# Shipbuilding

#### Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

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The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Alternative fails—state coopts it. Only perm solves

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In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of ‘emancipatory’ security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and ‘blindness’ to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to ‘protect’ and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, ‘if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed’ (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

# FW

#### Predictions based on existential magnitude must be considered, there is no coming back from it, and there have been no previous examples to base predictions off of, and waiting to be reactive to situations is worse

Nick Bostrom, 02

Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford [University](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html) [www.nickbostrom.com](http://www.nickbostrom.com/) [Published in the Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002). (First version: 2001)], accessed 1/16/13,WYO/JF

Existential risks are distinct from global endurable risks. Examples of the latter kind include: threats to the biodiversity of Earth’s ecosphere, moderate global warming, global economic recessions (even major ones), and possibly stifling cultural or religious eras such as the “dark ages”, even if they encompass the whole global community, provided they are transitory (though see the section on “Shrieks” below). To say that a particular global risk is endurable is evidently not to say that it is acceptable or not very serious. A world war fought with conventional weapons or a Nazi-style Reich lasting for a decade would be extremely horrible events even though they would fall under the rubric of endurable global risks since humanity could eventually recover. (On the other hand, they could be a local terminal risk for many individuals and for persecuted ethnic groups.) I shall use the following definition of existential risks: Existential risk – One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. An existential risk is one where humankind as a whole is imperiled. Existential disasters have major adverse consequences for the course of human civilization for all time to come. 2 The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2%22%20%5Co%20%22) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3%22%20%5Co%20%22) A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4%22%20%5Co%20%22) Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: · Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. · We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[[5]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn5%22%20%5Co%20%22) Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. · Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. · If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic work has been done in this area. Part of the explanation may be that many of the gravest risks stem (as we shall see) from anticipated future technologies that we have only recently begun to understand. Another part of the explanation may be the unavoidably interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking seriously about a depressing topic. The point, however, is not to wallow in gloom and doom but simply to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival. In order to do that, we need to know where to focus our efforts.

# Cap

#### Cap sustainable: rising now and can recapture growth

Corcoran, 11

Terence Corcoran, Financial Post · Saturday, Jan. 8, 2011, Capitalism's comeback,
[http://www.financialpost.com/opinion/columnists/Capitalism+comeback/4078699/story.html#ixzz1CYct9eqf](http://www.financialpost.com/opinion/columnists/Capitalism%2Bcomeback/4078699/story.html#ixzz1CYct9eqf) , accessed 1-30-2011, WYO/JF

The markets are ready to take up the challenge. Corporations and investors are sitting on unprecedented volumes of cash. This is the capital that will drive capitalism's recapture of the economy and a return to growth. That's already happening, as Richard Salsman of InterMarket Forecasting noted recently (see commentary nearby). That these trends toward more growth and production will continue through the year seems all but inevitable. What is not certain is the ability of governments to get out of the way fast enough to make growth solid and sustainable. Getting out of the way means two things: reducing government spending and reining in monetary policy. All governments now talk about reducing deficits. But if Washington, Ottawa and the provinces are to avoid fiscal calamities -- and even Eurostyle debt meltdowns -- they must begin by reducing spending. So far, politicians are talking about the need for fiscal reform but nobody is doing anything. The second big uncertainty is monetary policy. Unprecedented printing of money by the Federal Reserve has flooded the world economy with U.S. dollars. As a result, the U.S. dollar is going down and commodity prices are rising, including oil. Low interest rates and monetary expansion are creating an environment that could fuel pockets of inflation--bubbles--that risk a repeat of the mortgage bubble that was at the heart of the financial crisis. But there's no denying a major shift in the political and economic landscape -- a shift back to markets, growth and competition. Capitalism is on the rise, but the state has yet to get as far out of the way as it should.

