# 1NC

## T

#### Interpretation: the plan must substantially reduce restrictions on, and/or substantially increase financial incentives.

#### Reduce means make smaller

Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law 96

<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/reduce>.

to make smaller

#### Reduce means make smaller

WordNet 8

<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/reduce>.

make smaller; "reduce an image"

#### Restrictions in the context of coal are legal requirements that either preclude, delay or increases the cost of actual coal mining- they say mining. NOT the increase or decrease.

US DOE 7

[Depts of Energy, Agriculture and Interior, Inventory of Assessed Federal Coal Resources and Restrictions to Their Development, August 2007, p. <http://www.fossil.energy.gov/epact/epact437_final_rpt.pdf> //wyo-tjc]

The restrictions that constrain access to Federal lands are frequently a complex set of requirements that can preclude mining or increase costs and delay activity in order to achieve other important policy objectives, such as environmental protection and maximizing public benefi t from revenues in return for rights to extract resources from Federal lands. Restrictions and impediments include areas unavailable for leasing and areas where the coal can be leased, but with no surface mining allowed. There are also limitations on activities due to a variety of environmental considerations, typically manifested as leasing restrictions. Section 437 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required a study, as a cooperative effort between Department of Energy, Department of the Interior (DOI), and Department of Agriculture (USDA), which was to include an analysis of coal resources for Federal lands in the United States. The text of Section 437 is set forth below

**Violation:** the plan eliminates conditions which are not related to the COST of coal mining. .

#### This is bad because explodes the topic. To many affs for the neg to prep for.

####  Means the neg will just run generic strategy,

####  Destroy education and topic specific debate

#### Voter Education.

## DA

### 1NC: Middle East War Module

#### Republicans will make deals on sequester now, calculus has changed post Obama’s reelection, but his political capital is key

Kaletsky, 1/23

[Anatole, Economist and journalist, “Cooperation isn’t coming to Washington – it’s already arrived,” Reuters, January 23, 2013, <http://blogs.reuters.com/anatole-kaletsky/2013/01/23/cooperation-isnt-coming-to-washington-its-already-arrived/> //uwyo-baj]

Before the election, Republicans and their business backers had two overriding reasons to obstruct any deals with Obama on borrowing, spending or taxes. First, most Republicans genuinely expected to win the presidential election and therefore had every incentive to defer important decisions until their man was in power. Secondly, they calculated that any collateral damage inflicted on the economy through fiscal warfare would harm the incumbent president, whose Achilles’ heel was economic policy. Once the election was over, this calculus completely changed. Having failed to unseat Obama, Republicans were suddenly in a situation where sabotaging the economy was no longer in their interests. As I argued immediately after the election, and again during the fiscal cliff negotiations, the GOP had few incentives after Nov. 7 to just thwart Obama. Republicans now had to persuade voters that their policies would promote jobs and growth — and would do so immediately, not in some distant future when budgets would have to balance or else the United States would turn into Greece. The election also changed motivations for the Republicans’ business supporters. Instead of viewing Washington gridlock as a weapon for defeating Obama, American businesses after the election had to accept the inevitable. They would have to live with Obama and his policies, however much they disliked them. For most U.S. businesses, the primary political consideration was no longer the ideological debate over taxing and spending, but a purely economic issue: How would the economic policies negotiated between the White House and Congress affect business conditions in the four years leading to 2016? This gestalt shift implies that Republicans are unlikely to press very hard for large-scale spending cuts, government layoffs or fiscal tightening that could be seen as harming economic recovery. Instead the focus should move to long-term budget reforms, designed to take effect only after the economy has largely recovered in 2015 or so – conveniently beyond the next congressional elections. The president will have strong incentives to cooperate with such gradual fiscal consolidation, with major budget cuts backloaded to the last years of his administration and beyond. He would rather go down in history as the man who delivered universal healthcare, saved the U.S. economy from its worst crisis since the Great Depression, and put U.S. fiscal policy on a sustainable footing than waste his entire second term haggling over budgets – especially since achieving fiscal austerity does not require any major cuts or austerity, except in the very long term. In fact, the White House has already said it will offer some long-term entitlement reforms as part of the bipartisan budget deal that now looks eminently attainable. This may infuriate left-wing Democrats, but Obama is unlikely to care much, now that he has been reelected. In any case, grassroots Democratic voters will probably care more about presidential efforts on gun control, immigration and climate change than about wonkish arguments over Chained CPI and Medicare spending caps in the next decade. Why then has there been little discussion of this change in political dynamics? Probably because the media mostly see it as their role to magnify political drama rather than to analyze how they are likely to be resolved. The same applies to many professional politicians. Extreme statements from both parties will always attract the most media attention. The congressional arithmetic, however, means that the views of radicals, highlighted by the media, are no longer very important. In the House, the minority Democrats can pass important votes, such as a budget compromise, with just 20 votes from moderate Republicans eager to compromise. The same applies in the Senate, where the Democrats can lose several of their left-wing caucuses but still easily pass a compromise bill. What matters in this situation is not how most Republicans vote but whether 20 moderates can be found to back a bill to raise taxes, passed mainly by the Democrats. Most likely the Republican leadership would tacitly even encourage and support this handful of defectors, who would allow their party to foster an image of reasonableness and compromise while forcing the Democrats to carry the entire responsibility for higher taxes.

