### 1AC

#### George and Rasheed rocked us Round 7 by winning that we need to take debate to that next level, so the framework is already established- debate should engage in different epistemologies and seek to understand how our participation is productive of a certain subjectivity.

#### But changing debate only reconfigures the parameters of the contest- we still have to DEBATE on that level. As Acompora suggests[[1]](#endnote-1),

Given that, he asks, what form of struggle might best advance human possibilities generally? Several features of productive contest emerge, although Nietzsche never offers a full exposition of the relevant question?' Beyond potentially inspiring excellence, which would presumably be relative to some previously existing standard, agonistic contest is supposed to be radically open, at least this seems to be a feature that Nietzsche specifically designates as exceptional about the view he finds in ancient Greece.21 The openness is achieved in two respects: first, the viability of challenge must be preserved; second, the contest must be flexible enough to generate decisions about excellence that are relative not only to past performances but also in accordance with new standards produced through the contest itself. 22 In other words, although rare and exceptional, every contest at least extends the possibility that the prevailing standards of measure themselves could be reformed. The significance of this openness to the community as a whole is evident to Nietzsche in what Diogenes Laertius reports as the original purpose of ostracism: anyone who emerged as an undefeatable opponent had to be banished, as great as such a person might be. This was not because greatness itself was despised; rather, it was out of concern for cultivating the pursuit of excellence as a whole. The latter was to be effected not through reduction to the lowest common denominator but by ever extending the prospect of being able to earn a title to great- ness, to participate in creating the standard for what would count as best. Moreover, those standards of judgment were being constantly formulated and renegotiated in every instance of rendering a decision. Nietzsche cites the most exemplary contestants as those who not only offered an exceptional performance in the contest but also revised the very standards by which they were judged. Nietzsche's admiration of these features of contest makes it clear that he is not simply nostalgic for a heroic ethic of nobility lost, and he is not pining for a return to the good old days of Homer. Moreover, it is worth considering the relations between victors, competitors, and the community that will provide the institutional framework for such agonistic enterprises to occur.

#### So yea, they took debate up to that next level, but they have to get tired of beating people on framework and the cap K at some point in time and get down to it. So, if you thought Pocatello was cold, get another coat. We’re going to 7200 feet above sea level in Laramie, Wyoming.

#### During the spring of 2012 while the topic paper was being pounded out in a D.C. law-office, energy was being produced all around us. We all saw the derricks and wind mills on the roads surrounding Norman at CEDA last year and Wyoming itself is the heart of the nation’s energy supply[[2]](#endnote-2). But with energy all around us, it is what is unseen that can tell us more why we as a community feel so compelled to debate about how to produce more and more and more of it. In a rush to map out the annual topic policy equations, we forget what is right in front of us on our campuses, our towns and our communities. Fundamentally, we speak from the place of Laramie.

#### A slight fissure opened up in the edifice of energy production but was only the faintest of traces by the time the paper was being written and voted on. On the University of Wyoming Campus, a grounds crew was laying fresh sod to cover up the ground where a sculpture known as “Carbon Sink”, a spiral of charred logs and lumps of Wyoming coal that sought to connect ongoing destruction to fossil fuel electricity had been suddenly dismantled by UW. They cited water-damage as the cause. Freedom of information requests uncovered that the destruction of carbon sink occured because of pressure on UW administrators from the state’s energy companies and legislators, including threatening future funding and donations[[3]](#endnote-3).

#### State senator Lubnau went so far as to say ““While I would never tinker with the University of Wyoming budget—I’m a great supporter of the University of Wyoming—every now and then you have to use these opportunities to educate some of the folks at the University of Wyoming about where their paychecks come from,”[[4]](#endnote-4)

#### The state’s largest newspaper condemned the decision as one of censorship and lies [[5]](#endnote-5). That narrative is insufficient to grasp the challenge of carbon sink. What is perhaps most disturbing about the event may be its banality; replace the name of UW in those headlines with ‘Idaho State’ or Oklahoma and no one would bat an eye- energy and the wealth it creates is at the center of life for our debate teams.

