### 1st off

#### First, interpretation: financial incentives are direct support for the private production of power- that excludes procurement

Czinkota et al, 9 **-** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. Fiscal incentives are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. Financial incentives offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. Nonfinancial incentives include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### Second, violation: the affirmative engages in direct procurement

#### Third, prefer our interpretation:

#### A- Education: ‘procurement allows them to bypass market dynamics which is the core education area of how private producers react to government incentives

#### B- Reasonable limits- justifies affirmatives with unpredictable lit bases like ‘nationalize energy production’ or have the US government drill in areas without opening them to private drilling

#### Fourth, vote negative: Topicality is a voting issue because it is a prima facie burden and should be evaluated as a question of competing interpretations

### 2nd Off

#### Text: The 50 states, Washington D.C., and relevant territories should increase procurement contracts for small modular reactors deployed in the United States.

#### States solve nuclear power production

NEI, Nuclear Energy Institute, “Industry Applauds Recognition of Nuclear Policies in NCSL Energy Task Force Report”, July 26, 2010

WASHINGTON,D.C.—The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the nation’s largest policy organization for state lawmakers, has released a report identifying several recommendations to expand the use of nuclear energy as state lawmakers pursue policies that provide secure sources of energy. The policy options range from lifting moratoria on new nuclear power plants that exist in some states to tax incentives for new reactor construction to defining nuclear as a clean power source. The report describes these “effective” policies and identifies instances in which they already have been put in place across the nation. The policy prescriptions, disseminated this past weekend by NCSL’s Energy Supply Task Force at the organization’s Legislative Summit in Louisville, Ky., represent an attempt to balance “cleaner, domestic sources of electricity with the need for job growth and economic development.” “In the past, most energy decisions have focused on reliability and cost,” the report states. “Today, utilities and policymakers consider many other factors as well, including job creation, economic development, energy security, and the environment.” The NCSL task force notes that a growing number of states are passing clean energy legislation with significant provisions to expand nuclear energy. “These policies, along with the potential for federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, have changed the landscape when it comes to building new power plants,” the report states. “There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach on energy policy that will work for every state, but clearly nuclear has to be part of the mix,” said Rep. Al Carlson, North Dakota House majority leader and NCSL Energy Supply Task Force co-chair. “States do need to take a lead on energy, and baseload generation is an important component,” added task force co-chair Tom Holbrook, who serves as chairman of the Illinois House Utilities Committee. Nuclear energy policy options identified in the task force report include: • state laws making the permitting process more efficient without sacrificing safety, resulting in new reactor construction in a shorter time frame; • state-level financing support mechanisms; • tax incentives; • education and training for America’s nuclear work force; • incentives for domestic supply chain production; • revisions or repeal of nuclear energy moratoria; • nuclear power plant site suitability studies; • defining nuclear as “clean energy”; and • decommissioning trust fund support. “Increasingly we are seeing states assume leadership over key energy issues that fail to secure commitment or enactment in Washington,” said Marshall Cohen, senior director for state and local government affairs at the Nuclear Energy Institute. “In its acknowledgment of the role nuclear energy can play in securing a clean, reliable and domestic supply of electricity going forward, this NCSL report affords state policymakers an attractive menu of tested and proven policy options that promise to revitalize our economy while also help achieve our aggressive emissions reductions ambitions. “NCSL leadership and its task force are to be commended for providing this comprehensive policy guide to lawmakers across the country at a crucial time.”

### 3rd Off

#### Obama wins- leading now, winning electoral college

Cohn Oct. 1oth

[Nate Cohn, political analyst, October 10th, 2012, Daily Breakdown: Romney's Bounce Appears To Hold Through Wednesday,http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/108433/daily-breakdown-romneys-bounce-appears-hold-through-wednesday#, uwyo//amp]

There is one poll offering better news for the president: the YouGov/Economist survey showing Obama leading by 3 points, 49-46. Of course, YouGov/Economist is different in another respect; it’s an internet pollster with a track record. More on this later. If there was any other silver lining for the president, it was the continuing hints of a split between battleground and national surveys. Despite a wave of national polls showing Romney with the lead, there hasn’t been a battleground state poll showing Romney leading in a battleground state since ARG showed Romney ahead in Ohio and Colorado. Since then, multiple polls have shown Obama leading in Nevada and Ohio—two states sufficient to get Obama over the top when combined with Wisconsin, another state where two post-debate polls show Obama in the lead. Support thought-provoking, quality journalism. Join The New Republic for $3.99/month. To a certain extent, Obama’s persistent advantage in the battleground states isn’t surprising. In pre-debate polls, Obama led by at least 5 points in states worth 281 electoral votes, including Iowa, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Nevada. If Romney has gained about 4 points, then Obama would retain a slight lead in these states. But the conclusion that Romney has only gained 4 points is largely based on these state polls, since the national surveys suggest that Romney has gained at least 5 points, which should have been enough to yield a few more polls showing Romney ahead in states like Ohio, Iowa, and Nevada.

#### Obama’s base will backlash to policy implementation of his nuclear goals-reaction to Obama’s pro-nuclear rhetoric proves

Mick 2010

[Jason Mick, June 19 2010, Obama Fights For Nuclear, Environmentalists Label Him a Shill, [http://www.dailytech.com/Obama+Fights+For+Nuclear+Environmentalists+Label+Him+a+Shill/article18781.htm](http://www.dailytech.com/Obama%2BFights%2BFor%2BNuclear%2BEnvironmentalists%2BLabel%2BHim%2Ba%2BShill/article18781.htm), uwyo//amp]

Breaking with many members of his party, U.S. President Barack Obama this year called upon the U.S. to regain its lead in nuclear power and embrace new clean nuclear technology. The move was tremendously unpopular among some of his key constituents. A February article in Mother Jones blasted the President, accusing him of be in the nuclear industry's pocket, writing: With the leading projects in dissary (sic), why is the Obama administration rushing to put billions on the line to encourage new construction? The industry has been trying to get Uncle Sam to bankroll its comeback for more than a decade. Between 1999 and 2009, the industry poured more than $600 million into lobbying for its cause and spent almost $63 million on campaign contributions, according to a recent analysis from the Investigative Reporting Workshop at American University. Republicans have long championed nuclear power, putting forward legislation that would call for the construction of 100 new nuclear plants in the next two decades. But the nuclear lobby's most ambitious goals were often stymied by Democrats in Congress—until Obama was elected and his administration began the push for (sic) climate bill. That was just one of a host of rambling and angry commentaries attacking the President's stand. Others included -- "Obama’s nuclear error: $54 billion in loan guarantees make little policy or political sense", "5 Reasons Why Nuclear Energy is Even Worse than Clean Coal", "Next in Line for a Bailout: The Nuclear Industry?", "There’s a New Drive for Nuclear Power, But It’s Still a Financial Dead End", "The loan arranger: Obama triples budget for nuke loan guarantee program… but hasn’t seen a single promising application in two years".

