# 1nc

#### A. OUR INTERPRETATION: THE AFFIRMATIVE SHOULD PRESENT A TOPICAL PLAN OF ACTION AND DEFEND THAT THEIR POLICY SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

#### B. DEFINITIONS:

#### 1. THE TOPIC IS DEFINED BY THE PHRASE FOLLOWING THE COLON – THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE AGENT OF THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL DEBATERS

Webster’s 2K

 Guide to Grammar and Writing 2K; <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### 2. “RESOLVED” EXPRESSES INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary 2K

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### 3. “SHOULD” DENOTES AN EXPECTATION OF ENACTING A PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary – 2K

[www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### 4. THE U.S.F.G. is three branches of government

Encarta 2K

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2K [http://encarta.msn.com]

Supreme Court of the United States, highest court in the United States and the chief authority in the judicial branch, one of three branches of the United States federal government.

#### 5. OUR DEFINITION EXCLUDES ACTION BY SMALLER POLITICAL GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS.

Black’s Law 99

Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition Ed. Bryan A. Garner (chief) ‘99

Federal government 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters.

#### C. VIOLATION – THE AFFIRMATIVE IS NOT AN INSTRUMENTAL AFFIRMATION OF THE RESOLUTION –

#### D. REASONS TO PREFER –

#### 1. PREDICTABILITY: the resolution sets the parameters for the debate. Affirmatives would always win if there wasn’t predictable negative ground.

#### PRIVATE ACTOR FIAT BAD: advocating a personal movement or idea is unfair as there’s no literature base to counter it. Running a topical version of their affirmative solves all of their offense.

#### SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE SOLVES: topics are meaningless if we don’t debate both sides: topic-specific education outweighs general education.

#### Switch-side debate good—direct engagement with identities we don’t identify with is critical to overcome the existential resentment we feel towards the Other

Glover 10

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

In this vein, Connolly sees the goal of political engagement as securing a positive ‘ethos of engagement’ in relation to popular movements which alter existing assumptions, that is, a positive attitude towards attempts at pluralization. Connolly suggests we do so through thecultivation of two essential virtues: agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. 88 Agonistic respect is defined as a situation whereby each political actor arrives at an appreciation for the fact that their own self-definition is bound with that of others, as well as recognition of the degree to which each of these projections is profoundly contestable. 89 While Connolly notes that agonistic respect is a ‘kissing cousin’ of liberal tolerance, he distinguishes it by saying that the latter typically carries ‘the onus of being at the mercy of a putative majority that often construes its own position to be beyond question.’ 90 Thus, agonistic respect is a reciprocal democratic virtue meant to operate across relations of difference, and Connolly deploys it as a regulative ideal for the creation agonistic democratic spaces. 91 In a somewhat related way, the virtue of ‘critical responsiveness’ also attempts to move beyond liberal tolerance. 92 Critical responsiveness entails ‘ careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.’ 93 Critical responsiveness is not pity, charity, or paternalism but implies an enhanced degree of concern for others, driven by the cultivation of reciprocal empathic concern 21 for that which you are not. 94 This attitude cannot be developed in an abstract relation to these new and existing forms of radical cultural, political, religious, and philosophical difference. Critical responsiveness above all requires that one ‘get[s] a whiff of experiences heretofore alien to [us]’, recognizing that while this may be unsettling or cause discomfort, direct engagement is the means by which you, ‘work tactically on yourself and others to overcome existential resentment of this persistent condition of human being.’

#### E. VOTING ISSUE FOR GROUND, COMPETITIVE EQUITY AND JURISDICTION.

#### THIS ARGUMENT PROVIDES A-PRIORI REASONS TO VOTE NEGATIVE. YOU MUST USE YOUR BALLOT TO RATIFY CONSTRAINTS ON DISCOURSE TO PRESERVE A POLITICALLY-ENABLING DISCUSSION

Shively 2K

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2K, p. 179.

To put this point another way, it turns out that to be open to all things is, in effect, to be open to nothing. While the ambiguists have commendable reasons for wanting to avoid closure—to avoid specify­ing what is not allowed or celebrated in their political vision—they need to say "no" to some things in order to be open to things in general. They need to say "no" to certain forms of contest, if only to protect contest in general. For if one is to be open to the principles of democracy, for example, one must be dogmatically closed to the prin­ciples of fascism. If one would embrace tolerance, one must rigidly reject intolerance. If one would support openness in political speech and action, one must ban the acts of political intimidation, violence or recrimination that squelch that openness. If one would expand delib­eration and disruption, one must set up strict legal protections around such activities. And if one would ensure that citizens have reason to engage in political contest—that it has practical meaning and import for them—one must establish and maintain the rules and regulations and laws that protect democracy. In short, openness requires certain clear limits, rules, closure. And to make matters more complex, these structures of openness cannot simply be put into place and forgotten. They need to be taught to new generations of citizens, to be retaught and reenforced among the old, and as the political world changes, to be shored up, rethought, adapted, and applied to new problems and new situations. It will not do, then, to simply assume that these structures are permanently viable and secure without significant work or justification on our part; nor will it do to talk about resisting or subverting them. Indeed, they are such valuable and yet vulnerable goods that they require the most unflag­ging and firm support that we can give them.

