## TRANS

### Transition: Sooner is Better

#### FIRST, OUR 1NC LAYNE CARDS HAVE ALREADY PRE-EMPTED THIS. SOONER IS BETTER BECAUSE:

#### A) PRESERVES US POWER-- BY CONSERVING POWER NOW, WE CAN SUCCEED UNDER MULTIPOLARITY

#### B) WAITING GUARANTEES YOUR SCENARIOS-- EMERGENT POWERS COUPLED WITH DEGRADED AMERICAN POWER MEANS THE US WILL FIGHT THE WARS YOUR EVIDENCE SAYS WE CAN AVOID. ONLY A QUICK TRANSITION SOLVES THIS.

#### SECOND, IT’S NOT WORTH IT: WE’D GET AT MOST THIRTY MORE YEARS OF HEGEMONY, WHICH PALES IN COMPARISON TO:

#### A) A GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR FROM EXTENDED DETERRENCE FAILURES THAT COULD HAPPEN ANY DAY

#### B) INEVITABLE TERRORIST ATTACKS THAT CAN ONLY BE SOLVED THROUGH DISENGAGEMENT

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 190-192 //wyo-tjc]

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America’s Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolaritv. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America’s military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. The events of 9/11 are another example of how hegemony makes the United States less secure than it would he if it followed an offshore balancing strategy. Terrorism, the RAND Corporation terrorism expert Bruce Hoff- man says, is “about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change~.” If we step hack for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives.87 As Clausewitz observed, “War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object.”88 September 111 represented a violent counter reaction to America’s geopolitical—and cultural—hegemony. As the strategy expert Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article: It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of an eternal assault on Islam. U.S. hegemony fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of “blowback” against America’s preponderance and its world role.9°As long as the United States maintains its global hegemony—and its concomitant preeminence in regions like the Persian Gulf—it will he the target of politically motivated terrorist groups like al Qaeda. After 9/li, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, “Why do they hate us?” This question missed the key point. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do “hate” the United States for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. And even leaving aside American neoconservatives’ obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the war on terror inescapably has overtones of a “clash of civilizations.” Still, this isn’t—and should not be allowed to become a replay of the Crusades. Fundamentally 9/11 was about geopolitics, specifically about U.S. hegemony. The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it’s hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself in something like 9/11. As Michael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, puts it, “One of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe—at the urging of senior U.S. leaders—that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do.”91 It is American policies—to be precise, American hegemony—that make the United States a lightning rod for Muslim anger. Hegemony has proven to be an elusive goal for the great powers that have sought it. The European great powers that bid for hegemony did so because they were on a geopolitical treadmill. For them, it seemed as if security was attainable only by ~eliminating their great power rivals and achieving continental hegemony. And it is this fact that invested great power politics with its tragic quality, because the international system’s power-balancing dynamics doomed all such bids to failure. The United States, on the other hand, has never faced similar pressures to seek security through a hegemonic grand strategy, and, too often, instead of enhancing U.S. security as advertised, America’s hegemonic grand strategy has made the United States less secure. In the early twenty-first century, by threatening to embroil the United States in military showdowns with nuclear great powers and exposing the United States to terrorism, the pursuit of hegemony means that “over there” well may become over here. Objectively, the United States historically has enjoyed an extraordinarily high degree of immunity from external threat, a condition that has had nothing to do with whether it is hegemonic and everything to do with geography and its military capabilities. Consequently, the United States has, should it wish to use it, an exit ramp—offshore balancing—that would allow it to escape from the tragedy of great power politics that befalls those that seek hegemony. The failure of the United States to take this exit ramp constitutes the real tragedy of American diplomacy.

#### THIRD, HOLDING ON AS LONG AS POSSIBLE ONLY MAGNIFIES THE EVENTUAL IMPACT:

#### A) EXTEND THE LAYNE EVIDENCE THAT SHOWS DRAWING DOWN NOW INSULATES US FROM A RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR

#### B) HANGING ON AS LONG AS POSSIBLE MAKES GREAT POWER WARS MUCH MORE LIKELY

Layne in 3

[Christopher, CATO, Prof. Political Science, “Casualties of War Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War”, CATO Policy Analysis, No. 483, Aug. 13 //wyo-tjc]