#### Enthusiasm high now- Biden’s performance has corrected the enthusiasm gap-prefer this evidence because it is comparative

Zeff Oct. 12th

[Blake Zeff, former aide to Chuck Schumer and Eric Schneiderman, October 12th, 2012, What Biden Just Did for the Obama Campaign, <http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/10/6538139/what-joe-biden-just-did-obama-campaign>, uwyo//amp]

Joe Biden’s debate performance in Danville may not have been perfect—his repeated interruptions and mocking laughter may have turned off some viewers disinclined to like him anyway. But Biden did what his party most needed him to do, putting on a display designed to give supporters of a campaign once founded on hope and audacity a little of both. The vice president entered the floor like a doggie being let out of the kennel, hitting every point Democrats wanted to see, exhibiting the passion of a gladiator, and generally dominating the proceedings. He saddled Paul Ryan with Mitt Romney’s "47 percent" comments and a tax cut plan that eliminates deductions for the middle class, as well as Ryan’s plan to curtail Medicare and Social Security and his effort to win stimulus money from the very program he now derides. He made Ryan uncomfortable, and when the congressman didn't answer the moderator's questions, Biden made sure everyone knew it. Basically, Biden was everything at his debate that Barack Obama hadn't been at the first presidential debate; it's as if he prepped primarily by watching Obama’s performance and then resolving to do the opposite. This time around, it was the Republican, Ryan, who was passively playing defense while his opponent single-mindedly rattled off one argument after another. This time it was the Democrat controlling the pace and tone of the discussion, interrupting when he felt like, and viewing the moderator’s instructions, for the most part, as suggestions. Entering a debate, a candidate’s team will often agree on a tactical approach, in addition to points they want to hit. Biden's goal was clearly to expose a wide stature gap by dominating the floor, correcting his young opponent (he used the word “malarkey” three times), interrupting him when needed (“It’s incredible!”; “That’s a bunch of stuff”), and generally making him look small (“my friend, the Congressman”). On foreign policy, a subject Biden has worked on for nearly four decades, the difference was particularly stark. While Ryan generally managed to utter, without incident, the words his advisers had planned for him on the topic, he clearly lacked a fluency with the subject matter. At one point toward the end of the night, Biden looked like an old professor impatiently teaching a confused student about Afghanistan (“We want to send Afghans to do the job, not Americans,” he repeated extra-slow, to ensure comprehension). Biden was OK with the idea of coming off as obnoxious in exchange for demonstrating how much his opponent still had to learn before he could be considered commander in chief material. The reality is that vice presidential debates don't usually do much, in terms of convincing significant numbers of undecided voters to support a ticket. But after Denver, Republicans had a very real edge in enthusiasm, and their uncommitted voters, or “leaners,” were firming up. Fewer voters had been identifying as Democrats, reflecting a decrease in enthusiasm among Obama’s leaners. Perhaps Republican voters were not persuaded by Scranton Joe, who more likely reaffirmed their inclination to see him as a blowhard. And perhaps not every independent voter was moved to the Democrats’ side. Perhaps Republicans even have reason to feel good about Ryan’s mostly error-free performance (though their complaints about the moderator and emphasis on Biden’s body language suggest otherwise). With Obama's lead having shrunk in the polls after Denver, the vice president gave his team reason for confidence, and there is intrinsic value to that alone. Donors will give more, and raise more. Canvassers will approach their job with more enthusiasm. And those mercurial “leaners,” who were with Obama after the convention but more wobbly after his debate, might just return, particularly if the president can follow Biden's lead by asserting himself at the next debate at Hofstra.

#### Environmentalists/Obama’s base will only reach voter enthusiasm if he takes further steps toward clean energy

Casey 2011

[Mike Casey, founder and president of Tigercomm. He uses his 27 years of communications experience to counsel cleantech company executives, pro-sustainability nonprofit leaders and elected officials on building and running their communications programs, Can Obama Go Back to Political base(ics)?, November 28, 2011, <http://www.greatenergychallengeblog.com/2011/11/28/can-obama-go-back-to-political-baseics/>, uwyo//amp]

President Obama made a smart move this month by putting the Keystone XL pipeline project into the deep freeze. It had been poor politics for him — and it would have been even worse policy for the country, especially when you consider the aggressive retooling of our world energy sources demanded by the International Energy Agency findings in its latest World Energy Outlook. But for the president’s staff, the question that lingers is whether it will relearn what it had mastered so well in 2008 — that while you have to campaign in the center, your base voters’ enthusiasm matters a lot. Based on articles like this one in Bloomberg Businessweek, about how environmentalists “matter less to Obama 2012,” it certainly doesn’t seem that way. For instance, the Businessweek article quotes Obama campaign spokesman Ben LaBolt commenting that “[w]hen voters compare Obama’s record with [the Republican candidates for president], ‘there will be no question about who will continue our progress.’” The problem is, for ego-conscious millennials (the key, according to a new analysis by Center for American Progress political analysts Ruy Teixeira and John Halpin, to the 2012 election) like former Microsoft executive Jabe Blumenthal, who care deeply about environmental issues and who want to feel that their concerns are being heard at the highest levels, simply asserting that “I’m not Rick Perry” or “I’m not Mitt Romney” won’t work. To the contrary, Blumenthal says in the Businessweek piece, it’s “simply not true” that the specter of Romney, Perry or Gingrich will be sufficient cause for him to open his checkbook to the Obama campaign, as he did in 2008. Throughout the Keystone XL process, the message from Washington pundits and experts was that environmentalists “will not be happy, but they have nowhere else to go.” It’s hard to imagine such an arrogant statement being directed at African-American, gay or Latino voters, but the “nowhere else to go” sentiment directed at environmentalists seemed to have taught them it was time to chuck the tradition of patty-cake politics and “principled loserism” they’ve operated with for so long. The clincher in the Keystone fight was when committed Obama 2008 volunteers, donors and staffers started correcting the “nowhere else to go” idea. These Obama supporters recognized that they did indeed have somewhere else they could go: home, And not just on election day, but on all the days between now and then. In key states such as Colorado, where the green base is a lot of the base, these base voters realized that they could make themselves matter. In addition, environmental leaders such as 350.org’s Bill McKibben, Sierra Club’s Mike Brune, Friends of the Earth’s Erich Pica, and Greenpeace’s Phil Radford have shown they aren’t interested in the “nowhere to go” approach. I’m still not sure why the White House let things get to the point where supporters had to threaten to withhold their time, money and effort — all over a boondoggle that wouldn’t have dropped gas prices at all. To me, the politics around the Keystone XL pipeline were clear from the start. First there were the wildly inflated claims of jobs from an industry with a history of inflating them. And, of the jobs that would have been created, most would have been in states that were politically out of reach for Obama, and many of those would likely have been created after the election. Worse, the project had become a cafeteria line for TransCanada lobbyists, creating a paper trail of revolving door influence-peddling and inside dealing that the media would have acquired and used long into an Obama second term. On top of all that, the president’s approval of this project would have further depressed his base while benefiting an industry that is resolutely opposed to him — including his arch political enemies, the Koch brothers. It all leaves me scratching my head. But, hey, as a clean energy advocate, I’ll take the result. Going forward, there’s an opportunity for the Obama staff to stop confusing the critical task of courting the political center with the ill-advised practice of coddling lobbyists from a hostile oil industry. For the environmental community, there’s an opportunity to not resume the folded-hands, broken-hearted mode so much of its leadership has operated from over the last three decades. It will be interesting to see what the younger environmental leadership, having shown they aren’t interested in the “nowhere to go” approach, does to affect its fate.