#### Obama’s PC is high now, he will win key fights with GOP, but it is finite. The plan would regalvanize GOP oppsition and encourge them to dig in their heels on the budget

Tobin, 1/18

[Jonathan S., senior online editor of Commentary magazine, “Time-Out May Be the GOP’s Best Option,” Commentary, January 18, 2013, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/01/18/time-out-may-be-the-gop-best-option-debt-ceiling/> //uwyo-baj]

The top news out of the House Republican retreat in Williamsburg, Virginia is that the party is considering a short-term extension of the debt limit in order to give the party more time to try and convince their Democratic antagonists to start cutting spending. The proposal, which according to the New York Times, is being floated by Rep. Paul Ryan, could wind up connecting the debt ceiling issue with the deadline for the implementation of sequestration that would mandate devastating across-the-board spending cuts. That would theoretically give the GOP some room to maneuver in order to avoid a confrontation with President Obama that few think they would win. But it is hard to avoid the impression that the main object of a delay would be to deal with the Republicans’ biggest problems: a lack of unity. Like a sports team in disarray, the GOP needs a time out where they can catch their breath and somehow get on the same page with each other. As the votes over House Speaker John Boehner’s Plan B and then the final fiscal cliff deal revealed, the party is badly split between those who don’t want to give an inch on spending and taxes, those who think that compromise with the president is inevitable and those who believe the best the party can do is to speak out for its principles and oppose tactics that will blow up the economy and help demonize the party. But the problem for the Republican leadership is that even if they can buy themselves some more time to get their fractious caucus in line, the likelihood that a confident and aggressive President Obama will either accept a short-term extension or deal honestly with them on the issues. The argument for a time out is that in its current condition with a leadership that can’t count on its members to agree to back a unified strategy on fiscal issues, Republicans are doomed to defeat no matter what option they choose. The president is counting on the GOP splintering into warring factions and has done his best to help that process along by goading his opponents whenever possible including his stunning attack on them even as the two sides were negotiating a deal to prevent the nation from going over the fiscal cliff earlier this month. As Robert Costa and Andrew Stiles noted in their sum up from the retreat, even though Republicans remain in control of the House, the tone of the gathering was that of a defeated party searching for answers. Given the shock felt by many in the party over the president’s re-election and the beatings they’ve received over the debt ceiling and the fiscal cliff, that’s understandable. But Bill Kristol’s advice to them to “suck it up,” is exactly what they need to hear. I think those Republicans who want to make a stand on the debt ceiling are right. Even though the odds are against them prevailing in such a battle, the party can’t simply stand by and let President Obama off the hook without at least trying to stop him by whatever means are at their disposal. That sort of surrender would split the GOP and make it harder for them to recover at the next midterm. But the one given in this equation is that without a united caucus, House Republicans haven’t a prayer of doing anything effective to halt the country’s drift toward insolvency and to head off new taxes. For all of their pessimism, the GOP still controls the power of the purse. President Obama may have the wind at his back right now but his political capital is finite. So is his time. If conservatives can use the coming weeks to agree on a strategy to exploit his weaknesses — such as the division among Democrats and the president’s refusal to deal with entitlement reform — their position could be stronger than they think. The question is do Boehner, Eric Cantor or even Paul Ryan have the ability to convince their colleagues that if they don’t hang together, their hopes of stopping Obama from worsening the nation’s problems are nonexistent.

#### Sequestration devastates the economy, collapses heg, and culminates in Middle Eastern war

Hutchison 9/21

[Kay Bailey Hutchison,, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012 “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis]

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk. According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and a potentially catastrophic blow to our national defense and security capabilities in a time of increasing violence and danger. All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve. The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship. Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year. The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings. In the absence of U.S. military leadership, upheaval in the Middle East would be worse. As any student of history can attest, instability does not confine itself to national borders. Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region. Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological research, development and advantage - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities. Sequestration can still be avoided. But that will require leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Middle East goes nuclear

Russell 9

[James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf]

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

]y of saying, “Take a deep breath, Al.”

## K

#### THE ABSENCE OF STRUCTURAL HISTORICISM IS NO MERE OVERSIGHT, NOR IS IT ENOUGH TO SIMPLY MENTION ECONOMICS IN A FEW OF YOUR CARDS—THE RELIANCE OF INDENTY-BASED POLITICS IS NOT AN ACCIDENTAL INSTANCE OF IGNORING CLASS. ATTAINING WHITE, MALE BOURGEOISSE PRIVILEGE BECOMES THE BENCHMARK OF POLITICAL SUCCESS, REENTRENCHING THE FOUNDATION OF THE SYSTEM

BROWN (Professor & Genius) 1993

[Wendy, “Wounded Attachments”, Political Theory, Aug. p. 392-394//wyo-tjc]

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normalizing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "disciplinary power" produces social identifies (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdivided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal-the transparent fiction of state universality-combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices. As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of progressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bourgeois ideal as its measure. If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking

#### THE PRIVILEGING OF THE PARTICULAR AND THE DECENTERING OF SUBJECTIVITY NECESSARILY PRECLUDES A CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM BECAUSE IT DENIES THE VERY SYSTEM ITSELF

WOOD(Editor of Monthly Review) 1997

[Ellen Meiksins, “What is the Postmodern Agenda?”, In Defense of History, ed. Foster & Wood //wyo-tjc]

Not all intellectuals who think of themselves as "postmodernists" would knowingly subscribe to this kind of extreme epistemic relativism, even solipsism-though it seems an inevitable consequence of their epistemo- logical assumptions. But at the very least, postmodernism implies an em- phatic rejection of "totalizing" knowledge and of "universalistic" values-including Western conceptions of "rationality," general ideas of equality, whether liberal or socialist, and the Marxist conception of general human emancipation. Instead, postmodernists emphasize "difference": particular identities such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality; their various, particular, and separate oppressions and struggles; and particular "knowl- edges," including even sciences particular to ethnic groups. These basic principles imply that we must reject the left's traditional "economistic" concerns and forms of knowledge like political economy. We must, in fact, repudiate any "grand narratives," such as Western ideas of progress, including Marxist theories of history. All of these themes are typically lumped together in a denunciation of "reductionism," "founda- tionalism," or "essentialism"-of which Marxism is supposed to be a par- ticularly virulent strain, on the grounds that it allegedly reduces the varied complexity of human experience to a monolithic view of the world, "privi- leging" the mode of production as a historical determinant, class as against other "identities," and "economic" or "material" determinants as against the "discursive construction" of reality. This denunciation of "essentialism" tends to cover not just truly monolithic and simplistic explanations of the world (like Stalinist varieties of Marxism) but any kind of causal explanation. The meaning of postmodernist jargon should become clearer in the course of the articles that follow here; but for the moment, it should be obvious that the main thread running through all these postmodern principles is an emphasis on the fragmented nature of the world and of human knowledge. The political implications of all this are fairly clear: the human self is so fluid and fragmented (the "decentered subject"), and our identities are so vari- able, uncertain, and fragile, that there can be no basis for solidarity and collective action founded on a common social "identity" (such as class), a common experience, and common interests. Even in its least extreme manifestations, postmodernism insists on the impossibility of any emancipatory politics based on some kind of "totaliz- ing" knowledge or vision. Even an anticapitalist politics is too "totalizing" or "universalist." Capitalism as a totalizing system can hardly be said to exist at all in postmodern discourse, so that even the critique of capitalism is precluded. In fact, "politics" in any traditional sense of the word, having to do with the overarching power of classes or states and opposition to them, is effectively ruled out, giving way to the fractured struggles of "identity politics" or even the "personal as political." Although there are more uni- versal projects that do hold some attractions for the postmodern left, such as environmental politics, it is difficult to see how they-or, indeed, any political action-can be consistent with postmodernism's most fundamen- tal principles: a deep epistemological scepticism and a profound political defeatism.

