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#### Institutional approaches to consumption are key to solve—individual approaches narrow our ability to develop effective solutions

Maniates, 2002

[Michael, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, Confronting Consumption, “Individualization: plant a tree, buy a bike, save the world.” Pg. 43-66. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

Mark Dowie, a journalist and sometimes historian of the American environmental movement, writes about our ‘‘environmental imagination,’’ by which he means our collective ability to imagine and pursue a variety of productive responses (from individual action to community organization to whole-scale institutional change) to the environmental problems before us. 8 My claim in this chapter is that an accelerating individualization of responsibility in the United States is narrowing, in dangerous ways, our ‘‘environmental imagination’’ and undermining our capacity to react effectively to environmental threats to human wellbeing. Those troubled by overconsumption, consumerism, and commodification should not and cannot ignore this narrowing. Confronting the consumption problem demands, after all, the sort of institutional thinking that the individualization of responsibility patently undermines. It calls too for individuals to understand themselves as citizens in a participatory democracy first, working together to change broader policy and larger social institutions, and as consumers second. By contrast, the individualization of responsibility, because it characterizes environmental problems as the consequence of destructive consumer choice, asks that individuals imagine themselves as consumers first and citizens second. Grappling with the consumption problem, moreover, means engaging in conversation both broad and deep about consumerism and frugality and ways of fostering the capacity for restraint. But when responsibility for environmental ills is individualized, space for such conversation becomes constricted. The individually responsible consumer is encouraged to purchase a vast array of ‘‘green’’ or ‘‘ecofriendly’’ products on the premise that the more such products are purchased and consumed, the healthier the planet’s ecological processes will become. ‘‘Living lightly on the planet’’ and ‘‘reducing your environmental impact’’ becomes, paradoxically, a consumer-product growth industry. 9 Skeptics may reasonably question if the individualization of responsibility is so omnipresent as to warrant such concern. As the next section of this chapter shows, it is: the depoliticization of environmental degradation is in full swing across a variety of fronts and shows little sign of abating. The chapter continues with a review of the forces driving this individualization; in particular, it implicates the rise of global environmental problems and the construction of an individualized politics around them. How might these forces be countered? How can the politics of individualization be transcended? How might our environmental imagination be expanded? I wrestle with these questions in the final section of this chapter by focusing on the IPAT formula— a dominant conceptual lens within the field of environmental policy and politics, which argues that environmental impact ¼ population Â affluence Â technology.

#### Perm solves need to focus on individual consumption and pursue institutional avenues for change

Maniates, 2002

[Michael, Professor of Political and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, Confronting Consumption, “Individualization: plant a tree, buy a bike, save the world.” Pg. 43-66. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

IWAC is more illustrative than prescriptive. It highlights how prevailing conceptualizations of the ‘‘environmental crisis’’ drive us toward an individualization of responsibility that legitimizes existing dynamics of consumption and production. The globalization of environmental problems— dominated by natural-science diagnoses of global environmental threats that ignore critical elements of power and institutions— accelerates this individualization, which has deep roots in American political culture. To the extent that commonplace language and handy conceptual frameworks have power, in that they shape our view of the world and tag some policy measures as proper and others as far-fetched, IWAC stands as an example of how one might go about propagating an alternative understanding of why we have environmental ills, and what we ought to be doing about them. A proverbial fork in the road looms large for those who would seek to cement consumption into the environmental agenda. One path of easy walking leads to a future where ‘‘consumption’’ in its environmentally undesirable forms—‘‘overconsumption,’’ ‘‘commodification,’’ and ‘‘consumerism’’—has found a place in environmental debates. Environmental groups will work hard to ‘‘educate’’ the citizenry about the need to buy green and consume less and, by accident or design, the pronounced asymmetry of responsibility for and power over environmental problems will remain obscure. Consumption, ironically, could continue to expand as the privatization of the environmental crisis encourages upwardly spiraling consumption, so long as this consumption is ‘‘green.’’ 49 This is the path of business as usual. The other road, a rocky one, winds toward a future where environmentally concerned citizens come to understand, by virtue of spirited debate and animated conversation, the ‘‘consumption problem.’’ They would see that their individual consumption choices are environmentally important, but that their control over these choices is constrained, shaped, and framed by institutions and political forces that can be remade only through collective citizen action, as opposed to individual consumer behavior. This future world will not be easy to reach. Getting there means challenging the dominant view— the production, technological, efficiency-oriented perspective that infuses contemporary definitions of progress— and requires linking explorations of consumption to politically charged issues that challenge the political imagination. Walking this path means becoming attentive to the underlying forces that narrow our understanding of the possible. To many, an environmentalism of ‘‘plant a tree, save the world’’ appears to be apolitical and nonconfrontational, and thus ripe for success. Such an approach is anything but, insofar as it works to constrain our imagination about what is possible and what is worth working toward. It is time for those who hope for renewed and rich discussion about ‘‘the consumption problem’’ to come to grips with this narrowing of the collective imagination and the growing individualization of responsibility that drives it, and to grapple intently with ways of reversing the tide.

