# Case

# K

### 2NC – Impact Block

#### The K outweighs the case:

#### Magnitude – Increasing technological control produces the most violent technologies that make control of nature and humans possible, the progression from the sword to the atomic bomb proves it makes the worst violence inevitable, this turns the case and outweighs on magnitude, that’s Hubbard.

#### Probability and Timeframe – Nuclear technology enframes our entire lives—makes control and violence permeate the social order

Hubbard, 1997

[Bryan, MA Thesis at Arizona state University, Nuclear criticism after the cold war: a rhetorical analysis of two contemporary atomic campaigns, 8-1-1997, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA327948] /Wyo-MB

The first assumption, that we live in a nuclear age, needs some examination. To justify calling our moment a nuclear age, one turns to evidence that "nothing we do or¶ feel -- in working, playing, and loving, and in our private, family, and public lives -- is free of their [nuclear technologies] influence. The threat they pose has become the context for our lives" (Lifton & Falk, 1982, p. 3). "Since Hiroshima, we have been¶ captives of nuclear weapons. We rely on them and we flaunt them, but psychologically and politically they have imprisoned us" (Lifton & Mitchell, 1995, p. 302). "As no doubt¶ we all know, no single instant, no atom of our life (of our relation to the world and to being) is not marked today," Derrida (1984, p. 20) explains, directly or indirectly, by nuclear technology. Simultaneous to our dependence and fascination, we fear and dread the absolute experience of nuclear knowledge, and since 1945 people have "sensed in their bones that the world would never again be the same" (Clark, 1980, p. 128). Though "Hiroshima marked the start of what was called the 'atomic age' (Ungar, 1992, p. 60), the nuclearism3 that "has crept from the inside into all the cracks of daily life" (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 58) has grown more directly from nuclear technologies taking "their place as the dominant technology of permanent, self-propelling American megamachine that seems almost independent of human control" (Lifton & Mitchell, p. 304). The centrality of nuclear technology has succeeded because of the linkage of "nuclear plants and electricity to cultural symbologies of political economics and growth¶ ...[that shows progress is impossible without] electricity and the marvels of an industrially expanding social order" (Vickery, 1990, p. 143). To be against nuclear¶ technology is to be against progress and business which according to dominant American ideology is to be un-American.¶ During the years of the Cold War, the terror of annihilation made the public willing to "accept practically any measure that promised to sustain their [the American] supremacy; terror was to be held at bay by augmenting terror" (Ungar, 1992, p. 68). Even benign cartoons and popular narrators like Disney (Mechling & Mechling, 1995) contributed to the early construction of a powerful nuclearism. Robert J. Lifton and Eric¶ Markusen (1990) marked the psychological similarities between the mentality enabling the Nazi holocaust and the frame of mind which sustains our pathological nuclearism.¶ They stated:¶ ... the nuclear system takes on the configuration of a vast industrial corporation, sprawling and loosely connected but centrally animated by a deadly purpose in the form of end products... That "industrial organization" spans much of American society, and the "higher standards" of control and development intensify the genocidal dynamic. (Lifton & Markusen, p. 182).

#### Nuclear power’s networks of control deny freedom and value to life—reducing all threats to targets and grid locations

Hubbard, 1997

[Bryan, MA Thesis at Arizona state University, Nuclear criticism after the cold war: a rhetorical analysis of two contemporary atomic campaigns, 8-1-1997, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA327948] /Wyo-MB

The reasons for the increasing nuclear dangers involve "political instabilities throughout the world fueled by ethnic conflicts, militant fundamentalism, and terrorism; fundamental economic problems ... and unbridled proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery" (Powers & Muckerman, 1994, p. 99). The present nuclear potential threatens any hope of democracy's survival. According to Fred C. Ikle (1996), "Democracy cannot survive in a highly uncertain world in which a smuggled nuclear bomb might be detonated in Paris or Manhattan" (p. 127). The continued nuclear threat can justify increasingly panoptic measures toward security which involve "new global networks of sensors keeping track of worldwide targets" (Robins & Levidow, 1995, p. 124) reducing these threats, human or inanimate, to "precise grid locations" (Robins & Levidow, p. 121). Any freedom or privacy becomes illusory and expendable in pursuit of nuclear security. This "technology of power" (Foucault, 1980, p. 148) acts to decontextualize human interaction and decisions and already exists "in a variety of settings, both public and private" (Bogard, 1991, p. 335). Despite the need for nuclear security, the impulse toward totalistic panoptic measures must "be balanced against the protection of civil liberties" (Ikle, p. 128). As occurrences of crises increase, the line between necessary security and intrusion becomes increasingly fuzzy.

