# \*\*\*1NC

# 1

#### [A.] Interpretation: Production is distinct from transmission and distribution pipelines

US EIA no date[Glossary, http://205.254.135.7/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=A]

Production, oil and gas: The lifting of oil and gas to the surface and gathering, treating, field

processing (as in the case of processing gas to extract liquid hydrocarbons), and field storage.

The production function shall normally be regarded as terminating at the outlet valve on the lease

or field production storage tank. If unusual physical or operational circumstances exist, it may be

more appropriate to regard the production function as terminating at the first point at which oil,

gas, or gas liquids are delivered to a main pipeline, a common carrier, a refinery, or a marine

terminal.

#### [B.] Violation: affirmative removes restrictions

#### [C.] Reason to prefer:

#### Ground: Components of the supply chain outside of production are key to negative capacity to challenge the necessity of adding more supply. -Pipeline ground kills transmission efficiency counterplans and case takeout arguments against production centered approaches on energy. -Production centered ground is sufficient because it has structural market effects that allow the affirmative to implicate the other sectors.

#### Limits: Components of the supply chain outside of production unlimits affirmative potential and predictable constraints for the negative -There are tons of potential pipeline affirmatives - Alaska, Artic, Keystone, -Allowing preproduction opens the affirmative to directly promoting other upstream sections of the chain as well - includes exploration affs, refinery affs, and marketing affs.

#### [D.] Voting Issue: competitive equity and education.

# 2

#### A. OUR INTERPRETATION: THE AFFIRMATIVE SHOULD PRESENT A TOPICAL PLAN OF ACTION AND DEFEND THAT THEIR POLICY SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

#### B. DEFINITIONS:

#### 1. THE TOPIC IS DEFINED BY THE PHRASE FOLLOWING THE COLON – THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE AGENT OF THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL DEBATERS

Webster’s 2K

Guide to Grammar and Writing 2K; <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### 2. “RESOLVED” EXPRESSES INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary 2K

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### 3. “SHOULD” DENOTES AN EXPECTATION OF ENACTING A PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary – 2K

[www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### 4. THE U.S.F.G. is three branches of government

Encarta 2K

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2K [http://encarta.msn.com]

Supreme Court of the United States, highest court in the United States and the chief authority in the judicial branch, one of three branches of the United States federal government.

#### 5. OUR DEFINITION EXCLUDES ACTION BY SMALLER POLITICAL GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS.

Black’s Law 99

Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition Ed. Bryan A. Garner (chief) ‘99

Federal government 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters.

#### C. VIOLATION – THE AFFIRMATIVE IS NOT AN INSTRUMENTAL AFFIRMATION OF THE RESOLUTION –

#### D. REASONS TO PREFER –

#### 1. PREDICTABILITY: the resolution sets the parameters for the debate. Affirmatives would always win if there wasn’t predictable negative ground.

#### PRIVATE ACTOR FIAT BAD: advocating a personal movement or idea is unfair as there’s no literature base to counter it. Running a topical version of their affirmative solves all of their offense.

#### SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE SOLVES: topics are meaningless if we don’t debate both sides: topic-specific education outweighs general education.

#### Switch-side debate good—direct engagement with identities we don’t identify with is critical to overcome the existential resentment we feel towards the Other

Glover 10

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

In this vein, Connolly sees the goal of political engagement as securing a positive ‘ethos of engagement’ in relation to popular movements which alter existing assumptions, that is, a positive attitude towards attempts at pluralization. Connolly suggests we do so through thecultivation of two essential virtues: agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. 88 Agonistic respect is defined as a situation whereby each political actor arrives at an appreciation for the fact that their own self-definition is bound with that of others, as well as recognition of the degree to which each of these projections is profoundly contestable. 89 While Connolly notes that agonistic respect is a ‘kissing cousin’ of liberal tolerance, he distinguishes it by saying that the latter typically carries ‘the onus of being at the mercy of a putative majority that often construes its own position to be beyond question.’ 90 Thus, agonistic respect is a reciprocal democratic virtue meant to operate across relations of difference, and Connolly deploys it as a regulative ideal for the creation agonistic democratic spaces. 91 In a somewhat related way, the virtue of ‘critical responsiveness’ also attempts to move beyond liberal tolerance. 92 Critical responsiveness entails ‘ careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.’ 93 Critical responsiveness is not pity, charity, or paternalism but implies an enhanced degree of concern for others, driven by the cultivation of reciprocal empathic concern 21 for that which you are not. 94 This attitude cannot be developed in an abstract relation to these new and existing forms of radical cultural, political, religious, and philosophical difference. Critical responsiveness above all requires that one ‘get[s] a whiff of experiences heretofore alien to [us]’, recognizing that while this may be unsettling or cause discomfort, direct engagement is the means by which you, ‘work tactically on yourself and others to overcome existential resentment of this persistent condition of human being.’

