# 1nc

## f/w

#### OUR INTERPRETATION: The resolution asks a yes/no question as to the desirability of the United States Federal Government action. The role of the ballot should be to affirm or reject the actions and outcomes of the plan.

#### 1. THE TOPIC IS DEFINED BY THE PHRASE FOLLOWING THE COLON – THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE AGENT OF THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL DEBATERS

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2K

 <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### 2. “RESOLVED” EXPRESSES INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary 2K

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### 3. “SHOULD” DENOTES AN EXPECTATION OF ENACTING A PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary – 2K

[www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### 4. THE U.S.F.G. is the three branches of government

Dictionary.com 2k6 [[http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united+states+government](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united%2Bstates%2Bgovernment)]

|  |
| --- |
| noun |
| the executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of the United States  |

#### Policymaking is critical now- “willful ignorance” in the face of climate change is ethically bankrupt, we must act in the realm of policy before all questions of science are settled because the risk that we’re right produces catastrophic impacts

2011

[Donald A. Brown, Associate Professor of Environmental Ethics, Science, and Law, April 18, 2011, New York Times Krugman Claims That US Congressional Hearings Are A Moral Failure: The US Congress and The Ethics of Willful Ignorance., <http://rockblogs.psu.edu/climate/2011/04/new-york-times-krugman-claims-that-us-congressional-hearings-are-a-moral-failure-the-us-congress-and.html>, uwyo//amp]

Introduction In an April 4, 2011 New York Times op-ed entitled "The Truth, Still Inconvenient," Paul Krugman charged that Republican led climate change hearings that had just concluded were a deep moral failure. (Krugman, 2011) Krugman described the GOP US House of Representatives hearings at which of five invited witnesses on climate change, one was a lawyer, another an economist, and a third a professor of marketing---witnesses without any expertise in climate change science. One of the witnesses that was actually a scientist was expected to support the skeptical position but surprised everyone by supporting the mainstream scientific view on the amount of warming that the world has already experienced. Yet he was immediately attacked by climate skeptics. The point of the Krugman article is that it is obvious from the witnesses who were asked to testify that the GOP led hearings were never meant to be a serious attempt to understand climate change science. In this regard, Krugman says: . But it's worth stepping back for a moment and thinking not just about the science here, but about the morality. For years now, large numbers of prominent scientists have been warning, with increasing urgency, that if we continue with business as usual, the results will be very bad, perhaps catastrophic. They could be wrong. But if you're going to assert that they are in fact wrong, you have a moral responsibility to approach the topic with high seriousness and an open mind. After all, if the scientists are right, you'll be doing a great deal of damage. But what we had, instead of high seriousness, was a farce: a supposedly crucial hearing stacked with people who had no business being there and instant ostracism for a climate skeptic who was actually willing to change his mind in the face of evidence. As I said, no surprise: as Upton Sinclair pointed out long ago, it's difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it. But it's terrifying to realize that this kind of cynical careerism -- for that's what it is -- has probably ensured that we won't do anything about climate change until catastrophe is already upon us. So on second thought, I was wrong when I said that the joke was on the G.O.P.; actually, the joke is on the human race.  (Krugman 20110) This post examines Krugman's moral claims about the hearings. . II. Ethics and The US Congressional Hearings. The central ethical problem with the US Congressional climate change hearings on climate change is entailed by the universally recognized duty of people and nations to prevent avoidable harm to others. As we have seen in ClimateEthics, all major ethical theories recognize duties, obligations, and responsibilities of people to prevent serious harm to all people without regard to where they live around the world. See, Ethical Problems With Cost Arguments Against Climate Change Policies: The Failure To Recognize Duties To Non-citizens. Also, as ClimateEthics has previously explained, this duty to prevent harm is triggered once anyone is on notice that harms to others could be created by their actions particularly when those harms could be grave. A corollary of this responsibility is that once someone is put on notice that their behavior could be creating great harm one can know cannot avoid the duty to prevent harm to others by ignoring evidence that their behavior is causing harm. The behavior of the US Congress in the recent climate change hearings is deeply ethically problematic because there was no serious attempt to understand the potential harms the United States was causing others through US emissions of greenhouse gases. In fact, the witnesses that were selected by Congress could not be seriously understood as a sincere effort to determine the nature of the threat entailed by climate change. One must assume the Congressional hearings were designed to avoid what credible scientists or credible scientific institutions such as the US Academy of Sciences know about climate change. This kind of behavior is often referred to in ethics as "willful ignorance." In the 13th Century, Thomas Aquinas explained why "willful ignorance" is ethically problematic. It is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. ...This may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is \*bound and able to know." (Aquinas, 1225) Without doubt, gathering information for the purpose of ignoring obligations that would flow from the relevant evidence is deeply ethically troublesome. Because the impacts of climate change are so potentially devastatingly catastrophic to millions of poor people around the world, willful ignorance of climate change causation must be understood to be deeply ethically reprehensible. This is particularly true because, as ClimateEthics has on numerous times before explained, the duty to act on climate change is triggered long before all scientific uncertainties are resolved. . See for instance: Have We Been Asking the Wrong Questions About Climate Change Science? Why Strong Climate Change Ethical Duties Exist Before Scientific Uncertainties are Resolved. Also see: Twenty Ethical Questions that the US Press Should Ask Opponents of Climate Change Policies., and the Ethical Duty to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, From the standpoint of ethics, those who engage in risky behavior are not exonerated because they did not know that their behavior would actually cause damage. Under law that implements this ethical norm, for instance, to be convicted of reckless driving or reckless endangerment, a prosecutor simply has to prove that the defendant acted in a way that he or she should have known to be risky. Many types of risky behavior are criminal because societies believe dangerous behavior is irresponsible and should not be condoned. As a matter of ethics, a relevant question in the face of scientific uncertainty about harmful consequences of human behavior is whether there is a reasonable basis for concluding that serious harm to others could result from the behavior. Yet, as we have seen, in the case of climate change, humans have understood the potential threat from climate change for over one hundred years and the scientific support for this concern has been building with increasing speed over the last thirty years. In fact, for more than 20 years, the IPCC, a scientific body created with the strong support of governments around the world to advise them about the conclusions of peer review climate change science, has been telling the world that the great harm from climate change is not only possible but likely with increasing levels of confidence. Moreover, since the late 1970s, the United States Academy of Sciences has been advising the US government that human induced climate change is a serious threat to human health and life and the natural systems on which life depends. By the end of the 1980s there was widespread understanding among climate change scientists around the world that there was a great threat posed by rising concentrations of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases event though there were considerable uncertainties about timing and magnitude of climate change impacts. The climate science that has been accumulating in the last 20 years has been increasing the confidence about timing and magnitude of climate change impacts according to IPCC as wells as reasons for concluding that recent warming is largely human caused not withstanding considerable natural variability in the climate system. The United States Congress has clearly been on notice for several decades that climate change is a significant threat. III. Conclusion Thus far we have seen that it's ethically unacceptable to willfully avoid evidence that would establish potential harm to others and that this duty stems from the clear ethical responsibility recognized by almost all ethical theories to prevent serious harm to others. We have also seen that even in the face of uncertainty about the harm, ethics requires action. Given what is at stake with climate change, the conduct of the recent US hearings on climate change is deeply ethically bankrupt. Krugman's condemnation of the recently concluded US Congressional hearings on climate change is strongly supported by almost all ethical theories. Given what is at stake in climate change, U.S. Congress has a strong duty to examine the science of climate change carefully using the most reliable scientific analyses and expertise. The United States created the United Academy of Sciences for the express goal of giving scientific advice to government. In a report in May 2010, the US Academy concluded that: A strong, credible body of scientific evidence shows that climate change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses significant risks for a broad range of human and natural systems.(US Academy, 2010) Given that the National Academy of Sciences was created for the express purpose of giving advice to the government about scientific issues and that Congress is now expressly ignoring the advice of the very institution created to summarize significant complex scientific issues, the recent hearings of Congress are even more ethically troubling then the moral failure in conducting the hearings.

