**First the Plan**

**The United States federal government should reduce restrictions on the production of offshore wind power in the United States imposed by entities other than the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.**

**Second Solvency**

**The 2005 Energy Policy Act failed to create uniform permitting jurisdiction federally- multiple federal agencies are still responsible**

**Vann 12**

[Adam, Legislative Attorney, CRS Reports, “Wind Energy: Offshore Permitting”, 10.17, p. online//wyo-tjc]

**Prior to enactment of EPAct in 2005**, **the Army** **Corp of Engineers** (Corps) **took the lead role in the federal offshore wind** energy **permitting process**, **claiming jurisdiction pursuant to** Section 10 of **the Rivers and Harbors Act** (RHA),28 as amended by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).29 The Corps has jurisdiction under these laws to permit obstructions to navigation within the “navigable waters of the United States” and on the OCS.30 The Corps’ jurisdiction over potential offshore wind projects had never been made explicit, however. **Section 388 of EPAct sought to address some of the uncertainty** related to federal jurisdiction over offshore wind energy development by amending the OCSLA to specifically establish legal authority for federal review and approval of various offshore energy-related projects. The provision amended the OCSLA **by adding a new subsection that authorizes the Secretary of the Interior,** in consultation with other federal agencies, **to grant leases, easements, or rights-of-way** **on the OCS for** **certain activities—wind energy development** among them—not authorized by other OCSLA provisions, the Deepwater Port Act, the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, or “other applicable law.”31 A memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Interior and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) signed in April of 2009 confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, exercised through the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEM),32 an agency within DOI, over “the production, transportation, or transmission of energy from non-hydrokinetic renewable energy projects on the OCS.” **EPAct also makes clear that federal agencies with permitting authority under other federal laws retain their jurisdiction, despite enactment of this subsection.**33 **Thus, the Corps continues to permit offshore development pursuant to the RHA, and other federal agencies with jurisdiction over issues related to energy development,** such as species impacts, **are similarly unaffected**. **The legislative language does not clearly dictate which agency should take the lead role in coordinating federal permitting and responsibility for preparing analysis under** the National Environmental Policy Act (**NEPA**).34 However, several provisions within Section 388 suggest that DOI is charged with primary responsibility. The law directs the Secretary of the Interior to consult with other agencies as a part of its leasing, easement, and right-of way granting process.35 DOI is also responsible for ensuring that activities carried out pursuant to its new authority provide for “coordination with relevant federal agencies.”36 The law also directs the Secretary to establish a system of “royalties, fees, rentals, bonuses, or other payments” that will ensure a fair return to the United States for any property interest granted under this provision.37

**Lack of one-stop permitting destroys the certainty and timeframe necessary for investment decisions- plan’s consolidation is key**

**Weber 7**

[Lucas, no qualifications available, published on WindPower.net- the North American Offshore Wind Power Information Project, “Offshore Wind Energy Permitting”, May 10, p. online//wyo-tjc]

As the above description of the various permitting authorities illustrates, **the regulatory process for offshore wind energy development can be overwhelming.** **In order to combat this problem, there must be some form of centralized management. In Europe, the common practice is to use a “one-stop shop office” approach**.136 Under this approach, **the developers communicate with one official contact office to handle everything from administrative to legal matters**. A recent study by the International Energy Agency concluded that **the use of “one stop shop offices” has been a success from the point of view of both agencies and developers**.137 **The MMS, as the lead agency, would be perfect for this “one-stop shop” position**. As the one-stop shop agency for wind energy permitting on the OCS, **the MMS could streamline the approval process by coordinating with all of the other relevant agencies**. In fact, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 mandates such coordination.138 Therefore, **the MMS should** coordinate efforts with the other relevant agencies to **form a one-stop shop permitting office for wind energy development** on the OCS. IV. CONCLUSION In sum, **developing the United States’ potential for using offshore wind energy will contribute to security of energy supply**, reduce dependency on fuel imports, reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants, and improve environmental protection. **Despite a vast potential for offshore wind energy along the OCS, the MMS is holding potential development hostage through regulatory delay and time-consuming replications of environmental reviews. It is vital that the MMS reduce the regulatory confusion and establish a unified coordinated approach to ensure the expeditious**, yet responsible, **development of offshore wind energy**.

#### Any alternative to osw must be compared directly to a world of the status quo

Weber 7

[Lucas, no qualifications available, published on WindPower.net- the North American Offshore Wind Power Information Project, “Offshore Wind Energy Permitting”, May 10, p. online//wyo-tjc]

Along the same line as the current regulatory delay, the NEPA environmental review process is being misused as a method of obstructing future offshore wind energy development. Under the NEPA review process, the EIS should consider both the direct and indirect environmental effects of the proposed action.124 The environmental consequences, both positive and negative, of alternatives to the proposed action, including the alternative of no action, must also be objectively compared as part of EIS.125 During the scoping process, which is required to take place before the draft EIS is published126, the agency should consider the significant environmental impacts associated with the proposed action, as well as any connected actions and reasonable alternatives, including the alternative of no action.127 In the context of permitting offshore wind energy development, the MMS would be required to consider the significant environmental consequences associated with granting access rights for the construction and operation of the facility, any reasonable alternatives, and the alternative of no action. Essentially, this would translate into two potential options: permit offshore wind energy development or allow the current reliance on fossil fuel-generated electricity to continue. This environmental review framework should create a decision-making process based on a comparison of the proposed offshore wind energy project’s impacts against the impacts associated with other forms of electricity generation, chiefly fossil fuel generation. Given the known consequences of both the options, this decision-making process would make the offshore wind energy project the appropriate decision virtually every time.128 Consideration of the potential impacts on fish populations from offshore wind energy development illustrates this decision-making process. Despite claims that the Cape Wind Project would have significant impacts on fish populations, the project’s Draft EIS found that the impacts would be minimal and temporary.129 Conversely, the potential impacts on fish populations from fossil fuel and nuclear power plants would be significant and permanent. Fossil fuel and nuclear power plants typically use tremendous amounts of water for cooling. They pull water from the nearby lake, river, or ocean into the plant’s cooling system, where it absorbs waste heat. This heated water is then dumped back into the waterbody. This process kills thousands of fish and the warmer water destroys habitats. However, an offshore wind energy project, such as the Cape Wind Project, would reduce power plant fish kills to the extent that it displaces existing generation. Therefore, the concern for potential impacts on fish populations, which is frequently used by opponents of offshore wind energy projects, would actually favor those projects under the proper environmental review process.

## \*\*\*Advantage One – Europe

#### European markets have already reached their capacity, new growth in demand is key

**Zacks Investment Research, 12**

 Thursday 8:39 PM EST, Alternative Energy Stock Outlook - October 2012 - Industry Outlook, LN

