# 1AR

## Politics

### UQ

Romney will win now, economic models

Their 2012 model

found

Romney would win 320 Electoral Votes

intensifies the numbers

Republican challenger is projected to take 330

Hallowell

10/8

#### UC boulder model is the best/ most predictive

Billy Hallowell, 10/8

“ELECTORAL COLLEGE MODEL PREDICTS ROMNEY WILL WIN EVEN BIGGER THAN PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT IN 2012” <http://www.theblaze.com/stories/electoral-college-model-predicts-romney-will-win-even-bigger-than-previously-thought-in-2012/>, accessed 10/10/12,WYO/JF

While many election forecast models are based on the popular vote, the model developed by Bickers and Berry is based on the Electoral College and is the only one of its type to include more than one state-level measure of economic conditions. They included economic data from all 50 states and the District of Columbia. [...] The Bickers and Berry model includes both state and national unemployment figures as well as changes in real per capita income, among other factors. The new analysis includes unemployment rates from August rather than May, and changes in per capita income from the end of June rather than March. It is the last update they will release before the election. [...] In addition to state and national unemployment rates, the authors analyzed changes in personal income from the time of the prior presidential election. Research shows that these two factors affect the major parties differently: Voters hold Democrats more responsible for unemployment rates, while Republicans are held more responsible for fluctuations in personal income.

#### Romney is winning Virginia Romney leading by one point Cassidy, 10/8

#### Obama will Lose-All Swing States Surging towards Romney

Muja 10/12

[SAHIT MUJA, “New Polls: Romney leads Obama on 10 swing states”, OCTOBER 12, 2012, <http://www.examiner.com/article/new-poll-romney-leads-obama-on-10-swing-state-polls>, \\wyo-bb]