Although American hegemonists obviously disagree (after all, they think the United States is best off in a unipolar world), there are powerful reasons to believe that the return to a multipolar world actually would be strategically advantageous. Whether the United States benefits from multipolarity, or is harmed by it, however, depends largely on how it comes about. In the final analysis, Washington probably cannot prevent a reversion to a multipolar system in the next decade or two (a system in which Europe, China, Russia, and Japan—and perhaps India—would also emerge as great powers). By accommodating multipolarity, and embracing an offshore balancing strategy, the United States can capitalize on the realignment of the international system by devolving many of the security responsibilities it now bears for others.62 However, if Washington tries to heavyhandedly suppress the emergence of new great powers, it will lose doubly. First, the United States won’t be able to stop the emergence of new great powers over the long term. And second, by having tried to block such efforts, it virtually ensures that these new great powers will direct their security efforts against the United States. This is why the “new” NATO is such a bad bargain for the United States. The attempt to subordinate Europe to perpetual American tutelage is bound over time to poison transatlantic relations fatally.63 As Henry Kissinger wrote in the mid-1960s, the emergence of a united Europe as an independent pole of power would have pluses and minuses for the United States.64 But on the whole, if managed properly, it should be a net benefit for the United States. True, there always will be frictions—political, economic, and cultural— between the United States and Europe. In those same realms, however, there are also many common interests. The challenge for the future is to ensure that the heavy hand of American hegemony does not destroy the bases for future cooperation between the United States and a Europe that has become an independent pole of power in the international system. The “new” NATO is an empty vessel. The new NATO—like the old NATO—is merely the embodiment of American hegemony. From every other perspective it has become an irrelevant alliance. The United States derives no added value militarily from NATO. Without the Soviet Union, the new NATO advances no compelling vital American interest. The advocates of offshore balancing are correct: in the absence of a rival hegemonic threat, the United States does not need to be present in Europe militarily. There is no need to stabilize an already stable Europe; there is no need for peacekeeping in a peaceful Europe. The United States does not need to play the role of Europe’s stabilizer (or “pacifier’) and peacekeeper.

#### Exercising military presence only accelerates America’s decline—better to husband our resources to deal with inevitable multipolarity\*\*

MacDonald 9

[Paul, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, Columbia University, Daedalus, “Rebalancing American foreign policy”, 2009, p. asp]

Observers have anticipated America's decline numerous times before and have been proven wrong: just think of the military rebuilding itself in the aftermath of Vietnam or following post-cold war trimming of the defense budget. But the argument presented here is not another simple, overly pessimistic exercise in what Samuel Huntington has called "declinism." (28) The rise of new regional powers has not eliminated America's influence; it has simply attenuated and complicated it. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have not destroyed American military power; they have simply exposed certain limits to its effective application. But while it would be a mistake to prophesy the imminent decline and fall of America in the world, it would be just as erroneous to engage in American triumphalism. There is no more certain way to accentuate the limits in American power or to accelerate the erosion of American influence than by adopting policies designed to prolong American dominance. In this respect, the United States is its own worst enemy. As evidenced by the complications in Iraq and Afghanistan, with great power comes the opportunity to make great mistakes. By moderating its ends and relying on specialized means, the United States can be prepared for whatever uncertainties await it in the coming decades while acclimating itself to a world where it has much to lose and little to gain.

### Unsustainable: Multiple Factors

#### Hegemony not sustainable- hard and soft power and economic/political constraints will all undermine it

Layne 9

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, International Security, “The Waning of US Hegemony—Myth or Reality?”, 2009, p. asp]

According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony.

### Unsustainable: Prefer our Evidence

#### Also, prefer our evidence—global power trajectories have most closely followed our balance of power predictions and scholarship—unipolar optimists are wrong and risk a myopia that locks us into a violent multipolarity