#### THE DELIBERATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR ADVOCACY ARE A PRIOR QUESTION – PRE-CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT ARE NECESSARY FOR YOUR DECISION TO HAVE ANY POLITICAL VALUE

Gunderson 2K

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2K p. 104-105.

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separa­tion. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political deci­sion-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engage­ment with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet delibera­tion is also a form of political action that precedes the actual taking and implementation of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators require something to deliberate about and that deliberation presumes certain institutional structures and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting par­tisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

# 2

#### Bataille’s economic principles provide no approach to political economy, they destroy any attempt to manage the distribution of wealth, and transgression and useless expenditure lead to the complete destruction of all human life—the aff is a completely failed approach to the possibility of a systemic critique of capitalism

Sorenson, 2012

[Asger, philosophy of education at Aarhus University, On a universal scale: Economy in Bataille’s general economy, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 38(2) 169–197] /Wyo-MB

In a practical perspective one can consider the natural foundation of society as con- sisting of energy in different forms, some of which make energy accessible to human exploitation. In spite of the theory of relativity and our knowledge of the world as one big ecosystem, in a practical perspective it therefore makes good sense to distinguish between dead and living matter and between matter and energy.120 These distinctions make plain the conflict between on the one side the circulation of money and commod- ities understood mechanically as dead matter and on the other side living organisms that are transformed quantitatively and qualitatively because of the accumulated energy inside living matter. The traditional models of economical thought are clearly hostile to the self-organizing life of nature,121 and this is with good reason. Economy in the ordi- nary sense aims at the optimal management of resources, and management is possible only if one assumes an appropriate degree of standstill and unchangeability; if every- thing moves and emerges by itself, then conscious management is impossible.¶ Bataille’s theoretical fight to think the unreduced desire and the flow of energy in nature into economy leaves an impression of economy as totally unmanageable and uncontrollable in a practical sense. The anti-authoritarian, theoretical perspective means that the general economy loses its character of political economy and instead transforms itself into a scientistic ontology, the alleged necessity of which contributes to legitimate ideologically a total liberation of desire and consumption, which in turn can legitimate a capitalist development without any restrictions. As mentioned, this was clearly not Bataille’s intention, but the conceptual logic in this part of his thinking does not leave him much choice. However, in this account of the objective basis for the general econ- omy, as it is presented in the first part of The Accused Share, one does not see many signs of the dialectical thinking, which is the foundation of the other two parts,122 and this ten- sion makes the project as a whole vulnerable to critiques of inconsistency. Actually Bataille himself became aware of the problems with reconciling the wish for political result, which was connected with the account of the objectively given, and the more in-depth reflections concerning the inner subjectively given experiences,123 and he actu- ally ended up declaring the very attempt to create the connection between the subjective¶ experiences of eroticism and sovereignty and what is objectively given by the use of resources as deeply problematic.124¶ It is thus as political economy that the general economy turns out to have its greatest limitations. The basic problem is that with Bataille’s extended sense of economy it becomes very difficult to recommend a definite economical strategy at the ordinary polit- ical level. His main concern is the material conflict between the human being and life as such, between the human expression of desire, which liberates energy for loss, and the accumulation of energy on the earth and in nature in general. The human being has in the historical development of civilization developed a still greater consumption of energy, and it is thus not just capitalism, which is self-destructive, but the very human way of being. What Bataille has pointed out at the individual and the historical level is actually an onto- logical problem. The full actualization of the potential of human desire in sovereignty can lead only to emptying out all disposable energy resources on earth, and that will mean the end, if not of life as such, then at least of the human way of living. The complete realization of the human potential of civilization liberates the energy piled up in and on the earth to take up again the interrupted flow, which destines energy to a final loss in the tepidness of the universe.

#### THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—IT IS THIS LOGIC THAT MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE

DYER-WITHERFORD (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) 1999
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural and historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

# case

#### Utilitarianism is good and is key to ethical decision making, because it ensures beings are treated as equal—any other approach to ethics is arbitrary because it considers one’s preferences as more important than others

Lillehammer, 2011

[Hallvard, Faculty of Philosophy Cambridge University, “Consequentialism and global ethics.” Forthcoming in M. Boylan, Ed., Global Morality and Justice: A Reader, Westview Press, Online, <http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/teaching_staff/lillehammer/Consequentialism_and_Global_Ethics-1-2.pdf>] /Wyo-MB