#### UW president Buchanan even went so far as to explicitly revalidate the classic liberal values of academic freedom noting “the university has been and continues to be a place where the free exchange of ideas, including those that are unpopular, is encouraged.” [[6]](#footnote-1)

#### Ultimately, “Carbon Sink" heralds neither the death of academic freedom nor confirms the existence of some secretive ‘carbon cabal’ that controls higher education, but the banality of the event invites us to question why this narrative attains to the level of common sense. As Foucault suggests, in order to understand how we as subjects are produced, we must probe the limits of the self, those things posited as necessary, inevitable or banal, through geneaology[[7]](#endnote-6):

Yet while taking these precautions into account we must obviously give a more positive content to what may be a philosophical ethos consisting in a critique of what we are saying thinking and doing through a historical ontology of ourselves.

1. This philosophical ethos may be characterized as a limit-attitude. We are not talking about a gesture of rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given lo us as universal necessary obligatory what place is occupied by whatever is singular contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints ? The point in brief is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression. This entails an obvious consequence: that criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological -- and not transcendental -- in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.

#### So then let us return to Laramie. While Buchanan was successful at tamping down the Carbon Sink Controversy, his words reflect back a discursive regime of citizenship. Several quotes are revealing.

#### While appealing to the disembodied sovereign subject of the enlightenment’s free spirit of inquiry, he constructs a mode of citizenship that transforms the relationship between state and industry from one of taxation and regulation to one wherein industry itself becomes both a CONSTITUENT AND a stakeholder, who the people are accountable to, quote[[8]](#endnote-7):

In truth, there was nothing nefarious about the removal of the installation. While the university is sensitive to the concerns of the many constituents the university serves, the notion that UW cowers before donors and politicians is simply not true. The university has been and continues to be a place where the free exchange of ideas, including those that are unpopular, is encouraged.

#### And quote:

One of the positive outcomes of this controversy is that the university has a stronger relationship with northeast Wyoming and Powder River Basin coal country. The negative reactions to the installation have turned into productive discussions about how the university can better serve the educational needs of that fast-growing part of the state. I am delighted to see this progress: Increasing the university’s presence statewide, particularly through community colleges, has been one of my top priorities. The university works hard to develop and maintain a wide array of programs to sustain Wyoming’s economy and way of life, including programs of excellence in agriculture, natural resources, health sciences, ecology, computational sciences, the arts and humanities, and energy. The university is deeply committed to extending instruction, research and service to all corners of the state and to all economic and social sectors. The university also remains committed to free expression and to serving as a neutral marketplace for the exchange of ideas. The university’s students, faculty and staff challenge, provoke and stir discussion and debate, sometimes in eyebrow-raising fashion. Pay a visit to campus, and you will see a robust, diverse mixture of art installations, concerts, plays, lectures, visiting speakers, and student and faculty activities. There is no evidence that the university is censoring anything or is in anyone’s back pocket. In fact, it is just the opposite.

#### A disturbing attitude towards citizenship and governance is revealed. The purpose of education and government is defined in strictly economic terms; governance is only about maximizing economic productivity and education is similarly concerned only with the pragmatics of creating economically productive and disciplined citizens. This regime of economic citizenship is inherently a relation of violence, as Luibheid argues[[9]](#endnote-8):

