## 1NC

#### FIRST, THE REDUCTION OF CLASS TO A NEUTRAL LEVEL AMONG A LONG LIST OF OTHER OPPRESSIONS SUCH AS RACE AND GENDER, DESTROYS THE EMANCIPATORY POTENTIAL OF CLASS TO REACH ACROSS ALL LINES OF INDENTITY AND FORGE POLITICAL ACTION. CLASS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS QUALITATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT—OTHERWISE THE SYSTEM IS ABLE TO SATISFY DEMANDS ON GROUNDS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, DESTROYING ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME CAPITALIST OPPRESSION\*\*\*

GIMENEZ (Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder) 2001

[Martha, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html //wyo-tjc]

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it. Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class" in RGC remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential. Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.

#### SECOND, Their methodology homogenizes whiteness by collapsing structures of exploitation into a focus on white privilege that erases any historical connection between the ownership of production and racist exploitation—this disables materialist critique that is necessary to achieve emancipation

Cole 9

[Mike, Research Professor in Education and Equality, Head of Research and Director of the Centre for Education for Social Justice at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, Critical Race Theory in Education: A Marxist Response, 2009, Palgrave-McMillan, p. 25-28 //wyo-tjc]

While for Critical Race Theorists ‘white supremacy’ primarily describes the structural dimension of ‘white power’, ‘white privilege’ mainly refers to the day-to-day practices that arise directly or indirectly from ‘white supremacy’. However, both interact with each other (Delgado, personal correspondence, 2008), and both have structural and day-to-day practical implications. Thus immigration restrictions would be part of the structural dimension of the ‘white supremacist’ state (ibid.), but with obvious day-to-day practical manifestations. From a Marxist perspective, it is, of course, the poor and dispossessed rather than the rich and powerful, whose entry into other (richer) countries is restricted (although this exclusion is dependent on capitalists’ relative need for cheap labor). Delgado (ibid.) gives an example of the practical nature of ‘white privilege’ when ‘store clerks put change directly in the upraised palms of white customers but lay the coins down on the counter for blacks or Latinos/ Latinas’. For Critical Race Theorists, such practices are also enshrined structurally in ‘white supremacist’ societies. For Marxists, the class element is crucial. Rich people of color are less likely to get their change thrust on the counter. Moreover, well-off people of color will tend to shop in more ‘upmarket’ stores, and will be more disposed to the use of plastic as a form of payment. Critical Race Theorists believe that all white people are beneficiaries of ‘white supremacy’ and ‘white privilege’. Gillborn (2008, p. 34) states that while they are not all active in identical ways, and do not all draw similar advantages, ‘[a]ll White-identified people are implicated in . . . [relations of shared power and dominance]— . . . they do all benefit, whether they like it or not’. Sabina E. Vaught and Angelina E. Castagno (2008, p. 99) would appear to hold similar views and refer to ‘the ways in which power over others . . . benefits Whites individually and collectively’ (p. 99), and specifically emphasize white privilege’s ‘structural nature’ (p. 100). They argue (2008, p. 96) that ‘Whiteness as property is a concept that reflects the conflation of Whiteness with the exclusive rights to freedom, to the enjoyment of certain privileges, and to the ability to draw advantage from these rights’. Following Cheryl Harris (1993, p. 1721) they state that ‘to be identified as white’ was ‘to have the property of being white. Whiteness was the characteristic, the attribute, the property of free human beings’. ‘In this way’, Vaught and Castagno (2008, p. 96) continue, ‘individual White persons came to exercise, benefit from, and mutually create and recreate a larger structural system of collective, institutional White privilege’ (ibid.). Again, following Harris (1993, p. 1762), they refer to ‘the continued right to determine meaning’ (Vaught and Castagno, 2008, p. 101), and make reference to Peggy McIntosh’s (1988) notion of systemic ‘arbitrarily-awarded’ privilege (Vaught and Castagno, 2008, p. 99). They conclude that the societal systems ‘that sustain the reign of White race privilege are peopled and the concurrent, interactive acts of individuals and systems inexorably reinforce and entrench pervasive racial power across institutions, sites and events’ (p. 96). ‘White racial power’, they claim, ‘permeates every institution’ (p. 101). When Gillborn makes reference to McIntosh’s ‘famously listed 50 privileges’ (Gillborn, 2008, p. 35), and describes them as ‘privileges that accrue from being identified as White’, he has seriously misunderstood McIntosh’s list. In merely describing the privileges as accruing from being identified as white, he decontextualizes and dehistoricizes her analysis. In actual fact, McIntosh contextualizes white privilege with respect to her social class position as a white academic with respect to her ‘Afro-American co-workers, friends, and acquaintances’ with whom she comes into ‘daily or frequent contact in this particular time, place, and line of work’ (p. 293).4 Homogenizing the social relations of all white people ignores, of course, this crucial social class dimension of privilege and power. Mills (1997, p. 37) acknowledges that not ‘all whites are better off than all nonwhites, but [argues that] . . . as a statistical generalization, the objective life chances of whites are significantly better’. While this is, of course, true, we should not lose sight of the life chances of millions of working class white people. To take poverty as one example, in the United States, while it is the case that the number of black people living below the poverty line is some three times that of whites, this still leaves over 16 million ‘white but not Hispanic’ people living in poverty in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). This is indicative of a society predicated on racialized capitalism, *rather than indicative of a white supremacist society*. While the United States is witnessing the effects of the New Racial Domain (Marable, 2004—see below) with massively disproportionate effects on black people and other people of color, white people are also affected. In the United Kingdom, there are similar indicators of a society underpinned by rampant racism, with black people currently twice as poor as whites, and those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin over three times as poor as whites (Platt, 2007).5 Once again, however, this still leaves some 12 million poor white people in the United Kingdom, who are, like their American counterparts, on the receiving end of global neoliberal capitalism. The devastating effects of social class exploitation and oppression are masked by CRT blanket assertions of ‘white supremacy’ and ‘white privilege’. There are further problems with the homogenization of all whites. First it masks essential power relations in capitalist societies. For Marxists, the ruling class are by definition those with power since it is they who own the means of production, and the working class, in having to sell their labor power in order to survive, are (also by definition) the class largely without power. The manifestations of this major power imbalance in the capital/ labor relation massively affects relative degrees of privilege in capitalist, the aforementioned rates of poverty being just one. Lack of power for the working class is particularly evident in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom where that class has been successfully interpellated (Althusser’s concept of interpellation, outlined in chapter 1 of this volume). Moreover, some of the very privileges that poor white people possess *are in a very real sense compensatory privileges*. For example, Delgado (2008, personal correspondence) has introduced the concept of ‘paltry privileges’ to describe those ‘privileges’ that whites enjoy that compensate for the fact that they are living in impoverished conditions with low paid jobs, unpaid bills and poor life chances. Alpesh Maisuria and I (Cole and Maisuria, 2008) made a similar point when referring to the success of soccer in keeping white workers in line: Ruling class success in maintaining hegemony in the light of the disparity of wealth and the imperial quest was displayed in England during the 2006 World Cup by the number of St. George flags signifying a solid patriotism in run-down (white) working class estates, on white vans, on dated cars exhibiting a ‘proud to be British’ display. In addition, as economically active migrant workers from Eastern Europe enter the UK (a great benefit for capital, and for the middle strata who want their homes cleaned or renovated cheaply), the (white) working class, who spontaneously resist neo-liberalism by resisting working for low wages that will increase their immiseration, need to be assured that they ‘still count’. Hence the ruse of capital is to open the markets, and the role of sections of the tabloid media is to racialize migrant workers to keep the (white) working class happy with their lot with the mindset that ‘at least we are not Polish or Asian or black, and we’ve got our flag and, despite everything, our brave boys in Iraq did us proud. In Althusser’s words, their response is: ‘That’s obvious! That’s right! That’s true!’ (Althusser, 1971, p. 173). In this case the homogenization of all whites obfuscates the ideological element of the capital/labor relation. While it is undoubtedly true that racism and xeno-racism (see below) have penetrated large sections of the white working class, resulting in racist practices that contribute to the hegemony of whites, and while it is clearly the case that members of the (predominantly though not exclusively) white ruling class are the beneficiaries of this, it is certainly not white people as a whole who hold such power (Cole and Maisuria, 2008). For example, sections of the white working class in England have voted for the fascist British National Party (BNP) at recent elections precisely because they feel that they are treated with less equality than others (Cruddas et al., 2005). There are thus a number of problems with homogenizing all white people. Attempts to do this ignore capitalist social relations, which are infused with the crucial dimensions of social class, power and ideology.