**Historically, the growth outlook of alternative energy companies has been directly related to the state of the economy** and inversely related to the prices of petroleum products. **While that relationship remains in place, other macroeconomic uncertainties are weighing on the sector’s fortunes.** The recent trend of lower stock prices, higher spreads on investment-grade corporate bonds, a stronger dollar and increasing financial strains in the Eurozone are contributing to a less-robust picture going forward. **The bleak picture in U.S. has been offset only through increases in home prices and falling energy prices.** Of the macroeconomic uncertainties, the most significant is the recent re-intensification of a Eurozone debt crisis, which has the potential to drag the global economy into another recession. **The region’s problems are contributing to a flight toward dollar-denominated assets that is resulting in a stronger dollar**, lower yields on term Treasury securities, and declines in major European equity indices. The yield on the 10-year Treasury Note is hovering around all-time lows of around 1.5%. This has resulted in widening the spread between corporate bonds versus the treasury. Going forward, as the Fed continue to sell shorter-dated assets and uses the proceeds to buy longer-dated securities, effectively removing duration from the market, longer-dated yields will be kept lower than would otherwise be the case. As a result, we expect the 10-year Treasury note yield to hover around 2.0% in fiscal 2012, reflecting both persistent flight-to-quality effects and the impact of Operation Twist. **Overall, the outlook for the U.S. economy appears to have lost momentum, with a host of variables showing weakness in the last few months**. The Fed’s extension of Operation Twist and downgrading of its growth outlook are reflections of this emerging unfavorable trend. **That said, the expectation is that the U.S. economy will continue to expand a moderate pace, which given all problems in Europe and questions about China, has be considered a favorable outlook. Another direct fallout of the Eurozone crisis is weakness in global oil demand leading to oil prices going down.** However, the blame for the southward oil prices also falls on Saudi Arabia increasing production. To add to the woe, high U.S. crude stocks and worries about China’s growth outlook have been weighing on investor sentiment, weakening oil prices to a ten-month low. Partly offsetting this unfavorable view has been a tightening global supply picture in view of the geopolitical fallout over Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions and strong demand from developing countries. **With a muddled home front, the question now lies largely upon the slowdown in China and the recession in Europe and the effect it will have on the U.S. growth momentum.** The apparent ‘decoupling’ between not-so-bad U.S. prospects and a sub-par outlook abroad has nevertheless a bearing on the alternative energy sector, primarily because of restricted government spending levels. This reduced demand environment due to overburdened government finances has come at a particularly inopportune time for alternative energy operators due to the sector’s supply glut. The gradually emerging solar photovoltaic (PV) industry fortunes are currently on tenterhooks. On the one hand, the core European markets of Germany, Italy and Spain historically accounting for the lion’s share of solar products are fast nearing maturity. To counter this tepid growth, the companies are increasingly focusing on the Chinese, Indian and U.S. markets.

**US EU cooperation depends on effective energy sector collaboration – a firm US commitment solidifies broader strategic cooperation – solves Russian resurgence**

**Koryani, 11** [David, Deputy Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center of the Atlantic Council of the United States “Transatlantic energy futures”, http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/Transatlantic\_Energy\_Futures/Transatlantic\_Energy\_Futures.pdf]

Transatlantic cooperation is key to addressing all the above challenges¶ and dilemmas. Due to a number of reasons, the transatlantic¶ partners are well positioned to provide answers jointly.¶ To begin with, **transatlantic cooperation on energy has a rich history,¶ a decent track record and a good basis upon which to build.** It picked up after the first oil crisis in 1973-74 and led to the establishment¶ of the International Energy Agency (IEA). In the 1980s the¶ transatlantic partners somewhat differed in their views on core energy¶ security issues and in their responses to challenges, such as the role of¶ Russia in providing oil and natural gas to Europe. Nonetheless,¶ transatlantic cooperation again intensified in the 1990s and 2000s on¶ various issues, such as oil and gas pipelines,9 energy efficiency, RD&D¶ cooperation, carbon capture and storage projects, smart grids, and¶ energy storage. **This culminated in the establishment of the EU-U.S. Energy Council** in November 2009**, which testified to the recognition¶ of energy as an issue of strategic importance and of great potential in¶ transatlantic cooperation**.¶ The transatlantic partners share strategic interests in maintaining¶ and improving the effectiveness of a global governance system that is¶ norm-based, rule-based, and inclusive, and that ensures the security of¶ the U.S and the EU. Moreover, **the EU and the U.S. have an exceptionally¶ strong incentive**— exacerbated by the financial and economic¶ crisis—**to reinforce existing cooperation** and to share burdens by¶ pooling resources. **In times of austerity and shrinking budgets,** identifying¶ and exploiting synergies and avoiding duplications is a must.¶ **The transatlantic community is uniquely positioned to develop¶ technology**, leverage financing, **and share experiences in** legislative and¶ **regulatory developments that are necessary to advance clean energy technologies**. As pluralist democracies, the EU and the U.S. are best¶ positioned to profit from the ‘democratization of energy.’ Innovation,¶ initiative, subsidiarity and self-governance, decentralized decisionmaking¶ system, management of interconnectivity, co-dependencies¶ and market integration— all these skills, which will be required to be¶ successful in the new era, are deeply ingrained in our societies.¶ Finally **we face common threats and challenges closely linked to¶ energy issues, such as** the **prolif**eration of nuclear weapons, **a resurgent Russia, an unstable Middle East or China’s insatiable appetite for¶ resources and its repercussions around the globe**. ...and What Drives Us Apart¶ **Critical factors of divergence cannot be discounted either**, as they¶ have an almost equally strong pull. Differing climate change perceptions¶ and **the lack of U.S. commitment and action is extremely dangerous,¶ as it alienates Europeans**, both policymakers and the wider¶ public alike. These **differences**, if not solved, **could drive a wedge for¶ decades between the partners, undermine trust, create a value gap and¶ hinder cooperation not only in climate change and energy issues but¶ in all other aspects as well**.¶ There is in fact a chance that U.S. and European energy markets¶ could largely decouple in coming years, due in part to differences¶ regarding the need to tackle climate change, and in part to diverging¶ geopolitical and domestic trends. The U.S. has edged closer to selfsufficiency¶ with respect to fossil fuels, with the extensive development¶ of its vast unconventional gas resources and increasing reliance on¶ Canadian oil sands. This could lead to a more isolationist stance in¶ U.S. policy. Meanwhile unconventional gas faces mixed reactions in¶ Europe; the EU, for example, plans to shun oil shales and tar sands in¶ its impending Fuel Quality Directive. Friction in transatlantic perceptions¶ on energy security and divergences over preferred courses of¶ action are real dangers that must be addressed head on.¶ Towards a Transatlantic Energy Alliance¶ The systemic transformation of the world of energy, triggered by¶ climate change and powered by new technologies, will likely cause the¶ reorganization of our societies. The benefits and pitfalls of transatlantic¶ cooperation are beyond doubt. Renewing the transatlantic community’s¶ leadership is essential to lead the world to a sustainable, lowcarbon¶ future. Transatlantic cooperation can contribute to provide¶ secure and affordable energy to people in the EU and the U.S., foster¶ economic prosperity and create jobs. Current cooperation on a wide¶ range of subjects is encouraging but inadequate. **What we need is a¶ new impetus, genuine political will, adequate resources and enhanced¶ cooperation to advance a transatlantic green economy. Joint efforts in¶ addressing** climate change, innovation and **investment into clean¶ energy technologies**, risk sharing and cost reduction, joint RD&D and harmonized energy diplomacy **must be the cornerstones of a Transatlantic¶ Energy Alliance.¶ A Transatlantic Energy Alliance is desirable** and feasible, **but not¶ self-evident**. Climate change and **energy cooperation will be the litmus¶ test of converging or diverging European and American norms,¶ values and interests in the 21st century**. We have to bridge our differences¶ and we have to do that quickly in order to remain in the driving¶ seat. To amend Robert Kagan’s famous line, Americans may be from¶ Mars and Europeans from Venus, but we shall all soon need to move¶ to some other planet if we do not adjust course.

**Cooperation accesses every global impact—especially the Balkans**

**Stivachtis 10** – Director of International Studies Program @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute [Dr. Yannis. A. Stivachtis (Professor of Poli Sci @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from Lancaster University), THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,” The Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010, pg. <http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/78.html>]

