# 1NC

## Framework

#### First, our interpretation: Debate is an agonistic field of play where the affirmative must accept the constraints of switch-side debate by affirming a policy option that is topical to the current resolution when they are affirmative, and negating the topic when they are negative. The role of the ballot should be to accept or reject the actions and outcomes of the topical plan.

#### Second, our links: The aff team fails to engage in this process in three ways:

#### Not advocating a definitive course of action as indicated by the words ‘resolved’ and ‘should’[[1]](#footnote-1), rather they have you endorse a system of constant criticism.

#### Not defending the agent of the resolution, which is the government of the United States based in D.C.[[2]](#footnote-2)

#### Not defending the direction of the resolution, this requires a plan that advocates for either an increase in financial incentives or reduction in restrictions FOR energy production.

#### There are three net benefits to this interpretation of debate:

#### First, Energy Policy:

#### Policymaking is critical to address the overwhelming risks we face if we do not alter our energy production strategy-even if the science is uncertain, we must act to prevent the misery that will occur if we’re wrong

Schreyer 2005

[The Right Honourable Edward R. Schreyer was elected to the Manitoba Legislature in 1958, elected Leader of the Manitoba N.D.P. party in June 1969 and subsequently elected Premier of Manitoba from 1969-77. In 1979, Schreyer became Canada's 22nd Governor General, serving until 1984. He was awarded the Lester B. Pearson Peace Award in 1997. Mr. Schreyer currently serves on the Board of the International Institute for Sustainable Development and is the Chancellor of Brandon University. The Politics of Energy and the Environment, <http://www.ecclectica.ca/issues/2005/3/index.asp?Article=13>, uwyo//amp]