#### states do not inevitably compete nor is balance of power a necessary feature of IR. Narrative choice and the symbolic terminologies that create policy choice are the key dynamics that must be attended to

Schlickenmaier 9

[William, Georgetown University, “Exceptionalist Narratives and Great Power Status: The Social Sources of Realpolitik”, p. <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/2/4/4/p312440_index.html> //wyo-tjc]

Some realists might even grant that a relational approach to power and a network approach to great power politics are consistent with realist arguments about IR. However, many realists assume a certain logic of balancing, that states will always seek to balance, or always seek independence and autonomy. The narrative approach to great power politics would question that, and suggest that nothing forces an exceptionalist choice. This may be because I have chosen not to theorize about the motivations behind a narrative selection, seeing it as ultimately fruitless because we see variation in narrative choices. There are opportunities to choose exceptionalism where the path was not taken by an elite. Elites do not have to choose exceptionalism, or great power politics. Bill Wohlforth argues that all states seek status: based on social identity theory there is a unicausal sociopsychological mechanism where all states that do not have high status will seek it.59 However, there are a variety of ways to seek status that do not require great power competition and the expenses therein. As I have discussed, I do not see an animus dominandi [survival instinct] driving great power politics, but rather, an exceptionalist narrative deployment that leads states to feel defensive, seek independence, and move into that great power category that offers true independence. Much IR theory has a “great power selection bias” that sees competition as the norm because the great powers have chosen it, but do not consider that some states opt out, and their elites have been satisfied with that choice.60 So long as actors have the choice to shape and manipulate cultural narratives, there is no apparent driver that forces one narrative choice over another. It is a negotiation, an example of heresthetics and political skill rather than a will to power.61

#### Critical infrastructure policies are enframed in biopolitical approaches to life that attempt to control the population through systems of security and management

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

Dillon and Reid deal with both aspects of this biopolitical/necropolitical logic. Their discussion of the liberal way of war explores the various ways in which killing takes place, the aporia accompanying universal justifications of it, and the lethal criteria by which politics is reduced to mere “animal husbandry” (Dillon and Reid 2009:104). What is more pertinent for our purposes, however, is the equally significant account they offer of attempts by liberal rule to make life live: If the vocation of biopolitics is to make life live, it must pursue that vocation these days by making live life the emergency of its emergence ever more fully and ever more resiliently; detailing, clarifying, amplifying and otherwise drawing out the entailments of the emergency in the effort to make life live it even more animatedly in both virtual and actual terms. (Dillon and Reid 2009:89) It is in this context that we can return more explicitly to the role of resilient CIs because it is precisely these material apparatuses through which liberal rule secures the way of life it needs to reproduce its vision of “correct living” and also, therefore, the authorization of its own authority. Dillon and Reid pick up on Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s famous aphorism—“politics is the extension of war by other means”—to argue that the liberal peace is extended throughout society via CIs. They claim it is no coincidence that since 9/11 CIs have become reified as referent objects of securitization. Strategically and symbolically, CIs perform vital roles in securing the liberal way of rule and its vision of what “quality of life” must mean: ...the defence of critical infrastructure is not about the mundane protection of human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of other human beings, but about a more profound defence of the combined physical and technological infrastructures which liberal regimes have come to understand as necessary for their vitality and security in recent years. (Dillon and Reid 2009:130) On this basis, Dillon and Reid extend the biopolitical diagnosis of resilience offered by Lentzos and Rose. Not only is resilience about the design and management of the “system of systems” in such a way as to enable a smooth and expeditious return to “normal” conditions. More importantly, resilient CIs are also necessary for the optimalization of virtual (that is pre-emptive) tactics against the becoming-dangerous of bodies-in-formation: tactics upon which the edifice of liberal rule ultimately rests. Moreover, Dillon and Reid shrewdly observe that the perception of “terrorist threats” in Western societies enables liberal regimes to further develop and entrench CIs, in turn extending and intensifying biopolitical control over life.

