research on the relationship between do mestic natural gas price volatility and LNG exports. However, certain characteristics of the LNG market are likely to limit volatility. LNG is bound by technical constraints: it must be liquefied and then transported on dedicated tankers before arriving at terminals where a regasification facility must be installed. Liquefaction facilities have capacity limits to how much gas they can turn into LNG. If they are operating at or close-to full capacity, such facilities will have a relatively constant demand for natural gas, therefore an international price or supply shock would have little impact on domestic gas prices. Moreover, unlike oil trading, in which an exporter—theoretically—sells each marginal barrel of production to the highest bidder in the global market, the capacity limit on LNG production and export means that LNG exporters have an infrastructure-limited demand for natural gas leaving the rest of the natural gas for domestic consumption. As most LNG infrastructure facilities are built on a project finance basis and underpinned by long-term contracts, this demand can be anticipated by the market years in advance, reducing the likelihood of volatility. The macroeconomy and jobs The macroeconomic and job implications of LNG exports depend on two principal factors: the gains from trade from exploiting pricing differentials and inefficiencies of the global market; and the employment implications of those gains, higher domestic natural gas prices, and greater domestic natural gas production. The Department of Energy has commissioned a study on both the macroeconomic and employment implications of U.S. LNG exports, which will be released later this year. This study will provide a qualitative assessment of the implications of LNG exports to the U.S. economy and employment. LNG exports are likely to be a net benefit to the U.S. economy, although probably not a significant contributor in terms of total U.S. GDP. Exports of U.S. natural gas will take advantage of the benefits of the existing producer’s surplus resulting from the pricing differentials between the natural gas markets in the United States, Europe, and Asia. Contractual terms will determine how this surplus is shared between U.S. sellers and foreign buyers. 104 The benefit of this trade will likely outweigh the cost to domestic consumers of the increase in the price of natural gas as most of the natural gas demanded by exports will come from new natural gas production as opposed to displacing existing production from domestic consumers. On the other hand, LNG exports from the United States are likely to put marginal upward pressure on the relative value of the U.S. dollar. In March 2012, Citigroup released a report on North American hydrocarbon production that included a model of the macroeconomic impact of U.S. oil and gas exports. The Citi analysis found that oil and gas exports would cause a nearly two percent decline in the current account deficit by 2020, but that the exchange rate implications would be modest. By 2020, the U.S. dollar would appreciate by between 1.6 and 5.4 percent. 105 The implications of LNG exports on job creation are similarly difficult to quantify. Other than temporary construction jobs created by the need to build liquefaction capacity, pipelines, and other ancillary infrastructure, the operation of the liquefaction facility will likely provide little permanent employment benefit. As outlined in the section on price impacts above, as much of the gas for export will come from new production, rather than the displacement of consumption in other sectors, the negative economic, and therefore jobrelated, effects on those sectors is likely to be limited. Beyond the labor required for additional gas production to satisfy LNG exports, the net impact of LNG exports is likely to be minimal. Further upstream, the job potential may be greater. By increasing domestic natural gas production, employment from additional oil and gas producers will increase, as will the demand for manufacturers of equipment for oil and gas production, gathering, and transportation. domestic energy security Aside from the price impact of potential U.S. LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports would diminish U.S. “energy security”; that exports would deny the United States of a strategically important resource. The extent to which such concerns are valid depends on several factors, including the size of the domestic resource base, and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes of LNG export under consideration would not materially affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market. Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6 bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for shale gas reserves are uncertain, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected, domestic natural gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic. In the long-term, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities) to import gas when economic. A further gas-related consideration with regard to energy security is the effects of increased production of associated natural gas with the increasing volumes of U.S. unconventional oil. As the primary energy-security concern for the United States related to oil, the application of fracking and horizontal drilling in oil production is reducing U.S. oil import dependence, while simultaneously producing substantial volumes of natural gas, which, given the relative economics of oil and gas, is effectively delivered at zero (or, in the case of producers who have to invest in equipment to manage flaring and venting, negative) cost. To the extent that associated gas from unconventional oil production is used for LNG export, it can be seen as a consequence of—rather than a threat to—increased U.S. energy security. international implications The international implications of LNG exports from the United States can be divided into pricing, geopolitics, and environment. international Pricing As discussed in Part I, the global LNG market is informally separated into three markets: North America, the Atlantic Basin (mostly Europe), and the Pacific Basin (including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and India). These markets are separated because of important technical differences that impact the pricing structure for LNG in each market. The North American natural gas market is competitive and prices are traded in a transparent and open market. The Atlantic Basin is dominated by European LNG consumers such as the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Italy, and is a hybrid of a competitive U.K. market that was liberalized in the mid-1990s and a Continental European market that is dominated by oil-linked, take-or-pay contracts. In recent years, the U.K. hub, the National Balancing Point (NBP), has traded at a premium to the U.S. hub, the Henry Hub. The Pacific Basin is a more rigid market that depends heavily on oilindexed contracts that are more expensive than those used in the Atlantic Basin. While they have no central trading hub, the Pacific Basin consumers such as Japan and South Korea (which is implementing its recently-signed free-trade agreement with the United States) currently import LNG based on a pricing formula known informally as the Japan Crude Cocktail, the average price of custom-cleared oil imports into Tokyo. Many Pacific Basin contracts have a built-in price floor and price ceiling depending on the price of oil. 106 Without exporting any natural gas, the U.S. shale gas “revolution” has already had a positive impact on the liquidity of global LNG markets. Many LNG cargoes that were previously destined for gas-thirsty U.S. markets were diverted and served spot demand in both the Atlantic and Pacific Basins. The increased availability of LNG cargoes has helped create a looser LNG market for other consumers (see figure 9). This in turn has helped apply downward pressure to the terms of oillinked contracts resulting in the renegotiation of some contracts, particularly in Europe. Increased availability of LNG cargoes also accelerated a recent trend of increasing reliance of consumers on spot LNG markets. In 2010 short-term and spot contracts represented 19 percent of the total LNG market, up from only a fraction one decade earlier. 107 In this case, increasing demand for spot cargoes indicates that consumers are taking advantage of spot prices that are lower than oilindexed rates. LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG market beyond 2015 (see figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly 10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japan’s nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets, it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates. 108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by establishing an alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure. As previously mentioned, this impact is already be ing felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions to the oil-price linkage. 109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract. 110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however, Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts. 111 There are other limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020. Also, the impact of U.S. LNG exports could be limited by a number of external factors that will have a larger bearing on the future of global LNG prices. For instance, a decision by the Japanese government to phase-out nuclear power would significantly tighten global LNG markets and probably displace any benefit provided by U.S. LNG exports. Conversely, successful and rapid development of China’s shale gas reserves would limit the demand of one of the world’s fastest-growing natural gas consumers. However, to the extent that U.S. LNG exports can help bring about a more globalized pricing structure, they will have economic and geopolitical consequences. Geopolitics A large increase in U.S. LNG exports would have the potential to increase U.S. foreign policy interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific basins. Unlike oil, natural gas has traditionally been an infrastructure-constrained business, giving geographical proximity and political relations between producers and consumers a high level of importance. Issues of “pipeline politics” have been most directly visible in Europe, which relies on Russia for around a third of its gas. Previous disputes between Moscow and Ukraine over pricing have led to major gas shortages in several E.U. countries in the winters (when demand is highest) of both 2006 and 2009. Further disagreements between Moscow and Kiev over the terms of the existing bilateral gas deal have the potential to escalate again, with negative consequences for E.U. consumers. The risk of high reliance on Russian gas has been a principal driver of European energy policy in recent decades. Among central and eastern European states, particularly those formerly aligned with the Soviet Union such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the issue of reliance on imports of Russian gas is a primary energy security concern and has inspired energy policies aimed at diversification of fuel sources for power generation. From the U.S. perspective such Russian influence in the affairs of these democratic nations is an impediment to efforts at political and economic reform. The market power of Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, is evident in these countries. Although they are closer to Russia than other consumers of Russian gas in Western Europe, many countries in Eastern and Central Europe pay higher contract prices for their imports, as they are more reliant on Russian gas as a proportion of their energy mixes. In the larger economies of Western Europe, which consume most of Russia’s exports, there are efforts to diversify their supply of natural gas. The E.U. has formally acknowledged the need to put in place mechanisms to increase supply diversity. These include market liberalization approaches such as rules mandating third-party access to pipeline infrastructure (from which Gazprom is demanding exemption), and commitments to complete a single market for electricity and gas by 2014, and to ensure that no member country is isolated from electricity and gas grids by 2015. 112 Despite these formal efforts, there are several factors retarding the E.U.’s push for a unified effort to reduce dependence on Russian gas. National interest has been given a higher priority than collective, coordinated E.U. energy policy: the gas cutoffs in 2006 and 2009 probably contributed to the acceptance of the Nord Stream project, which carries gas from Russia into Germany. Germany’s decision to phase out its fleet of nuclear reactors by 2022 will result in far higher reliance on natural gas for the E.U.’s biggest economy. The environmental imperative to reduce carbon emissions—codified in the E.U.’s goal of essentially decarbonizing its power sector by the middle of century—mean that natural gas is being viewed by many as the short-to medium fuel of choice in power generation. Finally, the prospects for European countries to replicate the unconventional gas “revolution” that has resulted in a glut of natural gas in the United States look uncertain. Several countries, including France and the U.K., have encountered stiff public opposition to the techniques used in unconventional gas production, while those countries, such as Poland and Hungary, that have moved ahead with unconventional-gas exploration have generally seen disappointing early results. Collectively, these factors suggest that the prospects for reduced European reliance on Russian gas appear dim. The one factor that has been working to the advantage of advocates of greater European gas diversity has been the increased liquidity of the global LNG market, discussed above. Russia’s dominant position in the European gas market is being eroded by the increased availability of LNG. Qatar’s massive expansion in LNG production in 2008, coupled with the rise in unconventional gas production in the United States as well as a drop in global energy demand due to the global recession, produced a global LNG glut that saw many cargoes intended for the U.S. market diverted into Europe. As mentioned previously, with an abundant source of alternative supply, some European consumers, mainly Gazprom’s closest partners, were able to renegotiate their oil-linked, takeor-pay contracts with Gazprom. As figure 10 illustrates, however, in the wake of the Fukushima natural disaster and nuclear accident in Japan and a return to growth in most industrialized economies, the LNG market is projected to tighten considerably in the short-term, potentially returning market power to Russia. However, there is a second, structural change to the global gas market that may have more lasting effects to Russia’s market power in the European gas market. LNG is one of the fastest growing segments of the energy sector. The growth of the LNG market, both through long-term contract and spot-market sales, is likely to put increasing pressure on incumbent pipeline gas suppliers. A significant addition of U.S. LNG exports will accelerate this trend. In addition to adding to the size of the market, U.S. LNG contracts are likely to be determined on a “floating” basis, with sales terms tied to the price of a U.S. benchmark such as Henry Hub, eroding the power of providers of long-term oil linked contract suppliers such as Russia. While U.S. LNG will not be a direct tool of U.S. foreign policy—the destination of U.S. LNG will be determined according to the terms of individual contracts, the spot-price-determined demand, and the LNG traders that purchase such contracts—the addition of a large, market-based producer will indirectly serve to increase gas supply diversity in Europe, thereby providing European consumers with increased flexibility and market power. Increased LNG exports will provide similar assistance to strategic U.S. allies in the Pacific Basin. By adding supply volumes to the global LNG market, the U.S. will help Japan, Korea, India, and other import-dependent countries in South and East Asia to meet their energy needs. The desire on the part of Pacific Basin countries for the U.S. to become a gas supplier to the region has been underlined by the efforts of the Japanese government, which has attempted to secure a free-trade agreement waiver from the United States to allow exports. As with oil price-linked Russian gas contracts in Eu- rope, U.S. LNG exports linked to a floating Henry Hub benchmark, have the potential to weaken the market power of incumbent LNG providers to Asia, increasing the negotiating power of consumers and decreasing the price. As U.S. foreign policy undergoes a “pivot to Asia,” the ability of the U.S. to provide a degree of increased energy security and pricing relief to LNG importers in the region will be an important economic and strategic asset. Beyond the basin-specific considerations of U.S. LNG exports, they would provide a source of predictable natural gas supply that is relatively free from unexpected production or shipping disruption. With Qatar representing roughly one-third of the global LNG market, a blockade or military intervention in the Strait of Hormuz or a direct attack on Qatar’s liquefaction facilities by Iran would inflict chaos on world energy markets. While the United States government will be unable to physically divert LNG cargoes to specific markets or strategic allies that are most affected (gas allocation will be made by the market players), additional volumes of LNG on the world market will benefit all consumers. international Environmental implications Proposed LNG exports from the United States have encountered domestic opposition on environmental grounds. As outlined in Part I, natural gas production causes greenhouse gas emissions in the upstream production process through leakages, venting, and flaring. The greenhouse gas footprint of shale gas production has been the subject of vigorous debate, with some studies suggesting that methane from the production process leads to shale gas having a higher global warming impact than that of other hydrocarbons including coal. While the methodology underlying such studies has been widely criticized, there is no doubt that leakage and venting of natural gas is a serious negative environmental consequence of natural gas production and transportation: EPA has estimated that worldwide leakages and venting volumes were 3,353.5 bcf in 2010. 113 By contrast, some advocates of U.S. exports of LNG maintain that they have the potential to bring global environmental benefits if they are used to displace more carbon-intensive fuels. According to the IEA, natural gas in general has the potential to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 740 million tonnes in 2035, nearly half of which could be achieved by the displacement of coal in China’s power-generation portfolio. Natural gas—in the form of LNG—also has the potential to displace more carbon-intensive fuels in other major energy users, including across the EU and in Japan, which is being forced to burn more coal and oil-based fuels to make up for the nuclear generation capacity lost in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. In addition to its relatively lower carbon-dioxide footprint, natural gas produces lower emissions of pollutants such as sulfur dioxide nitrogen oxide and other particulates than coal and oil. Natural gas—both in the form of LNG and compressed natural gas—is also being viewed as a potential replacement for oil in the vehicle transportation fleet, with large carbon dioxide abatement potential. 114 However, as discussed in Part I, even the United States with its low gas prices is unlikely to see any significant move toward natural gas vehicles in the absence of government policies; the prospects for such vehicles entering the European or Asian markets, where gas is several times as expensive, are remote. On the other hand, additional volumes of natural gas in the global power generation fleet may also have longer-term detrimental consequences for carbon emissions. According to the IEA, by backing out nuclear and renewable energy generation, natural gas could add 320Mt of carbon dioxide by 2035. 115 Whether U.S. LNG exports contribute to reduced carbon dioxide emissions through the displacement of coal fired power generation or to the crowding out of renewable and nuclear energy in the global energy mix is something of a moot point. According to the IEA, global power generation is projected to exceed 27,000 terawatt hours per year by 2020. 116 Even assuming U.S. exports of 6 bcf/day (on the upper end of the range of expectations), zero losses due to transportation, regasification, and transmission, and a high natural gas power plant efficiency level of 60 percent, such volumes would account for just over one percent of total global power generation. 117 Therefore, although the domestic environmental impacts associated with shale gas extraction may, pending the outcome of further study, prove to be a cause for concern with respect to greenhouse gas emissions, the potential for U.S. LNG exports to make a meaningful impact on global emissions through changes to the global power generation mix is negligible. T his paper has attempted to answer two questions: Are U.S. LNG exports feasible? If so, what are the implications of U.S. LNG exports? For exports to be feasible, several demand and supply-related conditions need to be met. On the supply side, adequate resources must be available and their production must be sustainable over the long-term. The regulatory and policy environment will need to accommodate natural gas production to ensure that the resources are developed. The capacity and infrastructure required to enable exports must also be in place. This includes the adequacy of the pipeline and storage network, the availability of shipping capacity, and the availability of equipment for production and qualified engineers. On the demand side, LNG exports will compete with two main other domestic end uses for natural gas: the power-generation sector, and the industrial and petrochemical sector. According to most projections, the U.S. electricity sector will see an increased demand for natural gas as it seeks to comply with policies and regulations aimed at reducing carbon-dioxide emissions and pollutants from the power-generation fleet. Cheaper natural gas in the industrial sector has the potential to lower the cost of petrochemical production and to improve the competitiveness of a range of refining and manufacturing operations. Advocates of natural gas usage in the transportation fleet – particularly in heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) – see it as a way to decrease the country’s dependence on oil, although absent major policy support, this sector is unlikely to represent a significant source of gas demand. For increased U.S. LNG exports to be feasible, they will also need to be competitive with supplies from other sources. The major demand centers that would import U.S. LNG would be Pacific Basin consumers (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and increasingly China and India), and Atlantic Basin consumers, mostly in Europe. The supply and demand balance in the Atlantic and Pacific Basins and, therefore the feasibility for natural gas exports from the United States, depend heavily on the uncertain outlook for international unconventional natural gas production. Recent assessments in countries such as China, India, Ukraine, and Poland indicate that each country has significant domestic shale gas reserves. If these reserves are developed effectively—which is likely to be difficult in the short-term due to a lack of infrastructure, physical capacity, and human capacity—many of these countries would dramatically decrease their import dependence, with negative implications for existing and newcomer LNG exporters. Detailed analysis of the foregoing factors suggests that the exportation of liquefied natural gas from the United States is logistically feasible. Based on current knowledge, the domestic U.S. natural gas resource base is large enough to accommodate the potential increased demand for natural gas from the electricity sector, the industrial sector, the residential and commercial sectors, the transportation sector, and exporters of LNG. Other obstacles to production, including infrastructure, investment, environmental concerns, and human capacity, are likely to be surmountable. Moreover, the current and projected supply and demand fundamentals of the international LNG market are conducive to competitive U.S.-sourced LNG. While LNG exports may be practically feasible, they will be subject to approval by policy makers if they are to happen. In making a determination on the advisability of exports, the federal government will focus on the likely implications of LNG exports: i.e. whether LNG exports are in the “public interest.” The extent of the domestic implications is largely dependent upon the price impact of exports on domestic natural gas prices. While it is clear that domestic natural gas prices will increase if natural gas is exported, most existing analyses indicate that the implications of this price increase are likely to be modest.