The politics of energy production, the politics of supply prospects and the politics of environmental protection seem to serve (or fail to serve) entirely different interest groups. Yet, the challenge is largely all of one piece. To be sure, if there were truly widespread acceptance of the contention that fossil fuel combustion with its resultant 25 billion tonnes of annual CO2 were the principal cause of global climate change and that such change was upon us, then some action would become a moral imperative in the public forum. Slowly that consensus appears to be evolving but until the politicians see a clear public trend, most will not have the stomach for earlier action. It may then become action-just-in-time (if we are lucky). There is a great deal of evidence and logic to suggest that Planet Earth's oceans and forests, are vast enough to act as an absolute sink for great tonnages of CO2 as they have in the past. Planet Earth's resources and resiliency factors are indeed—vast. But they are not infinite. The rational politics of all this suggests that there is a prudent and practical course of action. It is to adopt the precautionary principle that in the face of growing evidence, but lacking absolute certainty, the most justifiable course is to conserve and attenuate the use of nonrenewables while working hard to develop the renewables. It becomes essential to slow the rate of depletion of fossil fuels and hasten the rate of harnessing the renewables, i.e., wind and hydro. Only those who have the most unlimited greed for profit by fast track depletion should have cause to object. No one realistically wishes for a disruption in the stability of the oil and gas industry, but their product would serve better if it were extracted at half the present pace rate and therefore remain available for twice as long into the future. On that basis, Earth's natural CO2 sinks would then have a somewhat better chance in the odds of absorbing the tonnages of CO2 that would still be emitted, but at greatly reduced levels each year. However, as matters now stand, and with the prevailing attitudes, there isn't a chance that we will come through this without major disruption and consequential misery. I also hold this view as regards the political and technological problem of getting alternative energy systems in place before supply shortfalls in oil and gas drive prices even further into erratic haywire extremes. The 2004/05 price examples are merely the leading edge. In other words, we are leaving the task of redirecting our energy future dreadfully late—dangerously late. I mean this from the point of view of supply shortages that both explode price and disrupt production capacity of food, fibre and finished goods. By then, we may or may not yet, have the ultimate proof of impending climate change bringing environmental and ecological disaster. If these two prospects are linked, however, does it really matter which comes first? Ironically, the linkage of these two transcending problems extends to the political world. There is infighting, even among groups who are genuine supporters of conservation policies. There are some who are environmental activists, because of visible impacts on the landscape and others who urgently support renewable energy initiatives because of sustainability concerns. Each of these groups have, within them, numbers who are impatient; who seek urgent measures in support of one or another policy initiative sometimes to the exclusion of all other options. In this context, one can meet those who favour the solar option and downplay wind energy and/or those who favour wind energy options as capable of meeting future energy needs without any need for development of hydroelectric sites, even of the most favorable kind. All this is rather remindful of the old adage—"every duck praises its own slough". The reality is that the very scale and nature of the problem is so great that it requires the adoption of all practical efforts and renewable, sustainable alternatives. This includes promotion of the conservation ethic—use less, waste less. It includes promotion of all efforts toward greater efficiency in energy and resource use; building better, smaller and with more insulation, more allowance for solar gain, etc. These are some examples that come mind. Acceptance of new technologies that have passed tests of feasibility must be encouraged. The slow rate at which geothermal heat pumps are being installed as an alternative to gas heating is a disappointing case in point. The technology is known. The capacity to install must be encouraged and ramped up but who will do this? One potential stakeholder awaits the other and governments remain passive bystanders. So it proceeds at a snail's pace. We perceive the political problem of breaking out of inertia. We appear, these past 20 years, to be living in a time when the dominant political philosophy guiding democratic governments is one of subordination to market forces. The path followed appears to be the opposite to that followed, e.g., by President Franklin Roosevelt in formulating the New Deal as a major struggle to reduce the poverty and despair of the 1930s. It was not left to chance then. Government was used as a useful tool—as an instrument to initiate certain programs and actions to seek certain objectives. At present, however, we drift without any guiding path or principles. The Kyoto Accord to reduce CO2 emissions has, for political reasons, been signed by most countries but not by others, including the US. It is important to note that there is, in fact, very little difference in the actual deeds thus far in either set of countries (except for a few in Europe). The quantum of fossil fuel depleted each year, and the resulting CO2 emissions keep moving in the direction opposite to the Accord. If this is progress, we must be using an inverted mirror. There has been no shortage of government press releases (implying action and progress) issued since the Kyoto Accord was negotiated eight years ago, but precious little has been done. As such, all these press communiques have been used rather like Weapons of Mass Deception. Only Alice in Wonderland, who learned how to use the Mock Turtle's calculator can explain how we manage to imply we have made progress when, in fact, oil and gas depletion has accelerated in Canada as much as anywhere else and so have greenhouse gas emissions. The political climate needed for any real and concerted action is apparently not yet at hand. Wildly contradictory statements by opposing camps of experts confuse and perplex those citizens who try to make sense of it all. But wait! The most recent events of the autumn of 2005 are beginning to show an unintended consensus, but a consensus nonetheless. We have, in recent years, begun to hear more and more from those who describe oil depletion as a global problem; global in scope and disastrous in its consequence, if not urgently addressed. These "peak oil" geologists (and others of the same view) were, until about 1995, few in number and viewed with derision by the conventional wisdom, and of course, by those hyping stock market shares and grinding other axes of self-interest. But these past two years they have been and are receiving respectful attention and are being joined in their efforts to explain, inform and educate, by some numbers at least, of economists, bankers and public policy analysts. They are no longer dismissed as doomsayers except perhaps by those who engage in the conventional wishful thinking that oil and gas will be available forever. In early November 2005 the International Energy Agency, which is the agency owned by the 22 or so major oil consuming industrial nations, released an astonishing statement indicating that the world's energy consumption patterns and practices were unsustainable and urged major changes. One must pause here to have that resonate and register. Particularly so, because the IEA has, until now, always tried to put an optimistic face on global energy future prospects. One can be sure that there has been, these past six years or so, much internal stress in deciding how best to maintain the façade of a business-as-usual energy strategy. It is the IEA's own annual publication "World Energy Outlook" that each year shows projected global oil consumption and depletion fast tracking upward to 100 million barrels per day and another 60 million barrels per day of gas in oil equivalent by 2020. The consequent CO2 emissions, therefore, are shown to rise to just under 40 billion tonnes per year. Business as usual indeed. The whole notion is absurd! Moreover, in the last 30 days, after 30 years, they have changed direction. Better late than never! In other words, the IEA has done a volte-face in November 2005. But again, wait for the final note: as though to contradict the "peal oil" geologists, the IEA states "there is still enough oil—enough to last another 30 years—all it will need is $17 trillion dollars of investment in production and plant infrastructure". Yes: 17,000 billion dollars over 30 years or 500 billion dollars per year. Oh! I forgot. The IEA also said that most (almost all) of this onus for production increase would have to come from OPEC. It didn't explain why there is apparently little hope or expectation that investment, no matter how massive, in North America, Europe or in deep sea drilling will make any meaningful difference. Therefore, the "lots of oil" is "lots of oil" except in a few places. One should not expect politicians to exhort more and more spending on oil exploration in old producing territories. Few things are as nonproductive as a once depleted oil field. Who will invest in the Brooklyn Bridge? The most telling point I leave toward the end. It is that if you carefully read the statements made by those wishing to put an optimistic spin; oftentimes they confirm rather than contradict the statements made by "peak oil" analysts. For example, the IEA statement "there is oil to last for another 30 years" is hardly different from the peak oil thesis that oil will be extractable for at least another 30 to 40 years but it will not increase, but rather only decrease in relation to demand, falling short each year in meeting that demand. The shortfall will create a psychology that will drive prices into a cocked hat of spiral and uncertainty. We will either ramp up in time with tar sands, shale and nonrenewables or we will face a sharp increase in the "index of misery" as food, fibre and mobility prices escalate wildly. Concurrently, if renewables lose out in development priority to tar sands, Arctic pipelines and more and more coal, you can expect the projected 40 billion tonnes of CO2 to surge upward by a commensurate greater amount. There are other negative possibilities, of course. One example is the case where governments use renewable energy cash flow where it is working well to subsidize continued use of one or another of the fossil fuels, etc. Yes, there is the tantalizing prospect of "clean coal". But, what does it mean? Coal can be cleaned, of course. It can be washed, scrubbed of its particulates and reduced in its sulfur emissions, etc., but to hype "clean coal" as being rid of its necessity to emit carbon dioxide in the burning of it, is to return to the nonsense alchemy of the high Middle Ages. To burn coal in a modern power plant is to combine carbon and oxygen in prodigious amounts. A coal plant of 1000MW producing electricity, let's say, at 80% capacity factor, will discharge about 7 million tonnes per year of CO2 into the atmosphere. To suggest that this CO2 can somehow be all sequestered, avoided or stored away somewhere at that grand scale month after month, year after year, is to hype the most outrageous nonsense. Without oxygen meeting carbon—no combustion and no steam. And, of course, natural gas combustion discharges carbon dioxide as well—at about 60 percent the rate of coal. That is not the only point. Natural gas is in much shorter supply, especially in North America, and its depletion rate on this continent is already making itself felt! Natural gas prices have tripled (+300%) in the past three years! The effect on home heating costs and industrial processing is drastic in its impact. The implications for fertilizer production and costs are severe enough to cause 100% price increases to western farmers. The politics of natural gas can be summarized as follows. All local clean air lobbies, and many environmental lobbies, favour natural gas over coal. However, those who are concerned with "sustainability" over the long run, favor coal over gas. Many lobbied for natural gas, not only for home heating where it was obviously to be favoured but also as a preference over hydro for electricity generation. In the latter case, it is not at all to be preferred, except for peak hour relief. Yet, repeatedly, in the 1990s to 2003, gas was promoted and installed in more than 90% of all new electricity-generating plants in North America. As a direct result, in at least three provinces in Canada, hydro development was poor mouthed and postponed, while we celebrated "an environmental victory" of gas installation. It was a mass phenomenon, like lemmings moving to the sea and their own demise. The shortsightedness and irresponsibility when shown in pictorial graph(a) is stunning. But, who will be called to account?? These events were a direct "defeat" for sustainability, if truth be known. The decade is only half over and already we are looking rather nervously at multi-billion dollar Arctic gas pipelines and multi-hundred billion dollar LNG terminals and ships to bring Mideastern, North African and Russian gas to North American shores because the decision makers have been so careless. That is where the politics of the 21st Century energy provenance seems to have taken us these past five short years. Ironic this is too, because 48 years ago the Diefenbaker government enacted policy that established a National Energy Board. It was empowered to grant or withhold licences for natural gas export, unless it could be demonstrated that the depletion for export purposes was not to be allowed except in amounts that were surplus to domestic requirements of the next 20 years. That was all changed in 1990 after 30 years of successful stewardship. It was replaced by the current system, now 15 years old. That is by the politics that have recently dictated that gas production and exports shall be ratcheted up without regard for domestic needs. The cynic will be excused for noting the energy clauses of the Free Trade Agreement do not force Canada to increase exports of oil and gas to the US. What they require is that those exports cannot be reduced from the levels of preceding year(s). There is a difference. The onus is entirely ours. It is simply not right to blame Americans for decisions in Canada and the aimless policy drift that allows ratcheting. It is made-in-Canada policy. It was not made during the administrations of Messrs. Diefenbaker, Pearson or Trudeau. So two guesses as to when the National Energy Board process on gas exports was abolished. To those who argue that without those energy resource clauses, the US would not have signed the Trade Agreement, I point out that Mexico very specifically declined from signing that Agreement until those energy clauses were removed. They were removed—they then signed on—and so did the US. (If they had softwood lumber and Mad Cows, would they be treated differently than we were last year?) After all, the notion that a nation must be obliged to buy products or resources it doesn't want or need is absurd. It is equally absurd that a nation must sell off resources at a rate any faster than it wishes to extract or deplete. Almost half of the American population would like very much to build up their own energy options and preferably base their energy policy more on sustainable modalities; and reduce, at long last, their perceived over dependency on foreign oil, especially Middle East oil. This is a growing consensus among many members of Congress today. They must wonder when they see the other half of the population supporting those who appear to demand that OPEC and other countries spend and invest heavily to increase production in order to deplete more rapidly that very resource they feel they are already exploiting too heavily and too quickly. And what would be the result of increasing production—to sell 20% more volume at 20% lower price? Better to leave it in the ground an extra few years. It might appreciate in value. So goes, and so will continue to revolve, the politics of fossil fuel energy during the first two decades of the 21st Century. The essence of the energy and environmental policy dilemma is not whether we must change policy direction but rather how soon can we start. We must put practical renewable energy capacity in place. There are two reasons why we must insist that no more time should be wasted as has been wasted this entire past decade. Some may argue that almost half of world oil reserves are now depleted while optimists (forced or otherwise) may insist that almost half of ultimate reserves remain to be exploited. They both happen to be right. That is not the point. Does it really matter so much if the cup is half full or half empty? The far, far more important thing we must do is to accept the real possibility that beyond a certain point, global capacity to produce will decline and fail to meet demand. Prices will soar as supply becomes erratic and undependable month to month. We will either be ready with a rational plan of practical alternatives (that are also non-greenhouse gas emitting) or we will witness a deterioration in environmental balances and sustainability, even while misery escalates in the face of decline in the production of the necessities of life. Is it rational to ration and conserve energy or is it "merely a personal virtue but of no relevance to public policy?" (as was recently uttered by senior White House official). Or was it the Mad Hatter or the March Hare who said this? No matter. Perhaps it is up to us if these next two decades are to become the best of times instead of the very worst of times. Possibly that is oversimplifying the possible scenarios. It may be that resource constraints, limits and realities in the face of a global population growing eventually to 8 billion and beyond, will outpace the best of human ingenuity and technological innovation and defeat the best of human rational impulses and decent determination to do ultimately the right thing. However, I like many others, choose in spite of the foregoing, to be optimistic. The ethical teachings of Greco-Roman civilization and the Judeo-Christian tradition lead us to the guiding principle of moderation in all things: moderation as being the basis of right action. This may motivate us, even if late in the day, to finally do the right thing. The consequence of doing otherwise does not bear thinking about. The very scale of human consumption and impact has, in the 21st Century, caught up with the vastness of the scale of Planet Earth and her "vast resources". Now what?