**[Probability] There is a strong historical correlation between economic decline and war.**

**Mead 9** — Henry Kissinger Senior Fellow at the CFR, Professor at Yale (Walter Russel, "What Doesn't Kill You Makes You Stronger," The New Republic)

So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. **Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists** who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, **the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies.** As a result, **developing countries** and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots **tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes**--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, **financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth.** This may be happening yet again. **None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession.** History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. **If financial crises have been a normal part of life** during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, **so has war**. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: **The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars.** Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but **the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring** Adolf **Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might** start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to **be born**? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, **if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.**

**Collapse causes Resource hording – turns mindset shift**

**Monbiot, 09**

[George Monbiot, columnist for The Guardian, has held visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning), and East London environmental science, August 17, 2009, “Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?,” online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change>, \\wyo-bb]

**From the second and third observations**, this follows: **instead of gathering as free collectives of happy householders, survivors of** this **collapse** will be **subject** **to** the **will of people seeking to monopolise** **remaining resources**. This will is likely to be **imposed through violence**. **Political accountability** will be a **distant memory**. The **chances of conserving any resource** in these circumstances **are** approximately **zero**. The **human and ecological consequences** of the first global **collapse are likely to persist for** **many** **generations**, perhaps **for our species' remaining time on earth.** **To imagine** that **good could come of** the involuntary **failure of industrial civilisation is** also **to succumb to denial**. The answer to your question – what will we learn from this collapse? – is nothing.

**Elites will backlash at the revolution, resulting in extinction**

**Dasmann, 89**

Raymond F. Dasmann, PhD in Zoology, professor emeritus of ecology at UC-Santa Cruz, 1989, The Ends of the Earth, edited by Donald Worster and Alfred W. Crosby, p. 288

There is really little doubt that there is a growing awareness of the necessity for modifying human ways to ensure the survival of the natural world on which the future of the human race depends. There is a rapidly growing biosphere consciousness, which is reaching the higher levels of many governments and has often found its expression at the level of the United Nations. One regrets that it is less evident in the United States government than it has been in the past, but it is certainly expressed among many members of the Congress, and one can expect future changes in the national leadership which will reflect the growing public awareness. The real question is whether or not the human race can modify its ways of behavior rapidly enough, because the majority continues to pursue pathways that lead toward the ecological impoverishment of the planet. The increase in awareness does not keep pace with the rate of destruction of tropical forests, the spread of deserts, the erosion of agricultural soils, the depletion of wildlife, or the growing pollution of the atmosphere and hydrosphere. **Those who exercise the greatest political and military power still threaten a war that can bring the whole edifice built by civilization crashing down into the wreckage of the biosphere, while in the meanwhile dozens of little wars forestall efforts to achieve sustainable ways of life. There is also a reasonable fear that if the power and influence of those who work for conservation of nature, sustainable development** based on social justice and equity, and a more reasonable approach to human use of the biosphere, **begins to reach a critical mass there will be attempts at massive repression by those who feel threatened by such changes. In other terms, if we begin to approach the hundredth monkey level, the “international power structure” will declare an open season on monkeys. If that happens then the real question will be whether anyone will be left to write the environmental history of our times.**

**Economic growth solves proliferation**

**Burrows and Windram 94**

(William & Robert, Critical Mass, p. 491-492)

**Economics is** in many respects **proliferation’s catalyst.** As we have noted, **economic desperation drives** Russia and some of the former Warsaw Pact **nations to peddle weapons and technology**. The possibility of considerable profits or at least balanced international payments also prompts Third World countries like China, Brazil, and Israel to do the same. Economics, as well as such related issues as overpopulation, drive proliferation just as surely as do purely political motives. Unfortunately, that subject is beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to say that, all things being equal, well-of, **relatively secure societies like today’s Japan are less likely to buy or sell superweapon technology than those that are insecure, needy, or desperate. Ultimately, solving economic problems**, especially as they are driven by population pressure, **is the surest way to defuse proliferation and enhance true national security.**

**And, prolif causes extinction from arms races and miscalculations**

**Utgoff 2**

(Deputy Director of the Strategy Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, Victor, “Proliferation, Missile Defence, and American Ambitions,” Survival, Volume 44, Number 2, Summer)

In sum, widespread **proliferation** is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such **shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible** with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, **we are headed toward a world** that will mirror the American Wild West of the, late 1800s. **With most,** if not all, **nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips**, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but **every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.**

**ECONOMIC COLLAPSE CAUSES QUICK WARMING**

**Lovelock 06**

 (Inventor: Gaia theory, fellow Royal Society, fellow Green College: Oxford) 2006

[James, The Revenge of Gaia p. 56-57, loghry]

