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#### Contention One is our artifact:

Stewart NDG

(Tim, full-time Washington Representative, “Coalbed Methane in the Powder River Basin,” <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fusers.wfu.edu%2Fpalmitar%2FCourses%2FEnergy%2520Law%2FStudent%2520Papers%2FPapers%2FStewart%2520-%2520CoalBed.doc&ei=YE1LUIvaKamCiwKnsoFY&usg=AFQjCNHef99On86qcg6Kog87pNHDws86-A&sig2=GawDTEb7Yh119AkGlM95vg//wyo-mm>)

As would be expected given the coal industry’s prodigious output, mining dominates the Wyoming economy. In 2005, mining accounted for over 30% of Wyoming’s GDP. The next largest sector, state and local government, contributed less than 10% to the state’s GDP. Mining interests wield extraordinary political power, and many of the residents are extremely proud of the industry. Even if they don’t depend on it for their livelihoods, the business generated by mining contributes greatly to the entire community’s standard of living. The energy sector has been successful at lobbying to create a School of Energy Resources at the University of Wyoming and regularly donates millions of dollars to a variety of university programs. Due to the fact that the mineral industry is so ingrained in the local culture, people who would challenge mining’s place in the Powder River Basin face an uphill battle and should be prepared to respond to the public’s fears about the economic impact of interruptions in the mining process. The state is not only energy-friendly but also staunchly conservative. On the flip side there are still many residents who make their living off the land, and in general people in the region have a healthy respect for conservation. Growing up in the midst of a wilderness teaches people to appreciate their natural resources. This duality is readily apparent: not only does Wyoming power the nation’s coal plants, it also plays home to one of the most spectacular nature preserves in the world—Yellowstone Park.

Michler 11

(Andrew, Inhabitat, “Chris Drury's "Carbon Sink" Art Installation Strikes Nerve of Wyoming Coal Industry,” July 27, 2011, http://inhabitat.com/chris-drurys-carbon-sink-art-installation-strikes-nerve-of-wyoming-coal-industry///wyo-mm)

#### “They get millions of dollars in royalties from oil, gas and coal to run the university, and then they put up a monument attacking me, demonizing the industry,” stated Marion Loomis, the director of the Wyoming Mining Association.

#### Lockwood 12

(Jeffrey, renowned entomologist and accomplished writer/philosopher who first arrived at the University of Wyoming in the 1980s to conduct groundbreaking research on grasshoppers, insecticides and biological controls, professor of philosophy and creative writing, WyoFile, “Behind the Carbon Curtain Art and Freedom in Wyoming,” 2012, <http://wyofile.com/2012/07/behind-the-carbon-curtain-art-and-freedom-in-wyoming///wyo-mm>)

OK, there was no book burning at the university, but there was something every bit as horrifying to those who value free speech. In May, the art installation Carbon Sink: What Goes Around Comes Around was destroyed and its remains consigned to the dump, “bone yard” and power plant (of course, the coal was burned).1 The only evidence of this compelling and controversial artwork that implied a connection between fossil fuels, climate change, and dying forests is a circular patch of sod. A central purpose of a university is to foster discussion of important issues. Drawing attention to the consequences of how modern society fuels itself (the artwork shined a light on the environmental costs of our individual and collective behaviors) seems perfectly aligned with the goal of promoting intelligent, civil discourse. So, why would the University of Wyoming destroy a powerful piece of art that had catalyzed such lively conversation about one of the vital issues of our time?

Scott 11

(Evelina, Provisions, “Wyoming’s “Carbon Sink” Draws Attention,” August 2, 2011, http://provisionslibrary.com/?p=12538//wyo-mm)

#### “While I would never tinker with the University of Wyoming budget—I’m a great supporter of the University of Wyoming—every now and then you have to use these opportunities to educate some of the folks at the University of Wyoming about where their paychecks come from,” - State representative Tom Lubnau.

#### Lockwood 12

(Jeffrey, renowned entomologist and accomplished writer/philosopher who first arrived at the University of Wyoming in the 1980s to conduct groundbreaking research on grasshoppers, insecticides and biological controls, professor of philosophy and creative writing, WyoFile, “Behind the Carbon Curtain Art and Freedom in Wyoming,” 2012, <http://wyofile.com/2012/07/behind-the-carbon-curtain-art-and-freedom-in-wyoming///wyo-mm>)

Given the extraordinary generosity of the legislature to UW, the institution is indebted to the politicians who are, in turn, beholden to the energy industry. Even though the piece was as much about individual responsibility as corporate accountability, legislators from energy-rich counties were unhappy with Carbon Sink.6 The declining demand for coal and the falling prices for natural gas made a fossil-fueled state government grumpy. Commonsense, experience with the Wyoming Way, and conversations with legislators7 leaves little doubt that the university administration traded free speech for political pacification (“extortion” is such an ugly word). People on the inside of Wyoming politics say that the day the artwork was destroyed, a servile email was sent to the carbonophilous legislators.8 Whether or not this bit of obsequious icing was added to the humble pie, our leaders should consider the warning of Somerset Maugham (a darling of conservatives,9 despite his being gay): “If a nation [or university?] values anything more than freedom, it will lose its freedom; and the irony of it is that if it is comfort or money that it values more, it will lose that, too.” Maybe I’m just paranoid. But like Kurt Cobain (not a favorite of conservatives) said, “Just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they aren’t after you.” And in this case, what might otherwise be a conspiracy theory became an explicit political policy during the 2012 legislative session.

#### Zhorov 9/28

(Irina, Wyoming Public Media, “Documents Show Artwork Removed Early Due to Pressure,” September 28, 2012, http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/documents-show-artwork-removed-early-due-pressure//wyo-mm)

#### Tom Lubnau continued:

#### “Whether you appreciate that or not, and whether you like that or not, between 60 and 80% of your budget comes from those extractive industries and it’s something you ought to know.”

#### Lockwood continues,

(Jeffrey, renowned entomologist and accomplished writer/philosopher who first arrived at the University of Wyoming in the 1980s to conduct groundbreaking research on grasshoppers, insecticides and biological controls, professor of philosophy and creative writing, WyoFile, “Behind the Carbon Curtain Art and Freedom in Wyoming,” 2012, <http://wyofile.com/2012/07/behind-the-carbon-curtain-art-and-freedom-in-wyoming///wyo-mm>)

Foxes Guarding the Henhouse? Not surprisingly, the School of Energy Resources Council includes some highly competent people when it comes to energy, such as vice-presidents from Marathon Oil and Arch Coal, along with the retired CEO for Basin Electric. As to whether these guys (they’re all men except for an ex officio member) represent a balanced portfolio, consider that this group comprises the Advanced Conversion Technologies Task Force — formerly known as the Clean Coal Task Force. Also not surprisingly, my best efforts to explore their backgrounds came up with no evidence that any of them possess the slightest expertise in the arts, which appears to put them on equal footing with Governor Mead. The sole qualification of our legislatively appointed censors is the capacity to choose art that will please — or at least not offend — some of Wyoming’s thin-skinned, fat-wallet enterprises (Perhaps tourism was omitted for fear that an environmental theme could creep in if this vital industry was included).

