### 2NC – Impact Block

#### Probability and Timeframe – Nuclear technology enframes our entire lives—makes control and violence permeate the social order

Hubbard, 1997

[Bryan, MA Thesis at Arizona state University, Nuclear criticism after the cold war: a rhetorical analysis of two contemporary atomic campaigns, 8-1-1997, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA327948] /Wyo-MB

The first assumption, that we live in a nuclear age, needs some examination. To justify calling our moment a nuclear age, one turns to evidence that "nothing we do or¶ feel -- in working, playing, and loving, and in our private, family, and public lives -- is free of their [nuclear technologies] influence. The threat they pose has become the context for our lives" (Lifton & Falk, 1982, p. 3). "Since Hiroshima, we have been¶ captives of nuclear weapons. We rely on them and we flaunt them, but psychologically and politically they have imprisoned us" (Lifton & Mitchell, 1995, p. 302). "As no doubt¶ we all know, no single instant, no atom of our life (of our relation to the world and to being) is not marked today," Derrida (1984, p. 20) explains, directly or indirectly, by nuclear technology. Simultaneous to our dependence and fascination, we fear and dread the absolute experience of nuclear knowledge, and since 1945 people have "sensed in their bones that the world would never again be the same" (Clark, 1980, p. 128). Though "Hiroshima marked the start of what was called the 'atomic age' (Ungar, 1992, p. 60), the nuclearism3 that "has crept from the inside into all the cracks of daily life" (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 58) has grown more directly from nuclear technologies taking "their place as the dominant technology of permanent, self-propelling American megamachine that seems almost independent of human control" (Lifton & Mitchell, p. 304). The centrality of nuclear technology has succeeded because of the linkage of "nuclear plants and electricity to cultural symbologies of political economics and growth¶ ...[that shows progress is impossible without] electricity and the marvels of an industrially expanding social order" (Vickery, 1990, p. 143). To be against nuclear¶ technology is to be against progress and business which according to dominant American ideology is to be un-American.¶ During the years of the Cold War, the terror of annihilation made the public willing to "accept practically any measure that promised to sustain their [the American] supremacy; terror was to be held at bay by augmenting terror" (Ungar, 1992, p. 68). Even benign cartoons and popular narrators like Disney (Mechling & Mechling, 1995) contributed to the early construction of a powerful nuclearism. Robert J. Lifton and Eric¶ Markusen (1990) marked the psychological similarities between the mentality enabling the Nazi holocaust and the frame of mind which sustains our pathological nuclearism.¶ They stated:¶ ... the nuclear system takes on the configuration of a vast industrial corporation, sprawling and loosely connected but centrally animated by a deadly purpose in the form of end products... That "industrial organization" spans much of American society, and the "higher standards" of control and development intensify the genocidal dynamic. (Lifton & Markusen, p. 182).

#### Nuclear power’s networks of control deny freedom and value to life—reducing all threats to targets and grid locations

Hubbard, 1997

[Bryan, MA Thesis at Arizona state University, Nuclear criticism after the cold war: a rhetorical analysis of two contemporary atomic campaigns, 8-1-1997, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA327948] /Wyo-MB

The reasons for the increasing nuclear dangers involve "political instabilities throughout the world fueled by ethnic conflicts, militant fundamentalism, and terrorism; fundamental economic problems ... and unbridled proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery" (Powers & Muckerman, 1994, p. 99). The present nuclear potential threatens any hope of democracy's survival. According to Fred C. Ikle (1996), "Democracy cannot survive in a highly uncertain world in which a smuggled nuclear bomb might be detonated in Paris or Manhattan" (p. 127). The continued nuclear threat can justify increasingly panoptic measures toward security which involve "new global networks of sensors keeping track of worldwide targets" (Robins & Levidow, 1995, p. 124) reducing these threats, human or inanimate, to "precise grid locations" (Robins & Levidow, p. 121). Any freedom or privacy becomes illusory and expendable in pursuit of nuclear security. This "technology of power" (Foucault, 1980, p. 148) acts to decontextualize human interaction and decisions and already exists "in a variety of settings, both public and private" (Bogard, 1991, p. 335). Despite the need for nuclear security, the impulse toward totalistic panoptic measures must "be balanced against the protection of civil liberties" (Ikle, p. 128). As occurrences of crises increase, the line between necessary security and intrusion becomes increasingly fuzzy.