#### 2. Meltdowns don’t cause lasting damage

Bosselman, 07 - Professor of Law Emeritus, Chicago-Kent College of Law (Fred, “The New Power Generation: Environmental Law and Electricity Innovation: Colloquium Article: The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear Power,” 15 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1, 2007)

In 1986, an explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine caused the release of large amounts of radiation into the atmosphere. 247 Initially, the Soviet government released little information about the explosion and tried to play down its seriousness, but this secrecy caused great nervousness throughout Europe, and fed the public's fears of nuclear power all over the  [\*46]  world. 248 Now a comprehensive analysis of the event and its aftermath has been made: In 2005, a consortium of United Nations agencies called the Chernobyl Forum released its analysis of the long-term effects of the Chernobyl explosion. [249](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n249) The U.N. agencies' study found that the explosion caused fewer deaths than had been expected. [250](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n250) Although the Chernobyl reactor was poorly designed and badly operated [251](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n251) and lacked the basic safety protections found outside the Soviet Union, [252](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n252) fewer than seventy deaths so far have been attributed to the explosion, mostly plant employees and firefighters who suffered acute radiation sickness. [253](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n253) The Chernobyl reactor, like many Soviet reactors, was in the open rather than in an American type of pressurizable containment structure, which would have prevented the release of radiation to the environment if a similar accident had occurred. 254 [\*47] Perhaps the most surprising finding of the U.N. agencies' study was that "the ecosystems around the Chernobyl site are now flourishing. The [Chernobyl exclusion zone] has become a wildlife sanctuary, and it looks like the nature park it has become." [255](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n255) Jeffrey McNeely, the chief scientist of the World Conservation Union, has made similar observations: Chernobyl has now become the world's first radioactive nature reserve... . 200 wolves are now living in the nature reserve, which has also begun to support populations of reindeer, lynx and European bison, species that previously were not found in the region. While the impact on humans was strongly negative, the wildlife is adapting and even thriving on the site of one of the 20th century's worst environmental disasters. [256](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n256) Mary Mycio, the Kiev correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, has written a fascinating book based on her many visits to the exclusion zone and interviews with people in the area. [257](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n257) She notes that the fear that radiation would produce permanent deformities in animal species has not been borne out after twenty years; the population and diversity of animals in even some of the most heavily radiated parts of the exclusion zone is similar to comparable places that are less radioactive. [258](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4a9f74e9d68358dde5b1da7c76fcc08d&docnum=49&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=b940f69f179ebb657dc94d1baf8c0fbd#n258)

#### No water wars – Economics of War, Tech Solving, Fosters Cooperation

Katz 11
[David Katz, Director of the Akirov Institute for Business and Environment at Tel Aviv University, February 2011, Vol. 11, No. 1, Pages 12-35, "Hydro-Political Hyperbole", http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/GLEP\_a\_00041?journalCode=glep, \\wyo-bb]

Proponents of water war scenarios often premise their dire conclusions on the fact that water is essential for life and non-substitutable.31 Yet water for basic needs represents a small share of total water use, even in arid countries.32 Economists and others point out that over 80 percent of world freshwater withdrawals are for the agricultural sector, a relatively low-value use and one in which large gains in efficiency could be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choice of crops. Thus, economic critiques of the water war hypothesis stress that the value of water that would be gained from military conflict is unlikely to outweigh the economic costs of military preparation and battle, much less the loss of life.33 Some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusion that freshwater is increasingly scarce,34 an assumption on which the water war hypothesis relies. Such a “cornucopian” view claims that people adapt to scarcity through improvements in technology, pricing, and efficiency—rendering water less scarce, not more so. Perhaps the strongest case against the likelihood of water wars is the lack of empirical evidence of precedents. Wolf found only one documented case of war explicitly over water, and this took place over 4500 years ago.35 Moreover, he could document only seven cases of acute conflict over water. Yoffe and colleagues also ªnd that armed conflict over water resources has been uncommon. 36 They found that cooperation was much more common than conflict, both globally and in all world regions except the Middle East/North Africa. This pattern may explain why only a limited number of case studies of water conflict are presented in the water wars literature. Analysts have criticized environmental security arguments that are based on case studies because such works tend to have no variation in the dependent variable.37 Many large sample statistical studies have attempted to address such shortcomings, however, in several cases these studies too have come under ªre. For instance, a number of large-sample statistical studies and correlations between water-related variables and conflict, however, few, if any, provide convincing support for causal relationships. Moreover, several studies found that water availability had no impact on the likelihood of either domestic or international conflict,38 including at least one study that attempted to replicate earlier studies that claimed to have found such correlations.39 Moreover, the results of several studies that do ªnd correlations between water and conflict are either not robust or are contrasted by other findings. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal and that the statistical significance of water scarcity variables is highly dependent on one or two observations, leading them to conclude that actual effects of water scarcity “are weak, negligible or insigniªcant.”40 Jensen and Gleditsch and that the results of Miguel and colleagues are less robust when using a recoding of the original dataset.41 Gleditsch and colleagues found that shared basins do predict an increased propensity for conflict, but found no correlation between conflict and drought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream, leading them to state that “support for a scarcity theory of water conflict is somewhat ambiguous.”42

