## T

#### We meet – we specify integral fast reactors – that’s a specific design developed at Idaho national Laboratory

#### We defend pyroprocessing – literally every piece of ev is in this context

#### No resolutional basis Nuclear power is power released in exothermic nuclear reactors

Hunt 79 [Manager, Energy Systems Division, McLaughlin Research Corporation]

V. Daniel, ENERGY DICTIONARY, p. 307

**nuclear power**. **Power released in exothermic nuclear reactions, which can be converted to mechanical or electrical power.**

#### NO risk of abuse –

#### CX checks

#### B) disclosure checks

#### c) lit checks – only one kind of IFR

#### Not a voter – potential abuse is not a voter – it’s what we do not what we justify

## Case

### FW

#### Limits increase creativity – they provide space for specific clash creating new possibilities.

Paul Armstrong, Dean and Prof of Literature at Brown, 2000, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser’s Aesthetic Theory,” New Literature History, pg 211–223

The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser’s analysis of “regulatory” and “aleatory” rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, “permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own” (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codiﬁed as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more ﬂexible and openended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity. As a rule-governed but open-ended activity, play provides a model for deploying power in a nonrepressive manner that makes creativity and innovation possible not in spite of disciplinary constraints but because of them. Not all power is playful, of course, and some restrictions are more coercive than enabling. But thinking about the power of constraints on the model of rules governing play helps to explain the paradox that restrictions can be productive rather than merely repressive. Seeing constraints as structures for establishing a play-space and as guides for practices of exchange within it envisions power not necessarily and always as a force to be resisted in the interests of freedom; it allows imagining the potential for power to become a constructive social energy that can animate games of to-and-fro exchange between participants whose possibilities for self-discovery and self-expansion are enhanced by the limits shaping their interactions.

## Warming

#### Disaster reps radically question the existing social order sparking concern and action – trumps short term interests.

Fuyuki Kurasawa, Constellation, v. 11, no. 4, 2004, “Cautionary Tales,” Blackwell

By contrast, Jonas’s strong consequentialism takes a cue from Weber’s “ethic of responsibility,” which stipulates that we must carefully ponder the potential impacts of our actions and assume responsibility for them – even for the incidence of unexpected and unintended results. Neither the contingency of outcomes nor the retrospective nature of certain moral judgments exempts an act from normative evaluation. On the contrary, consequentialism reconnects what intentionalism prefers to keep distinct: the moral worth of ends partly depends upon the means selected to attain them (and vice versa), while the correspondence between intentions and results is crucial. At the same time, Jonas goes further than Weber in breaking with presentism by advocating an “ethic of long-range responsibility” that refuses to accept the future’s indeterminacy, gesturing instead toward a practice of farsighted preparation for crises that could occur.30 From a consequentialist perspective, then, intergenerational solidarity would consist of striving to prevent our endeavors from causing large-scale human suffering and damage to the natural world over time. Jonas reformulates the categorical imperative along these lines: “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life,” or “Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life.”31 What we find here, I would hold, is a substantive and future-oriented ethos on the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight. Having suggested a way to thicken the normative foundations of farsighted cosmopolitanism, I would now like to discuss the socio-cultural strategies that global civil society participants have begun employing in order to create a sense of intergenerational solidarity. Both the moral imagination and reason constitute triggers of farsightedness that have entered public discourse in a variety of settings, with the objective of combatting the myopia of presentism.32 The first of these catalysts appeals to us to carefully ponder our epoch’s legacy, to imagine the kind of world we will leave to future generations (what will social life be like if today’s risks become tomorrow’s reality?). Left dystopianism performs just this role of confronting us with hypothetically catastrophic futures; whether through novelistic, cinematic, or other artistic means, it conjures up visions of a brave new world in order to spark reflection and inspire resistance.33 By way of thick description, dystopian tales call upon audiences’ moral imagination and plunge them into their descendants’ lifeworlds. We step into the shoes of Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Winston Smith or are strongly affected by The Handmaid’s Tale’s description of a patriarchal-theocratic society and The Matrix’s blurring of simulacra and reality, because they bring the perils that may await our successors to life. NGOs and social movements active in global civil society have drawn upon the moral imagination in similar ways, introducing dystopian scenarios less as prophecies than as rhetorical devices that act as ‘wake-up calls.’ Dystopias are thrust into public spaces to jolt citizens out of their complacency and awaken their concern for those who will follow them. Such tropes are intended to be controversial, their contested character fostering public deliberation about the potential cataclysms facing humankind, the means of addressing them, and the unintended and unexpected consequences flowing from present-day trends. In helping us to imagine the strengths and weaknesses of different positions towards the future, then, the dystopian imaginary crystallizes many of the great issues of the day. Amplifying and extrapolating what could be the long-term consequences of current tendencies, public discourse can thereby clarify the future’s seeming opaqueness. Likewise, fostering a dystopian moral imagination has a specifically critical function, for the disquiet it provokes about the prospects of later generations is designed to make us radically question the ‘self-evidentness’ of the existing social order.34 If we imagine ourselves in the place of our descendants, the takenfor- granted shortsightedness of our institutionalized ways of thinking and acting becomes problematic. Indifference toward the future is neither necessary nor inevitable, but can be – and indeed ought to be – changed. Aside from the moral imagination, and given that the idea of gambling with humanity’s future or failing to minimize its possible sources of suffering is logically unsustainable, the appeal to reason represents another main trigger of intergenerational solidarity. Since actual deliberation between current and future generations is obviously impossible, a Rawlsian contractualist thoughtexperiment allows us to demonstrate the soundness of a farsighted cosmopolitanism. If, in the original position, persons were to operate behind a chronological veil of ignorance that would preclude them from knowing the generation to which they belong, it is reasonable to expect them to devise a social order characterized by a fair distribution of risks and perils over time. Conversely, it is unreasonable to expect them to agree to a situation where these burdens would expand over time and thereby be transferred from one generation to the next. “The life of a people,” Rawls writes, “is conceived as a scheme of cooperation spread out in historical time. It is to be governed by the same conception of justice that regulates the cooperation of contemporaries. No generation has stronger claims than any other.”35 Via the practice of preventive foresight, this norm of crossgenerational fairness may acquire sufficient weight.

#### Environmental security challenges state legitimacy and lead to a paradigm shift away from militarism

Jon Barnett, Research Council Fellow In The School Of Social And Environmental Enquiry At The University Of Melbourne, 2001, The Meaning Of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics And Policy In The New Security Era, Chapter 9, 137-41

The question of whether it is valid to understand environmental problems as security problems recurs throughout any thoughtful discussion of environmental security. The dilemma should by now be apparent; securitising environmental issues runs the risk that the strategic/realist approach will coopt and colonise the, environmental agenda rather than respond positively to environmental problems (as discussed in Chapter 6). For this reason critics of environmental security, such as Deudney (1991) and-Brock (1991), Suggest that it is dangerous to understand environmental problems as security issues: This book's position on the matter has been emerging in previous chapters. It contends that the problem turns not on the presentation of environmental problems as security issues, but on-the meaning and practice of security in present times. Environmental security, wittingly or not, contests the legitimacy of the realist conception of security by pointing to the contradictions of security as the defence of territory and resistance to change. It seeks to work from within the prevailing conception of security, but to be successful it must do so with a strong sense of purpose and a solid theoretical base. Understanding environmental problems as security problems is thus a form of conceptual speculation. It is one manifestation of the pressure the Green movement has exerted on states since the late 1960s. This pressure has pushed state legitimacy nearer to collapse, for if the state cannot control a problem as elemental as environmental degradation, then what is its purpose? This legitimacy problem suggests that environmental degradation cannot further intensify without fundamental change or the collapse of the state. This in turn implies that state-sanctioned environmentally degrading practices such as those undertaken in the name of national security cannot extend their power further if it means further exacerbation of environmental insecurity. While the system may resist environmental security's challenge for change, it must also resist changes for the worse. In terms of the conceptual venture, therefore, appropriation by the security apparatus of the concept of environmental security is unlikely to result in an increase in environmental insecurity (although the concept itself may continue to be corrupted). On the other hand, succeeding in the conceptual venture may mean a positive modification of the theory and practice of national security. It may also mean that national governments will take environmental problems more seriously, reduce defence budgets, and generally implement policies for a more peaceful and environmentally secure world. This dual goal of demilitarisation and upgrading policy may well be a case of wanting to have one's cake and eat it — but either the having or the eating is sufficient justification for the concept (Brock 1996). The worst outcome would be if the state ceased to use the concept of environmental security, heralding the end of the contest and requiring that the interests of peace and the environment be advocated through alternative discourses. This is perhaps the only real failure that is likely to ensue from the project of environmental security.

## Solvency

#### No impact to radiation – Chernobyl proves

Spencer Weart, Ph.D. in Physics and Astrophysics at CU Boulder and former Director fo the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics, 3-26-2012, “Shunning Nuclear Power Will Lead to a Warmer World,” Yale Environment 360, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/shunning\_new\_nuclear\_power\_plants\_will\_lead\_to\_warmer\_world/2510/

But wasn’t Fukushima a health disaster? Not in the way you’d expect. Thanks to the openness of Japanese society and prompt evacuation, nobody received the kind of radiation that struck Soviet citizens after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine. So let’s look at Chernobyl as a baseline. The most visible harm there was due to ingestion of radioactive iodine, most commonly by children drinking milk from cows that had eaten radioactive grass in the contamination zone. Ingestion of radioactive iodine has caused nearly 5,000 children and young people to contract thyroid cancer in the ensuing 25 years, although most are doing well following surgery. The World Health Organization has projected that as many as 50,000 new cases of thyroid cancer could occur among young people affected by Chernobyl in the coming decades. But the Japanese were protected from this large-scale contamination, and few if any excess thyroid abnormalities are expected. What about other health problems? Some scientists believe that radiation at the levels to which millions of people farther from Chernobyl were exposed — moderately above the level of normal background radiation that we all receive — brings an increase in the rate of cancer. However, the increase, if any, has been too minuscule to detect amid the enormous number of cancers that afflict people anyway. Other scientists cite a variety of reasons to argue that low levels of radiation are completely harmless. We just don’t know.

#### No serious threat of nuclear terrorism – Al Qaeda is weak, their evidence is based on exaggerated threats by the Bush administration

Glenn Carle, fmr deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats and fmr member of CIA’s Clandestine Service, 7-13-2008, “Overstating Our Fears,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/11/AR2008071102710.html?hpid=opinionsbox1

We do not face a global jihadist "movement" but a series of disparate ethnic and religious conflicts involving Muslim populations, each of which remains fundamentally regional in nature and almost all of which long predate the existence of al-Qaeda. ad\_icon Osama bin Laden and his disciples are small men and secondary threats whose shadows are made large by our fears. Al-Qaeda is the only global jihadist organization and is the only Islamic terrorist organization that targets the U.S. homeland. Al-Qaeda remains capable of striking here and is plotting from its redoubt in Waziristan, Pakistan. The organization, however, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist operation. Al-Qaeda threatens to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, but its capabilities are far inferior to its desires. Even the "loose nuke" threat, whose consequences would be horrific, has a very low probability. For the medium term, any attack is overwhelmingly likely to consist of creative uses of conventional explosives. No other Islamic-based terrorist organization, from Mindanao to the Bekaa Valley to the Sahel, targets the U.S. homeland, is part of a "global jihadist movement" or has more than passing contact with al-Qaeda. These groups do and will, however, identify themselves with global jihadist rhetoric and may bandy the bogey-phrase of "al-Qaeda." They are motivated by hostility toward the West and fear of the irresistible changes that education, trade, and economic and social development are causing in their cultures. These regional terrorist organizations may target U.S. interests or persons in the groups' historic areas of interest and operations. None of these groups is likely to succeed in seizing power or in destabilizing the societies they attack, though they may succeed in killing numerous people through sporadic attacks such as the Madrid train bombings. There are and will continue to be small numbers of Muslims in certain Western countries -- in the dozens, perhaps -- who seek to commit terrorist acts, along the lines of the British citizens behind the 2005 London bus bombings. Some may have irregular contact with al-Qaeda central in Waziristan; more will act as free agents for their imagined cause. They represent an Islamic-tinged version of the anarchists of the late 19th century: dupes of "true belief," the flotsam of revolutionary cultural change and destruction in Islam, and of personal anomie. We need to catch and neutralize these people. But they do not represent a global movement or a global threat. The threat from Islamic terrorism is no larger now than it was before Sept. 11, 2001. Islamic societies the world over are in turmoil and will continue for years to produce small numbers of dedicated killers, whom we must stop. U.S. and allied intelligence do a good job at that; these efforts, however, will never succeed in neutralizing every terrorist, everywhere. Why are these views so starkly at odds with what the Bush administration has said since the beginning of the "Global War on Terror"? This administration has heard what it has wished to hear, pressured the intelligence community to verify preconceptions, undermined or sidetracked opposing voices, and both instituted and been victim of procedures that guaranteed that the slightest terrorist threat reporting would receive disproportionate weight § Marked 09:08 § -- thereby comforting the administration's preconceptions and policy inclinations.

