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#### First, American hard power remains unmatched in capability and weaponry-no country can go head to head with it and win

Kagan 2012

[Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, The World America Made, 2012 uwyo//amp]

Military capacity matters, too, as early-nineteenthcentury China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, "Military strength underpins hegemony."86 Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America's relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend roughly $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined.87 They do so, moreover, while consuming around 4 percent of GDP annually, a higher percentage than the other great powers but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s or the 7 percent it spent in the late 19805. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, are the most experienced in actual combat, and would defeat any competitor in a head-tohead battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire's relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

#### Short-term withdraw causes destroys stability in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan—better to hold on as long as possible

#### And, Indo-Pak war causes extinction

Washington Times 1

July 8, LN.

The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

#### First, Econ scenario- A) WITHDRAWAL TO OFFSHORE BALANCING RISKS INSTABILITY THAT DESTROYS THE ECONOMY

**THAYER** (Professor of Strategic Studies at Missouri State) **2006**

[Bradley, “In Defense of Primacy”, National Interest, Dec, p. asp //wyo-tjc]

A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.

#### B) Collapse of the economy results in EXTINCTION

BEARDEN (Lt. Col in US Army) 2000

[Thomas, “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis”, Free Republic, June 24, p. online //wyo-tjc]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

#### Second, Prolif scenario A) TRANSITION TO OSB CAUSES prolif

**THAYER** (Professor of Strategic Studies @ Missouri State) **2007**

[Bradley, American Empire: A Debate , P. 109 //wyo-tjc]

It is important to know what other countries think of the United States, but, equally, it is a fundamental mistake to worry disproportionately about what the rest of the world thinks. Leaders lead. That may be unpopular at times, indeed, perhaps most of the time. A cost of leadership is that the leader will be criticized for doing too much, or for accomplishing too little. But at the same time, few states would want to replace the leadership of the United States with the leadership of China. The allies of the United States are precisely its allies because to be so serves the interests of these countries. One country does not align itself with another for reasons of sentiment or emotion. If the United States adopted offshore balancing, many of those allies would terminate their relationship with the United States. They would be forced to increase their own armaments, acquire nuclear weapons, and perhaps ally against the United States, even aiming their nuclear weapons at the United States. In those circumstances, the United States would be far less secure and much worse off than it is now~ That might be the future if the United States changed its grand strategy. To be sure, at present the United States is a great ally. It is rich and powerful, with many allies all over the world. It weilds enormous influence in interna- tional institutions as well. When a global problem arises, countries turn to the United States to solve it.

#### B) That leads to MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WARS

TOTTEN (Assoc. Professor at University of Arkansas) 1994

[Samuel, The Widening Circle of Genocide, p. 289 //wyo-tjc]

There are numerous dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, including but not limited to the following: the possibility that a nation threatened by destruction in a conventional war may resort to the use of its nuclear weapons; the miscalculation of a threat of an attack and the subsequent use of nuclear weapons in order to stave off the suspected attack; a nuclear weapons accident due to carelessness or flawed technology (e.g., the accidental launching of a nuclear weapon); the use of such weapons by an unstable leader; the use of such weapons by renegade military personnel during a period of instability (personal, national or international); and, the theft (and/or development) and use of such weapons by terrorists. While it is unlikely (though not impossible) that terrorists would be able to design their own weapons, it is possible that they could do so with the assistance of a renegade government.

## Pan K

#### The way we view china is correct, it allows us to test our theories and make changes to our policy prescriptions

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**,

Claremont McKenna College “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, <http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc_theses>, accessed 12/12/12,WYO/JF

My starting point is the “China threat” of offensive realism, as portrayed in Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.5 I pick this threat articulation for three admittedly somewhat subjective reasons. First, it is arguably the most popular and visible China threat theory, aided by Mearsheimer’s popularity and his frequent publishing on the matter. Second, offensive realism portrays the “threat” in some of the most pessimistic terms, both in terms of the degree of conflict and the certainty of it occurring, and Mearsheimer has been fairly specific in the theory’s application in this manner. Lastly, offensive realism claims the threat on the basis of its relation to a more general theory of international politics, not a reductionist analysis of the Chinese case specifically. This allows for the testing of theories using China as a case study, enabling conclusions about the relative merits of theories as well as the status of the “China threat.” Of course not all other IR theoretical positions are completely optimistic about the rise of China. I also consider several other positions that espouse some concern, but none are as clear in their pessimism as offensive realism.

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#### Predictions aren’t perfect but need to be made

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**,

Claremont McKenna College “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, <http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc_theses>, accessed 12/12/12,WYO?JF

Will Mearsheimer’s prediction come true? His confidence is clear in the bluntness of his claim: “Can China rise peacefully? My answer is no.”63 Predictions of this certainty are not commonly found in international relations, especially not in contexts of such complexity and importance as the next few decades of East Asian security. Of course only time will tell, and Mearsheimer himself admits that the nature of social science does not allow for perfect predictive power.64 Yet one can still assess the strength of the claim in terms of both the substance of the prediction and the ability of theories to make such predictions more generally. This chapter makes that assessment, evaluating several other theoretical positions and the strengths and weaknesses they have relative to offensive realism.

#### It’s inevitable- states will always compete against one another, making competition and war inevitable.

**Realism must be used strategically, rejecting it is worse**

Stefano **Guzzini**, Assistant Professor at Central European Univ., Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, **1998**, p. 212

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that **it is impossible** just **to heap realism onto the dustbin** of history **and start anew**. This is a non‑option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various **realist assumptions are** well **alive in the minds of** many **practitioners** and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, **it** is a world‑view which suggests thoughts about it, and which **permeates our daily language** for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self‑understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public, whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, **forgetting realism is also questionable**. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or **being critical, does not mean** that **they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions**, not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, **this** understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it **is a prerequisite for opposing** the more **irresponsible claims made in the name**, although not always necessarily in the spirit, **of realism**.

**Rhetoric describes and reflects reality, it does not shape it—objective reality exists outside of language**

**Fram-Cohen ‘85**

[Michelle, “Reality, Language, Translation: What Makes Translation Possible?” American Translators Association Conference, enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/michelleframcohen//possibilityoftranslation.html, 9-24-06//uwyo-ajl]

Nida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds **the objectivity of reality**. This **means** that **reality is independent of consciousness,** **consciousness** **being the means of perceiving ?reality, not of creating it.** Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory **symbols that denote concepts**." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that **concepts are abstractions of** units **perceived** in **reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language**. Since **reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words**--and of all languages. **The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols**. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation. **Translation** is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another. It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of symbols denoting the same concepts. This process **is possible because concepts have specific referents in reality**. Even if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one language but not in another, **the referent** this **word and concept stand for** nevertheless **exists in reality, and can be referred to** in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. **Language is a means describing reality**, **and** as such **can** and should **expand** **to** **include** **newly discovered** or innovated **objects** in reality. The revival of the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward reality. Those who wanted to use Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users.

## K

#### Totalistic anti-nuclear criticism destroys coalitions and the possibility of progressive social change.

Krishna 93 (Sankaran, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, Alternatives, Summer, p. 400-401, “The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory)

The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: **one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to "nostalgic," essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the move mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing "facts" and "realities," while a "postmodern"** President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (Kn: xvi) Once again, **the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics pitting groups that have the most in commo**n (and need to unite on some basis to be effective**) against each other.** Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. **It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality.** Moreover, **it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti‑Gulf War movement.** Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy**. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives.** The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. **Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional on strategic essentialisms our attempts to create space for activist politics**. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.