#### THE AFFIRMATIVES FOCUS ON THE DISCURSIVE/SYMBOLIC REVEALS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY HAVE GIVEN UP ON ACTUALLY CHALLENGING THE STRUCTURES OF OPPRESSION. BUT FAR FROM BEING A POST-CAPITALIST AGE IN WHICH ALL SOCIAL EXPERIENCE IS TEXTUALLY OR DISCURSIVELY PRODUCED, IT IS A MATERIAL WORLD. ONLY A MATERIALIST METHOD CAN ACCOUNT FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH CERTAIN CLASSES CREATE AND DEPLOY RHETORIC TO LEGITIMIZE A CAPITALIST MODE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

CLOUD (Prof of Comm at Texas) 2001

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm //wyo-tjc]

At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomena. Most importantly, critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them. In poststructuralist discourse theory, the "retreat from class" (Wood, 1999) expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure at the level of the economy and the state. It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformation even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. At the core of the issue is a debate across the humanities and social sciences with regard to whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a great deal of evidence against claims that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, both class polarization (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor in the U.S. (as well as around the world) continued to grow, in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation and progressive critical practice in fact encourage scholars and/as activists to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and perhaps revolutionary potential. Instead, on their arguments, we must recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism. Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. The point, though, is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other. Marxist ideology critique, understands that classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience.Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144). Within this understanding, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details and representations of our lives. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges. (p. 7)

#### NEXT, THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—IT IS THIS LOGIC THAT MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE

DYER-WITHERFORD (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) 1999
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OR KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF LABOR AND SURPLUS VALUE MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION TO A SOCIETY BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

## CP

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should begin a process of negotiated rulemaking over [conditioning the production of coal upon the reclamation of land.] including an announced intention to no longer condition the production of coal upon the reclamation of land within a year and convene affected parties for binding mediation over the substance of this policy. We’ll clarify.

#### Counterplan competes: The counterplan and the plan are mutually exclusive. The counterplan is not “resolved” - Dictionary.com defines resolved as a “definite course of action” –, because regulatory negotiations allow involved parties to amend or nullify the affirmative’s regulation.

#### It doesn’t fiat topical action. The process is uncertain and open-ended — mutually exclusive with the plan.

Endelman 3 (Gary, “Go as Far as You Can: How Negotiated Rulemaking in Immigration Benefits America: Part 2 of 2” July 18th 2003)

Those who believe, as I do, that immigration is good for America have their principles right. Our challenge is to translate these principles into practice. If America is to move beyond paralysis and create a national immigration policy that works for all of us, we who most champion immigration must engage in the down and dirty work of building true alternatives to traditional rulemaking. Right now, there is such a balance of will between competing factions, the forces for and against positive change are so evenly balanced, that only a third way with absolute clarity of vision can chart a path forward towards sustainable compromise. Negotiated rulemaking is that third way. Absent this, precisely because any meaningful progress seems so remote, ideological combatants shrink back from assuming the very real risks that progress demands

#### Counterplan solves:

#### Reg-neg is a better competitive alternative to top-down regulatory changes – builds consensus that solves court clog, enforcement costs, clarity, and corruption.

CNA, Center for Negotiation Analysis, not-for-profit research institute established in 1993 devoted to studying, training, and providingg practical advisory support concerning negotiations, mediation, and other forms of conflict resolution at the national, regional and international levels, “Regulatory Negotiations,” February 1, 2004, <http://www.negotiations.org/reg-neg1.htm>, accessed 9-12-2012.