## Cap K

### 2AC Framework – Theory

#### Our interpretation is that plan focus is good

#### Aff choice – other frameworks moot the 1AC

#### Topic education – only focusing on the resolution ensures different ground from year to year

#### Reject non-policy alts and links not based on the plan text

### Role Playing Good – Mitchell

#### Role playing as public actors shatters apathy and political alienation which is critical to check inequality and exploitation

Gordon Mitchell, Associate Professor of Communication at University of Pittsburgh, Winter 2000, “Stimulated Public Argument As Pedagogical Play on Worlds”, Argumentation and Advocacy, vol 36, no 3, pq

When we assume the posture of the other in dramatic performance, we tap into

AND

that highlight this component of students' self-identities carry significant emancipatory potential.

### Role Playing Good – Streeten

#### Discussion of specific plans are can produce real world change

Paul Streeten, Econ prof @ Boston, 1999, Development, v. 42, n. 2, p 118

First, Utopian thinking can be useful as a framework for analysis. Just as

AND

opponents of reform, to those who want to preserve the status quo.

### Role Playing Good – Carlson

#### Schlags wrong

David Gray Carlson, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, Law Prof @ Cardozo, Columbia L. Rev, Nov. 1999, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908

Schlag is very hard on law professors who give advice to judges. He mocks their work as mere "pretend-law," n313 mere journalism. n314 "One need only pick up a judicial opinion, a state statute, a federal regulation, or a law review article to experience an overwhelming sense of dread and ennui." n315 Meanwhile, judges are not even paying attention to legal scholarship n316 - which, experience teaches, is disappointingly true. Vicarious participation in litigation or legislation can nevertheless be defended as a participation in culture itself. Law professors can contribute to that culture by making law more coherent, and in this sense their project is at least as worthy as any that philosophy, history or astrophysics [\*1951] could devise. Law has an objective structure that exceeds mere subjectivity. This objective structure can be altered by hard work. An altered legal world, however, is not the point. Evidence of consequential impact is gratifying, but this is simply what mere egotism requires. It is in the work itself that the value of legal scholarship can be found. Work is what reconciles the failure of the unhappy consciousness to achieve justice. Work is, in Hegel's view, “desire held in check, fleetingness staved off... work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent... This negative middle term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now... acquires an element of permanence. n317” Hegel, then, gives a spiritual turn to that worthy slogan "publish or perish." By working the law, lawyers, judges, private citizens, and even academics can make it more permanent, more resilient, more "existential," n318 but, more to the point, they make themselves more resilient, more "existential." n319 Work on law can increase freedom - the positive freedom that relieves the worker of "anxiety" - fear of disappearance into the Real. n320 When work is done, the legal universe swells and fills itself out - like an appetite that "grows by what it feeds on." n321 But far more important, the self gains a place in the world by the very work done. Work is the means of "subjective destitution" or "narcissistic loss" n322 - the complete externalization of the subject and the surrender of the fantasy support upon which the subject otherwise depends. In Lacanian terms, "subjective destitution" is the wages of cure at the end of analysis. n323 Or, in Hegelian terms, cure is "the ascesis that is necessary if consciousness is to reach genuine philosophic knowledge." n324 In this state, we precisely lose the suspicion that law (i.e., the big Other) does not exist. n325 In Hegel's inspirational words:

### 2AC Permutations

#### Perm do both – double bind – either the alt can’t overcome the status quo or it can overcome residual link to the plan

#### Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

### 2AC gg

#### Total rejection of capitalism fragments resistance – the perm solves best

J.K. Gibson-Graham, feminist economist, 1996, End of Capitalism

One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as “that which is known,” Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. We have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place. In return for our labors of creation, the monster has robbed us of all force. We hear – and find it easy to believe – that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist). The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place. The old political economic “systems” and “structures” that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still seem to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why can’t the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could being to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see. If capitalism takes up the available social space, there’s no room for anything else. If capitalism cannot coexist, there’s no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes “realistic” present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal. To achieve this I must smash Capitalism and see it in a thousand pieces. I must make its unity a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change.

### Nuclear Link

#### IFRs solve nuclear waste – Spent nuclear fuel is dangerously exposed in the status quo – only fast reactors solve

Fred Pearce, reporter on environmental issues for over 20 years, environmental correspondent for the New Scientist and The Guardian, 7-30-2012, “Are fast-breeder reactors the answer to our nuclear waste nightmare?” The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jul/30/fast-breeder-reactors-nuclear-waste-nightmare?newsfeed=true

None of it yet has a home. If not used as a fuel, it will need to be kept isolated for thousands of years to protect humans and wildlife. Burial deep underground seems the obvious solution, but nobody has yet built a geological repository. Public opposition is high — as successive U.S. governments have discovered whenever the burial ground at Yucca Mountain in Nevada is discussed — and the cost of construction will be huge. So the idea of building fast reactors to eat up this waste is attractive — especially in Britain, but also elsewhere. Theoretically at least, fast reactors can keep recycling their own fuel until all the plutonium is gone, generating electricity all the while. Britain's huge plutonium stockpile makes it a vast energy resource. David MacKay, chief scientist at the Department of Energy and Climate Change, recently said British plutonium contains enough energy to run the country's electricity grid for 500 years. Fast reactors can be run in different ways, either to destroy plutonium, to maximise energy production, or to produce new plutonium. Under the PRISM proposal now being considered at Sellafield, plutonium destruction would be the priority. "We could deal with the plutonium stockpile in Britain in five years," says Loewen. But equally, he says, it could generate energy, too. The proposed plant has a theoretical generating capacity of 600 megawatts. Fast reactors could do the same for the U.S. Under the presidency of George W. Bush, the U.S. launched a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership aimed at developing technologies to consume plutonium in spent fuel. But President Obama drastically cut the partnership's funding, while also halting work on the planned Yucca Mountain geological repository. "We are left with a million-year problem," says Loewen. "Right now there isn't a policy framework in the U.S. for solving this issue."

#### Plenty of fuel – IFRs eliminate need for uranium mining

Tom Blees, president of the Science Council for Global Initiatives and board member for the Global Energ Prize, 2008, “Newclear Power,” Prescription for the Planet, page 128

Consider, if you will, what this means in terms of energy availability. Nuclear “waste” — which in today’s terms can now be seen to be a gross misnomer — from LWRs 128 still contains about 95% of the fuel’s original energy. IFR plants can burn, in time, all of the actinides that have been mined, not just those that make it into the LWR’s fuel. None of the actinides that enter the site will ever leave it, until the time comes that all the plutonium from thermal reactors has been used up, and excess fissile material must be bred and transported to new reactors that need an initial loading. As we’ll see later on in the book, for all the worry about the long-lived nuclear waste building up all over the world, we can easily use it all up in IFRs. And once it’s all used up, all we’ll need to keep the then-existing IFRs operating is U-238, the principal component of depleted uranium (DU), which is a byproduct of uranium enrichment and the main component of all reactor fuels.129 We have so much of this already available that it could provide all the power needs of the entire planet for hundreds of years before we need to mine any more uranium. This is the same depleted uranium that is currently being used in both defensive and offensive weaponry, primarily by the United States. It would be a great improvement if we’d use it for generating electricity instead of shooting it at people.

#### Accidents can’t happen – the laws of physics mean zero risk

Tom Blees, president of the Science Council for Global Initiatives and board member for the Global Energ Prize, 2008, “Newclear Power,” Prescription for the Planet, page 136

No matter how safe a system is, those who seek to find fault with it will often contend that a disaster is only one human error away, and that there’s no way around it. That same argument will undoubtedly be leveled at the IFR system, yet it would be wildly off the mark. One of the wonders of the passive safety of IFRs is that they substitute the very laws of physics in place of human competence and mechanical performance. Rather than relying on pumps never failing (or on redundant backup pumps and systems), or on the competence of the plant operators, IFR design relies on unchanging physical laws. The boiling point of sodium is not going to change. And the temperature beyond which the fission reaction cannot sustain itself — less than the aforementioned boiling point of sodium — is likewise a function of the laws of physics. Human error cannot change these immutable conditions.

#### IFR is safer than SQ sources

Steve Kirsch, founder and CEO of multiple tech companies collectively worth over $1 billion and MS in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT, November 2009, “Why We Should Build an Integral Fast Reactor Now,” http://skirsch.wordpress.com/2009/11/25/ifr/

Safety: The IFR is safer than conventional nuclear because the reactors safely shut down based on the laws of physics if something goes wrong. Today's third generation nuclear designs are very safe: 1 accident predicted every 29 million reactor years. The IFR should be even safer due to the passive safety inherent in the design. Also, IFRs are much safer than the coal plants they replace. Coal power plants are estimated to kill 24,000 Americans per year, due to lung disease as well as causing 40,000 heart attacks per year. Outside of the Soviet Union, commercial nuclear has never killed even a single member of the public in its entire 50 year operating history.

#### Warming and fossil fuel burning outweighs nuclear waste and accidents – nukes are key to solve catastrophic warming

Spencer Weart, Ph.D. in Physics and Astrophysics at CU Boulder and former Director fo the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics, 3-26-2012, “Shunning Nuclear Power Will Lead to a Warmer World,” Yale Environment 360, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/shunning\_new\_nuclear\_power\_plants\_will\_lead\_to\_warmer\_world/2510/

The harm done to human health and the environment by all the nuclear accidents and nuclear waste releases in history is minor compared with the harm caused by the mining and burning of coal, with other fossil fuels not far behind. And there is worse: global warming, caused largely by the emission of heat-trapping gases from fossil fuels. If emissions continue to increase in a “business as usual” fashion — let alone if they increase even faster as reactors are phased out — future generations will suffer as we destabilize the climate system that has supported human civilization for thousands of years. Rising sea levels, droughts in key agricultural regions, and ever-worsening heat waves will threaten people just as the world’s population is projected to expand from 7 billion today to 10 billion by 2100. We will see the impoverishment of some of the ecosystems on which our society depends. While nuclear power offers no magical solution, it could help us avoid the worst.

