### 1st Off

#### TEXT: The United States Department of Defense should offer power purchase agreements to companies that generate electricity from small modular reactors in the United States.

#### DOD is crucial – plan doesn’t spur investment because tech is still not ready

Andres et al 11

[Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and, Hanna L. Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications,”http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20262%20Andres.pdf, \\wyo-bb]

The preceding analysis suggests that DOD should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors. This new technology has the potential to solve two of the most serious energy-related problems faced by the department today. Small reactors could island domestic military bases and nearby communities, thereby protecting them from grid outages. They could also drastically reduce the need for the highly vulnerable fuel convoys used to supply forward operating bases abroad. The technology being proposed for small reactors (much of which was originally developed in U.S. Government labs) is promising. A number of the planned designs are self-contained and highly mobile, and could meet the needs of either domestic or forward bases. Some promise to be virtually impervious to accidents, with design characteristics that might allow them to be if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies10 SF No. 262 www.ndu.edu/inss used even in active operational environments. These reactors are potentially safer than conventional light water reactors. The argument that this technology could be useful at domestic bases is virtually unassailable. The argument for using this technology in operational units abroad is less conclusive; however, because of its potential to save lives, it warrants serious investigation. Unfortunately, the technology for these reactors is, for the most part, caught between the drawing board and production. Claims regarding the field utility and safety of various reactors are plausible, but authoritative evaluation will require substantial investment and technology demonstration. In the U.S. market, DOD could play an important role in this area. In the event that the U.S. small reactor industry succeeds without DOD support, the types of designs that emerge might not be useful for the department since some of the larger, more efficient designs that have greater appeal to private industry would not fit the department’s needs. Thus, there is significant incentive for DOD to intervene to provide a market, both to help the industry survive and to shape its direction. Since the 1970s, in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well. If DOD leads as a first mover in this market—initially by providing analysis of costs, staffing, reactor lines, and security, and, when possible, by moving forward with a pilot installation—the new technology will likely survive and be applicable to DOD needs. If DOD does not, it is possible the technology will be unavailable in the future for either U.S. military or commercial use.

### 2nd Off

#### Compromise bill gave Obama power to take hard stand on upcoming debt ceiling and spending cuts – that’s key

WSJ, Authors Janet Hook, Corey Boles, and Siobhan Hughes, “Congress Passes Cliff Deal,” Wall Street Journal, 1/1/2013

Congress broke a rancorous stalemate Tuesday to pass legislation designed to avert the so-called fiscal cliff. But the compromise bill, which blocked most impending tax increases and postponed spending cuts largely by raising taxes on upper-income Americans, left a host of issues unresolved and guaranteed continued budget clashes between the parties.¶ The bill represented the largest tax increase in the past two decades and was passed over opposition from conservative Republicans in the House who objected to the fact that it contained no long-term spending cuts of any significance.¶ The House voted 257-167, with 172 Democrats joining 85 Republicans in supporting the measure. Voting against the bill were 151 Republicans, and the GOP leadership split over the issue: House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R., Va.) voted against it, while House Speaker John Boehner (R., Ohio) voted for it. Also supporting the bill was Rep. Paul Ryan (R., Wis.) the GOP vice presidential nominee who has been an ardent opponent of increasing taxes.¶ The bill now goes to President Barack Obama for his signature, ending a tortured drive by Congress to avert the fiscal cliff, a journey that ended up technically breaching the Jan. 1 deadline.¶ The far-reaching agreement will have lasting implications for the tax code, future budget battles and the balance of power in Washington. It raises income-tax rates for the first time in almost two decades and fulfills Mr. Obama's signature campaign promise to prevent rates from rising on the middle class. Not since 1991 has a Republican in Congress supported such a move—a challenge to its brand as the antitax party.¶ In policy terms, it permanently codifies most of the tax rates that were set only temporarily in the Bush era. After years of failed efforts, the bill permanently keeps the middle class from being hit by the alternative minimum tax, a 1960s edifice intended only for America's wealthiest.¶ At the same time, the bill defers some of America's toughest spending problems—in particular the ballooning cost of health care—and it doesn't come close to the kind of $4 trillion deficit-reduction deal the country's leaders had hoped to negotiate. By some estimates, it would cut the deficit by $600 billion over 10 years.¶ "The bill before us is not the Grand Bargain," said Rep. David Dreier (R., Calif.) as the House opened debate. "But we are working hard to pull ourselves back from the cliff."¶ The compromise dodges one cliff, but it sends Congress barreling toward another. In two months, the delayed $110 billion in spending cuts will again kick in. At the same time, the U.S. will face the need to increase its borrowing limit, a change that can only be made by Congress. That sets up another rancorous fight, one with potentially more damaging consequences. Republicans want to use the debt ceiling to extract spending cuts. Mr. Obama has said he won't negotiate.¶ The failure to grapple with the biggest budget questions disappointed business leaders who had hoped for a comprehensive budget agreement that could tackle the deficit and diminish what for some has been a debilitating policy uncertainty.

#### Obama’s leverage is key to new fights over debt ceiling and sequestration

-Political capital high: economy on cusp of revival

-AT: Compromise Bill Disproves: Compromised and merely delayed the big battles

Star Ledger, “Obama's legacy trap”, 1/1/2013. http://www.nj.com/us-politics/index.ssf/2013/01/obamas\_legacy\_trap.html

President Barack Obama hopes -- expects, really -- that '13 will be his lucky number, a year to cement his historical legacy and reap the benefits of an economy on the cusp of real revival.¶ That expectation, as much as anything, explains how Obama approached the fiscal cliff and why he opted for compromise over confrontation. The president, eyes fixed on history, always viewed the fight as an obstacle, not a destination, a thing to be gotten past on his way to breaking the historical pattern of weak, scandal-scarred and anticlimactic second-term presidencies.¶ But the endless battle over the budget -- new fights over the debt ceiling and automatic spending cuts loom in a matter of weeks -- could become a legacy trap for Obama, robbing him of precious leverage to redefine his relationship with Republicans on terms more favorable to an ambitious second-term agenda, scholars of the presidency say.¶ "People don't queue up in lines to see the pens for a budget deal under glass, or 'Hey, I just cut this deal with Boehner,'" says presidential historian Douglas Brinkley.¶ "Presidents are remembered for the big things. FDR did Social Security. Truman created the CIA. There's Eisenhower and the highway system. Kennedy and the moon," Brinkley added. "So, it's going to be Obama and what? Obamacare, that's the big one, and killing Bin Laden. There's room for one more big item. What will it be? Immigration? Climate change? It won't be deficits or the fiscal cliff."¶ The White House is casting the potential fiscal deal as a major victory because it forces Republicans to turn their backs on a two-decade policy of opposing all tax increases, even those on the wealthiest Americans, which is a "big win," in the words of one West Wing adviser.¶ For his part, Obama said Monday, "If we're going to be serious about deficit reduction and debt reduction, then it's going to have to be a matter of shared sacrifice -- at least as long as I'm president. And I'm going to be president for the next four years, I think..." he said with a widening smile on Monday.¶ The challenge for a president unusually attuned to his place in history is how to manage fights like the cliff without being diverted by them, and how to suppress the GOP challenge without it becoming a major drain of his time, popular good will and power.¶ "The question is whether he's willing to use the leverage he has to get a better deal. He has a chance to make history here," said Jared Bernstein, a former adviser to Vice President Joe Biden, reflecting the mixed emotions of many nervous progressives watching the cliff talks from the sidelines. "Standing up to them would not only be a gift to the country, but a big part of his legacy."¶ One staffer for a senior Senate Democrat, summing up the view of several other aides interviewed by POLITICO, called the potential deal a "cave," and warned that Obama's Monday afternoon campaign-style event ahead of the final deal was a "Leon Lett moment" -- a reference to the Dallas Cowboys lineman who fumbled the ball while celebrating a touchdown short of the goal line.¶ But Obama and his staff believe Americans would have blamed him for taking the country over the cliff, and they emphasize his refusal to negotiate over the looming debt ceiling in a couple of months. Nonetheless, even the president concedes that the smaller cliff deal, while possibly postponing bigger battles, prolongs a fight Obama had hoped to move quickly past.¶ Even if he were to become bogged down, Obama's place in history is already assured. He is the nation's first black president, a controversial Beltway neophyte who managed to ram through landmark health reform (the future of which future remains opaque), an incumbent who won a fresh term despite a sour economy, a commander in chief who ended two unwanted wars -- all the while tallying unprecedented national debt and deficits.