#### Plan triggers exports through demand changes

Perry 12 (Mark J., Scholar – AEI, Professor of Economics and Finance – University of Michigan, “Natural gas and nuclear power need to share the lead in power generation for the future,” American Enterprise Institute, 9-26, http://www.aei.org/article/natural-gas-and-nuclear-power-need-to-share-the-lead-in-power-generation-for-the-future/)

Recent advances in drilling technologies have unleashed a boom in domestic natural gas production. The United States may have more than 100 years' worth of gas reserves, and perhaps much more, including large untapped resources in Michigan. Policy makers are increasingly looking to natural gas as the locomotive of economic growth. A striking example is the increasing use of gas in electricity production. For the last several years, natural gas has accounted for more than 80% of new electric generating capacity in the United States. It now provides 32% of total electricity generation, up from 25% just two years ago, and its share could reach 50% by 2030. Natural gas, of course, has many virtues as a fuel. Its carbon content is less than half that of coal and it emits no mercury or other toxic particulates. But natural gas is needed for much more than electricity generation. In addition to residential and commercial heating, gas accounts for the bulk of the fuel used by the petrochemical industry. Manufacturing relies on the availability of cheap gas, and its use in transportation is increasing. Additionally, gas producers are gearing up to export some of the gas to markets in Europe and Asia, where gas costs up to five times more than it does in the United States. A dozen or more U.S. companies have applied for licenses to export liquefied natural gas from terminals, mainly on the Gulf of Mexico. Because of its multiple uses and rising popularity, the demand for natural gas is starting to increase, and its price could rise significantly. That is a real possibility, and would be consistent with its long history of price volatility. If we hope to maintain the security of our energy supply, we will need to expand the use of other energy sources, including nuclear power, which is also environmentally attractive and affordable. Although the capital cost of building a nuclear plant is high, the average price of nuclear-generated electricity is lower than power produced from natural gas. In 2011, the production cost of nuclear power was 2.19 cents per kilowatt-hour, compared to 4.51 cents for natural gas and 3.23 cents for coal. Today about 20% of America’s electricity comes from nuclear power. But demand for electricity is growing steadily and that trend will continue in the future. Without building new nuclear plants, pressure will build to use even more natural gas for electricity generation, making less available for manufacturing and transportation.

#### Kills chemical renaissance

Brady 12 – Jeff Brady, writer for NPR, February 13, 2012, "Natural Gas Boom Energizing The Chemical Industry" [www.npr.org/2012/02/13/146803953/natural-gas-boom-energizing-the-chemical-industry](http://www.npr.org/2012/02/13/146803953/natural-gas-boom-energizing-the-chemical-industry)

Just outside of West Virginia's capital city, Charleston, on the banks of the Kanawha River, sits the Institute Industrial Park. Chemical plants have operated here continuously since World War II, when the local factories cranked out synthetic rubber. Today there are industrial pipes, tanks and buildings stretching in just about every direction.¶ Soon, there could be more.¶ U.S. chemical companies are the latest beneficiaries of the nation's natural gas drilling boom. Long focused on cheap gas sources elsewhere in the world, companies are now looking to expand here. **A surplus of natural gas has pushed down prices, making it more attractive for chemical companies** that use lots of gas to reopen shuttered plants and build new ones.¶ Sleepy rural communities across the country are turning into industrial zones — and that worries people who live nearby. But the boom is good news for manufacturers that need cheap, plentiful supplies of natural gas.¶ The natural gas drilling boom near Charleston has local business boosters lobbying for a huge new chemical plant, called an ethane cracker, which could bring jobs to the state.¶ "It will take approximately 2,000 construction workers two years just to build the facility," says Matthew Ballard, president and chief executive officer of the Charleston Area Alliance. "Once up and running, there will be several hundred jobs at that cracking facility."¶ The plant would "crack" ethane — break it down at the molecular level — and turn it into ethylene. Kevin DiGregorio, executive director of the Chemical Alliance Zone in Charleston, says ethylene is used to produce all sorts of things, from the cushions we sit on to the clothes we wear.¶ "Everything that's not wood, or maybe brick, is made with chemicals, certainly. But probably 40 to 60 percent of it is made from ethylene," DiGregorio says. "It's very, very important to our daily lives."¶ States Compete For Plants, Jobs¶ The Marcellus Shale, from which nearby drillers are pulling natural gas, is particularly ethane-rich. Most natural gas contains anywhere from 2 to 8 percent of ethane, DiGregorio says, but "Marcellus natural gas contains as much as 14 to 16 percent" of ethane.¶ Bayer CropScience, the company that operates the industrial park near Charleston, is talking with companies interested in building ethane crackers in the region. No official announcement has been made, but business leaders here are keeping their fingers crossed.¶ The same is true elsewhere around northern Appalachia. Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia are competing to lure a new ethane cracker that the oil company Shell plans to build. Firms in Canada also see opportunity in the Marcellus Shale.¶ Economy¶ Project's Promise Of Jobs Has Appalachia Seeing Stars¶ "We wouldn't have to go back very far — literally just seven or eight years — and the picture for the industry here in North America was pretty uncertain," says Randy Woelfel, CEO of NOVA Chemicals in Calgary, Alberta.¶ He says high oil prices sent a lot of petrochemical manufacturing overseas to the Middle East and Asia. But now, low natural gas prices and the ethane-rich Marcellus Shale have changed everything.¶ "That means ... that we'll be back in the hiring business, rather than the consolidation and survival/cost-cutting mode that NOVA was clearly in for much of the last decade," Woelfel says.

#### Collapses innovation which causes extinction

ICCA 2 – ICCA (International Council of Chemical Associations), June 20, 2002, “SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY,” online: http://www.cefic.be/position/icca/pp\_ic010.htm

Sustainability in economic terms means the efficient management of scarce resources as well as a prospering industry and economy. Sustainability in the environmental sense means not placing an intolerable load on the ecosphere and maintaining the natural basis for life. Seen from society's viewpoint, sustainability means that human beings are the centre of concern. In view, particularly, of the population increase worldwide, there needs to be provided as large a measure of equal opportunities, freedom, social justice and security as possible. ¶ The chemical industry views Sustainable Development as a challenge put before all parts of society. In the advances made in its own operations, its improved performance and in the improvements to the human condition made through its products, the chemical industry sees cause for optimism and believes that Sustainable Development can be the intellectual framework around which the chemical industry, other industries and other sectors of society can reach consensus on how to improve living standards and the environment. ¶ The main challenges facing the world include:- ¶ \* Optimizing the benefits obtained from depleting resources¶ \* Assuring against excessive strains placed on the eco-system¶ \* The dynamic growth of the world population¶ \* Remedying social and economic inequalities¶ These are challenges on a global scale. It follows, therefore, that the attainment of Sustainable Development will call for action on the part of the people, governments, businesses and organisations around the world. The global chemical industry has realized this challenge. ¶ CONTRIBUTION OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT¶ The chemical industry is a key industry. Its products and services are instrumental in meeting the needs of mankind. It is present in all areas of life, from food and clothing, housing, communications, transport - right through to leisure activities. In addition, it helps to solve the problems of other sectors of industry, such as the energy sector, information technologies, environmental industries and the waste disposal sector, as examples.¶ Due to its size, the chemical industry is an important supplier to a broad range of downstream industries and is, as well, a customer of a broad range of products and services from other industries. It follows, therefore, that the chemical industry plays a major role in providing/ supporting performance improvements, research and development progress and, last but not least, employment in other industries.¶ In itself, it is a large-scale provider of jobs and makes a significant contribution to wealth creation and, hence, to the financing of both public works and the exercise of public responsibilities. Since living standards are determined to a large degree by material considerations, it is clear that the chemical industry with its unique capabilities is in a position to make a decisive contribution to Sustainable Development.¶ Commitment by the world chemical industry to the concept of Sustainable Development requires words to be transposed into company-specific action programmes in order to provide a framework for all those working in the sector. Its "Responsible Care" initiative, self-monitoring systems and other voluntary programmes such as Sustainable Technology (SUSTECH), Education-Industry Partnerships, Energy Efficiency Programmes are also part of this framework. Thereby, companies are also confronted with new challenges and must act responsibly. They must take account of the consequences of their actions upon society and future generations.¶ The global chemical industry believes that the key to improving the performance of the industry is both its commitment to achieving environmentally sound Sustainable Development and improved performance and transparency. Under the concept ¶ environment, to seek continuous improvement in performance, to educate all staff and work with customers and communities regarding product use and overall operation. Through these efforts the industry is improving its efficiency, reducing risks to health and the environment and making better products which, in turn, help individual and industry customers.¶ THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY's LEADERSHIP IN INNOVATION¶ The very notion of Sustainable Development will require new approaches in a number of areas. Innovation at all levels and in all fields of activity is the most effective instrument for ensuring that the economic, and environmental goals, as well as those of society, are being advanced.¶ The chemical industry's contribution is to continue innovation of new products that meet customer needs and manufacturing processes that reduce risks to health and the environment. This contribution is based upon the knowledge and experience the industry has acquired from applying innovation not only to making, handling and use of chemical compounds, but also to reprocessing, recycling and solving environmental problems. The challenge facing the chemical industry is to maximize innovation, which can contribute to society meeting its goals for Sustainable Development. ¶ The chemical industry is firmly convinced that leadership in innovation represents the best way of attaining Sustainable Development. For the individual company, this means:- ¶ \* a consistent orientation towards products, technologies and solutions which offer the greatest promise for the future¶ \* development of new integrated environmental technologies¶ \* a close cooperation with the customers of the chemical industry¶ \* adaptation to the conditions of global competition¶ \* bringing the most promising products quickly on the market¶ \* strengthening the R&D effort which requires resources which can only be financed from profitable earnings¶ \* actively contributing ideas and suggestions to the policy debates taking place in society¶ \* improving process yield (efficiency).¶ APPROACH TO THE ECONOMIC GOAL OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT¶ The internationalization of the economy at large, in conjunction with a growing trend towards global competition, is becoming more and more apparent. This is being manifested by:- ¶ \* an increase of imports and exports of goods as well as services¶ \* growing outward and inward flows of direct investment¶ \* an ever increasing exchange of technology transfers¶ \* globalization of monetary and financial schemes. ¶ The inter-relation of economic systems is complex, with a variety of relationships among countries. Multi-national chemical companies apply common standards in spreading investment capital and stimulating markets around the globe, thus setting the scene for the world market. What they need, in order to play a constructive role in Sustainable Development, is, first and foremost, freedom and fairness in international trade. Trade as an engine of economic growth is essential for Sustainable Development. A climate needs to be fostered within which such growth may take place on the basis of a clear set of rules with predictable consequences, by which investors may be guided in their long-term decision-making process. This includes bringing to a halt the growing intervention by governments in industry and their ever increasing demands to raise income by taxation, thus imposing a disproportionate load on the business community.¶ Wealth creation and **profits are fundamental to Sustainable Development**. They sustain economies (not just the chemical industry), and contribute, via re-investment and R&D, to new technologies and environmental improvements. Profits are needed to create flexible company structures oriented towards economic, environmental and society-related requirements.¶ The chemical industry is a major industrial sector and an essential contributor to welfare and employment on a global scale. In order to maintain this position under the imperative of Sustainable Development, the long-term future of the industry must be rooted in a dynamic policy, whereby continual innovation and re-engineering of companies result in an increase of productivity and, thus, keeping up international competitiveness as a pre-requisite of sustainable job creation.