### AT: Psychoanalysis – Fails

#### Psychoanalysis is tautological

Dian Perpich, Professor of PHILOSOPHY AT Vanderbilt, 2005, “Figurative Language and the ‘Face’ in Levinas’s Philosophy” Philosophy and Rhetoric vol. 38:2)

 Levinas’s hesitations about the value of psychoanalysis—indeed, what might be called his allergic reactions to psychoanalysis—are similarly based. Psychoanalysis, he writes, “casts a basic suspicion on the most unimpeachable testimony of self-consciousness” (1987b, 32). Psychological states in which the ego seems to have a “clear and distinct” grasp of itself are reread by psychoanalysis as symbols for a “reality that is totally inaccessible” to the self and that is the expression of “a social reality or a historical influence totally distinct from its [the ego’s] own intention” (34). Moreover, all of the ego’s protests against the interpretations of analysis are themselves subject to further analysis, leaving no point exterior to the analysis: “I am as it were shut up in my own portrait” (35). Psychoanalysis threatens an infinite regress of meaning, a recursive process that leads from one symbol to another, from one symptom to another with no end in sight and no way to break into or out of the chain of signifiers in the name of a signified. “The real world is transformed into a poetic world, that is, into a world without beginning in which one thinks without knowing what one thinks” (35). Put less poetically, Levinas’s worry is that psychoanalysis furnishes us with no fixed point or firm footing from which to launch a critique and to break with social and historical determinations of the psyche in order to judge society and history and to call both to account. Indeed, his uncharacteristic allusion to “clear and distinct” ideas betrays his intention: to seek, against both religious and psychoanalytic participations, for a relationship in which the ego is an “absolute,” “irreducible” singularity, within a totality but still separate from it, that is, still capable of a relation with exteriority. To seek such a relation is, Levinas says, “to ask whether a living man [sic] does not have the power to judge the history in which he is engaged, that is, whether the thinker as an ego, over and beyond all that he does with what he possesses, creates and leaves, does not have the substance of a cynic” (35). The naked being who confronts me with his or her alterity, the naked being that I am myself and whose being “counts as such” is now naked not with an erotic nudity but with the nudity of a cynic who has thrown off the cloak of culture in order to present him- or herself directly and “in person” through “this chaste bit of skin with brow, nose, eyes, and mouth” (41). Levinas picks up the thread of this worry about psychoanalysis in “Ethics and Discourse,” the main section of “The Ego and the Totality.” To affirm humankind as a power to judge history, he claims, is to affirm rationalism and to reject “the merely poetic thought which thinks without knowing what it things, or thinks as one dreams” (40). The impetus for psychoanalysis is philosophical, Levinas admits; that is, it shares initially in this affirmation of rationalism insofar as it affirms the need for reflection and for going “underneath” or getting behind unreflected consciousness and thought. However, if its impetus is philosophical, its issue is not insofar as the tools that it uses for reflection turn out to be “some fundamental, but elementary, fables ... which, incomprehensibly, would alone be unequivocal, alone not translate (or mask or symbolize) a reality more profound than themselves” (40). Psychoanalysis returns one, then, to the irrationalism of myth and poetry rather than liberating one from them. It resubmerges one within the cultural and historical ethos and mythos in a way that seems to Levinas to permit no end to interpretation and thus no power to judge. He imagines psychoanalysis as a swirling phantasmagoria in which language is all dissimulation and deception. “One can find one’s bearings in all this phantasmagoria, one can inaugurate the work of criticism only if one can begin with a fixed point. The fixed point cannot be some incontestable truth, a ‘certain’ statement that would always be sub ject to psychoanalysis; it can only be the absolute status of an interlocutor, a being, and not a truth about beings” (41). In this last claim, the fate of Heideggerian fundamental ontology that is an understanding of Being rather than a relation to beings (or to a being, a face) is hitched to the fate of psychoanalysis and both linked to participation, the “nocturnal chaos” that threatens to drown the ego in the totality.

#### Science disproves it

Mario Bunge, philosopher at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, 2010, “Should Psychoanalysis Be in the Science Museum?” <http://stirling-westrup-tt.blogspot.com/2010/11/tt-ns-2780-robert-bud-and-mario-bunge.html>

We should congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny helps in understanding democracy. Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of immaterial mind over body. Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513). More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However, once again, the original studies did not involve control groups. In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience. This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test. True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the testable ones have been soundly refuted. For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to have sex with their mothers. The list goes on. As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies. Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

### AT: Psychoanalysis – Gordon

####  Psychoanalytic critique causes passivity and destroys political struggle

Paul Gordon, psychotherapist living and working in London, Race & Class, 2001, v. 42, n. 4, p. 30-1

The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with disappointment. All the tragedies of the political project of emancipation -- the evils of Stalinism in particular -- are seen as the inevitable product of men and women trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into discourse and deconstruction and representation -- as though to interpret the world is more important than to change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'.58 To justify their flight from a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals find abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case, psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers `a world-historical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human- kind to be free. At every turn for such theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners: there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; however, once we grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax.59 Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory power of his new faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always `imagined', which, in his view, means based on fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are dismissed as `fantasies of self-sufficient combination'.60 In this scenario, the idea that people might come together, think together, analyse together and act together as rational beings is impossible. The idea of a genuine community of equals becomes a pure fantasy, a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the first place: `Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented traditions.'61 Now, this is not only nonsense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history `always false'? Did the Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always `imagined'? Or, as Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle? Furthermore, all attempts to legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other firm action against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded `understanding' or even help through psychotherapy. It is indeed a strange kind of `anti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up. In their move from politics to the academy and the world of `discourse', the postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical materialism, for another, psychoanalysis.62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed radicalism of psychoanalysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret it, need to look elsewhere.

### 2AC Consequentialism Good – Isaacs

#### Evaluating consequences key to ethics

Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, Spring 2002, Dissent, vol. 49, no. 2

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah

AND

choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

### 2AC Alt Vagueness

#### The alt is vague – it’s a voting issue

#### Spikes our offense – no way for aff to win

#### Skews 2AC time

#### Damage is done – 2NC clarification rewards them because 1AR will always be behind

#### If you assess they don’t have a pragmatic way to resolve their ethical impacts, it’s a reason to reject the alternative

### 2AC Alt Fails – Jones

#### Their politics fails – lack of a mechanism means they can’t convert theory into practice.

Richard Wyn Jones, 1999, “Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory,” ciao

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond grandiose statements of intent. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the mechanisms by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a fatally flawed enterprise.

### 2AC AT: Root Cause

#### No root cause– prefer proximate causes

John Norton, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia He formerly served as the first Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, Winter, 2004, “Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle”, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis Law

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. [n158](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1329520437445&returnToKey=20_T13973620735&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.647208.6119287203#n158) Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come.

### 2AC Root Cause – Warming

#### Root cause approach to warming fails – using the existing system is the only shot we have to avoid short term tipping points – we can shift the system later.

George Monbiot, climate socialist, 8-22-2008, “Identity Politics in Climate Change Hell,” http://www.monbiot.com/2008/08/22/identity-politics-in-climate-change-hell/

But in seeking to extrapolate from this experience to a wider social plan, she makes two grave errors. The first is to confuse ends and means. She claims to want to stop global warming, but she makes that task 100 times harder by rejecting all state and corporate solutions. It seems to me that what she really wants to do is to create an anarchist utopia, and use climate change as an excuse to engineer it. Stopping runaway climate change must take precedence over every other aim. Everyone in this movement knows that there is very little time: the window of opportunity in which we can prevent two degrees of warming is closing fast. We have to use all the resources we can lay hands on, and these must include both governments and corporations. Or perhaps she intends to build the installations required to turn the energy economy around – wind farms, wave machines, solar thermal plants in the Sahara, new grid connections and public transport systems – herself? Her article is a terryifying example of the ability some people have to put politics first and facts second when confronting the greatest challenge humanity now faces. The facts are as follows. Runaway climate change is bearing down on us fast. We require a massive political and economic response to prevent it. Governments and corporations, whether we like it or not, currently control both money and power. Unless we manage to mobilise them, we stand a snowball’s chance in climate hell of stopping the collapse of the biosphere. Jasiewicz would ignore all these inconvenient truths because they conflict with her politics. “Changing our sources of energy without changing our sources of economic and political power”, she asserts, “will not make a difference. Neither coal nor nuclear are the “solution”, we need a revolution.” So before we are allowed to begin cutting greenhouse gas emissions, we must first overthrow all political structures and replace them with autonomous communities of happy campers. All this must take place within a couple of months, as there is so little time in which we could prevent two degrees of warming. This is magical thinking of the most desperate kind. If I were an executive of E.On or Exxon, I would be delighted by this political posturing, as it provides a marvellous distraction from our real aims. To support her argument, Jasiewicz misrepresents what I said at climate camp. She claims that I “confessed not knowing where to turn next to solve the issues of how to generate the changes necessary to shift our sources of energy, production and consumption”. I confessed nothing of the kind. In my book Heat I spell out what is required to bring about a 90% cut in emissions by 2030. Instead I confessed that I don’t know how to solve the problem of capitalism without resorting to totalitarianism. The issue is that capitalism involves lending money at interest. If you lend at 5%, then one of two things must happen. Either the money supply must increase by 5% or the velocity of circulation must increase by 5%. In either case, if this growth is not met by a concomitant increase in the supply of goods and services, it becomes inflationary and the system collapses. But a perpetual increase in the supply of goods and services will eventually destroy the biosphere. So how do we stall this process? Even when usurers were put to death and condemned to perpetual damnation, the practice couldn’t be stamped out. Only the communist states managed it, through the extreme use of the state control Ewa professes to hate. I don’t yet have an answer to this conundrum. Does she? Yes, let us fight both corporate power and the undemocratic tendencies of the state. Yes, let us try to crack the problem of capitalism and then fight for a different system. But let us not confuse this task with the immediate need to stop two degrees of warming, or allow it to interfere with the carbon cuts that have to begin now.

#### A policy focused approach to the environment is good – spills over to value change

Anthony A. Leiserowitz, director of Strategic Initiatives and the Yale Project on Climate Change, and a research scientist at the School of Forestry & Environmental Studies at Yale University and Lisa O. Fernandez, the program coordinator for Strategic Initiatives and the Yale Project on Climate Change, October 2007, “Toward a New Consciousness: Values to Sustain Human and Natural Communities,” Environment, http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/September-October%202008/Leiserowitz-Fernandez-full.html

Policy analysts cannot create a movement by themselves. But they can help prepare the ground so that when a movement coalesces, policy tools and leaders are ready with a clear sense of which goals to pursue and paths to take. Likewise, it is imperative that environmentalism become more than another special interest. What is required is a systems shift, a new holistic view of the world we live in. A powerful, inspiring vision of a better world, not just a critique of the status quo is needed. If widely accepted, the policy changes will follow. Policymakers and analysts can help to develop the social and political capital and policy tools for the movement that is emerging in response to the ecological, social, and economic challenges of the present and future. Use policy to encourage behavior change along with a change in values. The late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) argued that, “The central conservative truth is that culture, not politics, determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself.” Sociologists have found that the engrained routinization of behavior, over time, can lead to sea changes in values. Focusing solely on changing values first may miss the opportunity to engrain new behaviors, which may themselves lead to new values. Part of the importance of policy is that laws and regulations can require changes in behavior, whether or not citizens and companies currently hold the values that would lead to those behaviors without regulation. Democratic governments, however, cannot govern without the consent of the governed and often cannot adequately enforce changes in individual behavior. Thus, policy instruments and value changes need to support each other, creating synergies and positive feedbacks that lead to large-scale changes in human behavior. Changes in smoking, seat-belt use, and drunk driving are all recent examples of the mutually reinforcing impacts of shifts in public values and attitudes on the one hand and changes in government policies on the other. • Prepare for the opportunities inherent in future crises. There is often opportunity in crisis, and the policy domain needs to be prepared to act when it occurs. Crises like Pearl Harbor, Three Mile Island, and 9/11 resulted in rapid and fundamental shifts in public priorities and institutions. As global environmental conditions continue to deteriorate, there will be inevitable surprises, shocks, and disasters. How can leaders be prepared not only to better respond to the damage and destruction of these events, but also to take advantage of these “teachable moments”? We need to prepare for future ecological crises by creating institutions, systems, and roadmaps for change so that negative responses, such as authoritarianism, do not seize the day.