 Recently the BBC broadcast in their Horizon series of science programmes an account of 'global dimming'; in it climate scientists, among them V. Ramanathan and Peter Cox, voiced their concern that we have already, in a sense, passed the point of no return in global heating. The science behind this programme appeared in a Nature article in 2005 which included as an author the distinguished German scientist, M. O. Andreae. **Industrial civilization has released into the atmosphere, in addition to greenhouse gases, a huge quantity of aerosol particles, and these tiny floating motes reflect incoming sunlight back to space and cause global cooling**. On large areas of the Earth's surface **the aerosol haze reflects sunlight back to space sufficiently to offset global warming. By themselves they cause a global cooling of 2 to 3°C**. Back in the 1960s, when we knew much less about the Earth and its atmosphere, a few scientists even speculated that continued economic growth would increase the density of the aerosol and lead to global cooling and even precipitate the next glaciation. The present extent of aerosol cooling is real and seriously worrying. It may have allowed us to continue our business as usual, not noticing how much we had changed the Earth nor realizing that we would have to pay back the borrowed time. **Aerosol particles stay only a brief time in the atmosphere: within weeks they settle to the ground. This means that any large economic downturn**, or a planned reduction in fossil-fuel usage, or unwise legislation to stop sulphur emissions, as the Europeans are now enacting to stop acid rain, **will allow the immediate expression of greenhouse warming**. It has been suggested that part of the excessive heat of the 2003 summer in Europe was caused by the European Union's efforts to remove the aerosol which is the source of acid rain. Peter Cox reminded us that because the aerosol was not fully included, climate modellers may have underestimated the sensitivity of their models to greenhouse gas abundance and failed to notice that we may already be beyond the point of no return.

**Free market growth key to space exploration—profit incentive boosts innovation and creativity**

**Garmong, 2005**

[Robert, Ph.D. in philosophy, was a writer for the Ayn Rand Institute from 2003 to 2004, “Privatize Space Exploration.” 7-22-2005, Online, <http://capitalismmagazine.com/2005/07/privatize-space-exploration>] /Wyo-MB

Nor would it be difficult to spur **the private exploration of space–it’s been happening, quietly, for years. The free market works to produce whatever there is demand for**, just as it now does with traditional aircraft**. Commercial satellite launches are now routine**, and could easily be fully privatized. The X Prize, which SpaceShipOne won, offered incentives for private groups to break out of the Earth’s atmosphere. But all this private exploration is hobbled by the crucial absence of a system of property rights in space. **Imagine the incentive to a profit-minded business if,** for instance, **it were granted the right to any stellar body it reached and exploited.** We often hear that the most ambitious projects can only be undertaken by government, but in fact the opposite is true**. The more ambitious a project is, the more it demands to be broken into achievable, profit-making steps–and freed from the unavoidable politicizing of government-controlled science. If space development is to be transformed** from an expensive national bauble whose central purpose is to assert national pride to a practical industry**, it will only be by unleashing the creative force of free and rational minds.** The creative minds that allowed SpaceShipOne to soar to triumph have made the first private steps toward the stars. Before them are enormous technical difficulties, the solution of which will require even more heroic determination than that which tamed the seas and the continents. **To solve them, America must unleash its best minds, as only the free market can do.**

#### Space solves multiple existential threats –key to survival

Pelton 03

(Joseph, Director of the Space and Advanced Communications Research institute at George Washington University and Executive Director of the Arthur C. Clarke Foundation, “COMMENTARY: Why Space? The Top 10 Reasons”, September 23, http://www.space.com/news/commentary\_top10\_030912.html)

Actually the lack of a space program could get us all killed. I dont mean you or me or my wife or children. I mean that Homo sapiens as a species are actually endangered. Surprising to some, a well conceived space program may well be our only hope for long-term survival. The right or wrong decisions about space research and exploration may be key to the futures of our grandchildren or great-grandchildren or those that follow. Arthur C. Clarke, the author and screenplay writer for 2001: A Space Odyssey, put the issue rather starkly some years back when he said: The dinosaurs are not around today because they did not have a space program. He was, of course, referring to the fact that we now know a quite largish meteor crashed into the earth, released poisonous Iridium chemicals into our atmosphere and created a killer cloud above the Earth that blocked out the sun for a prolonged period of time. This could have been foreseen and averted with a sufficiently advanced space program. But this is only one example of how space programs, such as NASAs Spaceguard program, help protect our fragile planet. Without a space program we would not know about the large ozone hole in our atmosphere, the hazards of solar radiation, the path of killer hurricanes or many other environmental dangers. But this is only a fraction of the ways that space programs are crucial to our future. He Continues… Protection against catastrophic planetary accidents: It is easy to assume that an erratic meteor or comet will not bring destruction to the Earth because the probabilities are low. The truth is we are bombarded from space daily. The dangers are greatest not from a cataclysmic collision, but from not knowing enough about solar storms, cosmic radiation and the ozone layer. An enhanced Spaceguard Program is actually a prudent course that could save our species in time.