#### E. VOTING ISSUE FOR GROUND, COMPETITIVE EQUITY AND JURISDICTION.

#### THIS ARGUMENT PROVIDES A-PRIORI REASONS TO VOTE NEGATIVE. YOU MUST USE YOUR BALLOT TO RATIFY CONSTRAINTS ON DISCOURSE TO PRESERVE A POLITICALLY-ENABLING DISCUSSION

Shively 2K

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2K, p. 179.

To put this point another way, it turns out that to be open to all things is, in effect, to be open to nothing. While the ambiguists have commendable reasons for wanting to avoid closure—to avoid specify­ing what is not allowed or celebrated in their political vision—they need to say "no" to some things in order to be open to things in general. They need to say "no" to certain forms of contest, if only to protect contest in general. For if one is to be open to the principles of democracy, for example, one must be dogmatically closed to the prin­ciples of fascism. If one would embrace tolerance, one must rigidly reject intolerance. If one would support openness in political speech and action, one must ban the acts of political intimidation, violence or recrimination that squelch that openness. If one would expand delib­eration and disruption, one must set up strict legal protections around such activities. And if one would ensure that citizens have reason to engage in political contest—that it has practical meaning and import for them—one must establish and maintain the rules and regulations and laws that protect democracy. In short, openness requires certain clear limits, rules, closure. And to make matters more complex, these structures of openness cannot simply be put into place and forgotten. They need to be taught to new generations of citizens, to be retaught and reenforced among the old, and as the political world changes, to be shored up, rethought, adapted, and applied to new problems and new situations. It will not do, then, to simply assume that these structures are permanently viable and secure without significant work or justification on our part; **nor will it do to talk about resisting or subverting them**. Indeed, they are such valuable and yet vulnerable goods that **they require the most unflag­ging and firm support that we can give them**.

#### THE DELIBERATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR ADVOCACY ARE A PRIOR QUESTION – PRE-CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT ARE NECESSARY FOR YOUR DECISION TO HAVE ANY POLITICAL VALUE

Gunderson 2K

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2K p. 104-105.

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separa­tion. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political deci­sion-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engage­ment with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet delibera­tion is also a form of political action that precedes the actual taking and implementation of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators require something to deliberate about and that deliberation presumes certain institutional structures and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting par­tisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

# 3

#### SEEMINGLY INDIVIDUAL PRIVATE ACTIONS DIALECTICALLY CREATE DEPENDENCE—THEY TURN THEMSELVES

Lichman, 82

(Richard, Philosopher, The Production of Desire. pg 22, uw/mjs).

Now the fact that individuals private actions dialectically constitute the social structure of dependence manifests itself concretely as the "complete emptying out" of these individuals under the domination of "total alienation." The abstract, formal discrepancy, between intention and consequence reveals itself concretely as the dominance of external compulsion over the socially atomized individual. We have thereby reached that aspect of Marx's analysis that is the counterpart to the Freudian unconscious, for both can be described analogously as operating behind one's back, in the depths, through the dominance of overpowering objects. Nor is this convergence an artificial imposition; rather, it represents the agreement noted in the first chapter, that individual life is the manifestation of powerful forces that cannot be adequately represented in consciousness.

#### THE NARRATIVIZATION OF POLITICS IS INHERENTLY CONSERVATIVE—IT IS THE EMBRACE OF CAPITALIST EXCESS AND DESTROYS ANY ATTEMPT TO RESIST OR OPPOSE CAPITALISM ON ANY GROUNDS\*\*

FOSTER (Dept of Sociology at Oregon) 1997

[John Bellamy, “In Defense of History”, In Defense of History, ed. Foster & Wood //wyo-tjc]