#### Policy debate is good for education, the development of empathy, and producing real world engagement from participants. Clear rules, a stable topic, and institutional role playing and simulation are integral to the process. The things you criticize about debate make it a unique exercise in active learning.

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[Jeffrey S. Lantis is Professor in the Department of Political Science and Chair of the International Relations Program at The College of Wooster, “The State of the Active Teaching and Learning Literature”, <http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/thestateoftheactiveteachingandlearningliterature_sample.pdf> uwyo//amp]

Simulations, games, and role-play represent a third important set of active teaching and learning approaches. Educational objectives include deepening conceptual understandings of a particular phenomenon, sets of interactions, or socio-political processes by using student interaction to bring abstract concepts to life. They provide students with a real or imaginary environment within which to act out a given 9 situation (Crookall 1995; Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; Kaufman 1998; Jefferson 1999; Flynn 2000; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Thomas 2002; Shellman and Turan 2003; Hobbs and Moreno 2004; Wheeler 2006; Kanner 2007; Raymond and Sorensen 2008). The aim is to enable students to actively experience, rather than read or hear about, the “constraints and motivations for action (or inaction) experienced by real players” (Smith and Boyer 1996:691), or to think about what they might do in a particular situation that the instructor has dramatized for them. As Sutcliffe (2002:3) emphasizes, “Remote theoretical concepts can be given life by placing them in a situation with which students are familiar.” Such exercises capitalize on the strengths of active learning techniques: creating memorable experiential learning events that tap into multiple senses and emotions by utilizing visual and verbal stimuli. Early examples of simulations scholarship include works by Harold Guetzkow and colleagues, who created the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) in the 1950s. This work sparked wider interest in political simulations as teaching and research tools. By the 1980s, scholars had accumulated a number of sophisticated simulations of international politics, with names like “Crisis,” “Grand Strategy,” “ICONS,” and “SALT III.” More recent literature on simulations stresses opportunities to reflect dynamics faced in the real world by individual decision makers, by small groups like the US National Security Council, or even global summits organized around international issues, and provides for a focus on contemporary global problems (Lantis et al. 2000; Boyer 2000). Some of the most popular simulations involve modeling international organizations, in particular United Nations and European Union simulations (Van Dyke et al. 2000; McIntosh 2001; Dunn 2002; Zeff 2003; Switky 2004; Chasek 2005). Simulations may be employed in one class meeting, through one week, or even over an entire semester. Alternatively, they may be designed to take place outside of the classroom in local, national, or international competitions. The scholarship on the use of games in international studies sets these approaches apart slightly from simulations. For example, Van Ments (1989:14) argues that games are structured systems of competitive play with specific defined endpoints or solutions that incorporate the material to be learnt. They are similar to simulations, but contain specific structures or rules that dictate what it means to “win” the simulated interactions. Games place the participants in positions to make choices that 10 affect outcomes, but do not require that they take on the persona of a real world actor. Examples range from interactive prisoner dilemma exercises to the use of board games in international studies classes (Hart and Simon 1988; Marks 1998; Brauer and Delemeester 2001; Ender 2004; Asal 2005; Ehrhardt 2008). A final subset of this type of approach is the role-play. Like simulations, roleplay places students within a structured environment and asks them to take on a specific role. Role-plays differ from simulations in that rather than having their actions prescribed by a set of well-defined preferences or objectives, role-plays provide more leeway for students to think about how they might act when placed in the position of their slightly less well-defined persona (Sutcliffe 2002). Role-play allows students to create their own interpretation of the roles because of role-play’s less “goal oriented” focus. The primary aim of the role-play is to dramatize for the students the relative positions of the actors involved and/or the challenges facing them (Andrianoff and Levine 2002). This dramatization can be very simple (such as roleplaying a two-person conversation) or complex (such as role-playing numerous actors interconnected within a network). The reality of the scenario and its proximity to a student’s personal experience is also flexible. While few examples of effective roleplay that are clearly distinguished from simulations or games have been published, some recent work has laid out some very useful role-play exercises with clear procedures for use in the international studies classroom (Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Johnston 2003; Krain and Shadle 2006; Williams 2006; Belloni 2008). Taken as a whole, the applications and procedures for simulations, games, and role-play are well detailed in the active teaching and learning literature. Experts recommend a set of core considerations that should be taken into account when designing effective simulations (Winham 1991; Smith and Boyer 1996; Lantis 1998; Shaw 2004; 2006; Asal and Blake 2006; Ellington et al. 2006). These include building the simulation design around specific educational objectives, carefully selecting the situation or topic to be addressed, establishing the needed roles to be played by both students and instructor, providing clear rules, specific instructions and background material, and having debriefing and assessment plans in place in advance. There are also an increasing number of simulation designs published and disseminated in the discipline, whose procedures can be adopted (or adapted for use) depending upon an instructor’s educational objectives (Beriker and Druckman 1996; Lantis 1996; 1998; 11 Lowry 1999; Boyer 2000; Kille 2002; Shaw 2004; Switky and Aviles 2007; Tessman 2007; Kelle 2008). Finally, there is growing attention in this literature to assessment. Scholars have found that these methods are particularly effective in bridging the gap between academic knowledge and everyday life. Such exercises also lead to enhanced student interest in the topic, the development of empathy, and acquisition and retention of knowledge. Debriefing discussions have also been found to be an essential element of the design, giving students and instructors an opportunity to reflect on the role that participants played, the negotiation strategies employed, and lessons learned. Older studies failed to develop thorough ways of determining whether the exercise has met the initial educational goals, let alone whether the simulation provided any additional value beyond more traditional teaching techniques. More recent literature has done a better job, evaluating simulations, games, or role-plays for the international studies classroom more rigorously (Maddrell 1994; Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Brown and King 2000; Mooney and Edwards 2001; Sutcliffe 2002; Krain and Lantis 2006; Krain and Shadle 2006; Shellman and Turan 2006; Powner and Allendoerfer 2008), though there is room for much improvement in this area.