New polls in two presidential battleground states of the American Research Group polls in both states. In Florida, Romney is at 49% and Obama stands at 46%, the poll, released Friday, shows. Romney's advantage in New Hampshire is four points, 50% to 46%. According to Gravis Marketing new poll of 1,594 Ohio voters who indicated that they were registered to vote in the upcoming presidential election finds that the Obama vs. Romney race is very close. Among all of the likely voters, 1,313 of the poll's participants, Romney is leading with 45.9 percent of the people saying that they'd vote for him, compared to the 45.1 percent favoring Obama. The latest Rasmussen Reports telephone survey of Likely North Carolina voters shows Romney attracting 51% of the vote, while Obama earns support from 48% A new Tampa Bay Times/Bay News 9/Miami Herald poll show Mitt Romney leads President Obama 51 percent to 44 percent. President Obama appears to be in serious trouble in Florida, America's biggest battleground state. New polls points show Florida is shifting significantly toward the Republican nominee Mitt Romney. The latest from American Research Group shows another lead for Romney in Florida, this time 3-points 49 to 46 over President Obama. According to new Poll from Rasmussen. "Mitt Romney has crossed the 50% mark for the first time to widen his lead against Obama to four points in Florida". The latest Rasmussen Reports telephone survey of Likely Florida Voters finds Romney with 51% support to President Obama’s 47%. Two percent (2%) remain undecided. A new polls by QStarNews Swing State Poll with 4808 likely voters poll show Romney ahad of President Obama. Poll has a margin of error of 1.41 percent. The states included in this survey are Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin. Questions and results as asked by QStarNews Swing State Poll of likely voters in all 11 key swing states: If the election were held today, would you vote for the ticket of Democratic candidates, President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden, or the ticket of Republican candidates, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney and Congressman Paul Ryan or the ticket of Libertarian Candidates, former New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson and former California Judge Jim Gray? Romney/Ryan 50.20, Obama/Biden 46.00, Johnson/Gray 1.92 Do you approve or disapprove of Barack Obama's performance as president?Somewhat Approve 23.30, Strongly Approve 22.01, Strongly Disapprove 49.02, Somewhat Disapprove 5.51. Overall Approval and Disapproval: Approve 45.31: Disapprove 54.53 Projected vote percentages with 75 percent of undecided voters going for Romney, 25 percent to Obama. Romney/Ryan 51.61, Obama/Biden 46.47, Johnson/Gray 1.92 COLORADO: Romney/Ryan 52.18, Obama/Biden 45.86, Johnson/Gray 1.90. Approve 47.79, Disapprove 52.13. Romney/Ryan 52.23, Obama/Biden 45.87, Johnson/Gray 1.90 FLORIDA: A 1222 likely votes -- 3.96 margin of error Romney/Ryan 51.88, Obama/Biden 43.90, Johnson/Gray 4.22, Approve 42.28, Disapprove 57.02. IOWA : A 120 likely votes -- 8.95 margin of error Romney/Ryan 47.69, Obama/Biden 48.07, Johnson/Gray 1.90, Approve 50.11, Disapprove 49.34. MICHIGAN: A 311 likely votes -- 5.56 margin of error Romney/Ryan 52.40, Obama/Biden 44.71, Johnson/Gray 1.89, Approve 45.60, Disapprove 55.08. NEVADA: A 115 likely votes -- 9.14 margin of error. Romney/Ryan 50.72, Obama/Biden 40.24, Johnson/Gray 1.04, Approve 38.36, Disapprove 53.30. NEW HAMPSHIRE: A 83 likely votes -- 10.76 margin of error. Romney/Ryan 45.78, Obama/Biden 45.72, Johnson/Gray 5.08, Approve 45.72, Disapprove 50.85 Projected vote percentages with 75 percent of undecided voters going for Romney, 25 percent to Obama -- New Hampshire, Romney/Ryan 48.35, Obama/Biden 46.57, Johnson/Gray 5.08 NORTH CAROLINA: A 506 likely votes -- 4.36 margin of error. Romney/Ryan 51.96, Obama/Biden 40.09, Johnson/Gray 1.63, Approve 38.05, Disapprove 61.12. OHIO: A 775 likely votes -- 4.36 margin of error. Romney/Ryan 48.60, Obama/Biden 48.22, Johnson/Gray 1.51, Approve 48.45, Disapprove 51.78. PENNSYLVANIA: A 566 likely votes -- 4.12 margin of error. Romney/Ryan 49.0, Obama/Biden 46.20, Johnson/Gray 3.58, Approve 45.79, Disapprove 54.28 Projected vote percentages with 75 percent of undecided voters going for Romney, 25 percent to Obama -- Pennsylvania, Romney/Ryan 49.92, Obama/Biden 46.50, Johnson/Gray 3.58 VIRGINIA: A 532 likely votes -- 4.25 margin of error. Romney/Ryan 51.47, Obama/Biden 45.16, Johnson/Gray 2.01 WISCONSIN: A 228 likely votes -- 6.49 margin of error. Romney/Ryan 48.56, Obama/Biden 47.22. A wave of swing-state polling released this morning shows Mitt Romney leads President Obama in Swing State Polls. The recent shift of a number of voters along with Independents toward Romney is the result of the Romney-Obama debate, which clearly showed that President Obama is running the White House as he conducted himself during the debate: arrogant and disengaged, just like Joe Biden.

#### Obama wins but Romney could overcome his lead

Feller & Hunt Oct. 9th

[BEN FELLER and KASIE HUNT |, Associated Press, October 9th, 2012, Race between Romney, Obama still all about Ohio, <http://news.yahoo.com/race-between-romney-obama-still-ohio-214138408--election.html>, uwyo//amp]

As Obama wooed Ohio State University students here and Romney focused on the Democratic bastion of Cuyahoga County to the north, there were signs the president's Ohio advantage was narrowing. A new CNN poll showed Obama leading Romney 51 percent to 47 percent among likely Ohio voters. And Republican strategists familiar with Romney's internal polling contended the race was even closer — within a single percentage point — as the candidate enjoyed a post-debate surge of support."I promise you he's back in the game in Ohio," said Charlie Black, an informal Romney campaign adviser.