The weaknesses of postmodernism-from an emancipatory perspective- thus far overshadow its strengths. Missing from Foucault's analysis, like that of postmodernism generally, is any conception of a counter-order to the disciplinary orders described. In the more extreme case of "textual postmodernists"-those postmodernist thinkers like Derrida, as distinct from Foucault, who deny any reality outside the text-the political and historical weaknesses from a left perspective are even more glaring. By undermining the very concept of history-in any meaningful sense beyond mere story-telling-such theorists have robbed critical analysis of what has always been its most indispensable tool.'8 The denial within postmodernist theory of the validity of historical cri- tique covers up what is really at issue: the denial of the historical critique of capitalism, leading to a convergence between left thought infected by Nietzsche and the dominant liberal "end of history" conception. The danger of such ahistorical or anti-historical views, as E.P. Thompson observed, is that one loses sight not of "reason in history" in some abstract sense, but rather of "the reasons of power and the reasons of money."9 Historical materialism at its best provides a way out of this dilemma. This is not to ignore the fact that Marxism-which has sometimes given rise to its own crude interpretations and historical travesties, as in the case of Stalinism-has frequently been identified with the kind of "totalizations" and "essentialisms" that postmodernist theorists have singled out. As Thompson pointed out in a 1977 essay on Christopher Caudwell, Marxism has sometimes relied on " `essentialist' tricks of mind," the "tendency to intellectualize the social process"-"the rapid delineation of the deep proc- ess of a whole epoch." These are things that the historian (and social scientists in general) should guard against. But to abandon theory and historical explanation entirely in order to avoid "essentialism" and "foun- dationalism" is a bit like throwing out the baby in order to keep the bathwater clean. Marx himself provided another model, actively opposing theory (even "Marxist" theory) that purported to be "suprahistorical." In his Theses on Feuerbach, he presented what still ranks as the most thorough- going critique of what he called the "essentialist" conception of human beings and nature. Indeed, historical materialism has long engaged in its own self-critique, precisely in order to expel the kinds of "essentialisms," "positivisms," and "structuralisms" that have intruded on the philosophy of praxis itself-a self-critique that has produced the insights of theorists like Gramsci, Sartre, Thompson, and Raymond Williams.20 These thinkers distanced themselves from the positivistic "official Marx- ism" that grew out of the Second International and later turned into a caricature of itself in the form of Stalinism. Yet they held firm to the critique of capitalism and their commitment to the struggles of the oppressed. Moreover, these particular examples tell us that if what has sometimes been called "the postmodern agenda"-consisting of issues like identity, culture, and language-is to be addressed at all, this can only be accomplished within a historical context. And here one might openly wonder with Foucault "what difference there could ultimately be between being a historian and being a Marxist." When placed within a more holistic historical materialist context-ani- mated by the concept of praxis-the problems raised by postmodernism look entirely different. As David McNally says, "Language is not a prison- house, but a site of struggle." What the contributions in this volume have in common is the insistence that issues like language, culture, nationality, race, gender, the environment, revolution, and history itself are only effec- tively analyzed within a context that is simultaneously historical in charac- ter, materialist (in the sense of focusing on concrete practices), and revolutionary. Such analyses do not abandon the hope of transcending capitalism, nor of the notion of human progress as a possible outcome of historical strug- gles. It is said that Nicholas I, Czar of Russia, issued an order banning the word "progress." Today we no longer believe, in a nineteenth century sense, in automatic human progress, embodying some definite content-the idea that the Czar found so threatening. But this does not mean, as the philoso- pher Michael Oakeshott contended with respect to political activity in the 1950s, that we "sail a boundless and bottomless sea" that has "neither starting-point nor appointed direction" and that our only task is "to keep afloat on an even keel." History-as centuries of struggle and indeed pro- gress suggest-is more meaningful than that. To abandon altogether the concept of progress, in the more general sense of the possibility of progres- sive human emancipation, would only be to submit to the wishes of the powers that be. Such political disengagement by intellectuals on the left in the present epoch could only mean one thing: the total obeisance to capi- tal.21 The irony of post-modernism is that while purporting to have transcended modernity, it abandons from the start all hope of transcending capitalism itself and entering a post-capitalist era. Postmodernist theory is therefore easily absorbed within the dominant cultural frame and has even given rise recently to texts such as Postmodern Marketing, which attempts to utilize the insights of thinkers like Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and Baudillard to market goods within a capitalist economy. Perhaps this will be the final destiny of postmodernist theory-its absorption by the vast marketing apparatus of the capitalist economy, adding irony and color to a commercial order that must constantly find new ways to insinuate itself into the every- day lives of the population. Meanwhile, historical materialism will remain the necessary intellectual ground for all those who seek, not to revel in the "carnival" of capitalist productive and market relations, but to transcend them.22

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural and historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

# Case

#### Policy debate is a prerequisite to the solvency of their claims- absent this the aff becomes an individualistic fetish concerned only with our internal awareness of problems while allowing us to not take responsibility for our actions should we organize and achieve social change

Chandler 2009

[David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Questioning Global Political Activism”, What is Radical Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 81-2 uwyo//amp]