The traditional process of regulatory development is typically top-down. Government initiates, formulates and proposes the rules. In centralized or closed systems, regulations are imposed; in more open systems, businesses, groups or individuals may comment on the proposals in public hearings, but with little possibility of making major structural and functional modifications to the regulations. This process, while well-intentioned, often leaves stakeholders feeling far removed from the process and disempowered. They may feel that they have minimal voice in designing the regulations, standards and provisions that must be obeyed, and, as a result, compliance may be low and enforcement costs high -- a double-edged sword.¶ Stakeholder reactions to top-down regulatory development can have negative implications. If penalties are increased to discourage noncompliance, businesses may migrate into a "shadow economy," thereby fueling corruption, reducing tax revenues and evading the regulatory regime altogether. In some societies, lengthy and costly litigation in the courts is sometimes pursued by civil society groups to modify or eliminate imposed regulations. Antagonistic and adversarial relations between regulatory agencies and the regulated parties may ensue, resulting in delay or outright disregard for the regulation’s intent. The lack of effective and frank dialogue between the regulators and the regulated is usually blamed for these negative consequences.¶ There is an alternative approach to the traditional process of regulatory formulation and implementation – negotiated rulemaking or regulatory negotiation (reg-neg). Negotiated rulemaking brings together affected stakeholder groups -- businesses, organizations, and citizens -- with the relevant government agency and a neutral mediator or facilitator to build a consensus on the features of a new regulation before it is proposed officially by the agency. Regulatory provisions are developed as a bottom-up participatory process of negotiation.¶ Negotiated rulemaking is a fully collaborative process, in which all interested groups are convened in an "Advisory Committee." Key issues and concerns are identified, the interests of all sides are compared and contrasted, negotiations take place, and hopefully, agreements based on consensus are developed.¶ In the United States, negotiated rulemaking became an officially recommended approach to develop new regulations by federal government agencies in 1990 when the Negotiated Rulemaking Act (5 U.S.C. 561-570) was passed by Congress. A September 1993 Executive Order from the White House requires all federal agencies to consider applying negotiated rulemaking strategies in future regulatory actions. However, the approach has been used informally by government agencies since the 1970s. The Department of Labor, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of the Interior, are its principal proponents. By far, the EPA has been the most frequent user of negotiated rulemaking. Over 50 federal negotiated rulemaking cases have been documented between 1982 and 1995; many more applications have been conducted in the United States at the state level . Examples of environmental regulations developed using negotiated rulemaking in the United States include:¶ Penalties for businesses for noncompliance with the Clean Air Act¶ Exceptions for licensing pesticides¶ Performance standards for wood burning stoves¶ Controls on volatile organic chemical equipment leaks¶ Standards for transporting hazardous wastes¶ Standards for chemicals used in manufacturing wood furniture.¶ The experience with negotiated rulemaking in the United States has produced several benefits:¶ While negotiated rulemaking takes more time and effort upfront than traditional modes of developing regulations, all the stakeholders, including government agencies, are more satisfied with the results. ¶ Participants find that with a negotiated process, the resulting regulations tend not to be challenged in court. (In contrast, about 80 percent of all EPA regulations have been challenged in court and about 30 percent have been changed as a result.)¶ Less time, money and effort are expended on enforcing the regulations.¶ Final regulations are technically more accurate and clear to everyone.¶ Final regulations can be implemented earlier and with a higher compliance rate.¶ More cooperative relationships are established between the agency and the regulated parties.

## Case

#### Technological thought inevitable

Kateb 97 (George, Prof of Philosophy @ Princeton, "Technology and Philosophy," Social Research, Fall, p. ebscohost)

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity -- and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives -- would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence.

#### The aff forgets Being when they engage in a totalizing account of technologization—abandoning empiricism and the traditional sciences is the only scenario for their impacts

Latour 93 -- Professor and vice-president for research at Sciences Po Paris (Bruno, We Have Never Been Modern, 66-7)

And yet - 'here too the Gods are present': in a hydroelectric plant on the banks of the Rine, in subatomic particles, in Adidas shoes as well as in the old wooden clogs hollowed out by hand, in agribusiness as well as in timeworn landscapes, in shopkeepers' calculations as well as in Holderlin's heartrending verse. But why do those philosophers no longer recognize them? Because they believe what the modern Constitution says about itself! This paradox should no longer astonish us. The moderns indeed declare that technology is nothing but pure instrumental mastery, science pure Enframing and pure Stamping [Das Ge-stell], that economics is pure calculation, that capitalism is pure reproduction, the subject pure consciousness. Purity is everywhere! They claim this, but we must be careful not to take them at their word, since what they are asserting is only half of the modern world, the work of purification that distils what the work of hybridization supplies.

Who has forgotten Being? No one, no one ever has, otherwise Nature would be truly available as a pure 'stock'. Look around you: scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects objects and discourse. Networks are full of Being. As for machines, they are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being lose its difference, its incompleteness, its mark, its trace of Being? This is never in anyone's power; otherwise we should have to imagine that we have truly been modern, we should be taken in by the upper half of the modern Constitution.

Has someone, however, actually forgotten Being? Yes: anyone who really thinks that Being has really been forgotten. As Levi-Strauss says, 'the barbarian is first and foremost the man who believe in barbarism.' (Levi-Strauss, [1952] 1987. p. 12). Those who have failed to undertake empirical studies of sciences, technologies, law, politics, economics, religion or fiction have lost the traces of Being that are distributed everywhere among beings. If, scorning empiricism, you opt out of the exact sciences, then the human sciences, then traditional philosophy, then the sciences of language, and you hunker down in your forest -- then you will indeed feel a tragic loss. But what is missing is you yourself, not the world! Heidegger's epigones have converted that glaring weakness into a strength. 'We don't know anything empirical, but that doesn't matter, since your world is empty of Being. We are keeping the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who have all the rest, have nothing.' On the contrary: we have everything, since we have Being, and beings, and we have never lost track of the difference between Being and beings. We are carrying out the impossible project undertaken by Heidegger, who believed what the modern Constitution said about itself without understanding that what is at issue there is only half of a larger mechanism which has never abandoned the old anthropological matrix. No one can forget Being, since there has never been a modern world, or, by the same token, metaphysics. We have always remained pre-Socratic, pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean. No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts, so there is no need for reactionary counter-revolutions to lead us back to what has never been abandoned. Yes, Heraclitus is a surer guide than Heidegger: 'Einai gar kai entautha theous.'

#### Their ontology first args are tautologies that stifle effective politics

Graham 2k -- Graduate School of Management, Queensland (P, Heidegger’s Hippies, http://www.philgraham.net/HH\_conf.pdf)

To state their positions more succinctly: ‘Heraclitus maintained that everything changes: Parmenides retorted that nothing changes’ (Russell 1946: 66). Between them, they delineated the dialectical extremes within which the “problem of the subject” has become manifest: in the extremes of questions about ontology, the nature of “Being”, or existence, or ‘Existenz’ (Adorno 1973: 110-25). Historically, such arguments tend towards internalist hocus pocus:

The popular success of ontology feeds on an illusion: that the state of the intentio recta might simply be chosen by a consciousness full of nominalist and subjective sediments, a consciousness which self-reflection alone has made what it is. But Heidegger, of course, saw through this illusion … beyond subject and object, beyond concept and entity. Being is the supreme concept –for on the lips of him who says “Being” is the word, not Being itself –and yet it is said to be privileged above all conceptuality, by virtue of moments which the thinker thinks along with the word “Being” and which the abstractly obtained significative unity of the concept does not exhaust. (Adorno 1973: 69)