#### Switch side debate is good-direct engagement, not abstract relation, with identities we do not identify with is critical to us to overcome the existential resentment we feel towards those with whom we disagree. Lack of switch-side facilitates a refusal to accept that our position is within question

Glover 10

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

In this vein, Connolly sees the goal of political engagement as securing a positive ‘ethos of engagement’ in relation to popular movements which alter existing assumptions, that is, a positive attitude towards attempts at pluralization. Connolly suggests we do so through thecultivation of two essential virtues: agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. 88 Agonistic respect is defined as a situation whereby each political actor arrives at an appreciation for the fact that their own self-definition is bound with that of others, as well as recognition of the degree towhich each of these projections is profoundly contestable. 89 While Connolly notes that agonistic respect is a ‘kissing cousin’ of liberal tolerance, he distinguishes it by saying that the latter typically carries ‘the onus of being at the mercy of a putative majority that often construes itsown position to be beyond question.’ 90 Thus, agonistic respect is a reciprocal democratic virtue meant to operate across relations of difference, and Connolly deploys it as a regulative ideal forthe creation agonistic democratic spaces. 91 In a somewhat related way, the virtue of ‘critical responsiveness’ also attempts to move beyond liberal tolerance. 92 Critical responsiveness entails ‘ careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.’ 93 Critical responsiveness is not pity, charity, or paternalism but implies anenhanced degree of concern for others, driven by the cultivation of reciprocal empathic concern 21 for that which you are not. 94 This attitude cannot be developed in an abstract relation to thesenew and existing forms of radical cultural, political, religious, and philosophical difference.Critical responsiveness above all requires that one ‘get[s] a whiff of experiences heretofore alien to [us]’, recognizing that while this may be unsettling or cause discomfort, direct engagement isthe means by which you, ‘work tactically on yourself and others to overcome existential resentment of this persistent condition of human being.’

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### Whackos: Ideology w/out Base

#### DIVORCING IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE FROM ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE BASE COLLAPSES QUICKLY INTO NOTHING MORE THAN RELATIVISM—IF EVERYTHING IS CONSTRUCTED OR IDEOLOGICAL THAN THERE BECOMES NO BASIS ON WHICH TO JUDGE OR DISCREDIT THE HEGEMONIC FORMS OF CAPITALISM

CLOUD (Prof of Comm at Texas) 2001

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm //wyo-tjc]

It is difficult to overestimate the influence on critical textual practice across the humanities of poststructuralist scholars, most notably Michel Foucault (1980; see also the three-volume anthology of Foucault’s essential writings by Foucault, Rabinow, and Hurley, 1998, 1999; Foucault, Faubion, Gordon, Rabinow and Hurley, 2000.) Briefly stated, Foucault argues that power ought to be conceived as primarily constituted in discourses, unmotivated by extra-discursive economic or political interests, and emanating not from a discernable, repressive center of power (such as the state or the employer) but rather as a set of shifting discursive formations. On this view, discursive formations do not suppress or mystify social relations but rather establish in and of themselves what is real and true. In my view, Foucaultian poststructuralism is a natural outgrowth of Althusser’s (1960/1984) structuralism, which argued that ideology and its apparatuses (for example the education system, the family) were determining forces in social relations, warranting a reclassification of ideological outlets such as the church and the schools as "state apparatuses" with "relative autonomy" from economic interests and effects. This theory marked a distinctly idealist shift in Marxist thinking. Clegg (1991) argues that as Althusserian (and following him, poststructuralist) Marxists shifted attention away from economic factors and toward ideology, all previous Marxisms were discounted as crudely empiricist and economistic.

With postmodernists and post-Marxists (e.g., Baudrillard, 1975; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Lyotard, 1984), the discursive turn is taken to its logical conclusion in arguments that reject economic interests as foundational to understanding society and motivating struggle, in favor of a politics of textuality. As Cloud (1994) has argued, these theories tend toward both idealism and relativism, negating the possibilities of demystifying a dominant ideology or establishing criteria for judgment--for example, between the competing rhetorical truths of socialism and fascism--and action. In other words, without some idea of the reality of the exploitation of workers, the oppression of women and racialized minorities, and so forth, one has no basis for declaring a progressive political program more emancipatory and faithful to the interests of ordinary people than the racist scapegoating and appeals to order and unity of a fascistic one.

#### THE AFFIRMATIVES FOCUS ON THE DISCURSIVE/SYMBOLIC REVEALS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY HAVE GIVEN UP ON ACTUALLY CHALLENGING THE STRUCTURES OF OPPRESSION. BUT FAR FROM BEING A POST-CAPITALIST AGE IN WHICH ALL SOCIAL EXPERIENCE IS TEXTUALLY OR DISCURSIVELY PRODUCED, IT IS A MATERIAL WORLD. ONLY A MATERIALIST METHOD CAN ACCOUNT FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH CERTAIN CLASSES CREATE AND DEPLOY RHETORIC TO LEGITIMIZE A CAPITALIST MODE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

CLOUD (Prof of Comm at Texas) 2001

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm //wyo-tjc]

At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomena. Most importantly, critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them. In poststructuralist discourse theory, the "retreat from class" (Wood, 1999) expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure at the level of the economy and the state. It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformation even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. At the core of the issue is a debate across the humanities and social sciences with regard to whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a great deal of evidence against claims that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, both class polarization (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor in the U.S. (as well as around the world) continued to grow, in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation and progressive critical practice in fact encourage scholars and/as activists to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and perhaps revolutionary potential. Instead, on their arguments, we must recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism. Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. The point, though, is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other. Marxist ideology critique, understands that classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience.

Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144).