#### Second, Moral Disagreement: Effective moral deliberation requires that all parties be willing to submit to a RECIPROCAL process of agonistic disagreement. Without an effective PROCESS of switch-side debate, there can be no method of dealing with the practical constraints that surround any persuasive context. EVEN IF the affirmative wins there is merit to considering their case, their abandonment of the forum of switch-side debate leaves us less able to speak to problems of power, violence and inequality because they give up on a process that is inherently valuable.

Gutmann & Thompson 96

[Amy & Dennis, President of Penn State and Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 1//wyo-tjc]

OF THE CHALLENGES that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life. Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy. The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex. Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of delib-eration that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation—the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics. We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy. Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribu¬tion to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall pos¬sible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy pre-scribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies dis-cussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not Utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and nondeliberative disa-greement. Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken. (The abortion example—to which we often return in the book—is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, about a policy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practical politics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection, or between the application of each in the non-ideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where the logical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect always to prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in dem-ocratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already part of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies and process that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by which citizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.

#### Third, Switch-Side Debate: Third, SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE: The net-benefits are both epistemic and ontological: epistemic because prepared, competitive discourse and required listening to both sides of an argument is a prerequisite for critical reasoning and interested inquiry, and ontological because it affirms a method of living that is the only antidote to the violence of the affirmative’s universalist dogma, which is root of violence and genocide

Roberts-Miller 3

[Patricia, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at UT Austin, “Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, but not act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibility for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banality of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in both rhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

#### Vote negative to reject the affirmative’s refusal to subject themselves to the constraints of switch-side debate.

#### BOUNDED CREATIVITY outweighs: You should embrace a model of debate that strikes a balance between predictability and creativity—it is a PRACTICAL REALITY that preparing to debate within a common framework enhances education because it maximizes elaboration and testing of ideas. That’s also a reason to SEVERLY DISCOUNT their impact claims because those claims have not been submitted to rigorous testing but are only shallow gut-shot reactions.

Goodin 03

[Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, uwyo//amp]

Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and procedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue.

## K

#### THE ABSENCE OF STRUCTURAL HISTORICISM IS NO MERE OVERSIGHT, NOR IS IT ENOUGH TO SIMPLY MENTION ECONOMICS IN A FEW OF YOUR CARDS—THE RELIANCE OF INDENTY-BASED POLITICS IS NOT AN ACCIDENTAL INSTANCE OF IGNORING CLASS. ATTAINING WHITE, MALE BOURGEOISSE PRIVILEGE BECOMES THE BENCHMARK OF POLITICAL SUCCESS, REENTRENCHING THE FOUNDATION OF THE SYSTEM

BROWN (Professor & Genius) 1993

[Wendy, “Wounded Attachments”, Political Theory, Aug. p. 392-394//wyo-tjc]

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normalizing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "disciplinary power" produces social identifies (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdivided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal-the transparent fiction of state universality-combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices. As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of progressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bourgeois ideal as its measure. If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking

#### Their methodology homogenizes whiteness by collapsing structures of exploitation into a focus on white privilege that erases any historical connection between the ownership of production and racist exploitation—this disables materialist critique that is necessary to achieve emancipation

Cole 9

[Mike, Research Professor in Education and Equality, Head of Research and Director of the Centre for Education for Social Justice at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, Critical Race Theory in Education: A Marxist Response, 2009, Palgrave-McMillan, p. 25-28 //wyo-tjc]

