# 1nc

# 1

#### A. OUR INTERPRETATION: THE AFFIRMATIVE SHOULD PRESENT A TOPICAL PLAN OF ACTION AND DEFEND THAT THEIR POLICY SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

#### B. DEFINITIONS:

#### 1. THE TOPIC IS DEFINED BY THE PHRASE FOLLOWING THE COLON – THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE AGENT OF THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL DEBATERS

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2K

<http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### 2. “RESOLVED” EXPRESSES INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary 2K

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### 3. “SHOULD” DENOTES AN EXPECTATION OF ENACTING A PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary – 2K

[www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### 4. THE U.S.F.G. is three branches of government

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2K [http://encarta.msn.com]

Supreme Court of the United States, highest court in the United States and the chief authority in the judicial branch, one of three branches of the United States federal government.

#### 5. OUR DEFINITION EXCLUDES ACTION BY SMALLER POLITICAL GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS.

Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition Ed. Bryan A. Garner (chief) ‘99

Federal government **1.** A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters.

#### C. VIOLATION – THE AFFIRMATIVE IS NOT AN INSTRUMENTAL AFFIRMATION OF THE RESOLUTION –

#### D. REASONS TO PREFER –

#### 1. PREDICTABILITY: the resolution sets the parameters for the debate. Affirmatives would always win if there wasn’t predictable negative ground.

#### PRIVATE ACTOR FIAT BAD: advocating a personal movement or idea is unfair as there’s no literature base to counter it. Running a topical version of their affirmative solves all of their offense.

#### SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE SOLVES: topics are meaningless if we don’t debate both sides. This is why topic-specific education outweighs general education.

#### Switch side debate is good-direct engagement, not abstract relation, with identities we do not identify with is critical to us to overcome the existential resentment we feel towards those with whom we disagree. Lack of switch-side facilitates a refusal to accept that our position is within question

Glover 10

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

In this vein, Connolly sees the goal of political engagement as securing a positive ‘ethos of engagement’ in relation to popular movements which alter existing assumptions, that is, a positive attitude towards attempts at pluralization. Connolly suggests we do so through thecultivation of two essential virtues: agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. 88 Agonistic respect is defined as a situation whereby each political actor arrives at an appreciation for the fact that their own self-definition is bound with that of others, as well as recognition of the degree to which each of these projections is profoundly contestable. 89 While Connolly notes that agonistic respect is a ‘kissing cousin’ of liberal tolerance, he distinguishes it by saying that the latter typically carries ‘the onus of being at the mercy of a putative majority that often construes its own position to be beyond question.’ 90 Thus, agonistic respect is a reciprocal democratic virtue meant to operate across relations of difference, and Connolly deploys it as a regulative ideal for the creation agonistic democratic spaces. 91 In a somewhat related way, the virtue of ‘critical responsiveness’ also attempts to move beyond liberal tolerance. 92 Critical responsiveness entails ‘ careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.’ 93 Critical responsiveness is not pity, charity, or paternalism but implies an enhanced degree of concern for others, driven by the cultivation of reciprocal empathic concern 21 for that which you are not. 94 This attitude cannot be developed in an abstract relation to these new and existing forms of radical cultural, political, religious, and philosophical difference. Critical responsiveness above all requires that one ‘get[s] a whiff of experiences heretofore alien to [us]’, recognizing that while this may be unsettling or cause discomfort, direct engagement is the means by which you, ‘work tactically on yourself and others to overcome existential resentment of this persistent condition of human being.’

#### E. VOTING ISSUE FOR GROUND, COMPETITIVE EQUITY AND JURISDICTION.

#### THIS ARGUMENT PROVIDES A-PRIORI REASONS TO VOTE NEGATIVE. YOU MUST USE YOUR BALLOT TO RATIFY CONSTRAINTS ON DISCOURSE TO PRESERVE A POLITICALLY-ENABLING DISCUSSION

Ruth Lessl **Shively**, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, **2K**, p. 179.