#### Treating warming like a technical problem is the best method – arms race proves

Steven F. Hayward, the F. K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow at AEI, 10-16-2006, “The Fate of the Earth in the Balance,’ AEI, http://www.aei.org/article/society-and-culture/the-fate-of-the-earth-in-the-balance/

This small example of environmental atavism reveals a more fundamental aspect of the public discourse about climate change. At the core of environmentalist animus against nuclear power is a categorical suspicion about technology itself, which is connected to a larger philosophical pessimism about human civilization and (hu)man’s supposed separation or alienation from nature. We have seen this style of argument during the long controversy over the arms race in the late stages of the Cold War, during which the immense political and technical aspects of the problem were, for a certain cast of mind, entirely subsumed beneath a more general critique of how the arms race was merely symptomatic of a larger crisis of civilization. Unless this larger crisis was addressed, it was suggested, there would be no hope the arms race could be solved. It was not but twenty years ago that the large nuclear weapons arsenals of the superpowers threatened the instantaneous destruction of civilization and perhaps human life itself. Today, climate change is said to threaten the same things, only more slowly. It is remarkable how similarly the leading advocates for these two problems understand and conceptualize them. In the case of both the arms race then and climate change today, we are told that the issue is ultimately philosophical in nature, and that wholesale changes in our philosophical perspective must necessarily precede political and policy remedies to the problem. Should this perspective be taken seriously? What can it really mean? The Fate of the Earth in the Balance The peculiarity of this approach to major global problems is best seen by comparing the two leading popular books on each issue, Jonathan Schell’s 1982 bestseller The Fate of the Earth, and Al Gore’s 1991 bestseller Earth in the Balance (whose main arguments reappear in truncated form in An Inconvenient Truth). It is not just the titles that are strikingly similar; a close reading reveals the two books to be identical in their overarching philosophy.[5] In both, mankind is poised on the abyss, facing, in Gore’s words, “the most serious threat that we have ever faced,”[6] or “the nearness of extinction,”[7] to use only one of Schell’s many apocalyptic formulations. (An index entry--“despair; see also futility”[8]--conveys the mood better than any quotation from the main text.) In fact, if one substitutes “global warming” for “nuclear weapons” in the text of Fate of the Earth, the result is so shockingly close to Earth in the Balance that one could almost make out a case for plagiarism on Gore’s part. Perhaps some publisher will have the wit to meld the two books into one: The Fate of the Earth in the Balance. But such a combination is not necessary. The two books directly intersect in several places. Gore writes, for example, that: the political will that led to mass protests against escalating the arms race during the early 1980s came from a popular awareness that civilization seemed to be pulled toward the broad lip of a downslope leading to a future catastrophe--nuclear war--that would crush human history forever into a kind of black hole. . . . This is not unlike the challenge we face today in the global environmental crisis. The potential for true catastrophe lies in the future, but the downslope that pulls us toward it is becoming recognizably steeper with each passing year.[9] In this, Gore was only returning the favor to Schell, who occasionally paused long enough from his lament over nuclear catastrophe to include a few nods to ecocatastrophe. For his part, Schell mentions “global heating through an increased ‘greenhouse effect,’” adding: The nuclear peril is usually seen in isolation from the threats to other forms of life and their ecosystems, but in fact should be seen as the very center of the ecological crisis--as the cloud-covered Everest of which the more immediate, visible kinds of harm to the environment are the mere foothills. Both the effort to preserve the environment and the effort to save the species from extinction by nuclear arms would be enriched and strengthened by this recognition.[10] Both books display an affectation for gilding their arguments with lots of brief references to major thinkers from a wide variety of disciplines. Consider Schell on Heisenberg: The famous uncertainty principle, formulated by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg, has shown that our knowledge of atomic phenomena is limited because the experimental procedures with which we must carry out our observations inevitably interfere with the phenomena that we wish to measure. Schell applies Heisenberg’s scientific insight to all forms of human investigation, writing that “a limit to our knowledge is fixed by the fact that we are incarnate beings, not disembodied spirits.”[11] The supposed separation from nature implied by Heisenberg’s idea limits our appreciation for both nature and our predicament. Gore follows down the same track: Earlier this century, the Heisenberg Principle established that the very act of observing a natural phenomenon can change what is being observed. Although the initial theory was limited in practice to special cases in subatomic physics, the philosophical implications were and are staggering. It is now apparent that since Descartes reestablished the Platonic notion and began the scientific revolution, human civilization has been experiencing a kind of Heisenberg Principle writ large. . . . [T]he world of intellect is assumed to be separate from the physical world.[12] Gore opens his hit movie and companion book An Inconvenient Truth with an homage to the famous photo of the Earth taken from the moon by the Apollo 8 astronauts in 1968. This image, he tells us, played a key role in galvanizing the world’s environmental consciousness, underscoring the fragility of the planet. As he put it fulsomely in Earth in the Balance: Those first striking pictures taken by the Apollo astronauts of the earth floating in the blackness of space were so deeply moving because they enabled us to see our planet from a new perspective--a perspective from which the preciousness and fragile beauty of the earth was suddenly clear.[13] Schell uses the same trope: As it happens, our two roles in the nuclear predicament have been given visual representation in the photographs of the earth that we have taken with the aid of another technical device of our time, the spaceship. These pictures illustrate, on the one hand, our mastery over nature, which has enabled us to take up a position in the heavens and look back on the earth as though it were just one more celestial body, and, on the other, our weakness and frailty in the face of that mastery, which we cannot help feeling when we see the smallness, solitude, and delicate beauty of our planetary home.[14] These are only a few of the many examples that can be drawn of both books’ derivative and allusive nature. Both authors offer up references to Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Francis Bacon, Einstein, Descartes, and Hannah Arendt in what might be called, to paraphrase Arendt, the banality of promiscuous allusion, all to bolster a superficial philosophical or anthropological point that is far distant from the politics and policy of either issue. Most troubling is that both authors depict dissent from their point of view to be a pathology of some kind, foreclosing that there could be any rational basis for a different point of view. Gore compares dissenters to his view of our environmental predicament to garden-variety substance abusers, arguing that people who are oblivious to our “collision” with nature are “enablers” who are “helping to ensure that the addictive behavior continues. The psychological mechanism of denial is complex, but again addiction serves as a model.”[15] Elsewhere Gore compares our “dysfunctional civilization” to dysfunctional families, whose members suffer from “a serious psychological disorder.” While Gore begins this discussion by saying that family dysfunctionality is a metaphor, he ends by applying the concept literally: “The model of the dysfunctional family has a direct bearing on our ways of thinking about the environment.”[16] Schell is close aboard: “A society that systematically shuts its eyes to an urgent peril to its physical survival and fails to take any steps to save itself cannot be called psychologically well.”[17] Both authors call for making their particular issue the paramount global priority in the same terms. Gore argues that “we must make the environment the central organizing principle [emphasis added] for civilization. . . . [T]he tide in this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join in an all-out effort.”[18] Schell wrote, “If we felt the peril for what it is--an urgent threat to our whole human substance--we would let it become the organizing principle [emphasis added] of our global collective existence: the foundation on which the world was built.”[19] Having laid the groundwork for a wholesale change in our priorities, both Schell and Gore are surprisingly light on the social and political architecture of their alternative world. This is explicitly so in Schell’s case: “I have not sought to define a political solution to the nuclear predicament. . . . I have left to others those awesome, urgent tasks.”[20] Gore’s approach is better supported; he offers a laundry list of specific policy recommendations mostly on energy and resource use, but it falls far short of his desired “wrenching transformation” of civilization. If the broader solution to our predicament is not clear even in outline, it is because neither author fully grasps the magnitude of the critique he is making, such that a political solution--at least, a solution that is compatible with liberal democracy--is impossible. Neither man understands why. The Real Source for The Fate of the Earth in the Balance Despite the parade of quotes and references from Plato and Arendt, there is one thinker conspicuously absent from both Schell and Gore’s numerous citations but whose spirit is present on almost every page of both books: Martin Heidegger. Perhaps the absence of a reference to Heidegger is due to reticence or discretion, given Heidegger’s dubious and complicated association with Nazism. Nothing derails an argument faster than playing the reductio ad Hitlerum card. More likely it is the abstruse and difficult character of Heidegger’s arguments; Gore and Schell may not realize how closely the core of their argument about the technological alienation of man from nature tracks Heidegger’s more thorough account in his famous 1953 essay “The Question Concerning Technology.”[21] Heidegger asks, “What is modern technology?” His understanding of technology is sometimes rendered in translation as “technicity” to convey a defective way of knowing about phenomena, and to distinguish the term from its more common usage to mean mere scientific instrumentality (think gadgets). Heidegger believed that our mode of objectifying nature alienates mankind from perceiving and contemplating pure “Being.” Whatever this may mean--and even Heidegger’s followers admit it is obscure (Heidegger himself wrote that “we are asking about something which we barely grasp”[22])--Heidegger suggests that philosophy has been asking the wrong questions since the very beginning, and the culmination of this wrong track is modern technology, which completes the alienation of man from nature. This is where Heidegger prepares the way for Gore. Modern technology, according to Heidegger, puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. . . . The earth now reveals itself as a coal-mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears different from how it did when to set in order still meant to take of and maintain. . . . But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [italics in original] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use.[23] Here are Gore’s parallel passages: [O]ur civilization is holding ever more tightly to its habit of consuming larger and larger quantities every year of coal, oil, fresh air and water, trees, topsoil, and the thousand other substances we rip from the crust of the earth. . . . We seem increasingly eager to lose ourselves in the forms of culture, society, technology, the media, and the rituals of production and consumption, but the price we pay is a loss of our spiritual lives.[24] And: Our seemingly compulsive need to control the natural world . . . has driven us to the edge of disaster, for we have become so successful at controlling nature than we have lost our connection to it.[25] It is possible to compile a long inventory of close parallels between Heidegger and Gore. For example, Heidegger told interviewers in 1966: [T]echnicity increasingly dislodges man and uproots him from the earth. . . . The last 30 years have made it clearer that the planet-wide movement of modern technicity is a power whose magnitude in determining [our] history can hardly be overestimated.[26] Heidegger also found the earth-from-space photos as affecting as Gore and Schell: I don’t know if you were shocked, but [certainly] I was shocked when a short time ago I saw the pictures of the earth taken from the moon. We do not need atom bombs at all [to uproot us]--the uprooting of man is already here. All our relationships have become merely technical ones. It is no longer upon an earth than man lives today.[27] Gore likes to cite the supposed proverb that the Chinese symbol for “crisis” also means “opportunity.” Heidegger was fond of quoting a line from the German poet Hölderlin: “Where danger lies, there too grows the chance for salvation.” And is it necessary to mention that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle also shows up for duty in Heidegger’s essay on technology? Heidegger is often said to have advocated a return to pre-Socratic philosophy, though in fact he was skeptical that there was any philosophical solution to the problem he perceived. Gore follows Heidegger closely when he criticizes Plato and the Western philosophic tradition for preparing the ground for modern man’s estrangement from nature: The strange absence of emotion, the banal face of evil so often manifested by mass technological assaults on the global environment, is surely a consequence of the belief in an underlying separation of intellect from the physical world. At the root of this belief lies a heretical understanding of humankind’s place in the world as old as Plato, as seductive in its mythic appeal as Gnosticism, as compelling as the Cartesian promise of Promethean power--and it has led to tragic results.[28] Political Implications Assuming for the purposes of discussion that Gore’s Heideggerian analysis is correct, can a reconnection of intellect and the physical world be accomplished through politics--or led by politicians? Heidegger did not think so, which is why he said it would be impossible for him to write an ethical or political treatise.[29] He doubted democracy offered any hope. In an interview late in life, Heidegger said, “For me today it is a decisive question as to how any political system--and which one--can be adapted to an epoch of technicity. I know of no answer to this question. I am not convinced that it is democracy.”[30] Heidegger was contemptuous of postwar democratic reforms--calling them “halfway measures”--including individual constitutional rights, because: I do not see in them any actual confrontation with the world of technicity, inasmuch as behind them all, according to my view, stands the conception that technicity in its essence is something that man holds within his own hands. Heidegger thought American democracy was the most hopeless of all, in words that sound in substance exactly like Gore’s complaint: [Americans] are still caught up in a thought that, under the guise of pragmatism, facilitates the technical operation and manipulation [of things], but at the same time blocks the way to reflection upon the genuine nature of modern technicity.[31] (Separately, Heidegger wrote that America epitomized “the emerging monstrousness of modern times.”[32]) From here it is possible to comprehend more dispassionately Heidegger’s attraction to the Nazi movement in the 1930s. He had no brief for fascism in general or National Socialism in particular, nor was he an anti-Semite.[33] What he expressed in his famous “Rector’s Address”[34] in 1934 was that the “inner truth and greatness” of the Nazi movement was its potential “encounter between technicity on the planetary level and modern man,” and that it “casts its net in these troubled waters of ‘values’ and ‘totalities,’” or, as he put it a 1948 letter to Herbert Marcuse, “a spiritual renewal of life in its entirety.”[35] In other words, the “wrenching transformation” of Germany that the Nazi revolution set in motion held the potential for reconnecting humankind with the essence of Being in a primal, pre-Socratic way. Heidegger’s moral blindness to the phenomenon in front of him exposes the hazard of an excessively abstract approach to human existence. As Heidegger’s example shows, the idea of transforming human consciousness through politics is likely an extremist--and potentially totalitarian--project. Reviewing the fundamentally Heideggerian understanding of our environmental predicament in Gore’s thought throws new light on the deeper meaning of Gore’s call for a “wrenching transformation” of civilization on the level of thought. Gore would no doubt be sincerely horrified at the suggested parallel between his themes and Heidegger’s moral blindness toward political extremism, and rightly reject it as the implication of his views. He is, thankfully, too imbued with the innate American democratic tradition to embrace any such extremism.[36] But it is fair to ask whether he has fully thought through the implications of his ambitious critique. In the case of both Gore and Schell before him, the Heideggerian approach reveals a certain cast of mind: deeply pessimistic, but utopian at the same time. Our salvation demands submitting to the moral authority of their “vision” to change our “consciousness.” After all, one aspect of Plato that Heidegger approves of is the view that mankind will suffer unremitting disaster until either rulers become philosophers or philosophers become rulers. (Indeed it was the failure of intellectuals to guide the Nazi movement that led to its ruin, Heidegger thought.) Gore seems to be making a round trip, looking to end up on either end of this potentiality, envisioning himself either as a ruler who has become a philosopher or as a philosopher who may yet (again) become a ruler. Is it so farfetched to suggest that this has some problematic, if unintended, political implications? One of Gore’s sound and important arguments in Earth in the Balance and An Inconvenient Truth is that it is a profound error to suppose that the earth’s environment is so robust that there is little or nothing that mankind could do to damage it seriously. He is right, as was Heidegger, to point out the immense earthshaking power of modern technology. But there is a symmetrical observation to be made of Gore’s metaphysical approach to the problem, which is that it is an equally profound error to suppose that the environment of human liberty is so robust that there is no political intervention on behalf of the environment that could not damage liberty in serious ways, especially if the environment is elevated to the central organizing principle of civilization. Implicit in this goal is downgrading human liberty as the central organizing principle of civilization. There are no index entries in Earth in the Balance for “liberty,” “freedom,” or “individualism.” Heidegger believed the liberal conceptions of these great terms were meaningless or without foundation. There is no acknowledgement in Gore’s book that this is even a serious consideration. Gore’s one discussion of the matter is not reassuring: In fact, what many feel is a deep philosophical crisis in the West has occurred in part because this balance [between rights and responsibilities] has been disrupted: we have tilted so far toward individual rights and so far away from any sense of obligation that it is now difficult to muster an adequate defense of any rights vested in the community at large or the nation--much less rights properly vested in all humankind or in posterity.[37] But Is It Necessary? Is Gore’s high-level metaphysical analysis necessary in the first place? Do we really have to resolve or unwind the problem of Platonic idealism and Cartesian dualism to address the problem of climate change? The example of the previous case in point--the arms race--suggests an answer. The arms race did not require a revolution in human consciousness or a transformation of national and global political institutions to bring about rapid and favorable changes. The kind of grandiose, pretentious thinking exemplified in Fate of the Earth played little or no role in these shifts. The problem turned out to be much simpler. The acute problem of the superpower arms race was mostly a moral problem--not a metaphysical problem--arising from the character of the irreconcilable regimes. As was frequently pointed out, the United States never worried about British or French nuclear weapons. Once the United States and the Soviet Union were able to establish a level of trust and common interest, unwinding the arms race became a relatively easy matter. Nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear proliferation in unsavory regimes (Iran, North Korea) is still around today, but the acute existential threat of the arms race has receded substantially. In the early 1980s, The Fate of the Earth became the Bible for the nuclear freeze movement--the simplistic idea brought to you by the same people who thought Ronald Reagan was a simpleton. To his credit, then representative and later senator Gore opposed the nuclear freeze. Nowadays Gore has started to call for an immediate freeze on greenhouse-gas emissions, which he must know is unrealistic. His explanation in a recent speech shows that he missed entirely the lesson from that earlier episode: An immediate freeze [on CO2 emissions] has the virtue of being clear, simple, and easy to understand. It can attract support across partisan lines as a logical starting point for the more difficult work that lies ahead. I remember a quarter century ago when I was the author of a complex nuclear arms control plan to deal with the then rampant arms race between our country and the former Soviet Union. At the time, I was strongly opposed to the nuclear freeze movement, which I saw as simplistic and naive. But, three-quarters of the American people supported it--and as I look back on those years I see more clearly now that the outpouring of public support for that very simple and clear mandate changed the political landscape and made it possible for more detailed and sophisticated proposals to eventually be adopted.[38] The irony of this statement is that since the moral and political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union could not be resolved diplomatically, the way to move relations forward was to convert relations into a technical problem (i.e., negotiations over the number and specifications of weapons systems). Gore remained firmly within the technocratic arms-control community throughout this period, even as Schell and others tried to moralize the arms-control problem with the nuclear freeze proposal. But the moral confusion (some critics said the premise of moral equivalence) of the freeze idea made it a sideshow at best and a hindrance at worst. On the contrary, President Reagan’s resistance to the freeze, as well as the conventions of the arms-control process to which Gore held, were crucial to his strategy for changing the dynamic of the arms race. Having been an arms-control technocrat in the 1980s, Gore today wants to turn the primarily technical and economic problems of climate change into a moral problem. Gore’s argument that climate change is a moral problem and not a political problem is not serious, since the leading prescriptions for treating the problem all require massive applications of political power on a global scale. Skeptics and cynics might dismiss Gore’s metaphysical speculations as mere intellectual preening, as many critics did with Fate of the Earth in the 1980s. But such an approach to environmental issues may be an obstacle to many practical, incremental steps that can be taken to solve real climate-policy problems. Once one grasps the Heideggerian character of the Gore approach to thinking about environmental problems, the hesitance about nuclear power comes into better focus. Gore and others in his mold dislike large-scale technologies because they are intrinsic to mankind’s mastery of nature that is driving our supposed alienation from nature. This same premise also explains the frequently hostile reaction of many environmentalists to suggestions that adaptation to climate change should be a part of any serious climate policy, even though many leading climate scientists and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have embraced adaptation. The suggestion that technologies for climate modification might be developed, which would be the climate policy equivalent of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, are greeted contemptuously for the same reason. Will climate policy ultimately be guided by physicians or metaphysicians? Gore’s high-profile position on these issues tilts the balance toward metaphysicians. This is certain to generate ferocious resistance to change well beyond merely self-interested industries. Gore would be better off following the advice of Heidegger critic Stanley Rosen, and “step downward, out of the thin atmosphere of the floating island of Laputa or of the balloons in which so many of our advanced thinkers are currently suspended, back into the rich air of everyday life.”[39] That’s a fancy way of saying, “Take a deep breath, Al.”