While for Critical Race Theorists ‘white supremacy’ primarily describes the structural dimension of ‘white power’, ‘white privilege’ mainly refers to the day-to-day practices that arise directly or indirectly from ‘white supremacy’. However, both interact with each other (Delgado, personal correspondence, 2008), and both have structural and day-to-day practical implications. Thus immigration restrictions would be part of the structural dimension of the ‘white supremacist’ state (ibid.), but with obvious day-to-day practical manifestations. From a Marxist perspective, it is, of course, the poor and dispossessed rather than the rich and powerful, whose entry into other (richer) countries is restricted (although this exclusion is dependent on capitalists’ relative need for cheap labor). Delgado (ibid.) gives an example of the practical nature of ‘white privilege’ when ‘store clerks put change directly in the upraised palms of white customers but lay the coins down on the counter for blacks or Latinos/ Latinas’. For Critical Race Theorists, such practices are also enshrined structurally in ‘white supremacist’ societies. For Marxists, the class element is crucial. Rich people of color are less likely to get their change thrust on the counter. Moreover, well-off people of color will tend to shop in more ‘upmarket’ stores, and will be more disposed to the use of plastic as a form of payment. Critical Race Theorists believe that all white people are beneficiaries of ‘white supremacy’ and ‘white privilege’. Gillborn (2008, p. 34) states that while they are not all active in identical ways, and do not all draw similar advantages, ‘[a]ll White-identified people are implicated in . . . [relations of shared power and dominance]— . . . they do all benefit, whether they like it or not’. Sabina E. Vaught and Angelina E. Castagno (2008, p. 99) would appear to hold similar views and refer to ‘the ways in which power over others . . . benefits Whites individually and collectively’ (p. 99), and specifically emphasize white privilege’s ‘structural nature’ (p. 100). They argue (2008, p. 96) that ‘Whiteness as property is a concept that reflects the conflation of Whiteness with the exclusive rights to freedom, to the enjoyment of certain privileges, and to the ability to draw advantage from these rights’. Following Cheryl Harris (1993, p. 1721) they state that ‘to be identified as white’ was ‘to have the property of being white. Whiteness was the characteristic, the attribute, the property of free human beings’. ‘In this way’, Vaught and Castagno (2008, p. 96) continue, ‘individual White persons came to exercise, benefit from, and mutually create and recreate a larger structural system of collective, institutional White privilege’ (ibid.). Again, following Harris (1993, p. 1762), they refer to ‘the continued right to determine meaning’ (Vaught and Castagno, 2008, p. 101), and make reference to Peggy McIntosh’s (1988) notion of systemic ‘arbitrarily-awarded’ privilege (Vaught and Castagno, 2008, p. 99). They conclude that the societal systems ‘that sustain the reign of White race privilege are peopled and the concurrent, interactive acts of individuals and systems inexorably reinforce and entrench pervasive racial power across institutions, sites and events’ (p. 96). ‘White racial power’, they claim, ‘permeates every institution’ (p. 101). When Gillborn makes reference to McIntosh’s ‘famously listed 50 privileges’ (Gillborn, 2008, p. 35), and describes them as ‘privileges that accrue from being identified as White’, he has seriously misunderstood McIntosh’s list. In merely describing the privileges as accruing from being identified as white, he decontextualizes and dehistoricizes her analysis. In actual fact, McIntosh contextualizes white privilege with respect to her social class position as a white academic with respect to her ‘Afro-American co-workers, friends, and acquaintances’ with whom she comes into ‘daily or frequent contact in this particular time, place, and line of work’ (p. 293).4 Homogenizing the social relations of all white people ignores, of course, this crucial social class dimension of privilege and power. Mills (1997, p. 37) acknowledges that not ‘all whites are better off than all nonwhites, but [argues that] . . . as a statistical generalization, the objective life chances of whites are significantly better’. While this is, of course, true, we should not lose sight of the life chances of millions of working class white people. To take poverty as one example, in the United States, while it is the case that the number of black people living below the poverty line is some three times that of whites, this still leaves over 16 million ‘white but not Hispanic’ people living in poverty in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). This is indicative of a society predicated on racialized capitalism, *rather than indicative of a white supremacist society*. While the United States is witnessing the effects of the New Racial Domain (Marable, 2004—see below) with massively disproportionate effects on black people and other people of color, white people are also affected. In the United Kingdom, there are similar indicators of a society underpinned by rampant racism, with black people currently twice as poor as whites, and those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin over three times as poor as whites (Platt, 2007).5 Once again, however, this still leaves some 12 million poor white people in the United Kingdom, who are, like their American counterparts, on the receiving end of global neoliberal capitalism. The devastating effects of social class exploitation and oppression are masked by CRT blanket assertions of ‘white supremacy’ and ‘white privilege’. There are further problems with the homogenization of all whites. First it masks essential power relations in capitalist societies. For Marxists, the ruling class are by definition those with power since it is they who own the means of production, and the working class, in having to sell their labor power in order to survive, are (also by definition) the class largely without power. The manifestations of this major power imbalance in the capital/ labor relation massively affects relative degrees of privilege in capitalist, the aforementioned rates of poverty being just one. Lack of power for the working class is particularly evident in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom where that class has been successfully interpellated (Althusser’s concept of interpellation, outlined in chapter 1 of this volume). Moreover, some of the very privileges that poor white people possess *are in a very real sense compensatory privileges*. For example, Delgado (2008, personal correspondence) has introduced the concept of ‘paltry privileges’ to describe those ‘privileges’ that whites enjoy that compensate for the fact that they are living in impoverished conditions with low paid jobs, unpaid bills and poor life chances. Alpesh Maisuria and I (Cole and Maisuria, 2008) made a similar point when referring to the success of soccer in keeping white workers in line: Ruling class success in maintaining hegemony in the light of the disparity of wealth and the imperial quest was displayed in England during the 2006 World Cup by the number of St. George flags signifying a solid patriotism in run-down (white) working class estates, on white vans, on dated cars exhibiting a ‘proud to be British’ display. In addition, as economically active migrant workers from Eastern Europe enter the UK (a great benefit for capital, and for the middle strata who want their homes cleaned or renovated cheaply), the (white) working class, who spontaneously resist neo-liberalism by resisting working for low wages that will increase their immiseration, need to be assured that they ‘still count’. Hence the ruse of capital is to open the markets, and the role of sections of the tabloid media is to racialize migrant workers to keep the (white) working class happy with their lot with the mindset that ‘at least we are not Polish or Asian or black, and we’ve got our flag and, despite everything, our brave boys in Iraq did us proud. In Althusser’s words, their response is: ‘That’s obvious! That’s right! That’s true!’ (Althusser, 1971, p. 173). In this case the homogenization of all whites obfuscates the ideological element of the capital/labor relation. While it is undoubtedly true that racism and xeno-racism (see below) have penetrated large sections of the white working class, resulting in racist practices that contribute to the hegemony of whites, and while it is clearly the case that members of the (predominantly though not exclusively) white ruling class are the beneficiaries of this, it is certainly not white people as a whole who hold such power (Cole and Maisuria, 2008). For example, sections of the white working class in England have voted for the fascist British National Party (BNP) at recent elections precisely because they feel that they are treated with less equality than others (Cruddas et al., 2005). There are thus a number of problems with homogenizing all white people. Attempts to do this ignore capitalist social relations, which are infused with the crucial dimensions of social class, power and ideology.

#### NEXT, THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—IT IS THIS LOGIC THAT MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE

DYER-WITHERFORD (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) 1999   
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OR KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF LABOR AND SURPLUS VALUE MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION TO A SOCIETY BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

## Case

#### Malcom X’s violent plan is immoral and creates fear and low self-esteem for those it is supposed to liberate.

Cone, no date.

[Martin and Malcolm on Nonviolence and Violence James H. Cone. Python Journal. Page 176 of 173-183, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132627?seq=//uwyokb]

For King, love was the most powerful force in the world, and nonviolence was love expressed politically. Because nonviolence was widely thought of by many people as “doing nothing,” King repeatedly emphasized the active dimensions of nonviolence. It was only passive in the sense of refusing to inflict physical harm on others. Nonviolence, therefore, was not a method for cowards—people afraid to suffer for the cause of justice. Nonviolence resists evil but it refuses to commit evil. Even the enemy is a person and must be treated as such. The nonviolent activist does not insult or seek to destroy the opponent but rather seeks to make the enemy a friend. However, even if nonviolence fails to convert the enemy to a friend, it eliminates hate from the hearts of those who are committed to it. Nonviolence bestows courage and sell-respect to oppressed people who were once consumed by fear and low self-esteem. King believed that only moral means could achieve moral ends, because “the end is preexistent in the means.” Violence, therefore, was “both impractical and immoral.” As a ten-percent minority in the rIchest and most powerful nation in the world, it was ludicrous to think that blacks could achieve freedom through violence.

Self-esteem key to value to life.

Cooke-bothe, 93

[Self-esteem The Key To Valuing Life December 06, 1993|By Cathleen Cooke-Bothe. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-12-06/news/9312060024\_1\_self-esteem-human-life-parents//uwyokb]

DEKALB — Following the random shooting death of 14-year-old Shaun Carey, the 55th child under age 15 slain in Chicagoland this year, the Tribune reported on essays of his former classmates at Holy Angels School. The essays suggested solutions to the tragedies of violence in today's society. I did not know Carey, but after reading the original news report and the essays of his friends, it became obvious that he left behind something very special that we as a society need to embrace-self-esteem. Whenever we choose to show love and generosity instead of hate and indifference, we have an opportunity to build self-esteem. In the students' essays, their disdain for gangs, drugs and guns as well as their respect for Carey's life witnessed to the self-esteem that Carey helped build in them. Tragically, the boys who killed Carey had not experienced enough love and generosity or they would have valued life-their own and others'.

