## 1st Off

### T 1NC

#### First, interpretation- restrictions on energy production are limited to direct legal prohibitions or limits on the ability to produce power within the US

#### A-Restrictions are policy instruments—either statutory or regulatory—that directly limit activity

Free Legal Dictionary, accessed 12

[http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/restriction //wyo-tjc]

restriction n. any limitation on activity, by statute, regulation or contract provision. In multi-unit real estate developments, condominium and cooperative housing projects, managed by homeowners' associations or similar organizations are usually required by state law to impose restrictions on use. Thus, the restrictions are part of the "covenants, conditions and restrictions," intended to enhance the use of common facilities and property, recorded and incorporated into the title of each owner.

#### B-‘On’ refers to the indicated destination or focus of an effort

Merriam Webster, no date

[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/on]

9a —used as a function word to indicate destination or the focus of some action, movement, or directed effort <crept up on him> <feast your eyes on this> <working on my skiing> <made a payment on the loan> b —used as a function word to indicate the focus of feelings, determination, or will <have pity on me> <keen on sports> <a curse on you> c —used as a function word to indicate the object with respect to some misfortune or disadvantageous event <the crops died on them> d —used as a function word to indicate the subject of study, discussion, or consideration <a book on insects> <reflect on that a moment> <agree on price> e : with respect to <go light on the salt> <short on cash>

#### C-‘In’ indicates inclusion within a limit or boundary

Merriam Webster, no date

[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in]

Definition of IN

1 a —used as a function word to indicate inclusion, location, or position within limits <in the lake> <wounded in the leg> <in the summer>

b : into 1 <went in the house>

2 —used as a function word to indicate means, medium, or instrumentality <written in pencil> <bound in leather>

3 a —used as a function word to indicate limitation, qualification, or circumstance <alike in some respects> <left in a hurry>

b : into 2a <broke in pieces>

4 —used as a function word to indicate purpose <said in reply>

5 —used as a function word to indicate the larger member of a ratio <one in six is eligible>

#### D- “United States” is synonymous with “United States of America”, USA, ‘merica, etc.

Princeton Word net, no date

[http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=united%20states]

Noun S: (n) United States, United States of America, America, the States, US, U.S., USA, U.S.A. (North American republic containing 50 states - 48 conterminous states in North America plus Alaska in northwest North America and the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific Ocean; achieved independence in 1776)

#### Second, violation: there are two arguments:

#### The affirmative removes a barrier on who can OWN the production, not whether the activity itself IN THE US is illegal or prohibited

#### B) the plan simply says a grounds CANNOT be considered, not that foreign ownership is now LEGALLY PERMITTED, which doesn’t’ eliminate a restriction but only changes how it is enforced

#### Third, Reasons to prefer:

#### A-Principled limit- restriction isn’t a term of art in energy literature and it is commonly used in context. Direct legal barriers is the only way to place a limit on what counts

#### B- Predictablity- they justify affirmatives that would simply open up ownership rules and allow foreign investment on EXISTING energy production activities, this would be impossible to debate because they wouldn’t actually defend an increase in production, AND they can defend that foreign ownership would be rejected on national security grounds, which also allows them to shift out of production disads.

#### Fourth, vote negative: Topicality is a voting issue because it is a prima facie burden and should be evaluated as a question of competing interpretations

## 2nd Off

#### Text: The 50 states, Washington D.C., and relevant territories should substantially increase financial incentives for wind power to a level equivalent to the investment that would be made available if The United States federal government limited the review of foreign investment in wind power by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to cases in which national security, not economic competition is a factor.

#### This solves your warming advantage- State financial incentives solve – generate federal and private investment

EPA, “State Planning and Incentive Structure” In EPA’s, Clean Energy-Environment Guide to Action, April 2006.

States are achieving significant energy and cost sav­ ings through well-designed, targeted funding and incentives for clean energy technologies and services. Key types of financial incentives programs states offer include: • Loans • Tax incentives • Grants, buy-downs, and generation incentives • Nitrogen oxide (NOx) set-asides • Energy performance contracting • Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) States have achieved additional savings by coordinat­ ing financial incentives with other state programs and by leveraging utility-based clean energy programs. Over the past three decades, states have diversified their programs from grants or loans into a broader set of programs targeted at specific markets and customer groups. This diversification has led to port­ folios of programs with greater sectoral coverage, a wider array of partnerships with businesses and com­ munity groups, and an overall reduced risk associated with programmatic investments in energy efficiency and clean supply options. Objective State-provided funding and incentives meet the public purpose objectives of supporting technolo­ gies and products that are new to the market and encouraging and stimulating private sector invest­ ment. Funding and incentives can also reduce mar­ ket barriers by subsidizing higher “first costs,” increasing consumer awareness (the programs are often accompanied by education campaigns and the active promotion of products to help achieve a state’s energy efficiency goals), and encourage or “jump-start” private sector investment. Benefits States provide funding and incentives through a combination of sources (i.e., state and federal funds, utility programs, and ratepayers), to support a broad range of cost-effective clean energy tech­ nologies, including energy efficiency, renewable energy, and combined heat and power (CHP). State funding and incentive programs, some of which are self-sustaining (e.g., revolving loan funds), deliver energy and cost savings for governments, business­ es, and consumers. Program results vary depending on the configuration of funding and incentives used by each state. In Texas, the revolving loan fund has resulted in $152 million in savings since 1989 on an investment of $123 million (DOE 2005). In Oregon, more than 12,000 tax credits worth $243 million have been issued since 1980, which save or generate energy worth about $215 million per year (Oregon DOE 2005b). Providing funding and incentives for clean energy can offer the following environmental, energy, and economic benefits: • Reduces energy costs by supporting cost-effective energy efficiency improvements and onsite gener­ ation projects. • Ensures that clean energy is delivered, specifies which technologies are used, and offers incentives to install technologies. Providing funding and incentives also accelerates the adoption of clean energy technologies by improving the project eco­ nomics and offsets market, institutional, or regula­ tory barriers until those barriers can be removed. • Establishes a clean energy technology or project development infrastructure to continue stimulat­ ing the market after the incentives are no longer in effect. • Leverages federal incentives and stimulates private sector investment by further improving the eco­ nomic attractiveness of clean energy. A small investment may lead to broad support and adop­ tion of a clean energy technology or process. • Stimulates clean energy businesses and job cre­ ation within the state. • Supports environmental protection objectives, such as improving air quality.