### 2AC Pragmatism Good – Environment

#### Prag key to reconcile claims to justice and find specific solutions—blanket rejection of state engagement shut out voices from the conversation

Mei-Fang Fan, professor of Public Administration and Institute of Public Policy, Tamkang University, June, 2006, “Environmental Justice and Nuclear Waste Conflicts in Taiwan,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 417 – 434

It is necessary to rethink the multiple conceptions of environmental justice articulated by the Yami and Taiwanese groups. This section focuses on the questions of how we might respond to differing ways of understanding environmental justice, deal with the divisions within a multicultural society and formulate environmental policy regarding nuclear waste dilemmas. The Yami professional and teenage student groups tended to stress the preservation of a liveable environment for future generations and regarded it as the core element of the environmental justice movement and the basis for the Yami’s opposition to nuclear waste. Instead, for most of the Taiwanese participants, the Yami’s anti-nuclear movement did not exactly correspond to the claims of environmental justice. Those Taiwanese participants who hold utilitarian views considered that the Yami anti-nuclear waste movement involved political consideration, self-interest and the attempt to obtain benefits or celebrity. The gap between the Yami and Taiwanese groups and the lack of mutual understanding and communication between them are significant. The Yami groups expressed their doubts as to whether the Taiwanese people would treat the tribesmen sincerely as partners in dealing with environmental problems, while the Taiwanese participants seemed to view the Yami as insular. A growing number of environmental ethicists have tried to rethink the problem of what practical effect environmental ethics has had on the formation of environmental policy. Contrary to a monistic approach, moral pluralism as a practical philosophy allows a form of agreement on real cases in which agreement on the general formulation of moral principles is not essential. Practical philosophy seeks the integration of multiple values and tries to reduce the distance between disputants by finding a general policy direction that can achieve greater consensus. It searches for workable solutions to specific problems or a range of actions that are morally permissible or acceptable to a wide range of worldviews (Norton, 1995: 129– 33). The multiple conceptions of environmental justice articulated by the Yami and Taiwanese groups in the context of nuclear waste controversies provide support for a pluralistic account of environmental values rather than a monistic philosophical stance. A foundational approach to ethics that requires the application of a single theory functionally equivalent to truth fails to take a variety of conflicting moral insights into account and limits alternatives to nuclear waste management. In contrast, pragmatism represents an engagement with the actual problems in the specific historical and social context. Environmental pragmatism draws upon the pragmatist philosophical and political tradition in American thought, advocating a serious inquiry into the practical merits of moral pluralism (Light & Katz, 1996). The American philosophical school, represented mainly in the late 19th- and early 20thcentury writings of Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey is marked most notably by its anti-foundational character that denies the existence of ‘a priori or self-justifying ‘‘truths’’ and moral absolutes’ (Minteer & Manning, 1999: 193). For Light (1996), there is much that we do agree on that has not been put into environmental policy or communicated to the public effectively. From the metaphilosophical perspective, what environmental pragmatists agree on is that the truth of any particular theoretical framework is not always fundamental for specific environmental problems and the ‘appropriateness of any one theory in a particular case is contingent on historical, cultural, social and resource conditions’. Environmental pragmatism chooses the approach that is most appropriate for purposes of environmental practice regardless of its theoretical origin (Light, 1996: 172, 177). Considering the multiple values held by the Yami and Taiwanese groups in the nuclear waste disputes, abstract moral norms provided by environmental ethicists do not appear to resolve the practical problems faced by the local residents on Orchid Island. **Instead of asking environmental ethicists to give up** their **debates** **about** non-anthropocentric natural **value**, environmental pragmatism endorses a pluralism that acknowledges the possible necessity of sometimes using the anthropocentric description of the value of nature to help support a morally responsible policy (Light, 2004). Furthermore, the pragmatists admit that our understandings and concepts are fallible, and that experience can at any time reveal our beliefs or the meaning of an idea as false. Environmental pragmatism recognises the importance of many diverse individuals, experiences and concepts coming together to offer insights into actual problems in the public sphere (Parker, 1996). A growing body of research has demonstrated the validity of a pragmatic approach to specific environmental and social issues, including the cases of policymaking for leaded gasoline (Thomson, 2003), forest resource management (Castle, 1996), animal welfare and hunting (Light, 2004). Environmental pragmatism, representing a democratic respect for diverse public values and ethical positions regarding the environment, is relevant to the multiple understandings of environmental justice.