# Fem k

Gender oppression does not cause war, it’s the other way around

Joshua Goldstein, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

Feminist critics pick away at straw arguments, nation-state interests are NOT inherently gendered – asserting they are is essentialist

Michael Lind – editor of the National Interest – 2005 Of Arms and the Woman, review of the Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War by Cynthia Enloe

http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt accessed 11-20-07 [nfb]

Now--if you are still with me--the great intellectual challenge to the conventional realist understanding of international relations comes from the standpoint feminists and the postmodernist feminists, who agree on the broad outlines of the critique. (In what follows I will use "feminist" to mean standpoint and postmodernist scholars.) According to feminist critics, international relations theory as it has evolved incorporates "masculinist" prejudices at each of its three levels of analysis: man, the state and war. Realists are "androcentric" in arguing that the propensity for conflict is universal in human nature ("man"); that the logic and the morality of sovereign states are not identical to those of individuals ("the state"); and that the world is an anarchy in which sovereign states must be prepared to rely on self-help, including organized violence ("war"). Feminist theorists would stress the nurturing and cooperative aspects--the conventionally feminine aspects--of human nature; they would expose the artificiality of notions of sovereignty, and their connection with patriarchy and militarism; and they would replace the narrow realist emphasis on security, especially military security, with a redefinition of security as universal social justice. The first thing that must be said about the feminist critique of realism is that it is by no means incompatible with realism, properly understood. In fact, realist theory can hardly be recognized in the feminist caricature of it. Take the idea of the innate human propensity for conflict. Although some realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau have confused the matter (often under the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr) with misleading talk of "original sin," the controlling idea of realism is that there is an ineradicable potential for conflict between human beings--"men" in the inclusive, gender-neutral sense-- when they are organized in groups. Realism is not about conflict between individual men, that is, males; if it were, it would be a theory of barroom brawls or adolescent male crime. It is about conflict between rival communities, and those communities include women and men alike. Feminist critics of realism, then, begin by attacking a straw man, or a straw male. Even worse, they tend to indulge in the stereotypes that they otherwise abhor: aggression is "male," conciliation is "female." To their credit, most feminist theorists are aware of this danger, ever mindful of their dogma that all sexual identity is socially constructed, ever fearful that they will hear the cry of "Essentialist!" raised against them. Thus Enloe, in an earlier book called Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, struggles with how to answer what she calls "the `What about Margaret Thatcher?' taunt." Her answer is that women like Margaret Thatcher and Jeane Kirkpatrick reinforce the patriarchy by making international conflict look "less man-made, more people-made and thus more legitimate and harder to reverse." Enloe applies this analysis consistently--right-wing women like Phyllis Schlafly are pawns of the patriarchal-militarist power structure, while left-wing women like the Greenham Common Women are disinterested proponents of the good of humanity. Still, Enloe is troubled enough to return to the question: "some women's class aspirations and their racist fears lured them into the role of controlling other women for the sake of imperial rule." Admit that, however, and you are close to conceding the point about collective human behavior made by realists.

If feminists are right about patriarchal aggression you should take our impacts seriously – the prevalence of dualistic thinking means first priority is preventing a nuclear war

Victoria Davion- professor & head of the Philosophy Department at University of Georgia - 1996 “When Lives Become Logic Problems: Nuclear Deterrence, an Ecological Feminist Critique”

in *Ecological Feminist Philosophies* ed. Karen Warren, Indiana University Press p. 195 [nfb]

As I stated earlier, I do not think that taking ecological feminist critiques seriously necessarily means ceasing all deterrent threats, because part of taking such critiques seriously means believing that at present many people do think dualistically. In fact, if Plumwood's critique is correct, European white men as a group may be socialized to think more dualistically than others, given that they ,it reared for success in the public realm. And, given that they form the majority of powerful political leaders, if left unchecked a nuclear strike of some sort seems to be a distinct possibility. I want to make clear that I am not saying that men are somehow biologically predisposed to aggression while women are not. Indeed, women can and often do think dualistically. The point is that the group of people most likely to be successful in a political climate where dualistic thinking is prevalent are most likely to be dualistic thinkers themselves. And, since such thinking could lead to nuclear aggression, we must therefore face this possibility. While actually retaliating against citizens homogenized as the other would be morally outrageous, bluffing may be the best alternative for those having to deal with European white men, given the horrible truth that nuclear weapons exist and that many people think in the ways described above. This may seem to be a surprising conclusion from an ecological feminist perspective. Yet I believe that it is consistent with the critiques discussed here, because it recognizes the fact that in reality many people and nations do think dualistically, a major compo­nent of these critiques.