People often argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, Questioning Global Political Activism 79 anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to MakePoverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones – there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in them-selves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society.This is illustrated by the ‘celebration of differences’ at marches, protests and social forums. It is as if people are more concerned with the creationof a sense of community through differences than with any political debate, shared agreement or collective purpose. It seems to me that if someone was really concerned with ending war or with ending poverty or with overthrowing capitalism, political views and political differences would be quite important. Is war caused by capitalism, by human nature, or by the existence of guns and other weapons? It would seem important to debate reasons, causes and solutions; it would also seem necessary to give those political differences an organisational expression if there wasa serious project of social change.Rather than a political engagement with the world, it seems that radi-cal political activism today is a form of social disengagement – expressedin the anti-war marchers’ slogan of ‘Not in My Name’, or the assump-tion that wearing a plastic bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary isthe same as engaging in political debate. In fact, it seems that polit-ical activism is a practice which isolates individuals who think thatdemonstrating a personal commitment or awareness of problems is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as uncaring or brainwashed by consumerism. The narcissistic aspects of the practice of this type of global politics are expressed clearly by indi-viduals who are obsessed with reducing their carbon footprint, derivingtheir idealised sense of social connection from an ever-increasing aware-ness of themselves and by giving political meaning to every personalaction.Global ethics appear to be in demand because they offer us a sense of social connection and meaning, while at the same time giving us thefreedom to construct the meaning for ourselves, to pick our causes of concern, and enabling us to be free of responsibilities for acting as partof a collective association, for winning an argument or for success at the ballot-box.Whiletheappealofglobalethicalpoliticsisanindividualisticone, the lack of success or impact of radical activism is also reflected inits rejection of any form of social movement or organization.

#### No KXL contribution to climate change – at best .0001 degree.

Chip Knappenberger 3/5/12 Mr. Knappenberger holds an M.S. degree in Environmental Sciences (1990) from the University of Virginia His over 20 years of experience as a climate researcher have included 10 years with the Virginia State Climatology Office and 13 years with New Hope Environmental Services, Inc. The Climate Impact of Keystone XL? About 0.0001°C/yr March 5, 2012 http://www.masterresource.org/2012/03/keystone-xl-climate-0001cyr/#more-19033

Last month, a group of 15 climate scientists (included the now disgraced Peter Gleick) sent a letter to Congress expressing their displeasure over the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline. President Obama has weighed in against approval, but Congress wants a green light to allow construction of the 1,700-mile, $7 billion project. Most recently, Bill Clinton weighed in for the pipeline, indicating just how deep the positives of the project are for the U.S. and world oil market. So why are physical scientists getting political about a market-friendly pipeline to deliver oil from the Athabascan oil sands in Alberta, Canada, to various refinery locations in the Midwestern U.S. and ultimately the Gulf Coast? The letter (reprinted at the end of this post) states that in addition to the local environmental impacts of oil sand mining (see here and here for a first-person account from Reason magazine’s Ron Bailey of the operation), burning such oil “on top of conventional fossil fuels will leave our children and grandchildren a climate system with consequences that are out of their control.” The 15 climate scientists added: When other huge oil fields or coal mines were opened in the past, we knew much less about the damage that the carbon they contained would do to the earth’s climate and its oceans. Now that we do know, it’s imperative that we move quickly to alternate forms of energy—and that we leave the tar sands in the ground. What Is the Climate Impact of the Keystone XL Pipeline? As a climate scientist myself, I can profess to knowing the same thing that the 15 signatories know about what the impact that carbon contained in fossil fuel reserves will have on the climate. And I can (as can they) calculate how much of an effect the Keystone XL pipeline will probably have on global temperatures. For some reason (hmm?) the 15 climate scientists chose not to include that information in their letter to Congress. But here it is: The rise in global temperatures resulting from extracting and burning the oil delivered by Keystone XL at full capacity is about 0.0001°C/yr. Keystone XL by the Numbers The Keystone XL Pipeline was to deliver about 800,000 barrels of crude oil a day to U.S. refineries. Various estimates have been made of the total carbon dioxide associated with producing and burning a Keystone XL-delivered barrel of oil (or the products derived therefrom, such as gasoline) for energy, and they generally arrive at a number somewhere around 0.62 tons of CO2 per barrel (see here for a derivation of that number). Multiplying the amount of CO2 per barrel with a production of 800,000 barrels a day, 365 days a year, gets you an annual total CO2 emitted to the atmosphere from oil delivered by the Keystone XL Pipeline of 181 million metric tons. How much “global warming” does that get you? In a previous Master Resource article, I calculated, based on observations of CO2 emissions and temperature changes during the past 50 years, that it takes about 1,767,250 million metric tons of CO2 emissions to raise the global temperature 1°C. In fact, I think I suggested that everyone should jot this number down and pin it to a convenient place for ready reference next time someone was throwing around CO2 emissions reductions expected to result from some regulation. In this case, instead of using it to calculate the “savings” in global temperature rise from some perspective emissions control regulation, we can use it to calculate how much additional global warming that the oil flowing through the Keystone XL pipeline will produce when burned. To do so, we take 181 mmtCO2/yr and divide it by 1,767,250 mmtCO2/°C. And we get 0.0001°C/yr, that is, one ten thousandths of a degree Celsius of temperature rise from the Canadian tar sands oil delivered by the Keystone XL pipeline each year. Obviously, the climate scientists who wrote to Congress must have other concerns than the inconsequential and undetectable global climate change that would directly result from the Keystone XL-delivered oil. The Camel’s Nose When it comes to global climate impacts, the Keystone XL pipeline itself has virtually none.