#### Nuclear power has significant opposition – public and congressional

Andrew Freedman, Editor and Senior Science writer for Climate Central, “Feds Approve First Nuclear Reactors Since 1970s”, Climatecentral.org, February 9th, 2012.

By a v ote of 4 to 1 , the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approv ed the construction of the first new nuclear reactors to be built in the United States since 1 97 8. The reactors would be built at the Vogtle power plant near Way nesboro, Ga., which is a nuclear power plant operated by the Southern Company . As The Hill's E-2 Wire blog noted, the lone dissenting v ote was cast by NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko. The nuclear industry has faced numerous obstacles, most recently the backlash following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, in its efforts to build new nuclear plants in the U.S., and the Commission has issued recommendations on how to better protect U.S. reactors from earthquakes and floods. The country currently operates 1 04 nuclear reactors, but all were approv ed at least three decades ago. “This is a historic day ,” said Marv in Fertel, president of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry ’s trade group in a statement. “Today ’s licensing action sounds a clarion call to the world that the United States recognizes the importance of expanding nuclear energy as a key component of a low-carbon energy future that is central to job creation, div ersity of electricity supply and energy security .” Andrew Restuccia, writing for The Hill, noted the project still needs to ov ercome public opposition to nuclear power that may result in a lawsuit against the project, and congressional opposition to a hefty $8.3 billion federal conditional loan guarantee for reactor construction. "Some Democrats in Congress — noting that the loan guarantee is more than 1 5 times the size of the one granted to the failed solar firm Soly ndra — hav e called on Obama not to finalize the loan." “Ithink we are putting our taxpay er money at unnecessary risk giv en the unresolv ed safety issues and the lessons that hav e been learned from Fukushima,” Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), a senior Democrat on the House Energy and Commerce Committee and a v ocal critic of nuclear power, told The Hill Wednesday . The Obama administration has supported the dev elopment of new nuclear power plants as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissons and cut the use of fossil fuels.

#### Sequestration collapses Asia-Pacific pivot, power projection, ability to solve escalation, and air, sea, and land capabilities

Horowitz 12

[Michael Horowitz, NDT Champion, associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, 8/9/12, How Defense Austerity Will Test U.S. Strategy in Asia, thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/08/09/how-defense-austerity-will-test-u-s-strategy-in-asia/]

Decisions about defense spending are integrally linked to the United States’ overall strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Given ongoing uncertainty surrounding North Korea, China’s continuing development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and disputes over the East and South China seas, maintaining a robust presence in the region will be a high priority for any future administration. However, sequestration or other major defense cuts could undermine perceptions of U.S. resolve in the Asia-Pacific and make core U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea doubt Washington’s willingness to invest appropriately in relevant capabilities. Concretely, such cuts could make it more difficult for the United States to maintain its current presence. The United States’ predominant military strategy for ensuring continued superiority in the Asia-Pacific is AirSea battle (ASB)—an operational concept designed to help the U.S. Air Force and Navy jointly respond to A2/AD challenges, enhance deterrence, and ensure freedom of action around the world over the next generation. Implementing ASB will require significant investments in advanced technologies, including long-range precision-strike capabilities and submarine modernization. Furthermore, ASB primarily involves investments in the air force and navy, raising questions about how best to rebuild the readiness of the army and marines. There is a trade-off between providing relatively equal budget shares to the services—potentially reducing inter-service rivalries—and rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. Even within the air force and navy, there are disagreements about which programs represent the highest priority for the U.S. military. One concern is the potential for large decreases in the procurement of F-35s—the multirole replacement fighter for the air force and navy. Unless the military can find substitutes, further cuts beyond those already planned could potentially make it more difficult for the U.S. military to control the skies in a future confrontation in the Asia-Pacific. Decreases in F-35 procurement could also make U.S. allies less likely to purchase the F-35, thereby reducing interoperability with allied Asian militaries and further raising F-35 unit costs. Budget cuts may also lead to the scaling back of plans to purchase the full slate of Virginia-class attack submarines that the navy has requested. Given China’s continuing investments in submarines and anti-ship missiles, the modernization of the U.S. fleet is critical to maintaining U.S. naval capabilities in the Asia-Pacific, particularly for antisubmarine warfare and strike operations. Major cuts could affect the size of the navy, in terms of ships afloat, and compromise the United States’ ability to project power in crisis situations. At even greater risk of funding cuts is research and development. R&D into next-generation robotics, a new long-range bomber, and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) is essential to guaranteeing U.S. military power over the long term. R&D for basic programs is also likely to be on the chopping block during periods of defense austerity. One example is the X-47B drone designed to launch from and recover to aircraft carriers. Decreases in funding for such cutting-edge programs could undermine the United States’ long-term capacity to control the commons in the Asia-Pacific. The unparalleled access the United States enjoys to air, sea, and space could decline if other nations develop new technologies capable of placing legacy platforms such as large carriers or manned fighters at risk. Rising powers in the region are not standing still. The United States will only maintain its conventional superiority if it continues investing in R&D that will pay off with new weapon systems down the road.

#### Lack of asia pivot collapses heg and causes miscalc/WWIII

Macgregor Oct. 26th

[Douglas A. Mcgregor, contributor and is executive vice president of Burke-Macgregor Group, LLC. He is also a retired Army colonel, decorated combat veteran and the author of four books on military affairs.

