# 2ac

## Framework

#### OUR INTERPRETATION: The resolution asks a yes/no question as to the desirability of the United States Federal Government action. The role of the ballot should be to affirm or reject the actions and outcomes of the plan.

#### Second, is reasons to prefer:

#### Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 9 minutes of the 1ac

#### It is predictable, the resolution demands USFG action

#### It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another

#### Third, It is a voter for competitive equity—prefer our interpretation, it allows both teams to compete, other roles of the ballot are arbitrary and self serving

#### Policymaking is critical now- “willful ignorance” in the face of climate change is ethically bankrupt, we must act in the realm of policy before all questions of science are settled because the risk that we’re right produces catastrophic impacts

2011

[Donald A. Brown, Associate Professor of Environmental Ethics, Science, and Law, April 18, 2011, New York Times Krugman Claims That US Congressional Hearings Are A Moral Failure: The US Congress and The Ethics of Willful Ignorance., <http://rockblogs.psu.edu/climate/2011/04/new-york-times-krugman-claims-that-us-congressional-hearings-are-a-moral-failure-the-us-congress-and.html>, uwyo//amp]

Introduction In an April 4, 2011 New York Times op-ed entitled "The Truth, Still Inconvenient," Paul Krugman charged that Republican led climate change hearings that had just concluded were a deep moral failure. (Krugman, 2011) Krugman described the GOP US House of Representatives hearings at which of five invited witnesses on climate change, one was a lawyer, another an economist, and a third a professor of marketing---witnesses without any expertise in climate change science. One of the witnesses that was actually a scientist was expected to support the skeptical position but surprised everyone by supporting the mainstream scientific view on the amount of warming that the world has already experienced. Yet he was immediately attacked by climate skeptics. The point of the Krugman article is that it is obvious from the witnesses who were asked to testify that the GOP led hearings were never meant to be a serious attempt to understand climate change science. In this regard, Krugman says: . But it's worth stepping back for a moment and thinking not just about the science here, but about the morality. For years now, large numbers of prominent scientists have been warning, with increasing urgency, that if we continue with business as usual, the results will be very bad, perhaps catastrophic. They could be wrong. But if you're going to assert that they are in fact wrong, you have a moral responsibility to approach the topic with high seriousness and an open mind. After all, if the scientists are right, you'll be doing a great deal of damage. But what we had, instead of high seriousness, was a farce: a supposedly crucial hearing stacked with people who had no business being there and instant ostracism for a climate skeptic who was actually willing to change his mind in the face of evidence. As I said, no surprise: as Upton Sinclair pointed out long ago, it's difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it. But it's terrifying to realize that this kind of cynical careerism -- for that's what it is -- has probably ensured that we won't do anything about climate change until catastrophe is already upon us. So on second thought, I was wrong when I said that the joke was on the G.O.P.; actually, the joke is on the human race.  (Krugman 20110) This post examines Krugman's moral claims about the hearings. . II. Ethics and The US Congressional Hearings. The central ethical problem with the US Congressional climate change hearings on climate change is entailed by the universally recognized duty of people and nations to prevent avoidable harm to others. As we have seen in ClimateEthics, all major ethical theories recognize duties, obligations, and responsibilities of people to prevent serious harm to all people without regard to where they live around the world. See, Ethical Problems With Cost Arguments Against Climate Change Policies: The Failure To Recognize Duties To Non-citizens. Also, as ClimateEthics has previously explained, this duty to prevent harm is triggered once anyone is on notice that harms to others could be created by their actions particularly when those harms could be grave. A corollary of this responsibility is that once someone is put on notice that their behavior could be creating great harm one can know cannot avoid the duty to prevent harm to others by ignoring evidence that their behavior is causing harm. The behavior of the US Congress in the recent climate change hearings is deeply ethically problematic because there was no serious attempt to understand the potential harms the United States was causing others through US emissions of greenhouse gases. In fact, the witnesses that were selected by Congress could not be seriously understood as a sincere effort to determine the nature of the threat entailed by climate change. One must assume the Congressional hearings were designed to avoid what credible scientists or credible scientific institutions such as the US Academy of Sciences know about