A. Feminism lumps women together as a homogenous group of powerless, exploited people

Mohanty, postcolonial and transnational feminist theorist, 1986 (Chandra Talpade, Under Western Eyes, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/raim0007/RaeSpot/under%20wstrn%20eyes.pdf)

**By women as a category of analysis, I am referring to the critical assumption that all of us of the same gender, across classes and cultures, are somehow socially constituted as a homogeneous group identified prior to the process of analysis**. **This is an assump­tion which characterizes much feminist discourse**. The homogeneity of women as a group is produced not on the basis of biological essentials, but rather on the basis of secondary sociological and anthropological universals. Thus, for instance, in any given piece of feminist analysis, women are characterized as a singular group on the basis of a shared oppression. **What binds women together is a socio­logical notion of the "sameness" of their oppression**. It is at this point that an elision takes place between "women" as a discursively con structed group and "women" as material subjects of their own history. Thus, the discursively consensual homogeneity of "women" as a group is mistaken for the historically specific material reality of groups of women. **This results in an assumption of women as an always-already constituted group, one which has been labelled "powerless," "exploited,**" "sexually harrassed," etc., by feminist scientific, economic, legal and sociological discourses. (Notice that this is quite similar to sexist discourse labeling women weak, emotional, having math anxiety, etc.) The focus is not on uncovering the material and ideological specificities that constitute a particular group of women as "powerless" in a particular context. It is rather on finding a variety of cases of "powerless" groups of women **to prove the general point that women as a group are powerless.**

B. Homogenization of the concept of woman locks them into powerlessness. The alt just inverts power relations; it doesn’t resolve them

Mohanty, postcolonial and transnational feminist theorist, 1986 (Chandra Talpade, Under Western Eyes, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/raim0007/RaeSpot/under%20wstrn%20eyes.pdf)

What does this imply about the structure and functioning of power relations? **The setting up of the commonality of third world women's struggles across classes and cultures against a general notion of oppression** (primarily the group in power—i.e., men) **necessitates the** assumption of what Michel Foucault calls the "**juridico-discursive" model of power**," the principle features of which are: "a negative relation" (limit and lack); an "insistence on the rule" (which forms a binary system); a "cycle of prohibition"; the "logic of censorship"; **and a "uniformity" of the apparatus functioning at different levels. Feminist discourse on the third world which assumes a homogeneous category—or group—called women necessarily operates through the setting up of originary power divisions.** Power relations are structured in terms of a source of power and a cumulative reaction to power. Opposition is a generalized phenomenon created as a response to power—which, in turn, is possessed by certain groups of people**. The major problem with such a definition of power is that it locks all revolutionary struggles into binary structures—possessing power versus being powerless. Women are powerless, unified groups**. If the struggle for a just society is seen in terms of the move from powerless to powerful for women as a group, and this is the implication in feminist discourse which structures sexual difference in terms of the division between the sexes, then **the new society would be structurally identical to the existing organization of power relations, constituting itself as a simple inversion of what exists**. If relations of domination and exploitation are defined in terms of binary divisions—groups which dominate and groups which are dominated—surely the implication is that the accession to power of women as a group is sufficient to dismantle the existing organization of relations? But **women as a group are not in some sense essentially superior or infallible. The crux of the problem lies in that initial assumption of women as a homogeneous group or category ("the oppressed**"), a familiar assumption in Western radical and liberal feminisms."