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

The Cold War’s end stifled the burgeoning late 1980s’ debate about America’s relative decline while triggering a new debate about unipolarity. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, a verdict on those debates now can be rendered. First, it turns out the declinists were right after all. The United States’ power has declined relatively. By 2014, the US share of global GDP will shrink to 18%, which is well below the ‘‘normal’’ post–World War II share of 22% to 25% (Nye 1991, 2011). Just as the 1980s declinists predicted, chronic budget and current account deficits, overconsumption, undersaving, and deindustrialization have exacted their toll on the American economy. Judgment also now can be rendered on the debate between balance of power realists and unipolar stability theorists. As balance of power realists predicted, one new great power already has emerged to act as a counterweight to American power, with others waiting in the wings. In contrast to unipolar stability theorists who said unipolarity would extend well into the twenty-first century, balance of power realists predicted that unipolarity would come to an end around 2010. Instead of looking at the trend lines fueling China’s rise and America’s decline, unipolar stability theorists were wrong because they relied on static measures of national power and failed to grasp the velocity of China’s rise. If, indeed, it has not already done so, sometime this decade—- perhaps as early as 2016—China’s GDP will surpass the United States’. No longer is China an emerging great power; it is a ‘‘risen’’ one. The debate about unipolarity is over. The balance of power realists have won. The distribution of power in international political system is shifting dramatically. The US grand strategy must respond to the emerging constellation of power. Yet, US policymakers and many security studies scholars are in thrall to a peculiar form of denialism. First, they believe the world still is unipolar even in the face of overwhelming evidence that it is not. Second, they believe that even if unipolarity were to end, there would be no real consequences for the United States because it will still be the ‘‘pivotal’’ power in international politics, and the essential features of the ‘‘liberal order’’—the Pax Americana—will remain in place even though no longer buttressed by the US economic and military power that have undergirded it since its inception after World War II. This is myopic. Hegemonic decline always has consequences. As the twenty-first century’s second decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The world figures to become a much more turbulent place geopolitically than it was during the era of the Pax Americana. Accepting the reality of the Unipolar Exit—coming to grips with its own decline and the end of unipolarity symbolized by China’s rise—will be the United States’ central grand strategic preoccupation during the next ten to fifteen years.

### Multipolarity Good: 1NC

#### FIRST, A MULTIPOLAR ERA WON’T BE LIKE WWI BALANCE OF POWER—DETERRENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE WILL SOLVE MOST GREAT POWER CONFLICTS

Kupchan in ‘2

[Charles Professor of International Relations @ Georgetown, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York //wyo-tjc]

ALTHOUGH THE FUTURE holds in store a competitive world of multi­ple centers of power, the coming era of multipolarity will likely have its own unique characteristics and may resemble only distantly its his­torical antecedents. Much has changed in the recent past to provide optimism that the era that is opening will be less bloody than the one that is closing. Nations no longer have the same incentives to engage in predatory conquest. They now accumulate wealth through devel oping information technology and expanding financial services, not conquering and annexing land and labor. Nuclear weapons also increase the costs of war. And democratic states may well be less aggressive than their authoritarian ancestors; democracies seem not to go to war with each other. Perhaps future poles of power, as long as they are democratic, will live comfortably alongside each other. In this sense, the end of the American era does not represent a turning back to the traditional balance-of power system of, say Europe before World War I. Rather it signifies a turning forward to a new and uncharted historical era that will be guided by a new set of underlying forces and new rules of the game. Francis Fukuyama is therefore right to assert that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumph of liberal democracy constitute a historical end point. The closing of the current era will mark not just the end of American pri­macy, but also the end of a particular historical epoch—that of indus­trial capitalism, liberal democracy and the nation-state. America has in many respects been at the forefront of each of these defining char­acteristics of the contemporary era. And it has admirably succeeded in completing or at least bringing to their most elevated form each of these grand historical projects. [P. 34-35]

## CHINA

### CHINA

#### Conflict with China is inevitable unless we accept retrenchment—no amount of accommodation or good relations can avoid a hegemonic clash

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

#### Revealingly, Ikenberry makes clear this expectation when he says that the deal the United States should propose to China is for Washington ‘‘to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia’’ (Ikenberry 2011:356). It is easy to see why the United States would want to cut such a deal but it is hard to see what’s in it for China. American hegemony is waning and China is ascending, and there is zero reason for China to accept this bargain because it aims to be the hegemon in its own region. The unfolding Sino- American rivalry in East Asia can be seen as an example of Dodge City syndrome (in American Western movies, one gunslinger says to the other: ‘‘This town ain’t big enough for both of us’’) or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons cannot occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China’s ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.