#### Polls aren’t conclusive enough you vote neg on UC bolder economic model, best predictive quality

### Link General

#### Wind popular with the public

Kaften ‘11

Cheryl, Columnist, Green Technology World, “2012 Election Survey: Politicians 'Don't Know Which Way the Wind Blows'’, http://green.tmcnet.com/channels/wind-power/articles/237194-2012-election-survey-politicians-dont-know-which-way.htm

Conversely, when it comes to focusing federal subsidies on wind and solar, 38 percent of all Americans respond favorably. In fact, more than three out of four Americans (77 percent – including 65 percent of Republicans, 75 percent of Independents, 88 percent of Democrats, and 56 percent of Tea Party members – agree with the following statement: “The U.S. needs to be a clean energy technology leader and it should invest in the research and domestic manufacturing of wind, solar and energy efficiency technologies.” ¶ About seven in 10 Americans (71 percent) – including 55 percent of Republicans, 72 percent of Independents, 84 percent of Democrats, and almost half (47 percent) of Tea Party backers – strongly or somewhat support “a shift of federal loan-guarantee support for energy away from nuclear reactors and toward clean renewable energy such as wind and solar.” ¶ And only about one in 10 Americans (13 percent) – including just 26 percent of Tea Party supporters –believes that “no energy source should receive federal subsidies.” Pam Solo, founder and president, Civil Society Institute, said, “Americans of all political stripes have moved ahead of Washington and want our nation to make smarter choices about cleaner and safer sources of power. Common sense is the driving force in American opinion, which focuses not on whether Washington should help usher in a renewable, clean energy future, but how it should proceed in doing so.”

#### NIMBY theory wrong: studies conclude theory is misleading and inaccurate.

Wolsink 12

(Maarten, Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam, Energy Policy, “Undesired reinforcement of harmful ‘self-evident truths’ concerning the implementation of windpower,” June 28, 2012, Science Direct//wyo-mm)

NIMBY thinking has a low validity profile for most types of environmental conflict. For example, within the domain of renewable energy, several studies in the UK on various sources (like on- and off-shore wind, solar, tidal, geothermal etc.) in a recent collection strongly refute the validity of the NIMBY language. The overall conclusion is that there is “an array of inappropriate and misleading ways of thinking about technology siting and public engagement with renewable energy technologies, notably the ‘NIMBY’ concept with its deficit model of public knowledge or expertise and impoverished view of the backyard” (Devine-Wright, 2011, p. 318).

### Link Turn- CO

#### Ball, 10-5 Colorado still looms as possibility for the Republicans. Romney has endorsement of John Elway, given success in debate Colorado will be his comeback state.

#### Colorado will only reach voter enthusiasm if Obama takes further steps toward clean energy base voters’ enthusiasm matters key states such as Colorado green base is a lot of the base base voters realized they make themselves matter Casey 2011

#### Colorado is key to obama’s re-election if the president repeats that win in Colorado, This western strategy diminishes the importance of Ohio and Florida Sale 2012

#### Energy policy key to Colorado

Rebecca Elliott, buzzfeed staff writer, “Obama Sees Sharpest Drop In Donors From Western States”, June 12, 2012

Three of the high drop off states — Oregon, Nevada, and Colorado — went for Obama in the 2008 election, Oregon is expected to do so again this November. Idaho is solidly red, while Colorado and Nevada, with their respective 9 and 6 electoral votes, remain crucial battlegrounds. Democratic consultants and political scientists offered a range of theories for the drop-off in donors in a region with libertarian leanings and moderate instincts, relatively few African-Americans, and pockets of progressive politics. Richard Skinner, an assistant professor of political science at the New College of Florida, noted that the Pacific Northwest has traditionally been a stronghold of the progressive movement, many of whose adherents hoped for a far more combative, liberal Obama embrace of policies like single-payer health care. “Maybe more so than in other parts of the country, you have strongly liberal views and a dislike of politics as usual,” Skinner said. “Donors in those states would be probably even more inclined to be sort of idealistic donors — people who are motivated by purist views on issues, people who are uncomfortable with compromise.” In the case of Oregon, one of the issues that inspired voters to put money behind Obama in 2008 was getting American troops away from combat. That urgency has now faded. “Oregon was the most virulently anti-war states during the Iraq war,” said Jake Weigler, director of Oregon Communications at Strategies 360, a strategic communications firm. “That was a powerful motivator during the 2008 election. It may not be as powerful a one now.” In Colorado, which has long been focused on environmental and energy policy, the enthusiasm gap amongst donors may be related to Obama’s lack of progress on his environmental agenda, said John Straayer, a professor of political science at Colorado State University. The state also saw a surge in independents and young, college-educated voters were drawn into politics by Obama's 2008 campaign.