Within this understanding, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details and representations of our lives. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges. (p. 7)

#### MICROPOLITICS CAN ALWAYS CARVE OUT MYOPIC VICTORIES IN THE MARGIN WHILE CAPITALISM GOES ON DESTROYING EVERYTHING

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, p. 189 // wyo]

By the same token, to envisage the articulation and sustainable internal functioning of the capital system’s ‘microcosms’ on the basis of substantive equality is not less problematical. For to do so would require either to assume the existence of a totally different — harmonious — comprehensive socioeconomic ‘macrocosm’, or to postulate the my4sterious transformation of the hypostatized truly egalitarian ‘micro-structures’ into an antagonistic whole. Indeed the latter would bring with it the additional complication of having to explain how it is possible to secure the simultaneous reproduction of the antagonistic whole and its antagonism-free constituent parts. Isolated couples may be able to (and undoubtedly do) order their personal relationships on a truly egalitarian basis. There are in existence in contemporary society even utopian enclaves of communally interacting groups of people who can lay claim to being involved in humanly fulfilling and non-hierarchical interpersonal relations and a way of bringing up children in forms very different from the nuclear family and its splinters, But neither type of personal relations can become historically dominant within the framework of capital’s social metabolic control. For under the prevailing circumstances the ‘ubergefreindes Moment’ is that the reproductive ‘microcosms’ must be able to cohere in a comprehensive whole which cannot conceivably function on the basis of substantive equality. The smallest reproductive ‘microcosms’ must deliver without failing their share in the exercise of the overall social metabolic functions which include not only the biological reproduction of the species and the orderly transmission of property from one generation to the other. It is no less important in this respect their key role in the reproduction of the value system of the established social reproductive order which happens to be—and cannot help being —totally inimical to the principle of substantive equality. By concentrating too much on the property-transmission aspect of the family and the legal system linked to it, even Engels tends to paint a highly idealized picture of the proletarian household, discovering non-existent equality in it.

#### NEXT, THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—IT IS THIS LOGIC THAT MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE

DYER-WITHERFORD (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) 1999
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### OBSERVATION THREE: Put the ‘Fun’ Back in Fundamentals

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OR KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF LABOR AND SURPLUS VALUE MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION TO A SOCIETY BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### CASE

#### Heidegger’s ontology is terrible: it reaffirms the status quo, its essentialist, and ends after the initial questioning of language.

Strathausen 06

(Carsten, University of Missouri-Columbia, Postmodern Culture, “A Critique of Neo-Left Ontology,” 2006, accessed via ProjectMuse//wyo-mm)

The recent interest in political ontology thus departs from the traditional leftist position to equate ontological thinking (via Heidegger) with German fascism. Since Heidegger and up until the mid-1980's when a deconstructive version of Marxism emerged in the works of Laclau, Mouffe, Zizek, Badiou, a.o., ontology was synonymous with Heideggerianism: "Contemporary philosophical 'ontology' is entirely dominated by the name of Heidegger," Alain Badiou correctly stated in 1988 (Being and Event 9). Badiou himself, of course, will break with this tradition; yet this general identification of ontology and Heidegger allowed most leftist intellectuals at the time to dismiss the entire ontological tradition as a dangerous aberration in Western thought. As a philosophical tradition, ontology is not only suspect among leftist intellectuals. It is part of an oppressive super-structure that affirms rather than challenges the existing status quo. "In all its mutually excluding and defaming versions, ontology is apologetic," Adorno unequivocally states in 1966 (69).4 For Adorno, the basic fault of ontology in general, and of Heidegger's "foundational ontology" in particular, is its essentialism, which seeks the eternal, self-identical truth underneath the flow of history. "Heidegger," we read, "refuses to reflect [the difference between expression and thing]; he stops after only the first step of the language-philosophical dialectics" (117).

#### Preventing violence comes before ontology

Arnold **Davidson, 1989**

Critical Inquiry, Winter, p. 424

I understand Levinas’ work to suggest another path to the recovery of the human, one that leads through or toward other human beings:

The dimension of the divine opens forth froni the human face. Hence metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted— in our relations with men. . . . The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men .. . that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of.35

Levinas places ethics before ontology by beginning with our experience of the human face; and, in a clear reference to Heidegger’s idolatry of the village life of peasants, he associates himself with Socrates, who preferred the city where he encountered men to the country with its trees. In his discussion of skepticism and the problem of others, Cavell also aligns himself with this path of thought, with the recovery of the finite human self through the acknowledgment of others:

As long as God exists, I am not alone. And couldn’t the other suffer the fate of God? ... I wish to understand how the other now bears the weight of God, shows me that I am not alone in the universe. This requires understanding the philosophical problem of the other as the trace or scar of the departure of God. [CR, p. 47Oj

The suppression of the other, the human, in Heidegger’s thought accounts, I believe, for the absence, in his writing after the war, of the experience of horror. Horror is always directed toward the human; every object of horror bears the imprint of the human will.38 So Levinas can see in Heidegger’s silence about the gas chambers and death camps “a kind of consent to the horror.”39 And Cavell can characterize Nazis as “those who have lost the capacity for being horrified by what they do.”4° Where was Heidegger’s horror? How could he have failed to know what he had consented to?

Hannah Arendt associates Heidegger with Paul Valery’s aphorism, “Les evenments ne sont que l’écume des choses’ (‘Events are but the foam of things’).”4’ I think one understands the source of her intuition. The mass extermination of human beings, however, does not produce foam, but dust and ashes; and it is here that questioning must stop.

#### SECOND, VALUE TO LIFE IS SUBJECTIVE… MUST ALLOW PEOPLE THE CHOICE TO FIND THEIR OWN VALUE AT ALL COSTS AND RESIST EXTERNAL ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY IT

Schwartz 2004

[“A Value to Life: Who Decides and How?” www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf]

Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgement, and value judgements are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result,