#### EXTENDED DETERRENCE GUARANTEES WAR WITH CHINA WITHIN 10 YEARS—TAIWAN DISPUTE

Layne in ‘7

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science @ Texas A&M, American Empire: A Debate , P. 75 //wyo-tjc]

Finally, Taiwan is a powder-keg issue in Sino-American relations. China remains committed to national reunification, yet Taiwan is moving percepti- bly toward independence. Almost certainly, Beijing would regard a Taiwanese declaration of independence as a casus belli. It is unclear how the United States would respond to a China-Taiwan conflict, although President George \V Bush created a stir in 2001 when he declared that the United States would intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. For sure, how- ever, it is safe to predict that there would be strong domestic political pressure in favor of American intervention. Beyond the arguments that Chinese mili- tary action against Taiwan would undermine U.S. interests in a stable world order and constitute "aggression," ideological antipathy toward China and support for a democratizing Taiwan would be powerful incentives for Ameri- can intervention. On Taiwan, in other words, the arguments of U.S. primacists have come close to locking-in Washington to a potentially dangerous policy The primacists' claim that the United States must be prepared to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion overlooks three points. First, for nearly a quar- ter century, the United States has recognized that Taiwan is a Chinese prov- ince, not an independent state. Second, America's European and Asian allies have no interest in picking a quarrel with China over Taiwan's fate. If Wash- ington goes to the mat with Beijing over Taiwan, it almost certainly will do so alone. (Given their unilateralist bent, however, the prospect of fighting China without allies might not be much concern to American primacists.) Third, by defending Taiwan, the United States runs the risk of armed confronta- tion with China-probably not in the immediate future, but almost certainly within the next decade or so.

#### SECOND, WAR WITH CHINA LEADS TO DETERRENCE BREAKDOWNS AND NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST

Johnson in 1

[Chalmers, “Time to Bring the Troops Home”, The Nation, May 14, p. lexis // wyo-tjc]

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

## RUSSIA

#### REGIONAL MISCALCULATIONS AND AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE CASPIAN SPARKS A RUSSIAN FIRST-STRIKE, CHAIN-GANGING THE US INTO A NUCLEAR WAR

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[Stephen, MacArthur Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute, “American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region” World Affairs, Fall, p. asp// wyo-tjc]

Russia's warnings about U.S. efforts to obtain military-political-economic leverage in the Transcaspian and the Russian elite's extreme sensitivity regarding the region show that Moscow will resolutely contest expanded U.S. presence. The war in Chechnya shows that Russia is willing to do so forcefully, if necessary. Russia's new draft military doctrine suggests that Moscow will threaten even World War III if there is Turkish intervention, yet the new Russo-Armenian and Azeri-Turkish treaties suggest just such a possibility.(n75) Conceivably, the two larger states could then be dragged in to rescue their allies from defeat. The Russo-Armenian treaty is virtually a bilateral military alliance against Baku. It reaffirms Russia's lasting military presence in Armenia, commits Armenia not to join NATO, and could justify further fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh or further military pressure against Azerbaijan that will impede energy exploration and marketing.(n76) It also reconfirms Russia's determination to resist U.S. presence and to remain the regional hegemon. Thus many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The outbreak of violence by disaffected Islamic elements, the drug trade, the Chechen wars, and the unresolved ethnopolitical conflicts that dot the region, not to mention the undemocratic and unbalanced distribution of income across corrupt governments, provide plenty of tinder for future fires. Many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors also have great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their proxies and proteges. One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia, or if it could, would conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost everywhere else in the CIS or the "arc of crisis" from the Balkans to China. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other's perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.(n77) Betts's analysis implies that for each side the interest or area in question is a vital one. This does not imply that conflict between the superpowers or their proxies is preordained. Rather this analysis drives home the region's dangerous structural conditions. Great power rivalry does not necessarily impart stability to an already troubled region, quite the contrary. Russo-Chinese efforts at Bishkek in 1999 to tie Central Asia to their kite and Russia's new military doctrine demonstrate that such rivalry also stimulates efforts to create spheres of influence even while providing smaller states means to resist them.(n78) Nevertheless, the disproportion between Russia and the smaller Transcaspian states means that no natural equilibrium is possible there. Russia will neither restrain itself nor be restrained by any local institution or power in its pursuit of unilateral advantage and the reintegration of the CIS.(n79) The only restraints it now accepts are objective ones, such as the limits of its faltering economic and military power, that preclude the easy attainment of its goals of regional hegemony and compel it to pursue its aims by more pacific and less-coercive means. And even the perceptions of waning power are difficult to accept and translate into Russian policy. Often Russia refuses to accept the limits on its capability to achieve its vital interests. And where it has moved from using military coercion to economic efforts to retain its preeminence, it has done so as much for lack of a viable military as from the insight that it stands to gain more from a more purely economic approach.(n80) Although this local disproportion in Russia's favor hardly means that Russia can succeed at will across Central Asia, it does mean that if any regional balance, on energy or other major security issue, is to be achieved, someone else must lend power to the smaller littoral states to anchor that balance. The analysts who argue against any major American involvement fail to realize the tragic situation of the region. If the Transcaspian states are to be free and independent and have any hope of independent future development someone from the outside will have to help them because Russia still refuses to accept their sovereignty and independence. As the Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson observed, everyone he meets in Russia confidently expects the CIS to rejoin Russia, and prominent Russian statesmen such as Yevgeny Primakov and Andrei Kokoshin have no compunction about publishing statements concerning the illegitimacy of the current status quo and the expected "augmentation" of Russia's borders.(n81) These statements are hardly an aberration. Russia's national security concept, published in January 2000, states, The interests of ensuring Russia's national security predetermine the need, under appropriate circumstances, for Russia to have a military presence in certain strategically important regions of the world. The stationing of limited military contingents [the same term used to describe forces in Afghanistan] (military bases, naval units) there on a treaty basis must ensure Russia's readiness to fulfill its obligations and to assist in forming a stable military-strategic balance of forces in regions, and must enable the Russian Federation to react to a crisis situation in its initial stage and achieve its foreign policy goals.(n82) Therefore, the local states sought Washington's help as much as Washington turned its attention to them. This fact gets lost in analyses such as that of Anatol Lieven that airily dismiss Russia's continuing mischief making and threat mongering throughout the region.(n83) But the outside balancer must be ready to play a protracted and potentially even a military role in the region and risk the kind of conflicts described above. That power, to retain influence over the long term, cannot remain a detached and unmoved mover. There is little evidence that the United States can or will play this role, suggesting that ultimately its bluff can be called. For an outside regional balancer to prevail, it must abet the local producers' current efforts to diversify foreign investment in local energy deposits, encourage the growth of these states' economic and military power, promote regional economic-military cooperation, and stabilize them from within and without. Washington can achieve only part of this agenda. But even partial failure here will trigger a reversion to the phenomena we seek to avoid.