#### Keystone failure leads to emissions and tanker spills but pipeline spills into aquifers are unlikely.

**McNally**, 11/29/**2011** (Scott – research intern for the White House Council on Environmental Quality, Keystone XL? It’s Not an Environmental Question, Scientific American, p. http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/2011/11/29/guest-post-keystone-xl-its-not-an-environmental-question/)

Canada already produces almost two million barrels of oil per day from oil sands (National Energy Board of Canada – www.neb-one.gc.ca) and they aren’t going to just stop doing it because America says no to this pipeline. If the Keystone XL pipeline is blocked, TransCanada can just build a pipeline to the west coast of British Columbia and use tankers to move the oil to Asia. (By the way, they already have a major pipeline to the west coast – The Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline, and almost a dozen other major pipelines that come into the United States). You might argue, ‘Environmentalists in Canada will stop that pipeline.’ No they won’t. Pipelines and massive oil sands operations already exist. Keystone XL did not meet significant resistance in Canada, and as long as it is routed correctly, neither will a pipeline to the coast. The oil sands are an incredible source of jobs and revenue for Canada, and they will find a way to route the pipeline that does not meet untenable political resistance. Just like Canada will keep producing, we will keep importing. If we don’t import from Canada, we will import more oil from the Middle East or Africa. The same amount of oil will be produced and consumed globally either way, but in the ‘no Keystone’ case, the oil will just have to travel farther, which could mean more carbon emissions because of transportation. The previously referenced Ensys report also mentions that, “Together, growing Canadian oil sands imports and U.S. demand reduction have the potential to very substantially reduce U.S. dependency on non-Canadian foreign oil, including from the Middle East.” Furthermore, we are lucky to get the oil. Canada already exports to Asia, where the market is actually cheaper to access. That is because to export from Canada to China, the required pipeline will be much shorter than to the U.S. Gulf Coast, and pipelines are very expensive (About $1 million per mile). As it was put in the Ensys Keystone XL Report: “costs for transporting [Canadian oil sands] crudes to major markets in northeast Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) via pipeline and tanker are lower than to transport the same crudes via pipeline to the U.S. Gulf Coast.” There is valid concern over pipelines crossing sensitive areas, including aquifers. The pipeline should be routed so that any potential spill will have the least impact possible, as small spills should be expected to occur occasionally. However, the odds that oil spilled from a pipeline will actually contaminate an aquifer are low, and pipeline spills tend to be much less severe than tanker spills. The bottom line is this: if we don’t build a pipeline over land, the alternative to ship, in tankers, across oceans. The pipeline is the less risky environmental choice. For the record, I believe very strongly that we need to reduce carbon emissions. The quickest, easiest, least expensive, least disruptive way to reduce carbon emissions is to stop using so much energy. Stop driving, turn off your air conditioner. If we are serious about reducing carbon emissions, we have to get serious about using less energy and using it more efficiently. Blocking Keystone XL will not get us any closer to solving the climate problem.

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#### KXL competitor – Enridge’s gateway pipeline is far worse for natives.

John Daly 4/20/12 Stung by the Keystone XL Debacle, Canada Looks Eastwardshttp://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Thwarted-by-U.S.-Marginalizing-the-Keystone-XL-Pipeline-Canada-Looks-Eastwards.html