climate change. This kind of behavior is often referred to in ethics as "willful ignorance." In the 13th Century, Thomas Aquinas explained why "willful ignorance" is ethically problematic. It is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. ...This may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is \*bound and able to know." (Aquinas, 1225) Without doubt, gathering information for the purpose of ignoring obligations that would flow from the relevant evidence is deeply ethically troublesome. Because the impacts of climate change are so potentially devastatingly catastrophic to millions of poor people around the world, willful ignorance of climate change causation must be understood to be deeply ethically reprehensible. This is particularly true because, as ClimateEthics has on numerous times before explained, the duty to act on climate change is triggered long before all scientific uncertainties are resolved. . See for instance: Have We Been Asking the Wrong Questions About Climate Change Science? Why Strong Climate Change Ethical Duties Exist Before Scientific Uncertainties are Resolved. Also see: Twenty Ethical Questions that the US Press Should Ask Opponents of Climate Change Policies., and the Ethical Duty to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, From the standpoint of ethics, those who engage in risky behavior are not exonerated because they did not know that their behavior would actually cause damage. Under law that implements this ethical norm, for instance, to be convicted of reckless driving or reckless endangerment, a prosecutor simply has to prove that the defendant acted in a way that he or she should have known to be risky. Many types of risky behavior are criminal because societies believe dangerous behavior is irresponsible and should not be condoned. As a matter of ethics, a relevant question in the face of scientific uncertainty about harmful consequences of human behavior is whether there is a reasonable basis for concluding that serious harm to others could result from the behavior. Yet, as we have seen, in the case of climate change, humans have understood the potential threat from climate change for over one hundred years and the scientific support for this concern has been building with increasing speed over the last thirty years. In fact, for more than 20 years, the IPCC, a scientific body created with the strong support of governments around the world to advise them about the conclusions of peer review climate change science, has been telling the world that the great harm from climate change is not only possible but likely with increasing levels of confidence. Moreover, since the late 1970s, the United States Academy of Sciences has been advising the US government that human induced climate change is a serious threat to human health and life and the natural systems on which life depends. By the end of the 1980s there was widespread understanding among climate change scientists around the world that there was a great threat posed by rising concentrations of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases event though there were considerable uncertainties about timing and magnitude of climate change impacts. The climate science that has been accumulating in the last 20 years has been increasing the confidence about timing and magnitude of climate change impacts according to IPCC as wells as reasons for concluding that recent warming is largely human caused not withstanding considerable natural variability in the climate system. The United States Congress has clearly been on notice for several decades that climate change is a significant threat. III. Conclusion Thus far we have seen that it's ethically unacceptable to willfully avoid evidence that would establish potential harm to others and that this duty stems from the clear ethical responsibility recognized by almost all ethical theories to prevent serious harm to others. We have also seen that even in the face of uncertainty about the harm, ethics requires action. Given what is at stake with climate change, the conduct of the recent US hearings on climate change is deeply ethically bankrupt. Krugman's condemnation of the recently concluded US Congressional hearings on climate change is strongly supported by almost all ethical theories. Given what is at stake in climate change, U.S. Congress has a strong duty to examine the science of climate change carefully using the most reliable scientific analyses and expertise. The United States created the United Academy of Sciences for the express goal of giving scientific advice to government. In a report in May 2010, the US Academy concluded that: A strong, credible body of scientific evidence shows that climate change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses significant risks for a broad range of human and natural systems.(US Academy, 2010) Given that the National Academy of Sciences was created for the express purpose of giving advice to the government about scientific issues and that Congress is now expressly ignoring the advice of the very institution created to summarize significant complex scientific issues, the recent hearings of Congress are even more ethically troubling then the moral failure in conducting the hearings.