### CASE analysis

DOD adv- lashout b/c certaina ctors are irrational, begs the question of power relations and who gets determine the narrative of who/what countries/actors are rational and which are not- low probability of their impacts means you assign little value to the empirics of their studies- empirics works against you- no massive nuclear blackout despite attacks now

Even if they will civilian blackouts- question of hwo we understand the development of our response to crises- violent or cooperative- s water wars

### 2NC – Framework Block

#### The role of the ballot is to accept or reject assumptions behind nuclear power technology.

#### Prefer our framing—

#### The Plan never happens, nuclear policy won’t be changed because its controlled by an elite few. Debates do have value because they produces discourses and values that naturalize certain technologies and modes of society. Only our framing and education asks what we can do as communication scholars

#### And, Nuclear power discourse influences policy making and creates reality

Hubbard, 1997

[Bryan, MA Thesis at Arizona state University, Nuclear criticism after the cold war: a rhetorical analysis of two contemporary atomic campaigns, 8-1-1997, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA327948] /Wyo-MB

Today's nuclear critics must realize that policy decisions do not solely reflect a single material reality of a situation nor do they exist in a textually-isolated universe. Instead, policy decisions and public discourse reflect a practice co-disciplined by a textual tradition and a material history. This should not alarm material critics. Instead of separating discursive and material reality, this perspective sees textual and discursive practices as part of a material world which take on a material existence through human interaction and as recorded through an archiving process. If material history exists for those without direct experience of certain events, it comes to reality through the recordable and repeatable nature of texts. The works which record particular events become as much a part of the historical exigencies as the actual event with all the deflections and reflections that come in the writing and reading process. The nuclear critic therefore strikes a compromise; while admitting a material reality exists and that discourse is not totally determinant, critics should view discourse as influential (Condit, 1987a,1987b).

#### And, their Knowledge framing causes governmentality

Death, 2006

[Carl, department of international politics University of Wales, “Resisting (Nuclear) Power? Environmental Regulation in South Africa” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 109, Mainstreaming the African Environment in Development (Sep., 2006), pp. 407-424, Accessed online via JSTOR] /Wyo-MB

Michel Foucault's concept of 'governmentality' has been influential in re-theorising the links between political power, domination and resistance (Foucault, 2000a; Gordon, 1991; Rose, 1999). It takes as its starting point the assertion that political power defines the extent to which 'some men can more or less entirely determine other men's conduct - but never exhaustively or coercively' (Foucault, 2000b:324). For Foucault, power is everywhere, and constitutes relationships between individu- als. Power produces society, forms of knowledge, institutions and even our own identities. Power is thus not merely repressive, nor is it a normatively good or bad concept. Yet there are various types of power relationships - ranging from the fluid, shifting relationships that exist between individuals, to the sedimented, coercive relationships that characterise domination. In between these extremes are forms of power Foucault describes as techniques of government, established systems for regulating the conduct of conduct (Foucault, 1997a:298-299).These techniques of government have been referred to as manifestations of governmentality, or the rationality of government.¶ This concept draws attention to the numerous ways in which conduct is regulated - through our internalisation of certain roles (such as the economically rational individual, or the responsible citizen) and the advice of authoritative experts, in order to render society efficient, safe and productive. Therefore, for Nikolas Rose, freedom and government are mutually dependant within traditional Liberal political thought, since 'to dominate is to ignore or to attempt to crush the capacity for action of the dominated. But to govern is to recognise that capacity for action and adjust oneself to it' (Rose, 1999:4).This view of power, freedom and government has implications for the way we conceive of resistance, in particular rendering concepts like emancipation and liberation problematic. Since power is productive and everywhere, and government works through freedom, a power-free utopia is clearly impossible. Thus resistance in this article implies simply an unsettling or challenging of existing power relations (Darier, 1999).