## 3rd off

#### Compromise now – capitol watchers agree and post campaign flexibility

SFGate, “Fiscal Cliff impasse on tax rates is a big hurdle”, 11/8/2012. <http://www.sfgate.com/news/politics/article/Fiscal-cliff-Impasse-on-tax-rates-is-big-hurdle-4020913.php#ixzz2BgX4N7mY>

A lot is at stake. A new [Congressional Budget Office](http://www.sfgate.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=news%2Fpolitics&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Congressional+Budget+Office%22) report on Thursday predicted that the economy would fall into recession if there is a protracted impasse in Washington and the government falls off the fiscal cliff for the entire year. Though most Capitol-watchers think that long deadlock is unlikely, the analysts say such a scenario would cause a spike in the jobless rate to 9.1 percent by next fall.¶ The analysis says that the cliff — a combination of automatic tax increases and spending cuts — would cut the deficit by $503 billion through next September, but that the fiscal austerity also would cause the economy to shrink by 0.5 percent next year and cost millions of jobs.¶ The new study estimates that the nation's gross domestic product would grow by 2.2 percent next year if all Bush-era tax rates were extended and would expand by almost 3 percent if Obama's 2 percentage point payroll tax cut and current jobless benefits for the long-term unemployed were extended as well.¶ All sides say they want a deal — and that now that the election is over everyone can show more flexibility than in the heat of the campaign.

#### Second, Obama will get fiscal cliff done- political capital is essential

Sprung, 9/21

[Andrew Sprung is a political commentator & media consultant. He is the CEO of Sprung PR and hold a PhD from the University of Rochestor, “Ezra Klein's unconvincing theory that Obama misunderstands (or misrepresents) "change," http://xpostfactoid.blogspot.com/2012/09/ezra-kleins-unconvincing-theory-that.html]