So, what’s on the drawing boards to replace Keystone XL? First, the $5.54 billion, 731-mile Northern Gateway pipeline, proposed by Enridge Inc., which would carry 525,000 barrels a day (bpd) of Alberta's oil sands to a supertanker port in Kitimat, British Columbia. But opposition to the pipeline has swiftly mounted, led by Canada’s Indian community. The proposed pipeline route crosses land owned and claimed by Indian tribes and nations who worry that the pipeline will leak and foul rivers that are important salmon spawning grounds, while Indian groups in British Colombia argue that the coastline is too rugged for supertankers and that an oil spill is inevitable. The solution? Enbridge company is offering the Indian tribes about $1 billion dollars for "community building" and a 10 percent share in the project if they drop their opposition, while Harper’s government said that it will force time limits on regulators reviewing the pipeline plan, as it wants Northern Gateway approved within two years, despite opposition by Indians as well as Canadian and U.S. environmentalists. Nor is Northern Gateway the only energy transit project in the works, as on 10 April the British Colombia Environmental Assessment Office approved increasing the carrying capacity by 36 percent of the proposed $1 billion Pacific Trails natural gas pipeline. Pacific Trails is designed to transport natural gas from northeast British Colombia to Kitimat for export overseas. The pipeline project is owned by a consortium of EOG Resources, Apache and Encana, which also owns the $4.5 billion liquefied natural gas plant proposed for Kitimat. Indigenous opposition should not be discounted, as the Northern Gateway pipeline would pass through the territory of indigenous communities including the Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council, the Haida Nation, and the Yinka Dene Alliance, many of which have not signed treaties with the Canadian government, giving them heavy leverage in Ottawa to stop or significantly delay the pipeline because their land has not been ceded to the federal government. And 130 communities are strongly opposing the pipeline and tanker project, signing the Save the Fraser Declaration and the Coastal First Nation Declaration. Indigenous communities whose territories make up more than 50 percent of the combined pipeline and tanker route do not support this project and up to now have banned oil tankers and pipelines using their indigenous laws and authority, which are recognized under Canadian and international law, vowing to “form an unbroken wall of opposition from the U.S. border to the Arctic Ocean.”

#### Reapplication for the northern section of the pipeline makes now key.

Dinan, Stephen, May 4, 2012, Reporter for the Washington Times, Obama to get do- over Keystone Pipeline, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/4/obama-get-do-over-keystone-pipeline/

TransCanada announced it has asked for permits to build the pipeline into Nebraska, and will eventually submit a new route skirting environmentally sensitive lands in Nebraska — the sticking point that caused the [Obama administration](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/barack-obama/) to reject its previous application.In a statement, [TransCanada](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/transcanada/) President [Russ Girling](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/russ-girling/) made it clear he was appealing to Mr. Obama’s own stated goals of boosting American energy supplies. He also said the thousands of pages of environmental reviews already completed for the earlier application should convince the president to speed this new permit along.“The multibillion-dollar Keystone XL pipeline project will reduce the United States’ dependence on foreign oil and support job growth by putting thousands of Americans to work,” [Mr. Girling](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/russ-girling/) said

#### Turn – creates consensus – key to renewable policy.

Michael Schwartz 1/23/12 The Keystone Pipeline: Moving from Confrontation to Consensus CEO, New Wave Energy Capital Partners http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/01/sizing-up-obamas-keystone-pipe-1.php#2152627

Establishes actionable goals for procurement of US origin goods and services associated with oil sands development and pipeline construction/operation An alternative routing for the pipeline which avoids environmentally sensitive areas and thereby reduces the impact of pipeline construction and operation The heightened concerns about a potential disruption of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf only emphasize the importance of the role of the Keystone Pipeline and oil sands derived crude supply in enhancing US energy security and supporting economic recovery. Notwithstanding the merits of alternative fuels in the long-term, we must act today to protect the vital interests of the United States over the next years to come. With this in mind, let’s use the disapproval of the Keystone application as an opportunity to convert the issue from a source of vitriol to a basis for consensus building. This can be done by having stakeholders come together to support approval by the State Department based upon a new project submittal and developing a schedule for project review that allows for full assessment of the Pipeline’s environmental impact and the negotiation of an acceptable agreement that would address key environmental and economic issues surrounding both oil sands and the pipeline. Although the confrontational politics of the last several months suggests that it is not likely that any material progress can be achieved on almost any matter of significance, there is strong indication that the American public wants its political leadership to place country over partisanship. Constructive and timely action on the Keystone Pipeline would represent a good first step toward to demonstrating that we have functional and responsive government willing to act in the best interests of the public. Further, an agreement around Keystone could serve as a foundation for a broader consensus that could allow us to make progress around other energy initiatives.

# \*\*\*2NC

### 2NC A2 Permutation (General)

#### THIRD, THE AFF MAY TALK A GOOD GAME ON THE PERMUTATION, BUT THEIR APROPRIATION IS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO DISARM MARXISM OF ITS RADICAL POTENTIAL AS WELL AS MASKING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION OF SURPLUS-LABOR—THIS IS WHY YOU CANNOT PERMUTE A METHOD—IT STRIPS OUT ALL OF THE CONCEPTUAL THEORY THAT ALLOWS US TO BOTH UNDERSTAND THE WORLD AND TO CREATE A PRAXIS TO END OPPRESSION.