Adorno’s (1973) thoroughgoing critique of Heidegger’s ontological metaphysics plays itself out back and forth through the Heideggerian concept of a universalised identity –an essentialist, universalised being and becoming of consciousness, elided from the constraints of the social world. Adorno’s argument can be summed up thus: there can be no universal theory of “being” in and of itself because what such a theory posits is, precisely, non-identity. It obscures the role of the social and promotes a specific kind of politics –identity politics (cf. also Kennedy 1998):

Devoid of its otherness, of what it renders extraneous, an existence which thus proclaims itself the criterion of thought will validate its decrees in authoritarian style, as in political practice a dictator validates the ideology of the day. The reduction of thought to the thinkers halts the progress of thought; it brings to a standstill would thought would need to be thought, and what subjectivity would need to live in. As the solid ground of truth, subjectivity is reified … Thinking becomes what the thinker has been from the start. It becomes tautology, a regressive form of consciousness. (Adorno 1973: 128).

Identity politics - the ontological imperative - is inherently authoritarian precisely because it promotes regression, internalism, subjectivism, and, most importantly, because it negates the role of society. It is simplistic because it focuses on the thingliness of people: race, gender, ethnicity. It tries to resolve the tension of the social-individual by smashing the problem into two irreconcilable parts. Identity politics’ current popularity in sociological thought, most wellevidenced by its use and popularity in “Third Way” politics, can be traced back to a cohort I have called Heidegger’s Hippies –the failed, half-hearted, would-be “revolutionaries” of the 60s, an incoherent collection of middle-class, neo-liberal malcontents who got caught up in their own hyperbole, and who are now the administrators of a ‘totally administered’ society in which hyperbole has become both lingua franca and world currency (Adorno 1964/1973 1973).

# 1NR

#### Extinction irreversible – their impacts aren’t

Jonas ’96 (Hans, Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich, “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

#### Extinction is the worst impact—prioritizing anything else puts the cart before the horse

Schell 1982

(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, The Fate of the Earth, pages 136-137 uw//wej)

Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that our species is the most important of all the things that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about ex- tinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives.

#### Scenario planning is possible in a catastrophe-ridden world—it’s vital to make predictions about the future.

Kurasawa, 04

 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Independently of this contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, “[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

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#### Focusing on metaphysics destroys progressive actions to solve the problem---technical fixes are key

Hayward 6—Senior Fellow, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy (Steven, The Fate of the Earth in the Balance, http://www.aei.org/article/society-and-culture/the-fate-of-the-earth-in-the-balance/)