### Adv 1

No Pakistan collapse

**Bandow 9** – Senior Fellow @ Cato, former special assistant to Reagan (11/31/09, Doug, “Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10924)

From Pakistan's perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to "victory," whatever that would mean. In fact, the least likely outcome is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation's strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling. Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: "Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the neighborhood can adapt and resist." The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

#### Army checks any instability in Pakistan.

Grare 06 (Frédéric, Visiting Scholar @ Carnegie “Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist Peril” <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/45.grare.final.pdf>)

As sectarian conflict has intensified in Pakistan, the army has been accused of having created an Islamic Frankenstein it could no longer control. Yet, careful examination shows that the army, including the ISI direc- torate, has always been able to maintain violence at an “acceptable” level by dividing groups, generating infighting every time an organization became too important, and sometimes physically eliminating uncontrolable elements. Azam Tariq, leader of the Lashkar-e-Janghvi, the most lethal sectarian Sunni terrorist organization, was assassinated on October 5, 2003, for example. The army nevertheless cannot maintain total control. In December 2004, two suicide attackers nearly succeeded in assassinating Musharraf. Some extremely militant groups have become so estranged by the army leader- ship’s turn to the United States that they are beyond the government’s control. In November 2003, when Musharraf banned fifteen to seventeen violent sectarian organizations, other similar organizations that are useful in Afghanistan and Kashmir were merely kept on a watch list. Although sectarian violence is a serious law-and-order problem, it is not a threat to regime stability in Pakistan.

#### Afghan instability doesn’t escalate

#### Finel 9 [Dr. Bernard I. Finel, an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a senior fellow at the American Security Project, “Afghanistan is Irrelevant,” Apr 27 http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/afghanistan-irrelevant]

#### It is now a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that the decision to “abandon” Afghanistan after the Cold War was a tragic mistake. In the oft-told story, our “abandonment” led to civil war, state collapse, the rise of the Taliban, and inevitably terrorist attacks on American soil. This narrative is now reinforced by dire warnings about the risks to Pakistan from instability in Afghanistan. Taken all together, critics of the Afghan commitment now find themselves facing a nearly unshakable consensus in continuing and deepen our involvement in Afghanistan. The problem with the consensus is that virtually every part of it is wrong. Abandonment did not cause the collapse of the state. Failed states are not always a threat to U.S. national security. And Pakistan’s problems have little to do with the situation across the border. First, the collapse of the Afghan state after the Soviet withdrawal had little to do with Western abandonment. Afghanistan has always been beset by powerful centrifugal forces. The country is poor, the terrain rough, the population divided into several ethnic groups. Because of this, the country has rarely been unified even nominally and has never really had a strong central government. The dominant historical political system in Afghan is warlordism. This is not a consequence of Western involvement or lack thereof. It is a function of geography, economics, and demography. Second, there is no straight-line between state failure and threats to the United States. Indeed, the problem with Afghanistan was not that it failed but rather that it “unfailed” and becameruled by the Taliban. Congo/Zaire is a failed state. Somalia is a failed state. There are many parts of the globe that are essentially ungoverned. Clearly criminality, human rights abuses, and other global ills flourish in these spaces. But the notion that any and all ungoverned space represents a core national security threat to the United States is simply unsustainable. Third, the problem was the Taliban regime was not that it existed. It was that it was allowed to fester without any significant response or intervention. We largely sought to ignore the regime — refusing to recognize it despite its control of 90% of Afghan territory. Aside from occasional tut-tutting about human rights violations and destruction of cultural sites, the only real interaction the United States sought with the regime was in trying to control drugs. Counter-drug initiatives are not a sound foundation for a productive relationship for reasons too numerous to enumerate here. Had we recognized the Taliban and sought to engage the regime, it is possible that we could have managed to communicate red lines to them over a period of years. Their failure to turn over bin Laden immediately after 9/11 does not necessarily imply an absolute inability to drive a wedge between the Taliban and al Qaeda over time. Fourth, we are now told that defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan is imperative in order to help stabilize Pakistan. But, most observers seem to think that Pakistan is in worse shape now — with the Taliban out of power and American forces in Afghanistan — than it was when the Taliban was dominant in Afghanistan. For five years from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban ruled Afghanistan and the Islamist threat to Pakistan then was unquestionably lower. This is not surprising actually. Insurgencies are at their most dangerous — in terms of threat of contagion — when they are fighting for power. The number of insurgencies that actually manage to sponsor insurgencies elsewhere after taking power is surprising low. The domino theory is as dubious in the case of Islamist movements as it was in the case of Communist expansion. There is a notion that “everything changed on 9/11.” We are backing away as a nation from that concept in the case of torture. Perhaps we should also come to realize that our pre-9/11 assessment of the strategic value and importance of Afghanistan was closer to the mark that our current obsession with it. We clearly made some mistakes in dealing with the Taliban regime. But addressing those mistakes through better intelligence, use of special forces raids, and, yes, diplomacy is likely a better solution than trying to build and sustain a reliable, pro-Western government in Kabul with control over the entire country.

#### No proxy wars or great power wars --- incentives to cooperate outweigh

Weitz 6 [Richard, Senior Fellow and Director at the Program Management Hudson Institute, “Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia,” The Washington Quarterly]

Fortunately, the fact that Central Asia does not represent the most important geographic region for any external great power also works against the revival of a traditional, geopolitical great-game conflict. Russia, China, and the United States have strong reasons to cooperate in the region. Although each country has extensive goals in Central Asia, the resources they have available to pursue them are limited, given other priorities. As long as their general relations remain nonconfrontational, Moscow, Beijing, and Washington are unlikely to pursue policies in a lower priority region such as Central Asia that could disrupt their overall ties. Most often, they will find it more efficient and effective to collaborate to diminish redundancies, exploit synergies, and pool funding and other scarce assets in the pursuit of common objectives. Unfounded fears or overtly competitive policies could undermine these opportunities for cooperation and should be avoided.

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### No challengers

Kaplan, senior fellow – Center for a New American Security, and Kaplan, frmr. vice chairman – National Intelligence Council, ‘11

(Robert D and Stephen S, “America Primed,” *The National Interest*, March/April)

But in spite of the seemingly inevitable and rapid diminution of U.S. eminence, to write America’s great-power obituary is beyond premature. The United States remains a highly capable power. Iraq and Afghanistan, as horrendous as they have proved to be—in a broad historical sense—are still relatively minor events that America can easily overcome. The eventual demise of empires like those of Ming China and late-medieval Venice was brought about by far more pivotal blunders. Think of the Indian Mutiny against the British in 1857 and 1858. Iraq in particular—ever so frequently touted as our turning point on the road to destruction—looks to some extent eerily similar. At the time, orientalists and other pragmatists in the British power structure (who wanted to leave traditional India as it was) lost some sway to evangelical and utilitarian reformers (who wanted to modernize and Christianize India—to make it more like England). But the attempt to bring the fruits of Western civilization to the Asian subcontinent was met with a violent revolt against imperial authority. Delhi, Lucknow and other Indian cities were besieged and captured before being retaken by colonial forces. Yet, the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire at all, which continued on and even expanded for another century. Instead, it signaled the transition from more of an ad hoc imperium fired by a proselytizing lust to impose its values on others to a calmer and more pragmatic empire built on international trade and technology.1 There is no reason to believe that the fate of America need follow a more doomed course. Yes, the mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the United States’ own, but, though destructive, they are not fatal. If we withdraw sooner rather than later, the cost to American power can be stemmed. Leaving a stable Afghanistan behind of course requires a helpful Pakistan, but with more pressure Washington might increase Islamabad’s cooperation in relatively short order. In terms of acute threats, Iran is the only state that has exported terrorism and insurgency toward a strategic purpose, yet the country is economically fragile and politically unstable, with behind-the-scenes infighting that would make Washington partisans blanch. Even assuming Iran acquires a few nuclear devices—of uncertain quality with uncertain delivery systems—the long-term outlook for the clerical regime is itself unclear. The administration must only avoid a war with the Islamic Republic. To be sure, America may be in decline in relative terms compared to some other powers, as well as to many countries of the former third world, but in absolute terms, particularly military ones, the United States can easily be the first among equals for decades hence. China, India and Russia are the only major Eurasian states prepared to wield military power of consequence on their peripheries. And each, in turn, faces its own obstacles on the road to some degree of dominance. The Chinese will have a great navy (assuming their economy does not implode) and that will enforce a certain level of bipolarity in the world system. But Beijing will lack the alliance network Washington has, even as China and Russia will always be—because of geography—inherently distrustful of one another. China has much influence, but no credible military allies beyond possibly North Korea, and its authoritarian regime lives in fear of internal disruption if its economic growth rate falters. Furthermore, Chinese naval planners look out from their coastline and see South Korea and a string of islands—Japan, Taiwan and Australia—that are American allies, as are, to a lesser degree, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. To balance a rising China, Washington must only preserve its naval and air assets at their current levels. India, which has its own internal insurgency, is bedeviled by semifailed states on its borders that critically sap energy and attention from its security establishment, and especially from its land forces; in any case, India has become a de facto ally of the United States whose very rise, in and of itself, helps to balance China. Russia will be occupied for years regaining influence in its post-Soviet near abroad, particularly in Ukraine, whose feisty independence constitutes a fundamental challenge to the very idea of the Russian state. China checks Russia in Central Asia, as do Turkey, Iran and the West in the Caucasus. This is to say nothing of Russia’s diminishing population and overwhelming reliance on energy exports. Given the problems of these other states, America remains fortunate indeed. The United States is poised to tread the path of postmutiny Britain. America might not be an empire in the formal sense, but its obligations and constellation of military bases worldwide put it in an imperial-like situation, particularly because its air and naval deployments will continue in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world. No country is in such an enviable position to keep the relative peace in Eurasia as is the United States—especially if it can recover the level of enduring competence in national-security policy last seen during the administration of George H. W. Bush. This is no small point. America has strategic advantages and can enhance its power while extricating itself from war. But this requires leadership—not great and inspiring leadership which comes along rarely even in the healthiest of societies—but plodding competence, occasionally steely nerved and always free of illusion.

### Adv 2

**Intervening actors check disease impact**

**Zakaria 9—**Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)

Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize

It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But **we** can rarely **anticipate the human response to that crisis**. Takeswine flu. The virushad crucial characteristicsthat led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century.

#### No nuclear terror-

**Wolfe 12 –** Alan Wolfe is Professor of Political Science at Boston College. He is also a Senior Fellow with the World Policy Institute at the New School University in New York. A contributing editor of The New Republic, The Wilson Quarterly, Commonwealth Magazine, and In Character, Professor Wolfe writes often for those publications as well as for Commonweal, The New York Times, Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly, The Washington Post, and other magazines and newspapers. March 27, 2012, "Fixated by “Nuclear Terror” or Just Paranoia?" [http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-“nuclear-terror”-or-just-paranoia-2/](http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-)

If one were to read the most recent unclassified report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions, it does have a section on CBRN terrorism (note, not WMD terrorism). The intelligence community has a very toned down statement that says “several terrorist groups … probably remain interested in [CBRN] capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of those capabilities. … mostly focusing on low-level chemicals and toxins.” They’re talking about terrorists getting industrial chemicals and making ricin toxin, not nuclear weapons. And yes, Ms. Squassoni, it is primarily al Qaeda that the U.S. government worries about, no one else. The trend of worldwide terrorism continues to remain in the realm of conventional attacks. In 2010, there were more than 11,500 terrorist attacks, affecting about 50,000 victims including almost 13,200 deaths. None of them were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009, none were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,800 terrorist attacks in 2008, none were caused by CBRN hazards.

#### No water wars – best studies

Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT,

(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

#### Nuclear desalination turns case- infiltrates fresh water aquifers, resulting in a net decrease in the amount of available freshwater AND it salinates soil, devastating agricultural production

IAEA, 2010

[International atomic energy agency study, Environmental impact assessment of nuclear desalination, <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1642_web.pdf>] /Wyo-MB

Although never applied in a nuclear desalination facility, indirect (subsurface) seawater ¶ intakes remain an option. From an environmental impact perspective, their greatest problem ¶ lies in possible fresh groundwater aquifer deterioration from seawater intrusion, if not well ¶ designed and constructed. Most commonly this happens by disturbing the flow balance that ¶ exists between waters with different salinity. When water is pumped out of a beach well, ¶ higher salinity water moves in the upper layers thus, for instance, enlarging the coastal ¶ brackish water zone where the fresh water is mixed with seawater. (Figure 10) Intake pipes positioned through aquifers present another potential danger due to possible leaks ¶ of seawater, which is why, for instance, this option was ruled out in advance for the ¶ desalination plant in Ashkelon, Israel [49]. Over time, increased salinity of the fresh aquifer ¶ water can lead to soil salinization and subsequently to floral deterioration including ¶ agricultural decline. Changes in the salinity stratification of the aquifer waters may also lead ¶ to lower quality of the desalination feedwater, affecting the performance of the desalination ¶ process. Finally, the initial disturbance due to construction may be higher when indirect ¶ intakes are applied, as seabed sediments are replaced or resuspended [25]. Their entrainment ¶ and impingement potential though, is negligible.

#### Alt cause to water wars (political allocation), and trade would solve the impact

**Allouche 11**, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January), accessed 11/4/12,WYO/JF

This article has provided an overview of the current and future challenges in terms of global food and water systems. The major focus of the argument has been on how resource scarcity is a contested and subjective concept which cannot fully explain conflict, political instability or food insecurity. The politics of inequality and allocation are much more important variables in explaining water and food insecurity. This is particularly true for conflicts. Although resource scarcity has been linked to international wars, the current data shows that most conflict over water and food are much more local. But there again, although resource scarcity can be linked to malnutrition, hunger and water insecurity, in the majority of cases, water and food insecurity are rarely about competition over resources but rather reflect the politics of allocation and inequality. In this respect, war and conflicts aggravate these insecurities not just on the short term but also on the long term. At the global level, food security has considerably improved and provides the means to address these insecurities. Trade can certainly be seen as a way to address access for countries that are under severe stress in terms of food and water and provides logical grounds for questioning the various water and food wars scenarios. Although global trade and technological innovation are key drivers in providing stable and resilient global systems, the most destabilizing global water-related threat is increasing food prices and hunger. Overall, decision-makers should show greater concern for the human beings who make their living in agriculture, so that those at risk of livelihood and food-security failures, especially under anticipated scenarios of climate change, will be less deprived. Current debates linked to global food security and climate fail to address the political dimension of resource scarcity which is primarily linked to the politics of inequality, gender and power.