In my view, Klein is viewing this question too narrowly. Obama is well aware of the limitations of the bully pulpit, and he's got to know better than any person on the planet that presidential advocacy polarizes, entrenching the opposing party in implacable opposition to whatever the president proposes. Yet, in presenting a revamped theory of how the presidency works, he's not just feeding us a line of BS. And if Obama wins reelection, I believe that we will look back five or ten or twenty years from now and recognize that yes, Obama did change the way Washington works. Or at the very least, he kept the US on a sane policy course in a time of extreme polarization and thus gave (will have given...) the system space to self-correct, as it has in the past. Let's start with Klein's objection to Obama's characterization of how healthcare reform got done: The health-care process, which I reported on extensively, was a firmly “inside game” strategy. There were backroom deals with most every major interest group and every swing legislator.... By the time the law passed, many more Americans viewed it unfavorably than viewed it favorably — exactly the opposite of what you’d expect if health care had passed through an “outside game” strategy in which, as Obama put it, “the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” And yet, health care passed. The inside game worked. All true, laddie. And yet, in claiming that the impetus for healthcare reform came from the outside, I don't think Obama is attempting to whitewash this long and messy process -- or is even referring to it. He is alluding to the marshaling or channeling of popular will that got him elected. The essence of Obama's primary election argument against Hillary Clinton was that he was better equipped to marshal the popular will for fundamental change -- with healthcare reform as the centerpiece -- than she was. I well remember the moment when that argument first impressed itself on me. It was in a debate in the immediate aftermath of the Iowa caucuses, on Jan. 5, 2008: Look, I think it's easier to be cynical and just say, "You know what, it can't be done because Washington's designed to resist change." But in fact there have been periods of time in our history where a president inspired the American people to do better, and I think we're in one of those moments right now. I think the American people are hungry for something different and can be mobilized around big changes -- not incremental changes, not small changes. I actually give Bill Clinton enormous credit for having balanced those budgets during those years. It did take political courage for him to do that. But we never built the majority and coalesced the American people around being able to get the other stuff done. And, you know, so the truth is actually words do inspire. Words do help people get involved. Words do help members of Congress get into power so that they can be part of a coalition to deliver health care reform, to deliver a bold energy policy. Don't discount that power, because when the American people are determined that something is going to happen, then it happens. And if they are disaffected and cynical and fearful and told that it can't be done, then it doesn't. I'm running for president because I want to tell them, yes, we can. And that's why I think they're responding in such large numbers. Cue the political science eye-roll. The American people were not "determined" that healthcare reform per se had to occur. You can't read the results of the 2008 wave election as a "mandate" for a specific policy. In the aftermath, the electoral tide went back out with a vengeance. But it's also true that in two years of campaigning Obama's words did inspire people, that the American people were hungry for change after Bush, that Obama made a broad and conceptually coherent case for moving the center of American politics back to the left with a renewed commitment to shared prosperity and investment in the common good, and that healthcare reform was at the center of that case. True too that the results of that election gave him enough of a majority to persist, even when relentless Republican misinformation and bad-faith negotiation and delay eroded public support. Obama also used the bully pulpit at crucial points, if not to rally public opinion, at least to re-commit wavering Democrats -- and also to convince the public, as he enduringly has, that he was more of a good faith negotiator, more willing to compromise, than the Republicans. Those pressure points were the September 2009 speech he gave to a joint session of Congress, and the remarkable eight-hour symposium he staged with the leadership of both parties in late February 2010 to showcase the extent to which the ACA incorporated past Republican proposals and met goals allegedly shared by both parties, as well as his own bend-over-backwards willingness to incorporate any Republican ideas that could reasonably be cast as advancing those goals. In a series of posts about Ronald Reagan, Brendhan Nyhan has demonstrated that presidential rhetoric generally does not sway public opinion. Savvy politicians channel public opinion; transformative ones seize an opportunity when their basic narrative of where the country needs to go aligns with a shift in public opinion, usually in response to recent setbacks or turmoil. Obama, like Reagan, effected major change in his first two years because he caught such a wave -- he amassed the political capital, and he spent it, and we got what he paid for. The force from outside -- a wave election -- empowered Obama to work change from inside in a system that reached a new peak of dysfunctionality. Klein's also objects to Obama's pitch for how to effect change going forward. In 2011, he notes, Obama highlighted the substantial change won from the messy inside game of legislating, touting the long list of legislative accomplishments of the 111th Congress. In election season, he has reverted to a keynote of his 2008 campaign: change comes from you, the electorate; it happens when ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Klein regards this as election season hooey: But while this theory of change might play better, it’s the precise theory of change that the last few years have shattered. Whatever you want to say about the inside game, it worked. Legislation passed. But after the midterm elections, it stopped working. And so the White House moved towards an outside game strategy, where ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Perhaps the most public example was Obama’s July 2011 speech, in which he said: I’m asking you all to make your voice heard. If you want a balanced approach to reducing the deficit, let your member of Congress know. If you believe we can solve this problem through compromise, send that message. So many Americans responded that Congress’s Web site crashed. But Obama didn’t get his “balanced approach,” which meant a deal including taxes. Klein goes on to recount that throughout the past year of confrontation with the GOP, pushing a jobs package that had broad popular support, Obama won only one minor victory, extension of the payroll tax cut. He then reverts to two political science tenets: presidential advocacy entrenches the opposition, and it can't move popular opinion. But I think he misreads Obama's pitch, strategy and record on several counts. First, he understates Obama's (and the Democrats') successes in the year of confrontation that has followed the debt ceiling debacle. He writes off the payroll tax cut and unemployment benefit extension as small beer. But this was actually a near-total victory in two stages against entrenched opposition, and it won Obama some vital back-door stimulus for the second year running in the wake of the GOP House takeover. It was followed by a similar GOP cave-in on maintaining low student loan interest rates -- and then again, by the collapse of the House GOP effort to renege on the Budget Control Act and impose still more spending cuts. Presidential rhetoric may not change the public mind. But when it's in sync with voter's propensities, it can deploy public opinion to bring pressure to bear on the opposition. Second, it's true that under threat of GOP debt ceiling extortion, Obama successfully marshaled public opinion in favor of his "balanced" approach to deficit reduction but wasn't able to use that pressure to move the GOP off their no-new-taxes intransigence. But that battle ain't over yet, and popular support for Obama's position is political capital that's still in the bank. In the upcoming fiscal cliff negotiations, Obama, if he wins reelection, will have the whip hand, given the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and Republican teeth-gnashing over the defense cuts in the sequester. Speaking of which, Obama's refusal to intervene in the supercommittee negotiations as Republicans stonewalled once again over any tax hikes banked him further capital in this upcoming fight. Republicans are screaming much louder than Democrats about the sequester, disastrous though the cuts may be on the domestic side. Third, it's rational for Obama to recast his bid for change in election season, because of course he's seeking further "change" from the outside, i.e., more Democrats elected to Congress. He's not going to win a mandate as in 2008, or, most likely, majorities in both houses of Congress. But he has to make the pitch for being granted renewed tools to advance his agenda. Finally, a key part of Obama's "you are the change" pitch in his convention speech was a frank call to play defense -- to protect the changes wrought in his first term and fend off the further capture of the electoral process and the nation's resources by the oligarchy the GOP represents: If you turn away now – if you buy into the cynicism that the change we fought for isn’t possible … well, change will not happen. If you give up on the idea that your voice can make a difference, then other voices will fill the void: lobbyists and special interests; the people with the $10 million checks who are trying to buy this election and those who are making it harder for you to vote; Washington politicians who want to decide who you can marry, or control health-care choices that women should make for themselves.