There is no doubt that **US-European relations are in a period of transition**, and that the stresses and strains of globalization are increasing both the number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront transatlantic relations. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War have added significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same time, international **terrorism, the nuclearization of North Korea and** especially **Iran**, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the transformation of **Russia** into a stable and cooperative member of the international community, the growing power of **China, the political** and economic transformation and **integration of** the **Caucasian** and **Central Asian** states, the integration **andstabilization of the Balkan countries**, the promotion of **peace and stability in the Middle East, poverty, climate change, AIDS and other** emergent **problem**s and situations **require** further **cooperation** among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels. Therefore, **cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is more imperative** than ever to deal effectively with these problems. It is fair to say that the challenges of crafting a new relationship between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than global, but the implications of success or failure will be global. The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis, despite efforts to improve it since the Iraq War. This is not to say that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before the war. Actually, post-1945 relations between Europe and the U.S. were fraught with disagreements and never free of crisis since the Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. and Europe parted ways on issues from global warming and biotechnology to peacekeeping and national missile defense. Questions such as, the future role of NATO and its relationship to the common European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), or what constitutes terrorism and what the rights of captured suspected terrorists are, have been added to the list of US-European disagreements. There are two reasons for concern regarding the transatlantic rift. First, **if European leaders conclude that Europe must become counterweight to the U.S.,** rather than a partner, **it will be difficult to engage in the kind of open search for a common ground than an elective partnership** **requires.** Second, there is a risk that public opinion in both the U.S. and Europe will make it difficult even for leaders who want to forge a new relationship to make the necessary accommodations. If both sides would actively work to heal the breach, a new opportunity could be created. **A vibrant transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only if both sides make the necessary political commitment**. There are strong reasons to believe that the security challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more shared than divergent. The most dramatic case is terrorism. Closely related is the common interest in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea. This commonality of threats is clearly perceived by publics on both sides of the Atlantic. Actually, Americans and Europeans see eye to eye on more issues than one would expect from reading newspapers and magazines. But while elites on both sides of the Atlantic bemoan a largely illusory gap over the use of military force, biotechnology, and global warming, surveys of American and European public opinion highlight sharp differences over global leadership, defense spending, and the Middle East that threaten the future of the last century’s most successful alliance. **There are** other **important, shared interests** as well. **The transformation of Russia** into a stable cooperative member of the international community is a priority both for the U.S. **and Europe**. They also have an interest in promoting a stable regime inUkraine. **It is necessary for the U.S. and EU to form a united front** to meet these challenges **because** first, **there is a risk that** dangerous materials related to **WMD will fall into the wrong hands; and second, the spread of conflict** along those countries’ periphery **could destabilize neighboring countries and provide safe havens for terrorists** and other international criminal organizations. Likewise, in the Caucasus and Central Asia both sides share a stake in promoting political and economic transformation and integrating these states into larger communities such as the OSCE. This would also minimize the risk of instability spreading and prevent those countries of becoming havens for international terrorists and criminals. Similarly, there is a common interest in integrating the Balkans politically and economically. **Dealing with** Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other **political issues in the Middle East are also of a great concern for both** sides although the U.S. plays a dominant role in the region. Finally, **US-European cooperation will be more effective in dealing with the rising power of China** through engagement but also containment. The post Iraq War realities have shown that it is no longer simply a question of adapting transatlantic institutions to new realities. The changing structure of relations between the U.S. and Europe implies that a new basis for the relationship must be found if transatlantic cooperation and partnership is to continue. **The future course of relations will be determined above all by U.S. policy towards Europe** and the Atlantic Alliance. Wise policy can help forge a new, more enduring strategic partnership, through which the two sides of the Atlantic cooperate in meeting the many major challenges and opportunities of the evolving world together. But **a policy that takes Europe for granted and routinely ignores or even belittles European concerns, may force Europe to conclude that the costs of continued alliance outweigh its benefits**. There is no doubt that the U.S. and Europe have considerable potential to pursue common security interests. Several key steps must be taken to make this potential a reality. First, it is critical to avoid the trap of ‘division of labor’ in the security realm, which could be devastating for the prospects of future cooperation. Second, and closely related to avoiding division of labor as a matter of policy, is the crucial necessity for Europe to develop at least some ‘high-end’ military capabilities to allow European forces to operate effectively with the U.S. Third, is the need for both the U.S. and Europe to enhance their ability to contribute to peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Fourth, is the importance of preserving consensus at the heart of alliance decision-making. Some have argued that with the expansion of NATO, the time has come to reconsider the consensus role. One way to increase efficiency without destroying consensus would be to strengthen the role of the Secretary General in managing the internal and administrative affairs of the alliance, while reserving policy for the member states. Fifth is the need to make further progress on linking and de-conflicting NATO and EU capabilities. Sixth is the need for enhanced transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. Seventh, one future pillar for transatlantic cooperation is to strengthen US-European coordination in building the infrastructure of global governance through strengthening institutions such as the UN and its specialized agencies, the World Bank, the IFM, G-8, OECD and regional development banks. Finally, cooperation can also be achieved in strengthening the global economic infrastructure, sustaining the global ecosystem, and combating terrorism and international crime. To translate the potential of the transatlantic relationship into a more positive reality will require two kinds of development. First, the EU itself must take further steps to institutionalize its own capacity to act in these areas. Foreign policy and especially defense policy remain the areas where the future of a ‘European’ voice is most uncertain. Second, the U.S. and Europe need to establish more formal, effective mechanisms for consultation and even decision-making. **The restoration of transatlantic relations requires policies and actions that governments on both sides of the Atlantic should simultaneously adopt and not only a unilateral change of course**. Developing a new, sustainable transatlantic relationship requires a series of deliberate decisions from both the U.S. and EU if a partnership of choice and not necessity is to be established. **For the U.S., this means avoiding the temptation, offered by unprecedented strength, to go it alone** in pursuit of narrowly defined national interests. For the EU, the new partnership requires a willingness to accept that the EU plays a uniquely valuable role as a leader in a world where power still matters, and that a commitment to a rule-based international order does not obviate the need to act decisively against those who do not share that vision.

**Balkans go nuclear**

**Scherbak 8** – Advisor to the Chair of the Parliament of Ukraine (Yuri Scherbak (President of the Institute for Sustainable Development of Ukraine), Ten Theses about the Russian-Georgian Conflict: A View from Ukraine,  Nov 2008, pg. http://www.boell.pl/downloads/Georgia\_war\_from\_UA\_perspective\_by\_Y.Scherbak.pdf)

2. **The war in Caucasus attested that frozen conflicts, preserving tensions around them, pose a constant threat and, under the influence of interested parties, can explode despite international regimes and limitations, thus causing geopolitical changes in the region. This refers not only to Caucasus but also to Balkans**, Transdnistria and other similar regions of the world. 3. The Russian-Georgian war became the first war between the member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States and, as such, has actually put an end to the post-Soviet, post-Belovezzian world, which was grounded on the interests of the fSU republics and their recognition of the Russia’s leading role. 4. Compared to Ukrainian political parties, the Ukrainian civil and expert society has made a more sober assessment of the causes and consequences of this 5-day war. Among the main conclusions are the following: - by conducting the so-called soft ethnical cleansing (moving the Georgian population out of the self-proclaimed republics) and issuing passports of the Russian Federation to Abkhazians and Ossetians, for 17 years Russia has been deliberately preparing the recognition of the puppet regimes in order to undermine the integrity of Georgia and prohibit it from joining NATO; - the events in Caucasus are demonstrate the dangerous ignoring of international norms by the Russian leadership (Helsinki accords and international treaties) for the sake of reaching their geopolitical goals; - the strategic objective of Russia is to establish control over the routes of Caspian oil and gas transportation on the territory of Georgia and to prevent creation of independent routes for transferring energy carriers beyond Russia’s area of influence; - there **is a strong possibility of a growing threat from Russia to Ukraine to be realized by artificial creation of a conflict, most likely on the territory of Crimea, to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO. 5. The current harsh financial and economic crisis with unpredictable geopolitical and social consequences is a new destructive element affecting the situation in the Russian Federation**, **Ukraine, Caucasus states and the whole European region. There is a danger of neo-totalitarian regimes appearing on the continent, xenophobia and aggressive nationalism** growing stronger and new isolationism adopted as main political philosophy. All of these developments could dramatically change the political map of Europe. 6. One of the results of the war between Georgia and Russia is a new challenge of Russia to Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, NATO and EU member states, which can mean abandonment of the post-Helsinki world and returning to the 19th-20th -century style division of spheres of influence among superpowers. 7. Taking into account the deep political crisis, conflict in leadership and division in society, the situation in Ukraine is chaotic and unbalanced. No one, except for the President and the National Security and Defense Council, stands against the Russian doctrine of Putin-Medvedev regarding the legitimacy of Russia’s military actions towards its closest neighbors on the grounds of protecting “Russian citizens” on the territory of sovereign states. The official Kyiv has no uniform action strategy regarding the existing threats from Moscow. The Ukrainian expert community considers the following optional strategies that Ukraine could adhere to in this situation: - increase efforts to ensure that Ukraine joins NATO as soon as possible; - withdraw the issue of NATO membership from the country’s agenda and instead concentrate on making progress in relationship with the European Union, following the advice of German and French experts; - start rearmament and modernization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with some experts calling for renewal of the nuclear-missile potential of Ukraine; - conclude a separate military pact between Ukraine and the United States; - give in to Moscow’s pressure and proclaim a neutral, non-bloc state of Ukraine. 8. An important factor of the Russian pressure on Ukraine is the Black Sea Military Fleet of the Russian Federation, consisting of more than 100 warships and based in Sevastopol, which took part in the military operations in Caucasus. Moscow will insist on the prolongation of its stay in Sevastopol after 2017 (the final date of the stay provided for in the current bilateral treaty). At present, Ukraine has little means of control over the movement of the Russian warships on its own territory. 9. As a result of the massive campaign of Russian media, which could be considered an information war against Ukraine, 56% of Russians believe that Ukraine is hostile to Russia. Meanwhile only 8% Ukrainians consider Russia hostile to Ukraine. 10. The uniform position of the EU and NATO regarding common energy and security policy, involving participation of Ukraine and Georgia, could stop the Russia’s expansion in the postSoviet area. CONCLUSIONS 1. The war between Georgia and Russia opened a new dangerous phase of political instability. Russia took the road of building a new empire in the post-Soviet space and ignoring international legal norms. The use of **force by a great nuclear power against its weak neighbors can lead to a new global conflict.**