#### No risk of Asia war – Peaceful China and multilateral institutions

Bitzinger and Desker, 9

[Richard, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Barry, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, “ Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival | vol. 50 no. 6 | December 2008–January 2009

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely. This is not to say that the region will not undergo significant changes. The rise of China constitutes perhaps the most significant challenge to regional security and stability – and, from Washington’s vantage point, to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The United States increasingly sees China as its key peer challenger in Asia: China was singled out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as having, among the ‘major and emerging powers … the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States’.1 Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Second World War, it will probably not remain so over the next 25 years. A rising China will present a critical foreign-policy challenge, in some ways more difficult than that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.2 While the Soviet Union was a political and strategic competitor, China will be a formidable political, strategic and economic competitor. This development will lead to profound changes in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. Still, the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is more likely; the emergence of a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. While Beijing is increasingly prone to push its own agenda, defend its interests, engage in more nationalistic – even chauvinistic – behaviour (witness the Olympic torch counter-protests), and seek to displace the United States as the regional hegemon, this does not necessarily translate into an expansionist or warlike China. If anything, Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions of international relations, particularly by co-opting these to meet its own purposes. This ‘soft power’ process can be described as an emerging ‘Beijing Consensus’ in regional international affairs. Moreover, when the Chinese military build-up is examined closely, it is clear that the country’s war machine, while certainly worth taking seriously, is not quite as threatening as some might argue.

# 2nc/1nr

### 2NC – Impact Debate

#### The Impact outweighs and turns the aff, extend Burke--

#### Timeframe: Security logic results in systemic violence that is happening now through policy solutions and the construction of threats.

#### Probability: Burke says the logic of certainty combined with the ontology of security makes violent policies inevitable

#### Magnitude: causes the worst forms of atrocity through calculative thinking and threat construction, massive wars, environmental destruction and other forms of mass killing are inevitable

#### No V2l is a root cause claim-security logic is behind all violence—enframing treats people as means rather than ends. This results in the political exclusion of dangerous life. This turns the aff because if life isn’t worth living than there is no reason that death is an impact

#### Energy security produces normalized drive for warfare and violence that outweighs the aff

Ciuta, 2010

[Felix, School of Slavonic and East European Studies University College London, UK, Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?, Security Dialogue 2010 41: 123, Online, Sage Journals] /Wyo-MB

Even casual observers will be familiar with the argument that energy is a security issue because it is either a cause or an instrument of war or con- flict. Two different strands converge in this logic of energy security. The first strand focuses on energy as an instrument: energy is what states fight their current wars with. We can find here arguments regarding the use of the ‘energy weapon’ by supplier states (Belkin, 2007: 4; Lugar, 2006: 3; Winstone, Bolton & Gore, 2007: 1; Yergin, 2006a: 75); direct substitutions in which ener- gy is viewed as the ‘equivalent of nuclear weapons’ (Morse & Richard, 2002: 2); and rhetorical associations that establish policy associations, as exempli- fied by the panel ‘Guns and Gas’ during the Transatlantic Conference of the Bucharest NATO Summit.5 The second strand comes from the literature on resource wars, defined as ‘hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valu- able resources’ (Victor, 2007: 1). Energy is seen as a primary cause of great- power conflicts over scarce energy resources (Hamon & Dupuy, 2008; Klare, 2001, 2008). Alternatively, energy is seen as a secondary cause of conflict; here, research has focused on the dynamics through which resource scarcity in general and energy scarcity in particular generate socio-economic, political and environmental conditions such as population movements, internal strife, secessionism and desertification, which cause or accelerate both interstate and intrastate conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994, 2008; Solana, 2008; see also Dalby, 2004).¶ As is immediately apparent, this logic draws on a classic formulation that¶ states that ‘a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able . . . to maintain them by victory in such a war’ (Lippmann, 1943: 51). The under- lying principle of this security logic is survival: not only surviving war, but also a generalized quasi-Darwinian logic of survival that produces wars over energy that are fought with ‘energy weapons’. At work in this framing of the energy domain is therefore a definition of security as ‘the absence of threat to acquired values’ (Wolfers, 1952: 485), more recently reformulated as ‘sur- vival in the face of existential threats’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 27). The defining parameters of this traditional security logic are therefore: (1) an understanding of security focused on the use of force, war and conflict (Walt, 1991: 212; Freedman, 1998: 48); and (2) a focus on states as the subjects and objects of energy security.¶ In the war logic, energy security is derivative of patterns of international politics – often captured under the label ‘geopolitics’ (Aalto & Westphal, 2007: 3) – that lend their supposedly perennial attributes to the domain of energy (Barnes, Jaffe & Morse, 2004; Jaffe & Manning, 1998). The struggle for energy is thus subsumed under the ‘normal’ competition for power, survival, land, valuable materials or markets (Leverett & Noël, 2007). A key effect of this logic is to ‘arrest’ issues usually not associated with war, and thus erase their distinctive characteristics. Even the significance of energy qua energy is abolished by the implacable grammar of conflict: energy becomes a resource like any other, which matters insofar as it affects the distribution of capabili- ties in the international system. As a result, a series of transpositions affect most of the issues ranked high on the energy security agenda. For example, in the European context, the problem is not necessarily energy (or, more pre- cisely, gas, to avoid the typical reduction performed by such accounts). The problem lies in the ‘geopolitical interests’ of Russia and other supplier states, whose strength becomes inherently threatening (Burrows & Treverton, 2007; Horsley, 2006). Energy security policies become entirely euphemistic, as illus- trated for example by statements that equate ‘avoiding energy isolation’ with ‘beating Russia’ (Baran, 2007).¶

### 2NC – Framework

#### **The role of the ballot is to accept or reject the discursive assumptions of the 1ac.**

#### Treat the 1ac like a term paper, if the assumptions, language and premises that the paper draws its conclusions from are flawed than you reject it prior to looking at its results.

#### And its predictable, the affirmative should have to defend the process by which they arrive at their conclusions and impacts

#### Its educational, the criticism provides education about what we can do as academic actors, we will never be policy makers, and polices don’t change from college debate. Rather, engaging criticism of discourse allows us to effect the world though changing our assumptions. Those assumptions ultimately shape policy problems and solutions.

#### And its fair, they will always have the strategic advantage when they get to weigh hyperbolic impacts, you should let the negative get in the game by challenging their ability to arrive at those impacts in the first place

#### So there is no mistake let me be clear, If they don’t win that the debate leaves this room and they effect policy than they don’t get an aff

#### And our criticism comes logically prior to policymaking:

#### Extend Bruce, evidence is conclusive that discourse and assumptions must be criticized prior to policy making because discourse creates reality, it shapes our assumptions about the world which determines what things are identified as problems, and it makes certain types of solutions to problems as inevitable. The only way to preform best policy analysis is to crack open the terrain of policy making to allow for more questions and solutions to be explored

#### Coherence – only incorporation of representations can make sense of political reality

Jourde 6 – Cedric Jourde \* Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, 2002 \* M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, 1996 \* B.Sc., Political Science, Université de Montréal, Montréal, 1995 Hegemony or Empire?: The redefinition of US Power under George W Bush Ed. David and Grondin p. 182-3 2006

Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon representations. Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply 'insignificant', thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states' domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as 'unstable\*, 'prosperous', or 'ethnically divided'. It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant'.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor's and group of actors' cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints. Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of 'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a 'terrorist network', such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum. the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other\* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'.

#### **Supremacy of policy-making crowds out critical questioning – causes serial policy failure**

Biswas 7 (Shampa, Professor of Politics – Whitman College, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist”, Millennium, 36(1), p. 117-125)

**The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’**, he argues, **is** ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and **the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on** ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘**impersonal** theories and **methodologies’, and** most worrisome of all, their ability and **willingness to be** **seduced by power**.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 **This is** not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger **question of** intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR **scholars** to **feel the need to formulate their** scholarly **conclusions** in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured **entirely in terms of policy wisdom**. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds **of ethical questions** irreducible **to formulaic ‘for or against’ and** ‘costs and benefits’ analysis **can** simply **not be raised**. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘**intellectual relevance’** that is larger and more worthwhile, that **is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical** and perhaps unanswerable **questions rather than** the **offering** of recipes and **solutions**, that **is about** politics**(rather than techno-expertise**) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

#### If we win any of our framing arguments it means that they have to justify their assumptions about the world before being able to weigh their affirmative. It also means that even if they get to weigh their aff against the K you should first ask the question of which strategy can solve their impacts better. We have contextual evidence that discursive criticism can solve the impacts of security language and improve policy debates. If they cant win advocacy of policy solutions in college debate changes governmental policy than you should not evaluate their ability to access an impact

#### Finally, Were an impact turn to their framework—they securitize debate by policing what is and is not acceptable speech, leads to forms of discursive violence in debate, by placing some life and knowledge over others, that’s 1NC Burke evidence

#### their Knowledge framing causes governmentality

Death, 2006

[Carl, department of international politics University of Wales, “Resisting (Nuclear) Power? Environmental Regulation in South Africa” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 109, Mainstreaming the African Environment in Development (Sep., 2006), pp. 407-424, Accessed online via JSTOR] /Wyo-MB

Michel Foucault's concept of 'governmentality' has been influential in re-theorising the links between political power, domination and resistance (Foucault, 2000a; Gordon, 1991; Rose, 1999). It takes as its starting point the assertion that political power defines the extent to which 'some men can more or less entirely determine other men's conduct - but never exhaustively or coercively' (Foucault, 2000b:324). For Foucault, power is everywhere, and constitutes relationships between individu- als. Power produces society, forms of knowledge, institutions and even our own identities. Power is thus not merely repressive, nor is it a normatively good or bad concept. Yet there are various types of power relationships - ranging from the fluid, shifting relationships that exist between individuals, to the sedimented, coercive relationships that characterise domination. In between these extremes are forms of power Foucault describes as techniques of government, established systems for regulating the conduct of conduct (Foucault, 1997a:298-299).These techniques of government have been referred to as manifestations of governmentality, or the rationality of government.¶ This concept draws attention to the numerous ways in which conduct is regulated - through our internalisation of certain roles (such as the economically rational individual, or the responsible citizen) and the advice of authoritative experts, in order to render society efficient, safe and productive. Therefore, for Nikolas Rose, freedom and government are mutually dependant within traditional Liberal political thought, since 'to dominate is to ignore or to attempt to crush the capacity for action of the dominated. But to govern is to recognise that capacity for action and adjust oneself to it' (Rose, 1999:4).This view of power, freedom and government has implications for the way we conceive of resistance, in particular rendering concepts like emancipation and liberation problematic. Since power is productive and everywhere, and government works through freedom, a power-free utopia is clearly impossible. Thus resistance in this article implies simply an unsettling or challenging of existing power relations (Darier, 1999).

#### This reproduces the impacts of the criticism through their framing arguments—debates about nuclear power from outside of the position of the centralized state are impossible because of the hegemony of expert knowledge—the kritik is a key starting point

Martin, 1986

[Brian, Nuclear Suppression, Science and Public Policy vol. 13 number 6, December 1986, 312-320, Online, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/86spp.html] /Wyo-MB

In the debates and struggle over nuclear technology, the promoters have used their monopoly over nuclear knowledge to claim that they should have the final say. Opponents have argued that the key issues are not technical but rather social, political and economic. This response has had only limited impact so long as nuclear expertise remains unchallenged. One of the potent tools brought to bear by the opponents is 'counter-experts': knowledgeable people, often with credentials and experience in nuclear areas, who openly oppose the nuclear establishment.¶ One of the responses to such counter-experts is attempts to suppress them. This can take such forms as blocking publications, refusing permission to give talks, refusing or withdrawing funds and staff, job transfers, sacking, blacklisting and character assassination. Instead of responding to the arguments of the critical expert, the individual is attacked personally. Such attacks are almost always justified in 'legitimate' terms, such as penalties for failure to perform satisfactorily. Seldom is dissidence itself openly acknowledged as the reason for the suppression.¶ The first essential element in suppression is an act of dissidence, such as a speech, letter, report or research programme which threatens the practices or legitimacy of a powerful group such as a corporation, a state bureaucracy or a profession. The second essential element is an action by that powerful group, or by someone acting in its interests, to attack the dissident or to prevent freedom of speech or inquiry.¶ Suppression of intellectual dissent is a widespread phenomenon, found in a host of fields and organisational situations.[22-25] In most corporations and state bureaucracies, fundamental dissidence is rare, since employees realise that speaking out would jeopardise their promotions or jobs. Even in universities, where "academic freedom" should protect the staff, speaking out can be risky for one's career, and most never take the opportunity to find out. Needless to say, under military rule or state socialism, the opportunities to dissent are even more restricted.¶ The study of suppression of intellectual dissent is an undeveloped and disorganised area. Here I list a number of cases in the nuclear area which seem to fit the category of suppression: there is some threat to the interests of the promoters of nuclear technology, and some attempt to attack the source of the threat by the exercise of administrative power rather than to respond to dissident views by reasoned argument. The view that suppression is involved in a great many of these cases draws strength from the common pattern of events and its congruence with the theoretical explanation of suppression.[26]¶ In my experience, the search for evidence about suppression - which covers everything from journal articles and books to newspaper accounts, internal documents and letters, and verbal reports - can never be completed, since single cases frequently can disclose a mountain of complications and detail, and the number of cases never seems to end. Only thumbnail sketches of cases are included here. Some of these cases may turn out to have other interpretations but, as a whole, I hope they cause some general alarm bells to ring.