### 2NC – AT - Permutation

#### Perm fails—can’t make nuclear power safer—need complete resistance and transition from elite controlled nuclear energy

Martin, 1986

[Brian, “Nuclear disarmament is not enough.” Published in Peace Studies, No. 3, June/July 1986, pp. 36-39, Online, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/86ps.html] /Wyo-MB

An analogy can be drawn with the movement against nuclear power. Initially the objections to nuclear power were very limited: the hazards of nuclear reactor accidents, the environmental implications of heating up local water resources, the dangers of transportation of nuclear materials. These objections could have been answered by technical fixes, such as better safety precautions. But as a social movement developed around the world in the mid-1970s, the basis for concern broadened. It was realised that expansion of the nuclear fuel cycle could promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons, lead to attacks on civil liberties and create an entrenched political and economic system built around the nuclear industry. The campaign became one of stopping nuclear power entirely, not just making it safer.¶ As long as the anti-nuclear power movement was simply one of opposition, it was vulnerable to attack on the grounds that nuclear power was, or would become, an essential energy source, and also that nuclear power compared favourably with polluting alternatives such as coal. A great stride forward came with the elaboration of alternatives to nuclear power, notably the soft energy path. Energy efficiency and renewable energy sources can be promoted as a positive alternative, and activists could do much to promote them locally. At the same time, the critique of nuclear power as a 'hard energy source' was extended to other energy sources - including coal, oil and solar satellites - which are large scale, capital intensive, environmentally risky and dependent on control by experts and elites.

#### And, Nuclear power discourse influences policy making and creates reality

Hubbard, 1997

[Bryan, MA Thesis at Arizona state University, Nuclear criticism after the cold war: a rhetorical analysis of two contemporary atomic campaigns, 8-1-1997, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA327948] /Wyo-MB

Today's nuclear critics must realize that policy decisions do not solely reflect a single material reality of a situation nor do they exist in a textually-isolated universe. Instead, policy decisions and public discourse matkrfreflect a practice co-disciplined by a textual tradition and a material history. This should not alarm material critics. Instead of separating discursive and material reality, this perspective sees textual and discursive practices as part of a material world which take on a material existence through human interaction and as recorded through an archiving process. If material history exists for those without direct experience of certain events, it comes to reality through the recordable and repeatable nature of texts. The works which record particular events become as much a part of the historical exigencies as the actual event with all the deflections and reflections that come in the writing and reading process. The nuclear critic therefore strikes a compromise; while admitting a material reality exists and that discourse is not totally determinant, critics should view discourse as influential (Condit, 1987a,1987b).