#### Wind incentives sap capital – republican opposition, fossil fuel interests, and Solyndra scandal

NYT, New York Times, “End of Clean Energy Subsidies?” May 5, 2012

The federal government has given generously to the clean energy industry over the last few years, funneling billions of dollars in grants, loans and tax breaks to renewable power sources like wind and solar, biofuels and electric vehicles. “Clean tech” has been good in return. ¶ During the recession, it was one of the few sectors to add jobs. Costs of wind turbines and solar cells have fallen over the last five years, electricity from renewables has more than doubled, construction is under way on the country’s first new nuclear power plant in decades. And the United States remains an important player in the global clean energy market. ¶ Yet this productive relationship is in peril, mainly because federal funding is about to drop off a cliff and the Republican wrecking crew in the House remains generally hostile to programs that threaten the hegemony of the oil and gas interests. The clean energy incentives provided by President Obama’s 2009 stimulus bill are coming to an end, while other longer-standing subsidies are expiring. ¶ If nothing changes, clean energy funding will drop from a peak of $44.3 billion in 2009 to $16 billion this year and $11 billion in 2014 — a 75 percent decline. ¶ This alarming news is contained in a new report from experts at the Brookings Institution, the World Resources Institute and the Breakthrough Institute. It is a timely effort to attach real numbers to an increasingly politicized debate over energy subsidies. While Mr. Obama is busily defending subsidies, the Republicans have used the costly market failure of one solar panel company, Solyndra, to indict the entire federal effort to encourage nascent technologies.

#### Lack of compromise devastates Middle Eastern presence and devastates war

Hutchison 9/21

[Kay Bailey Hutchison,, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012 “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis]

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk. According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and a potentially catastrophic blow to our national defense and security capabilities in a time of increasing violence and danger. All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve. The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship. Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year. The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings. In the absence of U.S. military leadership, upheaval in the Middle East would be worse. As any student of history can attest, instability does not confine itself to national borders. Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region. Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological research, development and advantage - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities. Sequestration can still be avoided. But that will require leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Middle East goes nuclear

Russell 9

[James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf]

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

## 4th Off

#### Production focus to problems fails—the only solutions it engenders are more production, this only contributes to environmental problems

Princen et al, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Michael Maniates, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, and Ken Conca, Program Director the School of Global Environmental Politics at American University, Confronting Consumption, “Confronting Consumption.” Pg. 1-20. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

Combining the elements of socially embedded consumers and linked chains of resource-use decisions leads to a third theme of our provisional framework: that ‘‘consuming’’ occurs all along the chain, not just at the downstream node of consumer demand. Nodes of raw-material extraction and manufacturing, for example, represent not just production and value added, but also consumption and value subtracted. Producers are consumers; production is consumption. An important implication of this idea is that what is being consumed at each node is not obvious. At the node of primary resource extraction it might be the tree or the fish, or it might be the ecosystem integrity of the forest or the fishery. At the node of final purchase it might be an apple, or a person’s attention, or a community’s social fabric. Another implication of this view is that responsibility shifts from the individuated consumers-as-final-demanders to actors at all nodes of the chain. Producers may add value as they satisfy downstream demand, but they also risk value depletion; they consume value by producing. In using up resources both natural and social, they impose costs on the environment and on people— be they purchasers, workers, caregivers, neighbors, or citizens. This consumption angle on resource use offers a corrective to the production-centered perspective that dominates contemporary discussions of economic affairs, including environmental protection. In that perspective, raw materials feed manufacturing and distribution to produce what people want. It follows that, because goods are good and would not be produced if people did not want them, more goods— and more production— must be better. A productive economy is, as a result, one that produces more goods for a given input (thus increasing the economy’s ‘‘productivity’’), yields more choices for consumers, and increases output. When production creates problems such as pollution, the productive answer is to produce correctives such as scrubbers, filters, and detoxifiers. So goes the logic of production, productiveness, productivity, and products— construing all things economic as producing, as adding value, as, indeed, progress. The consumption angle turns this around to self-consciously construe economic activity as consuming, as depleting value, as risking ecological overshoot, as stressing social capacity.

#### Second, the Impact—consumption focus is the only way to solve for overconsumption and misconsumption that threaten human survival

Princen, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Confronting Consumption, “Consumption and its externalities: where economy meets ecology.” Pg. 23-42. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

A strictly ecological interpretation takes consumption as perfectly ‘‘natural.’’ To survive, all organisms must consume— that is, degrade resources. This interpretation of a given consumption act is background consumption. It refers to the normal, biological functioning of all organisms, humans included. Every act of background consumption by an individual alters the environment, the total environmental impact being a function of aggregate consumption of the population. Individuals consume to meet a variety of needs, physical and psychological, both of which contribute to the ability of the individual to survive and reproduce. From this limited, asocial, nonethical interpretation of consumption, all consumption patterns and consequences are natural, including population explosions and crashes and irreversibilities caused by the expansion of one species at the expense of other species. If, however, the interpretation is modified to include human concern for population crashes, species extinctions, permanent diminution of ecosystem functioning, diminished reproductive and developmental potential of individuals, and other irreversible effects, then ‘‘problematic consumption’’ becomes relevant. Two interpretive layers are overconsumption and misconsumption. Overconsumption is the level or quality of consumption that undermines a species’ own life-support system and for which individuals and collectivities have choices in their consuming patterns. Overconsumption is an aggregate-level concept. With instances of overconsumption, individual behavior may be perfectly sensible, conforming either to the evolutionary dictates of fitness or to the economically productive dictates of rational decision making. Collective, social behavior may appear sensible, too, as when increased consumption is needed in an advanced industrial economy to stimulate productive capacity and compete in international markets. But eventually the collective outcome from overconsuming is catastrophe for the population or the species. From a thermodynamic and ecological perspective, this is the problem of excessive throughput. 21 The population or species has commanded more of the regenerative capacity of natural resources and more of the assimilative capacity of waste sinks than the relevant ecosystems can support. And it is an ethical problem because it inheres only in populations or species that can reflect on their collective existence. What is more, for humans it becomes a political problem when the trends are toward collapse, power differences influence impacts, and those impacts generate conflict. The second interpretive layer within problematic consumption is misconsumption, which concerns individual behavior. The problem here is that the individual consumes in a way that undermines his or her own well-being even if there are no aggregate effects on the population or species. Put differently, the long-term effect of an individual’s consumption pattern is either suboptimal or a net loss to that individual. It may or may not, however, undermine collective survival. Such consumption can occur along several dimensions.