Pelzer 11

(Jeremy, The Star tribune, “University of Wyoming sculpture blasts fossil fuels ,” July 13, 2011, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article\_82943c8e-c869-5ffd-9874-8730df510368.html#ixzz1S1tgmtnJ//wyo-mm)

#### Loomis said it’s “hard to tell” whether the sculpture would affect the mining industry’s donations to UW in the future. “I’ll have to see what it looks like, I guess,” he said. “And maybe they’ll put up a sculpture commending the affordable, reliable electricity that comes from coal on the other end of Prexy’s Pasture.”

Lockwood continues,

(Jeffrey, renowned entomologist and accomplished writer/philosopher who first arrived at the University of Wyoming in the 1980s to conduct groundbreaking research on grasshoppers, insecticides and biological controls, professor of philosophy and creative writing, WyoFile, “Behind the Carbon Curtain Art and Freedom in Wyoming,” 2012, <http://wyofile.com/2012/07/behind-the-carbon-curtain-art-and-freedom-in-wyoming///wyo-mm>)

Not satisfied with the destruction of an artwork that conveyed an inconvenient truth, the Wyoming legislature wanted to assure that future artists wouldn’t offend the mineral magnates. So, in the appropriation for the renovation of the campus gym, the politicians mandated: “In providing artwork for the half acre recreation center pursuant to the provisions of W.S. 16-6-801 through 16-6-805, the university shall require artwork which displays the historical, cultural and current significance of transportation, agriculture and minerals in Wyoming’s history. Notwithstanding the provisions of W.S. 16-6-801 through 16-6-805 [which specifies that a panel representing the local community, art community, architect and state agency advise on the selection of art] the proposals for artwork shall be submitted to the university’s energy resources council and the governor for approval.”

#### Zhorov 9/28

(Irina, Wyoming Public Media, “Documents Show Artwork Removed Early Due to Pressure,” September 28, 2012, http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/documents-show-artwork-removed-early-due-pressure//wyo-mm)

#### “I just read the Casper Star Tribune story on the front page about the artist hired by the University to produce a product that trashes the very industries that provide nearly all the income in Wyoming for the State and for the University…” -Gillette Representative Gregg Blikre

#### Lockwood continues,

(Jeffrey, renowned entomologist and accomplished writer/philosopher who first arrived at the University of Wyoming in the 1980s to conduct groundbreaking research on grasshoppers, insecticides and biological controls, professor of philosophy and creative writing, WyoFile, “Behind the Carbon Curtain Art and Freedom in Wyoming,” 2012, <http://wyofile.com/2012/07/behind-the-carbon-curtain-art-and-freedom-in-wyoming///wyo-mm>)

But consider this analysis of “Stalin as Art Critic and Art Patron”: “Art under Stalin developed under unique conditions of total state control which made all forms and means of artistic expression served propagandistic purposes. The state proclaimed the arts to be its ideological weapon, established a monopoly over art production and distribution, and created a system of control over art with strict criteria of what kind of art society needs. All deviations from the state’s demands, either in form or in content, were strictly forbidden and the violators prosecuted.”11 Welcome to life behind the Carbon Curtain.

#### Zhorov 9/28

(Irina, Wyoming Public Media, “Documents Show Artwork Removed Early Due to Pressure,” September 28, 2012, http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/documents-show-artwork-removed-early-due-pressure//wyo-mm)

#### **President of the Petroleum Association of Wyoming, Bruce Hinchey said: “The next time the University of Wyoming is asking for donations it might be helpful to remind them of this and other things they have done to the industries that feed them before you donate.”**

#### Contention two is our criticism:

#### These stories demonstrate that we live under a governing body that deceptively gives us the illusion of freedom, while guiding us toward a specific mode of action and thought process that ostracizes difference and cedes power to the elites whose goal is to take energy to build profit.

Guillebeau 10

(Chris, The Art of Non-Conformity: Set Your Own Rules, Live the Life You Want, and Change the World, Chapter 4: “How to Fight Authority and Win,” subsection: Marginalization and the Department of No//wyo-mm)

Why do people do what other people expect them to instead of what they really want? There are a number of reasons: inertia, fear of change, and no one’s ever told them they don’t have to, for example. But here’s one more: sometimes people fall in line because authority figures are very skilled at keeping them in their place. Many of these authority figures are “gatekeepers,” which can be defined as follows: Gatekeeper: n. 1. A person or group with a vested interest in limiting the choices of other people. 2. An obstacle that must be overcome to achieve unconventional success. Gatekeepers are especially effective at telling you which choices you have, thus giving you the illusion of freedom while simultaneously blocking access to what really matters. It’s like asking, “Would you like a or b?”— without letting you know that c, d, and e are also valid choices. In the case of Tim DeChristopher, the Bureau of Land Management pretended the auctions were fair because they were open to “everyone.” In reality, very few opportunities are open to everyone—in this case, the auctions were open to everyone with at least $1.7 million to spare, effectively limiting the process to big oil companies. Understanding that few opportunities are truly democratic is the first step toward successfully challenging authority. Generally speaking, universities are open to everyone who has mastered the skill of taking standardized tests. Churches and religious institutions are open to all who agree to adopt a particular doctrine that defines acceptable and unacceptable beliefs. If a member sways too far from the agreed-upon boundaries, that member will be defined as deviant and will be ostracized by the rest of the group. You may not have to compete against Shell and ExxonMobil in a government land auction, but chances are you’ll come up against your share of gatekeepers. When you apply for admission to college or for employment with a company, for example, you’ll encounter gatekeepers who intend to determine many important aspects of your relationship to others in the institution. Among other things, they’ll determine: • Whether you’re even worthy of consideration in the first place • Whether the institution views you as a threat that should be guarded against • How you stack up compared to others who are also interested in the institution (peers, other applicants, and the people reviewing your file) • How much you should be rewarded (salary, scholarship, etc.) for your contribution to the institution Gatekeepers are “no” people. They are skilled at swatting down ideas and coming up with all kinds of reasons why a request should be denied or why a particular strategy won’t work. Many organizations have an entire Department of No, which usually goes by a disguised title such as Legal or Human Resources.8

#### The status quo usage of power has been ceded to the elite, corporate interests that perpetuates social inequalities and occludes citizen participation. Understanding these power structures is critical to this year’s resolution because power shapes everything- it describes, explains, legitimates and conditions policies, energy, and our social locations on every scale, and through repeated action creates dominant, heuristic narratives. But these narratives are not static..

Finlayson et al 05

(Alan Christopher, Thomas A. Lyson, Andrew Pleasant, Kai A. Schafft and Robert J. Torres, Critical Sociology, Finlayson is Professor of Political & Social Theory at the University of East Anglia, is Associate Editor of the journal Contemporary Political Theory, Treasurer of the Rhetoric and Politics Group, a member of the International Task Force of the Rhetoric Society of American and oversees the website British Political Speech, “The ''Invisible Hand'': Neoclassical Economics and the Ordering of Society1,” 2005, Sage Publications//wyo-mm)