#### Engaging the state is critical to the ability of citizens to break into the project of solving global challenges: Engagement relies on an existing internationalist state and refocuses its energies through citizen participation in national institutions that solve for war as well as environmental and social challenges

Sassen 2009

[ColumbiaUniversity, istheauthorof TheGlobalCity (2ndedn, Princeton, 2001), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, 2008) and A Sociology of Globalisation (Norton,2007), among others, 2009, The Potential for a Progressive State?, uwyo//amp]

Using state power for a new global politics These post-1980s trends towards a greater interaction of national andglobal dynamics are not part of some unidirectional historical progres-sion. There have been times in the past when they may have been as strong in certain aspects as they are today (Sassen, 2008a: chapter 3). But the current positioning of national states is distinctive precisely because 270 Saskia Sassen the national state has become the most powerful complex organizational entity in the world, and because it is a resource that citizens, confined largely to the national, can aim at governing and using to develop novelpolitical agendas. It is this mix of the national and the global that is so full of potential. The national state is one particular form of state: at the other end of this variable the state can be conceived of as a technical administrative capability that could escape the historic bounds of narrow nationalisms that have marked the state historically, or colonialism as the only form of internationalism that states have enacted. Stripping the state of the particularity of this historical legacy gives me more analytic freedom in conceptualising these processes and opens up the possibility of the denationalised state.As particular components of national states become the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central to glob-alisation they undergo change that is difficult to register or name. In my own work I have found useful the notion of an incipient denation-alising of specific components of national states, i.e. components that function as such institutional homes. The question for research then becomes what is actually ‘national’ in some of the institutional compo-nents of states linked to the implementation and regulation of economic globalisation. The hypothesis here would be that some components of national institutions, even though formally national, are not national in the sense in which we have constructed the meaning of that term overthe last hundred years.This partial, often highly specialised or at least particularised, dena-tionalisation can also take place in domains other than that of economic globalisation, notably the more recent developments in the humanrights regime which allow national courts to sue foreign firms and dictators, or which grant undocumented immigrants certain rights. Denationalisation is, thus, multivalent: it endogenises global agendas of many different types of actors, not only corporate firms and financial markets, but also human rights and environmental objectives. Those confined to the national can use national state institutions as a bridge into global politics. This is one kind of radical politics, and only one kind, that would use the capacities of hopefully increasingly denationalized states. The existence and the strengthening of global civil society organ-isations becomes strategic in this context. In all of this lie the possibilities of moving towards new types of joint global action by denationalized states–coalitions of the willing focused not on war but on environmental and social justice projects.

#### Policy debate is good for education, the development of empathy, and producing real world engagement from participants. Clear rules, a stable topic, and institutional role playing and simulation are integral to the process. The things you criticize about debate make it a unique exercise in active learning.

Lantis 8

[Jeffrey S. Lantis is Professor in the Department of Political Science and Chair of the International Relations Program at The College of Wooster, “The State of the Active Teaching and Learning Literature”, <http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/thestateoftheactiveteachingandlearningliterature_sample.pdf> uwyo//amp]