#### Third is the alt, rejection of the 1ac’s production focus in favor of a consumption based approach to energy resources.

#### Challenging consumption solves consumer sovereignty and solves for the health of the planet

Princen et al, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Michael Maniates, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, and Ken Conca, Program Director the School of Global Environmental Politics at American University, Confronting Consumption, “Confronting Consumption.” Pg. 1-20. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

Consumption and consumerism have long been consigned to the edges of polite talk among North Americans concerned about environmental degradation and the prospects for sustainability. How much, and what, do we consume? Why? Are we made happier in the process? How much is enough? How much is too much for the social fabric or health of the planet? Small wonder that these questions are addressed only obliquely, if at all. They are hard to answer, and when answers emerge they can be problematic, for they have an awkward tendency to challenge deeply held assumptions about progress and the ‘‘good life’’; they call into question the very idea of consumer sovereignty, a cornerstone of mainstream economic thinking. They also challenge prevailing distributions of power and influence and smack of hypocrisy, coming as they so often do from those who consume the most. To confront such questions is to bite off, in one chunk, a large and vexing body of social, political, and cultural thought and controversy. It is no exercise— intellectual or practical— for the timid.

## Case

### Econ

#### Economy is resilient and decline doesn’t cause war

Zakaria 9

 Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, December 12, 2009, “The Secrets of Stability: Why terrorism and economic turmoil won't keep the world down for long” Newsweek, <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.print.html>)

One year ago, **the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system**, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, **was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization**—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—**were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled**. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." **Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries**. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, **how much has the world really changed**? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. **Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.** A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' “says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" **This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage**. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) **The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many**. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe **there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think.** The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

#### Military ties increasing, shows relations are increasing

Xinhua, 11

China-U.S. military ties to be further advanced with implementation of heads-of-state consensus, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-05/20/c_13885931.htm>, accessed 5-24-2011, WYO/JF

**During a speech upon his arrival in the U.S., Chen said that his visit was aimed at implementing the consensus reached by the heads of state of the two nations on promoting bilateral military ties, boosting mutual understanding and trust and encouraging cooperation** as to build a new type of cooperative military relations featuring mutual respect and mutual benefit.

#### US China Relations good. North Korea de-escalation proves.

Pomfret, 11

(John Pomfret , Washington Post, January 2, 2011 Tone of US-China relations improves, but trust lacking <http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2011/01/02/tone_of_us_china_relations_improves_but_trust_lacking/>UWYOKB)

**In part, the improved tone reflects Washington’s success in leveraging Beijing’s desire for a smooth summit to get concessions from China** or nudge it toward policies closer to Washington’s liking. That said, significant problems — such as a gap in strategic trust — bedevil the relationship. “**You’ve got leaders in the United States and in China that want to do everything possible to limit direct confrontation**,’’ said Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, a consulting firm, “but structurally, both countries are going to have a hard time avoiding it.’’ **The most remarkable about-face has occurred in the administration’s attitude toward China over the Korean Peninsula. A few weeks ago, a senior administration official accused China of creating the conditions that allowed North Korea to start a uranium-enrichment program and launch two deadly attacks on South Korea. But late last month, senior administration officials praised China for pressing North Korea not to react to a South Korean military drill**. Officials referred specifically to a visit by China’s top diplomat, Dai Bingguo, to North Korea on Dec. 9. After the meeting, China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency reported that China and North Korea had reached a consensus on the situation on the peninsula — which many analysts interpreted as meaning North Korea had agreed not to provoke South Korea in the short term. **Administration officials also commended China for soft-pedaling a proposal to hold emergency talks between South and North Korea**, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States as part of a way **to calm the situation.** Instead, the officials said that China had accepted a US plan that put improving ties between the South and the North ahead of any multilateral talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Administration officials portrayed the United States and China as working in lockstep in dealing with the crisis. **China continued to urge restraint on North Korea**, they said, while the United States worked with Seoul to ensure that its exercises were “firm’’ but also “nonconfrontational and nonescalatory,’’ a senior administration said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the topic.