#### Turnout good- lack of turnout would hand the election to Republicans

Cost 2012

[Jay Cost, staff writer, June 12, 2012, Morning Jay: Obama’s Problem With His Base, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/morning-jay-obama-s-problem-his-base_646967.html>, uwyo//amp]

Instead, the problem is at the margins, which is where electoral politics is inevitably played. In 2008 the Democratic base was marginally more excited than it was in 2004, while the GOP base was marginally depressed. These small changes added up to an enormous effect. Consider this chart of party turnout in presidential elections going back to 1996: The shift from ’04 to ‘08 was not large, but it added up to a decisive victory for Obama. But this points to Obama’s problem today: With a reversion back to the 2004 levels of Democratic and Republican turnout, this president is sunk. Election night would be an early one. That’s because Obama is doing terribly with the independent vote. If the level of partisan turnout is the first important variable in deciding who wins, then the swing of the independent vote is the second. And independents do not approve of President Obama. According to the Gallup poll, the president has pulled in just 43 percent support from independents over the last month, and just 36 percent of “pure independents,” i.e., those with no ties at all to either party. Worse, as this analysis from Alan Abramowitz suggests, the swing vote shows no signs of warming up to the president any time soon. Indeed, according to the Gallup poll, the president has not been above 50 percent with independents since November 2009.

#### Romney election causes Iran strikes. Approach to Iran is the biggest contrast in Obama and Romney foreign policy – Obama will continue to push sanctions and negotiation while Romney will bow to Israeli desires to attack and pursue a bombastic foreign policy.

Daily KOs, Editorial, “The Daily Kos, President Obama Versus Romney on Iran”, 4/16/2012 <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/04/16/1083726/-President-Obama-versus-Romney-on-Iran>

To me, however the biggest contrast is their approach to Iran. Binyamin Netanyahu by all accounts is a hawk who is pushing the United States to bomb Iran and has been doing so for a long time. He appears to see no need for negotiation. Granted, he has a right to protect his nation if he believes that its under threat. However, we all know how flawed the “intelligence” was for the Iraq war. And its important to let negotiations play out as far as possible before rushing to war, which would have many unintended consequences for years to come. (See the Iraq war). Here’s the big difference. Here’s Netanyahu’s recent response to the ongoing P5+1 talks: http://news.yahoo.com/... Netanyahu -- whose government has not ruled out a preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities -- earlier said however that Tehran had simply bought itself some extra time to comply. "My initial impression is that Iran has been given a 'freebie'," Netanyahu said during talks with visiting US Senator Joe Lieberman, the premier's office reported. "It has got five weeks to continue enrichment without any limitation, any inhibition. I think Iran should take immediate steps to stop all enrichment, take out all enrichment material and dismantle the nuclear facility in Qom," he said. "I believe that the world's greatest practitioner of terrorism must not have the opportunity to develop atomic bombs," he said. Here’s President Obama’s response yesterday to Netanyahu (in a response to a journalist's question) at the press conference in Cartagena: But Obama refuted that statement, saying "The notion that we've given something away or a freebie would indicate that Iran has gotten something." "In fact, they got the toughest sanctions that they're going to be facing coming up in a few months if they don't take advantage of those talks. I hope they do," Obama said. "The clock is ticking and I've been very clear to Iran and our negotiating partners that we're not going to have these talks just drag out in a stalling process," Obama told reporters after an Americas summit in Colombia. "But so far at least we haven't given away anything -- other than the opportunity for us to negotiate," he said. Obama in conjunction with world powers is negotiating with Iran, trying to prevent a needless war. You can be sure that Mitt Romney would bow to his buddy Netanyahu and attack Iran. He has previously said “We will not have an inch of difference between ourselves and Israel”. As he also said in a debate, before making any decision regarding Israel, he will call his friend Bibi. Bottom line, if somehow the American people elect Mitt Romney, expect more of the bombastic, Bush cowboy approach to foreign policy with a more than likely bombardment of Iran. If the American people are not fooled by this charlatan and they reelect Barack Obama, he will continue in his measured way to deal with the threats around the world, quietly, through the use of negotiation, and force if absolutely necessary, but only as a last resort, without bragging, and scaring the American people with needless terrorism alerts.

#### Strikes on Iran cause global nuclear holocaust. Strikes would be nuclear from the outset, regional CBW use, Pakistan and India draw-in, US, Russia and China draw-in.

Dennis Ray Morgan, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies- South Korea, 10 July 2009, World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race, Futures 41 (2009) 683–693, uwyo//amp

Given the present day predicament regarding Iran’s attempt to become a nuclear power, particular attention should be given to one of Moore’s scenarios depicting nuclear war that begins through an attack on Iran’s supposed nuclear facilities. According to Seymour Hersh [12] the nuclear option against Iran has, in fact, been discussed by sources in the Pentagon as a viable option. As Hersh reports, according to a former intelligence officer, the lack of ‘‘reliable intelligence leaves military planners, given the goal of totally destroying the sites, little choice but to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons. ‘Every other option, in the view of the nuclear weaponeers, would leave a gap,’ the former senior intelligence official said. ‘Decisive is the key word of the Air Force’s planning. It’s a tough decision. But we made it in Japan.’’ [12].10 The official continues to explain how White House and Pentagon officials are considering the nuclear option for Iran, ‘‘Nuclear planners go through extensive training and learn the technical details of damage and fallout - we’re talking about mushroom clouds, radiation, mass casualties, and contamination over years. This is not an underground nuclear test, where all you see is the earth raised a little bit. These politicians don’t have a clue, and whenever anybody tries to get it out – remove the nuclear option – they’re shouted down’’ [12]. Understandably, some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not comfortable about consideration of the nuclear option in a first strike, and some officers have even discussed resigning. Hersh quotes the former intelligence officer as saying, ‘‘Late this winter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to remove the nuclear option from the evolving war plans for Iran - without success. The White House said, ‘Why are you challenging this? The option came from you’’’ [12]. This scenario has gained even more plausibility since a January 2007 Sunday Times report [13] of an Israeli intelligence leak that Israel was considering a strike against Iran, using low-yield bunker busting nukes to destroy Iran’s supposedly secret underground nuclear facilities. In Moore’s scenario, non-nuclear neighboring countries would then respond with conventional rockets and chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Israel then would retaliate with nuclear strikes on several countries, including a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, who then retaliates with an attack not only on Israel but pre-emptively striking India as well. Israel then initiates the ‘‘Samson option’’ with attacks on other Muslim countries, Russia, and possibly the ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ cities of Europe. At that point, all-out nuclear war ensues as the U.S. retaliates with nuclear attacks on Russia and possibly on China as well.11 Out of the four interrelated factors that could precipitate a nuclear strike and subsequent escalation into nuclear war, probably the accidental factor is one that deserves particular attention since its likelihood is much greater than commonly perceived. In an article, ‘‘20 Mishaps that Might Have Started a Nuclear War,’’ Phillips [14] cites the historical record to illustrate how an accident, misinterpretation,or false alarm could ignite a nuclear war. Most of these incidents occurred during a time of intense tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but other mishaps occurred during other times, with the most recent one in 1995. Close inspection of each of these incidents reveals how likely it is that an ‘‘accident’’ or misinterpretation of phenomena or data (‘‘glitch’’) can lead to nuclear confrontation and war. In his overall analysis, Phillips writes: The probability of actual progression to nuclear war on any one of the occasions listed may have been small, due to planned ‘‘failsafe’’ features in the warning and launch systems, and to responsible action by those in the chain of command when the failsafe features had failed. However, the accumulation of small probabilities of disaster from a long sequence of risks adds up to serious danger. There is no way of telling what the actual level of risk was in these mishaps but if the chance of disaster in every one of the 20 incidents had been only 1 in 100, it is a mathematical fact that the chance of surviving all 20 would have been 82%, i.e. about the same as the chance of surviving a single pull of the trigger at Russian roulette played with a 6- shooter. With a similar series of mishaps on the Soviet side: another pull of the trigger. If the risk in some of the events had been as high as 1 in 10, then the chance of surviving just seven such events would have been less than 50:50. [14]12 Aggression in the Middle East along with the willingness to use low-yield ‘‘bunker busting’’ nukes by the U.S. only increases the likelihood of nuclear war and catastrophe in the future. White House and Pentagon policy-makers are seriously considering the use of strategic nuclear weapons against Iran. As Ryan McMaken explains, someone at the Pentagon who had . . .not yet completed the transformation into a complete sociopath leaked the ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ which outlined plans for a nuclear ‘end game’ with Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria, none of which possess nuclear weapons. The report also outlined plans to let the missiles fly on Russia and China as well, even though virtually everyone on the face of the Earth thought we had actually normalized relations with them. It turns out, much to the surprise of the Chinese and the Russians, that they are still potential enemies in a nuclear holocaust.