#### THIRD, THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—IT IS THIS LOGIC THAT MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE

DYER-WITHERFORD (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) 1999
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### FOURTH, Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OR KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF LABOR AND SURPLUS VALUE MERELY SERVES TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION TO A SOCIETY BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

**THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE AGENT OF THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL DEBATERS**

**Webster’s** Guide to Grammar and Writing **2K**

 <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

 **“RESOLVED” EXPRESSES INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN**

**American Heritage Dictionary 2K**

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

**“SHOULD” DENOTES AN EXPECTATION OF ENACTING A PLAN**

**American Heritage Dictionary – 2K**

[www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

**B. Not defending the agent of the resolution, which is the government of the United States based in D.C.[[1]](#footnote-1)**

**THE U.S.F.G. is the three branches of government**

**Dictionary.com 2k6** [[http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united+states+government](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united%2Bstates%2Bgovernment)]

|  |
| --- |
| noun |
| **the executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of the United States**  |

**First, MORAL disagreement: Effective moral deliberation requires that all parties be willing to submit to a RECIPROCAL process of agonistic disagreement. Without an effective PROCESS of switch-side debate, there can be no method of dealing with the practical constraints that surround any persuasive context. EVEN IF the affirmative wins there is merit to considering their case, their abandonment of the forum of switch-side debate leaves us less able to speak to problems of power, violence and inequality because they give up on a process that is inherently valuable.**

**Gutmann & Thompson 96**

[Amy & Dennis, President of Penn State and Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 1//wyo-tjc]

OF THE CHALLENGES that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life. Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy. The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex. Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of delib-eration that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation—the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics. We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy. Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribu¬tion to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall pos¬sible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy pre-scribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies dis-cussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not Utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and nondeliberative disa-greement. Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken. (The abortion example—to which we often return in the book—is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, about a policy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practical politics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection, or between the application of each in the non-ideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where the logical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect always to prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in dem-ocratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already part of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies and process that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by which citizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.

**Second, SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE: The net-benefits are both epistemic and ontological: epistemic because prepared, competitive discourse and required listening to both sides of an argument is a prerequisite for critical reasoning and interested inquiry, and ontological because it affirms a method of living that is the only antidote to the violence of the affirmative’s universalist dogma, which is root of violence and genocide**

**Roberts-Miller 3**

[Patricia, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at UT Austin, “Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, but not act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibility for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banality of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters.

It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in both rhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

**First, BOUNDED CREATIVITY outweighs: You should embrace a model of debate that strikes a balance between predictability and creativity—it is a PRACTICAL REALITY that preparing to debate within a common framework enhances education because it maximizes elaboration and testing of ideas. That’s also a reason to SEVERLY DISCOUNT their impact claims because those claims have not been submitted to rigorous testing but are only shallow gut-shot reactions.**

**Goodin 03**

[Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, uwyo//amp]

Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and procedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue.

**Second is your argument filter: It is OK to divorce debate from the ‘real-world’- a laboratory separate from conviction is necessary to teach methods of argumentative reasoning AND advocacy skills—You should privilege these skills even if you have to sacrifice purity of inquiry because these are the skills MOST UNIQUE to the debate forum—they can’t be garnered anywhwere else**

**Muir 93**

[Star A., Professor of Communication Studies at George Mason, Philosophy and Rhetoric, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

The emphasis on method---focusing on the technique of debate as an educational end---is characteristic of the defense of debating both sides of a resolution. Interscholastic debate, many scholars reason, is different from “real world” disputation; it lacks the purposes or functions of a senate speech, a public demonstration, or a legal plea. Debate is designed to train students to construct arguments, to locate weaknesses in reasoning, to organize ideas, and to present and defend ideas effectively, not to convert the judge to a particular belief. As such, it is intended to teach debaters to see both sides of an issue and to become proficient in the exposition of argument independent of moral or ethical convictions. The debaters are to present the best case possible given the issues they have to work with. The definition of debate thus shapes a conception of its role in the development of the individual. Windes reaffirms the value of such a procedural training in his view of the activity: Academic debating is a generic term for oral contests in argumentation, held according to established rules, the purpose being to present both sides of a controversy so effectively that a decision may be reached---not on which side was right or wrong but on which side did the better job of arguing. Academic debating is gamesmanship applied to argumentation, not the trivial and amusing gamesmanship often thought of, but sober, realistic, important gamesmanship.