#### No US-China war – regional stability

Ackerman 11

(Robert, quoting former admiral Timothy Keating, the official blog of the Armed Forces Communication and Electronics Association, 5/10/11, “War Between China, U.S. Not Likely,” <http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510/>)

The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own. As for Taiwan, Adm. Keating offered that with each day, the likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan diminishes. Economic ties between the two governments are growing, as is social interaction. He predicts that a gradual solution to reunification is coming. The United States can hasten that process by remaining a powerful force in the region, he added.

#### **NO China trade war, rational actor**

Shah 8-29

[Abhishek, Analyst (VP) at Sunsara Capital, “China Solar Trade War,” Green Chip Stocks, August 29, 2012, <http://www.greenchipstocks.com/articles/china-solar-trade-war/2106>, //uwyo-baj]

The Global Green War had started with the US imposing duties on imports of Chinese made solar panels and cells. Subsequently dumping charges were also imposed on wind energy equipment made in China as well. China has not been able to do much against these duties as it exports almost 80-90% of its solar products. Though the Government is investigating the charges of cheap polysilicon imports from the USA , the Government has refrained from taking any action till now. The Chinese Government perhaps realizes that it does not want to get into a full scale war with the US considering the massive trade surplus it runs. However the Chinese Government does not want to get run down and has started making bigger noises. Today the Government of China criticized US for unfairly subsidizing six green energy projects against WTO rules. Though no action has yet been taken, China is trying to up the ante with the USA as Chinese solar panel exports to the US have declined sharply.

#### China won’t become powerful enough to go to war for decades to come

Nye 11

(Joseph S., Dean of Harvard’s JFK School of Government, “China’s Rise Doesn’t Mean War…,” Foreign Policy 184 (2011): 64+, Academic OneFile, Feb. 23)

**One should be skeptical about such dire projections**. **Americans go through cycles of declinism every decade or so, but that tells us more about America's psychology than its power resources. Not only is the U**nited **S**tates **likely to remain the most powerful country in the first half of this century, but China still has a long way to go to catch up in military, economic, and soft power**. In contrast, Germany had already surpassed Britain in industrial power by 1900, and the kaiser was pursuing an adventurous, globally oriented foreign and military policy that was bound to bring about a clash. But **China today has focused its policies primarily on its region and its own economic development**. China's "market-Leninist" economic model is attractive in authoritarian countries, but this so-called Beijing Consensus has the opposite effect in most democracies. And e**ven if China's GDP passes U.S. GDP around 2027** (as Goldman Sachs now projects), **the two economies would be equivalent in size, not equal in composition**. China would still face massive rural poverty and enormous inequality, and **it will begin to encounter demographic problems from the delayed effects of its one-child policy**. Moreover, **as countries develop, there is a natural tendency for growth rates to slow. By my calculations, if China's annual growth goes down to 6 percent and the U.S. economy grows at 2 percent per year after 2030, China will not equal the U**nited **S**tates in **per capita income until decades later. So China is a long way from posing the kind of challenge to America that the kaiser's Germany posed to Britain in 1900.**

#### Our evidence proves yours wrong/turns it: trade increases likelihood of conflict: asymmetry theory means states can use trading partners as sources of power to manipulate other countries and resources.

Kinne 12

(Brandon, University of Texas at Dallas, Journal of Politics, “Multilateral Trade and Militarized Conflict: Centrality, Openness, and Asymmetry in the Global Trade Network,” January 1, 2012, accessed via Academic Search Premiere//wyo-mm)

These arguments most directly implicate breadth, as a high number of trade partners should reduce a state’s reliance on any single partner. However, depth of ties also matters, especially if deep trade ties indicate established sales organizations for a state’s products or readily available sources of substitute goods. For example, when conﬂict led to a decline in Colombia-Venezuela trade in 2009, Colombia directed its efforts at trade substitution toward those countries with which it already enjoyed strong ties—the United States, the EU, China, and Canada. Deep trade ties may also increase a state’s autonomy if those ties are highly asymmetrical and, thus, potentially exploitable (Barbieri 1996, 31–32). As Hirschman argues with regard to asymmetrically dependent states, ‘‘The greater the percentage of exports and imports involved in a dominant market, the more difﬁcult it will be to provide substitute markets and sources of supply’’ (1980, 30). In short, asymmetry implies that powerful states ‘‘may be able to manipulate the relationship as a source of power’’ (Keohane and Nye 1973, 122). Finally, commercial proximity to nonpartners (closeness) may also increase autonomy, especially if it accords states strategically valuable positions in the global trade network. Concerns about strategic actors are a common theme in colloquial views of international economics—evidenced, for example, by popular criticism of China’s role in export of rare-earth metals or Japanese predominance in semiconductors. States that occupy highly central positions in the global trade network may hold monopoly power in value-added chains and thus exercise political inﬂuence even over nonpartners. This possibility is reinforced by evidence that trade in certain strategic resources in fact increases conﬂict (e.g., Goenner 2010; Polachek 1980; Sen 1984). Thus: H2: Trade integration increases a country’s probability of initiating militarized disputes Trade Integration and Network Centrality The complexity of multilateral trade integration presents an empirical challenge. I employ a network conception of integration, in which the global system of commerce is deﬁned as a network of interacting units. Most simply, a social network consists of a set of n actors (nodes) connected by a set of ties (edges). The network is formally represented as an n 3 n adjacency matrix, A, where matrix entries aij indicate a tie between node i and node j. Network ties may either be nondirected, such that aij 5 aji , or directed, such that aij ¼6 aji . Network ties may also be dichotomous, such that aij 5 1 if a tie exists and aij 5 0 otherwise, or they may be weighted, such that aij takes on some value indicating not merely the presence but also the strength of the i / j tie.