Under neoliberalism, norms and practices of citizenship have assumed a distinct cast. Previously, citizenship was constructed in relation to a liberal society where governments, in theory, undertook significant responsibility for providing social goods such as health care, education, and social welfare. Communities of color, women, low-income people, and queers waged political struggles for inclusion within these systems. Under contemporary conditions of neoliberal governmentality, however, many of these provisions have been privatized, and lack of access has been redefined as an individual failing rather than a reflection of systemic inequality. The model of the citizen has also changed: "The active citizen [is now] one who [is] an entrepreneur of him- or herself. . . . The individual [is] to conduct his or her life, and that of his or her family, as a kind of enterprise, seeking to enhance and capitalize on existence itself through calculated acts and investments."45 In these ways, the citizen is expected to reduce his or her burden on society. The role of the state has become to "empower" people to become entrepreneurial subjects of choice engaged in a quest for self-realization.46 Subjects who act in this manner are deemed to pose minimal risk to society and to comprise good subjects. Immigrants, however, cannot initially be trusted to fit this profile, and thus neoliberal strategies for risk management become important. As Rose, Dean, Inda, and others describe, two major strategies of risk management are evident under neoliberalism: one attempts to "activate the self-governing aptitudes of . . . troublesome individuals and stimulate them to take active care of their selves" in a manner that conforms to dominant norms; the other strategy, directed toward individuals who are deemed incapable of ever becoming good subjects, "concentrate(s) on containing and incapacitating them."47 Migrants constructed as "illegal" are targets of the second strategy, or, more accurately, we might say that being constructed as illegal (and therefore as available for exploitation, abuse, death) entails thoroughgoing containment and incapacitation, which occurs in varied forms. By contrast, legally admitted migrants are targets of the first risk management strategy, which is operationalized precisely through their family (including couple) ties. These ties become the means through which the immigration control system, in concert with a range of public and private assemblages, attempts to transform them into good citizens. Under neoliberalism, this [End Page 300] process is characterized not only by discipline but also "by the politics of the contract," which is "accompanied by new methods of regulation and control such as audit and evaluation."48 Legally admitted immigrants' compliance is secured by threatening them with possible loss of legal status, detention, and deportation (i.e., the second risk management strategy) if they fail to measure up. This is not to suggest, of course, that all immigrants or their partners simply acquiesce to dominant regimes of governance; rather, my argument is that we need a critical understanding of how couple ties are implicated in wider relations of rule.49

#### This geneaological work of mapping how the discursive formations of energy production, the topic, and its role in debate and our own subjectivity is crucial because power is immanent in everything we do. To speak and to name is to know, and to know is power. Power is the ability for a few small coal corporations to control the levers of government in order to extract value from Wyoming’s powder river basin and ship it over state-lines to be burned in plants that poison and kill the nation’s most vulnerable communities and bodies who are all too often both economically dispossessed and racially differentiated. It is discursive ideology that arrays and maintains these relations of production precisely because it tells us who we are and thus who we ought to be, as Finlayson argues[[10]](#endnote-9):