### Fiat No elections link

#### It’s a legitimate logistical question, plan happens after the election. There are no more legislative days with in the congressional schedule. Legislative business doesn't take place in pro forma sessions That’s Cox 9/24

### Impact D

#### Trade conflicts don’t escalate – new normal. Ups and downs in previous relationship, however there won’t be a full blown war, both sides realize this. Conflict over trade is here but there it’s a new normal for the relations- Feigenbaum 10

#### Even if relations take a hit, cooperation won't because of mutual interest

Reuters, 9/5

strength and resilience built into our relationship," she said after talks with Yang in the cavernous Great Hall of the People in Beijing. "It makes it possible for us to talk about anything, a positive and pragmatic relationship," underscored efforts by Beijing and Washington to contain quarrels, . China has been irked by the U.S.-backed proposals for a multi-lateral approach to managing and eventually resolving such disputes, preferring to negotiate separately with each of the far less powerful Asian claimants. "FISHING FOR ADVANTAGE" The overseas edition of state mouthpiece the People's Daily laid out China's concerns ahead of Clinton's meetings, and suggested the United States is seeking to gain leverage from China's tensions with Japan and Southeast Asian countries. "The United States' recent conduct concerning the Diaoyu islands and South China Sea issues cannot but create the suspicion that it is attempting to sow discord in order to fish for advantage," said a front-page commentary in the paper, which broadly reflects official thinking. "In the long term, this kind of adjustment in the United States' Asia-Pacific strategy will not bring gains, and could even backfire," it said. China and Japan have rival claims to the uninhabited Diaoyu islands -- called Senkaku in Japan -- and surrounding fishing areas and potentially rich gas deposits. "Regarding the South China Sea, the position of the Chinese government has been consistent and clear cut. China has sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and their adjacent waters," Yang, the foreign minister, told reporters. Clinton repeated that the United States took no position on the contending claims in the sea, and wanted China and Southeast Asian states to agree on a code of conduct to avoid dangerous flare-ups. The Obama administration wants greater Chinese cooperation on other international problems, including reining in the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, and finding a solution to the Syria crisis.

#### No risk of trade war: threats Overblown- just campaign rhetoric

White 9/15

(Ben, Wall Street correspondent and served as national political researcher, POLITICO, “Doubts grow on Mitt Romney’s China threats,” September 15, 2012, <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=D093A6D2-BB08-4466-8E06-1909BF75C357//wyo-mm>)

Mitt Romney is hoping his tough talk on China policy will win him votes — but few of his big business donors or fellow Republicans support what he’s saying or believe he’d follow through if elected. And if he did, many analysts say, he’d likely spark a disastrous and counter-productive trade war that would hurt both American consumers and the workers he says he’s trying to protect. But Romney advisers say voters shouldn’t expect him to back off the tough talk if he gets elected, and other experts say fears of a “trade war” are overblown since the Chinese need the American market just as much consumers like cheap Chinese imports.

## Anthro K

**Conditionality is bad:**

**Time Skew: allows them to neutralize large chunks of 2ac time, hurting 1AR strat. The 2AC matters most because it puts out all the arguments that the aff can go.**

**Decrease Education: multiple worlds cause muddled debates that preclude consistency of education.**

**Voting issue: for ground, fairness, and education.**

#### Considerations for any ethical system for animals presuppose a human benchmark: Two impacts 1.) human centric value is inevitable and they don’t solve or their value creates a method of asserting value without warrants turns the k.