**First, Their prophecy’s of doom in relation to racial progress make racism inevitable and prevent any meaningful change—they cause the impacts they criticize**

**Clark, 1995**

[Leroy, professor of Law, Catholic University Law School, ARTICLE: A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23, lexis nexis] /Wyo-MB

**Despite** Professor **Bell's prophecy of doom**, I believe **he would like to have his analysis proven wrong.** **However, he desperately leans on a tactic from the past--laying out the disabilities of the black condition and accusing whites of not having the moral strength to act fairly**. That is the ultimate theme in both of his books and in much of his law review writing. **That tactic not only lacks full force against today's complex society, it also becomes, for many whites, an exaggerated claim that racism is the sole cause of black misfortune**s. n146 Many whites may feel about the black condition what many of us may have felt about the homeless: dismayed, but having no clear answer as to how the problem is to be solved, and feeling individually powerless if the resolution calls for massive resources that we, personally, lack. Professor **Bell's two books may confirm this sense of powerlessness in whites with a limited background in this subject, because Professor Bell does not offer a single programmatic approach toward changing the circumstance of blacks.** **He presents only startling, unanalyzed prophecies of doom, which will easily garner attention from a controversy-hungry media**. n147¶ It is much harder to exercise imagination to create viable strategies for change. n148 Professor Bell sensed the despair that the average--especially average black--reader would experience, so he put forth rhetoric urging an "unremitting struggle that leaves no room for giving up." n149 **His contention is ultimately hollow, given the total sweep of his work.¶ At some point it becomes dysfunctional to refuse giving any credit to the very positive abatements of racism that occurred with white support, and on occasion, white leadership. Racism thrives in an atmosphere of insecurity, apprehension about the future, and inter-group resentments. Unrelenting, unqualified accusations only add to that negative atmosphere**. Empathetic and more generous responses are possible in an atmosphere of support, security, and a sense that advancement is possible; the greatest progress of blacks occurred during the 1960s and early 1970s when the economy was expanding. Professor Bell's "analysis" is really only accusation and "harassing white folks," and is undermining and destructive. **There is no love--except for his own group--and there is a constricted reach for an understanding of whites. There is only rage and perplexity. No bridges are built--only righteousness is being sold**.¶ A people, black or white, are capable only to the extent they believe they are. Neither I, nor Professor Bell, have a crystal ball, but I do know that creativity and a drive for change are very much linked to a belief that they are needed, and to a belief that they can make a difference**. The future** will be shaped by past conditions and the actions of those over whom we have no control. Yet it **is not fixed; it will also be shaped by the attitudes and energy with which we face the future. Writing about race is to engage in a power struggle. It is a non-neutral political act, and one must take responsibility for its consequences. Telling whites that they are irremediably racist is not mere "information"; it is a force that helps create the future it predicts. If whites believe the message, feelings of futility could overwhelm any further efforts to seek change**. I am encouraged, however, that the motto of the most articulate black spokesperson alive today, Jesse Jackson, is, "Keep hope alive!" and that much of the strength of Martin Luther King, Jr. was his capacity to "dream" us toward a better place.

**2nd, Bell’s pessimism in space traders erases the history of white alliances in the struggle against forms of racism**

**Clark, 1995**

[Leroy, professor of Law, Catholic University Law School, ARTICLE: A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23, lexis nexis] /Wyo-MB

¶ "**The Space Traders" is Professor Bell's projection of a future holocaust for African-Americans**. I prefer to relate the story to the American past, and confront the question of whether, lurking in the wings for blacks, there is an American version of the Nazi "final solution." From one perspective, the secession of the Southern States from the Union, which precipitated our Civil War, is as close as America has come to the ominous threat to expel blacks that Professor Bell creates fictionally in "The Space Traders." Rebellious white southerners proposed taking black slaves into a separate land--the plantation. The pay-off to the North was the end of strife and conflict over the importation of slaves, and the end of a nation divided into territories where slaves could or could not be owned.¶ **The actual history of this near "holocaust" for blacks contradicts Professor Bell's predictions. White abolitionists saw the Confederates as the "Space Traders" of their day, and fought a bloody and costly Civil War to successfully prevent blacks from being carried off into the continued hell of slavery. None of this history of positive white involvement in ending slavery is recognized** in Faces; rather, Professor Bell excoriates "television writers" of Alex Haley's novel, Roots, for creating "good white folks" who "eased the slaves' anguish," thus absolving white viewers from "recognizing American slavery as a burden on the nation's history." n28 The eminent historian, John Hope Franklin, claimed **that many abolitionists were committed to ending slavery out of moral and religious conviction, without concomitant limited personal selfinterests.** n29 By contrast, Professor Bell, in an article, asserts that the constitutional amendments freeing the slaves and giving them the vote were designed to keep the Republican party in office. n30¶ Milner Ball, writing, ironically, to defend Professor Bell from criticisms made by Randall Kennedy, said: "**People possessed by an ideology 'are simply no longer able to see certain facts.'" n31 This statement may well capture Professor Bell's dilemma. He appears to be operating out of a tightly wound ideology that most whites cannot be trusted, even--if one is referencing poor whites--to act in their own best interest--and that whites always subvert black interests**.¶ This ideology requires Professor Bell to proclaim, and more importantly, believe, that "nobody can free us but ourselves," n32 and that "few whites are ready to actively promote civil rights for blacks." n33 Thus, Faces includes blacks martyred or exiled during the freedom struggle. n34 **There is, however, no mention of the hundreds of white students who joined the civil rights movement in dangerous areas in the South during the 1960s, or of those** like Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman, **who were murdered because of their involvement.** n35 Ostensibly sympathetic white female characters appear in only two instances in Faces, and both are stick figures designed to underscore Professor Bell's themes of black danger, pain, and impending defeat. n36¶ **Nowhere in Faces or Confronting Authority is there a recognition of the long history of effective white cooperation with blacks in ending segregation,** **such as the fact that two major civil rights organizations, the NAACP and the Urban League, originated with whites and blacks acting cooperatively**. n37 **Nowhere in either book is there a recognition of white financing of the civil rights movement**. Black lawyers, like Charlie Houston and Thurgood Marshall, theorized the legal battle to end state-enforced racial segregation, but when Professor Bell and I were **lawyers for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, at least one third of the lawyers were white**. n38¶ Indeed**, from the very beginning, some talented and dedicated whites have been critical actors producing positive results in the black freedom struggle**. **That they may only have been the "few" whites that Professor Bell claims would "actively support civil rights for blacks" does not defeat the point.** **Most movements began with a "few."** **The larger public, white and black, becomes educated and drawn toward their direction. Those few, however, must possess special resources; they must, like President Lincoln, occupy a pivotal position, or must be especially dedicated, strategically smart, and talented.** n39

**And, Building political bonds between black and white individuals is key to solve oppression**

**Clark, 1995**

[Leroy, professor of Law, Catholic University Law School, ARTICLE: A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23, lexis nexis] /Wyo-MB

If Professor Bell meant that blacks should be the catalysts to furthering their freedoms, or that they should occupy visible leadership roles, I would agree. That qualified statement is probably true of any movement to end discrimination and oppression. The victims of oppression first become aware of the details of their victimization, and then take that knowledge to communities lacking such experience. **Blacks had to assume leadership positions so that young blacks were not trapped by maligning racial stereotypes that blacks lacked leadership capacity.** n46 While black leadership and an aroused black community are necessary conditions for the further realization of freedom, it is not accurate, historically or strategically, to say it has been, is, or ever will be a sufficient condition for freedom. n47¶ **One need not fear that reality. Despite abundant examples of prejudiced whites defeating the interests of blacks and other minority groups--for much of what Professor Bell relies on is historical fact n48 --this simply means that there must be a painstaking, careful identification of the whites who should be recruited, worked with, and most of all, trusted. Intelligence and precision in selecting trustworthy whites builds effective coalitions. Such racially cooperative coalitions will model a movement's predicted future--one in which differences are acknowledged and respected, while striving together for cooperative living.**