Contemporary discussions of consequentialism and global ethics have been marked by a focus on examples such as that of the shallow pond. In this literature, distinctions are drawn and analogies made between different cases about which both the consequentialist and his or her interlocutor are assumed to have a more or less firm view. One assumption in this literature is that progress can be made by making judgements about simple actual or counterfactual examples, and then employing a principle of equity to the effect that like cases be treated alike, in order to work out what to think about more complex actual cases. It is only fair to say that in practice such attempts to rely only on judgements about simple cases have a tendency to produce trenchant stand-offs. It is important to remember, therefore, that for some consequentialists the appeal to simple cases is neither the only, nor the most basic, ground for their criticism of the ethical status quo. For some of the historically most prominent consequentialists the evidential status of judgements about simple cases depends on their derivability from basic ethical principles (plus knowledge of the relevant facts). Thus, in The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick argues that ethical thought is grounded in a small number of self-evident axioms of practical reason. The first of these is that we ought to promote our own good. The second is that the good of any one individual is objectively of no more importance than the good of any other (or, in Sidgwick’s notorious metaphor, no individual’s good is more important ‘from the point of view of the Universe’ than that of any other). The third is that we ought to treat like cases alike. Taken together, Sidgwick takes these axioms to imply a form of consequentialism. We ought to promote our own good. Yet since our own good is objectively no more important than the good of anyone else, we ought to promote the good of others as well. And in order to treat like cases alike, we have to weigh our own good against the good of others impartially, all other things being equal. iv It follows that the rightness of our actions is fixed by what is best for the entire universe of ethically relevant beings. To claim otherwise is to claim for oneself and one’s preferences a special status they do not possess. When understood along these lines, consequentialism is by definition a global ethics: the good of everyone should count for everyone, no matter their identity, location, or personal and social attachments, now or hereafter. v Some version of this view is also accepted by a number of contemporary consequentialists, including Peter Singer, who writes that it is ‘preferable to proceed as Sidgwick did: search for undeniable fundamental axioms, [and] build up a moral theory from them’ (Singer 1974, 517; Singer 1981). For these philosophers the question of our ethical duties to others is not only a matter of our responses to cases like the shallow pond. It is also a matter of whether these responses cohere with an ethics based on first principles. If you are to reject the consequentialist challenge, therefore, you will have to show what is wrong with those principles.

#### Their alignment with Bataille signals their lack of understanding of criticism, every critical gesture to affirm Bataille destroys his writing by turning him into an artifact to be circulate. No form of sacrifice, or waste economy can ever overcome the weight of the failure of critical discourse

Mann, 99

(Paul, Masocriticism. “The Exquisite Corpse of George Bataille” 51-71, MB)

Bataille’s exegetical friends, no less than Blake’s corporeal ones, are his spiritual enemies. But in the fourth place, by that very means, they become heterological in spite of themselves. Every attempt to account for heterology impoverishes Bataille and reveals the abysmal poverty of the critical, but it is precisely for this reason that some- thing of dépense remains in Bataille criticism. The Yale contributors constitute the sacred element in Bataille, not by marking out and protecting its heterological terms, as their rhetoric at times suggests, but by recuperating those terms into the duplicitous homogeneity of their own articles. They sacrifice Bataille by serving him, expel his truth by trying to embody it. What we witness here is not the failure of criticism to circumscribe an ineffable Bataille who always escapes, but rather his ruinous trivialization in the very essays that have explicated him so well. Recuperation becomes the inverted form of expenditure expenditure not by expulsion but by destructive consumption. By emptying Bataille’s text of any transvaluative value, by coining the terms of the sacred and putting them into circulation, the scholar anus wastes them, sacrifices them, and hence also sacrifices the sublime truth it sought for it- self only so that it could lose it. We all read Bataille in order to destroy him, in a ritual accompanied by the mute laughter of the restricted economy itself. I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption” can never become an explicit critical motive.13 At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some Critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the Critical eye.14 Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. Excess is not a project but a by-product of any discourse; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of them- selves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory squeal like a pig before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no knowledge of Bataille.

#### Instrumentalization is not bad or violent

Bush, 2012

[Stephen, assistant professor of religious studies at Brown University, GEORGES BATAILLE’S MYSTICAL CRUELTY, 0.3:551–555, 2012 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.] /Wyo-MB

However, I do not think that the instrumentalization/non- instrumentalization distinction has the ethical significance that Brint- nall attributes to it, and I do not think, as Brintnall and Bataille do, that subject-object relations involve “inherently alienating violence.” Not all instrumentalization is ethically problematic or tends toward violence. We instrumentalize each other all the time and could not carry on our affairs without doing so. Many goods we rightly regard as valuable require instrumentalizing relations. What matters is that when we treat others as a means to an end, we simultaneously respect them as an end in themselves. We cannot treat them as a mere means. It is possible to¶ regard someone as both a means and an end, in other words. This is what the Kantians tell us, and though I do not count myself among their number, they are on to something here. When we buy a head of lettuce at a farmer’s market, we treat the farmer as a means to our end, but the important thing is we do not treat her as merely a means. We must treat her in such a way that regards her as a means to our end (of obtaining salad ingredients) but also as someone who has her own ambitions, desires, concerns, attachments, and decision-making capacities. To give an extreme example: if we abducted her and kept her in captivity, forcing her to grow and provide food for us, then we would be treating her merely as a means. So the ethically relevant distinction is not between instrumentalizing and non-instrumentalizing relations with others, but rather between different types of instrumentalizing, subject-object relations.