We use the concept of power in a very fundamental way: the ability to create, maintain, and defend order including the ability to codify bodies of knowledge as true or false. In our view, the perceived order in the world is an epiphenomenon of power. Social control is maintained by providing a particular set of conceptual and discursive possibilities while denying others. By dominating discourse, neoclassical economics structures what we can think and say. This is equally true for the elites who wield power as well as the ruled classes. The neoclassical economic narrative is power because it simultaneously describes, explains, and legitimates the conditions of life experienced by individuals in their interactions with others and with the institutions of social life. As a technology of power, the neoclassical economic narrative provides the legitimating narrative and discursive resources for the creation, maintenance, and enforcement of unequal distribution and access to social resources – not simply pecuniary wealth but also of social status and of power itself. 4 Power is not a thing but a force that can only be indirectly observed in its manifestations. Order is not simply a manifestation of power, but reproduces power. In this we follow from Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, which argues social order is both a subjective construct of interacting individuals and an objective structure that constrains yet does not uniquely determine the possible constructs (Bourdieu 1984, 1990). As a technology of power, the neoclassical economic paradigm has come to dominate all spheres of discourse, justifying and naturalizing current world “realities” so that alternatives seem impossible (Bourdieu 1998). Kelsey (1995) aptly calls this the TINA (There Is No Alternative) syndrome. 5 The realm of the possible is structured through an economic lens perhaps best exempliﬁed by the reliance on cost/beneﬁt analytical models of decision-making. Such a lens can selectively occlude and reveal, structuring the bounds of the possible and impossible, the acceptable and unacceptable. This technology of power is global, as Hardt and Negri (2000) have aptly argued, and extends beyond the sphere of inﬂuence of any single national entity, superseding sovereignty, and asserting its control over the “spatial totality” of the globe. The ability to inﬂuence culture is the ability to inﬂuence “common sense,” or the basic set of conceptions and categories that form the practical consciousness of people (Hall 1996:431). These “hegemonic moments” structure popular common sense and short-circuit alternative discourses, providing an ideological foundation and a closed spiral of discourse leading to the further achievement and security of a hegemonic bloc, an alliance of ideologically united classes. This is the sense in which the discourse of neoclassical economics becomes a heuristic narrative. The narrative itself is not the conclusion of an already cemented hegemonic force; it is, rather, the continual playing out of hegemonic relations of domination such that they are continually remade, restructured, and suited to particular anti-hegemonic responses (Hall 1986). Following Gramsci (1971), hegemony represents a particularly strong moment of social power, of “total social authority,” in which a class alliance, or bloc, gains economic, ideological, political, and cultural control through a combination of consent and coercion (Hall 1996). Such domains of control are conjoined and inseparable, and in this regard, it would be a mistake to reduce power to an economically-reductionist framework. Power is not merely about control over resources, but control over culture, politics, and ideology as well. For the question at hand, power is not simply about the ownership of the means of production, control of the factors of production (land, labor, capital), and the exploitation of the masses. Instead, power is about how control over resources is understood and justiﬁed within a hegemonic framework. In this case, the framework is that of the neoclassical economic paradigm. Hegemony consists of far more than a simple material project as it is naturally discursive, relational, and rooted in ideology and culture. This control of discourse and ideology is achieved through an ongoing process of consent and coercion in which relations of domination are won and lost. At some level, those who are being subordinated by the hegemonic bloc agree to the domination. By saying this, we follow Grossberg’s (1996:162) assertion that hegemony must mobilize popular support for its rule, a project that aims to make its interests the interests of people over whom hegemony is exercised. Coercive domination draws attention to itself. Consensual domination secures the tenure of power more completely and more eﬃciently and does so through the rendering of these arrangements as “natural” through the hegemonic standing of the master narrative. The hegemonic bloc naturalizes its particular form of ideological, material, and cultural control in the form of consent, that cannot be underestimated, of those being controlled. Socialization, inﬂuenced as it is through ideology, is the process by which this level of consensual control is accomplished, reproduced, and reinforced. Power, through its ubiquitous presence as the organizing and animating force of society, is most readily apparent in the process of socialization. Socialization can be understood in Foucauldian terms as the process of the transference of discipline from society to the individual – a process of internalizing the order of things including prevailing systems of power. Socialization is a process of the transformation of the extraordinary and arbitrary features of the social order into the mundane, the taken-for-granted, the heuristic, the natural – and therefore unquestioned – order of things. 6 Socialization is partially interpersonal and direct via our cumulative experience functioning within the many institutions of society – the family, school, workplace, and community. But socialization is also impersonal and indirect via the media of mass communication – television, radio, newspapers, and movies. Fundamentally, the process of socialization provides us with the ideological apparatuses that interpolate us as subjects within an ordered social system. Ideological in nature, these processes form for us the ways in which we come to understand our own relations to each other and the social order (Althusser 2001). In short, ideology, inﬂuenced as it is through the continual building and rebuilding of the hegemonic bloc, tells us not only how to think and act but who we are (Foucault 1971, 1977). The seeming naturalness of neoclassical market ideology as the model for the values and function of social institutions and the individuals that animate them is dialectically both explained and caused by the concentration of power in late 20th century industrial society in the hands of very large corporations. Most of these corporations have developed a transnational structure placing them beyond the eﬀective control of national governments and, thus, the traditionally conceived polity. 7 Thus, the values and preferences that consumers bring to the marketplace are not exogenous idiosyncrasies, as the neoclassical discourse would have it. In a very direct way, the process of socialization dominated by neoclassical market ideology and rationality has inculcated consumers. That is, they reﬂect the contemporary power structure and serve its perpetuation. The consumer does not shape the market through the exercise of exogenously derived preferences; the corporate and elite interests vis-à-vis the market endogenously shape and condition the preferences of the consumer. The invisible hand is power. A current manifestation of the explanatory power of the discourse of neoclassical economics is the justiﬁcation for accelerating social inequalities. These inequalities are not only wealth-based but are also manifest in the unequal capacity to meaningfully participate in consequential civic discourse. The neoclassical economic paradigm deﬁnes the concepts and vocabulary of that discourse and, in so doing, ”. Labor unions provide a more speciﬁc example of consensual submission to domination. Labor unions challenge the hegemony of industrial interests, but on the whole they make their challenges on a playing ﬁeld largely structured by industrial interests. While labor may not agree to be dominated outright, in order to be in the game at all laborers must consent to some level of domination (Smith 1998). Another example is found in the results of a 2001 survey by National Public Radio which showed that about half of respondents with incomes below the U.S. federal poverty level believed that people were poor because “people [are] not doing enough” to pull themselves out of poverty (National Public Radio 2001; Newman 1988). That those in poverty are willing to blame people in the same economic condition for their own poverty is a stark example of the power of the neoclassical narrative to obtain consent to domination. The acquiescence of the poor to their situation is generated through the neoclassical discourse, which, as Foucault (1971) argues, provides the order of the way things “should be.” Despite the strength of neoclassical economics today, hegemonic blocs 8 are not static structures with total social control. While the processes of hegemony are powerful and inﬂuential, they can never encompass the entirety of any social structure and cannot totalize all social relationships. Each hegemonic moment is based on a long history of struggles and the traces of those struggles remain as resistances threatening to fracture any current hegemonic moment. Hegemonic domination is an active, contingent, and historical accomplishment. Neoclassical economics and its resistances therefore necessarily carry out an ongoing dynamic battle for control of civic discursive space given that not all power is vested in neoclassical economics (Smith 1998). Rather, counter-hegemonic struggle takes place at a variety of loci within the social structure including, for example, civil society, state apparatuses, and the family (Gramsci 1971; Smith 1998). Struggle against the neoclassical worldview would almost surely have to be waged at multiple and disparate sites since the neoclassical viewpoint is so widely held and so deeply entrenched in social structures.