To put this point another way, it turns out that to be open to all things is, in effect, to be open to nothing. While the ambiguists have commendable reasons for wanting to avoid closure—to avoid specify­ing what is not allowed or celebrated in their political vision—they need to say "no" to some things in order to be open to things in general. They need to say "no" to certain forms of contest, if only to protect contest in general. For if one is to be open to the principles of democracy, for example, one must be dogmatically closed to the prin­ciples of fascism. If one would embrace tolerance, one must rigidly reject intolerance. If one would support openness in political speech and action, one must ban the acts of political intimidation, violence or recrimination that squelch that openness. If one would expand delib­eration and disruption, one must set up strict legal protections around such activities. And if one would ensure that citizens have reason to engage in political contest—that it has practical meaning and import for them—one must establish and maintain the rules and regulations and laws that protect democracy. In short, openness requires certain **clear limits, rules, closure**. And to make matters more complex, these structures of openness cannot simply be put into place and forgotten. They need to be taught to new generations of citizens, to be **retaught and reenforced** among the old, and as the political world changes, to be shored up, rethought, adapted, and applied to new problems and new situations. It will not do, then, to simply assume that these structures are permanently viable and secure without significant work or justification on our part; **nor will it do to talk about resisting or subverting them**. Indeed, they are such valuable and yet vulnerable goods that **they require the most unflag­ging and firm support that we can give them**.

#### THE DELIBERATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR ADVOCACY ARE A PRIOR QUESTION – PRE-CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT ARE NECESSARY FOR YOUR DECISION TO HAVE ANY POLITICAL VALUE

Adolf G. **Gundersen**, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, **2K** p. 104-105.

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separa­tion. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political deci­sion-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engage­ment with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet delibera­tion is also a form of political action that precedes the actual taking and implementation of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain **preconditions**. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators require something to deliberate about and that deliberation presumes certain institutional structures and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting par­tisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

# 2

#### THE ABSENCE OF STRUCTURAL HISTORICISM IS NO MERE OVERSIGHT, NOR IS IT ENOUGH TO SIMPLY MENTION ECONOMICS IN A FEW OF YOUR CARDS-- THE RELIANCE OF INDENTY-BASED POLITICS IS NOT AN ACCIDENTAL INSTANCE OF IGNORING CLASS. THE DEMAND ARISES OUT OF THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM—SUCH POLITICS PARTICULARIZES THE OPPRESSIONS OF CAPITALISM TO THE POINT THAT THE UNIVERSAL SYSTEM IS NATURALIZED. ATTAINING WHITE, MALE BOURGEOISSE PRIVILEGE BECOMES THE BENCH-MARK OF POLITICAL SUCCESS, RE-ENTRENCHING THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THE SYSTEM

BROWN (Professor & Genius) 1993

[Wendy, “Wounded Attachments”, Political Theory, Aug. p. 392-394//wyo-tjc]

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normaliz- ing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "disciplinary power" produces social identifies (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdi- vided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal-the transparent fiction of state universality-combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices.

As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of pro- gressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bour- geois ideal as its measure. xxxxxxxxxIf it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking.

#### THE REDUCTION OF CLASS TO A NEUTRAL LEVEL AMONG A LONG LIST OF OTHER OPPRESSIONS SUCH AS RACE AND GENDER, DESTROYS THE EMANCIPATORY POTENTIAL OF CLASS TO REACH ACROSS ALL LINES OF INDENTITY AND FORGE POLITICAL ACTION. CLASS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS QUALITATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT—OTHERWISE THE SYSTEM IS ABLE TO SATISFY DEMANDS ON GROUNDS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, DESTROYING ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME CAPITALIST OPPRESSION\*\*\*

GIMENEZ (Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder) 2001

[Martha, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html //wyo-tjc]

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it. Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalismxxxxx and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class" in RGC remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential. Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.

#### AND, YOUR NEGLECT OF THE DETERMINATE STRUCTURE OF CLASS IS FAR FROM AN INNOCENT OMMISSION—IT’S YOUR ATTEMPT TO CONSTRUCT AN IDEOLOGICAL ALIBI FOR DISMISSING MARXISM

Young in 6

[Robert, Prof. Critical Studies at Oxford, “Putting Materialism Back Into Race Theory”, Red Critique, Spring, p. online//wyo-tjc]