Read more: <http://nation.time.com/2012/10/26/affording-the-pacific-pivot/#ixzz2AqlmAi5s>, , October 26th, 2012, Affording the “Pacific Pivot”, <http://nation.time.com/2012/10/26/affording-the-pacific-pivot/>, uwyo//amp]

In the turbulent decade leading up to the outbreak of World War I, Winston Churchill, Britain’s First Lord of the Admiralty, urged Britain’s national leadership to concentrate British naval power in the Atlantic and the North Sea where Germany’s rapidly expanding high seas fleet seemed determined to challenge British naval supremacy. Churchill reasoned, “It would be very foolish to lose England in safeguarding Egypt. If we win the big battle in the decisive theater, we can put everything else straight afterwards. If we lose it, there will not be any afterwards.” On the precipice of sequestration and with the survival of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid at stake, Churchill’s strategic rationale is instructive, particularly for leaders in Washington, D.C., who advocate a U.S. military buildup in the Pacific. When Churchill made the case for concentrating the British fleet in the Atlantic, he was practicing economy of force, a time honored principle in British military affairs. In 1902, in the midst of a financial crisis brought on, in part, by the Boer War, London had already turned to Japan for military assistance in blocking Russian expansion in the Far East. By 1911, the Russian threat had disappeared beneath the waters of the Tsushima Strait, but the Anglo-Japanese Treaty still allowed the withdrawal of British naval and ground forces from Asia, facilitating the concentration of British military power in the Atlantic. The result was a debilitating blockade Germany could not overcome throughout the First World War.Like the British at the beginning of the 20th Century, Washington suffers from a case of “Imperial Overstretch.” Washington needs a new national security strategy, one designed to halt the dissipation of American military resources around the world and to concentrate it wherever it is needed. For the moment, the point of concentration is Asia, where China’s assertiveness opens the door to the kind of instability and potential for strategic miscalculation that is eerily similar to the crises and conflicts that preceded the outbreak of World War I in Europe.

### 3rd Off

#### Production focus to problems fails—the only solutions it engenders are more production, this only contributes to environmental problems

Princen et al, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Michael Maniates, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, and Ken Conca, Program Director the School of Global Environmental Politics at American University, Confronting Consumption, “Confronting Consumption.” Pg. 1-20. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

Combining the elements of socially embedded consumers and linked chains of resource-use decisions leads to a third theme of our provisional framework: that ‘‘consuming’’ occurs all along the chain, not just at the downstream node of consumer demand. Nodes of raw-material extraction and manufacturing, for example, represent not just production and value added, but also consumption and value subtracted. Producers are consumers; production is consumption. An important implication of this idea is that what is being consumed at each node is not obvious. At the node of primary resource extraction it might be the tree or the fish, or it might be the ecosystem integrity of the forest or the fishery. At the node of final purchase it might be an apple, or a person’s attention, or a community’s social fabric. Another implication of this view is that responsibility shifts from the individuated consumers-as-final-demanders to actors at all nodes of the chain. Producers may add value as they satisfy downstream demand, but they also risk value depletion; they consume value by producing. In using up resources both natural and social, they impose costs on the environment and on people— be they purchasers, workers, caregivers, neighbors, or citizens. This consumption angle on resource use offers a corrective to the production-centered perspective that dominates contemporary discussions of economic affairs, including environmental protection. In that perspective, raw materials feed manufacturing and distribution to produce what people want. It follows that, because goods are good and would not be produced if people did not want them, more goods— and more production— must be better. A productive economy is, as a result, one that produces more goods for a given input (thus increasing the economy’s ‘‘productivity’’), yields more choices for consumers, and increases output. When production creates problems such as pollution, the productive answer is to produce correctives such as scrubbers, filters, and detoxifiers. So goes the logic of production, productiveness, productivity, and products— construing all things economic as producing, as adding value, as, indeed, progress. The consumption angle turns this around to self-consciously construe economic activity as consuming, as depleting value, as risking ecological overshoot, as stressing social capacity.

#### Second, the Impact—consumption focus is the only way to solve for overconsumption and misconsumption that threaten human survival

Princen, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Confronting Consumption, “Consumption and its externalities: where economy meets ecology.” Pg. 23-42. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

A strictly ecological interpretation takes consumption as perfectly ‘‘natural.’’ To survive, all organisms must consume— that is, degrade resources. This interpretation of a given consumption act is background consumption. It refers to the normal, biological functioning of all organisms, humans included. Every act of background consumption by an individual alters the environment, the total environmental impact being a function of aggregate consumption of the population. Individuals consume to meet a variety of needs, physical and psychological, both of which contribute to the ability of the individual to survive and reproduce. From this limited, asocial, nonethical interpretation of consumption, all consumption patterns and consequences are natural, including population explosions and crashes and irreversibilities caused by the expansion of one species at the expense of other species. If, however, the interpretation is modified to include human concern for population crashes, species extinctions, permanent diminution of ecosystem functioning, diminished reproductive and developmental potential of individuals, and other irreversible effects, then ‘‘problematic consumption’’ becomes relevant. Two interpretive layers are overconsumption and misconsumption. Overconsumption is the level or quality of consumption that undermines a species’ own life-support system and for which individuals and collectivities have choices in their consuming patterns. Overconsumption is an aggregate-level concept. With instances of overconsumption, individual behavior may be perfectly sensible, conforming either to the evolutionary dictates of fitness or to the economically productive dictates of rational decision making. Collective, social behavior may appear sensible, too, as when increased consumption is needed in an advanced industrial economy to stimulate productive capacity and compete in international markets. But eventually the collective outcome from overconsuming is catastrophe for the population or the species. From a thermodynamic and ecological perspective, this is the problem of excessive throughput. 21 The population or species has commanded more of the regenerative capacity of natural resources and more of the assimilative capacity of waste sinks than the relevant ecosystems can support. And it is an ethical problem because it inheres only in populations or species that can reflect on their collective existence. What is more, for humans it becomes a political problem when the trends are toward collapse, power differences influence impacts, and those impacts generate conflict. The second interpretive layer within problematic consumption is misconsumption, which concerns individual behavior. The problem here is that the individual consumes in a way that undermines his or her own well-being even if there are no aggregate effects on the population or species. Put differently, the long-term effect of an individual’s consumption pattern is either suboptimal or a net loss to that individual. It may or may not, however, undermine collective survival. Such consumption can occur along several dimensions.

#### The alternative is to reject the production based approach of the affirmative in favor of the 1NC criticism of consumption.