#### However, failure to interrogate these power structures however turns us into “docile bodies”, in which endless wars and nuclear exchange are inevitable

Campbell, prof of cultural and political geography at Durham Univ. 1992

(David, *Writing Security*) NG

Foucault posited some direct and important connections between the individualizing and totalizing power relationships in the conclusion to The History of Sexuality, Volume I. There he argues that starting in the seventeenth century, power over life evolved in two complementary ways: through disciplines which produced docile bodies, and through regulations and interventions directed at the social body. The former centered on the body as a machine and sought to maximize its potential in economic processes, while the latter was concerned with the social body's capacity to give life and propagate. Together, these relations of power meant that 'there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of "bio-power".'25 This era of bio-power saw the art of government develop an overtly constitutive orientation through the deployment of technologies concerned with the ethical boundaries of identity as much (if not more than) the territorial borders of the state. Foucault supported this argument by reference to the 'theory of police.' Developed in the seventeenth century, the 'theory of police' signified not an institution or mechanism internal to the state, but a governmental technology that helped specify the domain of the state.26 In particular, Foucault noted that Delamare's Compendium - an eighteenth century French administrative work detailing the kingdom's police regulations - outlined eleven domains of concern for the police: religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, town buildings, public safety, the liberal arts, trade, factories, the supply of labor, and the poor. The logic behind this ambit claim of concern - which was repeated in all treatises on the police - was that the police should be concerned with 'everything pertaining to men's happiness,' all social relations carried on between men, and all 'living.'27 As another treatise of the period declared; 'The police's true object is man.'28 The theory of police, as an instance of the rationality behind the art of government, had therefore the constitution, production, and maintenance of identity as its major effect. Likewise, the conduct of war is linked to identity. As Foucault argues, 'Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of slaughter in the name of life necessity.' In other words, countries go to war, not for the purpose of defending their rulers, but for the purpose of defending 'the nation,' ensuring the state's security, or upholding the interests and values of the people. Moreover, in an era which has seen the development of a global system for the fighting of a nuclear war (the infrastructure of which remains intact despite the 'end of the cold war'), the paradox of risking individual death for the sake of collective life has been pushed to its logical extreme. Indeed, 'The atomic situation is now at the end of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence.'29 The common effect of the theory of police and the waging of war in constituting the identity in whose name they operate highlights the way in which foreign policy/Foreign Policy establishes the general preconditions for a 'coherent policy of order,' particularly as it gives rise to a geography of evil.30 Indeed, the preoccupation of the texts of Foreign Policy with the prospects for order, and the concern of a range of cultural spokespersons in America with the dangers to order, manifests how this problematic is articulated in a variety of sites distinctive of the United States. Most importantly, though, it is at the intersection of the 'microphysics' and 'macrophysics' of power in the problematic of order that we can locate the concept of security. Security in this formulation is neither just an essential precondition of power nor its goal; security is a specific principle of political method and practice directed explicitly to 'the ensemble of the population.'31 This is not to suggest that 'the population' exists in a prediscursive domain; on the contrary, 'One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of "population" as an economic and political problem.'32 Furthermore, Foucault argues that from the eighteenth-century onwards, security becomes the central dynamic in governmental rationality, so that (as discussed in chapter six) we live today, not in a narrowly defined and overtly repressive disciplinary society, but in a 'society of security,' in which practices of national security and practices of social security structure intensive and extensive power relations, and constitute the ethical boundaries and territorial borders of inside/outside, normal/pathological, civilized/ barbaric, etc.33 The theory of police and the shift from a sovereign's war to a population's war thus not only changed the nature of 'man' and war, it constituted the identity of 'man' in the idea of the population, and articulated the dangers that might pose a threat to security. The major implication of this argument is that the state is understood as having no essence, no ontological status which exists prior to and is served by either police or war. Instead, 'the state' is 'the mobile effect of a multiple regime of governmentality,' of which the practices of police, war, and foreign policy/Foreign Policy are all a part.34 Rethinking security and government in these terms is one of the preconditions necessary to suggest some of the political implications of this study. Specifically, it has been the purpose of this book to argue that we can interpret the cold war as an important moment in the production and reproduction of American identity in ways consonant with the logic of a 'society of security'. To this end, the analysis of the texts of Foreign Policy in chapter one, the consideration of Eisenhower's security policies in chapter six, and the examination of the interpretation of danger surrounding 'the war on drugs' and the economic threat of Japan in chapters seven and eight, demonstrated that even when these issues are represented in terms of national security and territorial boundaries, and even when these issues are written in the depoliticizing mode of policy discourse, they all constitute 'the ensemble of the population' in terms of social security and ethical borders. Likewise, Foucault's argument underpins the fact that these developments are not peculiar to the post-World War II period.

#### The problem with energy incentives is not only that they’re dominated by energy conglomerates, but that our policy-makers, catering to the elites, use top-down reductionist approaches to energy solutions, making top-down solutions normalized. Without a reframing of our decision-making practices, any single policy-solution will inevitably fail.

Jørgensen 12

(Ulrik, Department of Management Engineering, Innovation and Sustainability, Technical University of Denmark, Environment & Policy, “No Smooth, Managed Pathway to Sustainable Energy Systems – Politics, Materiality and Visions for Wind Turbine and Biogas Technology,” 2012, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/x170560383685725/fulltext.html//wyo-mm>)

The historical case studies demonstrate that eschewing conflict and focusing on only one policy measure or one central economic agent to provide expected results can easily destroy the general capacity to adjust to change in terms of how energy supply is configured, how energy is used and in the role of the dominant sociotechnical regime. Acting within a context of conflict and constant negotiation is part of the challenge, since trying to solve problems fully at every stage of development may not provide long-term satisfactory solutions – as seen from the perspective of society’s need for the sustainable transformation of its energy system. Policy-makers, analysts and entrepreneurs see competing developmental directions and technical paradigms but a simple top-down choice cannot be made since a variety of actors and ideas is crucial to the process. The leap to a definitive solution by seeking the most convenient or efficient technology may lock out committed innovators and entrepreneurs, as well as processes in which learning and piecemeal engineering can be practised. In Denmark, for example, if the utility companies had been made the only providers of power and given a central role in decision-making on the introduction of energy technologies based on renewable sources, the continuing process of improvement would not have occurred and the viability of new system compositions would probably have been lower. Alternatively, if wind turbines and biogas facilities had had access to investment funding and support that was not constantly adjusted according to the increasing efficiency of the technology, far too many early designs might have been installed and not renewed once the next generation of wind and biogas technology came along – their sunk costs would have been wasted. These have been controversial issues during the decades of change; balancing interests and facilitating innovation and experimentation turned out to be an important aspect of governing transition. When this de facto governance of feed-in prices was terminated in the late 1990s in favour of specific, albeit inadequate, market forces, the transition came to a halt. Only recently, thanks to a sense of urgency on climate change, steps towards a continued transition have been considered again, albeit in a very top-down policy manner. Still, the impact of these steps may not live up to the political and corporate rhetoric on mitigating climate change. The dominant top-down technology approach has shown its weakness in contemporary climate-based policies, scenarios and plans. Politicians and companies have criticised consumers and citizens for not taking serious steps while they themselves, afraid of backlash from constituents and clients, have avoided committing to radical regulatory measures. There is a clear need for bottom-up experimenters and committed grass-root movements to take up the challenge and become an innovative force in energy system transition.