By downplaying the determinate structures of class and ideology, it seems as if one could merely dispense with race because of a crisis in raciology, as Gilroy suggests in his recent book, Against Race. Gilroy's notion of "post-race" offers a cultural cosmopolitanism to resolve the crisis in racial representation, but he has very little to say about economics. In fact, he is explicitly anti-Marxist (336) and in this regard, his text continues his long standing and unrelenting attacks against Marxism. His notion of "cosmopolitanism" provides the most recent concept for displacing class theory. According to Gilroy, by locating those moments when race is dispersed into singularities that resist conceptualization, "cosmopolitanism" will take us beyond the positivistic faith of Marxism and usher in a post-race dispensation. Of course, his caricature of Marxism runs counter to one of the core concepts of Marxism—class struggle. Recall the opening lines of the Communist Manifesto: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" (9). What is significant about this reading of history is that, in contrast to the "cosmopolitan" embrace of the local and the singular, for Marx and Engels the localities of "history" are never meaningful in themselves—they are not auto-intelligible—because the meaning of the local always refers back to the broader global relations (totality) from which it emerges. In other words, if Marxism highlights the historicity of class antagonism, then, contrary to Gilroy, there is very little room for transhistorical positivistic pieties. But Gilroy is not as interested in seriously engaging Marxism as much as he is in constructing an ideological alibi for dismissing Marxism. Gilroy idealist understanding of post-race emerges from his post-Marxism, which he launched in an earlier work. Indeed, it is his earlier work that clearly shows the link between the discourse of (racial) autonomy and the politics of reformism. Specifically, in There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack, Gilroy "supplements" class analytics with new urban social movements. However, with Gilroy the "supplement" operates as a code for recuperating liberal pluralism (what Gilroy calls "multi-modality" 28). Consequently, we do not get a sustained theorizing of the dialectical relationship between class and race; rather, we get what ultimately amounts to an abandonment of class theory (245). Here is why he must abandon class theory: the trajectory of class theory calls for revolutionary transformation of existing capitalist society. However, this is not Gilroy's project, nor the project of the new urban movements. Gilroy endorses the new social movements precisely because "the new movements are not primarily oriented towards instrumental objectives, such as the conquest of political power or state apparatuses" (226). Instead, the new social movements desire autonomy within the existing system (226) and therefore foreground the "sphere of autonomous self-realization" (233). In other words, they do want to change an exploitative system, they merely want a little more (discursive) freedom within it, and this (reformist) project signals agency for Gilroy. For Gilroy, the new social movements represent agency, and in this regard, they replace the proletariat—the historic vehicle for social transformation—but their agency, to repeat, is directed toward reforming specific local sites, such as race or gender, within the existing system. In short, they have abandoned the goal of transforming existing capitalism—a totalizing system which connects seemingly disparate elements of the social through the logic of exploitation—for a new goal: creating more humane spaces for new movements within capitalism.

#### NEXT, THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—IT IS THIS LOGIC THAT MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE

DYER-WITHERFORD (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) 1999   
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OR KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF LABOR AND SURPLUS VALUE MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION TO A SOCIETY BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. xxxxxxxxI will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

# 2nc

#### Fourth, competition turn- you kill coalitions necessary for solvency and also sacrifice and exclude your opposition

Atchison & Panetta 9

[Jarrod & Edward, Assistant Professor at Wake Forest and Professor at University of Georgia, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future”, The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, 2009, pp. 317-334//wyo-tjc]

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

**Racism not the root cause of all violence**

**Mertus 99**

(Professor Julie Mertus is the co-director of Ethics, Peace and Global Affairs. She has written widely on human rights and gender, conflict, the Balkans, U.S. foreign policy and U.N. institutions. She is the author or editor of ten books, including Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, named "human rights book of the year" by the American Political Science Association) and, most recently Human Rights Matters: Local Politics and National Human Rights Institutions and The United Nations and Human Rights. Before entering academia, she worked as a researcher, writer and lawyer for several human rights and humanitarian organizations., J.D., Yale Law School; B.S. Cornell University, International Council on Human Rights Policy, “THE ROLE OF RACISM AS A CAUSE OF OR FACTOR IN WARS AND CIVIL CONFLICT”, http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/167/112\_-\_The\_Role\_of\_Racism\_as\_a\_Cause\_of\_or\_Factor\_in\_Wars\_and\_Civil\_Conflict\_Mertus\_\_Julie\_\_1999.pdf)

**This paper examines the role of racism as a cause of or factor in wars and civil conflicts.** “Racism” as understood here is defined broadly to encompass acts and processes of dehumanisation. The conflicts in **Rwanda and Kosovo serve as case studies; the former illustrates a case where the racist nature of the conflict has been clear to most observers, and the latter represents a case where racism plays an important yet overlooked role. Racism did not cause either conflict. Rather, the conflicts were the outcome of political manipulation and enlargement of already existing group classification schemes and social polarisation, a history of real and imagined oppression and deprivation, the absence of the rule of law and democratic structures, and state monopoly over the provision of information. Under such conditions, political élites could use racist ideology as a method of gaining power and, when necessary, waging war.**

**Claims that the middle passage was the “first” is both historically inaccurate and politically problematic – indentured servitude was the first forced immigration.**

**Walsh and Jordan 8**

White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain's White Slaves in America

Don Jordan is a television producer and director who has worked on dozens of documentaries and dramas. He also co-produced and co-wrote Love is the Devil, a film about the life of Francis Bacon.