This small example of environmental atavism reveals a more fundamental aspect of the public discourse about climate change. At the core of environmentalist animus against nuclear power is a categorical suspicion about technology itself, which is connected to a larger philosophical pessimism about human civilization and man’s supposed separation or alienation from nature. We have seen this style of argument during the long controversy over the arms race in the late stages of the Cold War, during which the immense political and technical aspects of the problem were, for a certain cast of mind, entirely subsumed beneath a more general critique of how the arms race was merely symptomatic of a larger crisis of civilization. Unless this larger crisis was addressed, it was suggested, there would be no hope the arms race could be solved.¶ It was not but twenty years ago that the large nuclear weapons arsenals of the superpowers threatened the instantaneous destruction of civilization and perhaps human life itself. Today, climate change is said to threaten the same things, only more slowly. It is remarkable how similarly the leading advocates for these two problems understand and conceptualize them. In the case of both the arms race then and climate change today, we are told that the issue is ultimately philosophical in nature, and that wholesale changes in our philosophical perspective must necessarily precede political and policy remedies to the problem. Should this perspective be taken seriously? What can it really mean?¶ The Fate of the Earth in the Balance¶ The peculiarity of this approach to major global problems is best seen by comparing the two leading popular books on each issue, Jonathan Schell’s 1982 bestseller The Fate of the Earth, and Al Gore’s 1991 bestseller Earth in the Balance (whose main arguments reappear in truncated form in An Inconvenient Truth). It is not just the titles that are strikingly similar; a close reading reveals the two books to be identical in their overarching philosophy.[5] In both, mankind is poised on the abyss, facing, in Gore’s words, “the most serious threat that we have ever faced,”[6] or “the nearness of extinction,”[7] to use only one of Schell’s many apocalyptic formulations. (An index entry--“despair; see also futility”[8]--conveys the mood better than any quotation from the main text.) In fact, if one substitutes “global warming” for “nuclear weapons” in the text of Fate of the Earth, the result is so shockingly close to Earth in the Balance that one could almost make out a case for plagiarism on Gore’s part. Perhaps some publisher will have the wit to meld the two books into one: The Fate of the Earth in the Balance.¶ But such a combination is not necessary. The two books directly intersect in several places. Gore writes, for example, that:¶ the political will that led to mass protests against escalating the arms race during the early 1980s came from a popular awareness that civilization seemed to be pulled toward the broad lip of a downslope leading to a future catastrophe--nuclear war--that would crush human history forever into a kind of black hole. . . . This is not unlike the challenge we face today in the global environmental crisis. The potential for true catastrophe lies in the future, but the downslope that pulls us toward it is becoming recognizably steeper with each passing year.[9]¶ In this, Gore was only returning the favor to Schell, who occasionally paused long enough from his lament over nuclear catastrophe to include a few nods to ecocatastrophe. For his part, Schell mentions “global heating through an increased ‘greenhouse effect,’” adding:¶ The nuclear peril is usually seen in isolation from the threats to other forms of life and their ecosystems, but in fact should be seen as the very center of the ecological crisis--as the cloud-covered Everest of which the more immediate, visible kinds of harm to the environment are the mere foothills. Both the effort to preserve the environment and the effort to save the species from extinction by nuclear arms would be enriched and strengthened by this recognition.[10]¶ Both books display an affectation for gilding their arguments with lots of brief references to major thinkers from a wide variety of disciplines. Consider Schell on Heisenberg:¶ The famous uncertainty principle, formulated by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg, has shown that our knowledge of atomic phenomena is limited because the experimental procedures with which we must carry out our observations inevitably interfere with the phenomena that we wish to measure.¶ Schell applies Heisenberg’s scientific insight to all forms of human investigation, writing that “a limit to our knowledge is fixed by the fact that we are incarnate beings, not disembodied spirits.”[11] The supposed separation from nature implied by Heisenberg’s idea limits our appreciation for both nature and our predicament.¶ Gore follows down the same track:¶ Earlier this century, the Heisenberg Principle established that the very act of observing a natural phenomenon can change what is being observed. Although the initial theory was limited in practice to special cases in subatomic physics, the philosophical implications were and are staggering. It is now apparent that since Descartes reestablished the Platonic notion and began the scientific revolution, human civilization has been experiencing a kind of Heisenberg Principle writ large. . . . [T]he world of intellect is assumed to be separate from the physical world.[12]¶ Gore opens his hit movie and companion book An Inconvenient Truth with an homage to the famous photo of the Earth taken from the moon by the Apollo 8 astronauts in 1968. This image, he tells us, played a key role in galvanizing the world’s environmental consciousness, underscoring the fragility of the planet. As he put it fulsomely in Earth in the Balance:¶ Those first striking pictures taken by the Apollo astronauts of the earth floating in the blackness of space were so deeply moving because they enabled us to see our planet from a new perspective--a perspective from which the preciousness and fragile beauty of the earth was suddenly clear.[13]¶ Schell uses the same trope:¶ As it happens, our two roles in the nuclear predicament have been given visual representation in the photographs of the earth that we have taken with the aid of another technical device of our time, the spaceship. These pictures illustrate, on the one hand, our mastery over nature, which has enabled us to take up a position in the heavens and look back on the earth as though it were just one more celestial body, and, on the other, our weakness and frailty in the face of that mastery, which we cannot help feeling when we see the smallness, solitude, and delicate beauty of our planetary home.[14]¶ These are only a few of the many examples that can be drawn of both books’ derivative and allusive nature. Both authors offer up references to Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Francis Bacon, Einstein, Descartes, and Hannah Arendt in what might be called, to paraphrase Arendt, the banality of promiscuous allusion, all to bolster a superficial philosophical or anthropological point that is far distant from the politics and policy of either issue.¶ Most troubling is that both authors depict dissent from their point of view to be a pathology of some kind, foreclosing that there could be any rational basis for a different point of view. Gore compares dissenters to his view of our environmental predicament to garden-variety substance abusers, arguing that people who are oblivious to our “collision” with nature are “enablers” who are “helping to ensure that the addictive behavior continues. The psychological mechanism of denial is complex, but again addiction serves as a model.”[15] Elsewhere Gore compares our “dysfunctional civilization” to dysfunctional families, whose members suffer from “a serious psychological disorder.” While Gore begins this discussion by saying that family dysfunctionality is a metaphor, he ends by applying the concept literally: “The model of the dysfunctional family has a direct bearing on our ways of thinking about the environment.”[16] Schell is close aboard: “A society that systematically shuts its eyes to an urgent peril to its physical survival and fails to take any steps to save itself cannot be called psychologically well.”[17]¶ Both authors call for making their particular issue the paramount global priority in the same terms. Gore argues that “we must make the environment the central organizing principle [emphasis added] for civilization. . . . [T]he tide in this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join in an all-out effort.”[18] Schell wrote, “If we felt the peril for what it is--an urgent threat to our whole human substance--we would let it become the organizing principle [emphasis added] of our global collective existence: the foundation on which the world was built.”[19]¶ Having laid the groundwork for a wholesale change in our priorities, both Schell and Gore are surprisingly light on the social and political architecture of their alternative world. This is explicitly so in Schell’s case: “I have not sought to define a political solution to the nuclear predicament. . . . I have left to others those awesome, urgent tasks.”[20] Gore’s approach is better supported; he offers a laundry list of specific policy recommendations mostly on energy and resource use, but it falls far short of his desired “wrenching transformation” of civilization. If the broader solution to our predicament is not clear even in outline, it is because neither author fully grasps the magnitude of the critique he is making, such that a political solution--at least, a solution that is compatible with liberal democracy--is impossible. Neither man understands why.¶ The Real Source for The Fate of the Earth in the Balance¶ Despite the parade of quotes and references from Plato and Arendt, there is one thinker conspicuously absent from both Schell and Gore’s numerous citations but whose spirit is present on almost every page of both books: Martin Heidegger. Perhaps the absence of a reference to Heidegger is due to reticence or discretion, given Heidegger’s dubious and complicated association with Nazism. Nothing derails an argument faster than playing the reductio ad Hitlerum card. More likely it is the abstruse and difficult character of Heidegger’s arguments; Gore and Schell may not realize how closely the core of their argument about the technological alienation of man from nature tracks Heidegger’s more thorough account in his famous 1953 essay “The Question Concerning Technology.”[21]¶ Heidegger asks, “What is modern technology?” His understanding of technology is sometimes rendered in translation as “technicity” to convey a defective way of knowing about phenomena, and to distinguish the term from its more common usage to mean mere scientific instrumentality (think gadgets). Heidegger believed that our mode of objectifying nature alienates mankind from perceiving and contemplating pure “Being.” Whatever this may mean--and even Heidegger’s followers admit it is obscure (Heidegger himself wrote that “we are asking about something which we barely grasp”[22])--Heidegger suggests that philosophy has been asking the wrong questions since the very beginning, and the culmination of this wrong track is modern technology, which completes the alienation of man from nature. This is where Heidegger prepares the way for Gore.¶ Modern technology, according to Heidegger,¶ puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. . . . The earth now reveals itself as a coal-mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears different from how it did when to set in order still meant to take of and maintain. . . . But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [italics in original] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use.