#### No warrants for economic conditions causing great wars and trade more likely to increase tensions between great powers.

Littlefield 10

(Alexis, PhD candidate at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung

Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Exploring the Security Dimension of Sino–US Trade Asymmetry Implications for the International Trade System,” 2010, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/spring/littlefield.pdf//wyo-mm>)

Liberals have argued that mutual economic interdependence precludes war or at least should greatly reduce the possibility of military conlict. In the decades leading up to 1914, trade in goods “reached almost as large a proportion of global output as in the past thirty years,” writes Ferguson. Trade interdependence certainly did not prevent the Great War despite the overt economic irrationality of that venture. Ferguson goes so far as to ask the question “Was there also some connection between the efects of global economic integration and the outbreak of the First World War?” 14 There is little (if any) historical evidence of states going to war over economic is­ sues; likewise, there is little evidence of economic issues preventing states from going to war. I argue the asymmetric economic dependence between the United States and China rather than fostering good will exasperates tensions between the two powers. Invariably this compels one to ask what inancial circumstances could potentially lead to a crisis in Sino–US rela­ tions. his is addressed in greater detail in the second section.

### Warming

#### No impact to warming – new NASA data

Taylor,11

 senior fellow for environment policy at the Heartland Institute, 7-27-11

(James, “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole in Global Warming Alarmism,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/>) JDB

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal [Remote Sensing](http://www.mdpi.com/2072-4292/3/8/1603/pdf). The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama [press release](http://pielkeclimatesci.wordpress.com/2011/07/26/new-paper-on-the-misdiagnosis-of-surface-temperature-feedbacks-from-variations-in-earth%E2%80%99s-radiant-energy-balance-by-spencer-and-braswell-2011/). “There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans.” In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted. The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models [had predicted](http://wattsupwiththat.com/2009/03/30/lindzen-on-negative-climate-feedback/). Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted. In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict. When objective NASA satellite data, reported in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, show a “huge discrepancy” between alarmist climate models and real-world facts, climate scientists, the media and our elected officials would be wise to take notice. Whether or not they do so will tell us a great deal about how honest the purveyors of global warming alarmism truly are.

#### No Extinction from warming—can’t overwhelm adaptation and feedbacks

Lomborg 8

Director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School

Bjorn, “Warming warnings get overheated”, The Guardian, 8/15, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange>

These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren’t for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a “catastrophe” and the beginning of the “extinction” of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners’ scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland’s ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world’s coastal infrastructure and much of the world’s farmland – “undoubtedly” causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years’ time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell’s claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

# \*\*\*A2 Warming

#### They have an incredibly high threshold for winning impact uniqueness—catastrophic harm is inevitable and stopping global climate change would require insane emissions cuts: 50% below 1990 levels by 2050

Barnett 10

[Jon, Australian Research Council Fellow in the School of Social and Environmental Enquiry at the University of Melbourne, POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER, “Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate Change”, April 2010, p. online//wyo-tjc]

There are a number of things that governments can do to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of migration exacerbated by climate change. Principal among them is to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid 2oC of warming above pre-industrial levels may now be all but impossible, and therefore ‘dangerous’ climate change is almost certain to occur. However, deep cuts in emissions can minimize the danger, and in terms of this report, minimize the number of people whose movements would constitute an impact of climate change, and maximize the scope for more voluntary migrations to contribute to adaptation. Stern (2008) suggests stabilizing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at 500ppm CO2 e is not impossible, even though this would mean global emissions need to fall by at least 50% relative to 1990 levels by 2050.

#### IPCC predictions fail and rely on faulty computer models – even if they win that the earth is warming, the rate is too slow to trigger their impacts

Bast & Taylor ‘11

[Joseph and James, CEO of the Heartland Institute, author of Rebuilding America’s Schools, Why We Spend Too Much on Health Care, Eco-Sanity: A Common-Sense Guide to Environmentalism, Education & Capitalism, Climate Change Reconsidered, and The Patriot’s Toolbox, and managing editor of Environment & Climate News, Senior Fellow for The Heartland Institute, bachelor degree from Dartmouth College and law degree from the Syracuse University College of Law, “Global Warming: Not a Crisis,” The Heartland Institute, 8.2.11., http://heartland.org/ideas/global-warming-not-crisis) //wyo-hdm]

How Much Warming? NASA satellite data recorded since 1979 allow us to check the accuracy of claims that the past three decades have been warming at an alarming rate. The data show a warming rate of 0.123 degrees C per decade. This is considerably less than what land-based temperature stations report during the same time period, and which are relied on by the IPCC (Christy, 2009). If the Earth’s temperature continues to rise at the rate of the past three decades, the planet would see only 1.23 degrees C warming over the course of an entire century. Most climate scientists, even “skeptics,” acknowledge that rising CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere would, all other things held constant, cause some small amount of warming. Alarmists claim that small amount will trigger increases in the amount of moisture in the atmosphere, which in turn will cause further warming. But other scientists have found no evidence of rising levels of moisture in those areas of the atmosphere where the models claim it should be found. Without this “amplification,” there is no global warming crisis (Singer, 2011). While the global climate warmed slightly during the 1980s and 1990s, it has not warmed at all since 2000, and there is some evidence that a cooling trend has begun (Taylor, 2007). This contradicts the predictions of the IPCC and poses a challenge to the theory that CO2 concentrations play a major role in global temperature trends. It confirms the views of many less-politicized climate scientists who acknowledge that the global climate is always warming or cooling (Michaels, 2005; Christy, 2006). The scientific community’s lack of certainty about future climate trends is rooted in the shortcomings of computer models. These models are the centerpiece of the IPCC’‘s reports, yet it is widely recognized that they fail to account for changes in precipitation, water vapor, and clouds that are likely to occur in a warmer world. It is a case of “garbage in, garbage out.” If we cannot predict how much warming will occur, how can we claim that continued human emissions of greenhouse gases is harmful?