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups

. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). MARKEDYet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### FIFTH, DISADS TO THE PERM—

#### A) PARTICULARISM-- SINGLE ISSUE RESISTANCE IS EASILY CO-OPTED AND MARGINALIZED—LABOR IS THE ONLY ISSUE THAT CANNOT BE INTEGRATED AND DESTROYED BY CAPITAL—THIS UNIVERSAL IS KEY TO UPROOT THE ENTIRE SYSTEM\*\*

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, 40// wyo]

However, historically/epochally defined non-integrability, no matter how important for the future, cannot guarantee success on its own. Switching the allegiance of disappointed socialists from the working class to so-called ‘new social movements’ (praised now in opposition to, and by discarding altogether the emancipatory potential of, labour) must be considered, therefore, far too premature and naive. Single issue movements, even if they fight for non-integrable causes, can be picked off and marginalized one by one, because they cannot lay claim to representing a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the given order as a mode of social metabolic control and system of societal reproduction. This is what makes focusing on the socialist emancipatory potential of labour more important today than ever before. For labour is not only non-integrable (in contrast to some historically specific political manifestations of labour, like reformist social democracy, which may be rightly characterized as integrable and indeed in the last few decades also completely integrated), but — precisely as the only feasible structural alternative to capital — can provide the comprehensive strategic framework within which all ‘single issue’ emancipatory movements can successfully make their common cause for the survival of humanity.

#### SIXTH, IT’S TRY OR DIE—THE SLIGHTEST RISK OF A LINK DOOMS US TO EXTINCTION

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus, Philosophy, Univ. of Sussex) ‘01   
[lstvan, Socialism or Barbarism: From the American Century to the Crossroads, p. 37-38]

Those who talk about the ‘third way” as the solution to our dilemma, asserting that there can be no room for the revival of a radical mass movement, either want to deceive us by cynically calling their slavish acceptance of the ruling order “the third way,’ or fail to realize the gravity of the situation, putting their faith in a wishfully non-conflictual positive outcome that has been promised for nearly a century but never approximated even by one inch. The uncomfortable truth of the matter is that if there is no future for a radical mass movement in our time, there can be no future for humanity itself. § Marked 09:03 § If I had to modify Rosa Luxemburg’s dramatic words, in relation to the dangers we now face, I would add to ‘socialism or barbarism” this qualification: “barbarism if we are lucky.” For the extermination of humanity is the ultimate concomitant of capital’s destructive course of development. And the world of that third possibility, beyond the alternatives of “socialism or barbarism,” would be fit only for cockroaches. which are said to be able to endure lethally high levels of nuclear radiation.

### Link

#### STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL ACCESS IS A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY OF LIBERAL MYTHS

#### Piccioto 1982

[Sol. (Lectures in law at Warwick University. Works on the Converence of Socialist Economicsts as an editor of its journal *Capital and Class*). Marxism and Law. 1982. pg 178//uwyo-stannard]

The activities of "law enforcement" officials are structured by this form of generally applicable laws retroactively applied to individual conduct. This mediation of the "application" of laws is also carried out of course above all by the "professionals," the lawyers. This raises all the familiar problems of "access" to the law-the cost, social and cultural barriers, etc. Seen in this light, the pressure to make the law equally accessible to all is simply a desperate attempt to maintain the credibility of the liberal myths. However, this is not to say that it is not important to demystify law, especially to deprofessionalize it. Here again we can note the lessons of the past few years of militancy around the law in Britain, and the sharp dichotomy between the line of "law for the poor" or "you too have rights" (see, for example, Hodge 1 974) and the struggles to work towards a demystification (for example, Release 1978).

#### Marxism must be a prefigurative for an Ecojustice Movement [May need retagged]

Kovel 11

[Joel Kovel, Social Studies, Bard College, “On Marx and Ecology” Version of record first published: 10 Feb 2011, Google scholar, Date Accessed: December 2012, Pg 9, \\wyo-bb]

A key principle of ecosocialist practice in a time when these potentials are still weak may be called ‘‘prefiguration.’’ It involves the dual recognition, first, that any socialist outcome is very far off given the hegemony of capital; and second, that it is possible to determine and choose between courses of action according to which contains the more vital germ of an ecologically integral future. For example, the politics of climate change include one set of choices organized around ‘‘cap and trade,’’ a means of creating a commercialized system of pollution credits, and on another side, a set organized around ‘‘climate justice’’ movements; these entail means of ‘‘keeping the oil in the soil’’ and are built around the needs and claims of indigenous folk who happen to be in the way of corporate initiatives to extract resources. Obviously the former is the province of capital, and the latter, of its victims. Hence the path of climate justice\*a project grounded in class struggle\*is to be chosen as prefigurative of an ecosocialist future. The same would hold, it must be added, for any practice carried forth in the name of justice. For justice, like freedom, is a necessary constituent of integral human ecosystems.