#### The political has already been ceded in the context of nuclear debates. Expert knowledge controls publics participation, only our critique of centralized power can democratize the nuclear political

Martin, 1986

[Brian, Nuclear Suppression, Science and Public Policy vol. 13 number 6, December 1986, 312-320, Online, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/86spp.html] /Wyo-MB

The key 'crime' of those who are victimised is not having critical ideas or doing critical research, but rather taking the critical ideas to the general public. In-house criticism sometimes can be tolerated: involving the public threatens the claimed monopoly of expertise and the control over decision-making by bureaucrats and professionals.¶ The most common methods of suppression in these cases seem to be cutting off funds (especially in the United States), transferring the dissident to another post or place and, if necessary, dismissal. This does not mean that these are the most prevalent forms of suppression: they just tend to be more visible.¶ Arguably the most common forms of suppression are blocking of publications, appointments and research funds. These decisions are usually made in secret and are unaccountable. Also important are various forms of petty harassment, which are very difficult to document.¶ Probably the most important consequence of suppression or the threat of it is the climate of conformity and fear of controversy found in most scientific organisations. Overt suppression of dissent is seldom required because so few scientists are willing to utilise their 'scientific freedom' to speak out. As Robert Jungk puts it, "It would appear that in the western world the fear of job loss is the equivalent of the eastern world's harsher methods of dissuasion".[91]¶ It is revealing that employers avoid openly admitting to discrimination because of a worker's views on nuclear issues. The official reasons for action (if any are given) are almost always presented in 'legitimate' terms, such as poor work performance. Neither public perceptions nor private self-respect would allow open admission of suppression. For any organisation to discriminate against a critic is widely recognised as unjust.¶ Finally, it is striking how seldom co-workers support victimised dissidents. To be a dissident is risky, and even to consort with critics can be dangerous to one's career. The courts seldom provide much satisfaction to those who are victimised, precisely because the official reasons are couched in legitimate terms such as transfers and supervisor evaluations. The greatest support for dissidents comes from colleagues around the world, from the anti-nuclear movement and from the media. Fear of adverse media coverage undoubtedly inhibits reprisals against dissidents.¶ Dhirendra Sharma's experiences appear to fit all these patterns. It is his outspoken criticisms of India's nuclear programmes which have made him the target of suppression. Other science policy researchers have made similar criticisms. Those who are not from India cannot easily be attacked. Furthermore, criticisms which are couched in cautious and esoteric terms in academic journals often have little political impact. Sharma speaks from a prestigious position in the political heart of India, and he speaks clearly and accessibly to a wide audience.¶ The attack on Sharma has taken the familiar form of a transfer. As is typical, opposition to Sharma's criticisms was not given as the reason for this transfer. Neither was any other reason given. The lack of a 'legitimate' explanation is not uncommon in suppression cases. In Sharma's case, the real reasons appear transparent, and this allows mobilisation of opposition.¶ Finally, Sharma's case is also typical in that no support from other staff at his university has been forthcoming. He has often been labelled a CIA agent (remember that India has strong foreign policy ties to the Soviet Union), a slur which provides a convenient excuse for left-wing academics in India to avoid taking a stand which might hurt their careers. The most effective resistance has been letters to Indian newspapers from eminent figures around the world, including Noam Chomsky and Tony Benn,[92]and articles in newspapers.[93]¶ Sharma initially refused to acquiesce in Jawaharlal Nehru University's transfer of his position. In various letters to the administration, he demanded that university regulations be followed. JNU did not respond to Sharma's letters, but proceeded by charging him with misconduct and stopping his salary while he was doing research in Britain on nuclear and science policy.¶ In late 1985, Sharma, "under protest", joined the School of Languages. As convenor of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, he continues to give talks and interviews and write articles about science policy, especially in the nuclear area. He is organising an independent People's Commission on Atomic Energy.¶ Those individuals who make public criticisms of powerful political and economic interests provide a valuable public service by promoting public debate on important issues. In the nuclear area, the overwhelming political and economic strength has been on the side of the nuclear industry. In opposition have been a range of grass-roots movements.[94]¶ Nuclear dissidents play a vital role in puncturing the industry's claim to a near monopoly on expert opinion. For this reason, opposition to nuclear suppression should be a high priority, not only to oppose injustice to individuals but also to maintain public discussion of critical social issues.

## Link Block

### 2NC Link Block

#### Link is obvious. Martin says there is a connection between nuclear power production and the military and fuels a nexus of militarized secret science that enables state power and securitization. The plan builds reactors for the military—this is the link

#### Bruce, Burke, and Plumwood are our second link and fundamental premise. Security is constructed through speech acts like the 1ac that enable nuclear power and threat logic to be normalized and promoted into different parts of everyday life by normalizing violent assumptions

### 2NC – AT: SMRs Link Turn

#### ---The Affirmative’s story of salvation by the little-modular-reactor-that-could assumes a narrative of progressive technological determinism that befogs effective policymaking and precludes rational risk assessment.

Carper and Schmid 2011 (Ross Carper (rosscarper@gmail.com), a writer based in Washington state, is the founding editor of the creative nonfiction project BeyondtheBracelet.com. Sonja Schmid (sschmid@vt.edu) is an assistant professor in Science and Technology Studies at Virginia Tech. “The Little Reactor That Could?” http://www.issues.org/27.4/carper.html)

“It turns out that most of the … mishaps [in nuclear plants] actually involve humans. So we were thinking today, what do we do to create a power plant control system to minimize that kind of impact? We came up with the following. The power plant of the future will have three control devices: a computer, a dog, and a guy. The computer runs the power plant because, as I said, most power plant mishaps happen because of human interaction. The dog keeps people away from the computer. And the guy is just there to feed the dog.” After lingering on the title slide a moment longer—“New. Clear. Energy.” in yellow letters—he advanced the screen and gave his opening line, a message he would revisit throughout his talk. “It’s more of a battery metaphor.” As the co-founder and president of Hyperion Power Generation, Deal was referring to his company’s starring product, which he believes will represent a radical revolution for nuclear power. He has also described the Hyperion Power Module (HPM), which is only a few feet wide and not much taller, as the iPhone of nuclear power: a compact, technologically elegant device that will be a worldwide sensation for its portability, ease of use, and applications. These first moments of a normal overview presentation contain two of Hyperion’s prominent talking points: a piece of imagery and a problem solved. HPMs are batteries that eliminate nuclear energy’s obstacles related to human error and expertise. For the latter point, his Denver talk and many others refer to the goal of taking Homer Simpson out of the equation. When Sonja Schmid and I set out to capture the story of small modular reactors, it quickly became clear that this technological coming-of-age tale is really, at least for now, a story about stories—the imagery industry leaders use to both envision their designs and communicate them to policymakers and the public. Behind the technical fact sheets, and in the years that remain before designs become physical machinery, small reactors are a movement of metaphors. On many topics, imagery doesn’t carry substantive weight. It is added for flavor, to simplify, clarify, or restate content in more vivid terms. But in the house of small nuclear reactors, metaphors seem to be weight-bearing walls. They also come in the context of a debate that couldn’t have higher stakes. On one hand, our world must quickly scale up new sources of carbon-neutral energy. On the other, the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, reminded us that our attempts to do so in the nuclear sector may result in unforeseen complications that can spiral into disasters. In today’s proposals for a new nuclear approach, presentation matters. But how much does corporate imagery reveal about the technology itself and its implications, and how accurate are the pictures the industry paints? Is small beautiful? Overall, the emerging vision of small modular reactors is a major downshift from the custom-built giants of yesteryear to new railcar-ready, factory-manufactured, standardized machines with an electricity output in the range of 25 to 200 megawatts (MW), rather than the 1,000 or more MW that is typical in today’s commercial reactors. A growing faction of promoters believes that these small reactors can provide solid answers to the myriad risks nuclear energy continues to face: safety, weapons proliferation, waste management, and initial capital cost. Each small reactor design offers a unique narrative of how it will remove or reduce these risks. Recurring themes include built-in capsule-like containment, passive cooling features, pledges for more effective disposal or recycling of waste, and a kind of inverse “economies of scale”: advantages offered by small capital investment, standardization, and mass production. Because none of these small designs has yet been licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and all of them are still several years from market deployment in even the most optimistic scenarios, they make a convenient canvas on which to paint metaphors. In the case of radically advanced reactor designs and deployment strategies, both corporations and journalists readily put vivid colors to use. Others are cast in more muted, evolutionary tones: They are miniature versions of the world’s tried-and-true light-water reactors, with substantially improved safety features. Leading revolutionary approaches in fuel, moderation, and cooling include reactors by Hyperion, Toshiba, and GE Hitachi, whereas efforts in favor of a more incremental design change include NuScale, Westinghouse, and Babcock & Wilcox. All leading small reactors create a modular option, which allows them to be pieced together like LEGO blocks to build up a customized power supply. Customers could potentially receive their prepackaged mini-reactors anywhere in the world, as long as the site is accessible by boat, truck, or rail. Judging by a rising emphasis on small modular reactors within President Obama’s past two budget requests, not to mention Energy Secretary Steven Chu’s outspoken affection for the technology, small reactors are increasingly being considered a highly exportable clean energy innovation and therefore prime candidates to implement the administration’s “win the future” message. Returning to Hyperion, the way they present their technology shows that subtlety is not a priority. In some sense, there is a space for this; the small reactor market is already revolutionary in that it allows room for entrepreneurs to join the nuclear energy ranks alongside giant, buttoned-up corporations. And some entrepreneurs have a habit of making big, bold claims—early and often. Most recently, a February 2011 Time magazine article titled “Nuclear Batteries” prominently features the “tanned and enthusiastic” Grizz Deal. Curiously, the author of the piece uses the phrase “nuclear battery” throughout, not as a metaphor but as the default label for Hyperion’s small reactor. Along the way, Deal outlines his goals for the HPM, a commercialized design that is based on work performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. By the end of the article, he is quoted offering to “take care” of much of the world’s nuclear fuel, precluding the need for new nations to pursue enrichment or reprocessing programs, because these countries will presumably rely entirely on leasing Hyperion’s product. The Time article is not an outlier. In dozens of trade and popular press articles, interviews, and blog posts, the character of Grizz and his imagery shine through. In November 2008, he was quoted in the Guardian on Hyperion’s safety and nonproliferation features: “You could never have a Chernobyl-type event; there are no moving parts,” said Deal. “You would need nation-state resources in order to enrich our uranium. Temperature-wise it’s too hot to handle. It would be like stealing a barbecue with your bare hands.” Seeking out the origins of the venture helped us fill in some of the history behind the enthusiasm. It began with an initial shared motivation, which was recounted to us in an interview with Deborah Deal-Blackwell, Deal’s sister and cofounder of Hyperion. “My brother and I—neither of us have kids,” she said. “About five years ago, we started asking, what can we do to leave a legacy in the world? After some searching, we found that clean water was the answer.” Deal-Blackwell explained the leap from clean water to nuclear reactors. She and Deal had quickly found that providing clean water on large scales, such as through desalination, can be quite energy-intensive. So they began to explore options. After briefly looking into renewable energy sources, they decided on a nuclear solution to pursue their clean water mission. Deal had worked at Los Alamos as an entrepreneur in residence, and he knew of an advanced reactor design by the lab’s Otis Peterson that he thought would be perfect to commercialize. The HPM concept was born. Peterson’s design was technically intriguing to say the least. It would use uranium hydride, a novel nuclear fuel with unique self-regulating features that control the core’s temperature. But in 2009, foreseeing licensing delays with such a revolutionary approach, Hyperion decided on an entirely different design Los Alamos had produced: a uranium nitride–fueled fast reactor cooled by molten lead-bismuth. In other words, instead of forcing the NRC to create a new classification, Hyperion intends, for now, to fit its reactor within the somewhat more familiar, but still far from commercial, Generation IV category. Interestingly, the only previous application of a lead-bismuth cooled reactor was in the Alfa-class Soviet submarines developed in the 1960s. The HPM is also revolutionary in its size and its approach to spent fuel. The smallest of the leading design proposals, each unit would produce 25 MW of electricity, enough to power 20,000 U.S. homes—or considerably more homes in any other nation. Also unique is the approach of providing a factory-sealed unit that would be removed completely for refueling and waste removal every 5 to 10 years, alleviating proliferation concerns related to sensitive material accumulated in spent fuel. This is a clear innovation that, if successful, would be a positive step forward from traditional practice. As a result, the approach offers an advantage over other small reactor designs, which do not seem to contain substantively new solutions for dealing with the on-site accumulation of spent fuel. However, returning to the notion of human expertise reveals a clear weakness. Deal-Blackwell also told a version of the “feed the dog” joke during our interview, a repetition that implies that, in Hyperion’s view, human expertise is best handled by sealing it inside an automated technology. Although concerns about human error are legitimate, neither the public nor government regulators are ready to accept that scenario. Emerging technologies such as Hyperion’s call for a new and robust regulatory plan to determine what kind of human expertise is necessary for their safe operation, as well as how relevant knowledge can be created and maintained, transferred when appropriate (such as during export), and secured from illicit applications. For three years, the “battery” metaphor has been the centerpiece of Hyperion’s identity. Although some of this language seems to have been scrubbed from the company’s Web site, former statements are easy to find on other sites devoted to the leading edge of nuclear technology. One example, from an early Hyperion Web page, began with the text “Hyperion is different. Think Big Battery …” and ended with, “Think battery, with the benefits of nuclear power. Think Hyperion.” With this direct exhortation to nontechnical audiences on exactly how they should think about a small reactor, Hyperion is unmatched in its brazen communications. And as the Time article shows, the image has stuck. The question is whether it fits. In one way, it does. The HPM is envisioned as a self-contained sealed unit, delivered and used until its fuel has depleted, then carefully returned to a proper facility. But the comparison doesn’t hold much further than procedural similarities. A battery is a static device that converts stored chemical energy to electrical energy. It arguably does not belong in the same conversation as harnessing a nuclear chain reaction, the results of which include highly radioactive materials. Images on Hyperion’s Web site of buried, unattended nuclear reactors would make sense if they were merely batteries, but they are not. For this reason, more than one of the nuclear energy experts we interviewed used the term “fantasy” in reference to such scenarios that deploy “walk-away-safe” nuclear reactors. In the middle of Deal’s talk in Denver, he began flipping through some artist-drawn images. The most striking of all shows a small nuclear reactor, buried and unattended at what looked to be less than 15 feet below the surface. Two simple tubes snake upward from the reactor, drawing the eye to a pair of gray above-ground tanks, with the words “Potable Water” stamped on the side. The setting? An impoverished African village complete with about a dozen mud-constructed, thatch-roofed huts. A handful of people were drawn into the image, all of them walking to or from the clean water source, which is apparently powered by a $50 million HPM. Although the humanitarian goals that launched Hyperion are admirable, this quaint portrait of a Third-world problem goes beyond vivid jokes, iPods, batteries, and barbecues to reveal a full savior narrative that casts Hyperion’s small reactor as a solution to some of humanity’s direst needs. And the message is reinforced again and again. A recent news article in South Carolina’s Aiken Standard led with the following sentence: “Nuclear power is the only thing that can save the human race, Hyperion Power Generation CEO John ‘Grizz’ Deal told a crowd of more than 150 in Augusta on Wednesday.” A utopian narrative is not without precedent in the history of nuclear power. In fact, it harkens back to the early 1950s, when the American public first heard rumors that “atoms for peace” would soon yield “electricity too cheap to meter.” Early in our search for the story of small reactors, we began to notice something familiar: The shift to small modular reactors has the nuclear industry playing out the plot of The Little Engine That Could, a slice of mid–20th-century Americana that became a hallmark of children’s self-esteem building. Where the large have failed to try, or tried and failed, the Little Reactor will come along and prevail, pulling the heavy load of toys and goodies over the mountain. Or at least the Little Reactor thinks he can. An emphasis on evolution The Little Reactor character appears in many forms, most of which are far less colorful than Hyperion’s version. We spoke to Bruce Landrey, chief marketing officer at NuScale Power, a small-reactor startup based in Corvallis, Oregon. Landrey has spent his career communicating information about nuclear reactors for various companies. The story of his experiences, at its end, harmonizes well with his current employer’s approach. When Landrey graduated from the University of Oregon in the mid-1970s, he didn’t have a job, and he wasn’t necessarily looking to go into the energy sector. But soon his father was paired on the golf course with a stranger from an electric company that happened to be seeking new communications talent for the rollout of a new nuclear power plant. Eighteen holes later, Landrey’s father had positioned him, without his knowledge, as a prime candidate for the job. He applied, and was hired. “I was thrown into the deep end,” he said, remembering how little he knew about nuclear power. He also encountered an odd phenomenon related to public perception in his region. “We had a lot of protesters and demonstrations at the plant, people chaining themselves to the fence and so on,” he remembers. “But it was ironic, because the protesters were the same people I was drinking beer with the previous year at the university. But here I was, on the other side of the issue.” Landrey decided that if he would be earning his living speaking in favor of nuclear power, he would use his first six months on the job to learn everything he possibly could about the technology and its implications. He did so, becoming immersed in the technical side of nuclear reactors enough to make him confident discussing them from an environmental and safety perspective. “But what I was never comfortable with was the tremendous business risk a large nuclear power plant poses to an electric company, its customers, and its shareholders,” he said. And over the next several years, he had a front-row seat to the downsides of this risk. “The company I worked for tried to build two additional nuclear plants, which became caught up in licensing delays. Then, after the Three Mile Island accident, they were finally just abandoned.” Three decades later, Landrey still finds himself speaking up for nuclear energy, but now for NuScale. He is as risk-averse as ever when it comes to the financial challenges presented by nuclear power. So is NuScale, and this perspective guides both its technical approach and its communications. As the company sees it, their strategy builds on proven market-ready technology, familiar to regulators and the community of existing experts. Compared to revolutionaries such as Hyperion, the essence of NuScale’s metaphor is much less splashy: Our small reactor is really an improved version of the reactor down the road. It is a light-water design, which means it uses normal water as its coolant, and it shares this feature, along with standard fuel rods, with the majority of active nuclear power reactors in the world. Landrey explained some differences between NuScale and its larger predecessors, while also evoking a metaphor: a Thermos. Rather than a large concrete containment building, each reactor module comes inside its own steel vessel, which performs the containment’s safety purposes while also forming a Thermos-like vacuum between the vessel and the reactor module. This enables the reactor’s passive cooling feature, which uses natural circulation by a convection process, eliminating the need for a normal light-water reactor’s mechanical equipment or backup power generation to cool the reactor. Of course, backup power generation was the key failure that set off the Fukushima disaster and is the Achilles heel of all existing nuclear power plants. When we asked about Hyperion and other small reactor designs, Landrey was quick to draw a line in the sand between NuScale and a less traditional approach. “You have to be very careful with small modular reactors,” he said, “to distinguish what goes in the near-term commercialization category and what continues to remain a concept in a laboratory someplace. There is a big gulf—it’s really apples and oranges.” He also mentioned key differences on the topic of human expertise. Rather than automation, Landrey spoke of the importance of education and training in any context that will use NuScale reactors. The company’s plans call for an expert staff to operate the facility. For example, the top image on the company’s “Our Technology” Web page is an overhead view not of a reactor itself, but of the control room and user interfaces for plant operators. For Landrey, the evolution-versus-revolution question is a central issue to explore when looking into small reactors: Which designs, or aspects of the design, grow out of widely used commercial power reactors, and which represent completely new attempts? The unstated perspective is that the evolutionaries represent realistic near-term solutions, whereas the revolutionaries are still far more futuristic than their promoters will admit. Dusting off a design Also quick to emphasize this gulf is Babcock & Wilcox, one of the world’s preeminent suppliers of nuclear reactors. B&W is now partnering with engineering and construction giant Bechtel to develop and produce the “mPower,” a compact new light-water reactor similar in many ways to the NuScale design. Last summer, Christofer Mowry, president of B&W, told the Wall Street Journal, “Bechtel doesn’t get involved in science projects. This [agreement] is a confidence builder that the promise of this small reactor is going to materialize.” Of course, as with Landrey’s comment, such a quote cleverly forces the question into the reader’s mouth: Which of today’s small reactors should be dismissed as mere “science projects”? Although the mPower is certainly an advanced project, its first draft has been around for quite a while; our interviewees spoke of their small-reactor effort beginning by “dusting off a technology from the early eighties.” Compared to a conventional pressurized water reactor, the mPower reactor has the distinction of integrating the entire primary system (the reactor vessel, the steam generator, and the pressurizer) in one containment structure, which, according to one of the B&W engineers, “gives us a lot of inherent safety features that the large reactors don’t have.” The tendency to look backward before moving forward arose not only from B&W’s vast experience with light-water designs. First, it was a conscious response to its perception of the market. Many potential mPower customers are utilities that run today’s fossil fuel plants (not exactly the most venturesome bunch), who will perhaps one day need to turn their turbines using a carbon-neutral technology. Hypothetically, a significant number of these utilities that would be priced out of a large reactor would, in fact, be interested in a more manageably sized, and priced, option. This thinking was the result of an executive saying flatly “show me a customer” when the company’s technical leaders approached him with their idea about a small-sized, budget reactor. But a related and perhaps greater motivation for B&W’s design conservatism is the current regulatory gatekeeper. “The Nuclear Regulatory Commission… is a light water reactor regulatory agency,” one of our B&W interviewees said. “It takes a very long time to come up with a regulatory framework to be able to license another type of technology, and we wanted to get the technology to market as quickly as we could." Another interjected, "The idea was to come up with a design that capitalizes on the tremendous knowledge base that surrounds light water reactors, and then make some evolutionary changes. But when you get into revolutionary changes, the market isn't looking for that right now." The design includes a plan to bury the mPower underground. Although this feature is widely shared across the small-reactor industry, B&W offered an interesting reason when we asked why. They first referred to aesthetics; their initial rationale had been to avoid the stigma associated with the physical appearance of a nuclear power plant. The typical cooling towers and containment structures have acquired almost emblematic status among opponents of nuclear energy. Only after having volunteered these reasons did they add that the underground placement also earned them safety advantages with regard to earthquakes and missile impact. Like Mowry’s reference to “science projects,” B&W’s presentation is subtle but quick to make use of the public’s associations. Rather than taking a direct approach to force positive associations through imagery, B&W and others find the negative associations we already hold, and offer just the opposite. As they do so, the message comes back to their historical credentials, familiar technology, and the inclusion of credible players such as Bechtel. And the continuity of mPower’s design sends its loudest message to the regulatory community: This is a well-known, mastered technology, but upgraded to add significant improvements. The appeal to history Our foray into the light-water approaches coalesced in one question: Does inertia trump innovation in the U.S. nuclear industry? It would seem so, at least judging by NuScale’s and B&W’s carefully chosen paths. To some extent, even Hyperion’s shift in reactor fuel for its initial small reactor sends a similar signal. A familiar picture emerges, where the very entities that serve as the guarantor of safety also represent an obstacle to new, potentially better ideas. Perhaps unintentionally, they provide incentives for companies to continue down the well-trodden path, in exchange for faster licensing approval and shorter time to market. In terms of accounting for human expertise, evolutionary approaches do have a marked advantage. They do not seek a technical fix that eliminates the operator’s crucial role and ignores organizational and educational structures. On the downside, however, slow incremental innovations tend to neglect nuclear energy’s historical problems. The known hurdles with traditional light-water reactors, including low efficiency and unresolved waste management concerns, will arguably continue to live on for another generation, and if their industrial promoters get their way, these problems will be mass-produced and widely exported. Other potentially valuable lessons from history are also ignored; for example, why there is so little commercial experience with small nuclear reactors. In the past, small reactors have been used in research settings, for naval propulsion, and, rarely, to power research or industrial facilities at remote locations. But until recently, most small reactors for research and on submarines and icebreakers operated on highly enriched uranium, material that in sufficient quantities could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. When converted to fuel with lower enrichment, these reactors require more frequent refueling. Furthermore, the United States abandoned small reactors altogether in the 1970s to take advantage of the anticipated economies of scale to be achieved with larger power reactors. As the story has gone, in many cases the word “economy” hasn’t proven to apply. In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. nuclear industry was embroiled in a debate over the safety of scaling up. Would substantially increasing the size of nuclear reactors allow extrapolation from existing safety protocols, or would it in fact produce qualitatively new problems? Similar questions should be asked in today’s opposite scenario. It is far from self-evident that a compressed scale automatically produces smaller risks or that the data gathered from similarly fueled and cooled large reactors transfers down. And if the evolutionary approach does lower the risk of a given small modular reactor, who can say whether reduced risks in individual power plants are outweighed by an overall global risk of dispersing a much greater number of nuclear reactors across the planet? The Fukushima disaster has inconveniently shown a problem inherent to installing multiple reactors at one plant. After a scenario of unique failures within several reactors at once, is the prospect of a dozen or more interrelated small modular reactors on one site still as attractive? An overarching question is whether any of these risks are significantly curbed by an approach that offers familiarity, or whether this would encourage complacency. Pyotr Neporozhni, who served as the Soviet minister of energy and electrification for three decades, is reported to have dismissed concerns about nuclear safety with the quip: “A nuclear reactor is just another boiler.” Neporozhni retired in 1985, one year before Chernobyl. Although it is true that the end task is to boil water, it would be a mistake to ignore the intricate, wholly new ways in which small modular reactors will attempt to go about that task, even if widely known materials are used. A small design is not “just another light water-reactor.” Even if, as one B&W representative said, the NRC has traditionally been a “light-water–reactor agency,” its leadership does not seem to be glossing over the novel questions small modular reactors are raising. During a summer 2010 keynote address at a conference devoted to small reactors, William Ostendorff, a current member of the NRC, indicated that the question is open regarding how much history counts toward confidence about new small reactors. “There are substantial differences between the proposed concepts for SMRs [small modular reactors] and the large, light-water reactors that the NRC’s regulations were based upon,” he said. “How will prototype reactors be licensed? How will risk insights be used? How do SMRs fit into the Price-Anderson nuclear liability framework? Questions like these are not easy ones to answer.”