Following Gramsci (1971), hegemony represents a particularly strong moment of social power, of “total social authority,” in which a class alliance, or bloc, gains economic, ideological, political, and cultural control through a combination of consent and coercion (Hall 1996). Such domains of control are conjoined and inseparable, and in this regard, it would be a mistake to reduce power to an economically-reductionist framework. Power is not merely about control over resources, but control over culture, politics, and ideology as well. For the question at hand, power is not simply about the ownership of the means of production, control of the factors of production (land, labor, capital), and the exploitation of the masses. Instead, power is about how control over resources is understood and justiﬁed within a hegemonic framework. In this case, the framework is that of the neoclassical economic paradigm. Hegemony consists of far more than a simple material project as it is naturally discursive, relational, and rooted in ideology and culture. This control of discourse and ideology is achieved through an ongoing process of consent and coercion in which relations of domination are won and lost. At some level, those who are being subordinated by the hegemonic bloc agree to the domination. By saying this, we follow Grossberg’s (1996:162) assertion that hegemony must mobilize popular support for its rule, a project that aims to make its interests the interests of people over whom hegemony is exercised. Coercive domination draws attention to itself. Consensual domination secures the tenure of power more completely and more eﬃciently and does so through the rendering of these arrangements as “natural” through the hegemonic standing of the master narrative. The hegemonic bloc naturalizes its particular form of ideological, material, and cultural control in the form of consent, that cannot be underestimated, of those being controlled. Socialization, inﬂuenced as it is through ideology, is the process by which this level of consensual control is accomplished, reproduced, and reinforced. Power, through its ubiquitous presence as the organizing and animating force of society, is most readily apparent in the process of socialization. Socialization can be understood in Foucauldian terms as the process of the transference of discipline from society to the individual – a process of internalizing the order of things including prevailing systems of power. Socialization is a process of the transformation of the extraordinary and arbitrary features of the social order into the mundane, the taken-for-granted, the heuristic, the natural – and therefore unquestioned – order of things. 6 Socialization is partially interpersonal and direct via our cumulative experience functioning within the many institutions of society – the family, school, workplace, and community. But socialization is also impersonal and indirect via the media of mass communication – television, radio, newspapers, and movies. Fundamentally, the process of socialization provides us with the ideological apparatuses that interpolate us as subjects within an ordered social system. Ideological in nature, these processes form for us the ways in which we come to understand our own relations to each other and the social order (Althusser 2001). In short, ideology, inﬂuenced as it is through the continual building and rebuilding of the hegemonic bloc, tells us not only how to think and act but who we are (Foucault 1971, 1977). The seeming naturalness of neoclassical market ideology as the model for the values and function of social institutions and the individuals that animate them is dialectically both explained and caused by the concentration of power in late 20th century industrial society in the hands of very large corporations. Most of these corporations have developed a transnational structure placing them beyond the eﬀective control of national governments and, thus, the traditionally conceived polity. 7 Thus, the values and preferences that consumers bring to the marketplace are not exogenous idiosyncrasies, as the neoclassical discourse would have it. In a very direct way, the process of socialization dominated by neoclassical market ideology and rationality has inculcated consumers. That is, they reﬂect the contemporary power structure and serve its perpetuation. The consumer does not shape the market through the exercise of exogenously derived preferences; the corporate and elite interests vis-à-vis the market endogenously shape and condition the preferences of the consumer. The invisible hand is power. A current manifestation of the explanatory power of the discourse of neoclassical economics is the justiﬁcation for accelerating social inequalities. These inequalities are not only wealth-based but are also manifest in the unequal capacity to meaningfully participate in consequential civic discourse. The neoclassical economic paradigm deﬁnes the concepts and vocabulary of that discourse and, in so doing, ”. Labor unions provide a more speciﬁc example of consensual submission to domination.

#### Unquestioned, the power/knowledge nexus allows regimes of power to discipline subjects. This docility enables the worst possible atrocities because the rendering of bodies into subjects now allows the rendering of bodies as populations and as citizens, enabling sacrifice in the name of the body politic, according to Campbell[[11]](#endnote-10):

Foucault posited some direct and important connections between the individualizing and totalizing power relationships in the conclusion to The History of Sexuality, Volume I. There he argues that starting in the seventeenth century, power over life evolved in two complementary ways: through disciplines which produced docile bodies, and through regulations and interventions directed at the social body. The former centered on the body as a machine and sought to maximize its potential in economic processes, while the latter was concerned with the social body's capacity to give life and propagate. Together, these relations of power meant that 'there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of "bio-power".'25 This era of bio-power saw the art of government develop an overtly constitutive orientation through the deployment of technologies concerned with the ethical boundaries of identity as much (if not more than) the territorial borders of the state. Foucault supported this argument by reference to the 'theory of police.' Developed in the seventeenth century, the 'theory of police' signified not an institution or mechanism internal to the state, but a governmental technology that helped specify the domain of the state.26 In particular, Foucault noted that Delamare's Compendium - an eighteenth century French administrative work detailing the kingdom's police regulations - outlined eleven domains of concern for the police: religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, town buildings, public safety, the liberal arts, trade, factories, the supply of labor, and the poor. The logic behind this ambit claim of concern - which was repeated in all treatises on the police - was that the police should be concerned with 'everything pertaining to men's happiness,' all social relations carried on between men, and all 'living.'27 As another treatise of the period declared; 'The police's true object is man.'28 The theory of police, as an instance of the rationality behind the art of government, had therefore the constitution, production, and maintenance of identity as its major effect. Likewise, the conduct of war is linked to identity. As Foucault argues, 'Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of slaughter in the name of life necessity.' In other words, countries go to war, not for the purpose of defending their rulers, but for the purpose of defending 'the nation,' ensuring the state's security, or upholding the interests and values of the people. Moreover, in an era which has seen the development of a global system for the fighting of a nuclear war (the infrastructure of which remains intact despite the 'end of the cold war'), the paradox of risking individual death for the sake of collective life has been pushed to its logical extreme. Indeed, 'The atomic situation is now at the end of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence.'29