Michael Walsh spent twelve years as a reporter and presenter on World in Action and has won six awards for his work. He is now a producer, specialising in political and historical documentaries.

While the Spanish slaughtered in America for gold, **the English in America had to plant for their wealth**. Failing to find the expected mineral riches along the eastern seaboard, they turned to farming,  
hoping to make gold from tobacco. **They needed a compliant, subservient, preferably free labour force** and since the indigenous peoples of America were difficult to enslave they turned to their own homeland to provide. They imported Britons deemed to be 'surplus' people - the rootless, the unemployed, the criminal and the dissident - **and held them in the Americas in various forms of** bondage for anything from three years to life. This book tells the story of these victims of empire. They were all supposed to gain their freedom eventually. For many, it didn't work out that way. In the early decades, half of them died in bondage. This book tracks the evolution of the system in which tens of thousands of whites were held as chattels, marketed like cattle, punished brutally and in some cases literally worked to death. For decades, **this underclass was treated just as savagely as black slaves and**, indeed, toiled, **suffered and rebelled alongside them.** Eventually, a racial wedge was thrust between white and black, leaving blacks officially enslaved and whites apparently upgraded but in reality just as enslaved as they were before. According to contemporaries, **some whites were treated with less humanity than the blacks working alongside them.** Among the first to be sent were children. Some were dispatched by impoverished parents seeking a better life for them. But others were forcibly deported. In 1618, the authorities in London began to sweep up hundreds of troublesome urchins from the slums and, ignoring protests from the children and their families, shipped them to Virginia.1 England's richest man was behind this mass expulsion. It was presented as an act of charity': the 'starving children' were to be given a new start as apprentices in America. In fact, they were sold to planters to work in the fields and half of them were dead within a year. Shipments of children continued from England and then from Ireland for decades. Many of these migrants were little more than toddlers. In 1661, the wife of a man who imported four "Irish boys' into Maryland as servants wondered why her husband had not brought 'some cradles to have rocked them in' as they were 'so little'. A second group of forced migrants from the mother country were those, such as vagrants and petty criminals, whom England's rulers wished to be rid of. The legal ground was prepared for their relocation by a highwayman turned Lord Chief Justice who argued for England's goals to be emptied in America. Thanks to men like him, 50,000 to 70,000 convicts (or maybe more) were transported to Virginia, Maryland, Barbados and England's other American possessions before 1776. All manner of others considered undesirable by the British Crown were also dispatched across the Atlantic to be sold into servitude. They ranged from beggars to prostitutes, Quakers to Cavaliers.2 A third group were the Irish. For centuries, Ireland had been something of a special case in English colonial history. From the Anglo-Normans onwards, the Irish were dehumanized, described as savages, so making their murder and displacement appear all the more justified. The colonization of Ireland provided experience and drive for experiments further afield, not to mention large numbers of workers, coerced, transported or persuaded. Under Oliver Cromwell's ethnic-cleansing policy in Ireland, unknown numbers of Catholic men, women and children were forcibly transported to the colonics. And it did not end with Cromwell; for at least another hundred years, forced transportation continued as a fact of life in Ireland. **The other unwilling participants in the colonial labor force were the kidnapped**. Astounding numbers are reported to have been snatched from the streets and countryside by gangs of kidnappers or 'spirits' working to satisfy the colonial hunger for labor. Based at every sizeable port in the British Isles, spirits conned or coerced the unwary onto ships bound for America. London's most active kidnap gang discussed their targets at a daily meeting in St Paul's Cathedral. They were reportedly paid £2 by planters' agents for every athletic-looking young man they brought aboard. According to a contemporary who campaigned against the black slave trade, kidnappers were snatching an average of around 10,000 whites a year - doubtless an exaggeration but one that indicates a problem serious enough to create its own grip on the popular mind.3 Along with the vast numbers ejected from Britain and forced to slave in the colonics were the still greater multitudes who went of their own free will: those who became indentured servants in the Americas in return for free passage and perhaps the promise of a plot of land. Between 1620 and 1775, these volunteer servants, some 300,000, accounted for two out of three migrants from the British Isles.4 Typically, these 'free-willers', as they came to be called, were the poor and the hopeful who agreed to sacrifice their personal liberty for a period of years in the eventual hope of a better life. On arrival, they found that they had the status of chattels, objects of personal property', with few effective rights. But there was no going back. They were stuck like the tar on the keels of the ships that brought them. Some, of course, were bought by humane, even generous, masters and survived their years of bondage quite happily to emerge from servitude to build a prosperous future. But some of the most abused servants were from among the free-willers.