**Plan is key to solve cooperation, streamlined permitting is key**

**Portman, 10** [Marine Renewable¶ Energy Policy¶ Some US and International Perspectives Compared, Michelle E, Assistant Professor/Senior Lecturer Faculty of Architecture and Town Planning Technion – Israel Institute of Technology. Research Areas: environmental, <http://www.tos.org/oceanography/archive/23-2_portman.pdf> ]

Lessons for Policy Deve lopmen t¶ From the growing literature on the¶ subject and the summary presented here,¶ it is apparent that **the** best supporting¶ **policies for development of offshore¶ renewable energy are dependent on¶ the context within which they are¶ formulated, adopted, and implemented.¶ Context broadly encompasses a country’s¶ regulatory regime**, onshore and¶ offshore physical conditions, available¶ ocean resources, and political and social¶ constructs. However, some overall¶ **conclusions can be drawn from the experiences¶ of other countries**, and policies¶ should be aimed at solving a number of¶ problems inherent to the offshore renewable¶ energy sector. Overall, poor data on the resource¶ potential of ocean energy has hindered¶ widespread support for policies that¶ could jumpstart marine renewable¶ energy initiatives. More research funding¶ needs to go into understanding the¶ scale of ocean energy as a resource¶ and disseminating this information.¶ Regarding technological impediments¶ and development of the nascent offshore¶ sector, policies should aid the demonstration¶ of full-scale prototypes because¶ lack of such demonstration projects is an¶ identified barrier to development (AEA¶ Energy & Environment, 2006). Programs¶ and policies should be available particularly¶ to offset the exorbitant cost of¶ connecting demonstration projects tothe electricity grid.¶ In the regulatory sphere, **countries¶ should cooperate to craft internationally¶ recognized standards for developing,**¶ testing, and measuring **marine renewable energy technologies. They could¶ also benefit from the exchange of experience¶ with regard to environmental¶ impact assessments for commercial scale¶ ocean energy projects. Regulatory¶ frameworks are uncertain for this sector,¶ which partially stems from limited¶ experience in applying existing regulatory¶ regimes** beyond the territorial sea¶ (Leary and Esteban, 2009). These are¶ all areas where **countries can both learn¶ from one another** and learn from other¶ sectors, such as offshore mining and¶ commercial fishing.¶ It is natural that in the rush for renewable¶ energy, developers in countries and¶ regions with plentiful land resources¶ available for large energy projects, such¶ as those needed for solar energy panel¶ fields or expansive wind farms, may be¶ reluctant to move into the ocean environment,¶ regardless of public policy.¶ However, in countries with certain¶ geographical conditions, such as plentiful¶ offshore wind and wave resources available¶ close to load centers where plentiful¶ electrical energy is needed by consumers,¶ and a lack of other options (such as¶ in northeastern United States and the¶ Pacific Northwest), **marine renewable¶ energy is likely the next energy frontier.¶ It is the government’s role to support and¶ encourage renewable energy** generation¶ where good resources and significant¶ needs coincide. This should be accomplished¶ while seeking compensation for¶ the use of public resources, protecting¶ the environment, and avoiding conflicts¶ in uses of ocean (and coastal) space.¶ Learning from a variety of international¶ experiences can contribute a lot. **Based¶ on the experiences of other countries,¶ particularly in Europe,** with the right¶ policies in place**, US interests in the¶ offshore renewable energy sector can be¶ served by greater technological advances,¶ continued cost reduction, and streamlined¶ permitting**.¶

**And, tech development ensures international diffusion – know how, personnel movement and regional hubs – serves multiple distinct markets and resolves skilled labor shortages**

**Brewer, 9/12/12** [September 2012Issues and Options for Institutional Architectures Thomas L. Brewer, Senior Fellow, ICTSDA International Technology Diffusion in a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (SETA), <http://ictsd.org/downloads/2012/10/international-technology-diffusion-in-a-sustainable-energy-trade-agreement.pdf>]

International diffusion The international **diffusion of sustainable energy technologies is not only important for climate change mitigation, but also for low-carbon growth and trade**, including in developing countries. Since Solow (1956), **economists have emphasized the importance of technological change** in increasing productivity and economic growth. In order to improve understanding of these opportunities, ICTSD completed technology mapping studies of the energy supply sector and of climate-friendly technologies in two key end-use sectors: transport and buildings. The mapping studies identify products, including components, associated with these technologies; the studies provide bases for analyses of market access conditions and market opportunities that arise from the deployment of such technologies, including for producers in developing countries. (See especially Lako, 2008; Kejun, 2010; Vossenaar, 2010; Vossenaar and Jha, 2010; Goswami, Dasgupta and Nanda, 2009. An extensive list of relevant ICTSD studies appears at the end of the References section.) **The mapping studies also illustrate the large potential for climate change mitigation that can be achieved by deploying climate-friendly technologies.** See Box 2 for a list of the many ways that technologies can reduce greenhouse gas emissions. **Although technology is sometimes equated with hardware and thus as goods** in international trade, **a broader notion of technology as “knowhow**” - and thus services-**is now more widely accepted**, as noted above. Engineering services, consulting services, and construction services are obvious examples (see esp. Kim, 2011). **The list of services in Box 3 is indicative of the number and variety of services potentially involved**, for example, **in an offshore wind farm.** In order to understand the diffusion of sustainable energy technologies, **it is important to recognize that international technology transfers are often undertaken** by firms **as elements in complex “bundles**” of transactions **involving services, the movement of personnel, and the movement of financial capital, as well as goods**. It is typically firms’ direct investment projects that drive the composition of these bundles. Moreover, direct investment projects are often central to the key strategic choices of firms as they expand internationally within particular regions. For instance, in the wind industry, transportation economics create pressures to locate production of large towers, blades and turbines near wind farm installation sites. **These pressures, in combination with economies of scale that create pressures to centralize production, lead to international regional hubs being strategically important for serving multiple international markets. A key ingredient** of the hub **is an international** direct investment project, the success of which depends on market access to the countries of the region. In many cases, **technology can be transferred internationally through joint ventures**, involving a direct investment by the foreign firm as well as an investment by a local partner. For example, Japanese firms have partnered with local Indian firms in joint ventures involving high-efficiency, low-emission coal technologies (IEA, 2010: 575). Access to technology can also be facilitated by international licensing. For example, one of China’s largest wind technology manufacturers, Goldwind, gained access to wind technology by purchasing licencesfrom German wind turbine maker Vensys. Chinese firms have also acquired licences to produce boilers, turbines, and generators for advanced technology coal-fired power plants. The importance of sustainable energy technologies and energy efficiency Two fundamental facts about the significance of energy production and consumption as contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions need to be recognized In order to understand the potential contributions of sustainable energy technologies to climate change mitigation (IEA, 2010): • Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) of all greenhouse gas emissions world-wide can be attributed to energy supply and energy use. • More than four-fifths (84 percent) of global CO2 emissions in particular are energy-related. **Addressing energy production and consumption issues is thus essential to mitigate climate change**. As for technological solutions:

**That bolsters collaboration—plan spills over**

**Martin, 9/20/12** [David Martin is Director of the Offshore Marine Academy, Securing Skills for a Successful Offshore Wind Industry

http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/09/securing-skills-for-offshore-wind]

Bristol, UK -- Trade group RenewableUK has said that the **offshore wind** and marine energy sector **could support** 88,000 **jobs** in the UK by 2021, up from approximately 10,600 at present. **In order to reach this target the right policies and financial conditions must be in place and**, as obvious as it may seem, **there will need to be an adequate amount of skilled recruits to fill these jobs**. ¶ Skills – Where Are We Now?¶ **At the moment we are facing a significant skills gap** in the industry and this needs to be addressed to reach the positive employment figures which are possible. There are two levels to this skills gap — firstly, the professional level including project managers and engineers, and secondly the operational level which consists of staff including vessel crew members and electricians. Over the next number of years we will see the ratio of operational to professional workers grow as we begin to move from the design and build phases to the operational phase.¶ This skills gap has been widening over the past three years but unfortunately has yet to be addressed successfully by the industry. New wind farms will bring with them new engineering challenges and it is paramount that the industry is prepared for this. When work on these projects begins there will be a need for a huge amount of skilled offshore workers and preparation needs to begin for this now.¶ An Outdated Approach To Training?¶ The [2009 Renewable Energy Directive](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=Oj:L:2009:140:0016:0062:en:PDF) set targets for EU Member States to reach. The UK, for instance, is expected to achieve 15% of its consumption from renewable sources by 2020 – this compares to 3% in 2009. This has meant that the past few years has seen an increase in offshore wind production and this will continue to grow, which, in turn, will lead to an increase in investment and job opportunities within the industry in the coming years.¶ The skills gap can partly be attributed to the fact that, even though it is a rapidly growing sector, there is no industry standard for offshore training. There exists an offshore health and safety standard but outside of this there are different opinions in terms of what each company interprets as an adequate technical standard. SMEs may not be able to afford to offer training to potential employees, which makes it difficult to recruit suitable workers. Even larger companies which can afford to provide such training could benefit from a common training standard and the time and money they invest in bringing new recruits up to standard could be used to expand other parts of the business.¶ SMEs are the lifeblood of the renewables industry and in the past they may have had to poach offshore workers from the oil and gas industry in order to get the skills they need. This might have been a successful tactic when jobs in the oil industry were scarce. But as new opportunities within oil and gas become more available, this has created a growing problem for SMEs. As a result, smaller companies may be tempted to employ workers who may not be up to the desired level and rely on them gaining training and experience on the job.¶ Closing the Gap¶ There are in fact many skilled workers who may be unaware that their initial career has given them the basis to successfully train to work in the renewables industry. Construction workers and fishermen are among those who may have skills that can be readily transferred to working on offshore renewables projects.¶ Many of these workers can be trained to utilise their qualifications or transferable skills for the offshore industry while maintaining high standards; in turn they can help any renewables developer — large or small — develop a competent, professional and well-trained workforce.¶ Specialist training offers the opportunity to prepare for a life working offshore and enables the transition of technical skills to be more applicable to the needs of the offshore industry. In addition an understanding of the necessary health and safety training and instruction should be provided.¶ But this is not enough for the future; for us to encourage the sheer numbers of skilled workers the industry will need we must start at the beginning, working with colleges and universities. Even though work is currently being undertaken to provide courses and degrees dealing with renewable energy, there is very limited focus on the challenges faced in the offshore industry. We, as an industry, need to work more closely with higher education institutions, encouraging them to include offshore training on their courses. Industry can provide access to the tools they need, including access to physical wind turbines and other offshore technology, and also to people who already work in the industry who can give first-hand insight. There is simply no point in having highly educated engineers or project managers with degrees in renewable energy if they can't apply this knowledge in an offshore working environment.¶ When training staff for working offshore in renewables it is important to have a finger on the pulse of the industry and a current working knowledge of the issues involved. You need to be aware of the challenges new recruits will face in order to help them prepare fully for the experience. This allows identification of what the industry needs.¶ It is going to take a united stance from companies — both large and small — to address the significant skills gap facing the renewables industry and acknowledge the clear business benefits of creating industry standards. While the value to SMEs is clear to see, larger companies also have much to gain financially by recruiting workers who could, theoretically, be offshore on their first day in the job.¶ **What Can Be Done** Now?¶ While we may need to wait for an industry standard to come about, companies can still address the barrier that is lack of experience. **This is an obstacle that companies can ease if they start working on offshore projects collaboratively**.¶ Acceptance of there being a skills gap within individual companies will also help to ensure the smooth running of projects. **Projects may begin slowly in the first instance as agreements and permissions are granted, but once these initial stages have been passed things can move more a lot more quickly**. Bearing this in mind, companies need to plan well ahead — look at what they are bidding for, what they are winning or likely to win and, once this has been taken into consideration, make sure that the necessary skills are in place to carry out each task.¶ What the Future Holds...¶ **Once companies, both large and small, start to work together, mutual benefits will begin to become apparent** — from cost and time savings for the larger companies, to new business opportunities for SMEs. We need to develop a more open-minded approach to the industry, helping us to become more aware and wiser to the skills and staff available to the industry. At this point we will realise how an industry standard in practical renewables training can really benefit offshore renewables as a whole.¶ **Sizeable commercial opportunities** for developers and operators **are available offshore**; at the same time new engineering challenges will be introduced which will require different ways of thinking, and new and innovative ways of working offshore. This will, of course, require an expanded workforce with the skills to meet these challenges. **There will be a moment of realisation when the sheer scale of the skills gap becomes apparent — but by thinking and acting more collaboratively the industry can demonstrate its maturity, its resilience — and its ability to adapt** for the future.

**plan’s high tech diffusion creates zones for political activism that challenge state power through democratic forums  
Ong,**

Anthro Prof at UC Berkeley, ‘6 (Aihwa, “Mutations in Citizenship” Theory, Culture, and Society, Vol 23 No 2-3, p 499-531,)  
<http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/mellon/Mutations.pdf>