**Data disproves their claims progress has been made and is possible in many social arenas—moving towards the end of racism and discrimination**

**Clark, 1995**

[Leroy, professor of Law, Catholic University Law School, ARTICLE: A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23, lexis nexis] /Wyo-MB

Professor **Bell treats** the post-1960s **claims of progress as an illusion: discrimination simply became more covert, but equally efficient**. n69 **The facts, however, viewed with a holistic perspective, largely refute this claim.** n70¶ **The most thorough analysis of black-American status** since Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma in 1944, is A Common Destiny--Blacks and American Society. n71 The report covers the period from 1940 through 1986, and **is more comprehensive than the studies Professor Bell relied on** in recent law review articles.¶ A Common Destiny **answers** Professor **Bell's central question** in Faces:¶ Contemporary views of the status of black-white relations in America vary widely. Perspectives range from optimism that the main problems have been solved, to the view that black progress is largely an illusion, to assessments that the nation is retrogressing and moving toward increased racial disparities. To some observers, the present situation is only another episode in a long history of recurring cycles of apparent improvement that are followed by new forms of dominance in changed contexts: the level of black status changes, it is said, but the one constant is blacks' continuing subordinate social position. To other observers**, the opposite is correct: long-run progress is the dominant trend**. n72¶ A Common Destiny, however, concludes that **the overwhelming majority of black-Americans made substantial progress since 1940:¶ Over the 50-year span covered by this study, the social status of American blacks has on average improved dramatically, both in absolute terms and relative to whites**. **The growth of the economy and public policies promoting racial equality led to an erosion of segrega- tion and discrimination**, making it possible for a substantial fraction of blacks to enter the mainstream of American life. n73¶ **Just five decades ago, most black Americans could not work, live, shop, eat, seek entertainment, travel where they chose.** Even a quarter century ago--100 years after the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863--**most blacks were effectively denied the right to vote. . . . Today the situation is very different.** n74¶ The Committee acknowledged that "the great gulf that existed between black and white Americans in 1939 . . . has not closed," because **one-third of blacks "still live in households with incomes below the poverty line." n75 Yet the study reported that 92% of blacks lived below the poverty line in 1939. n76 A 60% drop in poverty is an astounding improvement, by any measure, and is an even faster movement out of poverty than that of the white public** that was also suffering from the ravages of the economic depression of the 1930s. n77 Some reduction of black poverty occurred when blacks secured higher paying jobs in defense industries during World War II. But **the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act brought a significant reduction in racial employment discrimination**. **By 1984, blacks had $ 9 billion more per year in real income, adjusted for inflation, than they would have had** if they had remained arrayed throughout the occupational spectrum as they were **before the Act**. n78 **A new black economic elite developed through movement into higher paying employment** in the private sector and away from employment in government, the clergy, and civil rights organizations; this new elite should sustain their progress and finance opportunities for their young. n79¶ **The number of black elected officials increased from a few dozen in 1940 to 6,800 by 1988, and the number of black public administrators went from 1% in 1940 to 8% in 1980**. n80 **No white elected official has openly supported racial segregation since Governor Wallace in the early 1960s, a testament, in part, to the substantial increases in black voter registration and voting, due to the Voting Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1965**. n81¶ **One could also show decreases in racial segregation in education, housing, and other aspects of American life, coupled with the virtual disappearance of racial exclusion in public accommodations--all due to enforcement of the new legislation.** It is true, **racial discrimination has not been totally eradicated**. n82 **But**, Peter F. Drucker summarizes:¶ **In the fifty years since the Second World War the economic position of African-Americans in America has improved faster than that of any other group in American social history--or in the social history of any country**. Three-fifths of America's blacks rose into middleclass incomes; before the Second World War the figure was onetwentieth. n83

**4th, Either differing self interest is inevitable and the aff can’t sovle, or progress is possible because black and white self interest cant converge around issues of racism**

**Clark, 1995**

[Leroy, professor of Law, Catholic University Law School, ARTICLE: A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23, lexis nexis] /Wyo-MB

¶ **One would not expect a heroic, self-sacrificing stance, which is by definition unique, from the bulk of the white American public. Naturally, the masses of whites, and their leaders, will embrace a direction more rapidly when their interests are fostered. That does not, per se, stamp whites as having low character, for blacks as a group are no different than whites in that regard. Blacks completely sacrificed their own interests only when they were forced to do so--during slavery. While black and white interests can diverge, there is no inherent antagonism when there is a simple demand for racial integration**. n40 **Whites and blacks may benefit in different ways and thus have different motivations for seeking racial equality, but in the long run, both groups will enjoy a less strife-ridden, more harmonious society.** n41 Indeed, **why bemoan the fact, as Professor Bell does, that white interests can be fostered while black interests are served? Blacks should give the highest priority to circumstances which satisfy mutual interests; those advances will be the most stable and enduring.**

## 2NC

#### Our method comes first and solves: without a fundamental challenge to the ownership of production, all of their concern for overcoming structures of racial exploitation lapses back into reformism—we must take the lesson of MLK, who found that emancipation lies in revolution and freedom from necessity. Their concern for the effects of class oppression may be appealing but above all else we must remember that the fundamental point is to CHANGE it.

Cole 9

[Mike, Research Professor in Education and Equality, Head of Research and Director of the Centre for Education for Social Justice at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, Critical Race Theory in Education: A Marxist Response, 2009, Palgrave-McMillan, p. 49-52 //wyo-tjc]