#### Perm solves—focusing on ecological costs of production will solve environmental harm from consumption

Princen, 2002

[Thomas, Ph.D., Political Economy and Government, 1988, Harvard University and Associate professor at the Univ. of Michigan school of natural resources and environment, Confronting Consumption, “Distancing: consumption and the severing of feedback.” Pg. 103-131. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

Where lowering distance is difficult or where shading is prevalent, institutions must be devised or re-oriented. By institution I mean both formal, governmental structures and informal social norms occurring at all levels from the local and self-organized (e.g., common pool resource systems) to large-scale, intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the World Trade Organization). To increase resource accountability, the purpose of institutions must be to direct primary decisionmaking to those who are most likely to receive and act on negative ecological feedback. To the extent such feedback occurs among those who interact with the resource (e.g., fishers and farmers), the local institutions must jealously retain decision authority and the larger, overarching institutions must strive to ensure such authority. From a sustainability perspective, all other institutional objectives— efficiency, growth, cooperation, equity— become secondary. A second general implication is that the burden of proof for any economic intervention— a new trade relationship, investment, technology or retailing method— must be on the interveners. In the contemporary policy environment, such interventions are assumed to have net benefits and those who would promote sustainability goals must prove otherwise. The concepts of shading and distancing help delineate the conditions under which net benefits cannot be assumed, thus shifting the burden to the interveners. If, for example, the existing economy is based on subsistence agriculture and the proposed intervention involves conversion to cash export crops, the interveners must show that the dimensions of distance are low, that costs will not be shaded, and that institutions exist to retain decision authority among growers. Reversing the burden of proof thus becomes a key component of a political economy of sustainability. It may contribute to a weak form of sustainability, but shifting the burden may be more tractable than establishing the sustainability of either the current system or the proposed intervention. It may also be empowering if those who would have their existing resource use pattern disrupted need only show, for instance, that institutional safeguards are not in place or that interveners are unable to assume full responsibility for their resource use. This is not to say that high-distance interventions should always be rejected. It is to argue that, although such interventions may be risky, they may be worth doing as small experiments with on-going evaluation. This would indeed slow the pace of economic expansion and change. But, as argued, it is precisely the rapidity of change and the mobility of capital and technology that makes institutional response so difficult. Internalization efforts thus become after-the-fact attempts to account for costs when the very structure of the economic intervention— high-distance and pervasive shading— makes costs impossible to count and interveners unaccountable.

#### Small scale approaches to consumption have failed—need to combine the alt with institutional change

Clapp, 2002

[Jennifer, Associate Professor in the Comparative Development and Environmental and Resource Studies Programs at Trent University, Confronting Consumption, “The Distancing of Waste: Overconsumption in a global economy.” Pg. 155-176. Published by The MIT press] /Wyo-MB

To date the efforts to reduce waste distancing have been on a relatively small scale or have only partially addressed broader structures. Increasing efficiencies and expanding opportunities within the global economy are still the main organizing principles for national and local economies. Large-scale production, consumption, and waste disposal systems follow, along with inequality. Measures to reduce distancing still largely exist within this broader economic framework. Whether such measures will be successful within the global economic context depends in large part on whether they explicitly connect their aims to a revision of the broader structures and whether they are emulated more widely. Institutionally, the precautionary principle, zero discharge, waste minimization, and the proximity principle must override risky free-trade principles such as open markets, capital mobility, and centralized production.