[23]¶ Here are Gore’s parallel passages:¶ [O]ur civilization is holding ever more tightly to its habit of consuming larger and larger quantities every year of coal, oil, fresh air and water, trees, topsoil, and the thousand other substances we rip from the crust of the earth. . . . We seem increasingly eager to lose ourselves in the forms of culture, society, technology, the media, and the rituals of production and consumption, but the price we pay is a loss of our spiritual lives.[24]¶ And:¶ Our seemingly compulsive need to control the natural world . . . has driven us to the edge of disaster, for we have become so successful at controlling nature than we have lost our connection to it.[25]¶ It is possible to compile a long inventory of close parallels between Heidegger and Gore. For example, Heidegger told interviewers in 1966:¶ [T]echnicity increasingly dislodges man and uproots him from the earth. . . . The last 30 years have made it clearer that the planet-wide movement of modern technicity is a power whose magnitude in determining [our] history can hardly be overestimated.[26]¶ Heidegger also found the earth-from-space photos as affecting as Gore and Schell:¶ I don’t know if you were shocked, but [certainly] I was shocked when a short time ago I saw the pictures of the earth taken from the moon. We do not need atom bombs at all [to uproot us]--the uprooting of man is already here. All our relationships have become merely technical ones. It is no longer upon an earth than man lives today.[27]¶ Gore likes to cite the supposed proverb that the Chinese symbol for “crisis” also means “opportunity.” Heidegger was fond of quoting a line from the German poet Hölderlin: “Where danger lies, there too grows the chance for salvation.” And is it necessary to mention that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle also shows up for duty in Heidegger’s essay on technology? Heidegger is often said to have advocated a return to pre-Socratic philosophy, though in fact he was skeptical that there was any philosophical solution to the problem he perceived. Gore follows Heidegger closely when he criticizes Plato and the Western philosophic tradition for preparing the ground for modern man’s estrangement from nature:¶ The strange absence of emotion, the banal face of evil so often manifested by mass technological assaults on the global environment, is surely a consequence of the belief in an underlying separation of intellect from the physical world. At the root of this belief lies a heretical understanding of humankind’s place in the world as old as Plato, as seductive in its mythic appeal as Gnosticism, as compelling as the Cartesian promise of Promethean power--and it has led to tragic results.[28]¶ Political Implications¶ Assuming for the purposes of discussion that Gore’s Heideggerian analysis is correct, can a reconnection of intellect and the physical world be accomplished through politics--or led by politicians? Heidegger did not think so, which is why he said it would be impossible for him to write an ethical or political treatise.[29] He doubted democracy offered any hope. In an interview late in life, Heidegger said, “For me today it is a decisive question as to how any political system--and which one--can be adapted to an epoch of technicity. I know of no answer to this question. I am not convinced that it is democracy.”[30] Heidegger was contemptuous of postwar democratic reforms--calling them “halfway measures”--including individual constitutional rights, because:¶ I do not see in them any actual confrontation with the world of technicity, inasmuch as behind them all, according to my view, stands the conception that technicity in its essence is something that man holds within his own hands.¶ Heidegger thought American democracy was the most hopeless of all, in words that sound in substance exactly like Gore’s complaint:¶ [Americans] are still caught up in a thought that, under the guise of pragmatism, facilitates the technical operation and manipulation [of things], but at the same time blocks the way to reflection upon the genuine nature of modern technicity.[31]¶ (Separately, Heidegger wrote that America epitomized “the emerging monstrousness of modern times.”[32])¶ From here it is possible to comprehend more dispassionately Heidegger’s attraction to the Nazi movement in the 1930s. He had no brief for fascism in general or National Socialism in particular, nor was he an anti-Semite.[33] What he expressed in his famous “Rector’s Address”[34] in 1934 was that the “inner truth and greatness” of the Nazi movement was its potential “encounter between technicity on the planetary level and modern man,” and that it “casts its net in these troubled waters of ‘values’ and ‘totalities,’” or, as he put it a 1948 letter to Herbert Marcuse, “a spiritual renewal of life in its entirety.”[35] In other words, the “wrenching transformation” of Germany that the Nazi revolution set in motion held the potential for reconnecting humankind with the essence of Being in a primal, pre-Socratic way. Heidegger’s moral blindness to the phenomenon in front of him exposes the hazard of an excessively abstract approach to human existence. As Heidegger’s example shows, the idea of transforming human consciousness through politics is likely an extremist--and potentially totalitarian--project.¶ Reviewing the fundamentally Heideggerian understanding of our environmental predicament in Gore’s thought throws new light on the deeper meaning of Gore’s call for a “wrenching transformation” of civilization on the level of thought. Gore would no doubt be sincerely horrified at the suggested parallel between his themes and Heidegger’s moral blindness toward political extremism, and rightly reject it as the implication of his views. He is, thankfully, too imbued with the innate American democratic tradition to embrace any such extremism.[36] But it is fair to ask whether he has fully thought through the implications of his ambitious critique. In the case of both Gore and Schell before him, the Heideggerian approach reveals a certain cast of mind: deeply pessimistic, but utopian at the same time. Our salvation demands submitting to the moral authority of their “vision” to change our “consciousness.” After all, one aspect of Plato that Heidegger approves of is the view that mankind will suffer unremitting disaster until either rulers become philosophers or philosophers become rulers. (Indeed it was the failure of intellectuals to guide the Nazi movement that led to its ruin, Heidegger thought.) Gore seems to be making a round trip, looking to end up on either end of this potentiality, envisioning himself either as a ruler who has become a philosopher or as a philosopher who may yet (again) become a ruler.¶ Is it so farfetched to suggest that this has some problematic, if unintended, political implications? One of Gore’s sound and important arguments in Earth in the Balance and An Inconvenient Truth is that it is a profound error to suppose that the earth’s environment is so robust that there is little or nothing that mankind could do to damage it seriously. He is right, as was Heidegger, to point out the immense earthshaking power of modern technology. But there is a symmetrical observation to be made of Gore’s metaphysical approach to the problem, which is that it is an equally profound error to suppose that the environment of human liberty is so robust that there is no political intervention on behalf of the environment that could not damage liberty in serious ways, especially if the environment is elevated to the central organizing principle of civilization. Implicit in this goal is downgrading human liberty as the central organizing principle of civilization. There are no index entries in Earth in the Balance for “liberty,” “freedom,” or “individualism.” Heidegger believed the liberal conceptions of these great terms were meaningless or without foundation. There is no acknowledgement in Gore’s book that this is even a serious consideration. Gore’s one discussion of the matter is not reassuring:¶ In fact, what many feel is a deep philosophical crisis in the West has occurred in part because this balance [between rights and responsibilities] has been disrupted: we have tilted so far toward individual rights and so far away from any sense of obligation that it is now difficult to muster an adequate defense of any rights vested in the community at large or the nation--much less rights properly vested in all humankind or in posterity.[37]¶ But Is It Necessary?¶ Is Gore’s high-level metaphysical analysis necessary in the first place? Do we really have to resolve or unwind the problem of Platonic idealism and Cartesian dualism to address the problem of climate change? The example of the previous case in point--the arms race--suggests an answer. The arms race did not require a revolution in human consciousness or a transformation of national and global political institutions to bring about rapid and favorable changes. The kind of grandiose, pretentious thinking exemplified in Fate of the Earth played little or no role in these shifts. The problem turned out to be much simpler. The acute problem of the superpower arms race was mostly a moral problem--not a metaphysical problem--arising from the character of the irreconcilable regimes. As was frequently pointed out, the United States never worried about British or French nuclear weapons. Once the United States and the Soviet Union were able to establish a level of trust and common interest, unwinding the arms race became a relatively easy matter. Nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear proliferation in unsavory regimes (Iran, North Korea) is still around today, but the acute existential threat of the arms race has receded substantially.¶ In the early 1980s, The Fate of the Earth became the Bible for the nuclear freeze movement--the simplistic idea brought to you by the same people who thought Ronald Reagan was a simpleton. To his credit, then representative and later senator Gore opposed the nuclear freeze. Nowadays Gore has started to call for an immediate freeze on greenhouse-gas emissions, which he must know is unrealistic. His explanation in a recent speech shows that he missed entirely the lesson from that earlier episode:¶ An immediate freeze [on CO2 emissions] has the virtue of being clear, simple, and easy to understand. It can attract support across partisan lines as a logical starting point for the more difficult work that lies ahead. I remember a quarter century ago when I was the author of a complex nuclear arms control plan to deal with the then rampant arms race between our country and the former Soviet Union. At the time, I was strongly opposed to the nuclear freeze movement, which I saw as simplistic and naive. But, three-quarters of the American people supported it--and as I look back on those years I see more clearly now that the outpouring of public support for that very simple and clear mandate changed the political landscape and made it possible for more detailed and sophisticated proposals to eventually be adopted.[38]¶ The irony of this statement is that since the moral and political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union could not be resolved diplomatically, the way to move relations forward was to convert relations into a technical problem (i.e., negotiations over the number and specifications of weapons systems). Gore remained firmly within the technocratic arms-control community throughout this period, even as Schell and others tried to moralize the arms-control problem with the nuclear freeze proposal. But the moral confusion (some critics said the premise of moral equivalence) of the freeze idea made it a sideshow at best and a hindrance at worst. On the contrary, President Reagan’s resistance to the freeze, as well as the conventions of the arms-control process to which Gore held, were crucial to his strategy for changing the dynamic of the arms race. Having been an arms-control technocrat in the 1980s, Gore today wants to turn the primarily technical and economic problems of climate change into a moral problem.¶ Gore’s argument that climate change is a moral problem and not a political problem is not serious, since the leading prescriptions