#### Personalized debate Has Two Disads- Victimization and Therapy rhetoric

Zompetti 04

[Joseph P. Zompetti (Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University) “PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY” September  2004   Contemporary Argumentation and Debate volume 25, \\wyo-bb]

Many, if not most, of **the complaints heard in debate rounds have merit**. As a community, we must address the issues of exclusivity, tolerance, respect and diversity. **However, when debaters make arguments about these issues in debate rounds, the arguments become personalized, often seen as attacks against specific individuals, namely the "other" team** (in arguments such as "you don't address your privilege," or "you don't do anything or aren't doing enough for diversity"). The so-called "Other" that debaters refer to as being marginalized becomes transferred onto "other" individuals and teams as the competitive structure of a debate necessitates. **The point, then, is not that these complaints and concerns should not be discussed, but that they should not be discussed in actual debate rounds**. I should also add that since diversity is still an on-going concern, we must question the efficacy of personalized debating at generally improving diversity in our community. **Even if other solutions fall short as well, they at least avoid the pitfalls of personalized debating** that I now begin to explore. Interjecting **the personalized into debate rounds has become highly problematic.** As discussions on eDebate demonstrate 1 and my own discussions with folks who have judged teams like Louisville 1 suggest, **these arguments have increased anxiety, frustration, anger and resentment. To be fair, these arguments have also facilitated much soul-searching and self-reflexivity in the community**. However, except for the Urban Debate League (UDL) movement 2 little, **if anything, is being done to correct for inadequacies and inequities in the community, contrary to the appeal of the personalized arguments. In fact, any benefits from the personalization of debate can be accrued from enhancing other strategies: larger community discussions** (as evidenced by some messages on eDebate), 3 discussion fora at national tournaments, 4 special high school debate institutes, 5 clear directives and discussion during the CEDA and NDT business and roundtable meetings, 6 more sensitive topic selection, 7 etc. **The drawbacks to personalizing debate, however, are, in my opinion, enormous. I will elaborate on two significant problems of engaging the personal in actual debate rounds: victimhood and therapy rhetoric.**

#### Finally, you’re not exclusive with our framework- Solved by other parts of the community

Atchison & Panetta 9

[Jarrod & Edward, Assistant Professor at Wake Forest and Professor at University of Georgia, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future”, The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, 2009, pp. 317-334//wyo-bb]

The earliest debaters figured out that there is nothing like the experience of attending an intercollegiate debate tournament. In their modern manifestations, tournaments are rigorous tests of mental acuity and perseverance. From our perspective, there is no other college activity that provides students with an opportunity to engage in such an intense and powerful academic exchange with fellow students from across the country, representing a wide diversity of institutions. What is more impressive is that debaters travel to tournaments several times a semester while maintaining their academic responsibilities. In our experience, few academic conferences produce the same level of rigorous conversation that happens at one college debate tournament. That being said, **one thing that is missing from modern college debate tournaments is a forum for discussing community concerns.** Debate historians have argued correctly that this was not always the case. In the distant past, tournaments held after-dinner speeches where debaters would address their community about a wide range of topics. **In the recent past, tournaments such as Northwestern held forums where coaches, directors, and debaters offered community proposals for discussion**. In fact, **according to one version of the story, the Northwestern forum was the place where Ross Smith argued that the National Debate Tournament community should seriously consider adopting the Cross Examination Debate Association resolution**—precipitating the merger of the two debate communities. Unfortunately, we are not aware of these forums at any of the regional or major national tournaments today. In this final section, **we propose experimenting with tournament scheduling to create a period of time for a community forum.** Technology has improved tremendously today's tournament schedules. In the past, pairing a single round of debate required an extensive tab room staff with experience and patience. Today, computer programs have drastically reduced the amount of time necessary to pair debates. Additionally, **the community has gotten better about starting debates on time and turning in ballots in a timely fashion**. As a result of these innovations, **debate tournaments have more flexible time for participants**. There are at least three scenarios that a tournament could adopt in an effort to generate public discussions. Much like tournament structure was used to reform debate in the 1920s, debate can look to the weekend competitions as a forum to address the recurrent problems of contest debating.

# 2NC

## Marx

**Only a Marxist pedagogical method can create the intellectual pathways connecting local and global networks of material oppression—starting from the point of ‘white supremacy’ is fundamentally unable to resist and challenge structures of oppression**

**Cole 9**

[Mike, Research Professor in Education and Equality, Head of Research and Director of the Centre for Education for Social Justice at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, ETHNICITIES, “Critical Race Theory Comes to the UK: A Marxist Response”, 9:246//wyo-tjc]

I am not arguing that CRT cannot provide insights into racism in capitalist societies; for example, its emphasis that ‘people of colour’ need to be heard to provide meaningful analyses of racism is useful and particularly illuminating for those whose life experiences are restricted to monocultural settings in multicultural societies (Delgado, 1995). **(Xeno-) racism and the process of (xeno-)racialization can best be understood, however, by a combination of listening to and learning about the life histories and experiences of those at the receiving end of racism, and by objective Marxist analysis.** **There is a richness to be gained from this theoretical technique, which facilitates a synthesis of lived experience through the lens of Marxist theory and traces the ‘how’ of life experience back to the ‘why’ of capitalist class practices. This is always rooted in shifts in the relations of production aimed at more and more profit for the few, and which results in more and more immiseration for the many**. There is thus considerable purchase in Zeus Leonardo’s (2004) attempt to ‘integrate Marxist objectivism and race theory’s focus on subjectivity’, a move that works to ensure that the CRT concept of ‘voice’ does not drift into postmodern ‘multivocality’ (multiple voices) where everyone’s opinion has equal worth and therefore ‘voice’ becomes thoroughly depoliticized (Maisuria, 2006). In summary, **I must reject the insistence of CRT to valorize ‘race’ over class. Marxism has the crucial benefit of contextualizing practices in capitalist relations of production. It gives priority to the abolition of class society because without its demise, racism** (**as well as other forms of discrimination) is likely to continue it in its various guises**. In contemporary societies, we are in many ways being globally miseducated. The Bush and Blair administrations’ propaganda war about ‘weapons of mass destruction’, aimed at masking new imperialist designs and capital’s global quest for imperial hegemony and oil, was a key example. Conditioning the discourse is only half the story. ‘Education’ has become a key component in the profit-making process itself. Tied to the needs of global, corporate capital, ‘education’ worldwide has been reduced to the creation of a flexible workforce, the openly acknowledged, indeed lauded (by both capitalists and politicians) requirement of today’s global markets. Corporate global capital is in schools, in the sense of both determining the curriculum and exercising burgeoning control of schools as businesses. An alternative vision of education is provided by Peter McLaren. Education should, McLaren argues, following Paulo Freire, put ‘social and political analysis of everyday life at the centre of the curriculum’ (McLaren, 2003: xxix). Racism should be a key component in such an analysis. Following through the thrust of this article, I would argue that, **in order for racism to be understood, and, in order for strategies to be developed to undermine it, there is a need first to reintroduce the topic of imperialism in schools**; **second to initiate in schools a thorough analysis of the manifestations of xeno-racism and xeno-racialization**. I deal with each in turn. The reintroduction of the teaching of imperialism in schools Anti-imperialism is one of Chávez’s main platforms. As he remarked in 2003: In Venezuela, we are developing a model of struggle against neoliberalism and imperialism. For this reason, we find we have millions of friends in this world, although we also have many enemies. (cited in Contreras Baspineiro, 2003)13 I have dealt with the teaching of imperialism in schools at length elsewhere (e.g. Cole, 2004c, 2008a). Here I make a few general points**. Reintroducing the teaching of imperialism in schools**, I believe, **would be far more effective than CRT in increasing awareness of racism, and crucially linking racism to capitalist modes of production**. **Students will need skills to evaluate the New Imperialism and ‘the permanent war’ being waged** by the US with the acquiescence of Britain. Boulangé (2004) has argued that it is essential, with the Bush and Blair ‘war on terror’, and Islamophobia worldwide reaching new heights, for teachers to show solidarity with Muslims, for ‘this will strengthen the unity of all workers, whatever their religion’ (Boulangé, (2004: 24), and **this will have a powerful impact on the struggle against racism in all spheres of society, and education in particular. In turn, this will strengthen the confidence of workers and students to fight on other issues**. **According to the neoconservative**, Niall **Ferguson** (2003): **Empire is as ‘cutting edge’ as you could wish** . . . [It] has got everything: economic history, social history, cultural history, political history, military history and international history – not to mention contemporary politics (just turn on the latest news from Kabul). **Yet it knits all these things together with . . . a ‘metanarrative**’. For Marxists, **an understanding of the metanarrative of imperialism, past and present, does much more than this. Indeed, it encompasses but goes beyond the centrality of ‘racial’ liberation in CRT theory. It takes us to the crux of the trajectory of capitalism from its inception right up to the 21st century; and this is why Marxists should endorse the teaching of imperialism old and new**. Of course, the role of education in general, and teaching about imperialism in schools in particular, has its limitations and young people are deeply affected by other influences and socialized by the media, parents/carers and by peer culture (hence the need for media awareness **Unlike Marxism, CRT does not explain why Islamophobia, the ‘war on terror’ and other forms of racism are necessary to keep the populace on task for ‘permanent war’ and the accumulation of global profits**. Teaching against xeno-racism and xeno-racialization **Marxism most clearly connects old and new imperialisms with capitalism. It also provides an explanation for xeno-racism and xeno-racialization**. **While CRT certainly reminds us that racism is central in sustaining the current world order**, and that we must listen to the voices of people oppressed on grounds of racism, **it does not and cannot make the necessary connections to understand and challenge this racism. Indeed**, as I have argued, **its advocacy of ‘white supremacy’ as an explanatory factor is counterproductive**, particularly, as I have argued, in the school and university context, **in the struggle against racism**. Xeno-racism and xeno-racialization in the UK and the rest of Europe need to be understood in the context of the origins of the EU, and globalization generally. With respect to the EU’s current enlargement, connections need to be made between the respective roles of (ex-)imperial citizens in the immediate post-Second World War period, and migrant workers from Eastern Europe today (both sources of cheap labour). An analysis of the way in which the media portrays asylum seekers and refugees, on the one hand, and migrant workers, on the other, would also foster an awareness of the processes of xeno-racism and xeno-racialization. Alternatives to neoliberal global capitalism Chávez devoted a call-in television programme on 15 May 2005 to education. In direct contrast to the US and the UK view that we should teach the entrepreneurial culture in schools, for Chávez there is a new educational model: competition and individualism in schools must give way to unity and solidarity: ‘We are all a team, going along eliminating little by little the values or the anti-values that capitalism has planted in us from childhood’ (Chávez, cited in Whitney, 2005). No space in the education systems of the US or the UK is provided for a discussion of alternatives to neoliberal global capitalism, such as world democratic socialism. Marxists should agitate for the (totally democratic) suggestion that such discussions should take place in schools, colleges and universities. CONCLUSION In this debate article, I have argued that **CRT is theoretically inadequate, both in its advocacy of ‘white supremacy’ and in its prioritizing of ‘race’ over class as the primary contradiction in capitalist society**, to explain everyday racist and xeno-racist occurrences in capitalist societies. I have suggested that **CRT’s promotion of the ‘abolition of whiteness’ is extremely problematic, particularly in the context of education in schools**. I have further tried to demonstrate that **an anti-racist/anti-imperialist Marxism is possible**, and have commended 21st-century Venezuela as a way forward to an anti-racist socialist world. I have finally made some suggestions for practice in educational institutions. My intention has not been to question the ideological or political integrity of Critical Race Theorists, but to open up comradely discussion in the light of the recent entry of CRT into British academia. I welcome responses from Critical Race Theorists as to how we might move the debate forward in a productive anti-racist manner.