### Cap

### Impact

#### Fellow-feeling or compassion are impossible under a capitalist logic that monetizes all life, enabling the worst atrocities imaginable

Joel **Kovel**, Alger Hiss Professor, Social Studies, Bard College, THE ENEMY OF NATURE: THE END OF CAPITALISM OR THE END OF THE WORLD, 20**02**, p. 141.

Capital produces egoic relations, which reproduce capital. The isolated selves of the capitalist order can choose to become personifications of capital, or may have the role thrust upon them. In either case, they embark upon a pattern of non-recognition mandated by the fact that the almighty dollar interposes itself between all elements of experience: all things in the world, all other persons, and between the self and its world: nothing really exists except in and through monetization. This set-up provides an ideal culture medium for the bacillus of competition and ruthless self-maximization. Because money is all that ‘counts’, a peculiar heartlessness characterizes capitalists, a tough-minded and cold abstraction that will sacrifice species, whole continents (viz. Africa) or inconvenient sub-sets of the population (viz. black urban males) who add too little to the great march of surplus value or may be seen as standing in its way The presence of value screens out genuine fellow-feeling or compassion, replacing it with the calculus of profit-expansion. Never has a holocaust been carried out so impersonally When the Nazis killed their victims, the crimes were accom­panied by a racist drumbeat; for global capital, the losses are regrettable necessities.

### link

#### IDENTITY POLITICS IS WORSE THAN USELESS—THROUGH REINSCRIBING DIFFERENCE, IT FRAGMENTS A UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND PREVENTS US FROM EVERY CHALLENGING THE BASIC ANTAGONISM OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY WHICH IS THE EXPLOITATION OF THE MANY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE FEW

CLOUD (Prof. Comm at UT) 2003

[Dana, “Marxism and Oppression”, Talk for Regional Socialist Conference, April 19, 2003, p. online //wyo-tjc]

That title demonstrates the major flaw of identity politics, namely, that it encourages people to target the wrong enemies. If oppression is thought to be a matter of maligned identities rather than historical and systematic efforts to divide and conquer, then Black people will see their fight as being against white people; women against men; gay people against straight people; immigrants against the native born; and so on. This logic actually replicates the ideologies of the capitalist system and does the bosses’ work for them. As the Black abolitionist Frederick Douglass noted about the beneficiaries of slavery, “The slaveholders by encouraging the enmity of the poor, laboring white man against the Blacks, succeeded in making the said white man almost as much a slave as the Black himself. Both are plundered and by the same plunderers. They divided both to conquer each.” Identity politics cooperates with that division. It obscures the fact that white straight men can fight oppression, and can be convinced that their long-term interests are not served by perpetuating racism, sexism, or homophobia. Identity politics hides the fact that whenever capitalists can threaten to replace one group of workers with another, poorly paid group of workers, neither group benefits.xxxxxx And it obscures the fact that the majority of the world’s population is at the mercy of a tiny elite at the top of society, a few percent of the world’s population that controls most of the world’s wealth and power. Every specially oppressed group is divided by class, and elite members of those groups don’t necessarily share interests in common with working class members of the same group. However, class also can bring together the vast majority of oppressed people around the world in a common fight. We are going to have to get together to challenge that system and make a world based on different priorities, one that does not require division and scapegoating to enable a few people to profit at the expense of the many. The politics of identity cannot point the way towards building the kind of movement which can actually end oppression. Among existing organizations founded on the basis of identity politics, the tendency has been toward fragmentation and disintegration rather than growth and effectiveness. The tactics of identity politics are often limited to people with the resources to commit cultural actions and shocking displays. The lifestyle emphasis of identity politics guarantees that movements will remain fragmented, middle class in nature, an therefore unable to confront the basic antagonism of capitalist society.