Hayward 97

[PhD, Department of Politics at Edinburgh University, “Anthropocentrism: a Misunderstood Problem”, Environmental Values, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

But if the project of overcoming speciesism can be pursued with some expectation of success, this is not the case with the overcoming of anthropocentrism. What makes anthropocentrism unavoidable is a limitation of a quite different sort, one which cannot be overcome even in principle because it involves a non-contingent limitation on moral thinking as such. While overcoming speciesism involves a commitment to the pursuit of knowledge of relevant similarities and differences between humans and other species, the criteria of relevance will always have an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism about them. Speciesism is the arbitrary refusal to extend moral consideration to relevantly similar cases; the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is marked by the impossibility of giving meaningful moral consideration to cases which bear no similarity to any aspect of human cases. The emphasis is on the ‘meaningful’ here: for in the abstract one could of course declare that some feature of the nonhuman world was morally valuable, despite meeting no determinate criterion of value already recognised by any human, but because the new value is completely unrelated to any existing value it will remain radically indeterminate as a guide to action. If the ultimate point of an ethic is to yield a determinate guide to human action, then, the human reference is ineliminable even when extending moral concern to nonhumans. So my argument is that one cannot know if any judgement is speciesist if one has no benchmark against which to test arbitrariness; and, more specifically, if we are concerned to avoid speciesism of humans then one must have standards of comparison between them and others. Thus features of humans remain the benchmark. As long as the valuer is a human, the very selection of criteria of value will be limited by this fact. It is this fact which precludes the possibility of a radically nonanthropocentric value scheme, if by that is meant the adoption of a set of values which are supposed to be completely unrelated to any existing human values. Any attempt to construct a radically non-anthropocentric value scheme is liable not only to be arbitrary – because founded on no certain knowledge – but also to be more insidiously anthropocentric in projecting certain values, which as a matter of fact are selected by a human, onto nonhuman beings without certain warrant for doing so. This, of course, is the error of anthropomorphism, and will inevitably, I believe, be committed in any attempt to expunge anthropocentrism altogether.

#### Anti-anthropocentric rhetoric reinforces a more dominant frame of human value because they reify ideological opposition to respect for non-human life

Hayward 97

[PhD, Department of Politics at Edinburgh University, “Anthropocentrism: a Misunderstood Problem”, Environmental Values, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Anthropocentrism, widely used as a term of criticism in environmental ethics and politics, is something of a misnomer: for while anthropocentrism can intelligibly be criticised as an ontological error, attempts to conceive of it as an ethical error often involve conceptual confusion. I point out that there is no need for this confusion because a more appropriate vocabulary to refer to the defects the ethical ‘anti-anthropocentrists’ have in mind already exists. My argument is not just about semantics, though, but engages directly with the politics of environmental concern: blanket condemnations of ‘anthropocentrism’ not only condemn some legitimate human concerns, they also allow ideological retorts to the effect that criticisms of anthropocentrism amount to misanthropy. My argument, therefore, is that a more nuanced understanding of the problem of anthropocentrism allows not only a more coherent conceptualisation of environmental ethics but also a more effective politics. The article has five main sections. The first notes the paradox that the clearest instances of overcoming anthropocentrism involve precisely the sort of objectivating knowledge which many ecological critics see as itself archetypically anthropocentric. The second section then notes some ways in which anthropocentrism is not objectionable. In the third section, the defects associated with anthropocentrism in ethics are then examined: I argue, though, that these are better understood as instances of speciesism and human chauvinism. In order to explain why it is unhelpful to call these defects anthropocentrism, I note in section four that there is an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism in any ethic at all, and in the fifth section that the defects do not typically involve a concern with human interests as such anyway. Because of this last point, I also argue, the rhetoric of anti-anthropocentrism is not only conceptually unsatisfactory, it is counterproductive in practice.

**Overemphasis on method destroys effectiveness of the discipline**

**Wendt**, Handbook of IR, **2k2** p. 68

It should be stressed that **in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’.** But **the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes** us. But since we do not know how far that is, **if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address**. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

#### VALUE TO LIFE IS SUBJECTIVE… MUST ALLOW PEOPLE THE CHOICE TO FIND THEIR OWN VALUE AT ALL COSTS AND RESIST EXTERNAL ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY IT

Schwartz 2004

[“A Value to Life: Who Decides and How?” www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf]

Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgement, and value judgements are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result,

no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality. Nevertheless, quality is still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherine’s choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which considerations can be used to protect the patient’s interests. The quality of life criterion asserts that there is a difference between the *type* of life and the *fact* of life. This is the primary difference between it and the sanctity criterion discussed on page 115. Among quality of life considerations rest three assertions: 1. there is relative value to life 2. the value of a life is determined subjectively 3. not all lives are of equal value. *Relative value* The first assertion, that life is of relative value, could be taken in two ways. In one sense, it could mean that the value of a given life can be placed on a scale and measured against other lives. The scale could be a social scale, for example, where the contributions or potential for contribution of individuals are measured against those of fellow citizens. Critics of quality of life criteria frequently name this as a potential slippery slope where lives would be deemed worthy of saving, or even not saving, based on the relative social value of the individual concerned. So, for example, a mother of four children who is a practising doctor could be regarded of greater value to the community than an unmarried accountant. The concern is that the potential for discrimination is too high. Because of the possibility of prejudice and injustice, supporters of the quality of life criterion reject this interpersonal construction in favour of a second, more personalized, option. According to this interpretation, the notion of relative value is relevant not between individuals but within the context of one person’s life and is measured against that person’s needs and aspirations. So Katherine would base her decision on a comparison between her life before and after her illness. The value placed on the quality of a life would be determined by the individual depending on whether he or she believes the current state to be relatively preferable to previous or future states and whether he or she can foresee controlling the circumstances that make it that way. Thus, the life of an athlete who aspires to participate in the Olympics can be changed in relative value by an accident that leaves that person a quadriplegic. The athlete might decide that the relative value of her life is diminished after the accident, because she perceives her desires and aspirations to be reduced or beyond her capacity to control. However, if she receives treatment and counselling her aspirations could change and, with the adjustment, she could learn to value her life as a quadriplegic as much or more than her previous life. This illustrates how it is possible for a person to adjust the values by which they appraise their lives. For Katherine Lewis, the decision went the opposite way and she decided that a life of incapacity and constant pain was of relatively low value to *her*. It is not surprising that the most vociferous protesters against permitting people in Katherine’s position to be assisted in terminating their lives are people who themselves are disabled. Organizations run by, and that represent, persons with disabilities make two assertions in this light. First, they claim that accepting that Katherine Lewis has a right to die based on her determination that her life is of relatively little value is demeaning to all disabled people, and implies that any life with a severe disability is not worth Write a list of three things that make living. Their second assertion is that with proper help, over time Katherine would be able to transform her personal outlook and find satisfaction in her life that would increase its relative value for her. The first assertion can be addressed by clarifying that the case of Katherine Lewis must not be taken as a general rule. Deontologists, who are interested in knowing general principles and duties that can be applied across all cases would not be very satisfied with this; they would prefer to be able to look to duties that would apply in all cases. Here, a case-based, context-sensitive approach is better suited. Contextualizing would permit freedom to act within a particular context, without the implication that the decision must hold in general. So, in this case, Katherine might decide that her life is relatively valueless. In another case, for example that of actor Christopher Reeve,

the decision to seek other ways of valuing this major life change led to him perceiving his life as highly valuable, even if different in value from before the accident that made him a paraplegic. This invokes the second assertion, that Katherine could change her view over time. Although we recognize this is possible in some cases, it is not clear how it applies to Katherine. Here we have a case in which a rational and competent person has had time to consider her options and has chosen to end her life of suffering beyond what she believes she can endure. Ten months is a long time and it will have given her plenty of opportunity to consult with family and professionals about the possibilities open to her in the future. Given all this, it is reasonable to assume that Katherine has made a well-reasoned decision. It might not be a decision that everyone can agree with but if her reasoning process can be called into question then at what point can we say that a decision is sound? She meets all the criteria for competence and she is aware of the consequences of her decision. It would be very difficult to determine what arguments could truly justify interfering with her choice. The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

#### THIRD, REFUSAL TO ASSIGN A VALUE TO LIFE RENDERS LIFE VALUELESS

Phera.com 2005

[www.phera.com/value\_of\_life]

Refusal to assign any value to life often leads, ironically, to ''no'' value being attached to life. So, treating an endangered human life, or even the value of Earth itself, in economics formally as a commodity can be morally justified, in that risks of failure to protect it, thus become costs.