#### But it is also dangerous for us to pursue this line of inquiry because we simultaneously occupy a position of privilege and vulnerability in the economy of energy. We privilege from the low tuition it gives us and our debate budget, but we are also privileged to be separated from some of the worst effects of energy consumption as most of the coal is shipped to the urban centers of the country. - but the flip-side of privilege is indebtedness and danger at being rebuked by those with direct control over resources. In this debate, Mary and I do not confess our privilege out of guilt or resentment, but simply because it is the right thing to do. Foucalt explains through the concept of parrhesia[[12]](#endnote-11):

The last characteristic of parrhesia is this: in parrhesia, telling the truth is regarded as a duty. The orator who speaks the truth to those who cannot accept his truth, for instance, and who may be exiled, or punished in some way, is free to keep silent. No one forces him to speak, but he feels that it is his duty to do so. When, on the other hand, someone is compelled to tell the truth (as, for example, under duress of torture), then his discourse is not a parrhesiastic utterance. A criminal who is forced by his judges to confess his crime does not use parrhesia. But if he voluntarily confesses his crime to someone else out of a sense of moral obligation, then he performs a parrhesiastic act. To criticize a friend or a sovereign is an act of parrhesia insofar as it is a duty to help a friend who does not recognize his wrongdoing, or insofar as it is a duty towards the city to help the king to better himself as a sovereign. Parrhesia is thus related to freedom and to duty. To summarize the foregoing, parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. That then, quite generally, is the positive meaning of the word parrhesia in most of the Greek texts where it occurs from the Fifth Century B.C. to the Fifth Century A.D.

#### Thus, Mary and I affirm that we should engage in a genealogical interrogation of our relationship to energy.

#### Let’s return to Pocatello now and conclude with a few arguments for the superiority and necessity of our method of knowledge and epistemology. First, as Turner explains, Parrhesiatic acts are necessary to overcome the trap of docility[[13]](#endnote-12):