#### Second link---technological manipulation, framing nuclear power as having the potential of being perfectly controllable makes extinction inevitable

Kovel 1984

Joel, The Culture of Technocracy, Against the State of Nuclear Terror, pg 107, http://www.colorado.edu/ReligiousStudies/chernus/4820-ColdWarCulture/Readings/AgainstTheStateOfNuclearTerror.pdf

Nuclear weaponry is not just an aberration but the logical result of an entire attitude toward the world. This becomes even clearer when we consider the intermediate stage comprised by the saga of industrial and commercial nuclear power .21 Again, it would be too far afield to consider this story in any detail. But its bare essentials should be pointed out. The nuclear industry arose as a twofold effort to turn the discovery of nuclear technology to the further advantage of the ruling system of power-two lines of approach that have been, we might add, frequently combined in the history of capitalist society. One was to make the whole business of destruction seem legitimate and benign: hence arose "atoms for peace" as a handy slogan to temper the brutal reality of the technology. And the other was the irresistible impulse to turn a profit by squeezing the new source of power into the shape of a commodity-by boiling water with it and using the steam to generate electricity, which could of course be sold. The grim story of this venture need not be recounted here. But it is worth re-emphasizing that the failings of nuclear power arose out of the peculiar delusion that any and all parts of nature could be tamed by the human master. Thus, just as the unimaginable ferocity of nuclear weapons breaks down the political ends served by the use of technology in warfare, so does the malignancy of uncontrolled radioactivity make a mockery of the fantasy that there are no limits to the sources of commodities and profits. And as nuclear weapons continue to proliferate, while plutonium accumulates in reactors, we face the breakdown of "atoms for peace." It appears inevitable that the proposed U.S. build-up must draw on spent reactor fuel. Meanwhile, the nuclear power industry itself becomes militarized, in large measure because of the tre-mendous risks associated with its source of energy. A good example of this is the recently disclosed fact that U.S. Army Green Berets have been stationed at nuclear power plants, ostensibly to check on whether these leviathans are vulnerable to sabotage .22 Thus the two lines of nuclear development find each other once more contributing to the heightening of nuclear terror but also to the dissolution of one of its stage props. As we have noted, the triumph of the economic means the triumph of the principle of exchange as the guiding standard of human reason. Roughly put, this means making the whole world into a market, where everything has its price, a monetary value through which it can be equated, and so exchanged, 1 with anything else. The exchange principle makes the rule of the economic sphere coincide with the rule of money. The other side of the principle of exchange is the loss of what is unique and cannot be exchanged. As capitalist economics rose, the sacred was lost. Out of this loss arose the unchecked power of the rationalized market mentality. The mentality of the market is but the economic form of technocratic rationalization. The same animal goes under different names depending on its habitat 23 -market mentality, technocratic rationalization, instrumental reason (as a general philosophical category), positivism (as a philosophy of science), or pragmatism (as an ethical code of conduct). If we emphasize technocracy here, it is because it is the form of the animal most closely implicated with the nuclear crisis. All of the forms, however, are variations on the exchange principle and the stripping of value from the boundary between humanity and nature. Since there are no bounds to what this mentality thinks it can do with the principle of exchange, the way is left open for the nuclear power industry and the making of nuclear weapons. But the principle also implies the inevitable use of the bomb, since its effects are deemed equivalent to something else, say, the intimidation of an adversary .24 Therefore, state managers have never really gone beyond a simple calculation of what advantage and what risk could be wrought by the use of nuclear weapons, and a weighing of the results in the balance of possible actions. Because of this attitude, there was never any serious question of whether or not to drop the bomb on Hiroshima.