#### The question of this year’s resolution is not just how we should produce energy, but how energy produces us. Carbon Sink demonstrates speaking out against energy corporations in Wyoming is dangerous-. This state and resolution are both enframed in top-down approaches and the complexity of issues like energy make nonlinearity inevitable- thus, fracturing linear approaches is critical to disrupt dominant narratives of the squo to reveal the complexity of energy.

Ramalingam et al 08

(Ben, Harry Jones, Toussaint Reba and John Young, Foreword by Robert Chambers, Results of ODI research presented in preliminary form for discussion and critical comment, “Exploring the science of complexity Ideas and implications for development and humanitarian efforts,” 2008, <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/833.pdf//wyo-mm>)

Linearity describes the proportionality assumed in idealised situations where responses are proportional to forces and causes are proportional to effects (Strogatz, 2003). Linear problems can be broken down into pieces, with each piece analysed separately; finally, all the separate answers can be recombined to give the right answer to the original problem. In a linear system, the whole is exactly equivalent to the sum of the parts. However, linearity is often an approximation of a more complicated reality – most systems only behave linearly if they are close to equilibrium and are not pushed too hard. When a system starts to behave in a nonlinear fashion, ‘all bets are off’ (Strogatz, 2003). This is not to suggest that nonlinearity is necessarily a dangerous or unwanted aspect of systems. The biology of life itself is dependent on nonlinearity, as are the laws of ecology. Combination therapy for HIV/AIDS using a cocktail of three drugs works precisely because the immune response and viral dynamics are nonlinear – the three drugs taken in combination are much more effective than the sum of the three taken separately. The nonlinearity concept means that linear assumptions of how social phenomena play out should be questioned. It is important to note that such thinking has only relatively recently been incorporated into the ‘hard’ science paradigms and, moreover, is still only starting to shape thinking in the social, economic and political realms. Nonlinearity poses challenges to analysis precisely because such relationships cannot be taken apart – they have to be examined all at once, as a coherent entity. However, the need to develop such ways of thinking cannot be overstated – as one thinker puts it: ‘... every major unresolved problem in science – from consciousness to cancer to the collective craziness of the economy, is nonlinear’ (Capra, 1996). Although nonlinearity is a mathematical formulation, it is useful to take the suggestion that what is required is a ‘qualitative understanding of [the] quantitative’ when attempting to investigate them systematically (Byrne, 1998). Such a qualitative understanding has been furthered by the work of Robert Jervis (1997) on the role of complexity in international relations. Starting with the notion that understanding of social systems has tacitly incorporated linear approaches from Newtonian sciences, Jervis goes on to highlight three common assumptions that need to be challenged in order to take better account of nonlinearity. These assumptions provide a solid basis for investigating nonlinearity. First, it is very common to test ideas and propositions by making comparisons between two situations which are identical except for one variable – referred to as the independent variable. This kind of analysis is usually prefaced with the statement ‘holding all other things constant’. However, in a system of interconnected and interrelated parts, with feedback loops, adaptive agents and emergent properties, this is almost impossible, as everything else cannot be held constant and there is no independent variable. Jervis argues that, in such systems, it is impossible to look at ‘just one thing’, or to make only one change, hence to look at a situation involving just one change is unrealistic. Secondly, it is often assumed that changes in system output are proportional to changes in input. For example, if it has been assumed that a little foreign aid slightly increases economic growth, then more aid should produce more growth. However, as recent work by ODI and others argues, absorption capacity needs to be taken account – more aid does not necessarily equate to better aid. In complex systems, then, the output is not proportional to the input. Feedback loops and adaptive behaviours and emergent dynamics within the system may mean that the relationship between input and output is a nonlinear one: ‘Sometimes even a small amount of the variable can do a great deal of work and then the law of diminishing returns sets in [a negative feedback process] … in other cases very little impact is felt until a critical mass is assembled’ (Jervis, 1997). The third and final commonly made assumption of linearity is that the system output that follows from the sum of two different inputs is equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs. In other words, the assumption is that if Action A leads to Consequence X and Action B has Consequence Y then Action A plus Action B will have Consequences X plus Y. This frequently does not hold, because the consequences of Action A may depend on the presence or absence of many other factors which may well be affected by B or B’s Consequence (Y). In addition, the sequence in which actions are undertaken may affect the outcome. Example: The growth dynamics model as an alternative to linear regression models Studies of economic growth face methodological problems, the foremost of which is dealing with real world complexity. The standard way of understanding growth assumes, implicitly, that the same model of growth is true for all countries, and that linear relationships of growth are true for all countries. However, linear relationships might not apply in many cases. An example would be a country where moderate trade protection would increase economic growth but closing off the economy completely to international trade would spell economic disaster. Linear growth models imply that the effect of increasing the value of the independent variable would be the same for all countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other variables. Therefore, an increase of the tariff rate from 0% to 10% is presumed to generate the same change in the growth rate as a change from 90% to 100%. Furthermore, the change from 0% to 10% is assumed to have the same effect in a poor country as in a rich country, in a primary resource exporter as in a manufacturing exporter, and in a country with well developed institutions as in a country with underdeveloped institutions. Despite some efforts to address these issues by relaxing the linear framework and introducing mechanisms to capture nonlinearities and interactions among some variables, this is still a poor way of addressing real world nonlinearity. Econometric research has identified that linear models cannot generally be expected to provide a good approximation of an unknown nonlinear function, and in some cases can lead to serious misestimates (Rodríguez, 2007). Research at Harvard University has focused on the problem of designing a growth strategy in a context of ‘radical uncertainty’ about any generalised growth models. They call their method ‘growth diagnostics’, in part because it is very similar to the approach taken by medical specialists in identifying the causes of ailments. In such a context, assuming that every country has the same problem is unlikely to be very helpful. The principal idea is to look for clues in the country’s concrete environment about the specific binding constraints on growth. The growth diagnostics exercise asks a set of basic questions that can sequentially rule out possible explanations of the problem. The answers are inherently country-specific and time-specific. The essential method is to identify the key problem to be addressed as the signals that the economy would provide if a particular constraint were the cause of that problem. Implication: Challenge linearity in underlying assumptions Within complex systems, the degree of nonlinearity and relationships between various factors, and the lack of proportionality between inputs and outputs, means that the dynamics of change are highly context-specific. Therefore, if there are assumptions, aggregations and theories about the relations among different aspects of a specific situation, and these are not entirely appropriate when applied to the dynamics of a new local situation, then this perspective is unlikely to lead to a deep understanding of what should be done, and is furthermore unlikely to lead to the hoped-for changes. Nonlinearity implies that, as well as understanding the limitations of a particular model or perspective, it is important to build and improve new models that can provide the sort of information required for the particular task at hand. ‘No kind of explanatory representation can suit all kinds of phenomena ... any one diagnosis of [a] problem and its solution is necessarily partial’ (Holland, 2000). From this perspective, it is important to tailor to the particular situation one’s perspective on the dynamics of some phenomena. In a complex system, one must examine the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies among its parts or elements (Flynn Research, 2003). It is important from the outset to understand the association and interaction among variables, rather than assuming that one causes another to change, and to look at how variables interact and feed back into each other over time (Haynes, 2003). Homer-Dixon, cited above, suggests that political scientists use methods that are modelled on the physical sciences, developing broad theories of political behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest.