## TERROR

#### US presence in the Middle East incites terrorism—must drawdown presence to solve

Layne 9

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, Review of International Studies, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”, 2009, p. asp]

The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American interests. In his study of suicide terrorist groups, Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern, and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’.47 Here, the Bush administration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism.Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism, the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is, along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue, the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. The administration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment, and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups. Instead of solving this problem, staying in Iraq will exacerbate it.

#### HEGEMONY IN THE MIDDLE EAST SPARKS TERRORISM AND INSTABILITY, LINK TURNING EVERY POSSIBLE REASON FOR HAVING HEG THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 123 //wyo-tjc]

Nondemocratic states know—and have known long before March 2003— that the United States is willing to use its hard power to impose its liberal institutions and values on them. This tends to create self-fulfilling prophecies, because it causes states that might not otherwise have done so to become “threats.” When the United States challenges the very legitimacy of existing nondemocratic regimes, the effect is to increase their sense of isolation and vulnerability. States and regimes are highly motivated to survive, so it’s no surprise that, in self-defense, others respond to U.S. offensive use of liberal ideology by adopting strategies that give then, a chance to do so, including asymmetric strategies such as acquiring weapons of mass destruction annl supporting terrorism. Another grand strategic consequence of U.S. democracy-promotion efforts is that these often generate instability abroad. Again, Iraq is a good example. Convinced that the Middle East already is so turbulent that nothing the United States does will make things worse, the Bush II administration professes indifference about the destabilizing potential of democratic transitions in the region.34 President George W. Bush declared that the United States will not accept the status quo in the Middle East and that “stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.”35 Although it’s unlikely the United States can purchase real democracy in the Middle East at any price, it is likely that by attempting to do so Washington will end up buying a lot more turmoil in the region. Indeed, radical Islamic groups see the U.S. push to democratization as a path for seizing power.36 The odds are high that U.S. efforts to export democracy will backfire, because even if democracy should take root in the region, it is not likely to he liberal democracy. Illiberal democracies usually are unstable, and they often adopt ultranationalist and bellicose external policies.37 In a volatile region like the Middle East, it is anything but a sure bet that newly democratic regimes—which by definition would be sensitive to public opinion—would align themselves with the United States. Moreover, if new democracies should fail to satisfy the political and economic aspirations of their citizens—precisely the kind of failure to which new democracies are prone—they easily could become far more dangerous breeding grounds for terrorism than are the regimes now in power in the Middle East.