### 2AC Value To Life Subjective – Shwartz

#### Value to life can’t be measured externally – we must preserve life to give people autonomy

L. Shwartz “A Value to Life: Who Decides and How?” Medical ethics: a case-based approach 2002 www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)

Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgement, and value judgements are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result, no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality. Nevertheless, quality is still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherine’s choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which considerations can be used to protect the patient’s interests.

### 2AC Pragmatism Good – Boggs

#### Engaging in institutions is key to politics

Carl Boggs, Professor of Social Sciences at National University in Los Angeles, 1997, “The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America,” *Theory and Society*, Volume 26, Number 6, December, Springer

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here—localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post-modernism, Deep Ecology—intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. [end page 773] The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved—perhaps even unrecognized—only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites—an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise—or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75

### 2AC Epistemology Not First – Owen

#### Epistemology is not a prerequisite

David Owen, University of Southampton, July 2002, “Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Practical Reasoning,” Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 31.3, p. 655-656

Commenting on the 'philosophical turn' in IR, Wæver remarks that '[a] frenzy for words like "epistemology" and "ontology" often signals this philosophical turn', although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory [end page 655] to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, 'theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program' in that it 'dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory'.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since 'whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry'.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) 'the Highlander view'—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates [end page 656] the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

### Cap K – Space add on

#### cap makes space travel possible

Nader Elhefnawy, taught at the University of Miami, published widely on space and international issues, Monday, September 29, 2008, “Economic growth and space development over the long haul” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1220/1

Nonetheless, even if one should not get carried away by seemingly staggering numbers, the fact of higher output still means an enlarged range of options. Just as China’s economic growth has made its new ambitions in space more than just a dream (even if many of its plans have yet to prove to be realistic), a space project of any given size would seem far more affordable in a world where global wealth had risen by a factor of two, three, or five.

#### Space is key to preventing extinction

James Oberg, space writer and a former space flight engineer based in Houston, 1999, Space Power Theory, http://www.jamesoberg.com/books/spt/new-CHAPTERSw\_figs.pdf

We have the great gift of yet another period when our nation is not threatened; and our world is free from opposing coalitions with great global capabilities. We can use this period to take our nation and our fellow men into the greatest adventure that our species has ever embarked upon. The United States can lead, protect, and help the rest of [hu]mankind to move into space. It is particularly fitting that a country comprised of people from all over the globe assumes that role. This is a manifest destiny worthy of dreamers and poets, warriors and conquerors. In his last book, Pale Blue Dot, Carl Sagan presents an emotional argument that our species must venture into the vast realm of space to establish a spacefaring civilization. While acknowledging the very high costs that are involved in manned spaceflight, Sagan states that our very survival as a species depends on colonizing outer space. Astronomers have already identified dozens of asteroids that might someday smash into Earth. Undoubtedly, many more remain undetected. In Sagan’s opinion, the only way to avert inevitable catastrophe is for mankind to establish a permanent human presence in space. He compares humans to the planets that roam the night sky, as he says that humans will too wander through space. We will wander space because we possess a compulsion to explore, and space provides a truly infinite prospect of new directions to explore. Sagan’s vision is part science and part emotion. He hoped that the exploration of space would unify humankind. We propose that mankind follow the United States and our allies into this new sea, set with jeweled stars. If we lead, we can be both strong and caring. If we step back, it may be to the detriment of more than our country.

### 2AC Dissident IR Fails – Agathenagelou

#### Dissident IR fails – it lacks a mechanism to convert theory into practice – maintains same violent structures.

Anna M. Agathangelou, Dir. Global Change Inst. And Women’s Studies Prof @ Oberlin, and L.H.M. Ling, Inst. For Social Studies @ Hague, Fall 1997, Studies in Political Economy, v. 54, p 7-8

Yet, ironically if not tragically, dissident IR also paralyzes itself into non-action. While it challenges the status quo, dissident IR fails to transform it. Indeed, dissident IR claims that a “coherent” paradigm or research program — even an alternative one — reproduces the stifling parochialism and hidden power-mongering of sovereign scholarship. “Any agenda of global politics informed by critical social theory perspectives,” writes Jim George “must forgo the simple, albeit self-gratifying, options inherent in ready-made alternative Realisms and confront the dangers, closures, paradoxes, and complicities associated with them. Even references to a “real world, dissidents argue, repudiate the very meaning of dissidence given their sovereign presumption of a universalizable, testable Reality. What dissident scholarship opts for, instead, is a sense of disciplinary crisis that “resonates with the effects of marginal and dissident movements in all sorts of other localities.” Despite its emancipatory intentions, this approach effectively leaves the prevailing prison of sovereignty intact. It doubly incarcerates when dissident IR highlights the layers of power that oppress without offering a heuristic, not to mention a program, for emancipatory action. Merely politicizing the supposedly non-political neither guides emancipatory action nor guards it against demagoguery. At best, dissident IR sanctions a detached criticality rooted (ironically) in Western modernity. Michael Shapiro, for instance, advises the dissident theorist to take “a critical distance” or “position offshore’ from which to “see the possibility of change.” But what becomes of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like while the esoteric dissident observes “critically” from offshore? What hope do they have of overthrowing these shackles of sovereignty? In not answering these questions, dissident IR ends up reproducing despite avowals to the contrary, the sovereign outcome of discourse divorced from practice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving.

## Substance

### 2AC Delay

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the counterplan – we shouldn’t have to defend immediacy in the context of cheating counterplans

#### Should means “ought to” – we only have to defend the desirability of the plan, not its immediacy

American Heritage, 2009, “should,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/should

Like the rules governing the use of shall and will on which they are based, the traditional rules governing the use of should and would are largely ignored in modern American practice. Either should or would can now be used in the first person to express conditional futurity: If I had known that, I would (or somewhat more formally, should) have answered differently. But in the second and third persons only would is used: If he had known that, he would (not should) have answered differently. Would cannot always be substituted for should, however. Should is used in all three persons in a conditional clause: if I (or you or he) should decide to go. Should is also used in all three persons to express duty or obligation (the equivalent of ought to): I (or you or he) should go. On the other hand, would is used to express volition or promise: I agreed that I would do it. Either would or should is possible as an auxiliary with like, be inclined, be glad, prefer, and related verbs: I would (or should) like to call your attention to an oversight. Here would was acceptable on all levels to a large majority of the Usage Panel in an earlier survey and is more common in American usage than should. · Should have is sometimes incorrectly written should of by writers who have mistaken the source of the spoken contraction should've. See Usage Notes at if, rather, shall.

#### Congress isn’t in session – that justifies the perm

David Lightman and William Douglas 9-21-2012, “Unproductive Congress breaks until after November election”, http://www.adn.com/2012/09/20/2633147/unproductive-congress-breaks-until.html\_

Lawmakers spent Thursday pointing fingers and charging opponents with cynical political posturing. Among Congress' last decisions was a characteristic 2012 judgment: Punt action until later. It will let the farm bill, a broad measure that sets the nation's agriculture and food and nutrition assistance policies, expire Sept. 30.¶ Congress also exits without any serious effort to edge away from the "fiscal cliff," the prospect of economy-damaging budget chaos if it doesn't act by year's end. Bush-era tax cuts are due to expire, and automatic spending cuts will take effect unless alternatives are passed.¶ The public is noticing, as the legislative failures stir uncertainty and further roil an already-weak economy. This Congress' approval ratings were stuck at 13 percent in a Gallup survey Sept. 6-9, the lowest the pollster has ever logged this late in an election year since such measurements began in 1974.¶ Yet lawmakers are slinking out of town, after a September session that was on and off for less than two weeks, following a summer recess that ran from Aug. 3 to Sept. 10. Congress is expected to return Nov. 13.

#### Severance is good –

#### Forces strategic thinking – they have to choose counterplans that force us to sever out of desirable parts of the aff

#### Best policy option and enhances critical thinking – makes us alter proposals in light of evidence

#### Reciprocal - Counterplans serve to alter the baseline neg advocacy. We should be able to amend the plan, the aff advocacy, the same way.

#### No Abuse - We made the argument in a constructive

#### Topicality Checks - Aff should be allowed to alter the plan as much as they want in 2AC as long as it's still topical. If it's topical, then neg should be prepared to debate it, and they have the block to answer it.

#### Not a Voter - If they win the theory then the perm goes away, but the plan may still be justified. There's no specific abuse and you shouldn't vote on potential abuse because if the abuse happened in the future, specific args would always check.

#### Theory XX

### 2AC Elections – Obama Good

#### Romney up in the key states

Susan Page, for USA Today, 10-15-2012, “Swing States poll: Women push Romney into lead,” USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2012/10/15/swing-states-poll-women-voters-romney-obama/1634791/

9:06PM EDT October 15. 2012 - WASHINGTON — Mitt Romney leads President Obama by four percentage points among likely voters in the nation's top battlegrounds, a USA TODAY/Gallup Poll finds, and he has growing enthusiasm among women to thank. As the presidential campaign heads into its final weeks, the survey of voters in 12 crucial swing states finds female voters much more engaged in the election and increasingly concerned about the deficit and debt issues that favor Romney. The Republican nominee has pulled within one point of the president among women who are likely voters, 48%-49%, and leads by 8 points among men.

#### Wisconsin key – Romney’s surging

William Galston, election editor for TNR, 10-15-2012, “Why Wisconsin Could Be the Key to a Romney Victory,” The New Republic, Why Wisconsin Could Be the Key to a Romney Victory, http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/108578/why-wisconsin-could-be-the-key-romney-victory

Which brings us to Wisconsin, the only state that Romney’s surge has truly moved into the swing category. Not only have the post-debate surveys shown Obama’s margin down to 2 points, but also, the same survey that gave Obama a 52 percent approval rating in Virginia put him at 47 in Wisconsin. History suggests that if vice-presidential candidates matter anywhere, it’s in their home states. If I were Romney’s campaign manager, I would tell Ryan to spend most of the next three weeks—morning, noon, and night—visiting every city, town, and hamlet in Wisconsin. And if my internal polls had Obama’s margin down to (say) one point with three or four days until the election, I would schedule one or two big Romney rallies to maximize enthusiasm and turnout. Wisconsin matters because it could reduce the pressure on Romney to draw to an inside straight. Carrying Wisconsin wouldn’t fully compensate for losing Ohio, of course. But added to Romney’s base of 235 electoral votes, Wisconsin plus Virginia would bring him to 258, at which point Colorado plus any one of the three smallest swing states--New Hampshire, Iowa, Nevada-- would put him over the top. So would winning Iowa and Nevada, even without Colorado. By the same token, while carrying Wisconsin wouldn’t quite compensate for losing Virginia, winning Ohio plus Wisconsin would give Romney 263 electoral votes, at which point either Colorado or any two of the remaining smaller states would yield victory.