Like Weberianism, post-structuralism, postmodernism, and transmodernism, CRT appears to me to be ultimately lacking in a direction for moving humankind forward progressively. As far as Weber is concerned, he believed that socialism would be even more rationalized, and bureaucratic than capitalism and thus more alienating. A common criticism of post-structuralism and postmodernism is that, in focusing on deconstruction, they have no solutions, while for transmodernist, Enrique Dussel, as noted in the Introduction to this volume, the solution is an ‘ex nihilo utopia’. CRT and Human Liberation Darder and Torres (2004, p. 98) observe, in the CRT view of education: ‘ “racial” liberation [is] embraced as not only the primary but as the most significant objective of any emancipatory vision of education in the larger society’ (ibid.). According to Krenshaw et al. (1995b, p. xiii) Critical Race Theorists also share ‘an ethical commitment to human liberation’ but ‘often disagree among [themselves], over its specific direction’ (ibid.). Thus often in CRT the solution is vague. To take an example, introducing their edited collection, Critical Race Theory in Education, Dixson and Rousseau (2006b) talk about ‘the struggle’ (pp. 2–3); ‘a vision of hope for the future’ (p. 3); ‘social action toward liberation and the end of oppression’ (p. 3); ‘the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression’ (p. 4); and ‘the ultimate goal of CRT— social transformation’ (p. 7). To take another example, Dixson and Rousseau (2006, pp. 2–3) argue that ‘CRT scholars acknowledge the permanence of racism’ but that this should lead to ‘greater resolve in the struggle’. They also refer to a CRT focus on ‘praxis’, which incorporates ‘a commitment not only to scholarship but also to social action toward liberation and the end of oppression’ (p. 3). They talk of ‘eliminating racial oppression as part of the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression’ (p. 4), and state that the ‘ultimate goal of CRT [is] social transformation’. However, no indication is given of what they are struggling towards, what liberation means to them, or what is envisioned by social transformation and the end of all forms of oppression. Mills is somewhat clearer. As we saw in chapter 2 of this volume, for him (1997, p. 111) ‘[w]hite Marxism [is] predicated on colorless classes in struggle’. He argues that if socialism is to come then ‘white supremacy/ majoritarian domination’ must be overthrown first in ‘the struggle for social democracy’. Only after ‘white supremacy’ has been overthrown, and ‘social democracy’ established is the next stage—socialism—possible. This seems to be in line with Mills’ argument that ‘a non-white-supremacist capitalism is morally and politically preferable to . . . white-supremacist capitalism’ (reiterated in Pateman and Mills, 2007, p. 31 and Mills, 2007, p. 243), something with which I would totally concur. However, given the massive advantages to capitalism of racialized capitalism, capitalism without racism (or sexism) is almost inconceivable. Whether, in the light of the current ‘credit crunch’ (a euphemism for the inherent contradictions in capitalism) capitalist politicians globally will adopt long-term a more ‘social democratic’ as opposed to ‘neoliberal’ form (they have already adopted interventionist measures in the short-term) remains to be seen. Certainly a number of commentators are urging this (e.g., Elliott, 2008; Irvin, 2008). Whatever happens, it is Marxism, I believe, that provides the possibility of a viable equitable future. In chapter 7, I posited developments in South America, specifically Venezuela, as providing one possible future direction for twenty-first-century socialism. Though currently a capitalist state, with a government enacting social democratic measures, Chávez is promoting socialist values and forms of organization. In the barrios of Caracas, and everywhere else where the poor live, and the spark of socialism has been lit, people are not celebrating Max Weber or post-structuralism; they are not embracing postmodernism, transmodernism or Critical Race Theory (for these are largely academic pursuits). Instead they are engaging with the possibility of a practical democratic socialism, a socialism that is truly inclusive, with respect to ‘race’, but also with respect to gender, sexual orientation, disability, age and other forms of exploitation and oppression. It is worth recalling that, at the beginning of this volume, I recounted that one of the people cited by Delgado and Stefancic (2001, p. 4) as being influential in the genesis of CRT was that tireless and irrepressible campaigner against racism, Martin Luther King Jr. At the time of writing (Summer 2008), it is the fortieth anniversary of King’s assassination. King, a reformer, pacifist and Baptist minister rather than a revolutionary socialist (Martin, 2008a), is quite accurately known for his gradualism and his reformism. However, it is significant that in the year preceding his death King became notably radicalized. Charles Steele, 2008 president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (King was the first president) has emphasized that, towards the end of his life, King had moved on from purely ‘racial’ issues, and that his final campaigns were focused on fighting poverty and on labor disputes (cited in Harris, 2008).1 Steele believes that King, who came to Memphis in 1968 in support of striking workers (Harris, 2008), ‘was killed [there] because he had started to focus on poor folks, regardless of their colour’ (cited in ibid.). As Jerald Podair puts it, ‘[i]f you thought having a talk about race was difficult in America, then having one about class is even harder’ (cited in ibid.). Paul Harris (2008) concludes that ‘40 years ago King tried to start that debate as well. A bullet cut short his ambitions’ (Harris, 2008).2 The implications for the subject matter of this book are clear. As long as CRT centralizes ‘race’ rather than class, and as long as it voices no serious challenge to United States and world capitalism, it will be tolerated. As Roland Sheppard (2006, p. 7) notes, Martin Luther King had a different perspective at the time of his death to the 1963 ‘I have a dream’ speech: ‘he had begun to view the struggle for equality as an economic struggle and the capitalist economic system as the problem’. As King, who by 1967 believed that the total elimination of poverty was now a practical responsibility (Sheppard, 2006, p. 8), put it in a speech to the SCLC in August, 1967: We’ve got to begin to ask questions about the whole society. We are called upon to help the discouraged beggars in life’s marketplace. But one day we must come to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring. It means that questions must be raised. ‘Who owns this oil? . . . Who owns the iron ore? . . . Why is it that people have to pay water bills in a world that is twothirds water?’ (cited in Sheppard, 2006, p. 8) However, perhaps Martin Luther King’s most unequivocal declaration of a firm change of direction came earlier, in remarks to his staff at the SCLC on November 14, 1966. King proclaimed that the civil rights reforms of the early 1960s ‘were at best surface changes’ that were ‘limited mainly to the Negro middle class’. He went on to add that demands must now be raised to abolish poverty (cited in Martin, 2008a): You can’t talk about solving the economic problem of the Negro without talking about billions of dollars. You can’t talk about ending the slums without first saying profit must be taken out of slums. You’re really tampering and getting on dangerous ground because you are messing with folk then. You are messing with captains of industry . . . . Now this means that we are treading in difficult water, because it really means that we are saying that something is wrong . . . with capitalism . . . . There must be a better distribution of wealth and maybe America must move toward a democratic socialism. (cited in The Democratic Socialists of Central Ohio, 2008)3 Classism or Marxism and Democratic Socialism? David Gillborn (2008, p. 13) may be right when he asserts that ‘the best critical race theorists are passionate about . . . classism’. But while challenging the oppression of people that is based on their social class (classism) is extremely important, and is championed by Marxists, *the fundamental point is to also challenge the exploitation of workers at the point of production, for therein lies the economic relationship that sustains and nurtures the capitalist system*.