#### Cap sustainable: green tactics solve environmental crisis

Weiss 09

(Marc, CEO of Global Urban Development, and chairman of the Climate Prosperity Project, served as special assistant to the HUD secretary in the Clinton administration, and was a professor of urban development and planning at Columbia University, “Climate Prosperity: Why Marx Was Wrong and Mother Nature Is Right,” Tikkun, Vol. 24, Issue 3, June 2009, Academic Search Premiere//wyo-mm)

Fortunately it is not too late to create an even higher standard of living for every person and community throughout the world, by shifting from resource-wasting capitalism to resource-saving capitalism. In the twenty-first century, the only way to get richer is by becoming greener, and the only way to earn more money is by using fewer resources and reusing more. In other words, the global economy can significantly enhance prosperity and quality of life for people everywhere by treating Mother Nature as our good friend and one of our most precious assets, rather than as our enemy to be exploited and conquered. The main challenge is for each of us to acknowledge the ancient wisdom of two essential values: 1) new is not always better than old; and 2) more is not always better than less.

# CP

#### Global warming causes an increase in disease, less productive crops, and loss of biodiversity

Schlesinger 11

[William H., president of the Carry Institute of Ecosystem Studies, former biogeochemistry prof at Duke. "Climate change." Interpretation. 65.4 (2011): n. page. Web. 8 Jul. 2012. //Wyo-BF]

Rapid changes in climate associated with global warming have several indirect effects on human health and well being. Many diseases that are transmitted by insects, especially mosquitoes, occur in climatic regions that are defined by conditions of temperature and moisture. A warmer, wetter world in the future is likely to allow an expansion of the occurrence of malaria, dengue fever, and other insect-borne diseases, or require a substantial human investment to prevent it. (28) Anticipated effects on plant diseases are similar. Already, a northward expansion of the hemlock woolly adelgid, due to warmer winters, is thought to be responsible for the loss of hemlock from northeastern forests. (29) Noah Diffenbaugh and his colleagues show potential expansions in the range of the corn-borer and other insect pests of major crops, which could threaten the breadbasket of major foods in the Great Plains. (30) While some crops may grow better in warmer conditions, many of the world's major crops show lower yields. (31) Even wine growers should expect a shift in the optimal range for wine production from California to points northward. (32) Many models for future climate indicate a substantial drying in the southwestern United States, an area of rapid current population growth and limited water supply. (33) In the eastern United States, predictions of the effects of climate change on the distribution of forest species show sugar maple being eliminated from most of its present range, persisting only in Canada. (34) There are substantial changes in the predicted range of southern pine species, which should be of major concern to all those who depend on the current forest products industry of that region. The range of many bird species in New York State has already shifted northward during the past several decades, (35) and in many areas of the eastern United States, springtime migrating birds are arriving earlier from the South. (36) Simultaneous, but disconnected, shifts in insects, birds, and plant species threaten a reconfiguration of the major components of nature in many areas. It is likely that some species will lose the entire envelope of climate that now supports their existence. (37) Chris Thomas and colleagues predict a loss of 18 to 35% of species with the global warming expected in this century. (38)

#### Human interference is inevitable—Eco-pragmatism solves better by integrating environmental approaches and uniting human and environmental wellbeing.

Mintz 2004

[Joel A., Prof. law @ Nova Southeastern University, “Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a Guide to Environmental Protection, 31 B.C. Envtl Aff. L. Rev. 1, LN//uwyo-ajl]