#### The purpose of debate should be to fashion our selves, the alternative opens up space for ethical engagement with the problem of consumption and the embrace of voluntary simplicity, this changes our subjectivity as consumers

Alexander, 2011

[Samuel, University of Melbourne Office for Environmental Programs and Simplicity Institute, Voluntary Simplicity as an Aesthetics of Existence, Online] /Wyo-MB

¶ The ¶ aim ¶ of ¶ this ¶ paper, ¶ however, ¶ is ¶ not ¶ to ¶ present ¶ a ¶ thorough ¶ analysis ¶ of ¶ Foucault’s ¶ notion ¶ of ¶ an ¶ aesthetics ¶ of ¶ existence. ¶ Several ¶ such ¶ analyses ¶ have ¶ appeared ¶ in ¶ recent ¶ times ¶ (after ¶ years ¶ of ¶ unfortunate ¶ scholarly ¶ neglect), ¶ and ¶ much ¶ of ¶ this ¶ emerging ¶ commentary ¶ is ¶ very ¶ probing ¶ and ¶ insightful.12 ¶ But ¶ this ¶ is ¶ not ¶ the ¶ time ¶ to ¶ focus ¶ on ¶ furthering ¶ that ¶ critical ¶ discussion ¶ or ¶ even ¶ providing ¶ a ¶ comprehensive ¶ literature ¶ review ¶ of ¶ it. ¶ Instead, ¶ after ¶ providing ¶ a ¶ brief ¶ exposition ¶ of ¶ Foucault’s ¶ ethics, ¶ this ¶ paper ¶ will ¶ undertake ¶ to ¶ actually ¶ apply ¶ the ¶ idea ¶ of ¶ an ¶ aesthetics ¶ of ¶ existence ¶ to ¶ a ¶ particular ¶ subject ¶ of ¶ ethical ¶ concern, ¶ namely, ¶ to ¶ our ¶ role ¶ as ¶ ‘consumers’ ¶ in ¶ the ¶ context ¶ of ¶ First ¶ World ¶ overconsumption. ¶ This ¶ is ¶ an ¶ area ¶ that ¶ raises ¶ ethical ¶ questions ¶ concerning ¶ how ¶ we ¶ ought ¶ to ¶ live ¶ for ¶ two ¶ main ¶ reasons: ¶ firstly, ¶ due ¶ to ¶ the ¶ impact ¶ Western-­‐style ¶ consumers ¶ are ¶ having ¶ on ¶ the ¶ natural ¶ environment; ¶ and ¶ secondly, ¶ due ¶ to ¶ the ¶ continued ¶ existence ¶ of ¶ poverty ¶ amidst ¶ plenty. ¶ There ¶ is, ¶ however, ¶ another ¶ perspective ¶ to ¶ consider ¶ also. ¶ A ¶ large ¶ body ¶ of ¶ sociological ¶ and ¶ psychological ¶ literature ¶ now ¶ exists ¶ indicating ¶ that ¶ Western-­‐style ¶ consumption ¶ practices ¶ are ¶ often ¶ failing ¶ to ¶ provide ¶ meaning ¶ and ¶ fulfillment, ¶ even ¶ to ¶ those ¶ who ¶ have ¶ ‘succeeded’ ¶ in ¶ attaining ¶ a ¶ high ¶ material ¶ standard ¶ of ¶ living.13 ¶ These ¶ three ¶ consumption-­‐related ¶ issues ¶ – ¶ ecological ¶ degradation, ¶ poverty ¶ amidst ¶ plenty, ¶ and ¶ consumer ¶ malaise ¶ – ¶ provide ¶ ample ¶ grounds ¶ for ¶ thinking ¶ that ¶ consumption ¶ is ¶ a ¶ proper ¶ subject ¶ for ¶ ethical ¶ engagement, ¶ in ¶ the ¶ Foucauldian ¶ sense ¶ of ¶ ethics ¶ as ¶ ‘the ¶ self ¶ engaging ¶ the ¶ self.’ ¶ If ¶ it ¶ is ¶ the ¶ case ¶ that ¶ our ¶ individual ¶ identities ¶ have ¶ been ¶ shaped, ¶ insidiously ¶ perhaps, ¶ by ¶ a ¶ social ¶ system ¶ that ¶ celebrates ¶ and ¶ encourages ¶ consumption ¶ without ¶ apparent ¶ limit ¶ – ¶ and ¶ it ¶ would ¶ not ¶ be ¶ unfair ¶ to ¶ describe ¶ consumer ¶ societies ¶ in ¶ these ¶ terms14 ¶ – ¶ then ¶ it ¶ may ¶ be ¶ that ¶ ethical ¶ practice ¶ today ¶ calls ¶ for ¶ a ¶ rethinking ¶ of ¶ our ¶ assumptions ¶ and ¶ attitudes ¶ concerning ¶ consumption, ¶ which ¶ might ¶ involve ¶ a ¶ deliberate ¶ reshaping ¶ of ¶ the ¶ self ¶ by ¶ the ¶ self. ¶ ¶ ¶ This ¶ paper ¶ will ¶ explore ¶ the ¶ possibility ¶ of ¶ such ¶ an ¶ ethics ¶ of ¶ consumption ¶ in ¶ the ¶ following ¶ ways. ¶ First, ¶ by ¶ explaining ¶ how ¶ neoclassical ¶ economics, ¶ which ¶ is ¶ arguably ¶ the ¶ most ¶ influential ¶ paradigm ¶ of ¶ thought ¶ in ¶ the ¶ world ¶ today, ¶ conceptualizes ¶ consumption ¶ as ¶ something ¶ that ¶ benefits ¶ both ¶ ‘self’ ¶ and ¶ ‘other’ ¶ and, ¶ therefore, ¶ as ¶ something ¶ that ¶ should ¶ be ¶ maximized. ¶ To ¶ the ¶ extent ¶ that ¶ modern ¶ consumers ¶ have ¶ internalized ¶ this ¶ conception ¶ of ¶ consumption, ¶ an ¶ ethics ¶ of ¶ consumption ¶ might ¶ involve ¶ engaging ¶ the ¶ self ¶ for ¶ the ¶ purpose ¶ of ¶ changing ¶ the ¶ self ¶ and ¶ creating ¶ something ¶ new. ¶ The ¶ second ¶ way ¶ an ¶ ethics ¶ of ¶ consumption ¶ will ¶ be ¶ explored ¶ will ¶ be ¶ through ¶ an ¶ examination ¶ of ¶ the ¶ theory ¶ and ¶ practice ¶ of ¶ ‘voluntary ¶ simplicity,’ ¶ a ¶ term ¶ that ¶ refers ¶ to ¶ an ¶ oppositional ¶ living ¶ strategy ¶ or ¶ ‘way ¶ of ¶ life’ ¶ with ¶ which ¶ people, ¶ somewhat ¶ paradoxically, ¶ perhaps, ¶ seek ¶ an ¶ increased ¶ quality ¶ of ¶ life ¶ through ¶ a ¶ reduction ¶ and ¶ restraint ¶ of ¶ one’s ¶ level ¶ of ¶ consumption.15 ¶ The ¶ paradox, ¶ so-­‐ called, ¶ consists ¶ in ¶ the ¶ attempt ¶ to ¶ live ¶ ‘more ¶ with ¶ less.’ ¶ Since ¶ voluntarily ¶ living ¶ simply ¶ means ¶ heading ¶ in ¶ the ¶ opposite ¶ direction ¶ to ¶ where ¶ most ¶ people ¶ in ¶ consumer ¶ societies ¶ (and ¶ increasingly ¶ elsewhere) ¶ seem ¶ to ¶ want ¶ to ¶ go, ¶ one ¶ would ¶ expect ¶ living ¶ simply ¶ to ¶ require ¶ a ¶ fundamentally ¶ creative ¶ engagement ¶ with ¶ life ¶ and ¶ culture, ¶ especially ¶ in ¶ contemporary ¶ consumer ¶ societies ¶ that ¶ seem ¶ to ¶ be ¶ predicated ¶ on ¶ the ¶ assumption ¶ that ¶ ‘more ¶ consumption ¶ is ¶ always ¶ better.’ ¶ This ¶ need ¶ for ¶ a ¶ fundamentally ¶ creative ¶ engagement ¶ with ¶ life ¶ is ¶ what ¶ prompted ¶ the ¶ present ¶ attempt ¶ to ¶ elucidate ¶ the ¶ idea ¶ of ¶ ‘voluntary ¶ simplicity ¶ as ¶ aesthetics ¶ of ¶ existence,’ ¶ and ¶ it ¶ is ¶ this ¶ attempt ¶ to ¶ infuse ¶ Foucauldian ¶ ethics ¶ with ¶ an ¶ emerging ¶ post-­‐consumerist ¶ philosophy ¶ of ¶ life ¶ that ¶ constitutes ¶ the ¶ original ¶ contribution ¶ of ¶ this ¶ paper. ¶ It ¶ is ¶ hoped ¶ that ¶ this ¶ practical ¶ application ¶ of ¶ Foucault’s ¶ ethics ¶ might ¶ also ¶ prompt ¶ others ¶ to ¶ consider ¶ how ¶ ethical ¶ engagement ¶ might ¶ produce ¶ new ¶ ways ¶ of ¶ being ¶ that ¶ are ¶ freer, ¶ more ¶ fulfilling, ¶ and ¶ yet ¶ less ¶ resource-­‐intensive ¶ and ¶ damaging ¶ than ¶ the ¶ modes ¶ of ¶ being ¶ which ¶ are ¶ dominant ¶ in ¶ consumer ¶ societies ¶ today. ¶ Could ¶ it ¶ be, ¶ for ¶ example, ¶ that ¶ the ¶ ‘Death ¶ of ¶ Man,’ ¶ to ¶ use ¶ Foucault’s ¶ phrase, ¶ was ¶ actually ¶ the ¶ first ¶ (and ¶ a ¶ necessary) ¶ phase ¶ in ¶ the ¶ demise ¶ of ¶ what ¶ one ¶ might ¶ call ¶ ‘homo ¶ consumicus’? ¶ And ¶ what ¶ forms ¶ of ¶ life, ¶ what ¶ modes ¶ of ¶ being, ¶ would ¶ or ¶ could ¶ materialize ¶ with ¶ the ¶ voluntary ¶ emergence ¶ of ¶ ‘homo ¶ post-­‐consumicus’? ¶ These ¶ are ¶ the ¶ large ¶ questions ¶ that ¶ motivated ¶ this ¶ study ¶ and ¶ in ¶ the ¶ following ¶ pages ¶ a ¶ preliminary ¶ attempt ¶ is ¶ made ¶ to ¶ grapple ¶ with ¶ them. ¶ The ¶ aim, ¶ however, ¶ is ¶ not ¶ to ¶ legitimate ¶ ‘what ¶ is ¶ already ¶ known,’16 ¶ since ¶ that ¶ would ¶ not ¶ be ¶ a ¶ very ¶ Foucauldian ¶ endeavor; ¶ rather, ¶ the ¶ aim ¶ is ¶ to ¶ explore ¶ whether ¶ or ¶ to ¶ what ¶ extent ¶ it ¶ is ¶ possible ¶ to ¶ ‘free ¶ thought ¶ from ¶ what ¶ it ¶ silently ¶ thinks,’17 ¶ in ¶ the ¶ hope ¶ that ¶ this ¶ might ¶ open ¶ up ¶ space ¶ to ¶ ‘think ¶ differently,’18 ¶ to ¶ think ¶ otherwise.