All of our techniques to overcome our docility, therefore, require courageous, persistent attention to our selves, the objects comprising our environment, and our responses (emotions, feelings, thoughts, and behavior) to our environments. Becoming less docile will also require trying more courageous, potentially defiant behaviors, including at least honest speech (i.e., parrhesia143), in all institutions of our lives – for example: frank speech with one’s own intimate relations (family, lovers, friends); improvisational movement and contact practices;144 opposition actions in public places and offices145 (e.g., Russian radical art collective VOINA’s actions146), in academic institutions (e.g., protesting abuses of power147), in corporations (e.g., collective bargaining, strikes); confrontations with governmental police and political authorities (e.g., Wikileaks, recent protest actions in Wisconsin; revolutionary armed struggle in Libya, occupation of and demonstration in public spaces within Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Iran, Morocco,148 and so on). Whatever the circumstances, whatever one’s degree of fearfulness, one or another technique of freedom can be exercised and amended to improve one’s awareness and courage. Our organism’s neural macrostructure, by guaranteeing the basic capacity for tonic readiness, guarantees that these techniques, along with the capacity for their future development, already exist – the human organism is not simply disciplinary, ressentimental, but also an experimental, risk-taking subject. What the organism does not guarantee is the degree and sites of disciplinary acculturation and, conversely, of development of techniques of the self. Fear conditioning can make avoidance behavior more probable, and make recall of the stimulus’s original ambivalence difficult. But this conditioning, research indicates, requires conscious attention. (We may still find ourselves doing things we cannot remember choosing, but this does not mean we did not choose them.) Whereas for Connolly, our “tactics of selfidentity” and “otherness,” involving ressentimental responses, are normally subconscious and automatic, a growing body of evidence seems to indicate instead that our responses to ontogenic/conditioned fear stimuli are still choices involving conscious awareness, even when these responses happen quickly and don’t involve long deliberation.149 That they can be recalled, attended to, even in the “midst of action,” is the source of our (and Connolly’s) hope in techniques of the self that might develop our habit of attention. This (latter) research also seems to indicate that this habit of attention is in all subjectivities already developed enough to be able to maintain and even develop itself further, to varying degrees in both the “slow” and “fast” interactions that constitute our everyday lives. The amygdala, “somatic markers,” and virtual memories that are crucial to Connolly’s conclusions appear not to act independently of conscious awareness but as a result of it. This is not to say that watching certain films from a Bergsonian perspective will not affect the subject; these exercises of steady observation/attention in the dark and quiet, free of most fear stimulation, can, as Connolly says, “help” (i.e., allow repeated attention to what one might normally avoid), given that perception, reaction, response, and conditioning require attentional focus. Such slowing down of one’s movement/responses can result in the development (through practice) of one’s ambivalence – critical awareness – to include attention to more minute detail by allowing the repeated experience of one’s sensations (feelings and thoughts), so that they become recallable memories. Slowing down is not necessarily a fear-stimulated act of avoidance (a distraction from one’s sensations, feelings, and thoughts). It can also be an act of engagement with one’s sensations, feelings, and thoughts; Connolly’s film-watching technique could do this. And the resulting awareness, if repeatedly practiced, might be maintained during faster and less restricted movement and interaction. But the maintenance of this attention is also made more probable by repeatedly practicing – by trying it. Film watching is, nevertheless, still only a partial confrontation with the disciplinary subject; as a technique, in and of itself, it does not risk the fearful (but also ambivalently arousing) struggle with arbitrary authority where it exists in our practices in our relations with friends, strangers, coworkers, and also supervisors and other authorities who enforce our society’s conventions and laws. Given his desire and hope for agonistic respect, Connolly’s technique (Bergsonian film watching) and his neuroscience seem unrealistically pessimistic; they at least implicitly assume a universally fear-dominated subjectivity (conditioned by an Augustinian command morality) – i.e., an apparently determined subjectivity – that contradicts both neuroscientific evidence and Connolly’s optimism about the transformative possibilities of techniques of the self. There is hope. The modern liberal subject is not simply a disciplinary and ressentimental subject; s/he also has the capacity – i.e., freedom – (already developed to some degree) in fearful experiences to “remark, describe, and remember,”150 to tell the truth of her/his experience. If this subject wants to change his/her dispositions, behavior, and relations, s/he must risk this confrontation.

#### Additionally, Our genealogical approach makes power visible, and resistance and political engagement possible, as Dean concludes[[14]](#endnote-13):

The ethico-political impulse of this kind of critical intellectual work can also be described in positive terms. This practice of genealogy might be said to have two impulses meshing behind the critical orientation to historical material. The first of these might be called diagnostic in the sense detected by Deleuze (1991). This is an orientation to the present as an open set of possi­bilities rather than as portending catastrophe, witnessing decay or promising fulfilment. Yet it is a present subject to knowable limits and constraints, not least of which would be the vocabularies and forms of reason by which we make politics thinkable, the mechanisms by which this politics is accom­plished and the manner in which we understand ourselves as those who govern and are governed. The ethos of this type of genealogy is of militancy grounded in scholarly moderation. It is militant in that the problems it addresses are called into focus by social and political movements and local­ized struggles. Yet it does not urge such movements to overturn everything or to 'subvert all codes'. Genealogy is led to undertake a task of some com­plexity requiring considerable erudition: to sort out what we take to be necessary and contingent in the ways in which we think and act in regard to the 'conducting' of our lives and those of others, and to discover what prob­lematizations of this are possible. Further, it is the attempt to discern which of these problematizations indicate lines of fracture and transformation and which indicate a consolidation of regimes of government. In this diagnostic mode, genealogy is less a refuge from disaster and more a cautious initiation into the conditions of a renewed task of political invention. Its cautious mil­itancy and intellectual moderation places the ethos of genealogy against all the dire prognostications on the fragmentation of identity and the ills of 'mass society'. Genealogy is thus an attempt to renew acquaintance with the strangeness of the present against all the attempts to erase it under the nec­essary dialectic of reason in history or to mark it as a moment of millenarian rupture, final denouement or irreversible loss.