 Environmental pragmatism is a relatively new direction in modern philosophy. n34 A product of the late 1980s and 1990s, it attempts to connect the precepts and methods of philosophical pragmatism to the solution of real environmental issues. n35The most comprehensive collection of essays by environmental pragmatists may be found in Environmental Pragmatism, edited by Andrew Light and Eric Katz. n36 In their introduction to this work, Light and Katz accurately observe that environmental pragmatism refers to "a cluster of related and overlapping concepts," as opposed to a single view. n37 They note that it may take at least four distinct forms: (1) examinations into the connection between classical American philosophical pragmatism and environmental issues; (2) the articulation of practical strategies for bridging gaps between environmental theorists, policy analysts, activists, and the public; (3) theoretical investigations into the overlapping normative bases of specific environmental organizations and movements in order to provide grounds for the convergence of activists on policy choices; and (4) general arguments for theoretical and meta-theoretical moral pluralism in environmental normative theory. n38What all of the environmental pragmatist approaches share, however, is a rejection of the view that "adequate and workable environmental ethics must embrace non-anthropocentrism, holism, moral monism, and, perhaps, a commitment to some form of intrinsic value." n39 [\*7] For Kelly Parker, the principal insight of environmental pragmatism is that "the human sphere is embedded at every point in the broader natural sphere, that each inevitably affects the other in ways that are often impossible to predict, and that values emerge in the ongoing transactions between humans and environments." n40 Parker defines environment as "the field where experience occurs, where my life and the lives of others arise and take place." n41 He believes that pragmatism commits us to treating all places where experience unfolds, i.e., all environments, with "equal seriousness." n42 Moreover, under Parker's pragmatic approach, people are encouraged to "restructure our social institutions" so that the public is afforded "a real voice in determining the kinds of environments we inhabit." n43Like Parker, Sandra B. Rosenthal and Rogene A. Buckholz also emphasize the organic unity of the individual embedded in his or her environment. n44 To them, human beings are biological creatures, part of, and continuous with, nature. n45 In light of this, the philosophical argument over anthropocentrism is meaningless since no real line may be drawn between human and environmental well-being. n46 Rosenthal and Buckholz see the "systematic focus" of pragmatism as being on "science as method, or as lived through human activity, on what the scientist does to gain knowledge." n47 Humans exist in the world as active experimenters who create knowledge and formulate ethical values by integrating "potentially conflicting values and viewpoints." n48Another leading environmental pragmatist, Bryan G. Norton, also advocates a pluralistic approach. n49 In Norton's opinion: The goal of seeking a unified, monistic theory of environmental ethics represents a misguided mission, a mission that was formulated under a set of epistemological and moral assumptions that harks back to Descartes and Newton. . . . The search for a "Holy Grail" of unified theory in environmental [\*8] values has not progressed towards any consensus regarding what inherent value in nature is, what objects have it, or what it means to have such a value. n50Norton's expressed preference is for the integration of multiple values on three "scales" of human concern and valuation: (1) locally developed values that reflect the preferences of individuals; (2) community values that protect and contribute to human and ecological communities; and (3) global values, which express a hope for the long-term survival of our species. n51 As Norton views it: A good environmental policy will be one that has positive implications for values associated with the various scales on which humans are in fact concerned, and also on the scales on which environmentalists think we should be concerned if we accept responsibility for the impacts of our current activities on the life prospects and options--the "freedom" of future generations. n52 One particularly provocative aspect of environmental pragmatic thought is its desire for compatibilism, i.e., a philosophical framework within which competing environmental theories may be compatible in practice. n53 Andrew Light is an advocate for this view. n54 Light contrasts the views of social ecologists and materialists, such as Murray Bookchin and Herbert Marcuse, n55 who view environmental degradation as presupposed by a capitalist economy, and ontologists, including "deep ecologists" like Arne Naess, n56 whose focus is on reform of the self, and one's relationship with the non-human world, as expressed in individual identity. n57 To harmonize these mutually antagonistic schools of environmental thought, Light proposes a pragmatic "principle of tolerance." n58 [\*9] Under it, theorists and practitioners are required to communicate a "straightforward public position" that endorses the considerations on which they agree, and the practices best suited to meeting their mutually desired goals, while leaving some questions that divide them to private dispute. n59

#### Anti-anthropocentric rhetoric reinforces a more dominant frame of human value because they reify ideological opposition to respect for non-human life