#### FOURTH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE IS A HORROR ON PAR WITH GENOCIDE BECAUSE OF HOW IT INDISCRIMINATELY AND ABSOLUTELY DESTROYS INNOCENT LIFE

Evans ‘95

[Gareth, Ministor of Foreign Affairs, Australia, “On the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” *Verbatim Excerpts of Oral Statements to the International Court of Justice,* October 30, disarm.igc.org/oldwebpages/icjquote.html, acc. 8-24-05//uwyo-ajl]

The right to self-defence is not unlimited. It is subject to fundamental principles of humanity. Self-defence is not a justification for genocide, for ordering that there shall be no enemy survivors in combat or for indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population. Nor is it a justification for the use of nuclear weapons.

The fact remains that the existence of nuclear weapons as a class of weapons threatens the whole of civilization. This is not the case with respect to any class or classes of conventional weapons. It cannot be consistent with humanity to permit the existence of a weapon which threatens the very survival of humanity.

There are some weapons the very existence of which is inconsistent with fundamental general principles of humanity. In the case of weapons of this type, international law does not merely prohibit their threat or use. It prohibits even their acquisition or manufacture, and by extension their possession. Such an attitude has been manifested in the case of other types of weapons of mass destruction. Both the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention do not merely prohibit the use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, but prevent their very existence.

As was hideously demonstrated at Hiroshima, where a relatively minuscule atomic bomb was detonated, and as the release of radiation by the Chernobyl disaster showed to our horror, any use of nuclear weapons, anywhere at any time, would be devastating and in no way comparable to any use, in whatever magnitude, of conventional weapons

#### FIFTH, FAILURE TO ACT IN THE FACE OF ANNIHILATION RISKS TOTALITARIANISM BY DENYING INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Campbell ‘98

[David, Int’l Relations Prof @ UM, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, 186]

The undecidable within the decision does not, however, prevent the decision nor avoid its urgency. As Derrida observes, “a just decision is always required immediately, ‘right away.’” This necessary haste has unavoidable consequences because the pursuit of “infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it” are unavailable in the crush of time. Nor can the crush of time be avoided, even by unlimited time, “because the moment of decision as such always remains a finite moment of urgency and precipitation.” The decision is always “structurally finite,” it a”always marks the interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it.” That is why, invoking Kierkegaard, Derrida, declares that “the instant of decision is a madness.”

The finite nature of the decision may be a “madness” in the way it renders possible the impossible, the infinite character of justice, but Derrida argues for the necessity of this madness. Most importantly, Derrida argues for the necessity of this madness. Most importantly, although Derrida’s argument concerning the decision has, to this pint, been concerned with an account of the procedure by which a decision is possible, it is with respect to the ncessity of the decision that Derrida begins to formulate an account of the decision that bears upon the content of the decision. In so doing, Derrida’s argument addresses more directly – more directly, I would argue than is acknowledged by Critchley – the concern that for politics (at least for a progressive politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination.

That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, “that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinalbe cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others.” Indeed, “incalculable justice requires us to calculate.” From where do these insistences come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that “left to itself, the incalculable and given (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation.” The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid “the bad,” the “perverse calculation,” even the worst.” This is the duty that also dwells with deconstructive thought and makes it the starting point, the “at least necessary condition,” for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences “we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism.”

**Method can’t be evaluated in a vacuum- to do so is useless**

Mario **Bunge**, Treatise on basic Philosophy Vol 6: Epistemology and Methodology II: Understanding the world, **1983** p. 207

Tenth, th**e methodics of any science includes not only its peculiar techniques but also the scientific method** (Ch. 7, Section 2.2). **A collection of techniques**, e.g. for producing high pressures or high vacua, or for measuring the effects of reinforcement on the learning of philosophy **does not constitute a science: methods are means not ends, and they cannot be applied or evaluated apart from a problematics and an aim**. Merely exploiting a given technique for obtaining or processing data without any ulterior purposes is not doing science but just keeping busy and possibly salaried.