#### Aff don’t solve—sacrifice is never complete

Biles, 2011

[Jeremy, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/Community, Culture, Theory and Critique Volume 52, Issue 2-3, 2011 Special Issue: The God Who Would Not Die: Theological Remnants and Traces of a Hidden God in Twentieth Century French Thought, Taylor and Francis online] /Wyo-MB

Though the members of Acéphale were bound by an oath of secrecy, the fragmentary descriptions of the society's activities that have surfaced reveal that the initiated were instructed by Bataille to meet in the depths of night, in a forest, by a lightning-blasted tree, where they were to stage rituals whose contents remain largely hidden. What seems certain, however, is that Bataille, whose lifelong obsession would be ‘the enigma of sacrifice’, sought to enact a human sacrifice as the founding myth of this acéphalic community. Bataille is said to have offered himself as the victim of this mad act. According to the legend, however, no one in the group was willing to lift the blade that would render Bataille the headless victim of this headless community.3 The sacrifice never came to pass; the group disbanded, leaving Bataille to contemplate the dissolution of his communitarian project.¶ However scandalous Bataille's proposed gift of death, and however uncertain the accounts that have emerged from behind the veils of secrecy, this legend reveals something crucial about communication and community as they will come to be thought by Bataille. In the present pages, I want to investigate the role of the death of God within the sacrificial logic that underwrites and animates Bataille's notions of communication and community. Drawing upon Bataille's theory of general economics allows one to seize upon the importance of an often-overlooked element of Bataille's thought: time. I propose here that the sacrifice of God – the God that Bataille identifies with the will to eternity or limitless duration – is the means by which one solicits the ecstatic destructions of time and thus the ‘inner experience’ of the present moment. But as Bataille himself acknowledged, the sacrifice of God is destined to remain forever incomplete, never definitively achieved. In developing an account of the dynamics and ethical dimensions of Bataille's sacrifice of God, I examine key texts by two prominent contemporary thinkers – Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben – who find in Bataille at once an inception and limit point for thinking the logic of sacrifice, the sacred, and community. In confronting Bataille, Nancy and Agamben offer critiques of Bataille that, I argue, themselves require critical rethinking. Responding to their interpretations will in turn reveal the resources Bataille presents for thinking a community that, through the sacrifice of God, is experienced in its very dissolution.

#### Aff fails—rational utility inevitable—their author

Biles, 2011

[Jeremy, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/Community, Culture, Theory and Critique Volume 52, Issue 2-3, 2011 Special Issue: The God Who Would Not Die: Theological Remnants and Traces of a Hidden God in Twentieth Century French Thought, Taylor and Francis online] /Wyo-MB

And yet, the sacred, by its very nature, is fleeting; the passional effluxes of sacrifice inevitably wane, and the aims of instrumental reason invariably reassert themselves, giving rise again to the fear of the loss of self, and with it, the tendency to hypostasise work in the form of God. The remains of God, like the profane self that always returns, are never finally eradicated; prohibitions are re-installed, and the world of rational utility endures. Individuals are again themselves, discontinuous and isolated by the profane concerns of the workaday world and traditional social structures, deprived of the deep sense of continuity, or intimacy, that is afforded in transitory experiences of sacred community.

#### Alternative has no potential – can't overcome economic systems

**Plontisky, 95** (Arkady, Professor of English and Theory and Cultural Studies, Purdue University, “On Bataille: Critical Essays,” State University of New York Press, pg. 111, Tashma)

Indeed, as Bataille's discourse shows with extraordinary power, it is the economic insistence on consumption at the multiple and often interacting levels of theoretical economies—economic, political, conceptual—that is most problematic. The theoretical problem is a metaphoric loss of the economy of loss and thus of the general economy. It is not that consumption and the pleasure of consumption are not important or theoretically and otherwise pleasurable. **To reverse the configuration** absolutely and to privilege expenditure unconditionally **would be** just as **untenable**. As I indicated earlier, Bataille's heavy insistence on waste and expenditure must be seen as problematic in this respect, and is "saved" only by the enormous labyrinthine complexity of Bataille's inscription of these concepts.

#### No solvency- Bataille’s theory retains power relations

Wolin, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center, 2006 (Richard, “Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology”, <http://courses.ucsd.edu/nbryson/Graduate%20Readings/BatailleLeftFascism.pdf> Constellations vol. 2 issue 3, pp. 397-428)

Yet, in his celebratory discussions of sacrifice, potlach, and so forth, Bataille fundamentally misconstrues the historical and contextual parameters of such ritual practices. One could even go so far as to say that, in a certain measure, Bataille’s understanding of these phenomena succumbs to a type of “primitivism”: he decontextualizes the cultural practices he analyzes in order the better to incorporate them within his own theoretical agenda of his own critique of modernity. Here, Bataille seeks nothing less than “an anthropology that will itself provide a living – and orgiastic – myth to overturn, through its experience on a collective level, ‘modern’ sterile bourgeois society.”51 Bataille chooses to view sacrifice and gift-giving in the first instance as gratuitous, non-utilitarian, or, as he puts it, “having no ends beyond themselves” – but this is far from the case. While he is correct in characterizing such practices as related to the production of wealth, they are very much oriented toward the reproduction of existing relations of power. The act of human sacrifice as practiced among the Aztecs redounds to the credit of the sacrificer(s): it reinforces existing relations of authority, viz., the authority of those who are empowered to commission a sacrifice (in this case, the priests and aristocracy). It provides those in authority with a quasi-divine power to preside over life and death. In this sense, it is misleading to claim that sacrifice has no end beyond itself.