#### This reproduces the impacts of the criticism through their framing arguments—debates about nuclear power from outside of the position of the centralized state are impossible because of the hegemony of expert knowledge—the kritik is a key starting point

Martin, 1986

[Brian, Nuclear Suppression, Science and Public Policy vol. 13 number 6, December 1986, 312-320, Online, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/86spp.html] /Wyo-MB

In the debates and struggle over nuclear technology, the promoters have used their monopoly over nuclear knowledge to claim that they should have the final say. Opponents have argued that the key issues are not technical but rather social, political and economic. This response has had only limited impact so long as nuclear expertise remains unchallenged. One of the potent tools brought to bear by the opponents is 'counter-experts': knowledgeable people, often with credentials and experience in nuclear areas, who openly oppose the nuclear establishment.¶ One of the responses to such counter-experts is attempts to suppress them. This can take such forms as blocking publications, refusing permission to give talks, refusing or withdrawing funds and staff, job transfers, sacking, blacklisting and character assassination. Instead of responding to the arguments of the critical expert, the individual is attacked personally. Such attacks are almost always justified in 'legitimate' terms, such as penalties for failure to perform satisfactorily. Seldom is dissidence itself openly acknowledged as the reason for the suppression.¶ The first essential element in suppression is an act of dissidence, such as a speech, letter, report or research programme which threatens the practices or legitimacy of a powerful group such as a corporation, a state bureaucracy or a profession. The second essential element is an action by that powerful group, or by someone acting in its interests, to attack the dissident or to prevent freedom of speech or inquiry.¶ Suppression of intellectual dissent is a widespread phenomenon, found in a host of fields and organisational situations.[22-25] In most corporations and state bureaucracies, fundamental dissidence is rare, since employees realise that speaking out would jeopardise their promotions or jobs. Even in universities, where "academic freedom" should protect the staff, speaking out can be risky for one's career, and most never take the opportunity to find out. Needless to say, under military rule or state socialism, the opportunities to dissent are even more restricted.¶ The study of suppression of intellectual dissent is an undeveloped and disorganised area. Here I list a number of cases in the nuclear area which seem to fit the category of suppression: there is some threat to the interests of the promoters of nuclear technology, and some attempt to attack the source of the threat by the exercise of administrative power rather than to respond to dissident views by reasoned argument. The view that suppression is involved in a great many of these cases draws strength from the common pattern of events and its congruence with the theoretical explanation of suppression.[26]¶ In my experience, the search for evidence about suppression - which covers everything from journal articles and books to newspaper accounts, internal documents and letters, and verbal reports - can never be completed, since single cases frequently can disclose a mountain of complications and detail, and the number of cases never seems to end. Only thumbnail sketches of cases are included here. Some of these cases may turn out to have other interpretations but, as a whole, I hope they cause some general alarm bells to ring.

### 2NC – AT - Permutation

#### 1st, Extend Plumwood. The perm makes no sense and is mutually exclusive with the critique:

#### A. We reject nuclear power, need to develop a resistance to nuclear power technology and the power over live that it creates. Failure to do this makes annihilation and control inevitable

#### B. We reject centralization of power, through the state. Instead we need a critique of centralization and bureaucracy. The Alt is key to break down power relationships and the expert monopoly on nuclear knowledge.

#### Perm fails—can’t make nuclear power safer—need complete resistance and transition from elite controlled nuclear energy

Martin, 1986

[Brian, “Nuclear disarmament is not enough.” Published in Peace Studies, No. 3, June/July 1986, pp. 36-39, Online, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/86ps.html] /Wyo-MB

An analogy can be drawn with the movement against nuclear power. Initially the objections to nuclear power were very limited: the hazards of nuclear reactor accidents, the environmental implications of heating up local water resources, the dangers of transportation of nuclear materials. These objections could have been answered by technical fixes, such as better safety precautions. But as a social movement developed around the world in the mid-1970s, the basis for concern broadened. It was realised that expansion of the nuclear fuel cycle could promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons, lead to attacks on civil liberties and create an entrenched political and economic system built around the nuclear industry. The campaign became one of stopping nuclear power entirely, not just making it safer.¶ As long as the anti-nuclear power movement was simply one of opposition, it was vulnerable to attack on the grounds that nuclear power was, or would become, an essential energy source, and also that nuclear power compared favourably with polluting alternatives such as coal. A great stride forward came with the elaboration of alternatives to nuclear power, notably the soft energy path. Energy efficiency and renewable energy sources can be promoted as a positive alternative, and activists could do much to promote them locally. At the same time, the critique of nuclear power as a 'hard energy source' was extended to other energy sources - including coal, oil and solar satellites - which are large scale, capital intensive, environmentally risky and dependent on control by experts and elites.

