#### 1

#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS FORCE CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO THE DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALMS BY MAKING WAR TOO COSTLY, SOLVING THE OUTBREAK OF MAJOR HEGEMONIC WARS AS BALANCES SHIFT

Alagappa in ‘8

[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow at East-West Center, “Nuclear Weapons and National Security”, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. M. Alagappa, P. 484//wyo-tjc]

The fear of escalation to nuclear war conditions the role of force in major power relations and circumscribes strategic interaction among them. By restraining measures and actions that could lead to conflict escalation, nuclear weapons limit the competitive strategic interaction of major powers to internal and external balancing for deterrence purposes; constrain their resort to coercive diplomacy and compellence; and shift the burden of international competition and adjustment in status and influence to the economic, political, and diplomatic arenas. They also render remote the possibility of a hegemonic war should a power transition occur in the region. More immediately, nuclear weapons enable Russia and China to deter the much stronger United States and mitigate the negative consequences of the imbalance in conventional military capability. Nuclear weapons reinforce India’s confidence in dealing with China. By reducing military vulnerabilities and providing insurance against unexpected contingencies, nuclear weapons enable major powers to take a long view and engage in competition as well as cooperation with potential adversaries. Differences and disputes among them are frozen or settled through negotiations. Though they are not the only or even primary factor driving strategic visions and policies, nuclear weapons are an important consideration, especially in the role of force in major power strategic interaction. They prevent the outbreak of large—scale war. Military clashes when they occur tend to be limited.

#### SMALL ARSENALS SOLVE DETERRENCE NEEDS- CREATES CREDIBILITY, FORCES ARE SURVIVABLE AND SOLVES THE RISK OF ACCIDENTS/MISUSE

Arquilla 97

[John, Assoc. Professor at US Naval Postgraduate School, Comparative Strategy, Jan-Mar, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

The favorable assessment that in South Asia "more may be better" rests on three strands of reasoning. First, there is the view that the possession of even minimal nuclear capabilities creates robust strategic deterrence. This assessment is supported by the seeming success of minimal arsenals to induce caution on the part of adversaries with larger amounts of nuclear weaponry. The best example of this phenomenon that can be used to provide insight into the current situation in South Asia is the Cuban Missile Crisis, which as Brahma Chellaney noted, proved "that minimum &terrence works." Even though "the Soviets had only a small number of ICBMs . . . the United States was deterred.., by the fact that it could not assuredly knock out all those missiles" [ 23//wyo-tjc]. A small nuclear arsenal is good enough for deterrence of the sort that Charles de Gaulle once called an "arm tearing-off' capability. The second body of thought on the benefits of proliferation in South Asia builds on this first point, contending that the small number of devices in question make them easier to hide. This lessens the possibility that the adversary will be tempted to engage in preventive or preemptive attacks. Further, the small scale of the arsenal makes issues of command and control simpler to resolve, and safer in terms of minimizing the chances for accidental or inadvertent war.

#### 2

#### 3

#### ZERO RISK OF A PROLIFERATION SNOWBALL- ‘CREDIBILITY’ OF THE NPT IS NOT EVEN A FACTOR IN A STATES CALCULATION TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.\*\*

O’Neil in 7

[Andrew, School of Political and International Studies at Flinders University, Australia, Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia, 2007, P. 122-124//wyo-tjc]