no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality. Nevertheless, quality is still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherine’s choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which considerations can be used to protect the patient’s interests. The quality of life criterion asserts that there is a difference between the *type* of life and the *fact* of life. This is the primary difference between it and the sanctity criterion discussed on page 115. Among quality of life considerations rest three assertions: 1. there is relative value to life 2. the value of a life is determined subjectively 3. not all lives are of equal value. *Relative value* The first assertion, that life is of relative value, could be taken in two ways. In one sense, it could mean that the value of a given life can be placed on a scale and measured against other lives. The scale could be a social scale, for example, where the contributions or potential for contribution of individuals are measured against those of fellow citizens. Critics of quality of life criteria frequently name this as a potential slippery slope where lives would be deemed worthy of saving, or even not saving, based on the relative social value of the individual concerned. So, for example, a mother of four children who is a practising doctor could be regarded of greater value to the community than an unmarried accountant. The concern is that the potential for discrimination is too high. Because of the possibility of prejudice and injustice, supporters of the quality of life criterion reject this interpersonal construction in favour of a second, more personalized, option. According to this interpretation, the notion of relative value is relevant not between individuals but within the context of one person’s life and is measured against that person’s needs and aspirations. So Katherine would base her decision on a comparison between her life before and after her illness. The value placed on the quality of a life would be determined by the individual depending on whether he or she believes the current state to be relatively preferable to previous or future states and whether he or she can foresee controlling the circumstances that make it that way. Thus, the life of an athlete who aspires to participate in the Olympics can be changed in relative value by an accident that leaves that person a quadriplegic. The athlete might decide that the relative value of her life is diminished after the accident, because she perceives her desires and aspirations to be reduced or beyond her capacity to control. However, if she receives treatment and counselling her aspirations could change and, with the adjustment, she could learn to value her life as a quadriplegic as much or more than her previous life. This illustrates how it is possible for a person to adjust the values by which they appraise their lives. For Katherine Lewis, the decision went the opposite way and she decided that a life of incapacity and constant pain was of relatively low value to *her*. It is not surprising that the most vociferous protesters against permitting people in Katherine’s position to be assisted in terminating their lives are people who themselves are disabled. Organizations run by, and that represent, persons with disabilities make two assertions in this light. First, they claim that accepting that Katherine Lewis has a right to die based on her determination that her life is of relatively little value is demeaning to all disabled people, and implies that any life with a severe disability is not worth Write a list of three things that make living. Their second assertion is that with proper help, over time Katherine would be able to transform her personal outlook and find satisfaction in her life that would increase its relative value for her. The first assertion can be addressed by clarifying that the case of Katherine Lewis must not be taken as a general rule. Deontologists, who are interested in knowing general principles and duties that can be applied across all cases would not be very satisfied with this; they would prefer to be able to look to duties that would apply in all cases. Here, a case-based, context-sensitive approach is better suited. Contextualizing would permit freedom to act within a particular context, without the implication that the decision must hold in general. So, in this case, Katherine might decide that her life is relatively valueless. In another case, for example that of actor Christopher Reeve,

#### Heidegger’s theories on existentialism and transcendence at best resulted in nihilism.

Hotam 09

(Yotam, PhD. of The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Exchange Mosse Professor at the UW-Madison, and Fellow of the Franz Rosenzweig Center for German-Jewish Literature and Cultural History, History of European Ideas, “Overcoming the mentor: Heidegger's present and the presence of Heidegger in Karl Löwith's and Hans Jonas’ postwar thought,” 2009, Taylor and Francis//wyo-mm)

The trope of transfigured Christianity was also a central theme of the book he published after his return to Germany in 1953, Heidegger: Thinker in Destitute Times. Löwith divulged the theological hidden layer within Heidegger's secular philosophy by attacking Heidegger's philosophy for being ‘concealed theology.’33 In evoking Heidegger's own words, Löwith labeled Heidegger as being ‘too much a Christian Theo-logian,’ and pointed out that Heidegger's ‘apodictic language must in fact be an inspired language of revelation.’34 For Löwith, Heidegger's philosophy was merely a ‘diluted and secularized’ reformulation of ‘the idea of transcending toward a perfect and infinite being.’35The characterization of the concealed theological vein within Heidegger's secular thought enabled him to present a twofold critique of Heidegger. First, he reprimanded his former mentor not only for cloaking his genuine motivations but, more profoundly, for being a culmination of the philosophical tradition of concealment in general, rather than its philosophical adversary. Second, he connected between Heidegger's existentialism and European nihilism. Here, Löwith's adopted Nietzsche's definition of nihilism as the ‘logic of decadence,’ or better put, ‘the negation of existing civilization.’36 Based on this definition, Löwith regarded Heidegger's secularization of the theological ‘idea of transcendence,’ and consequently his existential philosophy in general, as the fundamental negation of the world, that is, alienation from the world and thus nihilistic to its innermost core.37

# 2nc

## case

#### We should reject the aff- the demands of Heidegger’s ontological understandings were so great that not even he could meet them- the contradictions in his stance on ecology proves the vacuousness of his beliefs.

Garrard 10

(Greg, faculty member in the department of English Literature at Bath Spa University, Oxford Journals, “Heidegger Nazism Ecocriticism,” May 11, 2010, <http://isle.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/2/251.full//wyo-mm>)

As numerous later commentators have pointed out, Heidegger seems not to have noticed that his “history of Being” suffers from a profound contradiction between nostalgia for a lost alertness to Being and a recognition (shared with much anti-foundationalist philosophy) of the radical contingency of metaphysical discourses. Richard Rorty shows how Heidegger presents a convincing case that no historical understanding of Being, be it pre-Socratic, Platonic, Cartesian, or Heideggerian, could be preferable to any other, since there is no extra-historical standpoint—no God's eye view, so to speak—from which such a judgment could be made (Essays): he “never tells us how we can be historical through-and-through and yet ahistorical enough to step outside our world-view and say something neutral about the ‘structure’ of all actual and possible world-views” (42). Heidegger frequently evinces a degree of admiration for a lost epoch of authentic openness to Being, and concomitant virulent contempt for contemporary technological society, that his own critique of ahistorical metaphysics ought to have ruled out. As Terry Eagleton observes, “[w]ithout some strong implicit normativity there could be no critique of the alienated world of prattle and mass opinion, not to mention science, democracy, liberalism and socialism; but for Heidegger's work to have true authority it must go beyond mere doxa [opinion] to describe things as they really are, draw its title to speak from the very nature of Being itself rather than sink into controvertibly interpretations” (Ideology, 307). Which is why Heidegger's allegedly “ecological” demand that we “let beings be” is at once so rhetorically central to his philosophical ethos and so morally vacuous.

#### Rejecting a certain form of technological domination merely replaces it with a new one, furthering the technologization of life and reinscribing the target of criticism

Zizek 99

[Slavoj, Unapologetic Self-Plagierist, The Ticklish Subject: The absent centre of political ontology, NYC: Verso, 1999, 11-12//uwyo-ajl]

In his project of ‘overcoming’ metaphysics, Heidegger fully ensorses this Nietzschean dismissal of quick and easy exists from metaphysics; the only real way to break the metaphysical closure is to ‘pass through it’ in its most dangerous form, to endure the pain of metaphysical nihilism at its most extreme, which means that one should reject as futile all false sedatives, all direct attempts to suspend the mad vicious cycle of modern technology by means of a return to premodern traditional Wisdom (from Chrsitianity through Oriental thought), all attempts to reduce the threat of modern technology to the effect of some ontic social wrong (capitalist exploitation, patriarchal domination, ‘mechanicist paradigm’…). These attempts are not only ineffectual: the true problem with them is that, on a deeper level, they incite the evil they are fighting even further. An excellent example here is the ecological crisis: the moment we reduce it to disturbances provoked by our excessive technological exploitation of nature, we silently already surmise that the solution is to rely again on technological innovations: new ‘green’ technology, more efficient and global in its control of natural processes and human resources… Every concrete ecologogical concern and project to change technology in order to improve the state of our natural surroundings is thus devalued as relying on the very source of the trouble.