#### There is never, or was ever any transgression, it’s a lie designed to fuel critical discourse

Mann, 99

(Paul, Masocriticism. “The Exquisite Corpse of George Bataille” 51-71, MB)

In the end, one might have to take an even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a “Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his “Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one is hip to heterology or does it by accident, whether one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition . All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relation to the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, or the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or dépensiues in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking lies.

# 2nc

### Cap K – Link – Bataille Ignores Money

#### Their critique of energy ignores the role of money in capitalism—money is dead matter that allows the unlimited accumulation of resources with no need for expenditure. Their failure to theorize money in the political economy, prevents a critique of capitalism, the revolution of the proletariat, or a transition from a capitalist society to other economic forms through redistribution of wealth and control of the means of production

Sorenson, 2012

[Asger, philosophy of education at Aarhus University, On a universal scale: Economy in Bataille’s general economy, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 38(2) 169–197] /Wyo-MB

Bataille’s anti-authoritarian traits are also expressed in his indifference to money. Throughout the development of the general economy he thus discusses, sometimes in great detail, resources, things and commodities, just as he deals with sacrifices, gifts, labour, trade, growth, saving, accumulation and wealth; but when it comes to money, he just states, quite simply and almost in passing, that money is a form of energy.99 That means, however, that Bataille ignores a basic piece of knowledge gained by the classical political economy, namely that money, as Locke notes, has the special quality that, when recognized as of value, it allows almost unlimited accumulation of wealth. This is not the case with produced goods and not at all with living and thereby perishable resources.100 It is the very social recognition of the value of money that makes it a spe- cific social resource, where the energy precisely is depending on the actual recognition. Bataille’s disregard of money can therefore be interpreted as a disregard of what is specifically capitalist about modern society, since precisely capital could never come into existence without money in this sense.101 Bataille clearly sees that desire can be directed towards something perishable, just as it can be directed towards something immaterial like value; but apparently he has not noticed the societal mediation, which bestows on money almost magical value, that is, what Marx calls the fetish character of money.102 In the natural scientific energy per- spective of the general economy this is of course a recognition of a fictional resource, but as Locke clearly sees, the acceptance of this fiction is crucial for the development of social inequality as distinct from the naturally given inequality.103 Dead matter is socially recognized as valuable, in the form both of houses, money, jewellery and of con- sumer goods such as washing machines, and social inequality is primarily expressed through the social adaptation, organization and distribution of dead matter. In the general perspective dead matter, however, is not as perishable or explosive as living matter, and there are therefore no urgent practical reasons, nor any ontological necessities with respect to energy, which call upon the one in possession of such an excess to expend it without any retribution. In the perspective of societal economy the accumulation of wealth can be a prob- lem, since it can be a sign of surplus production and lack of purchasing power. This problem Keynesian economics solved politically by a continuous redistribution of the socially recognized dead values, that is, primarily money. It is, however, not the energy movement of life that necessitates this redistribution, but the social misery that makes the exploited masses boil over in rage against the ruling injustice. One can thus experience a social pressure from parts of society despite the exploitation that actually strips them of their natural living energy. Bataille, however, does not distinguish between use-value and exchange-value, he has no specific concept of plus-value and no systematic concept of capital either. Since he does not share the objectively orientated theory of labour-value of the classical political economy of Locke, Smith and Marx, but takes sides with the neoclassical conception of value as subjectively constituted by desire, it becomes difficult for the general economy to criticize economical inequality at the societal level. As mentioned before, accu- mulation is for Bataille not primarily a problem in relation to the societal distribu- tion of economical goods; it is mainly a problem because of the pressure generated by the surplus energy. Bataille is not really interested in the distribution of goods at a societal level, nor in the form of government in a society, and I think it therefore quite fair to characterize the general economy as apolitical in the same sense that liberalism can be considered apolitical.104

### Cap K – Link – Kritik of Utility Fuels Capitalism

#### They are wrong about utility and rationality—their desire to sacrifice utility is the logic that enables capitalism to overcome its contradictions and expand so quickly it overcomes all other alternatives—they disable a critique of capitalism or any meaningful form of social transition

Sorenson, 2012

[Asger, philosophy of education at Aarhus University, On a universal scale: Economy in Bataille’s general economy, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 38(2) 169–197] /Wyo-MB