#### Romney’s surging on favorable and Obama’s crashing

Andrew Sullivan, editor in chief of the Daily Dish and noted writer for Newsweek, The New Republic, and The Atlantic, 10-19-2012, “Romney's Net Favorables Now Exceed Obama's,” The Daily Dish, http://andrewsullivan.thedailybeast.com/2012/10/romneys-net-favorables-now-exceed-obamas.html

It increasingly seems clear to me that the first debate's impact on Romney's personal image may be its most enduring legacy. One of Romney's clear disadvantages in this race is that the president was for a long time basically liked much more than Romney and the Obama campaign's spring and summer offensive on his record and image helped widen this gap. It's now gone entirely. Here are Romney's favorable ratings with no heightened sensitivity, from June to now. Red is unfavorable; black is favorable: Just look at that pivot. The Convention failed to move the needle, but some time in late September, a rise began, perhaps as Republicans came home and just decided they could like the guy. But then the big turning point is Romney's first debate, when he effectively undid in one night almost everything the Obama campaign had thrown at him since the spring. It was a new market; he had a new sales pitch; a new set of policies; a personality implant. And for many low-information voters, and others, that was enough. Now, look, alas, at what has happened to the president in the same period of time in the same poll of polls: Obama's net favorability is now + 2 points. Romney's net favorability is now + 4.7. If you try and see the very latest twists and heighten sensitivity, Obama is actually in net unfavorable territory (- 2) while Romney is + 0.2. I cannot see much to encourage the Obama campaign in these numbers. Since mid-September, the country has clearly soured on the president personally a little, and gotten to like Mitt more. More to the point, you can't blame the first debate. The shift began in mid-September - but then accelerated after the first debate. That may explain why that debate moved so much. Voters had been coming around to Romney already and he then confirmed those voters' sentiments in the debate and they moved en masse. At least that's my best guess. We have yet to see any real impact from the second debate. But Obama has only ever had net unfavorables for a brief period after the debt ceiling fiasco in the summer of 2011. It's not a good sign when the biggest movement upward in your unfavorables in your entire term is in October of your re-election year. Let's just hope that his new stump speech boosting the recovery gets the rebound we need. In the Electoral College vote, here's what Princeton has right now:

#### NRC will issue licenses for large reactors before the election

Mark Peters, deputy laboratory director for programs at Argonne National Laboratory, "The Future of Nuclear Energy," 6-25-2012, http://www.fas.org/blog/pir/2012/06/25/the-future-of-nuclear-energy/

NUCLEAR ENERGY SINCE THE LATE 1970s¶ Although the power of the “peaceful atom” was initially welcomed as a generation source that would provide electricity “too cheap to meter,” the economics of the industry were upended after the oil crisis of 1973-74. With the national economy stagnant and interest rates as high as 20 percent, the cost of building new nuclear capacity spiked from an average of $161/kW in 1968-1971 to $1,373/kW in 1979-84.[1] During the same period, U.S. environmentalists and other opponents of nuclear energy were galvanized by the highly publicized partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania, which caused the release of small amounts of radioactive gases. The combination of extraordinary costs and public opposition brought U.S. nuclear power plant construction to a halt. After 1978, no new units were ordered for more than 30 years,[2] although power uprates and license extensions for many existing plants have been granted since then. (Work began recently on preparation for new reactors at the Vogtle nuclear plant site in Georgia; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is expected to issue the combined construction and operating license for the new reactors by the end of this year.)

#### No link – plan doesn’t happen till after the election

David Lightman and William Douglas 9-21-2012, “Unproductive Congress breaks until after November election”, http://www.adn.com/2012/09/20/2633147/unproductive-congress-breaks-until.html\_

Lawmakers spent Thursday pointing fingers and charging opponents with cynical political posturing. Among Congress' last decisions was a characteristic 2012 judgment: Punt action until later. It will let the farm bill, a broad measure that sets the nation's agriculture and food and nutrition assistance policies, expire Sept. 30.¶ Congress also exits without any serious effort to edge away from the "fiscal cliff," the prospect of economy-damaging budget chaos if it doesn't act by year's end. Bush-era tax cuts are due to expire, and automatic spending cuts will take effect unless alternatives are passed.¶ The public is noticing, as the legislative failures stir uncertainty and further roil an already-weak economy. This Congress' approval ratings were stuck at 13 percent in a Gallup survey Sept. 6-9, the lowest the pollster has ever logged this late in an election year since such measurements began in 1974.¶ Yet lawmakers are slinking out of town, after a September session that was on and off for less than two weeks, following a summer recess that ran from Aug. 3 to Sept. 10. Congress is expected to return Nov. 13.

#### Other factors cancel each other out – only the economy matters

Mano Singham, PHD, theoretical physicist and director of UCITE, at U Cleveland, 3-8-2012, “What really matters in predicting presidential election outcomes,” Free Thoughts Blog, http://freethoughtblogs.com/singham/2012/03/08/what-really-matters-in-predicting-presidential-election-outcomes/

A political scientist colleague of mine who tracks these things closely says that what they look at are markers of the state of the economy. The best predictor of presidential elections is the change in real disposable income and the GDP. Since there is usually a six-month lag in these numbers filtering down to voters, the figures that come in starting around May will give us a good indication of which way the election will go in November, largely irrespective of the candidates and the issues. Figures like unemployment do not matter so much because most people are employed and so it does not affect them directly. This seems counterintuitive. Surely the GRAGGS (guns, race, abortion, gays, god, sex) issues that occupy so much time and space and arouse so much passion must influence the way people vote? But apparently they are not very good as predictors. I am guessing here but suspect that it is because most people’s views on these are fixed and thus the debates have little chance of changing the way people vote and merely serve to stoke the intensity of their feelings. And for those who can be swayed, the effects are random and largely cancel each other out, in that for every undecided voter who decides to vote for the Democrat because he or she is disturbed by the contraception uproar, there is likely another who it drives to the Republican camp.

#### Winners win

Robert Creamer, political strategist for over four decades, 12-23-2011, "Why GOP Collapse on the Payroll Tax Could be a Turning Point Moment," Huffington Post, www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/why-gop-collapse-on-the-p\_b\_1167491.html

2). Strength and victory are enormous political assets. Going into the New Year, they now belong to the President and the Democrats. One of the reasons why the debt ceiling battle inflicted political damage on President Obama is that it made him appear ineffectual - a powerful figure who had been ensnared and held hostage by the Lilliputian pettiness of hundreds of swarming Tea Party ideological zealots. In the last few months -- as he campaigned for the American Jobs Act -- he has shaken free of those bonds. Now voters have just watched James Bond or Indiana Jones escape and turn the tables on his adversary. Great stories are about a protagonist who meets and overcomes a challenge and is victorious. The capitulation of the House Tea Party Republicans is so important because it feels like the beginning of that kind of heroic narrative. Even today most Americans believe that George Bush and the big Wall Street Banks - not by President Obama -- caused the economic crisis. Swing voters have never lost their fondness for the President and don't doubt his sincerity. But they had begun to doubt his effectiveness. They have had increasing doubts that Obama was up to the challenge of leading them back to economic prosperity. The narrative set in motion by the events of the last several weeks could be a turning point in voter perception. It could well begin to convince skeptical voters that Obama is precisely the kind of leader they thought he was back in 2008 - a guy with the ability to lead them out of adversity - a leader with the strength, patience, skill, will and resoluteness to lead them to victory. That now contrasts with the sheer political incompetence of the House Republican Leadership that allowed themselves to be cornered and now find themselves in political disarray. And it certainly contrasts with the political circus we have been watching in the Republican Presidential primary campaign. 3). This victory will inspire the dispirited Democratic base. Inspiration is the feeling of empowerment - the feeling that you are part of something larger than yourself and can personally play a significant role in achieving that goal. It comes from feeling that together you can overcome challenges and win. Nothing will do more to inspire committed Democrats than the sight of their leader -- President Obama - out maneuvering the House Republicans and forcing them into complete capitulation. The events of the last several weeks will send a jolt of electricity through the Progressive community. The right is counting on Progressives to be demoralized and dispirited in the coming election. The President's victory on the payroll tax and unemployment will make it ever more likely that they will be wrong. 4). When you have them on the run, that's the time to chase them. The most important thing about the outcome of the battle over the payroll tax and unemployment is that it shifts the political momentum at a critical time. Momentum is an independent variable in any competitive activity - including politics. In a football or basketball game you can feel the momentum shift. The tide of battle is all about momentum. The same is true in politics. And in politics it is even more important because the "spectators" are also the players - the voters. People follow - and vote -- for winners. The bandwagon effect is enormously important in political decision-making. Human beings like to travel in packs. They like to be at the center of the mainstream. Momentum shifts affect their perceptions of the mainstream. For the last two years, the right wing has been on the offensive. Its Tea Party shock troops took the battle to Democratic Members of Congress. In the Mid-Terms Democrats were routed in district after district. Now the tide has turned. And when the tide turns -when you have them on the run - that's the time to chase them.

#### Public loves nukes

WNA, World Nuclear Association, August 2012, “US Nuclear Power Policy,” http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41\_US\_nuclear\_power\_policy.html

Public opinion regarding nuclear power has generally been fairly positive, and has grown more so as people have had to think about security of energy supplies. Different polls show continuing increase in public opinion favourable to nuclear power in the USA. More than three times as many strongly support nuclear energy than strongly oppose it. Two-thirds of self-described environmentalists favour it. A May 2008 survey (N=2925) by Zogby International showed 67% of Americans favoured building new nuclear power plants, with 46% registering strong support; 23% were opposed10. Asked which kind of power plant they would prefer if it were sited in their community, 43% said nuclear, 26% gas, 8% coal. Men (60%) were more than twice as likely as women (28%) to be supportive of a nuclear power plant. A March 2010 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed that strong public support for nuclear energy was being sustained, with 74% in favour of it11. In particular, 87% think nuclear will be important in meeting electricity needs in the years ahead, 87% support licence renewal for nuclear plants, 84% believe utilities should prepare to build more nuclear plants, 72% supported an active federal role in encouraging investment in "energy technology that reduces greenhouse gases", 82% agree that US nuclear plants are safe and secure, 77% would support adding a new reactor at the nearest nuclear plant, and 70% say that USA should definitely build more plants in the future. Only 10% of people said they strongly opposed the use of nuclear energy. In relation to recycling used nuclear fuel, 79% supported this (contra past US policy), and the figure rose to 85% if "a panel of independent experts" recommended it. Although 59% were confident that used reactor fuel could be stored safely at nuclear power plant sites, 81% expressed a strong desire for the federal government to move used nuclear fuel to centralised, secure storage facilities away from the plant sites until a permanent disposal facility is ready. Half of those surveyed considered themselves to be environmentalists. A February 2011 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed similar figures, and that 89% of Americans agree that all low-carbon energy sources – including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy – should be taken advantage of to generate electricity while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Just 10% disagreed. Also some 84% of respondents said that they associate nuclear energy "a lot" or "a little" with reliable electricity; 79% associate nuclear energy with affordable electricity; 79% associate nuclear energy with economic growth and job creation; and 77% associate nuclear energy and clean air.