### 4th Off

#### Production focus to problems fails—the only solutions it engenders are more production, this only contributes to environmental problems

Princen et al, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Michael Maniates, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, and Ken Conca, Program Director the School of Global Environmental Politics at American University, Confronting Consumption, “Confronting Consumption.” Pg. 1-20. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

Combining the elements of socially embedded consumers and linked chains of resource-use decisions leads to a third theme of our provisional framework: that ‘‘consuming’’ occurs all along the chain, not just at the downstream node of consumer demand. Nodes of raw-material extraction and manufacturing, for example, represent not just production and value added, but also consumption and value subtracted. Producers are consumers; production is consumption. An important implication of this idea is that what is being consumed at each node is not obvious. At the node of primary resource extraction it might be the tree or the fish, or it might be the ecosystem integrity of the forest or the fishery. At the node of final purchase it might be an apple, or a person’s attention, or a community’s social fabric. Another implication of this view is that responsibility shifts from the individuated consumers-as-final-demanders to actors at all nodes of the chain. Producers may add value as they satisfy downstream demand, but they also risk value depletion; they consume value by producing. In using up resources both natural and social, they impose costs on the environment and on people— be they purchasers, workers, caregivers, neighbors, or citizens. This consumption angle on resource use offers a corrective to the production-centered perspective that dominates contemporary discussions of economic affairs, including environmental protection. In that perspective, raw materials feed manufacturing and distribution to produce what people want. It follows that, because goods are good and would not be produced if people did not want them, more goods— and more production— must be better. A productive economy is, as a result, one that produces more goods for a given input (thus increasing the economy’s ‘‘productivity’’), yields more choices for consumers, and increases output. When production creates problems such as pollution, the productive answer is to produce correctives such as scrubbers, filters, and detoxifiers. So goes the logic of production, productiveness, productivity, and products— construing all things economic as producing, as adding value, as, indeed, progress. The consumption angle turns this around to self-consciously construe economic activity as consuming, as depleting value, as risking ecological overshoot, as stressing social capacity.

#### Second, the Impact—consumption focus is the only way to solve for overconsumption and misconsumption that threaten human survival-(YELLOW HIGHLIGHTING)

Princen, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Confronting Consumption, “Consumption and its externalities: where economy meets ecology.” Pg. 23-42. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

A strictly ecological interpretation takes consumption as perfectly ‘‘natural.’’ To survive, all organisms must consume— that is, degrade resources. This interpretation of a given consumption act is background consumption. It refers to the normal, biological functioning of all organisms, humans included. Every act of background consumption by an individual alters the environment, the total environmental impact being a function of aggregate consumption of the population. Individuals consume to meet a variety of needs, physical and psychological, both of which contribute to the ability of the individual to survive and reproduce. From this limited, asocial, nonethical interpretation of consumption, all consumption patterns and consequences are natural, including population explosions and crashes and irreversibilities caused by the expansion of one species at the expense of other species. If, however, the interpretation is modified to include human concern for population crashes, species extinctions, permanent diminution of ecosystem functioning, diminished reproductive and developmental potential of individuals, and other irreversible effects, then ‘‘problematic consumption’’ becomes relevant. Two interpretive layers are overconsumption and misconsumption. Overconsumption is the level or quality of consumption that undermines a species’ own life-support system and for which individuals and collectivities have choices in their consuming patterns. Overconsumption is an aggregate-level concept. With instances of overconsumption, individual behavior may be perfectly sensible, conforming either to the evolutionary dictates of fitness or to the economically productive dictates of rational decision making. Collective, social behavior may appear sensible, too, as when increased consumption is needed in an advanced industrial economy to stimulate productive capacity and compete in international markets. But eventually the collective outcome from overconsuming is catastrophe for the population or the species. From a thermodynamic and ecological perspective, this is the problem of excessive throughput. 21 The population or species has commanded more of the regenerative capacity of natural resources and more of the assimilative capacity of waste sinks than the relevant ecosystems can support. And it is an ethical problem because it inheres only in populations or species that can reflect on their collective existence. What is more, for humans it becomes a political problem when the trends are toward collapse, power differences influence impacts, and those impacts generate conflict. The second interpretive layer within problematic consumption is misconsumption, which concerns individual behavior. The problem here is that the individual consumes in a way that undermines his or her own well-being even if there are no aggregate effects on the population or species. Put differently, the long-term effect of an individual’s consumption pattern is either suboptimal or a net loss to that individual. It may or may not, however, undermine collective survival. Such consumption can occur along several dimensions.

#### Third is the alt, rejection of the 1ac’s production focus in favor of a consumption based approach to energy resources.

#### Challenging consumption solves consumer sovereignty and solves for the health of the planet

Princen et al, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Michael Maniates, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, and Ken Conca, Program Director the School of Global Environmental Politics at American University, Confronting Consumption, “Confronting Consumption.” Pg. 1-20. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

Consumption and consumerism have long been consigned to the edges of polite talk among North Americans concerned about environmental degradation and the prospects for sustainability. How much, and what, do we consume? Why? Are we made happier in the process? How much is enough? How much is too much for the social fabric or health of the planet? Small wonder that these questions are addressed only obliquely, if at all. They are hard to answer, and when answers emerge they can be problematic, for they have an awkward tendency to challenge deeply held assumptions about progress and the ‘‘good life’’; they call into question the very idea of consumer sovereignty, a cornerstone of mainstream economic thinking. They also challenge prevailing distributions of power and influence and smack of hypocrisy, coming as they so often do from those who consume the most. To confront such questions is to bite off, in one chunk, a large and vexing body of social, political, and cultural thought and controversy. It is no exercise— intellectual or practical— for the timid.

### Heg

#### New great powers are rising and will soon be on par with the us—prefer our evidence because it cites the two most important indicators of a power shift

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

American decline is part of a broader trend in international politics: the shift of economic power away from the Euro-Atlantic core to rising great and regional powers (what economists sometimes refer to as the ‘‘emerging market’’ nations). Among the former are China, India, and Russia. The latter category includes Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, Brazil, and South Africa. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank predicted that six countries—China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and South Korea—will account for one-half of the world’s economic growth between 2011 and 2025 (Politi 2011; Rich 2011). In some respects, of course, this emergence of new great powers is less about rise than restoration. As Figure 1 indicates, in 1700 China and India were the world’s two largest economies. From their perspective—especially Beijing’s—they are merely regaining what they view as their natural, or rightful, place in the hierarchy of great powers. The ascent of new great powers is the strongest evidence of unipolarity’s end. The two most important indicators of whether new great powers are rising are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). The evidence that the international system is rapidly becoming multipolar—and that, consequently, America’s relative power is declining—is now impossible to deny, and China is Exhibit A for the shift in the world’s center of economic and geopolitical gravity. China illustrates how, since the Cold War’s end, potential great powers have been positioning themselves to challenge the United States.