**Class is what defines the black body and creates the possibility for blackness**

**Johnson, 03**

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**Class represents a significant axis and divisiveness within black com munities**. Despite Stuart Hall’s assertion that ‘black’ is not the exclusive property of any particular social or any single discourse” and that “it has no necessary class belonging,” **there are those who trudge forward carrying the class card they believe guarantees their membership in authentic blackness.** As Martin Favor persuasively argues, “**authentic blackness is most often associated with the “folk” or the working-class black**.12 Moreover, art forms such as folklore and the blues that are associated with the black working class are also viewed as more genuinely black.’3 **This association of the folk with black authenticity necessarily renders the black middle class as inauthentic and apolitical. Indeed, over the years various black scholars, writers, and activists have located authentic blackness within poor and working-class black communities, suggesting,** according to Valerie Smith, **that the black working class “is an autonomous space, free of negotiations with hegemony, that contains the pure source of musical and spiritual culture and inspiration.** The black middle class, in contrast, is a space of pure compromise and capitulation, from which all autonomy disappears once it encounters hegemonic power”4

**Without a fundamental challenge to the ownership of production, all of their concern for overcoming structures of racial exploitation lapses back into reformism—we must take the lesson of MLK, who found that emancipation lies in revolution and freedom from necessity. Their concern for the effects of class oppression may be appealing but above all else we must remember that the fundamental point is to CHANGE it**

**Cole 9**

[Mike, Research Professor in Education and Equality, Head of Research and Director of the Centre for Education for Social Justice at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, Critical Race Theory in Education: A Marxist Response, 2009, Palgrave-McMillan, p. 49-52 //wyo-tjc]