## Warming

### 1NC – AT: Warming Advantage

#### 1st, Nuke Power doesn’t solve warming:

#### A. Nuke power doesn’t meaningfully solve emissions—way too long timeframe, and high carbon abatement costs make it a bad option

Sokolski, 2010

[Henry, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, "The high and hidden costs of nuclear power." Policy Review 162 (2010): 53+. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 June 2012] /Wyo-MB

Another assertion nuclear power supporters frequently make is that once carbon is no longer free, their zero carbon emission power plants will be the clear, clean-energy victor. Yet nuclear power may already have priced itself out of the running in any carbon abatement competition. Factoring in industry construction, operation, and decommissioning costs, the total cost of abating one ton of carbon by substituting a new nuclear power plant for a modern coal-fired generator has been pegged by nuclear power critics at $120 or more. (3) This figure, which includes the costs of public subsidies, assumes fairly low capital construction costs (roughly one half of the industry's latest high-end cost projections). If one uses high-end projections, the cost for each ton of carbon abated approaches $200. Certainly there are much cheaper and quicker ways to reduce carbon emissions (see Figure 2). Just how rapidly nuclear power can abate carbon emissions is also a significant issue. Certainly, if one is interested in abating carbon in the quickest, least expensive fashion, building expensive nuclear plants that take up to a decade to bring on line will not be an appealing option. That's why in North and South America and the Middle East, the building of natural gas burning generators is currently an attractive, near-term option. Advanced gas-fired power plants can halve carbon emissions as compared to coal-fired plants, can serve as base or peak power generators, and can be brought on line in 18 to 30 months rather than the years upon years needed to build large reactors. Advanced gas-fired generator construction costs, moreover, are a fraction of those projected for nuclear power. (5)

#### B

#### C. Too many plants would have to be produced to solve warming—can’t realistically solve

Hiltzik, 2011

[Michael, LA times, “A nuclear renaissance in U.S. was unlikely even before Japan disaster.” 3-23-11, Online, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/23/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20110323] /Wyo-MB

In recent years, nuclear energy has been promoted as a "green," or at least greenish, alternative to coal power and other fossil-fueled generation. That's been a potent selling point as concern has mounted over the latter's effect on climate change by the production of greenhouse gases. Nuclear power is burdened by its own environmental issues, including the dangers of radioactive release into the atmosphere, but the production of carbon dioxide isn't among them.¶ Yet the technology's potential as a weapon against global warming has been as oversold, just as its virtues as safe, clean and "too cheap to meter" were during its infancy in the 1950s. To realistically make a dent in climate change, nuclear plant construction would have to take off at such a rate that it would "pose serious concerns" for the availability of construction materials, properly trained builders and operating technicians, and safety and security oversight, as a report by the Council on Foreign Relations observed in 2007.

#### 2nd, Nuke Power causes warming:

#### A. Nuke power contributes to warming from the release of energy

Skorodin, 2010

[Morton, Contributor to global research, “Nuclear Energy Causes Global Warming.” 7-23-10, Online, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=20231] /Wyo-MB

Once you release all that energy from Uranium, as in a nuclear reactor, it is here forever, except for some fraction that radiates out into outer space as “long-wave radiation.” The rest goes into the air, waterways, glaciers, dirt and rocks as waste heat, also called thermal [heat] pollution, increasing the temperature, thereby bringing about global warming.¶ ¶ Is nuclear the only the only source of energy that releases waste heat?¶ ¶ No. Coal, oil and natural gas [hydrocarbons, so-called “fossil fuels”] also release waste heat when burned.¶ ¶ Why is this fact not included in the title of this article?¶ ¶ Because many people already know that use of hydrocarbons causes global warming. Also, many believe that nuclear power does not cause global warming and that it may actually solve the global warming problem. Nothing could be further from the truth, because it produces heat and, therefore, thermal pollution.