Simulations, games, and role-play represent a third important set of active teaching and learning approaches. Educational objectives include deepening conceptual understandings of a particular phenomenon, sets of interactions, or socio-political processes by using student interaction to bring abstract concepts to life. They provide students with a real or imaginary environment within which to act out a given 9 situation (Crookall 1995; Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; Kaufman 1998; Jefferson 1999; Flynn 2000; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Thomas 2002; Shellman and Turan 2003; Hobbs and Moreno 2004; Wheeler 2006; Kanner 2007; Raymond and Sorensen 2008). The aim is to enable students to actively experience, rather than read or hear about, the “constraints and motivations for action (or inaction) experienced by real players” (Smith and Boyer 1996:691), or to think about what they might do in a particular situation that the instructor has dramatized for them. As Sutcliffe (2002:3) emphasizes, “Remote theoretical concepts can be given life by placing them in a situation with which students are familiar.” Such exercises capitalize on the strengths of active learning techniques: creating memorable experiential learning events that tap into multiple senses and emotions by utilizing visual and verbal stimuli. Early examples of simulations scholarship include works by Harold Guetzkow and colleagues, who created the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) in the 1950s. This work sparked wider interest in political simulations as teaching and research tools. By the 1980s, scholars had accumulated a number of sophisticated simulations of international politics, with names like “Crisis,” “Grand Strategy,” “ICONS,” and “SALT III.” More recent literature on simulations stresses opportunities to reflect dynamics faced in the real world by individual decision makers, by small groups like the US National Security Council, or even global summits organized around international issues, and provides for a focus on contemporary global problems (Lantis et al. 2000; Boyer 2000). Some of the most popular simulations involve modeling international organizations, in particular United Nations and European Union simulations (Van Dyke et al. 2000; McIntosh 2001; Dunn 2002; Zeff 2003; Switky 2004; Chasek 2005). Simulations may be employed in one class meeting, through one week, or even over an entire semester. Alternatively, they may be designed to take place outside of the classroom in local, national, or international competitions. The scholarship on the use of games in international studies sets these approaches apart slightly from simulations. For example, Van Ments (1989:14) argues that games are structured systems of competitive play with specific defined endpoints or solutions that incorporate the material to be learnt. They are similar to simulations, but contain specific structures or rules that dictate what it means to “win” the simulated interactions. Games place the participants in positions to make choices that 10 affect outcomes, but do not require that they take on the persona of a real world actor. Examples range from interactive prisoner dilemma exercises to the use of board games in international studies classes (Hart and Simon 1988; Marks 1998; Brauer and Delemeester 2001; Ender 2004; Asal 2005; Ehrhardt 2008). A final subset of this type of approach is the role-play. Like simulations, roleplay places students within a structured environment and asks them to take on a specific role. Role-plays differ from simulations in that rather than having their actions prescribed by a set of well-defined preferences or objectives, role-plays provide more leeway for students to think about how they might act when placed in the position of their slightly less well-defined persona (Sutcliffe 2002). Role-play allows students to create their own interpretation of the roles because of role-play’s less “goal oriented” focus. The primary aim of the role-play is to dramatize for the students the relative positions of the actors involved and/or the challenges facing them (Andrianoff and Levine 2002). This dramatization can be very simple (such as roleplaying a two-person conversation) or complex (such as role-playing numerous actors interconnected within a network). The reality of the scenario and its proximity to a student’s personal experience is also flexible. While few examples of effective roleplay that are clearly distinguished from simulations or games have been published, some recent work has laid out some very useful role-play exercises with clear procedures for use in the international studies classroom (Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Johnston 2003; Krain and Shadle 2006; Williams 2006; Belloni 2008). Taken as a whole, the applications and procedures for simulations, games, and role-play are well detailed in the active teaching and learning literature. Experts recommend a set of core considerations that should be taken into account when designing effective simulations (Winham 1991; Smith and Boyer 1996; Lantis 1998; Shaw 2004; 2006; Asal and Blake 2006; Ellington et al. 2006). These include building the simulation design around specific educational objectives, carefully selecting the situation or topic to be addressed, establishing the needed roles to be played by both students and instructor, providing clear rules, specific instructions and background material, and having debriefing and assessment plans in place in advance. There are also an increasing number of simulation designs published and disseminated in the discipline, whose procedures can be adopted (or adapted for use) depending upon an instructor’s educational objectives (Beriker and Druckman 1996; Lantis 1996; 1998; 11 Lowry 1999; Boyer 2000; Kille 2002; Shaw 2004; Switky and Aviles 2007; Tessman 2007; Kelle 2008). Finally, there is growing attention in this literature to assessment. Scholars have found that these methods are particularly effective in bridging the gap between academic knowledge and everyday life. Such exercises also lead to enhanced student interest in the topic, the development of empathy, and acquisition and retention of knowledge. Debriefing discussions have also been found to be an essential element of the design, giving students and instructors an opportunity to reflect on the role that participants played, the negotiation strategies employed, and lessons learned. Older studies failed to develop thorough ways of determining whether the exercise has met the initial educational goals, let alone whether the simulation provided any additional value beyond more traditional teaching techniques. More recent literature has done a better job, evaluating simulations, games, or role-plays for the international studies classroom more rigorously (Maddrell 1994; Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Brown and King 2000; Mooney and Edwards 2001; Sutcliffe 2002; Krain and Lantis 2006; Krain and Shadle 2006; Shellman and Turan 2006; Powner and Allendoerfer 2008), though there is room for much improvement in this area.