### Method/Ontology/Terminology Key

#### The symbolic terminologies of identity choice are what determine war and international confrontation between states—there is no real ‘policy choice’ within a particular terminology because it determines what options are possible. Changing how we identify with and represent the other creates new policy spaces for accommodation or cooperation that avoid problems of war

Schlickenmaier 9

[William, Georgetown University, “Exceptionalist Narratives and Great Power Status: The Social Sources of Realpolitik”, p. <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/2/4/4/p312440_index.html> //wyo-tjc]

What are the policy implications of a particular identity? A relational identity in one polity should govern policy toward the other polity in the relationship. A particular identification of Self and Other should rule some policy options out, while keeping others in. I call this a “policy space,” the boundaries of which follow from an identity choice. Identity selection through narrative deployment leads to policies that are both consequentialist and appropriate within that space.21 The borders govern appropriate activity, with policy options outside the space ruled as inappropriate. In the same way, policy options exist insofar as they serve the national interest, which is a social construction out of the identity selected for a particular state.22 The policy space within an elite is constitutive of the identity selected by that elite, not caused by it.23 Within that space contestation exists, as actors negotiate among policies, but the boundaries of that space exclude or include important categories. Chief among these is the decision to challenge or accept an international order. Identity choice governs whether an elite sees an order as justified or not, acceptable or not, then leading the polity to accept or contest it. We can see accommodation, confrontation, and retreat as broad strategic options.24 For example, a state that chooses a cosmopolitan narrative as the basis for its national identity, or a globalist identity in line with that of the leading states in the order, will probably assent to an order established by that relational partner. Indeed, because of the narrative choice made by the first state’s elite, that other power is part of the Self, not an Other. Choosing an exceptionalist narrative increases the likelihood that a state will not accept the international order established by states that would qualify as Other, either by retreating from it (including buck-passing) or challenging it.25 Within the broad categories of accommodation and confrontation there are choices an elite may make based on national capabilities, domestic politics and other factors. It is worth noting that states have expensive and cheap accommodationist and confrontational options.26 Material capabilities matter, but are indeterminate for grand strategy because these multiple options exist. Further, a state choosing to confront an international order can convert latent capabilities into security resources, but such a decision follows from a threat assessment and policy choice, while a state choosing to assent to an order need not bother.

### A2 Brooks Wohlforth/Unipolarity

#### Wohlforth is wrong—states do not inevitably compete nor is balance of power a necessary feature of IR. Narrative choice and the symbolic terminologies that create policy choice are the key dynamics that must be attended to

Schlickenmaier 9

[William, Georgetown University, “Exceptionalist Narratives and Great Power Status: The Social Sources of Realpolitik”, p. <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/2/4/4/p312440_index.html> //wyo-tjc]

Some realists might even grant that a relational approach to power and a network approach to great power politics are consistent with realist arguments about IR. However, many realists assume a certain logic of balancing, that states will always seek to balance, or always seek independence and autonomy. The narrative approach to great power politics would question that, and suggest that nothing forces an exceptionalist choice. This may be because I have chosen not to theorize about the motivations behind a narrative selection, seeing it as ultimately fruitless because we see variation in narrative choices. There are opportunities to choose exceptionalism where the path was not taken by an elite. Elites do not have to choose exceptionalism, or great power politics. Bill Wohlforth argues that all states seek status: based on social identity theory there is a unicausal sociopsychological mechanism where all states that do not have high status will seek it.59 However, there are a variety of ways to seek status that do not require great power competition and the expenses therein. As I have discussed, I do not see an animus dominandi [survival instinct] driving great power politics, but rather, an exceptionalist narrative deployment that leads states to feel defensive, seek independence, and move into that great power category that offers true independence. Much IR theory has a “great power selection bias” that sees competition as the norm because the great powers have chosen it, but do not consider that some states opt out, and their elites have been satisfied with that choice.60 So long as actors have the choice to shape and manipulate cultural narratives, there is no apparent driver that forces one narrative choice over another. It is a negotiation, an example of heresthetics and political skill rather than a will to power.61