#### Only a Marxist pedagogical method can create the intellectual pathways connecting local and global networks of material oppression—starting from the point of ‘white supremacy’ is fundamentally unable to resist and challenge structures of oppression

Cole 9

[Mike, Research Professor in Education and Equality, Head of Research and Director of the Centre for Education for Social Justice at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, ETHNICITIES, “Critical Race Theory Comes to the UK: A Marxist Response”, 9:246//wyo-tjc]

I am not arguing that CRT cannot provide insights into racism in capitalist societies; for example, its emphasis that ‘people of colour’ need to be heard to provide meaningful analyses of racism is useful and particularly illuminating for those whose life experiences are restricted to monocultural settings in multicultural societies (Delgado, 1995). (Xeno-) racism and the process of (xeno-)racialization can best be understood, however, by a combination of listening to and learning about the life histories and experiences of those at the receiving end of racism, and by objective Marxist analysis. There is a richness to be gained from this theoretical technique, which facilitates a synthesis of lived experience through the lens of Marxist theory and traces the ‘how’ of life experience back to the ‘why’ of capitalist class practices. This is always rooted in shifts in the relations of production aimed at more and more profit for the few, and which results in more and more immiseration for the many. There is thus considerable purchase in Zeus Leonardo’s (2004) attempt to ‘integrate Marxist objectivism and race theory’s focus on subjectivity’, a move that works to ensure that the CRT concept of ‘voice’ does not drift into postmodern ‘multivocality’ (multiple voices) where everyone’s opinion has equal worth and therefore ‘voice’ becomes thoroughly depoliticized (Maisuria, 2006). In summary, I must reject the insistence of CRT to valorize ‘race’ over class. Marxism has the crucial benefit of contextualizing practices in capitalist relations of production. It gives priority to the abolition of class society because without its demise, racism (as well as other forms of discrimination) is likely to continue it in its various guises. In contemporary societies, we are in many ways being globally miseducated. The Bush and Blair administrations’ propaganda war about ‘weapons of mass destruction’, aimed at masking new imperialist designs and capital’s global quest for imperial hegemony and oil, was a key example. Conditioning the discourse is only half the story. ‘Education’ has become a key component in the profit-making process itself. Tied to the needs of global, corporate capital, ‘education’ worldwide has been reduced to the creation of a flexible workforce, the openly acknowledged, indeed lauded (by both capitalists and politicians) requirement of today’s global markets. Corporate global capital is in schools, in the sense of both determining the curriculum and exercising burgeoning control of schools as businesses. An alternative vision of education is provided by Peter McLaren. Education should, McLaren argues, following Paulo Freire, put ‘social and political analysis of everyday life at the centre of the curriculum’ (McLaren, 2003: xxix). Racism should be a key component in such an analysis. Following through the thrust of this article, I would argue that, in order for racism to be understood, and, in order for strategies to be developed to undermine it, there is a need first to reintroduce the topic of imperialism in schools; second to initiate in schools a thorough analysis of the manifestations of xeno-racism and xeno-racialization. I deal with each in turn. The reintroduction of the teaching of imperialism in schools Anti-imperialism is one of Chávez’s main platforms. As he remarked in 2003: In Venezuela, we are developing a model of struggle against neoliberalism and imperialism. For this reason, we find we have millions of friends in this world, although we also have many enemies. (cited in Contreras Baspineiro, 2003)13 I have dealt with the teaching of imperialism in schools at length elsewhere (e.g. Cole, 2004c, 2008a). Here I make a few general points. Reintroducing the teaching of imperialism in schools, I believe, would be far more effective than CRT in increasing awareness of racism, and crucially linking racism to capitalist modes of production. Students will need skills to evaluate the New Imperialism and ‘the permanent war’ being waged by the US with the acquiescence of Britain. Boulangé (2004) has argued that it is essential, with the Bush and Blair ‘war on terror’, and Islamophobia worldwide reaching new heights, for teachers to show solidarity with Muslims, for ‘this will strengthen the unity of all workers, whatever their religion’ (Boulangé, (2004: 24), and this will have a powerful impact on the struggle against racism in all spheres of society, and education in particular. In turn, this will strengthen the confidence of workers and students to fight on other issues. According to the neoconservative, Niall Ferguson (2003): Empire is as ‘cutting edge’ as you could wish . . . [It] has got everything: economic history, social history, cultural history, political history, military history and international history – not to mention contemporary politics (just turn on the latest news from Kabul). Yet it knits all these things together with . . . a ‘metanarrative’. For Marxists, an understanding of the metanarrative of imperialism, past and present, does much more than this. Indeed, it encompasses but goes beyond the centrality of ‘racial’ liberation in CRT theory. It takes us to the crux of the trajectory of capitalism from its inception right up to the 21st century; and this is why Marxists should endorse the teaching of imperialism old and new. Of course, the role of education in general, and teaching about imperialism in schools in particular, has its limitations and young people are deeply affected by other influences and socialized by the media, parents/carers and by peer culture (hence the need for media awareness Unlike Marxism, CRT does not explain why Islamophobia, the ‘war on terror’ and other forms of racism are necessary to keep the populace on task for ‘permanent war’ and the accumulation of global profits. Teaching against xeno-racism and xeno-racialization Marxism most clearly connects old and new imperialisms with capitalism. It also provides an explanation for xeno-racism and xeno-racialization. While CRT certainly reminds us that racism is central in sustaining the current world order, and that we must listen to the voices of people oppressed on grounds of racism, it does not and cannot make the necessary connections to understand and challenge this racism. Indeed, as I have argued, its advocacy of ‘white supremacy’ as an explanatory factor is counterproductive, particularly, as I have argued, in the school and university context, in the struggle against racism. Xeno-racism and xeno-racialization in the UK and the rest of Europe need to be understood in the context of the origins of the EU, and globalization generally. With respect to the EU’s current enlargement, connections need to be made between the respective roles of (ex-)imperial citizens in the immediate post-Second World War period, and migrant workers from Eastern Europe today (both sources of cheap labour). An analysis of the way in which the media portrays asylum seekers and refugees, on the one hand, and migrant workers, on the other, would also foster an awareness of the processes of xeno-racism and xeno-racialization. Alternatives to neoliberal global capitalism Chávez devoted a call-in television programme on 15 May 2005 to education. In direct contrast to the US and the UK view that we should teach the entrepreneurial culture in schools, for Chávez there is a new educational model: competition and individualism in schools must give way to unity and solidarity: ‘We are all a team, going along eliminating little by little the values or the anti-values that capitalism has planted in us from childhood’ (Chávez, cited in Whitney, 2005). No space in the education systems of the US or the UK is provided for a discussion of alternatives to neoliberal global capitalism, such as world democratic socialism. Marxists should agitate for the (totally democratic) suggestion that such discussions should take place in schools, colleges and universities. CONCLUSION In this debate article, I have argued that CRT is theoretically inadequate, both in its advocacy of ‘white supremacy’ and in its prioritizing of ‘race’ over class as the primary contradiction in capitalist society, to explain everyday racist and xeno-racist occurrences in capitalist societies. I have suggested that CRT’s promotion of the ‘abolition of whiteness’ is extremely problematic, particularly in the context of education in schools. I have further tried to demonstrate that an anti-racist/anti-imperialist Marxism is possible, and have commended 21st-century Venezuela as a way forward to an anti-racist socialist world. I have finally made some suggestions for practice in educational institutions. My intention has not been to question the ideological or political integrity of Critical Race Theorists, but to open up comradely discussion in the light of the recent entry of CRT into British academia. I welcome responses from Critical Race Theorists as to how we might move the debate forward in a productive anti-racist manner.