#### And, their Knowledge framing causes governmentality

Death, 2006

[Carl, department of international politics University of Wales, “Resisting (Nuclear) Power? Environmental Regulation in South Africa” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 109, Mainstreaming the African Environment in Development (Sep., 2006), pp. 407-424, Accessed online via JSTOR] /Wyo-MB

Michel Foucault's concept of 'governmentality' has been influential in re-theorising the links between political power, domination and resistance (Foucault, 2000a; Gordon, 1991; Rose, 1999). It takes as its starting point the assertion that political power defines the extent to which 'some men can more or less entirely determine other men's conduct - but never exhaustively or coercively' (Foucault, 2000b:324). For Foucault, power is everywhere, and constitutes relationships between individu- als. Power produces society, forms of knowledge, institutions and even our own identities. Power is thus not merely repressive, nor is it a normatively good or bad concept. Yet there are various types of power relationships - ranging from the fluid, shifting relationships that exist between individuals, to the sedimented, coercive relationships that characterise domination. In between these extremes are forms of power Foucault describes as techniques of government, established systems for regulating the conduct of conduct (Foucault, 1997a:298-299).These techniques of government have been referred to as manifestations of governmentality, or the rationality of government.¶ This concept draws attention to the numerous ways in which conduct is regulated - through our internalisation of certain roles (such as the economically rational individual, or the responsible citizen) and the advice of authoritative experts, in order to render society efficient, safe and productive. Therefore, for Nikolas Rose, freedom and government are mutually dependant within traditional Liberal political thought, since 'to dominate is to ignore or to attempt to crush the capacity for action of the dominated. But to govern is to recognise that capacity for action and adjust oneself to it' (Rose, 1999:4).This view of power, freedom and government has implications for the way we conceive of resistance, in particular rendering concepts like emancipation and liberation problematic. Since power is productive and everywhere, and government works through freedom, a power-free utopia is clearly impossible. Thus resistance in this article implies simply an unsettling or challenging of existing power relations (Darier, 1999).

#### This reproduces the impacts of the criticism through their framing arguments—debates about nuclear power from outside of the position of the centralized state are impossible because of the hegemony of expert knowledge—the kritik is a key starting point

Martin, 1986

[Brian, Nuclear Suppression, Science and Public Policy vol. 13 number 6, December 1986, 312-320, Online, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/86spp.html] /Wyo-MB

In the debates and struggle over nuclear technology, the promoters have used their monopoly over nuclear knowledge to claim that they should have the final say. Opponents have argued that the key issues are not technical but rather social, political and economic. This response has had only limited impact so long as nuclear expertise remains unchallenged. One of the potent tools brought to bear by the opponents is 'counter-experts': knowledgeable people, often with credentials and experience in nuclear areas, who openly oppose the nuclear establishment.¶ One of the responses to such counter-experts is attempts to suppress them. This can take such forms as blocking publications, refusing permission to give talks, refusing or withdrawing funds and staff, job transfers, sacking, blacklisting and character assassination. Instead of responding to the arguments of the critical expert, the individual is attacked personally. Such attacks are almost always justified in 'legitimate' terms, such as penalties for failure to perform satisfactorily. Seldom is dissidence itself openly acknowledged as the reason for the suppression.¶ The first essential element in suppression is an act of dissidence, such as a speech, letter, report or research programme which threatens the practices or legitimacy of a powerful group such as a corporation, a state bureaucracy or a profession. The second essential element is an action by that powerful group, or by someone acting in its interests, to attack the dissident or to prevent freedom of speech or inquiry.¶ Suppression of intellectual dissent is a widespread phenomenon, found in a host of fields and organisational situations.[22-25] In most corporations and state bureaucracies, fundamental dissidence is rare, since employees realise that speaking out would jeopardise their promotions or jobs. Even in universities, where "academic freedom" should protect the staff, speaking out can be risky for one's career, and most never take the opportunity to find out. Needless to say, under military rule or state socialism, the opportunities to dissent are even more restricted.¶ The study of suppression of intellectual dissent is an undeveloped and disorganised area. Here I list a number of cases in the nuclear area which seem to fit the category of suppression: there is some threat to the interests of the promoters of nuclear technology, and some attempt to attack the source of the threat by the exercise of administrative power rather than to respond to dissident views by reasoned argument. The view that suppression is involved in a great many of these cases draws strength from the common pattern of events and its congruence with the theoretical explanation of suppression.[26]¶ In my experience, the search for evidence about suppression - which covers everything from journal articles and books to newspaper accounts, internal documents and letters, and verbal reports - can never be completed, since single cases frequently can disclose a mountain of complications and detail, and the number of cases never seems to end. Only thumbnail sketches of cases are included here. Some of these cases may turn out to have other interpretations but, as a whole, I hope they cause some general alarm bells to ring.