### 2NC – Heg Link

#### [GREEN]Hegemony is super violent discipline and management through security

Morgareidge, 2001 (Clayton, Prof. Emeritus @ Lewis and Clark College, “The Global Panopticon” Online, Feb 21, 2001 MB)

As the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States is a super state. It does not directly govern the world, but it sure exercises hegemony over it. It establishes alliances and forms of cooperation wherever possible, and uses threats, intimidation and violence wherever it must. Its mission is to manage the process of globalization -- no small task. Globalization is an immense transformation, and it requires increasingly sophisticated forms of information and control. In the 1970s, the French philosopher Michele Foucault elaborated a conception of power/knowledge which I think helps us understand what current US foreign and military policies are about. One of the techniques of power/knowledge is the Panopticon, a design for prisons recommended by Jeremy Bentham in the mid 19th Century. According to this model, a guard tower stands in the center of a circular bank of cells many tiers high. The cells have windows on both sides -- on the side facing the guard tower and on the opposite side letting in light from outside. "All that is needed, then," writes Foucault, "is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a school boy." (200). "The cells are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible." Hence the major effect of the Panopticon is "to induce in the inmate a state of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its actions; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary…." (201) Although the panopticon was never actually constructed as a prison, this ideal of perfect information and control, or power/knowledge, showed up in a variety of schemes for public administration as early as the end of the 17th Century -- for example, in the control of a population facing an outbreak of plague. Foucault writes, "…[T]he image of the plague stands for all forms of confusion and disorder…" (199). The invisibility of the controlling authority in the Panopticon model is "a guarantee of order."  If the inmates are convicts, there is no danger of a plot, an attempt at collective escape, the planning of new crimes for the future, bad reciprocal influences; if they are patients, there is no danger of contagion; if they are madmen there is no risk of their committing violence upon one another; if they are schoolchildren, there is no copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time; if they are workers, there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions, none of those distractions that slow down the rate of work, make it less perfect or cause accidents.(201) The Panopticon… must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of…everyday life.… The Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; it … [is] a pure architectural and optical system; it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use." (205) So what is the plague, the disorder that the American super-state, the administrator and orchestrator of global order must contend with? One authoritative list of America's tasks in the world comes from Samuel Huntington writing in Foreign Affairs:  In the past few years the United States has, among other things, attempted or been perceived as attempting more or less unilaterally to do the following: pressure other countries to adopt American values and practices regarding human rights and democracy; prevent other countries from acquiring military capabilities that could counter American conventional superiority; enforce American law extraterritorially in other societies; grade countries according to their adherence to American standards on human rights, drugs, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and now religious freedom; apply sanctions against countries that do not meet American standards on these issues; promote American corporate interests under the slogans of free trade and open markets; shape World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies to serve those same corporate interests; intervene in local conflicts in which it has relatively little direct interest; bludgeon other counties to adopt economic policies and social policies that will benefit American economic interests; promote American arms sales abroad while attempting to prevent comparable sales by other countries; …expand NATO…; undertake military action against Iraq and later maintain harsh economic sanctions against the regime; and categorize certain countries as 'rogue states,' excluding them from global institutions because they refuse to kowtow to American wishes. The Panopticon in the 21st Century model, does not accomplish these goals perfectly and without violence. Thus, for example, what our President calls the "routine" bombing of Iraq, which the British prime minister Tony Blair recently acknowledged serves the need for the West to keep a tight grip on 'vital oil supplies." But this bombing is coordinated by intensive aerial surveillance of Iraq: again, power/knowledge at work. To go with the intense observation of the Panopticon, the superstate requires precise and immediate means of punishment and destruction. This is clearly what today's military planners have in mind, as is all too obvious in these recent remarks of George W. Bush. First, listen to how he identifies the dangers, the plagues that face us:  The grave threat from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons has not gone away with the cold war, it has evolved into many separate threats, some of them harder to see and harder to answer, and the adversaries seeking these tools of terror are less predictable, more diverse. With shared intelligence and enforcement, we must confront the threats that come in a shipping container or in a suitcase. And here is his description of the kind of power needed to counter these threats. Notice how information is woven into this power.  Power is increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and swiftness. Advantage increasingly comes from information, such as the three-dimensional images of simulated battle that I have just seen. Safety is gained in stealth and forces projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons. The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.… On land, our heavy forces will be lighter. Our light forces will be more lethal. All will be easier to deploy and to sustain. In the air, we'll be able to strike across the world with pinpoint accuracy, using both aircraft and unmanned systems. On the oceans, we'll connect information and weapons in new ways, maximizing our ability to project power over land. In space, we'll protect our network of satellites, essential to the flow of our commerce and the defense of our common interests. This project of total remote control of nations and peoples is mind-boggling. It's the globalization of the Panopticon, the ideal of complete information coming into the center from every point on the globe, knowledge of the movements and intentions of every group and individual, together with the ability to punish or destroy at will whatever elements the superstate determines stand in the way of its objectives. The panoptical dream, taken to the global level, is to instill among all nations and peoples a sense that they are being watched by a supreme power, exactly like the biblical eye of God, with the power to punish instantaneously. Once achieved, this state of consciousness would mean that actual violence could be used very rarely -- just enough to keep the fear of it alive. What is more important is the constant consciousness of surveillance.

### AT: DIsease

#### Disease reps/rhetoric link

Elden, 2008

(Stuart, “Strategies for Waging Peace.” Foucault on Politics, Security and War. Pg 33-35, mb)

This is a productive set of concerns. Blandine Barret Kriegel demonstrates how the hospital functions as a tool of cure, through its architectural design and organisation. Similar issues emerge in the public health concerns of the time, along with the emergence of the notion of population. Observation and quantification are the two privileged methods — the politics of calculation (Foucault et al., 1979: p. 22): mortality rates, birth and baptism figures, and the other mechanisms of modern demography; water, air seasons, climate, dietary regimes and their influence on mortality, and other medical concerns (Foucault et al., 1979: pp. 24-5). The population emerges as a site of medical knowledge — distinct and yet dependent on the individual bodies that make it up (Foucault et al., 1979: p. 23). To calculate is to establish a statistical quantity to the detriment of aesthetic composition, the estimation [le chi f fre] of the physician, the chemist and even the demographer, to the place of architectural proportion. Power is to command and realise the operation. (Foucault et al., 1979: p. 26) Dispersion and circulation become the keys to the hospital — the placing of objects, bodies and equipment within the space of the hospital itself and its situation in the town and surrounding area (Foucault et al., 1979: p. 26). Anne Thalamy's work also contributes to this general approach, noting the military model behind the hospital, with the traditional discipline, unified command and absolute hierarchy, but also more concretely to issues of circulation, the keeping of detailed notes and records, and the cataloguing of resources (Foucault et al., 1979: pp. 32-3). Thalamy finds in medical writing of the time the sign of a functional space and of a perpetually updated knowledge, which analyses the illness in the continuity of observation [le regard], and positions it in the duration of medical practice ... It is the essential support of an illness, which becomes an object of treatment, of a hospital conceived as a space of recovery. (Foucault et al., 1979: p. 36) Francois Beguin offers some further analysis, particularly around the object of the bed, with objectives of separation, rest and recovery. Again the idea of the physical design of the hospital comes through, with a particular stress here on architecture (Foucault et al., 1979: p. 39). Bruno Fortier's chapter again treats similar themes, arguing that the hospital is a 'political tool', a step in a wider political project of the control and organisation the population, particularly in the urban setting. Similar concerns are found in the prison and school, and 'spaces of work and exchange' (Foucault et al., 1979: p. 45). This importance is for a number of reasons, principally both for the creation of a disciplined society, but also as is often neglected in studies of Foucault (as opposed to Foucault's studies, but not perhaps for Foucaultian studies) for capitalism. In the second Rio lecture he makes this linkage clear: 'capitalism.., started by socialising a first object, the body, as a factor of productive force, of labour power' (Foucault, 1994a: vol. III, pp. 209-10). The control of society over individuals was accomplished not only through consciousness or ideology but also in the body and with the body. For capitalist society, it was biopolitics which is above all important, the biological, the somatic, the corporal. (Foucault, 1994a: vol. III, p. 210) This is why he contends that 'the body is a bio-political reality; medicine is a bio-political strategy' (Foucault, 1994a: vol. III, p. 210).

### AT: Terrorism

#### Fear and hysteria surrounding terrorism legitimizes any action taken in name of good, justifying violence, retribution and wars. This involves an endless cycle of the United States positing the terrorist as the absolute enemy Ending this cycle is a prior question to the aff.

Kellner 7

(Douglas, Chair of Philosophy @ UCLA, “Bushspeak and the politics of lying: presidential rhetoric in the 'war on terror'” Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 37 (4), 2007, pg. 622+, ProQuest)

**Such hyperbolic rhetoric** is a salient example of Bushspeak that **communicates through codes to specific audiences,** in this case domestic Christian right-wing groups that are Bush's preferred recipients of his discourse. (18) But demonizing terms for bin Laden both elevate his status in the Arab world as a mythical superhero who stands up to the West and help marshal support among those who feel anger toward the Westand intense hatred of the West. Bush and **the global media helped produce a mythology of bin Laden, elevating him to almost superhuman status, while generating fear and hysteria that legitimated Bush administration militarism geared toward the "Evil One,"** as Bush has called bin Laden, equating him with Satan. **The discourse of "evil" is totalizing and absolutistic, allowing no ambiguities or contradictions.** **It assumes a binary logic where "we" are the forces of goodness and "they" are the forces of darkness. Such discourse legitimates any action undertaken in the name of good, no matter how destructive, on the grounds that it is attacking "evil." The discourse of evil is** cosmological and **apocalyptic, evoking a cataclysmic war with mythical stakes.** In this perspective, evil cannot be just attacked one piece at a time, through incremental steps, but must be totally defeated, eradicated from the earth if good is to reign. This discourse of evil raises the stakes and violen**ce of conflict and** nurtures more apocalyptic and catastrophic politics, fueling future cycles of hatred, violence, retribution, and wa**rs.** It is, of course, theocratic Islamic fundamentalists who themselves engage in similar simplistic binary discourse and projection of evil onto the Other which they use to legitimate acts of terrorism. **For certain Manichean Islamic fundamentalists, the United States is "evil," the source of all the world's** problems, and deserves to be destroyed. Such one-dimensional thought does not distinguish between U.S. policies, leaders, institutions, or people, while advocating a Jihad, or holy war, against the American monolithic evil. The terrorist crimes of September 11 appeared to be part of this Jihad and the monstrousness of the actions of killing innocent civilians shows the horrific consequences of totally dehumanizing an "enemy" deemed so evil that even innocent members of the group in question deserve to be exterminated. Underlying the Bush-Cheney administration rhetoric were fundamental American political mythologies. The civilization discourse built on Ronald Reagan's favorite rhetoric of "the city on the hill," whereby the destiny of the United States was to establish a site of freedom and civilization in the wilderness (see Rogin 1987). **Bush's discourse in particular evoked the frontier mentality** whereby the sheriff defends the good citizens against evil outlaws and savages. (19) As Ivie and Giner (2007) put it, "After 9/11 **terrorism became the threatening face of savagery in democracy's troubled empire."** Bush's "savages" were the "evil doers" associated with Islamic terrorism, **against whom he declared war.** The legitimation of violence against evildoers is also grounded in the political mythology of what Jewett and Lawrence (1988) describe as the "American monomyth," a dominant trope of the genres of popular culture in the United States from Indian captivity narratives through the Hollywood western and superhero films. On this model, a community is threatened by barbaric forces, and redemptive violence is used to protect the community. In the post-9/11 context, the barbaric forces threatening the community were global terrorism and Bush's Terror War policies were redemptive violence.

### 2NC – Water Wars Link

#### Water wars predictions are not objective causal statements about the world but ideological projections of the state-based system- whether war happens is a question of our ideological frame, not inevitability

Trottier ‘4 (Julie, U of Oxford and contributor at UNESCO’s Int’l Hyrdrological Programme, “Water Wars: The Rise of a Hegemonic Concept”, Online)

A main achievement of state power in modern times has been the persuasion of the population concerning the legitimacy of the use of violence. In the western world, the idea according to which the state has a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence has become hegemonic. This legitimacy or lack of it confers the status of either murder or execution to what would otherwise be, technically, the same act. State violence is referred to as “war” or “police operation” whereas violence from another source is referred to as “terrorism” or “banditism.” The labeling of identical acts as war acts or terrorist acts is often enough to categorize them as legitimate or not, since the cognitive map of each citizen has been structured according to this hegemonic concept. Any group carrying out violent acts strives to label them as acts of war in order to secure that legitimacy. In the case of a body that is not a state, this has generally implied, over the last century, claiming to be a liberation movement that will eventually create a state. The objective of creating a state became necessary to acquire this legitimacy, even for groups such as the Kurds, whose form of political organization was not the territorial state (Badie, 1992). The water war discourse started growing in a fertile soil where a very specific definition of water development had become hegemonic and where the only legitimate violent conflicts were believed to be wars between opposing states. Of course other hegemonic concepts contributed to this fertile ground: the idea according to which the state is the only institution spelling out the rules of social control and determining who will exercise this social control, for example. Investigating this assumption, Joel Migdal demonstrated how it rarely reflects reality, especially in the developing world. He developed his state-in-society model in order to account for the interaction between the state and the multiple other institutions that spell out the rules and exercise social control (Migdal, 1988, 2001). How western hegemonic concepts concerning the state’s role in society have obscured the understanding of water conflicts in the non-western world has been explored elsewhere (Trottier, 2003). The eventual growth of the idea of water wars as a hegemonic concept must be analyzed within the context of other pre-existing and well-entrenched hegemonic concepts that distorted and rationalized unequal distributions of resources and specific distributions of power in various societies. These acted as building blocks supporting the growth of new concepts, they limited the range of options that appeared possible and they provided fences limiting the issue definitions: states wanted water development at all cost, therefore states might wage war in order to secure it. Such an issue definition precluded any consideration of the fact that water development could have a different meaning for various social groups, that states may not be the only social actors that benefit from water development, that other social groups may actually benefit from it more than the state itself while the state may loose from it, or that states rarely choose to go to war over one issue alone. “Water conflicts will cause the wars of the twenty-first century.” This is more than a catchy statement. It is the object of numerous arguments and counter-arguments in the scientific community, and much effort has been devoted either to proving or disproving the causality between water scarcity and water wars. Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson seem to have launched the debate by arguing, “water runs both on and under the surface of politics in the Middle East” (Naff and Matson, 1984, p. 181) and analyzing the role played by water in riparian state relations. A series of publications followed, which supported the concept of the causal link between water and war (Starr; Starr and Stoll, 1988; Bulloch and Darwish, 1993; Biswas, 1994; Soffer, 1994, 1999). The development of this literature led Hussein Amery to refer to “the well-established and thoroughly documented positive link between resource scarcity and violent conflict” (Amery, 2001). Clearly the idea of a causal link between water scarcity and war has grown over the past twenty years to the point that it could become ideologically hegemonic. In March 2001, even Kofi Annan was declaring “and if we are not careful, future wars are going to be about water and not about oil” (Annan, 2001). This illustrates that the concept was not confined to academic circles and was structuring the thoughts of high-level political officers. The idea that competition for water in water-scarce areas constitutes the greatest danger of war was growing to be taken as a given, an unquestionable fact of life. This school of thought led to what Ohlsson (1999) has called “the numbers game.” As the causal link between water scarcity and war remained unchallenged, the relevant question appeared to be quantitative: how much renewable water existed within the boundaries of every state? How much constituted scarcity? Engineers and hydrogeologists produced numerous studies detailing the various quantities of water available to every state in arid zones, especially in the Middle East (Elmusa, 1996). M. Falkenmark pioneered the idea of a water stress threshold. The ratio of the quantity of renewable water within a state’s territory to that state’s population was held as an indicator of water scarcity. Water security was achieved if the state contained more than 10,000 cubic meters per capita. Water availability was deemed adequate if the state contained from 10,000 to 1,666 cubic meters per capita. States endowed with 1,000 to 1,666 cubic meters per capita were deemed to be water stressed. They were said to be chronically water stressed if they contained between 500 and 1,000 cubic meters per capita and to lie beyond the water barrier if they contained less than 500. This indicator of water stress was essentially based on an estimate of the quantity needed in agricultural production using irrigation. A state that could not be self-sufficient in food production was deemed to be water stressed although these per capita water quantities were sufficient to cover domestic needs. Disturbing charts were drawn up, showing the various renewable water endowments of Middle East states (Beshorner, 1992). According to such an indicator, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq were deemed to have adequate water supplies while Israel, Jordan, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip lay beyond the water barrier. Such inequality was deemed highly dangerous as it was thought it could propel the waterpoor states to wage war on the water-rich states. This became the topic of detailed international relations study and social scientists followed suit by focusing on how international law could contribute to ”just” and sustainable water sharing among states, suggesting various allocations among riparian states (Lowi 1993a, 1993b; Benvenisti and Gvirtzman, 1993). It is worth noting that the majority of the water war literature focused on the Middle East.