Bataille considers his general economy a political economy, and even though it can be thought of as apolitical, one can of course detect a more or less implicit preference for a kind of economical principle, as I have also argued. The problem is that the kind of eco- nomical thinking that actually can get some legitimacy from Bataille’s general economy, precisely is a kind of economical thinking that normally is considered very questionable from a left-wing perspective. According to Jean-Joseph Goux the general economy can be considered a precursor of the postmodern way to legitimize capitalism, which is found with the modern neo-conservative ideologist George Gilder. With reference to Mauss Gilder thinks of modern capitalism as an economy of excess, which provides objects for desire, before they are in demand. Desire as such is undetermined and can be formed according to the possibilities for satisfaction, which are offered. That means that it is sup- ply that determines demand, not the other way round.105 According to Gilder capitalism is irrational as a system, and it is precisely its nucleus of play and gambling, which has secured its ideological success confronted with the rationality of socialism. In postmo- dern capitalism you do not know which object your desire will be directed towards, and all kinds of satisfaction of desire can be developed into a profit-making industrial pro- duction of objects. In such an economic system, however, one cannot distinguish at a fundamental level between necessity and luxury, that is, between needs and desire, such as it has traditionally been the case in political economy. In consumer capitalism objec- tive utility is finally reduced to a contingent choice,106 a preference, which at the same time expresses subjective needs and desire. Using this way of thinking in the development of a postmodern ideology for post- bourgeois hedonist consumer capitalism thus places Bataille, who think of himself as a radical leftist, in ‘bad company’.107 The general economy does not seem, as Bataille had hoped, to offer a clear alternative to an in-principle always restricted capitalist economy; quite on the contrary, it actually seems that the principles of general economy precisely are what capitalism needed to expand beyond its own ideological contradic- tions and limitations, in particular the conflict between neoclassical economy as a mechanical system, including the ideal of Homo economicus and then the idea of value as defined by subjective preferences, demand and desire. Economy in Bataille’s general sense thus seems to be realized as part of the neo-liberal world order, which is actually not an order at all, and the general economy can therefore be considered the ideological foundation for postmodern desire-capitalism run amok.

### Cap K – Link – Excessive Expenditure

#### Bataille’s excessive expenditure fuels capitalist-consumerist expansion

Anthony, 2010

[Ross, University of London, This is Not an Exit”: The Sacred in the Age of Consumer Capitalism, http://www.revue-silene.com/images/30/article\_23.pdf] /Wyo-MB

At the time of his death in 1962 Bataille had a bleak vision of the modern world: capitalism was reinvesting all surplus back into labor, while communism was trying to eradicate sovereign difference altogether. The modern world seemed bent on destroying all notions of the sacred. And yet it was around the time of 158 Bataille’s death that a new form of capitalism was arising – consumer capitalism, in which decadence, exuberance, waste, violence and sexuality were all emerging out of the very system which he so despised. A number of social critics point towards a kind of Batailian excess reemerging in contemporary consumer society. For example, Daniel Bell argued that the Protestant ethic had been eradicated by a society fixated on spending and material possessions 1 . This turnaround undermines the traditional value of thrift, frugality and self control, whilst simultaneously making items that were once considered a “luxury” now available to a much broader section of the population. Jean-Joseph Goux, drawing on Gilder’s Wealth and Poverty 2 , claims that Bataillian notions of waste and chance have re-merged through the vehicle of the stock market. Because a return on what is invested cannot be determined, the issue of chance becomes central to capitalism. The stock trader then, risking catastrophic loss, becomes a heroic, almost sacred figure – an image which the media has played up in films such as Wall Street (1987) and books such as The money Culture (1992). Baudrillard elaborates on this when talks of the “hero of consumption”, who has taken over from the earlier “hero of production.” These great wastrels of contemporary capitalism, in a similar vein to the American Indian Potlatch, attempt to outdo each other through competitive expenditure. He claims: It is always the excessiveness of their lives, the potential for outrageous expenditure that is exalted. Their superhuman quality is a whiff of potlatch that attaches to them […] they fulfil this function by proxy for the whole social body, like the kings heroes, priests or great parvenus of bygone ages. 3

### AT – Were Materialist

#### Battaile’s economic approach is not materialist, moves away from the general economy to study eroticism and sovereignty

Sorenson, 2012

[Asger, philosophy of education at Aarhus University, On a universal scale: Economy in Bataille’s general economy, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 38(2) 169–197] /Wyo-MB