**Zones of Entitlement In contrast to the Euro zone, emergent sites of growth in Asia currently display less ambivalence over the adoption of neoliberal values in policies shaping citizenship. These sites recognize that articulation with transnational networks and global professionals is crucial for their emergence as centers of global capitalism.** Transnational itineraries and practices enhance the capacity of professionals and investors to negotiate national spaces, while the desire for talented actors has induced changes in immigration laws. Complex affiliations by elite mobile actors allow for temporary, multiple, and partial ascription, thus creating conditions for expatriate populations to claim citizenship-like entitlements. **The concept of ‘flexible citizenship’ describes maneuvers of mobile subjects who respond fluidly and opportunistically to dynamic borderless market conditions. Global markets induce such activities, so that ‘flexibility, migration, and relocations, instead of being coerced or resisted, have become practices to strive for rather than stability’** (Ong, 1999: 19**). Furthermore, nation-states seeking wealth-bearing and talented foreigners adjust immigration laws to favor elite migrant subjects. Thus a new synergy between global capitalism and commercialized citizenship creates milieus where market-based norms articulate the norms of citizenship.** This premium on flexible, self-enterprising subjects originated in advanced democracies that had steadily adopted market-driven rationality in politics. Such neoliberal ideas stem from Frederic von Hayek’s theory of the *homo economicus* as an instrumentalist figure forged in the effervescent conditions of market competition. **The ideas of individual economic agency as the most efficient form for distributing public resources were embraced under the ‘neo-conservative’ policies of Thatcherism and Reaganomics. This shift toward a neoliberal technology of governing holds that the security of citizens, their well-being and quality of life, are increasingly dependent on their own capacities as free individuals to confront globalized insecurities by making calculations and investments in their lives.** For instance, in Tony Blair’s New Britannica, citizens are generally governed ‘through freedom’, or an inducement for formally free subjects to make calculative choices on their own behalf. Government is no longer interested in taking care of every citizen, but wants him/her to act as a free subject who self-actualizes and relies on autonomous action to confront globalized insecurities. There is thus a fundamental shift in the ethics of subject formation, or the ethics of citizenship, as governing becomes concerned less with the social management of the population (biopolitics) than with individual self-governing (ethicopolitics) (Rose, 1999). Such ethics are framed as an animation of various capacities of individual freedom, expressed both in the citizen’s freedom from state protection and guidance, as well as freedom to make choices as a self-maximizing individual. In the USA, administrative practices that govern through the aspirations of subjects especially target the urban poor, immigrants, and refugees who are viewed as less capable of self-improvement. But as neoliberal values of flexibility, mobility, and entrepreneurialism become ideal qualities of citizenship, they also undermine the democratic achievements of American liberalism based on ideals of equal rights (Ong, 2003). Tensions between neoliberal values of citizens as economic agents, andliberal ideals of citizens as defenders of political freedom continue to roil American political life. Neoliberal ideas and practices migrate and are taken up in new zones of hyper-growth. In democratic, socialist, and authoritarian Asian settings, citizens are urged to be selfenterprising, not only to cope with uncertainties and risks, but also to raise the overall ‘human quality’ of their societies. Thus, in East and South Asian environments, neoliberal ethics of self-responsible citizenship are linked to social obligations to build the nation. In India and Malaysia, discourses about ‘knowledge workers’ and ‘knowledge society’ urge citizens to selfimprove in order to develop high-tech industries. In Singapore, the accumulation of intellectual capital as an obligation of citizenship is most extreme. **Ordinary citizens are expected to develop new mindsets and build digital capabilities, while professionals are urged to achieve norms of ‘techno-preneurial citizenship’ or lose out to more skilled and entrepreneurial foreigners and be reduced to a second-class citizenry. In short, neoliberal values of self-management and self-enterprise have different implications for citizenship, depending on interactions with particular political environments**. While the tendency in Britain and the USA is to focus on the self-governing and technologically savvy citizen as a participant in civil society, in Asian growth zones, the discourse of the self-improving and entrepreneurial citizen is linked to ‘civic society’, or the building of national solidarity. The common feature is that across these diverse milieus, the stakes of citizenship are raised for the majority. Especially in hyper-capitalist zones, those who cannot scale the skills ladder or measure up to the norms of self-governing are increasingly marginalized as deviant or subjects who threaten the security of the globalized milieu. **Thus, the articulation of neoliberal criteria and situated citizenship regimes undercuts the protection of citizenship entitlements and blurs political distinctions between citizens and talented foreigners**. Arenas of Political Claims But the mix of market-opportunism and citizenship has also engendered conditions for greater political activism. In non-democratic countries embracing market-driven policies, new arenas are opening up for ordinary people to claim justice, accountability, and democratic freedoms. **The confluence of market forces and digital technologies have pried open cracks in the interstices of highly controlled societies, thus creating conditions for exciting outbursts of popular demands for democracy by ordinary people.**

**Brain ciruclation proves our conception of national identities is one that shows them to be existent but permeable, perm solves**

**Newman 1**

professor of political geography and chair of the Department of Politics and Government at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, 01 (David, Edited by Mathias Albert, Yosef Lapid and David Jacobson “Identities, Borders, Orders : Rethinking International Relations Theory”, Pg. 146-147, JD)

The postmodern discussion of territory suggests a more flexible framework through which territorial boundaries and identity boundaries can live side by side without the need for the demarcation of absolute entities (Newman 1999a, 2000a; Paasi 1999a, 1999b**). The opening of boundaries does not necessarily mean the dilution of national identities, but it enables such identities to operate within a looser spatial framework,** one that is **not** so tightly **bound to the territorial demarcation of state sovereignty. The permeability of territorial boundaries enables freedom of movement, dissemination of ethnic and national cultures, and,** for some favored groups, **multicitizenship**. But it does not mean that virtual identities are necessarily aspatial or divorced from notions of territory and space. In many cases, it enables members of diaspora groups to identify with distant territories, territories they learn about through the Internet and the satellite media, thus strengthening their territorial attachment while not necessarily residing therein. This, in turn, causes new problems associated with the extent to which these groups undergo successful processes of absorption into their new surroundings and/or the extent to which their host society accuses them of having dual loyalties. Important in this respect has been Paasi’s study of the RussianFinnish boundary. Paasi notes the importance of socialization narratives as part of the process through which the specific territorial attachments and identities of the populations on each side of the boundary have evolved over time (Paasi 1996). I have discussed similar processes in studies of the “green line” boundary between Israel and the West Bank (Newman 1994, 1995), itself part of a wider process through which the formation of Jewish national identity in the modern state of Israel is part of an ongoing process of territorial socialization to which the Jewish people were subject during the two thousand years of the Diaspora and that has been transformed into concrete policies aimed at controlling territory as a result of the establishment of the state of Israel. Thus **a study of** contemporary **boundaries requires** significant **reconceptualization, which can take account of the diverse scales of territorial analysis**, from the global to the local**, as well as the extent to which these different boundaries allow for greater or lesser contact as they become** more permeable and **easier to cross.** The relationship between identity and borders is, to a great extent, a function of the degree to which sociospatial ordering takes place, undergoes territorial reconfiguration, and is maintained for any significant period of time**. It is the fluidity of boundary change that has to be taken into account as part of this ordering process, rather than erroneously assuming that such fluidity automatically brings about the eradication of a structured spatial ordering.**

**\*\*\*Advantage Two- Ship building**

**U.S. Shipbuilding industry is collapsing**

**Paulo Santos, 12**

Paulo Santos is a Portuguese independent trader, analyst and algorithmic trading expert, having worked for both sell side (brokerage) and buy side (fund management) institutions. “Expecting A Bust In The Shipbuilding Industry” <http://seekingalpha.com/article/341301-expecting-a-bust-in-the-shipbuilding-industry>, accessed 12/20/12,WYO/JF

As the [Baltic Dry Index](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=BDIY:IND) plunges ever lower, [taking out the 2008 lows](http://seekingalpha.com/article/336001-baltic-dry-index-plumbs-new-lows), **we've already concluded that many dry ship bulkers will** [**go under the bankruptcy waves**](http://seekingalpha.com/article/318245-as-shipping-gets-no-relief-bankruptcies-are-to-be-expected) **in this cycle**. However, there are other obvious consequences of this pricing environment. We know that one of the clear reasons why freight rates are imploding is simply too many ships being delivered. And **such an influx of ships was the result of the bubble in freight rates** that took place during 2007 and early 2008, together with long delivery periods. Thus, today's incredibly low rates will lead to the opposite - precious few ships will be ordered and made in the next 2 years or so. So certainly, **the shipbuilders are going to hit a dry spell here. Unfortunately, shipbuilding is something that's long gone from the U.S. economy and markets**, and other than Huntington Ingalls Industries ([HII](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/hii)), I can't even locate any other shipbuilder. Naturally, HII doesn't fit this thesis, since it does mostly military work. Certainly, we can follow the events through a [worldwide shipbuilding index](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=BWSHIP:IND) published by Bloomberg, but that won't cut it as far as trading goes, since the shipbuilding companies are mostly Korean, like Hyundai and Daewoo as well as Chinese, such as Yangzijiang Shipbuilding. **There is, however, another consequence of a bust in shipbuilding**. It's something that adds to other factors I've already [written about](http://seekingalpha.com/article/320883-steel-is-in-china-s-hands), regarding the Chinese Economy slowdown, namely the drop in auto production that's already occurring, and the predicted drop in residential construction, given that residential prices are already falling. What is this consequence? **Well, those large ships take a lot of steel. If you don't make ships, you don't use steel. So this is one more reason why the steel sector will face substantial headwinds during 2012,** with United States Steel ([X](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/x)), AK Steel Holding Corporation Co ([AKS](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/aks)), Arcelor Mittal ([MT](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mt)) and Nucor ([NUE](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/nue)) **being potentially exposed to these developments**. Right now, these steel shares are being bought under the general theory that slightly better economic numbers in the U.S. will lead to higher steel consumption and prices, yet these effects I've been describing, from auto and residential production in China, to shipbuilding, are much more important than any increased demand on U.S. soil. It's thus not a surprise that, as I have written earlier, steel prices are already falling.