Like Weberianism, post-structuralism, postmodernism, and transmodernism, **CRT appears to** me to **be ultimately lacking in a direction for moving humankind forward progressively**. As far as Weber is concerned, he believed that socialism would be even more rationalized, and bureaucratic than capitalism and thus more alienating. A common criticism of post-structuralism and postmodernism is that, in focusing on deconstruction, they have no solutions, while for transmodernist, Enrique Dussel, as noted in the Introduction to this volume, the solution is an ‘ex nihilo utopia’. CRT and Human Liberation Darder and Torres (2004, p. 98) observe, in the CRT view of education: ‘ “racial” liberation [is] embraced as not only the primary but as the most significant objective of any emancipatory vision of education in the larger society’ (ibid.). According to Krenshaw et al. (1995b, p. xiii) **Critical Race Theorists also share ‘an ethical commitment to human liberation’ but ‘often disagree among [themselves], over its specific direction’** (ibid.). **Thus often in CRT the solution is vague. To take an example**, introducing their edited collection, Critical Race Theory in Education, **Dixson and Rousseau** (2006b) **talk about ‘the struggle’** (pp. 2–3); ‘**a vision of hope for the future’** (p. 3); ‘**social action toward liberation and the end of oppression’** (p. 3); ‘**the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression’** (p. 4); and ‘the ultimate goal of CRT— social transformation’ (p. 7). To take another example, Dixson and Rousseau (2006, pp. 2–3) argue that ‘CRT scholars acknowledge the permanence of racism’ but that this should lead to ‘greater resolve in the struggle’. **They also refer to a** CRT **focus on ‘praxis’, which incorporates ‘a commitment not only to scholarship but also to social action toward liberation** and the end of oppression’ (p. 3). **They talk of ‘eliminating racial oppression as part of the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression’** (p. 4), and state that the ‘ultimate goal of CRT [is] social transformation’**. However, no indication is given of what they are struggling towards, what liberation means to them, or what is envisioned by social transformation and the end of all forms of oppression**. **Mills is somewhat clearer**. As we saw in chapter 2 of this volume, for him (1997, p. 111) ‘[w]hite Marxism [is] predicated on colorless classes in struggle’. **He argues that if socialism is to come then ‘white supremacy**/ majoritarian domination’ **must be overthrown first** in ‘the struggle for social democracy’. Only after ‘white supremacy’ has been overthrown, and ‘social democracy’ established is the next stage—socialism—possible. **This seems to be in line with Mills’ argument that ‘a non-white-supremacist capitalism is morally and politically preferable to . . . white-supremacist capitalism’** (reiterated in Pateman and Mills, 2007, p. 31 and Mills, 2007, p. 243), **something with which I would totally concur. However, given the massive advantages to capitalism of racialized capitalism, capitalism without racism (or sexism) is almost inconceivable**. **Whether**, in the light of the current ‘credit crunch’ (a euphemism for the inherent contradictions in capitalism) **capitalist politicians globally will adopt long-term a more ‘social democratic’ as opposed to ‘neoliberal’ form** (they have already adopted interventionist measures in the short-term) **remains to be seen**. Certainly a number of commentators are urging this (e.g., Elliott, 2008; Irvin, 2008). **Whatever happens, it is Marxism**, I believe, **that provides the possibility of a viable equitable future**. In chapter 7, I posited developments in South America, specifically Venezuela, as providing one possible future direction for twenty-first-century socialism. Though currently a capitalist state, with a government enacting social democratic measures, Chávez is promoting socialist values and forms of organization. In the barrios of Caracas, and everywhere else where the poor live, and the spark of socialism has been lit, people are not celebrating Max Weber or post-structuralism; they are not embracing postmodernism, transmodernism or Critical Race Theory (for these are largely academic pursuits). Instead they are engaging with the possibility of a practical democratic socialism, a socialism that is truly inclusive, with respect to ‘race’, but also with respect to gender, sexual orientation, disability, age and other forms of exploitation and oppression. **It is worth recalling that,** at the beginning of this volume, I recounted that **one of the people cited** by Delgado and Stefancic (2001, p. 4) **as being influential in the genesis of CRT was that tireless and irrepressible campaigner against racism, Martin Luther King Jr.** At the time of writing (Summer 2008), it is the fortieth anniversary of King’s assassination. King, a reformer, pacifist and Baptist minister rather than a revolutionary socialist (Martin, 2008a), is quite accurately known for his gradualism and his reformism. However**, it is significant that in the year preceding his death King became notably radicalized.** Charles Steele, 2008 president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (King was the first president) has emphasized that, **towards the end of his life, King had moved on from purely ‘racial’ issues, and that his final campaigns were focused on fighting poverty and on labor disputes** (cited in Harris, 2008).1 Steele believes that **King**, who came to Memphis in 1968 in support of striking workers (Harris, 2008), ‘**was killed [there] because he had started to focus on poor folks, regardless of their colour’** (cited in ibid.). As Jerald Podair puts it, **‘[i]f you thought having a talk about race was difficult in America, then having one about class is even harder’** (cited in ibid.). Paul Harris (2008) concludes that ‘**40 years ago King tried to start that debate as well. A bullet cut short his ambitions’** (Harris, 2008).2 **The implications** for the subject matter of this book **are clear. As long as CRT centralizes ‘race’ rather than class, and as long as it voices no serious challenge to United States and world capitalism, it will be tolerated**. As Roland Sheppard (2006, p. 7) notes, Martin Luther **King had a different perspective at the time of his death to the 1963 ‘I have a dream’ speech**: ‘**he had begun to view the struggle for equality as an economic struggle and the capitalist economic system as the problem’**. **As King**, who by 1967 believed that the total elimination of poverty was now a practical responsibility (Sheppard, 2006, p. 8), **put it** in a speech to the SCLC in August, 1967: We’ve got to begin to ask questions about the whole society. We are called upon to help the discouraged beggars in life’s marketplace. But **one day we must come to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring**. **It means that questions must be raised. ‘Who owns this oil? . . . Who owns the iron ore? . . . Why is it that people have to pay water bills in a world that is twothirds water?’** (cited in Sheppard, 2006, p. 8) However, perhaps Martin Luther King’s most unequivocal declaration of a firm change of direction came earlier, in remarks to his staff at the SCLC on November 14, 1966. King proclaimed that the civil rights reforms of the early 1960s ‘were at best surface changes’ that were ‘limited mainly to the Negro middle class’. He went on to add that demands must now be raised to **abolish poverty (cited in Martin, 2008a): You can’t talk about solving the economic problem of the Negro without talking about billions of dollars. You can’t talk about ending the slums without first saying profit must be taken out of slums. You’re really tampering and getting on dangerous ground because you are messing with folk then. You are messing with captains of industry . . . . Now this means that we are treading in difficult water, because it really means that we are saying that something is wrong . . . with capitalism . . . . There must be a better distribution of wealth and maybe America must move toward a democratic socialism. (cited in The Democratic Socialists of Central Ohio, 2008)3 Classism or Marxism and Democratic Socialism? David Gillborn (2008, p. 13) may be right when he asserts that ‘the best critical race theorists are passionate about . . . classism’. But while challenging the oppression of people that is based on their social class (classism) is extremely important, and is championed by Marxists, *the fundamental point is to also challenge the exploitation of workers at the point of production, for therein lies the economic relationship that sustains and nurtures the capitalist system*.**

# 1NR

## Case

#### Theraputic Arguments Combined with Competition Nullify Solvency and Are a Dead End

Zompetti 04

[Joseph P. Zompetti (Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University) “PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY” September  2004   Contemporary Argumentation and Debate volume 25, \\wyo-bb]

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to get at these questions during a collegiate debate round. Not only is the limited time in a round an impediment at answering these complex questions, but both debaters of a single team may advance different personalized arguments, creating a moving target of advocacy that the opposing team and judges have difficulty in specifically pinning down for thorough and productive examination. Or, as Cloud suggests, **such therapeutic arguments "deflect** [sic] **the energy and radicalism of activists," essentially creating a shell-game during private discussions of much larger societal problems** (1998, p. 34). In addition, **these questions are often skirted in debate rounds because there is a drive for competition. While some critical self-reflection has undoubtedly occurred as a result of personalizing debate, the overwhelming majority of debaters and coaches spend less time thinking about the core problems of marginalization** (and their solutions) **than they do locating debate strategies to beat personalization arguments at the next tournament.** **During** squad **meetings and coaching sessions**, **one does not hear an opposing team sincerely talk about their privilege or the exclusion of women or people of color in the debate community. Instead, one hears about what topicality argument, framework argument, or counter-narrative will be deployed to win the judge's ballot.** The problem **of therapeutic rhetoric underscores how personalized debating prevents examination** of more **important factors such as resource disparity**. Thus, the underlying **therapeutic nature of personalized debate, coupled with the competitive component** of trying to win debate rounds **nullifies any chance at a fruitful and productive discussion about the problems** of marginalization and their potential solutions. A **focus on the** **personal** – my experience, my narrative, my feelings, how I learn, how I can engage the community – **is quite seductive**; we all want to know how we fit into the larger structure of the community. And, given the intense nature of our activity, it is easy to get lost in how our feelings of hard work, emotional attachment, anxiety, despair, excitement, success, and so on become interfaced with larger community trends. **Ultimately, however, a focus on the personal is a dead-end. The community's composition of multiple persons, who become focused on themselves, ignores the community at large.** This can be seen with the move toward personalizing debating. **Instead of examining problems of resource disparity (high costs of travel, scholarships, lack of novice tournaments, disparate coaching staffs, etc.) which plague debaters and debate programs throughout the country**, 1 the **personalization arguments focus on different styles of debating** (slow vs. fast, hip-hop vs. traditional evidence), **individual identity** (black vs. white, privileged vs. marginalized), **and praxis** (I'm doing something about the problem vs. you're not). Indeed, as Cloud argues, the "**privatizing, normalizing, and marginalizing discourses of the therapeutic are incompatible with a public-, policy-, and change-oriented definition of politics**" (1998, p. 7).