#### Be suspicious of their perm claims—incorporating the destruction of whiteness with the Marxist method fundamentally destroys any anti-capitalist project

Cole 9

[Mike, Research Professor in Education and Equality, Head of Research and Director of the Centre for Education for Social Justice at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, Critical Race Theory in Education: A Marxist Response, 2009, Palgrave-McMillan, p. 32-33 //wyo-tjc]

Here is the platform of Race Traitor (2005), an organization that takes the dangers of ‘white supremacy’ to their limits and that calls for the abolition of whiteness: What We Believe The white race is a historically constructed social formation. It consists of all those who partake of the privileges of the white skin in this society. Its most wretched members share a status higher, in certain respects, than that of the most exalted persons excluded from it, in return for which they give their support to a system that degrades them. The key to solving the social problems of our age is to abolish the white race, which means no more and no less than abolishing the privileges of the white skin. Until that task is accomplished, even partial reform will prove elusive, because white influence permeates every issue, domestic and foreign, in US society. The existence of the white race depends on the willingness of those assigned to it to place their racial interests above class, gender, or any other interests they hold. The defection of enough of its members to make it unreliable as a predictor of behavior will lead to its collapse. RACE TRAITOR aims to serve as an intellectual center for those seeking to abolish the white race. It will encourage dissent from the conformity that maintains it and popularize examples of defection from its ranks, analyze the forces that hold it together and those that promise to tear it apart. Part of its task will be to promote debate among abolitionists. When possible, it will support practical measures, guided by the principle, Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity. I have argued elsewhere (Cole, 2008d, p. 115) that the style in which the organization, Race Traitor’s ideological position is written is worryingly reminiscent of Nazi propaganda, and seriously open to misinterpretation: that it could be interpreted as meaning the abolition of white people. In fact, it is made clear above and in the book of the same name (Ignatiev and Garvey, 1996) that this is not the case.9 However, when one taps in ‘Race Traitor’ on a Google search, it is the above statement written by the organization ‘White Traitor’, which comes up first. I am not questioning the sincerity of the protagonists of ‘the abolition of whiteness’, nor suggesting in any way that they are anti-white people—merely questioning its extreme vulnerability to misunderstanding.10 Antiracists have made some progress, in the United Kingdom at least, after years of ‘establishment’ opposition, in making antiracism a mainstream rallying point, and this is reflected, in part, in legislation (e.g., the (2000) Race Relations Amendment Act).11 Even if it were a good idea, the chances of making ‘the abolition of whiteness’ a successful political unifier and rallying point against racism are virtually non-existent. For John Preston (2007, p. 13), ‘[t]he abolition of whiteness is . . . not just an optional extra in terms of defeating capitalism (nor something which will be necessarily abolished post-capitalism) but fundamental to the Marxist educational project as praxis’. Indeed, for Preston (2007, p. 196) ‘[t]he abolition of capitalism and whiteness seem to be fundamentally connected in the current historical circumstances of Western capitalist development’. From a Marxist perspective, coupling the ‘abolition of whiteness’ to the ‘abolition of capitalism’ is a worrying development which, if it gained ground in Marxist theory in any substantial way would most certainly undermine the Marxist project, even more than it has been undermined already (for an analysis of the success of the Ruling Class in forging consensus to capitalism in the United Kingdom, see Cole, 2008g, 2008h). Implications of bringing the ‘abolition of whiteness’ into schools are discussed in chapter 7 of this volume. As is argued in this volume, racism, xeno-racism, racialization, and xeno-racialization, when informed by Marxism, are far more conducive to understanding racism in contemporary societies than is the CRT concept of ‘white supremacy’. ‘White supremacy’, I believe, should be restricted to its conventional usage

**Bell’s negativity forecloses the possibility of a positive future and progress on racial discrimination**

**Clark, 1995**

[Leroy, professor of Law, Catholic University Law School, ARTICLE: A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23, lexis nexis] /Wyo-MB

Professor Derrick A. **Bell**'s book, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism, n1 **challenges tenets and ideals deeply held by civil rights organizations and by the larger liberal-integrationist community.** Professor **Bell charges that white society has never relinquished, and more importantly, will never relinquish, a deep-rooted racism, and that there has been, even in recent history, no true diminution in racial discrimination.**¶ I will endeavor to counter Professor Bell's claims by examining the historical record and by interpreting current American culture. Critics have yet to give Professor Bell's claims the fully objective assessment they merit, n2 although one can always characterize the dispute as a "glass is half empty or half full" problem. n3 I will therefore confront something quite deeper which is at stake, something unspoken, but implicit in Faces: its perspective, its attitude toward the future, and its view of the roles of strategy and law in race relations.¶ Fortunately, Professor Bell develops many of the issues from Faces more explicitly in his latest publication, Confronting Authority: Reflections of an Ardent Protester, n4 and in his many law review articles; thus, I will also focus on these works. I will not attempt a book review, but rather**, a construction of an alternative vision** and approach, **drawing largely on my involvement**--along with Professor Bell--**in the civil rights movement.**¶ I **write this article in ambivalence, but with a sense of urgency**. The ambivalence comes from criticizing the work of a one-time working colleague, who gained my sincere respect because of his unquestioned concern for the black plight. I do not doubt that Professor Bell has written, as he always does, with honesty. But it is precisely because he is a man of profound integrity, a man labeled the "founder of Critical Race Theory," n5 that his pronouncements may have an unprecedented powerful influence, especially on developing minority scholars. n6 Moreover, books and public appearances have made him a very visible figure who reaches an audience beyond legal academe; his ideas also impact the views of other critical, black commentators. n7 **The urgency, therefore, comes from my sense that Professor Bell's work propagates a damaging and dampening message which must be confronted and rejected if we are to fashion our future creatively.**

**Reorientation is possible and is key to solve racism**

**Clark, 1995**

[Leroy, professor of Law, Catholic University Law School, ARTICLE: A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23, lexis nexis] /Wyo-MB

The point is that blacks have no monopoly on the slowness or incompleteness of anti-discrimination law as a reorganizer of deep and complex social habits. n119 **Neither slavery, racial segregation, nor sex discrimination was produced or maintained exclusively by law. They were contributed to and reinforced by practically every societal institution. A reorientation in virtually every institution is necessary for complete or permanent change: a reorientation in the way we educate our children in schools and in families with respect to differences, in the ideas we advance in our media and in our cultural organs, in the way that we relate socially in friendships and in voluntary organizations, and in the way that churches and synagogues carry forth their moral messages. This is not to suggest that the problem of discrimination is too massive or wholly unmanageable. Indeed, just the opposite is suggested. Persons can work in small and large ways from wherever they are to reduce the problem of discrimination, even without the aid of the law**. n120