### Sol

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OR KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF LABOR AND SURPLUS VALUE MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION TO A SOCIETY BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. xxxxxxxxI will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### AN EXPLANATION OF THE ALT AND ITS RELATION TO THIS ROUND:

#### ALL OF THEIR PSEUDO-MARXIST OFFENSE IS MERELY A REACTION TO THE EMERGING CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITAL—INSTEAD OF RECOGNIZING THIS AS A HISTORICAL PRODUCT OF CLASS CONFLICT, THEY ATTEMPT TO NARROW AND CONTEXTUALIZE CLASS STRUGGLE AS A LOCALIZED PROBLEM\*\*

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

A parody of politics has taken over left politics in the U.S. and Europe. A parody in which—after the dead-end of the designer socialisms of postmarxisms—suddenly everyone is an "orthodox" Marxist: from Zizek who in the introduction to a selection of his work writes of the need to "return to the centrality of the Marxist critique of political economy" (Reader ix); to Michael Sprinker who referred to himself as a "neo-conservative marxist" ("Forum" 68). In calling himself a "neoconservative" Sprinker was embracing with pride Butler's definition of the term in her "Merely Cultural" in which she equates it with "leftist orthodoxy" (268). Then there is Paul Smith who now, after mocking Orthodox Marxism in Discerning the Subject and Universal Abandon, says he has a "fairly orthodox understanding of what Marx and the Marxist tradition has had to say about capitalism" (Millennial Dreams 3). Parody is always the effect of a slippage and the slippage here is that in spite of the sudden popularity of "orthodox" Marxism, the actual theories and practices of the newly orthodox are more than ever before flexodox. It seems as if once more Lenin's notion that when the class antagonism emerges more sharply "the liberals. . . dare not deny the class struggle, but attempt to narrow down [and] to curtail. . . the concept" ("Liberal and Marxist Conceptions of the Class Struggle," 122) has been proven by history. "Orthodox" Marxism has become the latest cover by which the bourgeois left authenticates its credentials and proceeds to legitimate the economics of the ruling class and its anti-proletarian politics. Take Paul Smith, for example. In Orthodox Marxism class is the central issue. (I put aside here that in his writings, on subjectivity for example, Smith has already gotten rid of the "central" by a deconstructive logic). What Smith does with class is a rather interesting test of how Orthodox Marxism is being used to legitimate the class interests of the owners. Smith reworks class and turns it into a useless Habermasian communicative act. He writes that "classes are what are formed in struggle, not something that exists prior to struggle" (Millennial Dreams 60). To say it again: the old ideological textualization of the "new left" is not working any more (just look at the resistance against globalization), so the ruling class is now reworking the "old left" to defend itself. Against the Orthodox Marxist theory of class, Smith evacuates class of an objective basis in the extraction of surplus labor in production, and makes it the effect of local conflicts. In short, Smith reverses the Orthodox Marxist position that, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (Marx, Contribution, 21), and turns it into a neomarxist view that what matters is their consciousness. In this he in fact shares a great deal with conservative theories that make "values" (the subjective) as what matters in social life and not economic access.

#### CAPITALISM IS WHAT TOTALIZES EVERYTHING—WE’RE JUST POINTING IT OUT

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, 41// wyo]

What must be stressed first of all is that capital is not a ‘material entity’ — let alone a rationally controllable ‘mechanism’, as the apologists of the allegedly neutral market mechanism’ (to be happily embraced by ‘market socialism’) tried to make US believe, as we shall see in Part Three — but an ultimately uncontrollable mode of social metabolic control. The main reason why this system must escape a meaningful degree of human control is precisely because it itself emerged in the COUrSe of history as a most powerful — indeed up to the present time by far the niost powerful — totalizing’ framework of control into which everything else, including human beings, must be fitted, and prove thereby their ‘productive viability’, or perish if they fail to do so. One cannot think of a more inexorably all engulfing — and in that important sense ‘totalitarian’ — system of control than the globally dominant capital system. For the latter blindly subjects to the same imperatives health care no less than commerce, education no less than agriculture, art no less than manufacturing industry, ruthlessly superimposing its own criteria of viability on everything, from the smallest units of its ‘microcosm’ to the most gigantic transnational enterprises, and from the most intimate personal relations to the most complex decision making processes of industry- wide monopolies, favouring always the strong against the weak. Ironically (and rather absurdly), however, in the opinion of its propagandists this system is supposed to be inherently democratic, indeed the paradigm foundation of all conceivable democracy. This is why the Editors and Leader writers of the London Economist can commit to paper in all seriousness the proposition according to which: There is no alternative to the free market as the way to organize economic life. The spread of free market economics should gradually lead to multi-party democracy, because people who have free economic choice tend to insist on having free political choice coo.46 I Unemployment for countless millions, among many other blessings of ‘free market economics’, thus belongs to the category of ‘free economic choice’, out of which in due course the fruits of ‘free political choice’ — ‘multi-party democracy’, no less, (and certainly no more) — will arise. And then, of course, we shall all live happily ever after. In actuality, though, the capital system is the first one in history which constitutes itself as an unexceptionable and irresistible totalizer, no matter how repressive the imposition of its totalizing function must be whenever and wherever it encounters resistance.