In the wake of discussions following the publication of Hardt and Negri’s Empire in 2000 there has been a remarkable resurgence of interest in the expression ‘general econ- omy’. The notion of a general economy can be traced back to, at least, Rousseau’s article on economy in the French Encyclopedia from 1755. Here it signifies what has later become known as political economy, namely knowledge of the laws necessary to govern the household of a state.1 From this original sense, however, the reference of ‘general economy’ can be displaced to include almost every aspect of human and social life,2 and it is well known that the expression has also been discussed in such a much wider sense by Derrida and Baudrillard.3 Known is also that these discussions draw heavily on the ideas of Georges Bataille,4 and in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the death of Bataille, this article analyses his notion of general economy. Bataille’s theoretical work was published under the title La part maudite. Essai de e ́conomie ge ́ne ́rale,5 which has adequately been translated into The Accursed Share. An Essay on General Economy.6 The explicit point of departure of Bataille’s general economy was political economy,7 but in spite of this, the notion of economy eventually developed by Bataille is quite far from economy in the ordinary sense. In the light of the discussions just mentioned, this article is therefore dedicated to improve the understand- ing of the relationship between economy in an ordinary sense and economy in Bataille’s much wider sense. The main questions guiding this investigation are thus three, namely what is economy, what does Bataille mean by ‘economy’, and how can Bataille’s under- standing of economy contribute to the ordinary understanding of economy? Let me, however, just say a few words about the textual basis of this investigation. The first part of The Accursed Share was published in 1949 with the subtitle 1. La consumation, i.e. ‘1. The Consumption’. Work on part two, Histoire de l’e ́rotisme, i.e. ‘History of the Eroticism’, was first dropped in 1951; it was then rewritten in 1954, and eventually given up again the same year.8 Part three, La souveraine ́te ́, ‘The Sovereignty’ was written in the same period, but also given up in 1954.9 Bataille died in 1962, and the second and third parts did not appear as publications in his lifetime. Thus, for a long time it was common to refer to the only part published, namely the first part, as simply La part maudite i.e. The Accursed Share.10 However, since the posthumous reconstruction of parts two and three, on the basis of the original manuscripts, in his collected works in the 1970s,11 and especially since the publication of all three parts in English in the 1990s, this misunderstanding has been obvious.12 What is really important about this story, however, is that the scope of the original project indicates that Bataille had a concept of economy that has a much wider sense than the term economy normally has, and in Bataille’s general perspective the latter is simply to be labelled ‘restricted economy’.13 This must be emphasized right from the beginning and kept in mind, especially since in this article the interpretation and analysis will focus mainly on the first part, The Consumption. The reason for this is simply that it is in this first part that Bataille most systematically discusses economy in both the ordinary and his own general sense. In spite of what has just been emphasized about the general title as covering all three parts and general economy thus comprising also eroticism and sovereignty, in the following the focus will mainly be on economy as discussed in the first part, The Consumption, alias La part maudite.

### AT - Perm

#### Bataille can’t solve questions of political economy, his solutions based in desire and his conception of the general economy fail to make change

Sorenson, 2012

[Asger, philosophy of education at Aarhus University, On a universal scale: Economy in Bataille’s general economy, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 38(2) 169–197] /Wyo-MB

The theoretical-empirical perspective on economy makes it possible for Bataille to see donations of gifts and squandering with excess resources where ordinary economists see scarcity and barter between instrumentally rational egoists. In a political economy, however, theoretical analyses must be followed up by practical recommendations, and this is also the case in Bataille’s general economy. As mentioned in the introduction, Bataille considered The Accursed Share as a work about political economy, i.e. as a piece of practically orientated macro-economical thinking, and the theoretical analysis of the general economy must therefore be able to give reasons for a specifically political organization of the economy. His general recommendations about getting rid of the problematic surplus by giving gifts actually give him reasons to make some apparently very explicit political statements on the global scale, but since he does not relate to anything less than the world economy, and since he is not concerned with justice, his recommendations are beyond what would normally be called the political sphere (A). To this disappointment must be added, I will argue, that the whole idea of the general economy is based on some very problematic conceptual slides between the natural and the societal level and between what is ontologically necessary and what is merely histor- ical. By his way of conceptualizing human reality Bataille tends to disregard what is specifically political in this reality, and because of this he also seems to give up on hav- ing ideals concerning the government of society (B). And even worse, apparently the actual political economy, which is best supported by the general economy, is the kind of laissez-faire liberalist economy recommended by the modern inheritors of neoclassi- cal economy, namely the postmodern neo-liberals. However, it can be argued that Bataille’s general economy does not in the end back up a globalized capitalist economy, since it maintains the fundamental distinction between needs and desire, which will always imply a critique of capitalism (C). The attempt to overcome conceptually this opposition, together with the contradictions between theory and practice, as well as the objective and the subjective, is a philosophical challenge that makes the general economy an impressing idea of dialectical thought, but in all likelihood also an almost impossible practical political project (D).