#### No Impacts -

#### Warming impacts won’t take hold for several centuries and in order to kill off the planet they would have to occur within one lifespan

Lomborg 8

[Director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School

Bjorn, “Warming warnings get overheated”, The Guardian, 8/15, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange>]

These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren’t for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a “catastrophe” and the beginning of the “extinction” of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners’ scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland’s ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world’s coastal infrastructure and much of the world’s farmland – “undoubtedly” causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years’ time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell’s claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

# \*\*\*A2 Warming

#### No runaway warming-CO2 PROVIDES AN INSURANCE POLICY AGAINST ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE

CO2 Science Magazine 03

(Center for the study of carbon dioxide and global exchange [www.co2science.org](http://www.co2science.org), “Rapid Climate Changes” Reviewed 22 January 2003  
<http://www.co2science.org/journal/2003/v6n4c1.htm> WYO/jr)

Although much is made of the role of models in studying "the complex interplay between Dansgaard-Oeschger warm phases and Heinrich cold events," Bard correctly reports that "at present, models coupling the atmosphere, ocean, and ice sheets are still unable to correctly simulate that variability on all scales in both time and space," which suggests we do not fully understand the dynamics of these rapid climate changes.  Indeed, he forcefully notes that "all the studies so far carried out fail to answer the crucial question: How close are we to the next bifurcation [which could cause a rapid change-of-state in earth's climate system]?"  In this regard, he also notes that "an intense debate continues in the modeling community about the reality of such instabilities under warm conditions [our italics]," which is a particularly important point, seeing that all dramatic warming and cooling events have been observed in either full glacial or transitional periods between glacials and interglacials.

This latter real-world fact clearly suggests we are unlikely to experience any dramatic warming or cooling surprises, as long as the earth does not beginning drifting towards glacial conditions, which is but another reason to not be concerned about the ongoing rise in the air's CO2 content.  Indeed, it suggests that more CO2 in the atmosphere and its potential for modest warming are actually to be preferred as a preventive measure or "insurance policy" against unexpected abrupt climate changes.  Interglacial warmth seems to inoculate the planet against climatic instabilities, allowing only the mild millennial-scale climatic oscillation that alternately brings the earth slightly warmer and cooler conditions typical of the Medieval Warm Period and Little Ice Age.  Hence, and in light of the fact that the four preceding interglacials were able to tolerate temperatures fully 2°C *warmer* than those of the current interglacial ([Petit *et al*., 1999](http://www.co2science.org/journal/1999/v2n12c1.htm)), without any adverse climatic consequences, humanity would probably be wise to not surrender the atmospheric CO2 insurance policy we worked so hard to put in place over the course of the Industrial Revolution.

#### Ocean acidification doesn’t prevent shell growth-alt causes put the ocean more at risk

Goreham 2012

[Steve Goreham, a speaker, author, and researcher on environmental issues as well as an engineer and business executive, December 12, 2012, PBS News Hour spreads false Ocean Acidification alarm, <http://polymontana.com/pbs-news-hour-spreads-false-ocean-acidification-alarm/>, uwyo//amp]

But PBS wrongly told viewers that reef degradation was due to warmer ocean temperatures and “ocean acidification,” both allegedly caused by human carbon dioxide emissions. Sreenivasan concluded with, “Time that maybe is running out for coral reefs in Florida and elsewhere.” Scientists, environmental groups, and the United Nations promote the fear of ocean acidification. According to claims, man-made emissions of carbon dioxide are absorbed by the oceans and converted into carbonic acid, thereby changing the chemical balance of the oceans. The basic concept of acidification is correct, but hugely exaggerated. The PBS segment is wrong in several ways. First, while today’s temperatures are the warmest in the last 400 years, oceans were warmer still during the Medieval Warm Period ten centuries ago. Peer-reviewed studies found that both the Gulf of Mexico and nearby Sargasso Sea were warmer about 1000 AD than at present. These warm temperatures were due to natural climatic changes o f Earth―not man-made emissions. Caribbean reefs adapted to these warm seas to remain with us today. Second, the segment paints a misleading picture of carbon dioxide entering the oceans, without providing perspective for the viewer. Sreenivasan interviews scientist Chris Landon who states, “And it’s enough railroad cars stacked end to end to wrap around the earth seven times. That’s how much carbon is going into the ocean every single year.” This sounds alarming, unless you know that the oceans absorb and release about 90 times that amount of CO2 every year from the atmosphere naturally. In addition, carbon dioxide is absorbed by vast deposits of limestone rock in the ocean floor, removing it from sea water. Third, the oceans are alkaline, not acidic. We’re discussing a reduction in alkalinity. Solutions are measured as acidic or alkaline (basic) on a logarithmic 14-point scale, called the pH Scale. Battery acid has a pH of about one, while the base lye has a pH as high as thirteen. Milk is slightly acidic, as are most of the foods we eat. Measured in the open ocean, sea water is alkaline, with a pH of about 8.2. According to computer models, doubling of atmospheric CO2 would decrease ocean pH to about 7.9, still basic, but less so. The concern is that this change would destroy the coral reefs by dissolving the carbonate shells and skeletons of reef creatures. Sreenivasan states, “Acidification acts a lot like osteoporosis does in humans. But in marine animals, it makes their shells and skeletons brittle. The more acidic the water, the harder it is for corals to grow their skeletons.” But, empirical evidence does not show it harder for today’s marine animals to grow their shells. A study of corals at the Great Barrier Reef shows that shell calcium growth rates today are about 25 percent higher than 300‒400 years ago when both ocean temperatures and levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide were lower. Scientists still know little about the alkalinity of today’s ocean or the oceans of past centuries. Ocean pH varies by depth, becoming less basic as one goes deeper. It varies by latitude from the equator to the poles. It varies by location, such as the open ocean, coral reef, or kelp bed. But the PBS segment ignores this uncertainty and implies that the rate of change in ocean pH is alarming. Dr. Langdon states, “What’s really and completely unique about what’s going on now is the rate of change. And that’s what is so difficult for organisms.” However, evidence shows that a high rate of change in ocean alkalinity is natural. A 2011 study by the Scripps Institution of Oceanography found large variations in ocean pH by day, week, and month. Changes in some locations were as high as 0.35 units over the course of a day, higher than computer models are predicting for the next century. Scuba divers know that reef creatures already experience acidic conditions near CO2 vents in the ocean floor. These vents bubble CO2 gas amidst coral reefs and grassy ocean pastures in millions of locations. Fish and reefs appear to be doing quite well near these CO2 vents. The coral reefs in the Caribbean and other seas may be endangered due overfishing, chemical pollution, and human abuse. But let’s not blame reef degradation on misguided fears about global warming.