#### Wind power does not touch coal consumption- power managers always target gas-fired power for the tradeoff because it has a fuel cost that is higher than coal EVEN WITH low gas prices\*\*

Electricity Journal 10

[staff, “Wind’s Gains are Proving to be Natural Gas’ Loss”, May 24, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

The reason for wind displacing natural gas has to do with relative marginal fuel costs. Competing generators bid into the Texas wholesale market, the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), essentially based on marginal fuel prices. Wind, which has zero fuel costs, and nuclear, which has negligible fuel costs, are generally the least-cost resources dispatched by the grid operator. Coal, which has relatively low fuel costs, is next in line. Natural gas plants – notably older, less-efficient units – are typically the most expensive resource and the last in line to be dispatched. Prices of natural gas have been depressed, but they are still expensive relative to coal. This explains why the growth of wind has come primarily at the expense of natural gas. Coal generation has been barely affected. That is surprise #1.

#### Natural gas glut kills solvency- it makes grid-parity and fuel-switching impossible for decades. This is the most durable take-out

Rotman 12

[David, editor of Technology Review, Technology Review, “King Natural Gas”, October, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Early this summer, a simple graph from the U.S. Energy Information Administration shocked even the most astute energy wonks. It showed that for the first time since the federal agency began keeping track, coal was no longer the dominant fuel used to generate electricity in the United States. Over the previous few months, the use of natural gas in power plants had risen so quickly that it accounted for as much electricity as coal, a far dirtier fossil fuel. (As usual, renewables such as wind and solar power flatlined near the bottom of the chart.) The milestone was just one more sign of a transformation in the energy prospects of the country -- and probably the world. The sudden abundance of cheap natural gas has dramatically changed the way the United States produces and consumes energy, dwarfing the changes wrought by decades of subsidies and other incentives for the development of nonfossil fuels.

The so-called gas revolution is largely the result of advanced drilling techniques -- horizontal drilling and hydrofracking -- that have become more widespread over the last several years. These methods make it practical to extract huge amounts of natural gas that have long been known to exist in shale deposits around the country, most notably in the Marcellus shale that spreads for tens of millions of acres underneath much of Pennsylvania and parts of New York, Ohio, West Virginia, Maryland, and Kentucky (see "Natural Gas Changes the Energy Map," November/December 2009). Experts disagree on how much recoverable gas these deposits actually hold, but by most guesses it is more than enough to supply the United States for many decades. What's more, large deposits of shale gas have been identified in China and in spots throughout the rest of the world.

Though it's been increasingly evident since the late 2000s how important this resource is, it's startling how quickly and thoroughly it has altered our energy habits. The reason has to do mainly with another statistic that the EIA carefully tracks: for much of the first half of this year, the price of natural gas hovered around $2 to $2.50 per million BTUs, far below the $13 it reached in 2008 (before the rapid expansion of drilling in the Marcellus shale). At $2.50 per million BTUs, the price of natural gas is the equivalent of around $15 per barrel for oil.

Put another way, modern natural-gas-fired power plants can now produce electricity at around four cents per kilowatt-hour. That's cheaper than energy from new coal plants, and far less than the price of even the most efficient wind or solar power when the cost of backup systems for those intermittent sources is taken into account (see chart on facing page).

"Cheap natural gas has taken a big bite out of coal very quickly," says David Victor, an energy expert at University of California, San Diego. "And there's going to be a bloodbath in wind power as well." For investors and technologists hoping to make renewable energy, such as wind and solar power, cost-competitive with fossil fuels, reaching so-called grid parity has suddenly gotten much tougher. Arguably, it's impossible to reach with existing technologies.

#### Decarbonized energy production insufficient for emissions cuts- would require too many coordinating policies in transportation and infrastructure as well as better technology

Williams 12

[James H. et al, prof of Energy and Environmental Economics, “The Technology Path to Deep Greenhouse Gas Emissions Cuts by 2050: The Pivotal Role of Electricity”, Science, Jan. p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Several states and countries have adopted targets for deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, but there has been little physically realistic modeling of the energy and economic transformations required. We analyzed the infrastructure and technology path required to meet California’s goal of an 80% reduction below 1990 levels, using detailed modeling of infrastructure stocks, resource constraints, and electricity system operability. We found that technically feasible levels of energy efficiency and decarbonized energy supply alone are not sufficient; widespread electrification of transportation and other sectors is required. Decarbonized electricity would become the dominant form of energy supply, posing challenges and opportunities for economic growth and climate policy. This transformation demands technologies that are not yet commercialized, as well as coordination of investment, technology development, and infrastructure deployment.