#### Using complex epistemology of the aff is critical to solve calculability that leads to bare life-

Kincheloe 08

(Joe, was a professor and Canada Research Chair at the Faculty of Education, McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, received three graduate degrees from the University of Tennessee, Knowledge and Critical Pedagogy, Chapter 6: “Down and Dirty: Outlining FIDUROD,” 2008, Pgs. 120-122, SpringerLink//wyo-mm)

This characteristic is very direct and simple: FIDUROD proclaims that only the information produced by a rigorous adherence to the scientific method merits the label of “knowledge.” This is justified by the “fact” that the scientific method is superior to all other methods of research. Using the scientific method correctly, knowledge producers can explain, predict, and control what goes on in the world. The critical complex notion of interpreting and acting to change the world to make it more just has little status among many of those who uphold and employ the principles of FIDUROD. Western science, advocates of FIDUROD argue, has been successful because it is the one correct way to study the world. The knowledge that science produces can be verified and proven. The term, positivism, was used to describe the epistemology that grounded such knowledge because the scientific method produced knowledge about which we could be positive that it was true. In this construction the more scientific research we conduct, the better we become at the task of producing universal truth. According to FIDUROD there is one correct view of nature—the one produced by science. This one-truth epistemology and its universal knowledge squelch a key dimension of science that advocates of FIDUROD claim to support—rigorous criticism. With only a small group of elite experts having been traditionally admitted to the community of scientists, those individuals who have fallen outside this domain have typically been ignored. Not surprisingly, these are the people who have some of the most revealing critiques of traditional science: women, indigenous peoples, non-Europeans, individuals from the lower socio-economic classes have been the ones who have least profited from the changes fashioned by science. Hermeneutic interpretation, for example, is simply not relevant in the epistemology of FIDUROD. Such ways of producing knowledge and understanding move beyond simple cause and effect scientific explanation, labeling them as too reductionistic an approach to understand the complex movement of events in the world. FIDUROD-based science has not taken such criticism well. The reaction of many scientists—especially many scientists within the domain of the social— has been to over-compensate for the fact they are not physical scientists and become more faithful to the methodologies and prejudices of physical sciences than physical scientists themselves. Employing such an epistemological stance, such social, psychological, and educational scientists are adamant in their efforts to eliminate any analysis of the influence of culture and context on their work: their work is rigorous science and thus culture free. In the spirit of FIDUROD, every other form of knowledge production is mere opinion. Because of this one truth epistemology with its one correct mode of research, FIDUROD-based inquiry has been decidedly insensitive to many human dimensions of social, psychological, and educational affairs. Critical theorists and critical pedagogues argue that such reductionistic forms of knowledge production produce data but not wisdom. In such a situation it is easy to see how the natural world and many of its low status people come to be viewed as resources to be used by the privileged in their quest for the accumulation of short term monetary wealth. When ethicists, political critics, environmentalists, advocates of social justice, novelists, or poets critique such insensitivity, the advocates of FIDUROD scoff at their naïve reflections. They are, after all, not real scientists and the critiques they issue are not authentic forms of knowledge. There is no reason for actual scientists to place any credence in the hermeneutic, the moral, or the literary imagination (Peat, 1989; Saul, 1995; Bruner, 1996; Giroux, 1997; Harding, 1998; Pickering, 1999). In an objectivist science FIDUROD-grounded knowledge producers are distanced from the subject of their inquiry in the effort to rid themselves of any contamination of human produced value or subjectivity. This objectivist mindset believes that it is simply absurd to address human dynamics such as caring, compassion, and love. Such abstract dimensions of humanness have nothing to do with rigorous scientific knowledge. In this epistemological cosmos social, psychological, or educational researchers who express anxiety about the depersonalized and often unforgiving world of FIDUROD-based science are manifesting a lack of intellectual maturity. The notion that such researchers are seeking a better world is equally inappropriate. Such perspectives reflect the patriarchal dimension of FIDUROD, as objective distance involves not only a separation from but also a domination of the feminine-inscribed emotional and embodied aspects of humanness. This separation and domination element of epistemology is a manifestation of an authoritarian patriarchy that suppresses feeling while seeking to control both women and nature (McClure, 2000). It is this same objectivist epistemological emotional distancing that shapes dominant Western culture’s mechanistic view of life and death. From this perspective life is little more than a functioning materialist body with a consciousness shaped by nothing more than neurophysiological and biochemical activities in the brain. When there is no knowledge other than scientific knowledge, humans find themselves at an existential dead end in the effort to understand the complex nature of who and what we are. If we operate on the basis of the epistemology of FIDUROD, we gain no insight into the deeper meanings of life. In this context the universe is viewed as mechanistic, vacant, pointless, and desolate.

#### Thus, Mary and I affirm that we should engage in a genealogical interrogation of our relationship to energy. Speaking out against the power structures in the face of danger represents an act of parrhesia that recognizes complexity, while simultaneously guiding us towards the truth of this topic.

Foucault 01

(Michael, transcribed from a series of recordings by Joseph Pearson, Fearless Speech, pgs 19-20//wyo-mm)

The last characteristic of parrhesia is this: in parrhesia, telling the truth is regarded as a duty. The orator who speaks the truth to those who cannot accept his truth, for instance, and who may be exiled, or punished in some way, is free to keep silent. No one forces him to speak, but he feels that it is his duty to do so. When, on the other hand, someone is compelled to tell the truth (as, for example, under duress of torture), then his discourse is not a parrhesiastic utterance. A criminal who is forced by his judges to confess his crime does not use parrhesia. But if he voluntarily confesses his crime to someone else out of a sense of moral obligation, then he performs a parrhesiastic act. To criticize a friend or a sovereign is an act of parrhesia insofar as it is a duty to help a friend who does not recognize his wrongdoing, or insofar as it is a duty towards the city to help the king to better himself as a sovereign. Parrhesia is thus related to freedom and to duty. To summarize the foregoing, parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. That then, quite generally, is the positive meaning of the word parrhesia in most of the Greek texts where it occurs from the Fifth Century B.C. to the Fifth Century A.D.

#### Parrhesia key and necessary to solve docility

Turner 11

(Robert, political theorist (Ph.D. Government, Cornell University, and medical researcher, currently doing epidemiological research at Sunnybrook Hospital in Toronto, Theory and Event, Volume 14, Issue 3, “Conditioned Subjects: Connolly, the Amygdala, Fear, and Freedom,” 2011, Project Muse/Wyo-MM)