Feminist epistemologies are too incoherent to formulate a political strategy

Murray 97 (Alastair, Politics Department, University of Wales Swansea, Reconstructing Realism, p. 192)

Given these problems, the attempt to establish an alternative, feminist epistemology falls apart. The aim to provide a 'new' theory of human nature just looks unnecessary when it is noted that the conventional view of the human character derived from realism is in fact simultaneously moral and immoral, 'both conflictual and cooperative', as Tickner demands. Similarly, the concern to redefine power amounts to little more than a sophisticated word game. 'Mutual enablement' ultimately sounds like some dreadful slogan dreamt up by a management consultant. The fact that realist theorists define power in terms of the ability to coerce does not mean that they neglect the ability to persuade as a tool in international politics, only that they define power in more rigorous terms than feminists, calling each by a different name to avoid confusion. Nor does it mean that, by doing this, they neglect the ability of international actors to co‑operate, or that they exclude from consideration the co‑operative basis upon which power relies or the co‑operative objectives to which it tends. If Tickner had read beyond the first chapter of *Politics among Nations*, she might have come across phrases such as the balance of power, in which curious things called 'alliances' and 'grand coalitions' co‑operatively generate power towards co‑operative ends. Conflict is not perpetual in the realist vision of international relations, and coalition building is ultimately just as essential to the realist account of international politics as it is to feminist accounts.

#### Trying to fracture masculine domination results in more conflict.

**Zalewiski and Parpart, 98**

(Marysia Zalewski, Reader in the Centre for Women’s Studies, and Jane Parpart, professor of Gender Studies at University of Dalhousie, 98 [The 'Man' Question in International Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, p76]uwyokb)

Central though this binary conception of gender is to much of Western thought, it presents an illusory dichotomous opposition between genders that obscures important distinctions within masculinity and femininity. Interestingly enough, once the idea of fractures within Western conceptions of masculinity and femininity is accepted, the division between what is masculine and what is feminine tends to be less clear. Fractures within masculinity have played a crucial part in defining the relationships between the two orthodox paradigms in IR: namely realism and liberal internationalism. The division of orthodox IR into two different masculine camps has led to a competition between two aspiring hegemonic masculinities over which is more masculine (real and objective) and which should be regarded as inferior and feminine (subjective and normative)

**Rhetoric describes and reflects reality, it does not shape it—objective reality exists outside of language**

**Fram-Cohen ‘85**

[Michelle, “Reality, Language, Translation: What Makes Translation Possible?” American Translators Association Conference, enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/michelleframcohen//possibilityoftranslation.html, 9-24-06//uwyo-ajl]

Nida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds **the objectivity of reality**. This **means** that **reality is independent of consciousness,** **consciousness** **being the means of perceiving ?reality, not of creating it.** Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory **symbols that denote concepts**." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that **concepts are abstractions of** units **perceived** in **reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language**. Since **reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words**--and of all languages. **The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols**. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation. **Translation** is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another. It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of symbols denoting the same concepts. This process **is possible because concepts have specific referents in reality**. Even if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one language but not in another, **the referent** this **word and concept stand for** nevertheless **exists in reality, and can be referred to** in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. **Language is a means describing reality**, **and** as such **can** and should **expand** **to** **include** **newly discovered** or innovated **objects** in reality. The revival of the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward reality. Those who wanted to use Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users.

They can’t win root cause—feminism cannot resist violent responses to external factors and patriarchy does not influence other systems of oppression

Biel 91

 (Janet MA @ Institute of Social Ecology at ; Finding our way: rethinking ecofeminist politic, googlebooks)