Hayward 97

[PhD, Department of Politics at Edinburgh University, “Anthropocentrism: a Misunderstood Problem”, Environmental Values, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Anthropocentrism, widely used as a term of criticism in environmental ethics and politics, is something of a misnomer: for while anthropocentrism can intelligibly be criticised as an ontological error, attempts to conceive of it as an ethical error often involve conceptual confusion. I point out that there is no need for this confusion because a more appropriate vocabulary to refer to the defects the ethical ‘anti-anthropocentrists’ have in mind already exists. My argument is not just about semantics, though, but engages directly with the politics of environmental concern: blanket condemnations of ‘anthropocentrism’ not only condemn some legitimate human concerns, they also allow ideological retorts to the effect that criticisms of anthropocentrism amount to misanthropy. My argument, therefore, is that a more nuanced understanding of the problem of anthropocentrism allows not only a more coherent conceptualisation of environmental ethics but also a more effective politics. The article has five main sections. The first notes the paradox that the clearest instances of overcoming anthropocentrism involve precisely the sort of objectivating knowledge which many ecological critics see as itself archetypically anthropocentric. The second section then notes some ways in which anthropocentrism is not objectionable. In the third section, the defects associated with anthropocentrism in ethics are then examined: I argue, though, that these are better understood as instances of speciesism and human chauvinism. In order to explain why it is unhelpful to call these defects anthropocentrism, I note in section four that there is an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism in any ethic at all, and in the fifth section that the defects do not typically involve a concern with human interests as such anyway. Because of this last point, I also argue, the rhetoric of anti-anthropocentrism is not only conceptually unsatisfactory, it is counterproductive in practice.

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#### Market forces drive tech shifts which solve warming

Anderson 4

(Terry L., senior fellow at the Hoover Institute, and adjunct prof at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, Hoover Digest, No.3 Summer, www.perc.org/articles/article446.php)

In the March 2004 issue of Scientific American, National Aeronautics and Space Administration global-warming expert James Hansen notes that greenhouse gas emissions and global-warming projections are "consistently pessimistic." Hansen suggests that projections do not take into account the lower carbon dioxide and methane emissions that have resulted from technological advancements. He explains that the lower carbon dioxide emissions result from increased energy efficiency following the energy crisis in the 1970s and the lower methane emissions, from technological changes in agriculture. Hansen's essay concludes on an optimistic note, saying "the main elements [new technologies] required to halt climate change have come into being with remarkable rapidity." This statement would not have surprised economist Julian Simon. He saw the "ultimate resource" to be the human mind and believed it to be best motivated by market forces. Because of a combination of market forces and technological innovations, we are not running out of natural resources. As a resource becomes more scarce, prices increase, thus encouraging development of cheaper alternatives and technological innovations. Just as fossil fuel replaced scarce whale oil, its use will be reduced by new technology and alternative fuel sources. Market forces also cause economic growth, which in turn leads to environmental improvements. Put simply, poor people are willing to sacrifice clean water and air, healthy forests, and wildlife habitat for economic growth. But as their incomes rise above subsistence, "economic growth helps to undo the damage done in earlier years," says economist Bruce Yandle. "If economic growth is good for the environment, policies that stimulate growth ought to be good for the environment." The link between greenhouse gas emissions and economic prosperity is no different. Using data from the United States, Professor Robert McCormick finds that "higher GDP reduces total net [greenhouse gas] emissions." He goes a step further by performing the complex task of estimating net U.S. carbon emissions. This requires subtracting carbon sequestration (long-term storage of carbon in soil and water) from carbon emissions. Think of it this way: When you build a house, the wood in it stores carbon. In a poor country that wood would have been burned to cook supper or to provide heat, thus releasing carbon into the atmosphere. McCormick shows that economic growth in the United States has increased carbon sequestration in many ways, including improved methods of storing waste, increased forest coverage, and greater agricultural productivity that reduces the acreage of cultivated land. Because rich economies sequester more carbon than poor ones, stored carbon must be subtracted from emissions to determine an economy's net addition to greenhouse gas emissions. McCormick's data show that "rich countries take more carbon out of the air than poorer ones" and that "the growth rate of net carbon emission per person will soon be negative in the United States." Put differently—richer may well be cooler. Global-warming policy analysts agree that greenhouse gas regulations such as those proposed at Kyoto would have negative impacts on the economy. Therefore, as McCormick warns, we should take great care that regulations in the name of global warming "not kill the goose that lays the golden eggs."