# 1nr

#### OUR FRAMEWORK IS NOT UNETHICAL – DEBATING BOTH SIDES ACCESSES THEIR IMPACTS BY RAISING AWARENESS THROUGH RESEARCH AND CLASH.

Narahiku **Inoue**, PhD, Kyushu University, Debate—A Process of Inquiry and Advocacy, **2K**, http://www.rc.kyushu-u.ac.jp/%7Einouen/debate-text.html

Some people worry about the practice of debating both sides in academic debate when the same person or team defend one position in one debate and attack that position in another debate.  We must understand that academic debate is different from substantive debate in that students are debating for the sake of practice.  They can develop unbiased attitude by looking at both sides of the question.  Even in substantive debate, some speakers serve as devil's advocates so that the question can be rigorously tested.  So debaters who are arguing against their own belief are not unethical or irresponsible. In debate, speakers are playing a role of either supporting or denying one position.  After students debate both sides of the question, they will be able to broaden their view about the question and will be able to come up with a better-informed opinion of their own.

#### Explorations of subjectivity and inclusion rely on a safe space in which participants can trust they will be listened to within reasonable parameters-absent these limits, trust is effaced and citizens refuse to engage due to fear of chaos and violence

Glover 10

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

While dissociative agonism tends to focus on the ineradicability of power relations in democratic life as well as the enduring presence of hegemony within the political, associative agonism subtly shifts the emphasis. Contra Mouffe and others, associative agonism does accept that there will be limits to pluralism—i.e. there will be identities, practices, and democratic discourse which will have to be excluded from politics—yet they ‘ insist that we often do not know with assurance what those limits will be .’ 81 Thus, the focus shifts from the ineradicability 19 of limits to a focus on how we negotiate difference, multiplicity, and plurality. Due to this, associative agonists tend to advance a much more demanding set of agonistic virtues than the dissociative agonists. Through these virtues, we are to address the paradoxical fact that, though radical difference is unsettling and may provoke resentment, it is the very means through which we constitute our own identity.Furthermore, while recognizing that the ‘identities and identifications’ we bring topolitical life ‘are not stable…’ associative agonism recognizes that, ‘…in the absence of resistance to them, they could be stabilized.’ 82 The task becomes to create agonistic spaces in which we define our own identity, we craft our own subjectivity. Associative agonists recognize that such an un-tethered and performative political arena involves a certain trust that contentious negotiation of difference does not devolve into chaos, violence, and conflict. Above all, the associative agonistic conception seeks to imbue in agonistic citizens an ‘openness to listen to those who appear to us to be unreasonable’ while retaining a ‘willingness to question whatcounts as reasonable speech’. 83 The means by which this can be accomplished in our currentpolitical, cultural, and social milieu is the defining focus of associative agonistic theory.

#### ROLE-PLAYING IN A COMPETITIVE FORMAT FOSTERS DEEP AND REWARDING EDUCATION.

Christopher C. **Joyner**, Professor, International Law, Georgetown University, “Teaching International Law: Views from an International Relations Political Scientist,” ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW v. 5, 19**99**, p. 377+.

Confronting international law in practice is critical to achievement of the course objectives, and this is effectively done through a series of debates in a course that I teach on International law and United States Foreign Policy. Students try to WIN the games by garnering support from the rest of the class based on the merits and suasion of their legal arguments, although past experience indicates that clear winners are not often produced. The degree of success this exercise enjoys depends on two key factors: first, the willingness of students to assume their adopted roles with energy and, second, the extent to which student participants in the debates can learn and relate how, where, and why international law is integrated into the United States foreign policy decision-making process and can demonstrate the tensions between national security considerations and international legal constraints in formulating United States foreign policy. Taken in tandem, these two ingredients can produce a successful and unique learning experience that fosters a deeper understanding of the subject matter than would likely be attained through a lecture-format course.