#### Considerations for any ethical system for animals presuppose a human benchmark: Two impacts 1.) human centric value is inevitable and they don’t solve or their value creates a method of asserting value without warrants turns the k. ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is marked by the impossibility of giving meaningful moral consideration aspect of human cases if we are concerned to avoid speciesism of humans standards of comparison features of humans remain the benchmark Hayward 97

Anti-anthropocentric rhetoric reinforces a more dominant frame of human value because they reify ideological opposition to respect for non-human life blanket condemnations of ‘anthropocentrism’ not only condemn human concerns allow ideological retorts misanthropy anthropocentrism coherent conceptualisation rhetoric of anti-anthropocentrism conceptually unsatisfactory counterproductive in practice Hayward 97

#### IMPLICIT IN YOUR CRITIQUE OF “ANTHROPOCENTRISM” IS THE NOTION OF ORDERING, ANIMALS SHOULD BE TREATED THE SAME AS HUMANS – BUT ARE BETTER THAN PLANTS OR MINERALS. THIS VERY NOTION PROVES MORALITY IS INTRINSIC TO HUMANS AND WE SHOULD BE JUDGED MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANIMALS

Machan, 2

Tibor R. Machan (Leatherby Center for Bus. Ethics, Argyros School of Bus. & Econ., Chapman Univ. AND Hoover Institution) 2002

[“Why Human Beings May Use Animals” Journal of Value Inquiry; 2002; 36, 1; ABI/INFORM Global pg. 9, loghry]

One reason for the propriety of our use of animals is that we, as members of the human species, are more important or valuable than other animals and some of our activities my require the use, even killing, of animals in order to succeed at our lives, to make it flourish most. This is different from saying that human beings are uniquely important, a position avidly ridiculed by Stephen R.L. Clark, who claims that -there seems no decent ground in reason or revelation to suppose that man is uniquely important or significant.' If man were uniquely important, that would mean that one could not assign any value to plants or non-human animals apart from their relationship to human beings. The position we are considering is that there is a scale of importance in nature and that among all the various kinds of being, the kind 'human being' is prima facie the most important even while some members of the human species may indeed prove themselves to be vile and worthless, as well. In short, the position is unabashedly a specieist position. How do we establish that we are the most important or valuable kind of being? We may do so by considering whether the idea of lesser or greater importance or value in the nature of things makes clear sense and if it does, then by applying it to an understanding of whether human beings or other animals are more important. Put somewhat differently, let us suppose that ranking things in nature as more or less important makes sense, is sound. lf, furthermore, human beings qualify as more important than other animals, there is at least the beginning of a reason why we may make use of other animals for our purposes, for instance, when a trade-off is unavoidable. That there are things of different degree of value or importance in nature is at least implicitly admitted by animal rights advocates, so there is no need to argue about that here. When they insist that we treat animals differently from the way We treat, say, rocks so that we may use rocks in ways that we may not use animals, say to build our homes, animal rights champions testify, at least implicitly, that animals are more important than rocks. They happen, also, to deny that human beings rank higher than other animals or at least they do not admit that ranking human beings higher warrants our using animals for our purposes. But that is a different issue. What matters for now is that defenders of the high or equal moral status of animals admit rankings in nature. Independently of this acknowledgment, there is evidence throughout the natural world of the existence of beings of greater complexity and thus arguably of higher value. For example, while it makes no sense to evaluate as good Or bad such things as planets, rocks, or pebbles, except as they may relate to human or other animal purposes or goals, when it comes to plants and animals, the process of evaluation commences very naturally. We can speak of better or worse oaks, redwoods, zebras, foxes, or chimps. While at this point we confine our evaluation to the condition or behavior of such beings without any intimation of their having any moral or ethical responsibility for being better or worse, when we start discussing human beings, our evaluation can take on a moral component. Indeed, none are more ready to testify to this than animal rights advocates. They, after all, do not demand any change of behavior on the part of non-human animals and yet insist that human beings conform to certain moral edicts as a matter of their own choice. This means that even animal rights advocates admit outfight that to the best of our knowledge, it is with human beings that the idea of moral responsibility enters the universe. This shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, a hierarchical structure in nature. Some things, such as rocks, comets, and minerals, do not invite any other than perhaps esthetic evaluations. It is of no significance, except in relationship to the well-being of some living entities, whether they exist or what condition they are in or how they behave. However, some things, such as zebras, frogs, and redwood trees, do justify being evaluated as to whether they do well or badly but without any moral or ethical significance to the evaluations involved. Finally, some things— human beings — invite moral evaluation, in light of the fact that they exercise the initiative or basic choice as regards the good and bad, right and wrong things they can do.

## CP

### Perm