#### Fourth, competition turn- you kill coalitions necessary for solvency and also sacrifice and exclude your opposition

Atchison & Panetta 9

[Jarrod & Edward, Assistant Professor at Wake Forest and Professor at University of Georgia, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future”, The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, 2009, pp. 317-334//wyo-tjc]

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

#### Preventing extinction is the highest ethical priority – we should take action to prevent the Other from dying FIRST, only THEN can we consider questions of value to life

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

# A2

#### Specific policy proposals are key to activism and deliberative democracy.

Walt 1991

(Stephen, Professor at the University of Chicago, *International Studies Quarterly* 35)

A second norm is relevance, a belief that even highly abstract lines of inquiry should be guided by the goal of solving real-world problems. Because the value of a given approach may not be apparent at the beginning–game theory is an obvious example–we cannot insist that a new approach be immediately applicable to a specific research puzzle. On the whole, however, **the belief that scholarship** in security affairs **should be linked to real-world issues has prevented the field from degenerating into self-indulgent intellectualizing**. And from the Golden Age to the present, **security studies has probably had more real-world impact, for good or ill, than most areas of social science**. Finally, **the renaissance of security studies has been guided by a commitment to democratic discourse. Rather than confining discussion of security issues to an elite group of the best and brightest, scholars** in the renaissance **have generally welcomed a more fully informed debate.** To paraphrase Clemenceau, **issues of war and peace are too important to be left solely to insiders with a vested interest in the outcome. The growth of security studies within universities is one sign of broader participation,** along with increased availability of information and more accessible publications for interested citizens. Although this view is by no means universal, the renaissance of security studies has been shaped by the belief that a **well-informed debate is the best way to avoid the disasters that are likely when national policy is monopolized by a few self-interested parties**.

#### You should evaluate ALL epistemology claims through the lens of specificity—you should not grant one epistemological commitment a privileged position because the conditions for knowing are ALWAYS contingent on the specific claim that is made. Drawing inferences from empirical reality is possible EVEN IF there is no possibility for pure certainty.

Wight 7

[Colin, Department of Politics, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Exeter, Journal of International Relations and Development, “Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Kratochwil’s attempt to push beyond the epistemological wars by remaining inside the epistemological cave is not as puzzling as it might seem given that **he assumes all meta-theoretical debate to be epistemological.** Thus, for example, he argues that he aims to ‘review some of the issues that meta-theorizing was supposed to address and show how this project of securing knowledge through hierarchization and finding absolute foundations failed’(Kr atochwil 2007: 2). Likewise, he suggests that issues such as incommensurability, reductionism and materialism vs idealism are arcane epistemological concerns (Kratochwil 2007: 2). **But in what sense, for example, is the materialism vs idealism question epistemological**? **As it has developed in IR, this is a debate about whether social outcomes are best explained in terms of material factors or ideational ones**.8 A related debate within philosophy attempts to grasp whether being or ideas ultimately matter. **In either debate, no epistemological issues are involved until a specific claim is made.**9 **We can certainly ask any theorist** who takes a position of either side of this debate **how they know (the epistemological question) their chosen factor is determinate in the last instance**. **But their epistemological response** to this question **is not the same as the claim itself, but rather defends the claim on one or other basis**. And we assess these claims on a number of grounds. **Given that we do not know in advance what the epistemological support for any given claim may be**, then it also follows that **scientists cannot afford to be epistemological dogmatists, pinning their colours to only one epistemological mast.** **Philosophers can trouble themselves with convoluted debates about the relative merits of one particular epistemological stance** over another— empiricism vs rationalism, for example—after all it is their job, **but scientists need to be epistemological opportunists** (Einstein 1949) **using a wide range of** epistemological **supports** **and never knowing in advance which one, or which mix of them, is relevant until a specific claim is made**. In some respects, this might seem to place me close to the position that Kratochwil suggests is absurd. For **is not my position a form of ‘anything goes’?** Well, again agreeing with Kratochwil that we should reject traditional logic and its associated yes or no answers, I will reply both yes and no.10 **Yes, it is an ‘anything goes’ position insofar as I reject outright that we need to commit ourselves to any particular epistemological position in advance of making or judging** particular **knowledge claims**. **I can see no good reason for giving any specific epistemological standpoint a position of a priori privilege**. **But I can also answer no because this position does not mean that we are unable to make informed judgements on the basis of the evidence for the claim**. **The fact that philosophers have been unable to provide secure foundations** for one or other epistemological stance **does not alter the fact that we continue to use these positions to get along in the world**. In this respect, I agree completely with Kratochwil’s claim (2007: 11) that b**oth absolute certainty and absolute doubt are impossible positions to hold, and that we ‘go on’in a situation located somewhere in between**. **It may be philosophically naıve of me to claim that if I wish to know how many cars are parked in my drive, then the easiest way is to probably go and look. But I can do this without needing philosophy to prove empiricism infallible.** Equally, in certain circumstances I might be able to ascertain how many cars are in my drive without looking; if, for example, I know that at time T1 that there were three cars and that one went away at time T2, then, if asked at time T3 (assuming these events are sequential), I have a legitimate case to say ‘two’. Of course, in either case, **I could still be wrong but the point is that the claim** about the existence of a certain number of cars **can justifiably be supported on various epistemological grounds and we do not know in advance which will be the most appropriate**. **Hence the context in which the claim emerges is also an important aspect of its validity**. In both cases, there is no doubt that observation or the process of rational deduction is theoretically laden, but **to say that our concepts help carve up the world in certain ways is not to accept that they either determine the physicality of what exists or can,** in all cases, **stop an object from existing**.