#### LIFE-LIKE POLICY SIMULATIONS PRODUCE COMPARATIVELY BETTER EDUCATION.

Christopher C. **Joyner**, Professor, International Law, Georgetown University, “Teaching International Law: Views from an International Relations Political Scientist,” ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW v. 5, 19**99**, p. 377+.

By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case.

**Debate roleplaying specifically activates agency**

**Hanghoj 8**

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Thus, **debate games require** teachers **to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching,** to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, **Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games** (and other game types) **may be valuable** within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that **players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective.** According to Bakhtin, **the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding:** In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, **it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice.** Bakhtin also refers to **the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”**, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). **Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive** citizens in a democratic society.

#### COMPETITIVE EQUITY IS A PRECURSOR TO EFFECTIVE DEBATE. OUR SHIVELY EVIDENCE EXPLAINS THAT CONTESTATION WITHIN DISCOURSE IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF WE PROCEED FROM A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD BASED ON PREDICTABLE GROUND. IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY DEBATE WE MUST BE ABLE TO PREPARE FOR THE DEBATE BASED ON A SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF TERMS OF THE DEBATE. TOPICS ARE CHOSEN TO EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTE FAIR AND PREDICTABLE GROUND BASED ON THE LITERATURE.

#### C. THEY CAN ONLY WIN ON WHAT THEIR POLICY OPTION DOES.

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Debate considers two choices but discussion may consider many choices.  In discussion about garbage disposal, different people will propose different solutions such as decreasing disposable products, recycling, using biodegradable products, proposing a new disposal site, etc.  Debate usually has only two choices: adopting or rejecting the proposal.

#### THEIR FRAMEWORK INTERPRETATION LETS THEM SHIELD THEIR AFF FROM INTERROGATIVE CRITICISM BY REFUSING TO FURNISH IT WITH A DEFENSE OF PRACTICAL APPLICATION

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In response to these arguments, the ambiguists might counter that they do not mean to contest the basic structures of democracy—that they mean simply to resist the cruel and subjugating tendencies that prevail within these structures. Thus, assuming that we live in an open, democratic society, they may simply set out to challenge our catego­rizations of people and behaviors as good or evil, licit or illicit, normal or abnormal, and so on. And within our given system, they may sim­ply seek to remind us that these categories are our creations—that we need the irrational and the deviant to have our own sense of rational and communal identity. Thus, perhaps it is possible to pursue a gen­eral policy of contest and subversion—a policy designed to resist so­cial pressure to categorize and judge others—without contesting or subverting the basic structures of openness and democracy. I would like to finish this discussion by briefly suggesting why such a policy of general subversion is not the best answer to the important issues the ambiguists raise, or why a policy of rational judgment is a preferable approach to these issues. The first problem with the ambiguists' position here is one that they typically ac­knowledge. The problem is that it is impossible to subvert all cat­egorizations, for in subverting one categorization, one necessarily embraces another. Thus, in subverting traditional categories—like good versus bad, normal versus abnormal, right versus wrong— the ambiguists necessarily embrace the alternative categories of the ambiguist: categories like those of open-mindedness versus close-mindedness, flexibility versus rigidity, creativity versus conformity, skepticism versus trust, tolerance versus intolerance, and the like. Which is to say that in denouncing anything, theorists cannot help but suggest what it is that they are not denouncing—or what they are accepting as preferable. While, as I said, the ambiguists acknowledge the impossibility of subverting all categorizations, they do not think that this undermines their general policy of subversion. Rather, they maintain that the ac­knowledgment of this fact should make us approach our own (and others') ideas with skepticism and flexibility, prompting us to see our ideas not as justified truths but as useful positions from which to unmask truth claims and not as enduring grounds for political theory but as temporary resting points from which to unsettle others—points that can themselves be expected to be challenged and changed down the road. The problem with this position is that even temporary and un­stable positions need justification. That is, even if we acknowledge that our categorizations are apt to be undermined and overthrown, they must be given reasons at the moment we are using them. If we are denouncing others' choices, we are necessarily commending our own and, as such, we need to say why we think our own commend­able. Likewise then, in denouncing traditional categories, the ambiguists cannot avoid suggesting that their own categories are superior; and, as such, they cannot avoid making positive moral claims or presenting a general, alternative theory about humanity and society. Thus, they are **obligated** to present their reasons for this alternative vision.