 for treating the problem all require massive applications of political power on a global scale. Skeptics and cynics might dismiss Gore’s metaphysical speculations as mere intellectual preening, as many critics did with Fate of the Earth in the 1980s. But such an approach to environmental issues may be an obstacle to many practical, incremental steps that can be taken to solve real climate-policy problems. Once one grasps the Heideggerian character of the Gore approach to thinking about environmental problems, the hesitance about nuclear power comes into better focus. Gore and others in his mold dislike large-scale technologies because they are intrinsic to mankind’s mastery of nature that is driving our supposed alienation from nature. This same premise also explains the frequently hostile reaction of many environmentalists to suggestions that adaptation to climate change should be a part of any serious climate policy, even though many leading climate scientists and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have embraced adaptation. The suggestion that technologies for climate modification might be developed, which would be the climate policy equivalent of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, are greeted contemptuously for the same reason.¶ Will climate policy ultimately be guided by physicians or metaphysicians? Gore’s high-profile position on these issues tilts the balance toward metaphysicians. This is certain to generate ferocious resistance to change well beyond merely self-interested industries. Gore would be better off following the advice of Heidegger critic Stanley Rosen, and “step downward, out of the thin atmosphere of the floating island of Laputa or of the balloons in which so many of our advanced thinkers are currently suspended, back into the rich air of everyday life.”[39] That’s a fancy way of saying, “Take a deep breath, Al.”

#### Focusing on epistemology or ontology selfishly ignores real world problems

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While Hoffmann might well be correct, these days one can neither begin nor conclude empirical research without first discussing epistemological orientations and ontological assumptions. Like a vortex, metatheory has engulfed us all and the question of "theory" which was once used as a guide to research is now the object of research. Indeed, for a discipline whose purview is ostensibly outward looldng and international in scope, and at a time of ever encroaching globalization and transnationalism, International Relations has become increasingly provincial and inward looking. Rather than grapple with the numerous issues that confront peoples around the world, since the early 1980s the discipline has tended more and more toward obsessive self-examination.3 These days the politics of famine, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, or ethnic cleansing, let alone the cartographic machinations in Eastern Europe and the reconfiguration of the geo-global political-economy, seem scarcely to concern theorists of international politics who define the urgent task of our time to be one of metaphysical reflection and epistemological investigation. Arguably, theory is no longer concerned with the study of international relations so much as the "manner in which international relations as a discipline, and international relations as a subject matter, have been constructed."4 To be concerned with the latter is to be "on the cutting edge," where novelty has itself become "an appropriate form of scholarship."5