#### Multipolarity will arrive in two decades as other powers catch up to the US—transition to offshore balancing now is key to avoid unending cycles of warfare\*\*

Layne 9

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, Review of International Studies, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”, 2009, p. asp]

Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because, as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system, it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors.4 Yet, recent studies by the CIA offer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power.5 And, of course, growing apprehensions about the military, as well as economic, implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world affairs are numbered. Offshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to fight an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two.

#### Retrenchment solves flashpoints—historically proven, eliminates flashpoint violence and tripwires, and end counter-balancing

Parent & Mac Donald 11

[Joseph and Paul, Assistant Professors of Political Science at the University of Miami and at Wellesley College, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

EVEN IF a policy of retrenchment were possible to implement, would it work? The historical record suggests it would. Since 1870, there have been 18 cases in which a great power slipped in the rankings, as measured by its GDP relative to those of other great powers. Fifteen of those declining powers implemented some form of retrenchment. Far from inviting aggression, this policy resulted in those states' being more likely to avoid militarized disputes and to recover their former rank than the three declining great powers that did not adopt retrenchment: France in the 1880s, Germany in the 1930s, and Japan in the 1990s. Those states never recovered their former positions, unlike almost half of the 15 states that did retrench, including, for example, Russia in the 1880s and the United Kingdom in the first decade of the twentieth century. Retrenchment works in several ways. One is by shifting commitments and resources from peripheral to core interests and preserving investments in the most valuable geographic and functional areas. This can help pare back the number of potential flashpoints with emerging adversaries by decreasing the odds of accidental clashes, as well as reducing the incentives of regional powers to respond confrontationally. Whereas primacy forces a state to defend a vast and brittle perimeter, a policy of retrenchment allows it to respond to significant threats at the times and in the places of its choosing. Conflict does not become entirely elective, as threats to core interests still must be met. But for the United States, retrenchment would reduce the overall burden of defense, as well as the danger of becoming bogged down in a marginal morass.

#### We outweigh- only a risk of a global nuclear war in a world of US primacy

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 176 //wyo-tjc]

If we assume, just for the sake of argument, that the magnet effect was a factor leading to U.S. involvement in Eurasian wars before 1945, nuclear weapons have changed the geopolitical equation since then. There are many imponderables about nuclear strategy. Nuclear weapons today probably would deter war between nuclear-armed great powers in Eurasia. On the other hand, because of the stability-instability paradox (the standoff at the strategic nuclear level makes it more thinkable for nuclear-armed great powers to fight limited, conventional wars against one another), nuclear deterrence might allow great powers to begin wars in the hope that they would be fought with conventional weapons only. However, in a conventional conflict between nuclear-armed great powers, the risk of escalation would be omnipresent. Precisely because of these unknowns, American grand strategy should maximize U.S. autonomy, because the last thing the United States should want is to be caught in the cross fire of a nuclear war fought by Eurasian great powers. If the United States adopts an offshore balancing grand strategy, it simply is not the case that the United States would he sucked into a war between Eurasian great powers. A nuclear conflict in Eurasia cannot leap the Atlantic or Pacific oceans and engulf the United States unless the United States is embroiled from the outset because of its forward military presence in Eurasia. In a nuclear world, it would be irrational to risk being involved in such a conflict for economic reasons (and, probably, for any reason).

#### Conflict with China is inevitable unless we accept retrenchment—no amount of accommodation or good relations can avoid a hegemonic clash

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

#### Revealingly, Ikenberry makes clear this expectation when he says that the deal the United States should propose to China is for Washington ‘‘to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia’’ (Ikenberry 2011:356). It is easy to see why the United States would want to cut such a deal but it is hard to see what’s in it for China. American hegemony is waning and China is ascending, and there is zero reason for China to accept this bargain because it aims to be the hegemon in its own region. The unfolding Sino- American rivalry in East Asia can be seen as an example of Dodge City syndrome (in American Western movies, one gunslinger says to the other: ‘‘This town ain’t big enough for both of us’’) or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons cannot occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China’s ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.

#### HEGEMONY IN THE MIDDLE EAST SPARKS TERRORISM AND INSTABILITY, LINK TURNING EVERY POSSIBLE REASON FOR HAVING HEG THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 123 //wyo-tjc]

Nondemocratic states know—and have known long before March 2003— that the United States is willing to use its hard power to impose its liberal institutions and values on them. This tends to create self-fulfilling prophecies, because it causes states that might not otherwise have done so to become “threats.” When the United States challenges the very legitimacy of existing nondemocratic regimes, the effect is to increase their sense of isolation and vulnerability. States and regimes are highly motivated to survive, so it’s no surprise that, in self-defense, others respond to U.S. offensive use of liberal ideology by adopting strategies that give then, a chance to do so, including asymmetric strategies such as acquiring weapons of mass destruction annl supporting terrorism. Another grand strategic consequence of U.S. democracy-promotion efforts is that these often generate instability abroad. Again, Iraq is a good example. Convinced that the Middle East already is so turbulent that nothing the United States does will make things worse, the Bush II administration professes indifference about the destabilizing potential of democratic transitions in the region.34 President George W. Bush declared that the United States will not accept the status quo in the Middle East and that “stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.”35 Although it’s unlikely the United States can purchase real democracy in the Middle East at any price, it is likely that by attempting to do so Washington will end up buying a lot more turmoil in the region. Indeed, radical Islamic groups see the U.S. push to democratization as a path for seizing power.36 The odds are high that U.S. efforts to export democracy will backfire, because even if democracy should take root in the region, it is not likely to he liberal democracy. Illiberal democracies usually are unstable, and they often adopt ultranationalist and bellicose external policies.37 In a volatile region like the Middle East, it is anything but a sure bet that newly democratic regimes—which by definition would be sensitive to public opinion—would align themselves with the United States. Moreover, if new democracies should fail to satisfy the political and economic aspirations of their citizens—precisely the kind of failure to which new democracies are prone—they easily could become far more dangerous breeding grounds for terrorism than are the regimes now in power in the Middle East.

#### Indo-Pak relations are likely to remain stable for reasons including national well-being, domestic cohesion, national security, and trade

Krepon 09

[Michael, Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Foundation, Nuclear Arms and the Future of South Asia, BNET, April 2009, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0KNN/is\_53/ai\_n31464292/pg\_3/?tag=content;col1//UWYO TDA]

The first such dominant trend is that **Pakistan and India will probably keep viewing economic growth as essential to national well-being, domestic cohesion, and national security.** **Trade between the countries** presumably **will** continue to **grow.** While the perceived primacy of economic growth does not ensure peaceful relations between Pakistan and India, **the pursuit of this goal is likely to further ameliorate animosity**. Pakistan's future growth is limited in part by constrained trading partnerships with India and states in Central Asia. As long as Pakistan's ties to neighboring India and Afghanistan remain conflicted, these natural trade routes will generate far less than optimal results. **This** dominant **trend is conducive to improved bilateral relationships on the subcontinent**. Second, in view of the primacy of economics **in** the national security calculations of **Pakistan and India**, **it is probable that the leadership in both countries will seek to avoid major crises and border skirmishes in the years ahead.** **Pakistan's interest in nonhostile relations with India is likely to be reinforced** by continued difficulties along its border with Afghanistan. The leadership goal of peaceful borders between Pakistan and India could, however, be challenged by significant acts of terrorism perpetrated by extremists with quite different agendas. Nonetheless**, there are greater buffers against escalation arising from significant acts of terrorism than in previous years. This dominant trend also points in the direction of improved bilateral relations on the subcontinent. It is hard to envision another standoff** like that of the "Twin Peaks" crisis in 2001-2002. (1) This does not, however, exclude lesser cases in which extremist acts trigger retaliatory measures.