## AT: A2A

### 2NC – AT: Perm

#### 1.Extend the Bruce 96 alternative card. This card makes a sequencing argument. You must fix the discourse that a policy is made with before you can have any change on the effects of those policies. Theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention. The world of the permutation is still one of limited solutions and a flawed world view. Your epistemology must be evaluated to see if you know the problem before you can fix it.

#### 2.Perm is a severance of your representations of the 1ac. Makes the aff a moving target, their presentation of the 1ac must be held fixed because it’s the only stable ground the negative gets in the debate.

#### 1st, Extend Plumwood. The perm makes no sense and is mutually exclusive with the critique:

#### A. We reject nuclear power, need to develop a resistance to nuclear power technology and the power over live that it creates. Failure to do this makes annihilation and control inevitable

#### B. We reject centralization of power, through the state. Instead we need a critique of centralization and bureaucracy. The Alt is key to break down power relationships and the expert monopoly on nuclear knowledge.

### 2NC – AT: Owen Specifically

#### 1. No link – the K doesn’t wholesale reject all “rational choice theory”, it just rejects the aff’s specific discourse because of the impacts isolated above.

#### 2. Owen concedes that epistemology and ontology are important and shape policies

Owen 2

(David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No 3, Sage)

 Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, **it is** **clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars.** In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no **doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions.** Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn.

#### 3. Out of context – Owen concludes inevitable confusion in IR causes his ‘vicious cycle’, not our critical interrogation

Owen 2

(David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No 3, Sage)

[YELLOW]

 It should be noted that **I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR by virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiro’s remarks are directed at (primarily North American) political science**. I am simply concerned to point out that the philosophical turn in IR increases its exposure to these dangers and, hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can, collectively, generate. Having specified these dangers, however**, I want to turn to a confusion within much of IR that has, I will argue, acted to encourage this philosophical turn and so increase its exposure to these risks**. As a preface to this task, though, it is useful to sketch out two main lines of debate within the IR theory wars; these are not the only lines of debate, but they are important ones.

### 2NC – AT: Threats Real

#### If we win IR is constructed than this is incorrect.

#### Even if some threats are real our responses to them and assumptions about them are shaped by our discourse, that’s Bruce. The aff makes some policy outcomes over others inevitable.

#### Security is a protection racket that conjures non-existent scenarios to justify state power

Neocleous 2003

[Mark, Teaches politics @ Brunel, Imagining the state, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 107-8//uwyo-ajl]

The state system and the statist political imaginary together use terrorism to effect a political rationalization of violence under the firm control of the state. In this context, the declaration of a war on terrorism by the US state and its allies in 2001 proves nothing other than the state's own misunderstanding of the world it has created. (And note that such a declaration was immediately expanded to include designated states which could then properly be con- fronted.) The standard Left-liberal critique of the category `terrorism' is to point to the lack of any internationally agreed definition of the term (the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO - and the European Union - EU - have all struggled to come up with an acceptable definition); or to point to the contradiction involved in the once denigrated `terrorist' being feted as `world statesman' (Mandela), or to the once-celebrated `freedom fighter' being castigated as `terrorist' (Bin Laden); or, finally, to point to the hypocrisy of western liberal democracies training and funding armed rebellions in some parts of the globe while objecting to them elsewhere. While pertinent, these arguments miss the central point, which is that terrorism is defined according to the demands of the raison d'Etat of hegemonic powers. States define terror- ism according to their own interests, and the predominant interests are neces- sarily those of the hegemonic forces. This then consolidates the state's claim to a monopoly of violence: terrorism will only end, says the state, when you all fully obey the demand to use violence only when we say so. As such, terrorism turns out to be the lifeblood of state terror. Such obedience as demanded by the state has traditionally been offered in exchange for protection. The state attempts to `set before mens eyes the mutu- all Relation between Protection and Obedience', as Hobbes puts it.34 This mutual relation has remained a key trope throughout western thought con- cerning the state. But what is meant by `protection'? Charles Tilly has noted that the word sounds two contrasting tones. One is comforting, calling up images of a friendly shelter against danger and a form of security or safety provided by a powerful friend, a large insurance policy, a sturdy roof or a bulwark against terrorism. The other, however, is more ominous, evoking the racket in which a local strong man forces merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage. In the second scenario, of course, the dangers are often imaginary: the strong man encourages the imagination of danger and may even threaten the danger himself in order to prove that it really does exist. The state's provision of protection plays on the first meaning of the term - recall how crucial the ideas of `security' and `welfare' are to statecraft - but the state could equally be said to be providing `protection' in the second sense of the term: To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. Since governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same way as racketeers. ~ The state, in other words, is a protection racket - and like all protection rackets it is a process of domination in which the `protected' become evermore subordinated to the `protector'. But this begs a question: who is to be protected? Better still: who is not to be protected? And what about those who appear to be `protected' by no state at all?

## 2NC – Alternative Debate

#### The alt solves – Extend Plumwood, critique exposes the undemocratic-centralized nature of power that the nuclear industry creates. This creates the space for alternatives outside of the technological order. Plumwood says critique must come first before all other forms of action because it makes resistance possible

#### The alt solves the K, extend Bruce. Rethinking our assumptions and language about the world causes it to be different. Language creates reality through various representations than construct the social world in certain ways. It also shapes the assumptions of actors that make certain policies solutions inevitable. Only rethinking allows new alternative ways of relating to others outside of security possible

#### And the alt solves the aff, Bruce says the K is a prerequisite to effective policies. Only when we question security logic can other policies be possible. The aff makes it possible to rethink energy policy outside of the construction of threats.

#### And the alt is key—resistance to nuclear power intersects with every other social issue,

Hartmann, 2011

[Betsy, Director of the Population and Development Program and Professor of Development Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, “Why Anti-Nuclear Belongs in All of Our Movements.” 8-3-11, Online, http://nuclearfreeplanet.org/articles/why-anti-nuclear-belongs-in-all-of-our-movements-.html] /Wyo-MB

Labor rights, reproductive rights, climate justice, nuclear weapons, peace- Betsey Hartmann makes a strong case for how they are all interconnected in the issue of nuclear power. Everyone's future depends on our moving away from nuclear power and weapons production and use. This is the time to put aside partisanship and work towards a truly sustainable energy policy.¶ The stakes are getting higher by the day in the radioactive roulette playing out at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex. On Monday the Japanese government finally widened the evacuation zone and is raising the threat level from five to seven, the same level as the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine. In our own movements we need to raise the nuclear threat level too.¶ While it’s tempting to sit back and wait for an antinuclear movement to rekindle in the United States, we simply can’t afford the time. Nor is it clear that such a movement will emerge. The failure of the anti-war movement to gain broad traction is a case in point. Many progressive movements are just struggling to hold on in the face of vicious right-wing assaults and loss of funding. So the question becomes: How do we build an antinuclear politics in the absence of a full-fledged antinuclear movement?¶ The answer lies in finding points of convergence. After all, nuclear power, waste and weaponry threaten us all, as well as generations to come. The nuclear accident in Japan – if we can really call it an accident since potential disaster was built into the very location and design of the plants – serves as a glaring reminder that those who hold the reins of power do not have solutions for the serious social, economic and ecological crises of our time. On the contrary, they are making disasters, not unmaking them, risking our collective future for their own short-term gain. As economist Joseph Stiglitz wrote recently, financial meltdown and nuclear meltdown are closely related, both products of a system of delusional speculation, technological hubris, public subsidies and private greed.¶ In each of our movements, then, we need to make a space for antinuclear activism. Here are just a few of many possible points of convergence:¶ Nuclear power is a reproductive rights issue. Among other serious side effects, exposure to radiation can increase the risk of sterility, birth defects and genetic mutations that can affect the reproduction of generations to come. Plutonium, a by-product of nuclear power and a key component of atomic bombs, is the most potent manmade poison on the planet, with a half life of 24,000 years. It crosses the placenta and is stored in male testicles.¶ Nuclear power is an environmental justice issue, from uranium mining on indigenous lands in the southwest to locating reactors in poor African-American rural communities in Georgia.¶ It’s a climate justice issue. Don’t let them fool you. Nuclear power is not a clean substitute for dirty fossil fuels. For one thing, the government and industry have no idea of how or where to safely store the waste. Moreover, nuclear is hardly emissions-free when you factor in the mining, transport and enrichment of uranium as well as the leakage of the potent greenhouse gas CFC 114 from cooling pipes. The money spent on nuclear development should instead flow to the development of safe renewable energies and conservation.¶ It’s a labor rights issue. As we’ve seen at Fukushima, nuclear workers, many of them laboring on an exploitative contract basis, are being exposed to unacceptable health risks. Nuclear power also produces dangerous chemical by-products that affect workers. As an industry shrouded in secrecy, workers often lack redress or are scared to complain about health and safety violations for fear of losing their jobs.¶ It’s a peace and security issue. The notion of ‘atoms for peace’, first trumpeted by President Eisenhower in the 1950s, has always been a sham. Nuclear power fuels the atomic weapons industry, facilitates nuclear proliferation, and increases vulnerability to terrorist attacks. In a profound irony, it helps legitimize the national security state as necessary to protect us from nuclear threats of the state’s own making.¶ Nuclear power is a basic democracy issue too. Why does President Obama support nuclear power? Because the nuclear lobby supported his candidacy. If we want clean renewable energy, we need clean elections. And we need local control. Right now the brave state of Vermont is fighting to shut down the leaking Vermont Yankee nuclear plant that has the same flawed design as Fukushima. Its state legislature is pitted against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission which recently renewed the plant’s license. Whose vote should count – the people of Vermont’s or a few pro-industry representatives on the NRC licensing committee?¶ By including opposition to nuclear power in all of our diverse struggles, we can start to build an effective antinuclear politics that could spawn a broader movement. But even if it doesn’t, we won’t have stood by passively as the threat level mounts. While the Republicans play at shutting down the government, what really needs shutting down is the nuclear industry. We all need to help in that fight.

## A2

### 2AC – AT: Calc/Consequences Good

#### The idea we can calculate is another link to the K. Burke says the ontology of calculation spills over to other areas of policy and is the root cause of all violence—environmental destruction, war and social exclusion are the result

#### And the banalization of war turns this argument. Security discourse makes war part of everyday life, violence and war permeate being which makes violence inevitable. Calculations of future impacts paper over this relationship

#### And no value to life turns this argument. Util assumes all lives are equally valued. Security logic devalues individuals to where they don’t count as deaths, this cause util to fail

#### Calculation renders life meaningless:

Dillon ‘99

[Political Theory, Another Justice – April 164-165]

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Here with, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision.

#### And, Utilitarian enframing coupled with the drive for security causes a totalizing metaphysical violence

Burke in 2007

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, pMUSE, cheek)

# This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 # What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action.

### 2NC – AT: Nuclear Power Inevitable

#### Transition from hard energy path is possible—social change is key

Morrison and Lodwick, 1981

[Denton and Dora, Dept of Sociology @ Michigan state university, The Social Impact of soft and hard energy systems: The lovins’ claims as a social science challenge, Annual energy review, 1981, 6: 357-78] /Wyo-MB

Lovins' argues for a path change. He asserts that it is possible, over a 50-year period, for industrialized countries to make the transition from a hard to a soft energy path. Fundamental to this tradition is a shift from HETs to SETs, i.e. the SETs deploy and gradually and completely displace the HETs. The two types of technologies exist together during the transition in constantly and purposefully changing proportions until the HETs are retired. What brings about this technological shift?¶ The inertia of the HEP is not complete. It contains the seeds of its own change in both the economic and social forces that are operative. Particu­ larly in his more recent papers, Lovins attempts to demonstrate in detail that the SETs have substantially lower overall costs and higher productivity than the HETs (4, 45, 46). For this and other reasons the SETs displace the HETs. Economic factors, especially competitive advantage, will be the driving force in the displacement of the RETs by SETs. This, however, is not sufficient for a path transition.¶ Path transition requires, in addition, that the RET to SET shift take place in the social context of cultural value preferences that promotes institu­ tional and organizational change processes to implement the SETs in a way that will produce the soft social impacts. Thus, in an important sense, the hard impacts are themselves instrumental in destabilizing the REP and in bringing forth an energy system transformation, as consciousness of the undesirability of the continuation of such impacts emerges. The economic forces that bring the displacement of the HETs by SETs must, for a path transition, be coordinated with a set of social forces that will implement the displacement of the hard social impacts by soft social impacts.7¶ Lovins is somewhat sketchy about the particulars of implementation. He is explicit in his insistence that the implementation process be noncoercive, and the importance of equitable implementation is uniformly implied in his analyses of SET deployment (4, 9, 43, 45, 46). It is clear, however, that Lovins thinks that the nascent cultural values that will result in the neces­ sary institutional and organizational changes to properly implement the SETs for a soft path transition are found in the United States and other Western democracies. Similarly, the economic forces are potentially opera­ tive in these social contexts: "...the social and economic advantages of a soft path are so great that if we let them show themselves, it would largely implement itself through existing market and political processes (46)."

### 2NC – AT: Science True

#### Nuclear power fuels the myth of neutral scientific knowledge—results in elitism and control of power through technology and power

Plumwood, 1984

[Val, Presenting to the social control conference @ Sydney, “The state and the expansion of nuclear technology.” Online, http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/radicalideas/files/2010/11/Plumwood-1984-The-state-and-the-explanation-of-nuclear-technology-1.PDF] /Wyo-MB

Of these other factors of explanation, a major one is the intellectual division of labour and the role of the scientific elite, which shows the positive operation of power in forming knowledge. The scientific elite has provided a major source of support for nuclear technology and a major reason for its continued existence, not only for the usual personal individual career reasons (promotion of an area in which the scientist has acquired an investment and opportunities for expansion), or even because of the opportunity for scientific-bureaucratic expansion and increase in control, but because elite concepts of knowledge and of the superiority of elite-based or elite promoting technologies have influenced the very forms of a criterion for what counts as respectable knowledge. Another factor here is the way in which the myth of the value-freedom of science is employed to escape recognition of the value systems served by technologies such as nuclear. The division of labour is employed to discourage work and to prevent them taking responsibility (or assist them in avoiding it). This is achieved through the division of the technical and the political the latter being the province of the special caste of political managers. The immense importance of this mechanism of social control is demonstrated by the enormous threat Green Bans, which challenged this division of technical and political labour, posed to the system, and the sorts of measures taken to repress and prevent their re-emergence. It is also demonstrated in the sort of treatment meted out to dissenting scientists and experts, both in nuclear and other areas, who attempt to take some sort of responsibility for the social effects of their work. This factor is focussed on in the 'self-management' critique of nuclear power. [5]