#### No impact to biodiversity loss – Ecosystems are resilient

Sedjo, 00

Roger A Sedjo 2k, Sr. Fellow, Resources for the Future, Conserving Nature’s Biodiversity: insights from biology, ethics & economics, eds. Van Kooten, Bulte and Sinclair, p 114

As a critical input into the existence of humans and of life on earth, biodiversity obviously has a very high value (at least to humans). But, as with other resource questions, including public goods, biodiversity is not an either/or question, but rather a question of “how much.” Thus, we may argue as to how much biodiversity is desirable or is required for human life (threshold) and how much is desirable (insurance) and at what price, just as societies argue over the appropriate amount and cost of national defense. As discussed by Simpson, the value of water is small even though it is essential to human life, while diamonds are inessential but valuable to humans. The reason has to do with relative abundance and scarcity, with market value pertaining to the marginal unit. This water-diamond paradox can be applied to biodiversity. Although biological diversity is essential, a single species has only limited value, since the global system will continue to function without that species. Similarly, the value of a piece of biodiversity (e.g., 10 ha of tropical forest) is small to negligible since its contribution to the functioning of the global biodiversity is negligible. The global ecosystem can function with “somewhat more” or “somewhat less” biodiversity, since there have been larger amounts in times past and some losses in recent times. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to indicate that small habitat losses threaten the functioning of the global life support system, the value of these marginal habitats is negligible. The “value question” is that of how valuable to the life support function are species at the margin. While this, in principle, is an empirical question, in practice it is probably unknowable. However, thus far, biodiversity losses appear to have had little or no effect on the functioning of the earth’s life support system, presumably due to the resiliency of the system, which perhaps is due to the redundancy found in the system. Through most of its existence, earth has had far less biological diversity. Thus, as in the water-diamond paradox, the value of the marginal unit of biodiversity appears to be very small.

#### THE MODELS USED TO PREDICT THE LOSS OF AGRICULTURE THAT YOU CITE, DO NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE MEASUREMENT OF MOISTURE – THIS THROWS OFF ANY PREDICTIONS ABOUT LOSSES IN AGRICULTURE

MICHAELS 2004

[Patrick J. Michaels, past president of the American Association of State Climatologists, “Meltdown” CATO Institute 2004 17-18// UW ef + scanner bitch]

Even so, that is where the climate models fall down-in the `aggregate" weather and its consequences. As one example of many. consider the finding of University of Delaware climatologist David Legates, who has demonstrated that the aggregate precipitation produced by GCMs can easily be off by 50 percent, depending upon location. That GCM precipitation is then used as input to a model for vegetation change, but it is in error. Further, the relationship between precipitation and vegetation is not all that clear-some equally wet and warm environments have radically different vegetaEon, depending upon other factors, including soil, drainage, and seasonality of precipitation. The multiplying mess becomes obvious: Because each of these interacting processes is only partially understood, the mathematics for each depends on the choice of the modeling team. As a result, different GCMs produce different patterns, rates, and distributions of warming resulting from human alteration of the atmosphere.

#### THIRD, EMPIRICAL RECORD DISPROVES DROUGHT PREDICTIONS—ALL TRENDS GO IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION

MICHAELS AND BALLING 2K

(Patrick, res. Prof @ U of Virginia, visiting scientist with Marshall Institute, past pres. of Am. Assoc. of State Climat. Ph.D. in ecol. Climat. Wisc.-Madison, contribut. Reviewer of IPCC, sen. Fellow Envt. Studies @ CATO, & Robert, Prof Geog. & Dir. Climat. @ ASU, The Satanic Gases, 2000, pg. 131-32 //wyo-ef)

The analyses of historical drought patterns in central North America bring us once again to the dilemma that is always at the heart of the greenhouse debate. The numerical model simulations would have us expect increasing temperatures, decreasing summer rainfall, and a decrease in the soil moisture levels. But we can check these expectations against reality because the region has excellent temperature, precipitation, and drought records. In fact, none of the expected seasonal patterns are found in the observations. Temperatures in the area are not rising, rainfall rates are up in summer instead of winter, and the leading drought indicators show a trend to increasing moisture levels.

#### No Extinction from disease

Posner 05

[Richard Posner Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.” http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html#abstract]

Yet the **fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort**, at least if the focus is on extinction events. **There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race**. There is a biological reason. **Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus**, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. **Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past** (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. **The reason is improvements in medical science.** But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

## No War

#### 1. MULTIPLE RESULTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ENSURE PLANETARY EXTINCTION

Badash 2001

[Lawrence, professor of history of science at UC Santa Barbara, “Nuclear Winter: Scientists in the Political Arena,” Physics in Perspective 3, 2001, 92//uwyo-ajl]

Ehrlich and Pavlov emphasized the certainty of the biological and medical consequences, given the dire climatic conditions. There were so many overlapping effects, each one individually capable of massive trauma to plants or animals, that their sum was indeed ‘‘overkill.’’ Toxic smog, ultraviolet-B, lack of photosynthesis, high levels of radioactivity, absence of liquid water, infection, disease, a sudden decrease in the oxygen content of the air (from burning of forests), starvation, and other disturbances to the social and environmental fabric would offer little hope to those who survived the war’s immediate effects.60 Ehrlich compared the certainty of the biological consequences of nuclear war to confidence in predicting the medical consequences of firing a double-barreled shotgun into one’s mouth.61

#### 2. NUCLEAR WAR RISKS ECO-SPHERE COLLAPSE AND EXTINCTION

Schell ‘82

[Jonathan, journalist, *The Fate of the Earth*, 1982]

To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation – just as it would be a misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know tha ta holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects, in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that manking will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time, we are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that, the global effects, including effects of which we are as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished. We are left with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our own species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger ofimminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possiblity of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of internaitonal agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass – of “the basic power of the universe” – and of a means by which man could realease the energy alterned the relationship between man and the source of his life, on earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. IN that sense, the question of human extinction has been on thepolitical agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from and immeasurably greater than, that of any othe risk, and as we make our decisions we have to take that signficance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the frame of life, extinction would shatter that frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purposs would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possiblity of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risks that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematica analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the take is, humanly speaking infinite and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learned the holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and of the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no chocie but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our speices. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a  mystery. We are in a deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now pose to the earth and ourselves.

#### 3A. NUCLEAR WAR RELEASES NOx THAT DESTROYS OZONE

London & White ‘84

[Julius, Prof. of Astrophysical, Planetary and Atmospheric Sci @ U. of Col., & Glibert F., Disting Prof of Geog at Inst of Behav Sci CU Boulder, Dir. Natural hazards Research Apps and Info Center, “The Environmental Effects of Nuclear War – An Overview,” *The Environmental Effects of Nuclear War*, Ed. London & White, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, 14//uwyo-ajl]

The extremely high temperature associated with nuclear explosions is responsible for massive production of oxides of nitrogen which, if present in the stratosphere, would significantly reduce the total atmospheric ozone content. This would result in increasing the ultraviolet radiation received at the ground to the extent of causing an alarming increase of skin cancer and producing severe trauma to the entire ecosystem (National Academy of Sciences, 1982). This topic is discussed by Julius Chang, formerly deputy division leader of the Theoretical Physics Division at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and currently program director of the Acid Rain Project at NCAR, and Donald Wuebbles, physipist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

#### B. THAT CAUSES EXTINCTION

Bunyard ‘99

[Peter, Editor of The Ecologist, *The Breakdown of Climate*, 1999, 94//uwyo]

Without stratospheric ozone and the oxygen which engenders it, not only would we not have the stratosphere, but we would also be bombarded with extremely harmful ultra-violet radiation. Life exposed to the sun, may have had difficulty surviving and it is even questionable whether life would have been able to colonize the land.