**asian war unlikely despite multiple flashpoints**

**Bitzinger and Desker 8**

Richard and Barry, PhD from UCLA and Senior Fellow @ International Studies Perspectives, Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Why East Asian War is Unlikely, [Survival](http://www.informaworld.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/smpp/title~content%3Dt713659919~db%3Dall), Volume [50](http://www.informaworld.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/smpp/title~content%3Dt713659919~db%3Dall~tab%3Dissueslist~branches%3D50#v50), Issue [6](http://www.informaworld.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/smpp/title~content%3Dg906414492~db%3Dall) December 2008 , pages 105 – 12

**The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world's most significant flashpoints** - the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier - where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. **Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect.** To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, **but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained**. The **North Korean nuclear issue**, while not fully resolved, **is at least moving toward** a conclusion with the likely **denuclearisation** of the peninsula. **Tensions between China and Taiwan**, while always just beneath the surface, **seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict** any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And **while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including** the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation **(APEC)** forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation - the Association of Southeast Asian Nations **(ASEAN)** - which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, **ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia - while not inconceivable - is unlikely.**

#### Times have changed – Russia has zero capacity to lash out an Armageddon.

Lieber and Press 06 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, from Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy” http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-u-s-nuclear-primacy.html

For almost half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 1960s, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to committing suicide. [LEIBER AND PRESS CONTINUE – PARAGRAPH LATER] This debate may now seem like ancient history, but it is actually more relevant than ever -- because the age of MAD is nearing an end. Today, for the first time in almost 50 years, the United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy. It will probably soon be possible for the United States to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike. This dramatic shift in the nuclear balance of power stems from a series of improvements in the United States' nuclear systems, the precipitous decline of Russia's arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China's nuclear forces. Unless Washington's policies change or Moscow and Beijing take steps to increase the size and readiness of their forces, Russia and China -- and the rest of the world -- will live in the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for many years to come.

### Prolif

#### SMRs cause prolif

#### Proliferation risk with SMRs – enables countries with high prolif risk to get nuclear energy

Moor 12 (Mr. Phillip O. Moor P.E., Consultant in nuclear technology, licensing, and business structuring and former Director of Project Management at GPU Nuclear, Chair of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) President’s Special Committee on SMR Licensing Issues, “Small Modular Reactor Panel Discussion Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee”, Summary Prepared by Derek Updegraff, Rebecca Lordan, Pierce Corden Dirksen-­‐366 May 9, 2012, http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/SummaryFinalSMR.pdf)

Moor also discussed one of the downsides of SMRs: The O&M costs are likely to be higher per MW than large reactors, unless new NRC regulations allow a reduction in staffing. However, additional costs for infrastructure would be avoided if SMR designs that mimic the larger LWRs were incorporated into the existing nuclear infrastructure. SMRs would use essentially the same fuel mixture and level of fuel enrichment (5% Uranium-­‐235) in fuel assemblies scaled to their size. The SMR designs that are designed to use higher enrichment (up to 20% for some designs) and longer fueling cycles would incur greater fuel costs. However, these models are not expected be competitive in the near term, both for reasons of infrastructure delay and concerns about proliferation.2 Proliferation is of particular concern in nations with lower security capacity and experience with nuclear materials. Since many of the nations who might accept SMRs for power generation fall into these categories, nonproliferation and materials safeguarding is paramount. One example Moor sited was Iran’s domestic enrichment to 20% — Iran could rationalize possessing highly enriched uranium if there were reactors that require it. However, if available technologies were using only low enriched uranium, it would be easier to decipher their intentions. To remedy these potential ambiguities, Moor said that a requirement could be to remove spent SMR fuel for disposal or reprocessing outside the country of concern.

#### Lack of effective inspections turns the whole case—-makes SMRs worse for prolif, safety and security than large reactors

Lyman 11

[Dr. Edwin Lyman 11, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, July 14, 2011, Testimony Before the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, "An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors", <http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf>, \\wyo-bb]

Proponents of small modular reactors (SMRs) claim that their designs have inherent safety features compared to large reactors, and some even argue that their reactors would have been able to withstand an event as severe as Fukushima. We find these claims to be unpersuasive. For any plant, large or small, the key factor is the most severe event that the plant is designed to withstand—the so-called maximum “design-basis” event. Unless nuclear safety requirements for new reactors are significantly strengthened, one cannot expect that either small or large reactors will be able to survive a beyond-design-basis event like Fukushima. Although some light-water SMR concepts may have desirable safety characteristics, unless they are carefully designed, licensed, deployed and inspected, SMRs could pose comparable or even greater safety, security and proliferation risks than large reactors.

#### NEW PROLIFERATORS NOT MORE LIKELY TO USE WEAPONS/WARFIGHT—NUKES DECREASE FREQUENCY AND INTENSITY OF WARS—4 REASONS.

(1) DETERRENCE INDUCES CAUTION.

(2) WARS WILL BE LIMITED.

(3) PROPORTIONAL PUNISHMENTS.

(4) USE SPARKS RAPID DE-ESCALATION.

Waltz in ‘3

[Kenneth N., Genius & Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, with Scott D. Sagan, p.36-37//wyo-tjc]

Does the spread of nuclear weapons threaten to make wars more intense at regional levels, where wars of high intensity have been possible for many years? If weaker countries are unable to defend at lesser levels of violence, might they destroy themselves through resorting to nuclear weapons? Lesser nuclear states live in fear of this possibility. But this is not different from the fear under which the United States and the Soviet Union lived for years. Small nuclear states may experience a keen sense of desperation because of vulnerability to conventional as well as to nuclear attack, but, again, in desperate situations what all parties become most desperate to avoid is the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Still, however improbable the event, lesser states may one day fire some of their weapons. Are minor nuclear states more or less likely to do so than major ones? The answer to this question is vitally important because the existence of some states would be at stake even if the damage done were regionally confined. For a number of reasons, deterrent strategies promise less damage than war-fighting strategies. First, deterrent strategies induce caution all around and thus reduce the incidence of war. Second, wars fought in the face of strategic nuclear weapons must be carefully limited because a country having them may retaliate if its vital interests are threatened. Third, prospective punishment need only be proportionate to an adversary's expected gains in war after those gains are discounted for the many uncertainties of war. Fourth, should deterrence fail, a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and thus bring rapid deescalation. Finally, war-fighting strategies offer no clear place to stop short of victory for some and defeat for others. Deterrent strategies do, and that place is where one country threatens another's vital interests. . Deterrent strategies lower the probability that wars will begin. If wars start nevertheless, deterrent strategies lower the probability that they will be carried very far. In a conventional world, to deter an attacker a status quo country must threaten a lot of force. It must do so to overcome doubts about the credibility of conventional threats and uncertainty about the effectiveness of conventional blows. In a nuclear world to deter one need threaten only a little force because so much more can easily be added. Limiting wars in a conventional world has proved difficult. In a nuclear world, only limited wars can be fought. In a conventional world, states are tempted to strike first to gain an initial advantage and set the course of the war. In a nuclear world, to strike first is pointless because no advantage can be gained against invulnerable forces. In a conventional world, combatants use their best, i.e. their most destructive, weapons. Although overlooked, this explains our use of atomic bombs in the Second World War. From Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima to Okinawa to the fire-bombing of Tokyo, America applied force on an ever-increasing scale. In the context of a conventional war, A-bombs looked simply like bigger and better weapons. The aim in a conventional war is to escalate to a higher level of force than your opponent can reach. In a nuclear world, no one can escalate to a level of force anywhere near the top without risking its own destruction. Deterrence in World War II worked only where combatants shared the ability to use a horrible weapon, poison gas. All of the major combatants were capable of using it. None did. On all of the above counts, nuclear weapons reverse the logic of war that operates in conventional worlds. Nuclear weapons lessen the intensity as well as the frequency of war among their possessors. For fear of escalation, nuclear states do not want to fight long and hard over important interests-indeed, they do not want to fight at all. Minor nuclear states have even better reasons than major ones to accommodate one another and to avoid fighting. Worries about the intensity of war among nuclear states have to be viewed in this context and against a world in which conven- tional weapons have become ever costlier and more destructive.