This criticism is based on the claim that legitimizing nuclear possession in Northeast Asia will serve to dilute the credibility and force of efforts elsewhere in the international system to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. By embracing a strategy whereby proliferation is managed, rather than prevented, Northeast Asian policy makers will make it that much harder for states in other regions to dampen proliferation pressures among those countries capable of going nuclear. This will encourage the dangerous dynamic of “copycat” proliferation where states in the Middle East, South America, and elsewhere will point to states that have gone nuclear in Northeast Asia as justification for their own nuclear ambitions. By accepting the demise of the nonproliferation regime, and acting accordingly by adopting a proliferation management strategy, policy makers in Northeast Asia will help destroy any remaining possibility of “repairing the regime.”~4 Like the claim concerning proliferation management enumerated above, this criticism is superficially persuasive due to the long-standing and surprisingly resilient assumption among a number of analysts that nuclear proliferation begets further proliferation. Melodramatic phrases included in the titles of academic analyses like “heading toward disaster”55 and “no end in sight”96 merely serve to reinforce this perception among observers. However, the logic underlying this “domino effect” assumption is more often assumed than demonstrated. Somewhat analogous to the discredited cold war domino theory—where it was feared that Communism would somehow spread from country to country irrespective of prevailing domestic factors in those countries—the idea that a state that acquires nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia will inevitably lead to other states going down that path is unpersuasive. For example, the assumption that accepting North Korea’s nuclear weapons force as legitimate will somehow act as an incentive for other states in regions outside Northeast Asia to acquire nuclear weapons lacks credibility for the simple reason that history shows that states that are determined to go nuclear are driven by immediate security concerns in their own regional domains or by more generic considerations of prestige and status. While North Korea’s successful nuclear “breakout” strategy may provide something of a model to a determined proliferator like Iran, there are few grounds to assume that proliferation trends in Northeast Asia will influence “nuclear fence sitters” in other regions, largely because *such a variety of state does not exist*. Without exception, every state that has acquired nuclear weapons since 1945 has been a determined proliferator willing to pay almost any price to achieve a nuclear capability. The idea that conferring legitimacy on North Korea’s nuclear weapons force might just serve to “tip” states in other regions over the nuclear threshold is unconvincing. As I argued in Chapter 4, even in the event that Japan acquires a nuclear force at some future point, it is by no means clear that regional neighbors, South Korea and Taiwan, will follow suit, despite their technological capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons if they decided to go down this path. Whether conferring legitimacy on the nuclear weapons forces of states that have gone nuclear further erodes the global nonproliferation regime is, in some ways, beside the point: the fact they have gone nuclear at all demonstrates the inability of the NPT and associated instruments to prevent proliferation in the first place. In itself, this should act as a something of a wakeup call for those who advocate the strategy of nonproliferation to reassess their own set of arguments and responses concerning the issue of nuclear proliferation. The time has come to break our of the intellectual and policy straightjackets of nonproliferation and evaluate alternative proliferation management strategies. As I have argued, the cost of failure is simply too high to remain wedded to an orthodoxy that does nor provide a way forward for managing nuclear proliferation in the twenty-first century.

#### PROLIF SOLVES INEVITABLE MISCALCULATIONS AND ESCALATION AND NEW NUCLEAR STATES WILL FIT INTO A DETERRENCE WORLD ORDER AND PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF MAJOR WARS

Waltz in ‘3

[Kenneth N., Genius & Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, with Scott D. Sagan, p.43-45.

What will a world populated by a few more nuclear states look like? I have drawn a picture of such a world that accords with experience throughout the nuclear age. Those who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that more is worse and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less responsible and less capable of self control than the old ones have been. They feel fears that many felt when they imagined how a nuclear China would behave. Such fears have proved unfounded as nuclear weapons have slowly spread. I have found many reasons for believing that with more nuclear states the world will have a promising future. I have reached this unusual conclusion for three main reasons. First, international politics is a self-help system, and in such systems the principal parties determine their own fate, the fate of other parties, and the fate of the system. This will continue to be so. Second, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century Norman Angell argued that war would not occur because it could not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some countries at the expense of others. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell's dictum becomes persuasive. When the active use of force threatens to bring great losses, war becomes less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One must expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them? Third, new nuclear states will feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced. New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than some of the old ones have been. Until recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons have spread slowly, con- [\*45//wyo-tjc] ventional weapons have proliferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been fought not at the center but at the periphery of international politics. The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons make wars hard to start. These statements hold for small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.

#### 4

#### TERRORIST ACQUISITION IS SO UNLIKELY AS TO BE A FICTION—STATES WOULD NEVER TRANSFER WEAPONS AND STEALING THEM IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT

Kapur in ‘8

[S. Paul, Associate Professor of Strategic Research at United States Naval War College, “Nuclear Terrorism: Prospects in Asia”, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. M. Alagappa, p. 324-325//wyo-tjc]