All of our techniques to overcome our docility, therefore, require courageous, persistent attention to our selves, the objects comprising our environment, and our responses (emotions, feelings, thoughts, and behavior) to our environments. Becoming less docile will also require trying more courageous, potentially defiant behaviors, including at least honest speech (i.e., parrhesia143), in all institutions of our lives – for example: frank speech with one’s own intimate relations (family, lovers, friends); improvisational movement and contact practices;144 opposition actions in public places and offices145 (e.g., Russian radical art collective VOINA’s actions146), in academic institutions (e.g., protesting abuses of power147), in corporations (e.g., collective bargaining, strikes); confrontations with governmental police and political authorities (e.g., Wikileaks, recent protest actions in Wisconsin; revolutionary armed struggle in Libya, occupation of and demonstration in public spaces within Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Iran, Morocco,148 and so on). Whatever the circumstances, whatever one’s degree of fearfulness, one or another technique of freedom can be exercised and amended to improve one’s awareness and courage. Our organism’s neural macrostructure, by guaranteeing the basic capacity for tonic readiness, guarantees that these techniques, along with the capacity for their future development, already exist – the human organism is not simply disciplinary, ressentimental, but also an experimental, risk-taking subject. What the organism does not guarantee is the degree and sites of disciplinary acculturation and, conversely, of development of techniques of the self. Fear conditioning can make avoidance behavior more probable, and make recall of the stimulus’s original ambivalence difficult. But this conditioning, research indicates, requires conscious attention. (We may still find ourselves doing things we cannot remember choosing, but this does not mean we did not choose them.) Whereas for Connolly, our “tactics of selfidentity” and “otherness,” involving ressentimental responses, are normally subconscious and automatic, a growing body of evidence seems to indicate instead that our responses to ontogenic/conditioned fear stimuli are still choices involving conscious awareness, even when these responses happen quickly and don’t involve long deliberation.149 That they can be recalled, attended to, even in the “midst of action,” is the source of our (and Connolly’s) hope in techniques of the self that might develop our habit of attention. This (latter) research also seems to indicate that this habit of attention is in all subjectivities already developed enough to be able to maintain and even develop itself further, to varying degrees in both the “slow” and “fast” interactions that constitute our everyday lives. The amygdala, “somatic markers,” and virtual memories that are crucial to Connolly’s conclusions appear not to act independently of conscious awareness but as a result of it. This is not to say that watching certain films from a Bergsonian perspective will not affect the subject; these exercises of steady observation/attention in the dark and quiet, free of most fear stimulation, can, as Connolly says, “help” (i.e., allow repeated attention to what one might normally avoid), given that perception, reaction, response, and conditioning require attentional focus. Such slowing down of one’s movement/responses can result in the development (through practice) of one’s ambivalence – critical awareness – to include attention to more minute detail by allowing the repeated experience of one’s sensations (feelings and thoughts), so that they become recallable memories. Slowing down is not necessarily a fear-stimulated act of avoidance (a distraction from one’s sensations, feelings, and thoughts). It can also be an act of engagement with one’s sensations, feelings, and thoughts; Connolly’s film-watching technique could do this. And the resulting awareness, if repeatedly practiced, might be maintained during faster and less restricted movement and interaction. But the maintenance of this attention is also made more probable by repeatedly practicing – by trying it. Film watching is, nevertheless, still only a partial confrontation with the disciplinary subject; as a technique, in and of itself, it does not risk the fearful (but also ambivalently arousing) struggle with arbitrary authority where it exists in our practices in our relations with friends, strangers, coworkers, and also supervisors and other authorities who enforce our society’s conventions and laws. Given his desire and hope for agonistic respect, Connolly’s technique (Bergsonian film watching) and his neuroscience seem unrealistically pessimistic; they at least implicitly assume a universally fear-dominated subjectivity (conditioned by an Augustinian command morality) – i.e., an apparently determined subjectivity – that contradicts both neuroscientific evidence and Connolly’s optimism about the transformative possibilities of techniques of the self. There is hope. The modern liberal subject is not simply a disciplinary and ressentimental subject; s/he also has the capacity – i.e., freedom – (already developed to some degree) in fearful experiences to “remark, describe, and remember,”150 to tell the truth of her/his experience. If this subject wants to change his/her dispositions, behavior, and relations, s/he must risk this confrontation.

#### Our genealogical approach makes power visible, and resistance and political engagement possible

Mitchell **Dean**, Professor, Sociology, Macquarie University, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY, London: Sage, 19**99**, p. 44.

The ethico-political impulse of this kind of critical intellectual work can also be described in positive terms. This practice of genealogy might be said to have two impulses meshing behind the critical orientation to historical material. The first of these might be called diagnostic in the sense detected by Deleuze (1991). This is an orientation to the present as an open set of possi­bilities rather than as portending catastrophe, witnessing decay or promising fulfilment. Yet it is a present subject to knowable limits and constraints, not least of which would be the vocabularies and forms of reason by which we make politics thinkable, the mechanisms by which this politics is accom­plished and the manner in which we understand ourselves as those who govern and are governed. The ethos of this type of genealogy is of militancy grounded in scholarly moderation. It is militant in that the problems it addresses are called into focus by social and political movements and local­ized struggles. Yet it does not urge such movements to overturn everything or to 'subvert all codes'. Genealogy is led to undertake a task of some com­plexity requiring considerable erudition: to sort out what we take to be necessary and contingent in the ways in which we think and act in regard to the 'conducting' of our lives and those of others, and to discover what prob­lematizations of this are possible. Further, it is the attempt to discern which of these problematizations indicate lines of fracture and transformation and which indicate a consolidation of regimes of government. In this diagnostic mode, genealogy is less a refuge from disaster and more a cautious initiation into the conditions of a renewed task of political invention. Its cautious mil­itancy and intellectual moderation places the ethos of genealogy against all the dire prognostications on the fragmentation of identity and the ills of 'mass society'. Genealogy is thus an attempt to renew acquaintance with the strangeness of the present against all the attempts to erase it under the nec­essary dialectic of reason in history or to mark it as a moment of millenarian rupture, final denouement or irreversible loss.

#### Engaging in dissenting action is necessary to shock the political system that has come to favor the elites: micro-activism checks against hegemonic structures, and fragmentation is empirically proven to add depth to debate.

Drache 08

(Daniel, Associate Director of the Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies and Professor of Political Science at York University, Toronto, Defiant Publics, Chapter 4: “Nixers, Fixers, and the Axes of Conformity,” pgs 139-141//wyo-mm)

Compared to a decade ago, the neo-liberal culture of conformity is increasingly embattled and on the defensive across the globe. Skeptics, contrarians, and whistleblowers of all kinds have a new legitimacy in a world in which conformity to the economic dogma used to be so pervasive. This confirms what social theorists have always recognized: societies need a system shock when political and economic arrangements become increasingly dysfunctional and when the rules of the game are no longer perceived by the majority as fair and even-handed. It needs a clear-cut course of action and requires a political theory to challenge conformist thinking about the possibilities of economic participation and social inclusion. Such a theory has a necessarily pessimistic view of power. Publics have always recognized that power, if unchecked, corrupts its possessor. The relational power of publics is the power to disseminate one’s ideas in ever widening political arenas. This form of power is only held vis-à-vis other activists and networks. In that particular regard it is the most decentralized sharing of power resources and is perhaps closest to resembling Nancy Fraser’s concept of a public system of checks and balances, a necessary part of the process of creating alternatives. It is a maddeningly slow kind of political mobilization. Incremental change occurs through a thousand small victories (or defeats) by micro-activists at the local level and the periodic breakthroughs of transnational movements such as those that occurred at the iconic “battle in Seattle” or the signing of the international treaty outlawing landmines. There are two phases to the big debate about “things public.” The first phase, which has recently come to an end, considered whether the shrinking of the public domain worldwide was constitutive of publics, dissenting activists, and skeptical public intellectuals won the day. Dissenters are now valuable political commentators, and their contribution adds depth to political debate. Ten years ago the currency of skeptical high-profile economists like Dani Rodrik of Harvard and Robert Hunter Wade of the London School of Economics traded at a lower level than it does today. Elites dismissed them as pessimistic gadflies who did not understand the new world order. Today, their intellectual transgression has been reinterpreted as prescient observation. Even the new conservatism is willing to embrace the non-conformist’s impulse to interrogate received wisdom. In conversation with the philosopher Michel Onfray, Nicolas Sarkozy was eager to impress prospective French voters with his dissenter’s credibility, stating “I believe in transgression . . . because freedom is transgression.31 Dissent has become an essential counterpoint to the mainstream discourse of law, security, markets, and private accumulation. The second phase, still underway, focuses on the global outcomes and possible local solutions available to democratic activists and global publics. Experts are now engaged with an in-depth analysis of the potential impacts and outcomes of the compass of dissent and the attempts by activists to “rally the public,” in Michael Warner’s apposite words. Dissenters stand in sharp contrast to neo-liberal faith in the market’s universalizing qualities. Nevertheless, no single group is in a position to control the public’s agenda any longer. Economic determinism has had to surrender the middle ground in most jurisdictions. Normative ideas about economics and the role of the state have reappeared in public policy making. In virtual politics there is no single command and control center. The battle for public opinion is intense, fluid, and unpredictable. Gradually, the market excesses of the neo-liberal system have roused global publics from the cynicism of conformity to collective engagement. Infinite varieties of public discourse have not led to the fragmentation of politics, nor has this cacophony of choices become unintelligible to the informed listener. Dissenting publics have begun to exercise their reasoning ability and the result is a tsunami of ideas and options for fixing the relationship between publics, states, and markets. Who is listening? Everybody.