#### The alternative fails, it just adds another voice in the mix, but leaves foundational assumptions unchallenged

Shome, 1996

[Raka, Doctoral candidate at univ of Georgia, “Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical Canon: An “other” view.” Communication theory, Vol. 6 issue 1, February, 40-59, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library,] /Wyo-MB

In fact, **even when we do sometimes try to break out of the Eurocen- tric canons informing contemporary academic scholarship by including alternate cultural and racial perspectives in our syllabi, we often do not realize that instead of really breaking free of the canon, all that we do is stretch it, add things to it. But the canon remains the same and unchal- lenged. Our subject positions in relation to the canon remain the same and unchallenged.** Instead of examining how the canon itself is rooted in a larger discourse of colonialism and Western hegemony, we fre- quently use the canon to appropriate “other” voice^.^

**Racism not the root cause of all violence**

**Mertus 99**

 (Professor Julie Mertus is the co-director of Ethics, Peace and Global Affairs. She has written widely on human rights and gender, conflict, the Balkans, U.S. foreign policy and U.N. institutions. She is the author or editor of ten books, including Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, named "human rights book of the year" by the American Political Science Association) and, most recently Human Rights Matters: Local Politics and National Human Rights Institutions and The United Nations and Human Rights. Before entering academia, she worked as a researcher, writer and lawyer for several human rights and humanitarian organizations., J.D., Yale Law School; B.S. Cornell University, International Council on Human Rights Policy, “THE ROLE OF RACISM AS A CAUSE OF OR FACTOR IN WARS AND CIVIL CONFLICT”, http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/167/112\_-\_The\_Role\_of\_Racism\_as\_a\_Cause\_of\_or\_Factor\_in\_Wars\_and\_Civil\_Conflict\_Mertus\_\_Julie\_\_1999.pdf)

**This paper examines the role of racism as a cause of or factor in wars and civil conflicts.** “Racism” as understood here is defined broadly to encompass acts and processes of dehumanisation. The conflicts in **Rwanda and Kosovo serve as case studies; the former illustrates a case where the racist nature of the conflict has been clear to most observers, and the latter represents a case where racism plays an important yet overlooked role. Racism did not cause either conflict. Rather, the conflicts were the outcome of political manipulation and enlargement of already existing group classification schemes and social polarisation, a history of real and imagined oppression and deprivation, the absence of the rule of law and democratic structures, and state monopoly over the provision of information. Under such conditions, political élites could use racist ideology as a method of gaining power and, when necessary, waging war.**

#### The Aff’s focus on deliberative approaches to public policy makes participation in policy decisions by those without their hands on the levers of power possible

Hickman, 12

[Larry, director of the Center for Dewey Studies and professor of philosophy at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, “Citizen Participation: more or less?” Online, http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=fi&page=hickman\_28\_6] /Wyo-MB