**Lack of regulatory clarity and speed with federal permitting destroys investment decisions in OSW broadly and in ship-building specifically**

**Bondaref 12**

[Joan, analyst with Blank Rome LLP, “Is the Time Right to Expedite Offshore Wind”, North American Wind Power, July, p. <http://www.nawindpower.com/digitaleditions/Main.php?MagID=2&MagNo=31> //wyo-tjc]

**While well intentioned**, the U.S. Department of the Interior’s (**DOI) “Smart from the Start” program has not produced a lease since the program was announced in 2010.** (Cape Wind, which was awarded the first commercial lease for wind energy development along the Outer Continental Shelf in October 2010, was grandfathered**.) If the DOI waits too long** to award leases, **it will** find itself in the middle of an election campaign and **face the possibility that leases will be delayed even further** should a new administration and new Congress come to Washington, D.C**. It may also find itself faced with the loss of developers that lose heart in the slow but methodical leasing process**. For example, **in May, Gamesa** – **citing the U.S. market’s uncertain offshore future – pulled out of its joint arrangement with Virginia-based Newport News Shipbuilding. Gamesa’s actions should serve as a warning to federal** and state **agencies**.

**Commercial shipbuilding’s key to naval power**

**NLUS 12** Navy League of the United States, “America’s Maritime Industry The foundation of American seapower”, 2012, <http://www.navyleague.org/files/americas-maritime-industry.pdf>, Date Verification – http://gsship.org/industry-links/

**Defense Industrial Base: Shipbuilding** The American Maritime Industry also contributes to our national defense by sustaining the shipbuilding and repair sector of our national defense industrial base upon which our standing as a **seapower** is based. History has proven that **without a strong maritime infrastructure**—shipyards, suppliers, and seafarers—no country can hope to build and support a Navy of sufficient size and capability to protect its interests on a global basis. Both our commercial and naval fleets **rely on U.S. shipyards** and their numerous industrial vendors for building and repairs. The U.S. commercial shipbuilding and repair industry also impacts our national economy by adding billions of dollars to U.S. economic output annually. In 2004, there were 89 shipyards in the major shipbuilding and repair base of the United States, defined by the Maritime Administration as including those shipyards capable of building, repairing, or providing topside repairs for ships 122 meters (400 feet) in length and over. This includes six large shipyards that build large ships for the U.S. Navy. Based on U.S. Coast Guard vessel registration data for 2008, in that year U.S. shipyards delivered 13 large deep-draft vessels including naval ships, merchant ships, and drilling rigs; 58 offshore service vessels; 142 tugs and towboats, 51 passenger vessels greater than 50 feet in length; 9 commercial fishing vessels; 240 other self- propelled vessels; 23 mega-yachts; 10 oceangoing barges; and 224 tank barges under 5,000 GT. 11 Since the mid 1990’s, the industry has been experiencing a period of modernization and renewal that is largely market-driven, backed by long-term customer commitments. Over the six-year period from 2000-05, a total of $2.336 billion was invested in the industry, while in 2006, capital investments in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry amounted to $270 million.12 The state of the industrial base that services this nation’s Sea Services is **of great concern** to the U.S. Navy. **Even a modest increase** in oceangoing commercial shipbuilding would give a **substantial boost** to our shipyards and marine vendors. Shipyard facilities at the larger shipyards in the United States are capable of constructing merchant ships as well as warships, but often cannot match the output of shipyards in Europe and Asia. On the other hand, U.S. yards construct and equip the best warships, aircraft carriers and submarines in the world. They are unmatched in capability, but **must maintain that lead**. 13

**Naval power solves nuclear war**

**Conway et al 7** James – General, US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gary Roughead – Admiral, U.S. navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Thad Allen – Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant of the Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, p. http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf

No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to **global stability** as **war among major powers**. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a **key component** of **deterring major power war**. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars. In times of war, our ability to **impose local sea control**, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an **indispensable** element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can **concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection** enable extended campaigns ashore.

**U.S. Sea Power is key to deter Chinese hegemony and war in the south china sea**

**Cropsey, 12**

Dr. Seth Cropsey Hudson Institute “The U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plan: Assumptions and Associated Risks to National Security” <http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SethCropsey--USNavyShipbuildingPlan--Testimony041812.pdf>, accessed 12/20/12,WYO/JF

A nation burdened with massive debt whose ability to shape world events has been limited in tandem with its capacity to invest in research and technology will have more and more trouble finding markets. **China’s potential hegemony would not only force its neighbors’ to reconsider whether the U.S. is a reliable ally. It would also become an increasingly powerful magnet for trade** in the region—**at the expense of U.S. commerce. Unlike the U.S. whose seapower has protected global sea lanes that other states have used to their benefit China** has a different set of values. It views with suspicion a liberal trading system notwithstanding the benefits received from it. **China’s friends include Iran and North Korea. Beijing is a poor candidate to support the international order that has been the keel of U.S. foreign and security policy** for a century. **Waning U.S. seapower is an invitation that China will regard as a complement to its rising military and navy in particular. It foreshadows a coercive resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea**, the likelihood of an increased regional arms race, and the troubling international perception that the U.S. is—or has—abandoned its role as a great power. American seapower is the strategic keel of our foreign and security policy. **Reducing it would be an exercise of history-making shortsightedness. Restoring it would be an act of statesmanship from which Americans and all who cherish political liberty would benefit for the remainder of this century. Thank you.**

#### CONFLICT IN THE SCS ESCALATES TO FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR

STRAITS TIMES 1995

[staff, “Choose Your Own Style of Democracy”, May 21, p. ln// wyo-tjc]

In his speech, Dr Mahathir also painted three scenarios for Asia.

**In the first -the worst possible scenario -Asian countries would go to war against each other, he said. It might start with clashes** between Asian countries **over the Spratly Islands** because of China's insistence that the South China Sea belonged to it along with all the islands, reefs and seabed minerals. **In this scenario, the United States would offer to help** and would be welcomed by Asean, he said. The Pacific Fleet begins to patrol the South China Sea. **Clashes occur between the Chinese navy and the US Navy. China declares war on the US and a full-scale war breaks out with both sides resorting to nuclear weapons.**

**That’s the most likely scenario for US-China war**

**Glaser 12** Bonnie S., Senior Fellow – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” CFR, April, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883

The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being **shaped by—rising apprehensions about** the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China **has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities** to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from **escalating militarily**. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The **most likely** and **dangerous contingency** is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an **armed Chinese response**. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in **aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident** similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also **increased the danger of an incident**, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A **miscalculation** or misunderstanding could then result in a **deadly exchange of fire**, leading to further **military escalation** and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult

**Attempting to Assess Chinese motivation is possible and epistemologically useful---**

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**,

Claremont McKenna College “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc\_theses