#### Bataille’s method of critique offers no political solutions to the problem of the economy—his alternatives spur more capitalism or fascism—preventing a transition to a society outside of oppression

Sorenson, 2012

[Asger, philosophy of education at Aarhus University, On a universal scale: Economy in Bataille’s general economy, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 38(2) 169–197] /Wyo-MB

The movement of energy is regarded by Bataille as an ‘eternal necessity’,89 but we can nevertheless, as mentioned above, choose how to relate to it, i.e. whether it should be accumulated until the point of exploding, or it should be expended and squandered away before then. Bataille does not, however, go into much detail about who the we really are, and as will be clear in the following, it is actually because Bataille does not have any really good idea about how society should be organized politically. When Bataille is moralizing, he appeals to the acknowledgement of the natural ontological necessity, not to the societal or historical necessity. Furthermore the knowledge of this necessity is regarded as motivating in itself, and that means that for the human being, neither its will not its actions are bound causally by the eternal necessities of nature. Bataille thus maintains a rather traditional liberal concept of freedom, and § Marked 08:58 § this concept of freedom also puts itself through in Bataille’s general economy. With regard to economy, Mauss thus considers generous interchange of gifts as the empirically original form of exchange. Interchange of gifts presupposes a higher degree of inequality than both barter and sharing, and the result of the interchange of gifts is typically a reinforcement of the inequality, since the donor in exchange gets higher social status and thereby power, whereas the recipient loses on both scales.90 Mauss is thinking of himself and is also recognized as a socialist, but he nevertheless thinks that morality and politics should be based upon such a generosity,91 and this way of thinking practi- cally is taken over by Bataille, again with a clear conscience about what giving gifts pre- supposes and will imply.92 By Bataille the structural inequality is even radicalized to the extreme, since he considers the sun as the ultimate donor and thinks of political economy only in the global perspective of a world government; but where Durkheim and Mauss consider society as a whole as analogous to an organism, which demands reasonable but also authoritarian, government,93 Bataille considers sovereignty to be the essence of every single human being and societal life as in itself reifying. Bataille thereby shar- pens the Marxist critique of capitalism as well as the classical liberal contradiction between the individual and the society, and even though Bataille does not regard equality as being significant politically, as is the case with traditional liberals and socialists,94 he clearly distances himself from authority as a legitimate principle of government.95 Without acceptance of authority, however, it is not possible to make politics in an ordinary sense, that is, no regulation of social life can take place. The result is that as a political economy on the normal political scale the general economy turns out to be almost equivalent to a very liberal market economy, that is, an economy with few limita- tions. In the classical liberalism of Adam Smith the societal rule primarily takes place at the individual level, since every human being is gifted with the ability of having moral sympathies. The strong moral appeal of the general economy shows that for Bataille the main instrument for regulation is also the morality of the individual. Apparently he ima- gines that a fundamental change can be achieved in the moral outlook of every individ- ual, in order for him or her not just to accumulate, but also to consume. As mentioned, the general economy makes Bataille favour the bourgeois society in relation to the communist, not because of justice, but because of the flow of energy. What is really worrying, however, is that the prime examples analysed of societies in ideal balance with regard to the flow of energy, i.e. pre-Columbian societies in America and Tibet before the Chinese invasion, are societies with strongly authoritarian forms of govern- ment, and that this does not seem to bother Bataille that much. Even though Bataille considers his general economy as a political economy, apparently he is not worried by the various forms the political government of a society can take, i.e. monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. The apolitical perspective of Bataille’s general economy seems to go hand in hand with an apolitical understanding of social reality as a whole. Such a way of understand- ing social reality is characteristic of the early Protestant liberals, namely the idea of a single individual facing the absolute. This absolute is first of all God, then the state, but can eventually also be the market, when it has been hypostasized as a self-sustaining entity, as is the case in neoclassical economy. The ideal typically gained from this way of thinking is freedom in the negative sense of ‘freedom from’. What is missing in such an understanding of social reality, is the importance of all the institutions of a modern society, which mediate politically between the absolute and the particular at various levels. Recognizing the value of such intermediary institutions, as was also done by Durkheim,96 typically spurs ideals about a ‘freedom to’, namely to participate in the civic rule of society.97 The point to be made here is that, in spite of the critique levelled against both fascism and communism, Bataille does not stress any ideals about how soci- ety should be governed, and the reason is probably that he never got over the qualms of parliamentary democracy so widespread in Europe among both leftist and rightist in the 1920s and 1930s.98

# 1nr

#### Either they set up a reason to vote aff, which establishes a utility value, and they lose because this contradicts with their 1ac.

Fortuna 10

(John J., University of California Santa Barbara, approved Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, “Ordinary Sacrifices: An Approach to Loss in Democratic Politics,” March, 2010, http://gradworks.umi.com/3398839.pdf//wyo-mm)

By separating sacrifice and loss from a logic of utility Bataille at the very least clarifies what it really means to engage in a sacrifice. Sacrifice is no longer simply a stand-in for what is really an economic logic of trade-offs. Bataille clearly means to highlight the anguish and pain involved in sacrificial loss by incorporating the figure of death into his analysis. Just as physical death represents a kind of ultimate finality, the loss experienced in sacrifice is similarly final—one does not relinquish in sacrifice with the thought of what one might gain from doing so; it is rather the case that one simply sacrifices. Sacrifice is not about trading off one good or value in favor of another; but instead consists in the absolute relinquishment of a given good or value—and the mental and psychological states which accompany such a relinquishment. Conceptualizing loss in this way more accurately illuminates for citizens what is really at stake when the operation of politics may at certain times ask, and at other times command, that one engage in sacrifice. 27