### 2NC – Link Block

#### Extend Plumwood, nuclear technology fuels centralized bureaucratic-technological control over society through the nature of its production. It creates a network of state-based elite driven power that resonates through all layers of society.

.

### 2NC – Alt Solvency

#### Criticism is key to survival—in the nuclear age power is delivered through discursive adoption of nuclear power—our alternative and role as communicative scholars is key to challenge this hegemony

Hubbard, 1997

[Bryan, MA Thesis at Arizona state University, Nuclear criticism after the cold war: a rhetorical analysis of two contemporary atomic campaigns, 8-1-1997, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA327948] /Wyo-MB

When one combines the obstacles facing disarmament, the difficulty of finding global authority for nuclear abolition and the residue of 50 years of nuclear industry, one sees nuclear technologies and capacities will inhabit our planet for the foreseeable future. For this reason, Caldicott (1994) stressed "it is of the utmost urgency that we refocus our attention on the problems posed by nuclear technology" (p. 23). This brief discussion shows why our moment is a nuclear age and how nuclear issues continue to play paramount roles in global survival. In addition to living in a nuclear age and recognizing the tantamount primacy of nuclear issues, scholars must realize that continued¶ governance of the nuclear age necessarily involves discursive and communication issues¶ requiring skills of material, textual and discursive analysis. Today, corporations and federal agencies make decisions about nuclear regulation and policy which often involve textual negotiation with wider communities through environmental impact statements, risk-analysis briefings and town meetings. The decisions and perception resulting from these communication-based decision-making processes rely on the intertextual nature of public dialogue as much as on accurate scientific analysis or textual accuracy. This realization must occur prior to nuclear criticism playing an important role in our nuclear future. For nuclear criticism to contribute to the present and future management ofthe nuclear age, it must overcome an assumption that governing the technically-driven nuclear age rests outside the scope of communication scholars' competence or, even more definitively, the problems of the nuclear age are not communication issues.¶ An awareness is growing among public policy advocates that the successful management of risk depends on widespread democratic participation and dialogue in the¶ decision-making process MARKEDs (Chess, Salomone, & Hance, 1995; Chess, Salomone, Hance, & Saville, 1995; Coleman, 1995; Fischoff, 1995; Heath & Nathan, 1990-91; Limoges,¶ Cambrosio, & Davignon, 1995; F. Rowan, 1996; K. E. Rowan, 1991; Stern, 1991; Viscusi, Magat, & Huber, 1991; Young, 1990). Currently, structural, material and textual obstacles exist to obtaining widespread meaningful participation in nuclear decisions, this situation leaves the management of a nuclear day in the hands of a small elite. A sustained nuclear criticism can point out how and where in the conversation obstacles like nukespeak affect the conversation.¶ An elite cannot safely govern post-Cold War nuclear risk without the wider public. It demands "storytelling and the sharing of our individual and communal stories" (Fasching, 1993, p. 314) to treat the pathology of previous nuclear experience and forge positive partnerships for future politics. Such democratic communication has not been characteristic of the first 50 years of the atomic age. Because of a long known "culture of secrecy" (Chess, Salomone, & Hance, p. 127), trust is exceedingly rare in the nuclear conversation. Further discursive practices like nukespeak have also obfuscated issues (Hilgartner, Bell, & O'Connor, 1982; Kauffman, 1989; J. Smith, 1984) and discouraged public participation (Aubrey, 1982; Chilton, 1985; Schiappa, 1989). If the solution for our nuclear dilemma rests with unleashing human communicative freedom and creativity, critics must help undo the barriers of 50 years of experience that continue to assert themselves in current textual practices. As Krug (1995) notes "nuclear writings continue to proliferate" (p. 205) in the post-Cold War era.