We should also be alert to the fact that a society imbued by such familial, presumably 'maternal' sentiments as "caring" may not have extended that "caring" to human beings of diverse ethnic origins—or for that matter, to the natural world. There is no reason to believe that the love that a mother extends to children and to other members of her family would have been able to resist the problems raised by the pressure of population growth, climatic changes that altered the food supply, or the impact of natural disasters. The evidence of human sacrifice already constitutes disturbing evidence of barbarities that, according to ecofeminist-theists, should have been completely alien to the allcaring, all-loving, and benign goddess of idyllic matricentric communities. In any case, the speculation that the ills of the world result exclusively from a shift from a matricentric to a warrior society can be matched, if we choose to do so, by the speculation that internal developments of hierarchy in a strictly matricentric culture are likely to have produced. "Prototypical" or "archetypal" as the oppression of women may be, the claim that it underpins all later forms of oppression in society is even more difficult to substantiate today, when one scans the complex systems of oppression that afflict the entire landscape of society. To be sure, no thinking person will seriously disagree that the liberation of women from the gender roles to which they have been confined holds the promise of liberating men from gender roles as well. Shedding roles that require males to be breadwinners or to suppress tender feelings would certainly be emancipatory for them. It is true that, despite the obvious privileges that male domination gives men, gender roles confine males also to stereotypical roles of their own, and that this keeps them from exercising the full range of their human capacities for love, cooperativeness, and trust and a nurturing emotional life in general. In these senses, feminism promises liberation for men as well as women. But it is difficult to see how freeing women from misogyny will also free women—or men—from oppression under capitalism and the nation-state, let alone in racist societies. Even as they dominate women, men dominate other men in their own right, and they do this not for the ultimate purpose of dominating women but for very clear reasons that require no psychoanalysis to explain. Men do not become capitalists because they are misogynists or emotionally repressed, or because they are afraid of women's "elemental power." Their aims, reasons, motivations, and methods are much more mundane, as a careful reading of any economic text will reveal. They usually stand to gain very distinct things, such as material wealth, status, vast state power, and military control— things that some women, too, have not been immune to wanting. Nazis wanted to kill Jews, homosexuals, and gypsies, but not women as such; they used German women for their own purposes and even "glorified" them in pursuit of their ends. We need not mystify this by attributing to male capitalists, for example, unprovable and inferred gender-derived neuroses. What they stand to gain is clear. Systems of domination like capitalism, statism, and ethnic oppressions—and sexism itself—have a "history, logic, and struggle" of their own, as Susan Prentice, a critic of ecofeminism, puts it. They are conscious projects in their own right. While the ecofeminist view that the domination of women is prototypical may be sound, it cannot be used to supplant the elaboration of domination into all different spheres of social life. "By locating the origin of the domination of women and nature in male consciousness," writes Prentice, "ecofeminism makes political and economic systems simply derivative of male thinking."46

The state’s political power makes it feminism’s best tool to disrupt patriarchy.

Harrington, 92

Mona Harrington, lawyer, political scientist, and writer in Cambridge, MA, 1992 (“The Liberal State as an Agent of Feminist Change,” in Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory, ed. V. Spike Peterson, pg. 66)

In the face of such pressures, I believe that feminist critics of the present state system should beware. The very fact that the state creates, condenses, and focuses political power may make it the best friend, not the enemy, of feminists--because the availability of real political power is essential to real democratic control. Not sufficient, I know, but essential. My basic premise is that political power can significantly disrupt patriarchal and class (which is to say, economic) power. It holds the potential, at least, for disrupting the patriarchal/economic oppression of those in the lower reaches of class, sex, and race hierarchies. It is indisputable that, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it has been the political power of states that has confronted the massive economic power privately constructed out of industrial processes and has imposed obligations on employers for the welfare of workers as well as providing additional social supports for the population at large. And the political tempering of economic power has been the most responsive to broad public needs in liberal democracies, where governments must respond roughly to the interests of voters.

**Total rejection provides no alternative to current dominant discourses—destabalization isn’t enough**

Saloom, 06

JD Univ of Georgia School of Law and M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from U of Chicago, Fall 2006 [Rachel, A Feminist Inquiry into International Law and International Relations, 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 159, l/n,]

Because patriarchy is embedded within society, it is no surprise that the theory and practice of both international law and international relations is also patriarchal. [98](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n98#n98" \t "_self) Total critique, however, presents no method by which to challenge current hegemonic practices. Feminist scholars have yet to provide a coherent way in which total critique can be applied to change the nature of international law and international relations. Some  [\*178]  feminist scholars are optimistic for the possibility of changing the way the current system is structured. For example, Whitworth believes that "sites of resistance are always available to those who oppose the status quo." [99](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n99#n99" \t "_self) Enloe suggests that since the world of international politics has been made it can also be remade. [100](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n100#n100" \t "_self) She posits that every time a woman speaks out about how the government controls her, new theories are being made. [101](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n101#n101" \t "_self) All of these theorists highlight the manner in which gender criticisms can destabilize traditional theories. They provide no mechanism, however, for the actual implementation of their theories into practice. While in the abstract, resistance to hegemonic paradigms seems like a promising concept, gender theorists have made no attempt to make their resistance culminate in meaningful change. The notion of rethinking traditional approaches to international law and international relations does not go far enough in prescribing an alternative theoretical basis for understanding the international arena. Enloe's plea for women to speak out about international politics does not go nearly far enough in explaining how those acts could have the potential to actually change the practice of international relations. Either women are already speaking out now, and their voices alone are not an effective mechanism to challenge the system, or women are not even speaking out about world politics currently. Obviously it is absurd to assume that women remain silent about world politics. If that is the case, then one must question women's ability to speak up, challenge, and change the system.