**Terrorists have had limited incentive to go nuclear – no ability to build their own couldn’t steal fissile material, or buy from corrupt insiders.**

**Mueller ‘10**

John Mueller, professor of political science at Ohio State University. “Calming Our Nuclear Jitters”. Issues in Science and Technology. 1/1/2010. Vol.26,Iss.2;p.58-66. Academic Search Premiere.

#### In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.”

#### The Probability of Nuclear Terrorism Is Low And It Won’t Cause Extinction

**Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 04**

[November 1, Vol. 60, #6, Lexis]

There are too many different ways in which terrorists could perpetrate some kind of nuclear attack to mention in this limited space. But keep this in mind: **There have been zero cases of nuclear terrorism --neither nuclear nor radiological. There are no known cases of theft or purchase of an intact nuclear weapon, so a terrorist attack with one is more than unlikely. There has not been any documented theft of enough fissile material for a crude nuke**--although there have been attempts. **There has never been a dirty bomb attack. There has never been a case of nuclear plant sabotage. If there were, it would** be awful--but **not the end of humanity.**

#### NEW NUCLEAR ARSENALS ARE SAFE- EASIER TO SAFE-GUARD AND WON’T HAVE HAIR-TRIGGER POSTURES LIKE CURRENT BIG ARSENALS

Waltz in ‘3

[Kenneth N., Genius & Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, with Scott D. Sagan, p. 154-5.

Third, new nuclear countries may, as Sagan says, lack safety devices for their weapons and may not have developed bureaucratic routines for controlling them. The smaller a force is, however, the more easily it can be guarded. States with large arsenals and faulty bureaucratic routines may accidentally fire warheads in large numbers. States with small arsenals cannot do so. Blair and Kendall estimated that a Soviet attack accidentally launched against us might have resulted in as many as three hundred warheads falling on the United States. In response, as many as five hundred of our warheads might then have been launched against the Soviet Union. A policy of launch on warning makes no sense. If a country is struck, retaliation at leisure and calibration of one's response in an attempt to bring de-escalation is called for. Only big nuclear' powers can implement the frightening practices we follow. Little ones cannot because they don't have the stuff. As ever in international politics, the biggest dangers come from the biggest powers; the smallest from the smallest. We should be more fearful of old nuclear countries and less fearful of recent and prospective ones. Efforts should concentrate more on making large arsenals safe and less on keeping weak states from obtaining the small number of warheads they may understandably believe they need for security.

#### TERRORIST ACQUISITION IS SO UNLIKELY AS TO BE A FICTION—STATES WOULD NEVER TRANSFER WEAPONS AND STEALING THEM IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT

Kapur in ‘8

[S. Paul, Associate Professor of Strategic Research at United States Naval War College, “Nuclear Terrorism: Prospects in Asia”, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. M. Alagappa, p. 324-325//wyo-tjc]

If a terrorist group’s goal can be advanced by the use of nuclear weapons, it would still need to meet a second important requirement: it would need to acquire a nuclear capability in the first place. It could do so either by procuring an intact weapon or by producing one. Terrorists could procure an intact weapon in two different ways. First, a nuclear state could voluntarily transfer a weapon to terrorists for use against a designated enemy. This could enable the state to inflict massive damage on the enemy while maintaining deniability and potentially avoiding retaliation (Ferguson and Potter 2004: 55—57). This occurrence, however, is unlikely. In this “transfer” scenario, the nuclear state would lose control of the weapon in question, forcing it to place enormous trust in the terrorists’ loyalty and judgment. It is doubtful that a nuclear state’s leaders would be willing to trust a terrorist organization to this degree (Feiguson and Pottei 2004 57 Glaser and Fetter 2001) Terrorist groups could also acquire an intact weapon by stealing it from a nuclear state This would be an extremely difficult feat even for sophisticated terrorist groups. Nuclear weapons are protected by the most robust security measures that nation—states can devise. Protective measures include programs to ensure the reliability of the personnel in charge of weapons extensive physical barriers including location in heavily guarded, often isolated military bases; electronic systems to prevent unauthorized weapons use; and storage of the fissile core separate from the rest of the weapon. According to Ferguson and Potter, in the absence of significant insider assistance, theft of a nuclear weapon by terrorists is probably better described as “the stuff of fiction than a practicable approach for a terrorist organization.” Even in the event of inside help or major political unrest within a nuclear weapon state, terrorist theft of an intact nuclear device would be difficult and unlikely (Bunn, Holdren, and Wier 2002: 5; Ferguson and Potter 2004: 57—65,119).

### Solvency

#### Multiple barriers to SMRs on military bases and risk theft overseas

Andres et al 11

[Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and, Hanna L. Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications,”http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20262%20Andres.pdf, \\wyo-bb]

Small reactors used on domestic military bases are likely to face a number of additional siting hurdles. As a distributed energy source, they are likely to face substantial “not-in-my-backyard” battles. Moreover, dispersing a large number of reactors leads to questions about longterm nuclear waste disposal. 27 Arguably, reactors should be relatively safe on domestic military installations, certainly more secure than, for instance, the reactors situated in developing countries or intended for processing tar sands. Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple. Institutional and technical uncertainties—such as the security of sealed modules, the potential and unintended social and environmental consequences, or the design of reliable safeguards—make dispersing reactors across the country challenging. Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors, and determining whether Permissive Action Links technology could be used to safeguard them. Using the emerging technology at expeditionary locations carries far greater risks. Besides the concerns outlined above, forward located reactors could be subject to attack. Today, forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan are regularly subjected to mortar attacks, suggesting that reactors at such locations could make these bases prime targets for attack. Since forward bases are also subject to capture, any design proposal that envisions deployment at forward operating bases must incorporate contingency plans in the event that reactors fall into enemy hands.