Questions?

1. (Christa Davis, professor of philosophy at City University of New York, CRITICAL AFFINITIES: NIETZSCHE AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN THOUGHT, pp. 183-4 uw/mjs) [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Stewart NDG

(Tim, full-time Washington Representative, “Coalbed Methane in the Powder River Basin,” <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fusers.wfu.edu%2Fpalmitar%2FCourses%2FEnergy%2520Law%2FStudent%2520Papers%2FPapers%2FStewart%2520-%2520CoalBed.doc&ei=YE1LUIvaKamCiwKnsoFY&usg=AFQjCNHef99On86qcg6Kog87pNHDws86-A&sig2=GawDTEb7Yh119AkGlM95vg//wyo-mm> [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Zhorov 2011, http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/documents-show-artwork-removed-early-due-pressure [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Scott 11

(Evelina, Provisions, “Wyoming’s “Carbon Sink” Draws Attention,” August 2, 2011, http://provisionslibrary.com/?p=12538//wyo-mm) [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. http://trib.com/opinion/editorial/uw-s-carbon-sink-fiasco-marked-by-lies-censorship/article\_0b8b9b0d-7657-528a-9123-28df69ae25f4.html [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. http://trib.com/opinion/buchanan-carbon-sink-removal-didn-t-fit-conspiracy-narrative/article\_6252c7a7-c1f5-592a-944e-9dd729a74d18.html [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
7. Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment’, http://w7.ens-lyon.fr/amrieu/IMG/pdf/Michel\_Foucault\_\_What\_is\_Enlightenment\_1984\_-\_copie.pdf [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
8. http://trib.com/opinion/buchanan-carbon-sink-removal-didn-t-fit-conspiracy-narrative/article\_6252c7a7-c1f5-592a-944e-9dd729a74d18.html [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
9. Luibhéid, 2008 (Eithne, “Sexuality, Migration, and the Shifting Line between Legal and Illegal Status.” Volume 14, Number 2-3, 2008, Lexus, MB) [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
10. Finlayson et al 05

(Alan Christopher, Thomas A. Lyson, Andrew Pleasant, Kai A. Schafft and Robert J. Torres, Critical Sociology, Finlayson is Professor of Political & Social Theory at the University of East Anglia, is Associate Editor of the journal Contemporary Political Theory, Treasurer of the Rhetoric and Politics Group, a member of the International Task Force of the Rhetoric Society of American and oversees the website British Political Speech, “The ''Invisible Hand'': Neoclassical Economics and the Ordering of Society1,” 2005, Sage Publications//wyo-mm) [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
11. Campbell, prof of cultural and political geography at Durham Univ. 1992

(David, *Writing Security*) NG [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
12. Foucault 01

(Michael, transcribed from a series of recordings by Joseph Pearson, Fearless Speech, pgs 19-20//wyo-mm) [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
13. Turner 11

(Robert, political theorist (Ph.D. Government, Cornell University, and medical researcher, currently doing epidemiological research at Sunnybrook Hospital in Toronto, Theory and Event, Volume 14, Issue 3, “Conditioned Subjects: Connolly, the Amygdala, Fear, and Freedom,” 2011, Project Muse/Wyo-MM) [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
14. Mitchell **Dean**, Professor, Sociology, Macquarie University, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY, London: Sage, 19**99**, p. 44. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)