### Impact Level

#### Earth is doomed by Capitalism- Destabilizing ecosystems globally that will collapse civilization

Kovel 11

[Joel Kovel, Social Studies, Bard College, “On Marx and Ecology” Version of record first published: 10 Feb 2011, Google scholar, Date Accessed: December 2012, Pg 4, \\wyo-bb]

I am honored to be here to explore with you the relation of Marxism to ecological civilization. Although the title of this conference may seem obscure to the average person, its importance becomes clear once we realize that the phrase, ‘‘ecological civilization,’’ means civilization restored to sanity in its relations with nature. This is in recognition of the grim fact that our planet Earth\*including all nations, the United States, where I am from, and China, where we meet today\*is undergoing a great ‘‘ecological crisis.’’ Though humanity is part of nature, it has become radically estranged from nature. This has introduced an exponentially expanding set of destabilizations in the ecosystems that represent our relations with nature. Whether expressed as climate change, species loss, pollution, soil loss, or any of the indices of a traumatized nature, the ecological crisis, unless creatively resolved, signifies the downfall of civilization and perhaps the extinction of our species. It is, simply, the greatest challenge to humankind in all history.

#### NEXT, THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—IT IS THIS LOGIC THAT MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE

DYER-WITHERFORD (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) 1999   
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. MARKEDToday, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

# \*\*\*1NR

### F/w

#### SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE: The net-benefits are both epistemic and ontological: epistemic because prepared, competitive discourse and required listening to both sides of an argument is a prerequisite for critical reasoning and interested inquiry, and ontological because it affirms a method of living that is the only antidote to the violence of the affirmative’s universalist dogma, which is root of violence and genocide

Roberts-Miller 3

[Patricia, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at UT Austin, “Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, but not act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibility for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banality of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters.

It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in both rhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

#### Policymaking/state politics good-Engaging in the aff recreates the opiate politics of religion which is satisfied by the illusion of change without ever demanding actual societal transformation-this reinforces the practice of self-gratification without praxis, allowing for irrational and unaccountable policymaking

Chandler 2009

[David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Questioning Global Political Activism”, What is Radical Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 81-2 uwyo//amp]

The stakes seem to exist largely at a global level at the same time as what is at stake in domestic politics seems to be increasingly diminished. However, politics is no less important to many of us today. It is just that the nature and practices of this politics are different. We are less likely to engage in the formal politics of representation – of elections and governments – but in post-territorial or global politics, a politics where there is much less division between the private sphere and the public one. This type of politics is on the one hand ‘global’ but, on the 77 78 David Chandler other, highly individualised: it is very much the politics of our everyday lives – the sense of meaning we get from thinking about global warming when we turn off the taps when we brush our teeth, take our rubbish out for recycling or cut back on our car use. We might also do global politics in deriving meaning from the ethical or social value of our work, or inour subscription or support for good causes from Oxfam to Green peace and Christian Aid.I want to suggest that when we do politics nowadays it is less the old politics, of self-interest, political parties and concern for governmental power, than the new politics of global ethical concerns. I further want to suggest that the forms and content of this new global approach to the political are more akin to religious beliefs and practices, than to the forms of our social political engagement in the past. Global politics is similar to religious approaches in three vital respects: (1) global post-territorial politics is no longer concerned with power: the concerns are free-floating and in many ways, existential, about how we live our lives; (2) globalpolitics revolves around practices that are private and individualized MARKED: they are about us as individuals and our ethical choices; (3) the practice of global politics tends to be non-instrumental: we do not subordinate ourselves to collective associations or parties and are more likely to give value to our aspirations, acts or the fact of our awareness of an issue, asan end in-itself. It is as if we are upholding our goodness or ethicality inthefaceof an increasingly confusing, problematic and alienating world–our politics in this sense is an expression or voice, in Karl Marx’s (1975:244) words, of ‘the heart in a heartless world’ or ‘the soul of a soulless condition’.The practice of politics as a form of religiosity may seem radical but could also be understood to be highly conservative. As Marx argued, religion was the ‘opium of the people’ – this is politics as a sedative or pacifier: it feeds an illusory view of change at the expense of genuine social engagement and transformation. I want to argue that global ethi-cal politics reflects and institutionalises our sense of disconnection and social atomisation and results in irrational and unaccountable govern-ment policy-making. I want to illustrate my points by looking briefly at the practices of global ethics in three spheres: those of radical political activism, government policy-making and academia.

### Case

#### **The pipeline is coming now. Proves that the grass roots movement they defend does not have any affect. Even the dems are agreeing to it.**

Graves, 3-22

[“Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Measure Passes Senate,” The Huffington Post, 3-22-13, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/22/keystone-xl-pipeline-john-hoeven_n_2935921.html?utm_hp_ref=green> //uwyo-baj]

Hoeven's Amendment 494 to the 2013 budget resolution passed Friday evening by a vote of 62 to 37. The amendment puts the Senate on record for the first time in support of the Keystone XL, the 1,700 mile pipeline that would carry tar sands from Canada to oil refineries