#### No spillover- DOD can’t drive investments

Dimotakis 06

[Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, December 09, 2006, “Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence”, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf>, \\wyo-bb]

The 2006 DoD fossil-fuel budget is, approximately, 2.5-3% of the national-defense budget, the range dependent on what is chosen as the total national-defense budget. Larger (percentage) fuel costs are borne by families and many businesses, for example, and fuel costs have only relatively recently become noticeable to the DoD. 3. At present, there is a large spread between oil-production cost and crude-oil prices. Many projections, however, including that of the U.S. Energy Information Agency, indicate that crude oil prices may well decrease to $40-$50/barrel within the next few years, as production and refining capacity increases to match demand. 4. DoD is not a sufficiently large customer to drive the domestic market for demand and consumption of fossil fuel alternatives, or to drive fuel and transportation technology developments, in general. Barring externalities, e.g., subsidies, governmental and departmental directives, etc., non-fossil-derived fuels are not likely to play a significant role in the next 25 years. 5. DoD fuel consumption constraints and patterns of use do not align well with those of the commercial sector. Most commercial-sector fuel use, for example, is in ground transportation, with only 4% of domestic petroleum consumption used for aviation. In contrast, almost 60% of DoD fuel use is by the Air Force, with additional fuel used in DoD aviation if Naval aviation consumption is included. Options for refueling ships at sea are more limited (or nonexistent) compared to those for commercial vehicles in urban areas. Options for DoD use of electrical energy on ground vehicles are limited, since one can not expect to plug into the grid in hostile territory, for example, to refuel/recharge an electric vehicle. Furthermore, drive cycles for DoD ground vehicles differ significantly from EPA drive cycles that, as a consequence, provide poor standards for fuel consumption.

#### Small modular reactor’s shielding can’t be scaled down to work, and take to long to build to every be competitive with alternatives

Lovins, 2009

[Amory, Chairman and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Research Institute, “"New" Nuclear Reactors, Same Old Story.” Online, http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2009-07\_NuclearSameOldStory] /Wyo-MB

Toshiba claims to be about to market a 200-kWe nuclear plant (~50× smaller than today’s norm); a few startup firms like Hyperion Power Generation aim to make 10¢/kWh electricity from miniature reactors for which it claims over 100 firm orders. Unfortunately, 10¢ is the wrong target to beat: the real competitor is not other big and costly thermal power plants, but micropower and negawatts, whose delivered retail cost is often ~1–6¢/kWh. Can one imagine in principle that mass-production, passive operation, automation (perhaps with zero operating and security staff), and supposedly failsafe design might enable hypothetical small reactors to approach such low costs? No, for two basic reasons:¶ • Nuclear reactors derive their claimed advantages from highly concentrated sources of heat, and hence also of radiation. But the shielding and thermal protection needed to contain that concentrated energy and exploit it (via turbine cycles) are inherently unable to scale down as well as technologies whose different principles avoid these issues.¶ • By the time the new reactors could be proven, accepted by regulators and the public, financed, built, and convincingly tested, they couldn’t undercut the then prices of negawatts and micropower that are beating them by 2–20× today—and would have gained decades of further head start on their own economies of mass production.

#### Small reactors cause same problems as larger plants and it is a fantasy they could be competitive

Lovins, 2009

[Amory, Chairman and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Research Institute, “"New" Nuclear Reactors, Same Old Story.” Online, http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2009-07\_NuclearSameOldStory] /Wyo-MB

In short, the notion that different or smaller reactors plus wholly new fuel cycles (and, usually, new competitive conditions and political systems) could overcome nuclear energy’s inherent problems is not just decades too late, but fundamentally a fantasy. Fantasies are all right, but people should pay for their own. Investors in and advocates of small-reactor innovations will be disappointed. But in due course, the aging advocates of the half-century-old reactor concepts that never made it to market will retire and die, their credulous young devotees will relearn painful lessons lately forgotten, and the whole nuclear business will complete its slow death of an incurable attack of market forces. Meanwhile, the rest of us shouldn’t be distracted from getting on with the winning investments that make sense, make money, and really do solve the energy, climate, and proliferation problems, led by business for profit.

#### Solvency takes decades—-SMRs require re-orienting the entire manufacturing industry

Ryan 11

[Dylan Ryan 11, Masters in Mechanical Engineering, expertise in energy, sustainability, Computer Aided Engineering, renewables technology; Ph.D. in solar energy systems, 2011, "Part 10 – Small modular reactors and mass production options,"http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/part-10-smallreactors-mass-prod/, \\wyo-bb]

So there are a host of practical factors in favour smaller reactors. But what’s the down side? Firstly, economies of scale. With a small reactor, we have all the excess baggage that comes with each power station, all the fixed costs and a much smaller pay-off. As I noted earlier, even thought many smaller reactors are a lot safer than large LWR’s (even a small LWR is somewhat safer!) you would still need to put them under a containment dome. It’s this process of concrete pouring that is often a bottle neck in nuclear reactor construction. We could get around the problem by clustering reactors together, i.e putting 2 or 4 reactors not only on the same site but under the same containment dome. The one downside here is that if one reactor has a problem, it will likely spread to its neighbours. How much of a showstopper this fact is depends on which type of reactors we are discussing. Also, in the shorter term small reactors would be slower to build, especially many of those we’ve been discussing, given that they are often made out of non-standard materials. Only a few facilities in the world could build them as the entire nuclear manufacturing industry is currently geared towards large LWR’s. Turning that juggernaut around would take decades. So by opting for small reactors while we’d get safer more flexible reactors, we be paying for it, as these reactors would be slower to build (initially anyway) and probably more expensive too.

#### Benefits of DOD acquisition of SMR is overstated- not the greatest thing since sliced bread- overlooks unknowns

Smith 11

[Terrence P. Smith 11, program coordinator and research assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at the CSIS, February 16, 2011, "An Idea I Can Do Without: "Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations,"" <http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations>, \\wyo-bb]

The National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies recently released a report on Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications. The authors of the report, Richard B. Andres and Hanna L. Breetz, provide a thoughtful analysis of the benefits and key implications of a move towards the use of small nuclear reactors for the Defense Department and its fighting forces. However, in my opinion, the report’s focus is misplaced by encouraging the pursuit of small reactor technology for the purpose of controlling a competitive technological edge. In doing so, the report pushes the assumption that the technology is a good idea to begin with – an approval I am hesitant to give. The report makes some reference to the downsides, but too quickly brushes aside the risks, as well as the numerous unknowns. In recent years the “U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become increasingly interested in the potential of small (less than 300 megawatts electric [MWe]) nuclear reactors for military use.” The NDU report does an excellent job of exploring why the DoD would have in interest in such an endeavor, but stops short of thoroughly examining the wisdom behind DoD’s interest, which is ultimately the more important question. My point is demonstrated by a quick glance at the four key points the authors chose to emphasis on the front page: 1. Without Department of Defense (DOD) intervention, the United States runs the risk of a small reactor market dominated by foreign countries, further eroding U.S. commercial nuclear power capabilities and damaging U.S. control over nuclear energy proliferation. 2. DOD has recently expressed interest in the possibility of integrating small nuclear reactors on military bases as part of its strategy to “island” bases from the fragile civilian power grid. 3. Small nuclear reactor technology offers a host of benefits over traditional large reactors—namely, a smaller footprint, scalable design, factory-based construction, portability, and passive safety features. 4. DOD has a chance to become a “first mover” in the emerging small reactor market; by providing assistance and guidance to the private sector, DOD can ensure that successful designs meet its operational needs. Nowhere in these key points is there even a hint of, “Hey this is not necessarily the best thing since sliced bread.” My initial response to each of these “key points”: (1) Takes the assumption it is a good idea and pushes a pursuit of the capability soon and hard to maintain a competitive technological edge, before examining the wisdom of the idea to begin with; (2) Just because DoD is interested in it, does not make it a good idea; (3) Arguing that they are better than larger reactors is not an argument for them being a good idea; (4) See my first point, but add in military advantage.