**Progress is manifested and durable—struggles have been successful in challenging racism**

**Clark, 1995**

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I must now address the thesis that there has been no evolutionary progress for blacks in America. Professor **Bell concludes that blacks improperly read history if we believe**, as Americans in general believe**, that progress--racial, in the case of blacks--is "linear and evolutionary."** n49 **According to Professor Bell**, the "American dogma of automatic progress" has never applied to blacks. n50 **Blacks will never gain full equality, and "even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary 'peaks of progress,' short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance."** n51¶ **Progress toward reducing racial discrimination and subordination has never** been "automatic," if that refers to some natural and inexorable process **without struggle**. Nor has progress ever been strictly "linear" in terms of unvarying year by year improvement, because the combatants on either side of the equality struggle have varied over time in their energies, resources, capacities, and the quality of their plans. Moreover, neither side could predict or control all of the variables which accompany progress or non-progress; some factors, like World War II, occurred in the international arena, and were not exclusively under American control.¶ **With these qualifications, and a long view of history, blacks and their white allies achieved two profound and qualitatively different leaps forward toward the goal of equality: the end of slavery, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964**. Moreover, **despite open and, lately, covert resistance, black progress has never been shoved back, in a qualitative sense, to the powerlessness and abuse of periods preceding these leaps forward**. n52

**Class not race is the problem is leading to greater freedom and equality**

**Clark, 1995**

[Leroy, professor of Law, Catholic University Law School, ARTICLE: A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23, lexis nexis] /Wyo-MB

**The major de-stabilizers that blacks face may not be racial discrimination, but** may, indeed, be problems sweeping the whole society that are merely aggravated for blacks, who have relatively **fewer financial and human capital resources** on average. Im**provements in the economic status of blacks relative to whites slowed** after the 1970s, but the overall economy also stagnated for whites after that period. n121 **Professor** **Bell**, in Faces, **leaves the impression that all retardation in improvements of black circumstances is due solely to racism. At no point does he acknowledge neutral, non-racial forces, like the condition of the general economy, as determining black prospects.**¶ **America now has a shrinking middle class and an increased economic gap between high-paid and low-paid workers**. During the 1980s, middle class living standards declined, and more Americans fell below the poverty line. n122 **Wealth is now more concentrated at the top**: four fifths of the share lost by the poorest families went to the richest fifth of the population, and the top 1% of the population's after-tax share of income rose from 7% in 1977 to 11% in 1990. n123 White males are a good barometer of the economic climate, since race and gender do not suppress their income. The median inflation-adjusted income of white males, who were their families' only breadwinner, fell 22% between 1976 and 1984. n124 We've experienced cyclical recessions, and many white collar persons experienced unemployment for the first time. An estimated 37 millions persons have no health insurance. n125 Well-paying blue collar jobs in mass production industries have disappeared faster than any other jobs, and blacks who flocked to these industries during World War II are affected disproportionately. n126 **College graduates fare better than non-college graduates, but even in the "improving economy" of the last two years, many of the jobs created are low-paying**. **Thus, college graduates are forced into sales clerk positions, and those persons with only sales clerk credentials, like many young blacks, are forced into unemployme**nt. n127 Law school graduates today, unlike the situation twenty or thirty years ago, sometimes cannot find employment. n128 Even employed persons suffer undue stress and anxiety: two incomes are now treated as a necessity, and many persons are severely overworked, with little time for family. n129¶ **Professor Bell's sense of futility may arise because our training in civil rights law does not help answer the two toughest questions America faces. First, can the economy be organized to reduce polarization in income and render overall greater economic security**? n130 **Second, can Americans be made politically conscious of questions which may involve recognizing class interests**? **Anti-discrimination law alone may be insufficient, given the spectrum of issues facing the black community. We, as lawyers, must resort to economists**, political scientists, and social psychologists to begin **to fashion answers to those tough questions.**

**Class based redistribution of wealth is key**

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**The desirable economic goals are clear. There must be a redistribution of wealth**, by means which the majority of the public see as benefiting them; thus, **race-specific affirmative action plans will play a minor role**. n139 **We must reduce poverty and banish unemployment for the unskilled as well as for professionals. We must retard the loss in real wages, so that a person's income can fulfill the basic needs for shelter, food, medical care, and education**. Very importantly, **we need to enhance dignity in the workplace and remove the insecurity that employment can be lost precipitously**.¶ How should we pursue these simple, clearly beneficial goals? Many civil rights lawyers, myself included, are probably closet leftists who were surprised by the massive collapse of the economies of the major socialist countries. **We must now educate ourselves through the economists and non-lawyers writing about the prospects for economic justice in a private property economy.** Charles Derber recently outlined a way to pursue the beneficial goals identified above, because of interesting developments in the business sector. n140 He points out, however, that "progressives of all stripes, as well as much of the population, have been seduced by the politics of the 'cultural wars' and have left economics to the economists, with the attendant negative consequences." n141 He also notes that black, women's, and **other movements have engaged in "a shift from economic and class issues to identity-based cultural politics," thereby ceding the field of economic restructuring to the business sector**. n142¶ Derber claims that **American business is moving in two fundamentally contradictory directions. One is "contingent capitalism," which can "intensify greed, social dislocation, ugly racial divisions and extreme class inequality**." The other is "cooperative capitalism," which "offers the seeds of a new idea of community in America and a potential solution to the specters of violence, family dissolution, poverty, and social breakdown that haunt the nation." n143¶ In cooperative capitalism, a business creates loyalty in its work force and customers by a commitment to shared values in the community, which sometimes takes precedent over profits. The business empowers workers, giving them more autonomy in how work is performed. Organizational decisions are made jointly by management and labor, thus reducing the need for a tier of supervisors to engage in surveillance. Various forms of employee-owned businesses are developing, as an outgrowth and extension of this approach. n144¶ Derber warns, however, that "**contingency capitalism" is a wholly contradictory direction that is competing with cooperative capitalism. Here, businesses replace permanent workers with contingents who are temporary, part-time, or designated as "independent contractors"--a designation which allows employers to avoid paying social security taxes for the worker. Secondly, companies further reduce the core of permanent employees through downsizing and contracting out, thus disrupting expectations of continued long-term employment. Finally, the corporations cut back on long-term, fixed obligations to employees, and revert to speed-ups and management by stress**.¶ Derber believes that **we are at a critical crossroads regarding the structure of the economy**, and that there are legislative measures which can encourage and support the cooperative capitalism direction. He believes that President Clinton's communitarian concerns could be realized through his embracing cooperative capitalism and informing the American public of these two fundamentally different directions facing the nation. Derber concludes that "**the ultimate success of [the black, women's, and other identity movements] and those of progressive citizens and community groups, depends on coalescing around a movement for a new genuinely democratic and cooperative economy**." n145

1. Federal government is the central government in Washington DC
Encarta Online 2005,

United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United

States is centered in Washington, D.C. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)