If a terrorist group’s goal can be advanced by the use of nuclear weapons, it would still need to meet a second important requirement: it would need to acquire a nuclear capability in the first place. It could do so either by procuring an intact weapon or by producing one. Terrorists could procure an intact weapon in two different ways. First, a nuclear state could voluntarily transfer a weapon to terrorists for use against a designated enemy. This could enable the state to inflict massive damage on the enemy while maintaining deniability and potentially avoiding retaliation (Ferguson and Potter 2004: 55—57). This occurrence, however, is unlikely. In this “transfer” scenario, the nuclear state would lose control of the weapon in question, forcing it to place enormous trust in the terrorists’ loyalty and judgment. It is doubtful that a nuclear state’s leaders would be willing to trust a terrorist organization to this degree (Feiguson and Pottei 2004 57 Glaser and Fetter 2001) Terrorist groups could also acquire an intact weapon by stealing it from a nuclear state This would be an extremely difficult feat even for sophisticated terrorist groups. Nuclear weapons are protected by the most robust security measures that nation—states can devise. Protective measures include programs to ensure the reliability of the personnel in charge of weapons extensive physical barriers including location in heavily guarded, often isolated military bases; electronic systems to prevent unauthorized weapons use; and storage of the fissile core separate from the rest of the weapon. According to Ferguson and Potter, in the absence of significant insider assistance, theft of a nuclear weapon by terrorists is probably better described as “the stuff of fiction than a practicable approach for a terrorist organization.” Even in the event of inside help or major political unrest within a nuclear weapon state, terrorist theft of an intact nuclear device would be difficult and unlikely (Bunn, Holdren, and Wier 2002: 5; Ferguson and Potter 2004: 57—65,119).

#### EVEN THE MOST RADICALLY DRIVEN NETWORKS THAT EMPLOY SUICIDE TACTICS ARE DETERRABLE

Quinlan in ‘6

[Michael, Former Undersecretary of State for Defence, “Deterrence and Deterrability”, in Deterrence and the New Global Security Environment, ed Kenyon & Simpson, P. 7-8//wyo-tjc]

There is naturally now, in the wake of 11 September, a further strand of concern about the willingness (increasingly evident also in the Israeli/Palestinian context) of individuals to give their lives — give them, not merely risk them — in order to early out terrorist attacks. What can deterrence, in the strict sense, do about these? In immediate terms, nothing. But they scarcely ever, if indeed ever, exist and operate in isolation from organisations, and these organisations rarely in isolation from states: xxxxxxand deterrence can be brought to hear by that route. We should, moreover, not write off entirely the idea of achieving something. in the long term, rather more directly. These individuals, whether regarded as tragic or awful, are not simply insane; they have their value-systems. They prize the respect of their families, their communities and their co—religionists: they often cherish the hope of a hereafter. The expectation of changing any of this may be distant and uncertain, and change cannot be imposed from outside the communities, especially if within them there is, as in the Middle East. a profound and shared sense of beleaguered grievance. But this dimension should not be abandoned. Islam — it is fair to focus there, because as a matter of plain fact the phenomenon of suicidal immolation is to he found above all in that environment — is a religion of moral teaching, and that teaching (at least in most of its explicit and established forms) does not commend acts like that of 11 September. If that be so, it is legitimate to wonder whether disapproval might come to be voiced more trenchantly and mobilized more effectively. That could make a genuine contribution to deterrence, through converting the reactions of families, friends and peers into costs rather than rewards. It would need, as a practical matter, to he partnered by a more resolute tackling of perceived grievance; and one must recognize the human difficulty often faced by moral teachers within settings where historic resentment is deeply ingrained. (It may be suspected — to invoke a parallel close to the writer personally — that in at least the initial stages of the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’ of the later twentieth century the Roman Catholic clergy there were not all as immediate, as outspoken, as unequivocal and as unanimous in their condemnation of Republican terrorism as Christian ethics truly required and as they themselves mostly later became: but significant change did take place, and progressively played a part in making community attitudes less tolerant of terrorism.) In brief, this is a relevant dimension of the terrorist problem; and there are opportunities and responsibilities capable of being exercised.

**No nuclear terrorism –statistically insignificant cumulative probability**

**Mueller ‘10**

John Mueller, professor of political science at Ohio State University. “Calming Our Nuclear Jitters”. Issues in Science and Technology. 1/1/2010. Vol.26,Iss.2;p.58-66. Academic Search Premiere.

**Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier** is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might **begin** a quantitative approach **by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor**. In my view, **this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a** fighting chance of **50 percent of overcoming each of the** 20 **obstacles** displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. **Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million**, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, **the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles** at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. **If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion** specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the **cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty** much the same-or even **small**er. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, **given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments** for such issues **are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion**. That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that **even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success,** following the approach used here, **would only be 10 percent.** Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that **even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent**.14 **Odds like that are** not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be **mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts** The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, **the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts**.16 **If there were a hundred such efforts** over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. **At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million.** If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally**, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the** **aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other** in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, **the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts** by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19