#### Tech is the best solution to holistic politics: checks back inequality, pollution, and disease.

Leckie and Buschman 09

(Gloria J. and John E., Gloria has a PhD from the University of Western Ontario and holds position with the Graduate School of Library and Information Science, John is the Associate University Librarian for Scholarly Resources and Services at Georgetown University and has an MA in American Studies from St. Joseph’s University, and is a doctoral candidate in the Liberal Studies Program at Georgetown University, New Critical Approaches, “Information Technology in Librarianship,” 2009//wyo-mm)

Consider the example of air pollution. So long as those responsible for it could escape the health consequences of their actions to green suburbs, leaving poor urban dwellers to breath ﬁ lthy air, there was little support for technical solutions to the problem. Pollution controls were seen as costly and unproductive by those with the power to implement them. Eventually, a democratic political process sparked by the spread of the problem and protests by the victims and their advocates legitimated the externalized interests. Only then was it possible to assemble a social subject including both rich and poor able to make the necessary reforms. This subject ﬁ nally forced a redesign of the automobile and other sources of pollution, taking human health into account. This is an example of a politics of design that will lead ultimately to a more holistic technological system. An adequate understanding of the substance of our common life cannot ignore technology. How we conﬁ gure and design cities, transportation systems, communication media, agriculture, and industrial production is a political matter. And we are making more and more choices about health and knowledge in designing the technologies on which medicine and education increasingly rely. Furthermore, the kinds of things it seems plausible to propose as advances or alternatives are to a great extent conditioned by the failures of the existing technologies and the possibilities they suggest. The once controversial claim that technology is political now seems obvious.

## f/w

#### Engaging the state is a critical prerequiste to the success of your critical project:

### Impact: Laundry List

#### First, The state is the only solvent site for radical politics-Neo-liberalism has ironically poised states to deemphasize nationalism and turn their projects to a global humanist agenda, no corporate power can match the complexity and resources of a state. Second, Engaging the state solves every impact: [Climate change, economic violence/injustice, war, other environmental catastrophes, racism, etc.]

Sassen 2009

[ColumbiaUniversity, istheauthorof TheGlobalCity (2ndedn, Princeton, 2001), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, 2008) and A Sociology of Globalisation (Norton,2007), among others, 2009, The Potential for a Progressive State?, uwyo//amp]

Power is made, and hence can be unmade. The work of making power varies across time and space. And so does the success, effectiveness and durability of this work of making. This means also that powerlessness is constructed. Powerlessness is not simply the absence of power or mere victimhood, as is so often believed. Hence it is variable rather than fixed. From there, then, comes the possibility that powerlessness can range from elementary to complex. This variability does not sim-ply depend on the characteristics of individuals: the settings also matter.For instance, the powerlessness of a specific undocumented immigrantwill be quite elementary in the context of a California commercial farmbut can become complex in a city like New York or Los Angeles. In thatcomplexity of powerlessness lies the possibility of a politics.Here I examine one particular aspect of a larger project that seeks to recode power and powerlessness (Sassen, 2008a, 2008b). It is the fact that corporate economic globalization is far more dependent on national states and national spaces than the typical arguments in the globali-sation scholarship allow for. This is one way of researching the limits of power, in this case, corporate global power. The work of national states has been far more important than is usually recognised. Much has been said about the USA and the UK as the key states producing the design for the new standards and legalities needed to ensure pro-tections and guarantees for global firms and markets. 2 But here it is 263 264 Saskia Sassen important to emphasise that the imposed ‘consensus’ in the commu-nity of states to further globalisation is not merely a political decision: ite ntails specific types of work by a large number of distinct state insti-tutions in each of the 150 plus countries that have joined (willinglyor not) the global economy. Legislative items, executive orders, adher-ence to new technical standards, and so on, will have to be producedthrough the particular institutional and political structures of each state.All these states worked at it, and in that process installed global logicsdeep inside their national institution. Precisely because of this, I see a possible radical politics in using state capacities for a politics not only of resistance, but of remaking without the violence of armed conflict, without war.I argue that neo-liberal globalisation has, ironically, forced specific state institutions to learn how to do global work and has produced a par-ticular type of state authority and power, one geared to global projects.States have historically been nationalist. One challenge for a radical pol-itics today is to get states to redeploy that learning and that particular type of power towards the pursuit of alternative global projects–towardsan alternative globalisation. We need to push states to use that learn-ing and emergent global power for projects aiming at social justice andhuman security in its many different settings. It will take political action to get states to reorient their international work away from the corporate global economy and from war. These global agendas include eliminating economic violence, strengthening human rights, protecting the envi-ronment, fighting racisms and intolerance. None of these is likely tobe achieved fully. But we can do better with our massive resources. Theworld need not be this grim.Any working state is a complex organisation with major capacities to handle an enormous variety of challenges and disparate political alignments. Not even the richest corporation is as complex a capabil-ity as a working state. Pity that just about most states are in the handof regressive forces when it comes to the larger agendas that wouldhumanise the world. If we add to this organisational complexity thefact that states have shown a willingness to be more internationalist,albeit on the wrong terrain, it becomes clear that states are key actorsto address our global challenges, from the environment to socially justeconomic development. We cannot give up on this type of capabil-ity. We need to reorient these vast organisations within each country towards addressing these urgent challenges, some of which can onlyb e addressed through collaborations and concerted action among a majority of states.

#### Policy debate is a prerequisite to the solvency of their claims- absent this the aff becomes an individualistic fetish concerned only with our internal awareness of problems while allowing us to not take responsibility for our actions should we organize and achieve social change

Chandler 2009

 [David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Questioning Global Political Activism”, What is Radical Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 81-2 uwyo//amp]

People often argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, Questioning Global Political Activism 79 anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to MakePoverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones – there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in them-selves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society.This is illustrated by the ‘celebration of differences’ at marches, protests and social forums. It is as if people are more concerned with the creationof a sense of community through differences than with any political debate, shared agreement or collective purpose. It seems to me that if someone was really concerned with ending war or with ending poverty or with overthrowing capitalism, political views and political differences would be quite important. Is war caused by capitalism, by human nature, or by the existence of guns and other weapons? It would seem important to debate reasons, causes and solutions; it would also seem necessary to give those political differences an organisational expression if there wasa serious project of social change.Rather than a political engagement with the world, it seems that radi-cal political activism today is a form of social disengagement – expressedin the anti-war marchers’ slogan of ‘Not in My Name’, or the assump-tion that wearing a plastic bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary isthe same as engaging in political debate. In fact, it seems that polit-ical activism is a practice which isolates individuals who think thatdemonstrating a personal commitment or awareness of problems is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as uncaring or brainwashed by consumerism. The narcissistic aspects of the practice of this type of global politics are expressed clearly by indi-viduals who are obsessed with reducing their carbon footprint, derivingtheir idealised sense of social connection from an ever-increasing aware-ness of themselves and by giving political meaning to every personalaction.Global ethics appear to be in demand because they offer us a sense of social connection and meaning, while at the same time giving us thefreedom to construct the meaning for ourselves, to pick our causes of concern, and enabling us to be free of responsibilities for acting as partof a collective association, for winning an argument or for success at the ballot-box.Whiletheappealofglobalethicalpoliticsisanindividualisticone, the lack of success or impact of radical activism is also reflected inits rejection of any form of social movement or organization.