#### This onto-epistemological criticism is a necessary prerequisite to any solution we imagine. The solutions are constrained by the ontological assumptions that precede their formation. Prioritizes certain forms of knowledge over others and results in serial policy failure.

Michael **Dillon**, Professor of Politics, University of Lancaster **and** Julian **Reid**, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency,” ALTERNATIVES: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION & HUMANE GOVERNANCE v. 25 n. 1, January/March 20**00**, npg.

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

#### We have to think beyond debate as simply the policy-making metaphor- debate doesn’t need to assume the government- debate has potential to be a knowledge production sphere because it creates a laboratory where we can subject our research to scrutiny through the clash of debates- Policymaking reduced to institutional management causes us to cede the political by destroying agonistic confrontation by creating totalizing threats against people who debate in particular threatening ways.

Swyngedouw 10

(Erik, University of Manchester, Theory, Culture, & Society, “Apocalypse Forever? : Post-political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change,” May 2010, Sage Publications//wyo-mm)

Post-politics refers to a politics in which ideological or dissensual contestation and struggles are replaced by techno-managerial planning, expert management and administration, ‘whereby the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives is the primary goal’ (Žižek, 2008). Whereas the proper democratic political recognizes the constitutive split of the people, the inherent antagonisms and heterogeneities that cut through the social, while presuming the equality of each and everyone qua speaking beings, the post-political disavows these antagonisms by displacing conﬂict and disagreement on to the terrain of consensually manageable problems, expert knowledge and interest intermediation (Swyngedouw, 2009a). ‘Doing politics’ is reduced to a form of institutionalized social management and to the mobilization of governmental technologies, where difﬁculties and problems are dealt with by administrative and techno-organizational means (Nancy, cited in Marchart, 2007: 68). In other words, politics as policymaking (la politique or politics/police) has sutured the space of the political as expressions of disagreement/dissensus (le politique or the political) (Dikeç, 2005). Such a post-political arrangement signals a de-politicized (in the sense of the disappearance of the democratic agonistic struggle over the content and direction of socio-ecological life) public space where administrative governance deﬁnes the zero-level of politics (see Marquand, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2009b). Proper political choice as the agonistic confrontation of competing visions of a different socio-ecological order is foreclosed as the space of the political, or sutured by totalizing threats that permit only one choice or direction, one that can be ‘managed’ through dialogical consensual practices (Mouffe, 2005).

#### Therefore debate is an essential activity because it shapes our knowledge about the world and how to interact with it. Power shapes everything we do, and criticism is necessary to create spaces for agency, and new forms of knowledge production.

Giroux ‘6

(Henry A. Giroux, 11-2-06, Cultural Studies in Dark Times: Public Pedagogy and the Challenge of Neoliberalism, <http://firgoa.usc.es/drupal/node/25904>)

In opposition to these positions, I want to reclaim a tradition in radical educational theory and cultural studies in which pedagogy as a critical practice is central to any viable notion of agency, inclusive democracy, and a broader global public sphere. Pedagogy as both a language of critique and possibility looms large in these critical traditions, not as a technique or a priori set of methods, but as a political and moral practice. As a political practice, pedagogy is viewed as the outgrowth of struggles and illuminates the relationships among power, knowledge, and ideology, while self-consciously, if not self-critically, recognizing the role it plays as a deliberate attempt to influence how and what knowledge and identities are produced within particular sets of social relations. As a moral practice, pedagogy recognizes that what cultural workers, artists, activists, media workers, and others teach cannot be abstracted from what it means to invest in public life, presuppose some notion of the future, or locate oneself in a public discourse. The moral implications of pedagogy also suggest that our responsibility as intellectuals for the public cannot be separated from the consequences of the knowledge we produce, the social relations we legitimate, and the ideologies and identities we offer up to students as well as colleagues. Refusing to decouple politics from pedagogy means, in part, creating those public spaces for engaging students in robust dialogue, challenging them to think critically about received knowledge and energizing them to recognize their own power as individual and social agents. Pedagogy has a relationship to social change in that it should not only help students frame their sense of understanding, imagination, and knowledge within a wider sense of history, politics, and democracy but should also enable them to recognize that they can do something to alleviate human suffering, as the late Susan Sontag (2003) has suggested. Part of this task necessitates that cultural studies theorists and educators anchor their own work, however diverse, in a radical project that seriously engages the promise of an unrealized democracy against its really existing and greviously incomplete forms. Of crucial importance to such a project is rejecting the assumption that theorists can understand social problems without contesting their appearance in public life. More specifically, any viable cultural politics needs a socially committed notion of injustice if we are to take seriously what it means to fight for the idea of the good society. Zygmunt Bauman (2002) is right in arguing that "if there is no room for the idea of wrong society, there is hardly much chance for the idea of good society to be born, let alone make waves" (p. 170). Cultural studies' theorists need to be more forceful, if not more committed, to linking their overall politics to modes of critique and collective action that address the presupposition that democratic societies are never too just, which means that a democratic society must constantly nurture the possibilities for self-critique, collective agency, and forms of citizenship in which people play a fundamental role in shaping the material relations of power and ideological forces that affect their everyday lives. Within the ongoing process of democratization lies the promise of a society that is open to exchange, questioning, and self-criticism, a democracy that is never finished, and one that opposes neoliberal and neoconservative attempts to supplant the concept of an open society with a fundamentalist market-driven or authoritarian one.   Cultural studies theorists who work in higher education need to make clear that the issue is not whether higher education has become contaminated by politics, as much as recognizing that education is already a space of politics, power, and authority. At the same time, they can make visible their opposition to those approaches to pedagogy that reduce it to a set of skills to enhance one's visibility in the corporate sector or an ideological litmus test that measures one's patriotism or ratings on the rapture index. There is a disquieting refusal in the contemporary academy to raise broader questions about the social, economic, and political forces shaping the very terrain of higher education—particularly unbridled market forces, fundamentalist groups, and racist and sexist forces that unequally value diverse groups within relations of academic power.