Progressives such as John Dewey have tended to take a very different view from that of Caplan, Lippmann, and the Roberts Court. In his 1927 book The Public and Its Problems, **Dewey** mounted an energetic response to Lippmann. He **encouraged support for a free and vigorous press whose task would be to make the results of research in the social sciences available to every citizen**. He denied that the “ordinary citizen” lacked sufficient intelligence or interest to participate in public affairs. **And** he **called for greater support for a type of public education that would increase the critical skills that every citizen requires to cut through the web of disinformation that tends to be disseminated by governments, corporations, and other forces seeking to impede full discussion of matters affecting the public good.** If ordinary citizens were as distracted as Lippmann claimed, **Dewey suggested**, they would hardly be amenable to control by the educated elites in any event. And **if experts were cut off from the needs and concerns of the general population, then their databases would dry up**. They and their reports would become increasingly irrelevant. Of course, Dewey was not advocating a pure form of participatory democracy. He recognized that **men and women have different talents,** needs, and interests and that when they associate themselves in groups larger than a mere handful, there is a tendency toward specialization in the various tasks required to support the continued existence of the group. **One of those areas of specialization is the ability to act on behalf of other members of a group**—or what Dewey termed **a public—in ways that its members find acceptable.** In sum, **in order for a public to exist, it must have members who are able to take the lead in articulating its goals and interests and in representing those goals and interests to other publics**. **Dewey was in fact calling for a form of deliberative democracy that would achieve a creative balance between participation and representation. He realized that deliberative democracies cannot function in the absence of experts in various fields** and representatives who take decisions on behalf of a voting public. On one side, while **participation within civic affairs** could hardly be required, it should nevertheless be open **to anyone willing to develop the skills necessary for involvement in the processes of public debate and decision making**. On the other side, **efficient government requires both representatives who are sensitive to public problems and experts who can advise those representatives on technical matters**.

# 1ar

#### Cap solves poverty and reduces infant mortality

Leeson 10

(Peter, Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago’s Becker Center on Chicago Price Theory and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at George Mason University, “Two Cheers for Capitalism?” Society, Volume 47, Number 3, 2010, SpringerLink//wyo-mm)

Contrary to this participants’ claim, the jury isn’t still out on how capitalism has affected development globally. We have plenty of evidence. And it overwhelmingly points in one direction: the growth of capitalism has made the world better off. The relationships I look at below aren’t the only ones one might want to consider. Certainly others could be examined. I encourage the reader to do so if she’s curious. In a moment I’ll present the evidence on the growth of capitalism and then on income. Income is highly and positively correlated with nearly every positive development indicator one can think of (for example, access to a clean water source), and highly and negatively correlated with nearly every negative development indicator one can think of (for example, infant mortality). There are exceptions. But this strong tendency militates against depicting many of these relationships. Once the relationship between capitalism and income is established, for most purposes, it becomes redundant to examine the relationship between capitalism and improved access to a clean water source, infant mortality, and so on. If the reader wishes to verify this for herself, she’s encouraged to plot the data and see.

#### Capitalism sustainable and inevitable: empirically proven to adapt to any conditions

Farndale 12

(Nigel, The Daily Telegraph, “CAPITALISM: We can rebuild it REPORT First we blamed bankers for the financial collapse, and now the system itself is under attack. But do economists have any better ideas?” January 15, 2012, ProQuest//wyo-mm)

Adam Fergusson's book When Money Dies: the Nightmare of the Weimar Hyperinflation, has become a modern classic. I ask for Fergusson's take. "I don't think there are any serious alternatives to capitalism," he says, "not if we hope for growth and recovery, because capitalism represents the competition and enterprise that produces these things. The events of the past three or four years will have taught those who practise capitalism some big lessons." Does his blood run cold at mention of quantitative easing? "Absolutely. It hasn't worked with us. It hasn't worked in America. The danger is of losing control. If it doesn't work you try harder with more, and it if it does work you increase the amount. It's like drug addiction." And anyway, a shortage of money is not the problem. The problem is that the money is in the wrong place. It's in China where people, for reasons that seem enigmatic to us, like to - say it in a whisper - save. What we are witnessing, then, is the "creative destruction" of the heavily indebted Western economies by the emerging economies of the East. Darwinism at its purest. And a very capitalist idea. What, after all, is capitalism about if not competition and survival of the fittest? Capitalism, like the poor, will always be with us, because trade is how society operates. Trade is the human condition. As the philosopher Michel Onfray has said: "Is this the end of capitalism? Absolutely not. Capitalism has been through antiquity, feudalism, the industrial era, it has worn the guise of fascism and now it's wedding itself to the ecology cause. After this latest event, it will take on a new form. It is indestructible and works like the Hydra of Lerne, cut off one head and another grows in its place."