#### THE EDUCATION THEY PROMOTE CAUSES BAD POLITICAL ADVOCACIES– THE AFFIRMATIVE’S INTERPRETATION OF DEBATE DEFENDS A PATHOLOGY THAT FORECLOSES ANY POSSIBILITY OF INFUSING STATE POLICY WITH ETHICAL LIMITS

Donald S. **Lutz**, Professor, Political Science, University of Houston, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, **2K**, p. 43-44.

To the extent that critical theorists have attacked empiricism per se, to that extent it is an attack on all of political theory, since the questions asked by empirical political science are an important and necessary part of the entire enterprise. To the extent critical political theory has attacked a free-floating empiricism isolated from the broader enterprise, it has sought to reintegrate the enterprise. Critical political theory works from the logic of deficiency. It attacks the actual state of affairs in the name of human aspiration for that which is in some sense better. To denounce something as deficient is to compare that reality with an ideal, or else there is no grounding to the critique. In this way, critical theory returns us to the total logic of the continuum. A critical stance is natural for political theory, and expresses the inevi­table conflict between political theory and politics as practiced. It is a healthy, necessary antidote to politics as usual inside the cave, and practiced well serves as a means of motivating politicians to enter into a discussion with political theorists. Practiced badly, critical theory is only the contemporary manifestation of the age-old pathology to seek the creation of the ideal in an actual world that will not bear the weight of the enterprise without seriously harming the human aspira­tions that political theory exists to serve. This is the kind of political theory that gets political theorists **banished, killed, or reduced to inef­fectual sniping**. Practiced badly, critical theory also needlessly **under­mines respect for all institutions**, including those that are in fact basically healthy and helpful. The hallmark of the latter pathology is the sophistic stance that there are no discoverable truths transcending culture and ideology upon which we can rest institutional design. This stance, ostensibly in the service of the downtrodden and marginalized, leaves us with no arguments with which to contest the assaults of power and the powerful, and in the long run quietly justifies the rule of the stronger and demoralizes those who would oppose and tame raw power with enduring principles of justice, now reduced to mere expressions of competing ideologies. To the extent politicians do listen to political theorists who fail to practice the entire project of political philosophy, to that extent we stand in danger of contributing to one of the natural pathologies in­herent in raw politics. Failure to inform politics with discourse about ideals **enhances the pathology of pursuing mere power indifferent to justice**. At best politics remains reactive and without purpose, and at worst it pursues only the ends imposed by the most powerful among us. Authoritarianism is the child of this pathology. Failure to inform politics with discourse about the best possible contributes to the pa­thology of fanaticism by leaving politics open to the pursuit of fanati­cal ends, of which communism and fascism are the most recent exemplars. Totalitarianism is the child of this pathology. Failure to address the current empirical realities or the means of improving on them contributes to the pathology of political alienation. Not knowing where we are at the moment, and therefore what needs improvement, or not knowing what effective means are available for achieving such improvement, leads to policies and institutions that are increasingly viewed as irrelevant to human needs and aspirations. The child of this pathology is political instability. Critical theory provides the impetus to use empirical analysis for improving institutions and for moving us from the status quo, but practiced badly it merely undercuts belief in any institutions and contributes to the political alienation that enhances instability. Ironically, critical theory in this guise also contributes to the loss of linkage between ends and means, which undermines the hope for movement toward any ideal, and thereby aids those who would provide at least stability whether justice is part of the result or not. On the other hand, a political theory that serves the integrated questions just outlined is comprehensible to politicians, if not always welcomed by them, and leaves open the possibility that political theorists may contribute to the marriage of justice with power by providing argu­ments, grounded in human aspiration as well as in empirically sup­ported analysis and philosophically sound logic, that can be used by constitutionally oriented political actors to address the needs and as­pirations of the poorer, less powerful, more marginal parts of society as well as the rest of society. Either we accept the possibility of such politicians coming to the fore, and the efficacy of constitutional poli­tics, or abandon the project of political theory entirely and resign ourselves, at best, to a mutual yet sterile stance of rhetorical moral superiority.

#### SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE: The net-benefits are both epistemic and ontological: epistemic because prepared, competitive discourse and required listening to both sides of an argument is a prerequisite for critical reasoning and interested inquiry, and ontological because it affirms a method of living that is the only antidote to the violence of the affirmative’s universalist dogma, which is root of violence and genocide

Roberts-Miller 3

[Patricia, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at UT Austin, “Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, but not act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibility for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banality of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters.

It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in both rhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking

#### DEBATING ABOUT THE PLAN PROMPTS GOOD DECISION-MAKING AND CLASH

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There are many reasons why people debate.  The most important reason is to make a best possible decision about a plan.  How can we arrive at the best decision?  We want to hear a best possible defense of the plan and best possible attack against the plan before we decide.  If someone tries his best to find reasons for the plan and another tries her best to find reasons against the plan, we will be able to hear good information for our decision.  If they try to attack and defend each other's arguments, we will be able to hear better reasons for our decision.

# 1nr

#### THE AFF MAY TALK A GOOD GAME ON THE PERMUTATION, BUT THEIR APROPRIATION IS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO DISARM MARXISM OF ITS RADICAL POTENTIAL AS WELL AS MASKING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION OF SURPLUS-LABOR—THIS IS WHY YOU CANNOT PERMUTE A METHOD—IT STRIPS OUT ALL OF THE CONCEPTUAL THEORY THAT ALLOWS US TO BOTH UNDERSTAND THE WORLD AND TO CREATE A PRAXIS TO END OPPRESSION.