First, **motives can be known**. Mearsheimer is correct in observing that assessing motives can be difficult, but this does not mean that the task is impossible. There clearly are ways of finding out information about the goals of states and the means with which they plan to achieve them. One of the most important roles of intelligence analysts, for example, is to determine state interests and expected behavior based on obtained information. The **possibility** that information may be flawed should **not lead to a rejection of all information**. People make decisions based on less than perfect knowledge all of the time. This ability to know motives extends to future motives, because an analyst can use information such as historical trends to observe consistencies or constant evolutions of motives. Prediction of the future is necessarily less certain in its accuracy, but the prediction can still be made.104¶ Second, even if there is still some uncertainty of motives, the rational response is not to assume absolute aggression. Assuming aggressive motive in a situation of uncertainty ignites the security dilemma, which could actually decrease a state’s security. Mearsheimer calls this tragic, but it is not necessary. An illustrative example is Mearsheimer’s analysis of the German security situation were the United States to withdraw its military protection. Mearsheimer argues that it would be rational for Germany to develop nuclear weapons, since these weapons would provide a deterrent, and it would also be rational for nuclear European powers to wage a preemptive war against Germany to prevent it from developing a nuclear deterrent. 105 This scenario is not rational for either side because it ignores motives. If Germany knows that other states will attack if it were to develop nuclear weapons, then it would not be rational for it to develop nuclear weapons. And if other states know that Germany’s development of nuclear weapons is only as a deterrent, then it would not be rational to prevent German nuclear development. The point is that the security dilemma exists because of a **lack of motivational knowledge,** so the proper response is to try to **enhance understanding of motives,** **not discard motivational knowledge altogether**. Misperception is certainly a problem in international politics, but reducing misperception would allow states to better conform to defensive realist logic, which results in preferable outcomes relative to offensive realism. 106¶ **Assessing motives is vital in the case of the rise of China**, because mutually preferable outcomes **can be achieved** if China is not an aggressive power, as offensive realism would have to assume, but is actually a status quo power with aims that have limited effect on the security of the U.S. and other potentially affected countries. I do not mean here to claim with certainty that China is and will always be a status quo power, and policymakers likely have access to more intentional information than what is publicly known. At the very least, **valuing motivational assessments empowers policymakers** to act on this knowledge, which is preferable because of the possibility of **reducing competition and conflict**.

**Thriving OSW industry jumpstarts shipbuilding and port improvements throughout the United States- leadership now is crucial to avoid the US shipping industries and ports from being locked-out of global competition**

**Bondaref 12**

[Joan, analyst with Blank Rome LLP, “Is the Time Right to Expedite Offshore Wind”, North American Wind Power, July, p. <http://www.nawindpower.com/digitaleditions/Main.php?MagID=2&MagNo=31> //wyo-tjc]

**Europe has been at the forefront of renewable energy** **and**, in particular, **offshore wind**. Like the DOD, Europe has made a commitment to renewable energy and set a more ambitious goal of having 20% of its energy consumption from renewable sources by 2020. Each member of the European Union (EU) has a national action plan to achieve this goal, and Europe is well on its way to meeting its objective. In 2009, wind constituted 7.7% of renewable energy sources in Europe. **This has also resulted in the creation of over 1 million new jobs, according to a recent report** by market research firm EurObserv’ER. **One burgeoning market in Europe that the U.S. should emulate is the offshore supply and support vessel industry**. **Innovative designs for new support vessels**, such as catamarans and crew-transfer vessels that can perform well in high-sea states, **have come online and can be deployed rapidly to new and existing offshore wind farms.** One U.K. company is building 25 crew-transfer vessels a year. Smart U.K. boat builders that are working in the offshore wind industry have also entered into licensing agreements with U.S. boat builders, which not only will bring jobs to a flagging industry, but also should enhance support for offshore wind. **Similarly, European port owners and operators are reaping the benefits of offshore wind farm projects**. How European ports have positioned themselves as “epicenters” of offshore wind operations and support bases is discussed at length in the September 2011 issue of North American Windpower (“U.S. Ports Model Themselves After European Counterparts,” page 50). **Instead of working to stymie offshore wind farms for fear of interference with shipping traffic, U.S. ports should focus on the new jobs and financial opportunities that would be created by similar projects in the U.S**. **To ensure that these high-tech, high-paying jobs come to the U.S., it requires leadership at the federal** and state **level**s. **The U.S. should do what it can to bring about the development of this clean industry, and not sit by while other regions such as the EU, India and China take over what could be a strong manufacturing base and job market for years to come**.

**Offshore wind would lead to massive investment of funds toward ship building**

**MCTC, 10**

Massachusetts Clean Energy Center, “Port and Infrastructure Analysis for Offshore Wind Energy Development”online, accessed 10/26/12,WYO/JF

**No purpose-built wind turbine installation vessels exist** that are compliant with U.S. coastwise trade laws (i.e., "Jones Act"). These laws require vessels to be U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, and U.S.-operated. **A small number of Jones Act-compliant vessels that are currently operating in the Gulf of Mexico** could be used to construct the first-generation U.S. offshore wind farms. These vessels lack the efficiency associated with purpose-built wind turbine installation vessels, such as the ability to transport multiple sets of turbine components and the ability to rapidly jackup, pre-load the legs, erect the turbines, and jack-down**. In order to economically and efficiently achieve GW-scale deployment of offshore wind in the United States, a fleet of purpose-built, Jones Act-compliant vessels will be needed. The industry recognizes this fact and is taking steps to develop the vessel infrastructure**. NRG Bluewater Wind, for example, has teamed with the Aker Philadelphia shipyard to develop three purpose-built wind turbine installation vessels. (Bluewater Wind 2009b). **Future wind turbine installation vessels are expected to focus on improving construction efficiency through faster transit speeds, larger payload capacity, and ability to erect turbines in higher wind speeds and larger sea states.** Some firms are developing designs that accommodate the transport and installation of fully assembled turbines (see Figure 3-18).

**Their K is useless in crafting policy response to Chinese action**

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**, “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc\_theses

Criticism also exists for the epistemological basis of mainstream IR theory, positivism, resulting in provocative theoretical positions. The basic claim of post-positivists is that mainstream theory claims that knowledge as objective and immutable when all knowledge is actually subjective and contingent. A theorist cannot have objective knowledge because reality can only be observed by a subject, the theorist. Knowledge, therefore, is articulated in terms of inherently subjective discourses. 156¶ Recognizing the subjectivity of mainstream IR’s supposedly objective knowledge leads to two main conclusions. First, mainstream IR is inaccurate in its understanding of the world, so awareness of subjectivity will allow for greater explanation and engagement with reality. Second, mainstream IR knowledge hides the value judgments inherent in subjective claims by positing their objectivity. This places them beyond question, elevating their power. The reproduction of dominant IR discourses oppresses the less powerful by marginalizing their discourses. 157 For example, critical theorists argue that mainstream IR discourse is implicitly masculinized, excluding women from positions of power and from consideration of the effects of theory and policy. 158 Critical theorists attribute many if not all of negative outcomes in international politics to exclusive, dominant discourses. War, for example, often results from the reproduction of dominant discourses of statist power. 159 Consequently, the goal of critical theory is “emancipatory,” a normative attempt to resist power. Resistance is attempted through exposing subjectivity, promoting the discourses of the oppressed, and otherwise attempting to change the discursive climate to loosen the grip of dominant discourses. 160¶ While purely critical approaches may be interesting or **even more correct**, they are **basically useless for policymakers**. Robert Cox distinguishes critical theory from problemsolving theory, where the latter does not question dominant discourses and institutions but tries to get them to **“work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble**.” Mainstream IR theory fits this description. Critical theory tries to affect the real world as well, but it tries to enact broad social change instead of focusing on specific problems. 161 **This will not do for policymakers**, who **have to** craft responses to **specific issues like the rise of China**. 162 As Waltz argues in a response to Ashley and Cox, problem-solving theory needs to make assumptions regardless of their objectivity: “**The alternative is simply to eschew such [problemsolving] theories altogether**. Would we then know more or less about the social and the natural worlds?” 163

#### Theory without Praxis fails

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**,

Claremont McKenna College “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, <http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc_theses>, accessed 12/12/12,WYO?JF

Ultimately, the theory-policy gap is impossible to completely bridge. Theory is disputed and decontextualized, and therefore not amenable to the necessities of policy. Yet theory can still provide generalized guidance to policymakers, pointing them toward potentially relevant factors in understanding the international environment. Theory must therefore facilitate policy, not constrain it. In the case of the rise of China, fatalistic theory is of no help. But theory that empowers policymakers may suggest solutions to this complex problem.