#### 5A. NUCLEAR WAR SHUTS DOWN GLOBAL AGRICULTURE

Greene et al ‘85

[Owen, Expert on Security issues, Director of Bradford U. Centre for Int’l Coop and Security, Arms Consultant to UN and EU, Ian Percival, Phys Prof, & Irene Ridge, Biologist, *Nuclear Winter: The Evidence and the Risks,* New York: Polity Press, 1985, 143//uwyo-ajl]

Small-scale, subsistence agriculture is all that would be possible for some years after a nuclear war. Conditions for plant growth would be poor for at least two or three years, with abnormal patterns of rainfall and temperature in the Northern Hemisphere, soils impoverished by erosion, and possible problems from increased UV-B radiation. Furthermore, modern varieties of crops compete poorly with weeds and are often highly susceptible to pests, yet there would be no herbicides, pesticides or fungicides to protect them. Weeds are among the plants most likely to regenerate after a nuclear winter; fungal pathogens could have persisted as spores; and there is a fairly high chance that among surviving insects would be pest species with a capacity for rapid inrease. Post-war agriculture might, therefore, be dominated by weeds, pests and diseases. It could take years to restore agriculture in the developed countries even to nineteenth-century standards rand advanced, twentieth-century agriculture might never be restored. Without fertilizers and hybrid seeds, the gains in production brought about in some Third World countries by the 'Green Revolution' would vanish. The inevitable result would be years of hunger and starvation

throughout the world.

#### Great power conflict is possible – resource conflicts, environmental crises and rising powers could spark global war

Dyer, 6

Gwynne Dyer is a London-based independent journalist, 'Has the world really changed since 9/11?,' September 7, http://www.straight.com/has-the-world-really-changed-since-9-11

Without 9/11 there would still be a “terrorist threat”, of course, because there is always some terrorism. It's rarely a big enough threat to justify expanding police powers, let alone launching a “global war” against it, but the fluke success of the 9/11 attacks (which has not been duplicated once in the subsequent five years) created the illusion that terrorism was a major problem. Various special interests climbed aboard the bandwagon, and off we all went. That is a pity, because without 9/11 there would have been no governments justifying torture in the name of fighting terrorism, no “special renditions”, no camps like GuantÃ¡namo. Tens of thousands of people killed in the various invasions of the past five years would still be alive, and western countries with large Muslim minorities would not now face a potential terrorist backlash at home from their own disaffected young Muslims. The United States would not be seen by most of the world as a rogue state. But that's as far as the damage goes. Current U.S. policy and the hostility it arouses elsewhere in the world are both transient things. The Sunni Muslim extremists””they would call themselves Salafis””who were responsible for 9/11 have not seized power in a single country since then, despite the boost they were given by the flailing U.S. response to that attack. The world is actually much the same as it would have been if 9/11 had never happened. Economically, 9/11 and its aftermath have had almost no discernible long-term impact: even the soaring price of oil is mostly due to rising demand in Asia, not to military events in the Middle East. The lack of decisive action on climate change is largely due to Bush policies that were already in place before 9/11. And, strategically, the relations between the great powers have not yet been gravely damaged by the U.S. response to 9/11. There may even be a hidden benefit in the concept of a “war on terror”. It is a profoundly dishonest concept, since it is actually directed mainly against Muslim groups that have grievances against the great powers: Chechens against Russia, Uyghurs against China, Kashmiri Muslims and their Pakistani cousins against India, and practically everybody in the Arab world against the U.S. and Britain. The terrorists' methods are reprehensible but their grievances are often real. However, the determination of the great powers to oppose not only their methods but their goals is also real. That gives them a common enemy and a shared strategy. The main risk at this point in history is that the great powers will drift back into some kind of alliance confrontation. Key resources are getting scarcer, the climate is changing, and the rise of China and India means that the pecking order of the great powers is due to change again in the relatively near future. Any strategic analyst worth his salt, given those preconditions, could draw you up a dozen different scenarios of disaster by lunchtime.

#### Great power wars are possible – specific scenarios, especially regional conflicts, could spark WWIII

Bosco, 6

David, senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine, 'Could This Be the Start of World War III?,' July 23, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday/commentary/la-op-bosco23jul23,0,6188365.story?coll=la-sunday-commentary

The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said last week. Certain religious websites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite. Consider the following scenarios: • Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel — and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war. • Missiles away: With the world's eyes on the Middle East, North Korea's Kim Jong Il decides to continue the fireworks show he began earlier this month. But this time his brinksmanship pushes events over the brink. A missile designed to fall into the sea near Japan goes astray and hits Tokyo, killing a dozen civilians. Incensed, the United States, Japan's treaty ally, bombs North Korean missile and nuclear sites. North Korean artillery batteries fire on Seoul, and South Korean and U.S. troops respond. Meanwhile, Chinese troops cross the border from the north to stem the flow of desperate refugees just as U.S. troops advance from the south. Suddenly, the world's superpower and the newest great power are nose to nose. • Loose nukes: Al Qaeda has had Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in its sights for years, and the organization finally gets its man. Pakistan descends into chaos as militants roam the streets and the army struggles to restore order. India decides to exploit the vacuum and punish the Kashmir-based militants it blames for the recent Mumbai railway bombings. Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces sent to secure Pakistani nuclear facilities face off against an angry mob. • The empire strikes back: Pressure for democratic reform erupts in autocratic Belarus. As protesters mass outside the parliament in Minsk, president Alexander Lukashenko requests Russian support. After protesters are beaten and killed, they appeal for help, and neighboring Poland — a NATO member with bitter memories of Soviet repression — launches a humanitarian mission to shelter the regime's opponents. Polish and Russian troops clash, and a confrontation with NATO looms. As in the run-up to other wars, there is today more than enough tinder lying around to spark a great power conflict. The critical question is how effective the major powers have become at managing regional conflicts andpreventing them from escalating. After two world wars and the decades-long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? The end of the Cold War had the salutary effect of dialing down many regional conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, every crisis in the Middle East had the potential to draw in the superpowers in defense of their respective client states. The rest of the world was also part of the Cold War chessboard. Compare the almost invisible U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo today to the deeply controversial mission there in the early 1960s. (The Soviets were convinced that the U.N. mission was supporting a U.S. puppet, and Russian diplomats stormed out of several Security Council meetings in protest.) From Angola to Afghanistan, nearly every Cold War conflict was a proxy war. Now, many local crises can be handed off to the humanitarians or simply ignored. But the end of the bipolar world has a downside. In the old days, the two competing superpowers sometimes reined in bellicose client states out of fear that regional conflicts would escalate. Which of the major powers today can claim to have such influence over Tehran or Pyongyang?