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

A2 sprit DA/ violent order

#### CAPITALISM IS WHAT TOTALIZES EVERYTHING—WE’RE JUST POINTING IT OUT

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, 41// wyo]

What must be stressed first of all is that capital is not a ‘material entity’ — let alone a rationally controllable ‘mechanism’, as the apologists of the allegedly neutral market mechanism’ (to be happily embraced by ‘market socialism’) tried to make US believe, as we shall see in Part Three — but an ultimately uncontrollable mode of social metabolic control. The main reason why this system must escape a meaningful degree of human control is precisely because it itself emerged in the COUrSe of history as a most powerful — indeed up to the present time by far the niost powerful — totalizing’ framework of control into which everything else, including human beings, must be fitted, and prove thereby their ‘productive viability’, or perish if they fail to do so. One cannot think of a more inexorably all engulfing — and in that important sense ‘totalitarian’ — system of control than the globally dominant capital system. For the latter blindly subjects to the same imperatives health care no less than commerce, education no less than agriculture, art no less than manufacturing industry, ruthlessly superimposing its own criteria of viability on everything, from the smallest units of its ‘microcosm’ to the most gigantic transnational enterprises, and from the most intimate personal relations to the most complex decision making processes of industry- wide monopolies, favouring always the strong against the weak. Ironically (and rather absurdly), however, in the opinion of its propagandists this system is supposed to be inherently democratic, indeed the paradigm foundation of all conceivable democracy. This is why the Editors and Leader writers of the London Economist can commit to paper in all seriousness the proposition according to which: There is no alternative to the free market as the way to organize economic life. The spread of free market economics should gradually lead to multi-party democracy, because people who have free economic choice tend to insist on having free political choice coo.46 I Unemployment for countless millions, among many other blessings of ‘free market economics’, thus belongs to the category of ‘free economic choice’, out of which in due course the fruits of ‘free political choice’ — ‘multi-party democracy’, no less, (and certainly no more) — will arise. And then, of course, we shall all live happily ever after. In actuality, though, the capital system is the first one in history which constitutes itself as an unexceptionable and irresistible totalizer, no matter how repressive the imposition of its totalizing function must be whenever and wherever it encounters resistance.

A2 Violence = calc

#### REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS REQUIRES A FULL BREAK WITH BOURGEOIS VALUES, MAKING VIOLENCE LEGITIMATE

FINLAY ’06

(Christopher, University College Dublin, “Violence and Revolutionary Subjectivity,” European Journal of Political Theory, <http://ept.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/5/4/373>, uw/mjs)

In the writings of Sorel, Fanon and Zizek, two important stresses are added to the theory as it appears in the writings of Marx and Engels: first of all, they emphasize and radicalize the idea that the consciousness of the revolutionary class and, consequently, the consciousness of post-revolutionary humanity as a whole, will involve a break with contemporary, bourgeois values. Second, they see this form of consciousness as being achieved fully only at the end of a process of development within capitalism (or in Fanon’s case colonialism); only at the point of revolutionary rupture itself does it achieve complete realization. To echo the words of the Communist Manifesto, only at the actual point of revolution itself and not prior to that moment does the proletariat assume a form of subjectivity in which it really has ‘nothing to lose but [its] chains’.40 If it still has something to lose, then it still has a possible particular interest and is therefore not purely proletarian and not yet truly revolutionary. An important issue for these thinkers, therefore, concerns the establishment of this authentic form of revolutionary subjectivity, a process that each of them addresses in part through a psychological framework.41 In all three cases, this results in two thoughts about revolutionary violence: first, that it may be justified by its contribution to the formation and dissemination of revolutionary subjectivity; \]]]]]and, second, that it is legitimate to the extent that it originates in this emergent form of consciousness. To the extent that the consciousness of the revolutionary class is understood to give rise to new values for a new order, this opens up the further possibility that whatever kinds of violence result from it are self-validating and not subject to the norms of existing conceptions of justic

#### Being DA

#### Their Graham evidence is nothing more than the politics of giving up—attempting to de-totalize resistance to capitalism erases our ability to conceive of it as a system—this politics of PRIVATE resistance reinforces the violence of class exploitation

COTTER 2002

[Jennifer, nqa, “War and Domestic Violence”, Red Critique, Sept/Oct, p. online //wyo-tjc]

In their book The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It), Katherine Gibson and Julie Graham (who write under the common pen name "J.K. Gibson-Graham"), argue for a "resistant agency" in response to globalization and violence against women. Following Sharon Marcus' deconstruction of "rape", Gibson-Graham argue that both globalization and violence against women need to be re-understood not as "inevitable truths" but as "language scripts" that can be "rewritten" and "resisted". For Gibson-Graham, like Marcus, re-understanding globalization and violence against women in these terms allows for "agency" on the part of women and workers to "resist" physical or economic violence in the "act" and to prevent it. For instance, according to Marcus, by approaching "rape" as a "language script", feminism can "shift the scene from rape and its aftermath" in the courts "to rape situations themselves and to rape prevention" (Marcus 387). This is also the dominant understanding of "prevention" in such films as Enough starring Jennifer Lopez and Panic Room starring Jodie Foster, which mark the degree to which in capitalist culture "self-defense" is understood as the limit of intervention into domestic violence in particular, and violence against women in general. Agency, on these terms, is the individual woman's capacity to prevent an assault from occurring in the first place by not accepting her "victimization" as inevitable and instead "fighting back". What this assumes is a very limited notion of "agency" as freedom of the "private individual". This is, in short, a re-articulation of the notion of "resistant citizenship" as the freedom of the monadic subject from the state. Domestic violence in this view becomes a matter of individualized agency—of volunteerism for women—and is cut off from the social relations of production that make it possible. This notion of "prevention" makes domestic violence not a SOCIAL concern, therefore requiring investigation into the underlying social and economic conditions that enable the reproduction of violence against women, but a PRIVATE matter and an individual woman's private responsibility. This is a highly destructive position for women because it steps backwards from the struggle to understand domestic violence as a public and social issue and, therefore, a matter of the organization of social resources (i.e., property relations) and instead makes individuals responsible for "managing" social contradictions on their own. Moreover, by generalizing Marcus' understanding of "rape prevention" to explain globalization in all of its practices, Gibson-Graham represent "resistance" to globalization on these same terms: as an autonomous act of private individuals not requiring general transformation of the social conditions of production for all. Far from offering a mode of "resistance", this actually offers a position that is highly useful to transnational capitalism, which is daily trying to dismantle any social resources committed to the economic, social, and physical well being of workers in general, and women in particular, in the international division of labor. In short, this position is consistent with the efforts of transnational capital to dismantle social resources and re-privatize them and destroy any conditions for social citizenship in order to stave off declines in the rate of profit. Gibson-Graham's privatized view of globalization and violence against women, for instance, follows the same logic as the Bush administration, which, working on behalf of transnational capital, has been working to dismantle social resources for women and reprivatize them.