#### Individual solutions to fix the community lead to piecemeal solutions that erode solvency

Zompetti 04

[Joseph P. Zompetti (Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University) “PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY” September  2004   Contemporary Argumentation and Debate volume 25, \\wyo-bb]

The **second major problem with this turn in contemporary policy debate is its deflection, if not downright rejection, of more fundamental or core problems which are the cause of marginalization**. Dana Cloud (1998) poignantly argues that when **focusing on the personalizing of "debating," society stifles dissent, which is probably more important and powerful at ushering-in social change than particularized attention to therapeutic, albeit victimized, perspectives**. The will to engage in discourse about transgression is one of **individualized therapy, as if the individual's psychological condition is at stake** (e.g., arguments about "discursive violence" are often deployed to this end). Her argument is primarily one about key progressive change – should we focus on individual notions of psychological distress or the larger group's problem of resource-based scarcity and exploitation**? If one is compelled by the argument that we should look self-reflexively** 2 **and comprehensively at the nature of excluding debaters of color and other marginalized groups, then we might be tempted to agree with the outcome of piecemeal solutions and incoherent policies.** On the other hand, we may want to analyze how such relationships occurred and grew when other relationships and situations were not as obvious. In fact, we may want to even broaden our interpretation of such relationships – exactly how are students of color marginalized? Why do folks believe they have nothing to contribute? Why do students of color feel excluded?

#### Sites of change can exist if the COMMUNITY changes- Banquets First Day Solves

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[Jarrod & Edward, Assistant Professor at Wake Forest and Professor at University of Georgia, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future”, The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, 2009, pp. 317-334//wyo-bb]

Tournaments that already have **banquets scheduled present an easy opportunity for the beginnings of community discussion.** The majority of these **tournaments have banquets after the end of the preliminary rounds. Traditionally, the banquets serve as a place for announcing speaker awards and teams clearing to the elimination debates.** It would be difficult to use this time for a community discussion because debaters are tired after two strenuous days of debate. **Those debaters who are clearing to the elimination rounds are often concerned about getting enough sleep and preparing for their potential opponents. Tournaments, however, that already have allocated resources for having a banquet could consider moving the banquet to the end of the first day of preliminary debates. There are two primary advantages to moving the banquet to the end of the first day.** First, because **most tournaments use preset pairings on the first day of preliminary debates, the day ends much earlier. The second day requires more time to pair a tournament**, and the judges often require more time to decide debates. **Moving the banquet would mean that debaters and directors would have more time to enjoy the meal and engage in a community discussion**. As currently scheduled, banquets are put on hold while tabulation rooms attempt to determine speaker awards and teams clearing to the elimination rounds. Moving the banquet means that debaters can get to bed earlier on the second night after the preliminary debates are finished. **Second, by moving the banquet and centering it on a forum for community concerns, the tournament increases the people who are exposed to the discussion**. Most people attend the banquets for a variety of different reasons; having the community discussion over prepaid food increases the participation of the entire community. **Hosting a voluntary forum would be less likely to attract as many participants as having the discussion at the banquet. Using tournaments with banquets for a community forum is the easiest scenario because the money and time have been set aside already for everyone to gather together. Under our proposal, the banquet would mean more than eating and finding out the results of the preliminary debates.** The **banquet would be a place forum for a variety of potential topics, including invited speakers, public debates, or just public discussions of community concerns. We suggest moving the banquet, but tournaments may prefer to start small and test the idea of the forum first**.

#### Voluntary Meeting Time

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[Jarrod & Edward, Assistant Professor at Wake Forest and Professor at University of Georgia, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future”, The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, 2009, pp. 317-334//wyo-bb]

Scenario Two: **Voluntary Meeting Time Tournaments have the opportunity to schedule a voluntary meeting time that is announced to all the participants in advance of the tournamen**t.2 The major advantage to this type of voluntary forum is that the people who attend are generally motivated to try and make a difference in the community. **The major disadvantage to this type of voluntary forum is that the people who do not attend are not exposed to the concerns about their community. However, some form of community discussion is better than not attempting anything at all.** The lessons learned from the past meetings are that it is important to publicize the forum well in advance, **find a space that is large enough to accommodate the audience, and set aside enough time for people to have dinner before coming to the forum**.

Personalized debate leads to Closeting the issue, Not solving it or leading to a Revolution of community change

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There is no question that **individualized and personalized questions of debate style are important to examine** – some debaters learn better through different styles and some styles are more exciting than others. And, if those are the questions the community wants to ask and deal with, then so be it. However, **if we are serious about creating a climate of tolerance, respect and diversity, then much deeper, structural** (i.e., not personalized) issues must be addressed first. We would do well to note Rogers et al., who argue: **The forensic community has made significant progress over the past few years towards understanding the complexities of the differing presentational styles**, argument forms and analysis of subdominant cultural groups hoping to bridge the **gap between understanding, tolerance and both significant representation and participation in debate. None would argue against the goal of significant inclusiveness and its overall contribution to the pedagogy of a complete forensic experience resulting in education.** In spite of our efforts, the participation and success rates for women and minorities within intercollegiate, competitive debate remain disparagingly low (2003, p. 2). As such, the problems of **diversity and privilege in the debate community cannot be addressed in individual debate rounds, particularly through arguments about "nontraditional" evidence, argumentative style and cultural forms of learning**. **The highly personalized nature of such arguments creates feelings of victimhood.** The competitive aspect of a debate round makes the therapeutic rhetoric of argumentative style displace the larger, structural impediments to a diverse and tolerant community. Again, if we refer to Cloud, we can translate her use of "private" for a "debate round," particularly if we juxtapose the private debate round to the community writ large: . . . **the therapeutic is a rhetoric that encourages a reformist rather than revolutionary political stance** . . . . **It is dangerous** . . . **to allow the therapeutic to set the bounds of our political imagination to the extent that it becomes difficult even to conceive of revolutionary change** . . . **the therapeutic asks activists to retreat from the public struggle for even modest reforms in favor of private wound-licking** (1998, pp. 159-160). And this is what personalizing debating does. **While projects** such as Louisville's **declare ambitions of "community change" and radical social transformation, what they are really doing is keeping such arguments in the closet by performing their therapeutic rhetoric of victimhood in private debate rounds. If revolutionary change is the intent, then revolutionary action should occur to change the structural and institutional barriers to more diverse involvement and success in debate** (Cloud, 1998, p. 166). Personalizing debating, as competitive arguments, in a private debate round does nothing except breed frustration, victimage, and displacement of more lofty efforts. **Debate should remain a simulated activity where students gather together to clash about issues of social controversy related to a resolution**. During the simulation, **debaters learn to engage each other with civility, obtain vital skills,** 1 and **engage about a common societal problem, rather than personalized problems that may or may not be a reflection of larger community issues**. If there are problems about who gets to participate, what topic gets debated, or what styles of debate get introduced, then those are issues the community as a whole needs to address, not the individual debaters.

#### Those who lose are mere Sacrificial lambs because of Win/Loss, not tokens of Change

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The final problem with **an individual debate round focus is the role of competition**. **Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the "community" portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning** debates. What is clear, **however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates**. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, **this is rarely a productive tension**. **Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community**. However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because its director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because its *coach or* director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? **Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the "debate as activism" perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change.** One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a **judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem**. Under this scenario, **the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem,** because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. **There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem**. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents' academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.

1. ### “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision

   Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

   Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

   And Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan  
   American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)  
   should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Federal government is the central government in Washington DC  
   Encarta Online 2005,   
     
   United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United

   States is centered in Washington, D.C. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)