#### No strikes – negotiations now

Barbara Slavin, 3-23-2012, Barbara, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C, “ Iran, Israel and U.S. moves from war rhetoric back to diplomacy,” <http://womennewsnetwork.net/2012/03/23/iran-israel-us-war-rhetoric/>

After months of sabre-rattling rhetoric by Iran, Israel and the United States, there seems to be a collective, and welcome, time out. Since President Barack Obama’s 4 March speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), all sides have been stressing non-military means to try to resolve the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. While asserting that he is determined to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, Obama spent much of his AIPAC address decrying what he called “loose talk” of war. He spoke eloquently of the costs of military conflict for a nation that has fought two wars in the last decade. His message to visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was clear: I am not going to start another war and you are not going to drag me into one. Netanyahu, for his part, appeared to bow to several realities. A savvy politician, he is recalculating the odds that Obama will be re-elected for another four-year term. The Israeli leader also knows that most of Israel’s defense and intelligence establishment – as well as a majority of the Israeli people – oppose a unilateral strike on Iran that could spark massive retaliation without significantly setting back the Iranian nuclear program. Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan has called such a strike “stupid”. Obama argues that economic sanctions are having a major impact on the Iranian economy and should be given more time to work. Evidence bears this out. U.S. banking sanctions and the threat of a European oil embargo have reduced the value of Iran’s currency by half, increased inflation and unemployment and depressed oil production. The International Energy Agency reported last week that Iran is pumping only 3.3 million barrels a day – down from 3.8 million barrels last year – and Iran’s oil exports may drop by as much as 50 per cent this summer. While denying that sanctions are a factor, Iranian leaders have agreed to come back to negotiations with the so-called P5+1 – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Talks – the first since January 2011 – are expected to take place after the Iranian New Year holiday. In advance, the Islamic Republic has been conducting a charm offensive. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 8 March reaffirmed a 1995 fatwa that building nuclear weapons would be a “great sin”. He also praised Obama for criticising war talk. “Such remarks are good and indicate a step out of delusions”, Khamenei said. On 15 March, Mohammad Javad Larijani, a U.S.-educated physicist and adviser to Khamenei, told CNN’s Christiane Amanpour that Iran would provide “full transparency” for its nuclear program in return for acceptance of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Larijani also denied that Iran had any intention of attacking Israel, saying that Iran would defend itself against aggression but would not strike another country first. The Iranians have signaled their interest in dialogue with the United States in other ways. On 5 March, Iran’s Supreme Court ordered a retrial for an Iranian American former U.S. Marine who had been sentenced to death as a CIA spy. On 13 March, the U.S. deported back to Iran an Iranian arms dealer arrested in 2007 in a sting operation in the Republic of Georgia. Taken together, these steps improve the atmosphere for negotiations. However, it remains unclear whether the Obama administration and its partners will put forward proposals that could provide Iran a face-saving way to reduce tensions.

#### Israel wont strike – defense establishment doesn’t want to

David Makovsky, Ziegler distinguished fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at The Washington Institute, 2-22-2012, “Friendship Under Fire ,” WINEP, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1827

All this puts Israel on the horns of a dilemma. It can hope that sanctions will ultimately deter Iran's nuclear program, but this may mean foregoing decisive action against what it sees as an existential threat in the hope that the United States will act further down the road. Barak and Netanyahu are commonly identified as favoring a strike, but based on my recent trip to the region, it is clear that others within the Israeli cabinet and defense establishment still have doubts. § Marked 09:15 § As such, the prospect of a strike is not inevitable. If Israel believed that the United States were absolutely committed to handling this issue, it would certainly shift the Israeli debate about whether to strike.

#### ( ) A Mideast war would not escalate or go nuclear

Elizabeth Stevens, September 19, 2002, http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/najournal/israelinucs.html

Thus far, Israel has confronted continuous hostility with a strong conventional superiority. It is doubtful that it would resort to a nuclear weapon given the fact that it could repel the attack of any one of its Arab opponents and probably a combination of them. Israel has signed a peace treaty with Egypt, and moderating forces in Jordan are strong. The recent peace treaty with the PLO and differences between Iraq and Syria further reduce the possibility of a united Arab attack. It would appear that Israel does not need a nuclear arsenal.

#### Romney is a foreign policy moderate – domestic focus and wants to preserve his legacy

Jacob Heilbrunn, senior editor at the National Interest, 8-27-2012, “Will Romney Discover His Inner Nixon?” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/27/will\_romney\_discover\_his\_inner\_nixon

The very fact that foreign affairs occupies so little prominence during the campaign suggests that Romney would, in common with most fledgling presidents, focus during his first year on domestic affairs -- tax cuts, the budget deficit, and unemployment. Foreign affairs would distinctly play second fiddle. Put otherwise, the notion that Romney would be thirsting for a new war -- a potential new Bay of Pigs, in other words -- at the outset of his presidency is questionable. As with so much concerning Romney, the more likely scenario is that his belligerent talk is simply cheap bluster that he has no intention of acting upon. Even Bush, for all his ranting about an "axis of evil," never had the cojones to take on either Iran or North Korea, settling instead for what he thought would be an easy, glittering victory in Iraq. What's more, to assume that a Romney administration would be a simple rerun of the Bush years may be mistaken. For one thing, no one could play the role of Dick Cheney to Romney. Unlike Bush, Romney would hardly be inclined to place his presidency at the disposal of his running mate, Paul Ryan, who has no discernible foreign-policy experience, in stark contrast to previous Republican vice presidents such as Richard Nixon, George H.W. Bush, and Cheney. It's also the case that when it comes to cabinet-level positions, Romney would send a strong signal that he wasn't about to embark upon adventures abroad if Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass is appointed secretary of state. And it would be telling if the moderate Evan A. Feigenbaum, a co-chairman of Romney's Asia-Pacific working group, gets a plum post. So the truth is that a replay of previous Republican administrations, with neocons duking it out against realists, may be the most likely outcome. Romney, like most of his Republican predecessors, would probably try to split the difference among the neocons, the realists, and the Tea Party types, all vying for the president's ear. Remember that Reagan, whom Romney constantly invokes, had a number of neocons inside his administration, including Abrams and Jeane Kirkpatrick, but when push came to shove, Reagan sided with realists such as Secretary of State Shultz, who emphasized diplomacy and alliances over bellicose unilateralism. George W. Bush himself reverted to this model in 2006, when he relied on Robert Gates and Condoleezza Rice rather than the neocons. The open question, of course, is whether, after a decade of neocon suzerainty in the GOP, enough realists remaining standing to make a difference. But perhaps the strongest argument for a moderate Romney is his own oleaginous character. In trying to stand for everything that Reagan stood for, Romney has ended up standing for nothing except his own personal advancement. The only thing that would be worse than Romney proclaiming things he doesn't believe is if he believed them. Yes, there's always the chance that Romney will feel forced to cater to the neocons and plunge America into a war with Iran -- which is why voters may end up deciding it's not worth taking the chance to find out whether he puts much credence in his own malarkey about creating a new American century. Still, the odds are against it. Democrats who warn about Romney provoking China and Russia or bombing Iran may be engaging in their own form of threat inflation. All three are a sideshow next to the economy. Cautious and hard-nosed, shrewd and unprincipled, Romney is undoubtedly aware that the only way he can become a successful president is by fulfilling the right's worst fears about him. Romney, in other words, needs to pull an Obama. If he plays his cards right and jettisons his foreign-policy flapdoodle upon entering the Oval Office, Romney might even end up earning the grudging respect of moderates and liberals who will be as amazed at his transformation as they were aghast at Obama's morphing into a hawk. Perhaps even Colin Powell will be placated by his performance.

#### Both candidates have same Iran policy

Aaron David Miller 2012, scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, “Barack O'Romney”, May 23, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/23/barack\_oromney

It's not only on these core assumptions that the candidates share a broad agreement. These principles translate into specific policies where it would be tough to tell the difference between a Romney and an Obama presidency: Iran: Sorry, I just don't see any significant difference between the way Obama is handling Iran's nuclear program and the way Romney might as president. And that's because there's seems to be an inexorable arc to the Iranian nuclear problem. If by 2013 sanctions and negotiations don't produce a sustainable deal and Iran continues its quest for a nuclear weapon, one of two things is going to happen: Israel is likely to strike, or we will. If it's the former, both Obama and Romney would be there to defend the Israelis and manage the mess that would follow. Both would be prepared to intercede on Israel's behalf if and when it came to that. As for a U.S. strike, it's becoming a bipartisan article of faith that the United States will not permit Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. And both men are prepared to use military strikes against Iran's nuclear sites as a last resort, even if it only means a delay (and that's what it would mean) in Iran's quest for nukes.

## Extra

### Transition Wars

#### Alternative leads to transition wars

Paul Aligica, Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, 4-21-2003, “The Great Transition and the Social Limits to Growth: Herman Kahn on Social Change and Global Economic Development”, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=2827

Stopping things would mean if not to engage in an experiment to change the human nature, at least in an equally difficult experiment in altering powerful cultural forces: "We firmly believe that despite the arguments put forward by people who would like to 'stop the earth and get off,' it is simply impractical to do so. Propensity to change may not be inherent in human nature, but it is firmly embedded in most contemporary cultures. People have almost everywhere become curious, future oriented, and dissatisfied with their conditions. They want more material goods and covet higher status and greater control of nature. Despite much propaganda to the contrary, they believe in progress and future" (Kahn, 1976, 164). As regarding the critics of growth that stressed the issue of the gap between rich and poor countries and the issue of redistribution, Kahn noted that what most people everywhere want was visible, rapid improvement in their economic status and living standards, and not a closing of the gap (Kahn, 1976, 165). The people from poor countries have as a basic goal the transition from poor to middle class. The other implications of social change are secondary for them. Thus a crucial factor to be taken into account is that while the zero-growth advocates and their followers may be satisfied to stop at the present point, most others are not. Any serious attempt to frustrate these expectations or desires of that majority is likely to fail and/or create disastrous counter reactions. Kahn was convinced that "any concerted attempt to stop or even slow 'progress' appreciably (that is, to be satisfied with the moment) is catastrophe-prone". At the minimum, "it would probably require the creation of extraordinarily repressive governments or movements-and probably a repressive international system" (Kahn, 1976, 165; 1979, 140-153). The pressures of overpopulation, national security challenges and poverty as well as the revolution of rising expectations could be solved only in a continuing growth environment. Kahn rejected the idea that continuous growth would generate political repression and absolute poverty. On the contrary, it is the limits-to-growth position "which creates low morale, destroys assurance, undermines the legitimacy of governments everywhere, erodes personal and group commitment to constructive activities and encourages obstructiveness to reasonable policies and hopes". Hence this position "increases enormously the costs of creating the resources needed for expansion, makes more likely misleading debate and misformulation of the issues, and make less likely constructive and creative lives". Ultimately "it is precisely this position the one that increases the potential for the kinds of disasters which most at its advocates are trying to avoid" (Kahn, 1976, 210; 1984).

### 2AC AT: War

#### Growth solves violence

John A. Tures, Associate Professor of Political Science at LaGrange College, 2003, “ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND CONFLICT REDUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1970S, 1980S, AND 1990S”, Cato Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3. http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22n3/cj22n3-9.pdf

The last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of market-based reforms and the profusion of economic freedom in the international system. This shift in economic policy has sparked a debate about whether free markets are superior to state controls. Numerous studies have compared the neoliberal and statist policies on issues of production capacity, economic growth, commercial volumes, and egalitarianism. An overlooked research agenda, however, is the relationship between levels of economic freedom and violence within countries. Proponents of the statist approach might note that a strong government can bend the market to its will, directing activity toward policies necessary to achieve greater levels of gross domestic product and growth. By extracting more resources for the economy, a powerful state can redistribute benefits to keep the populace happy. Higher taxes can also pay for an army and police force that intimidate people. Such governments range from command economies of totalitarian systems to autocratic dictators and military juntas. Other economically unfree systems include some of the authoritarian “Asian tigers.” A combination of historical evidence, modern theorists, and statistical findings, however, has indicated that a reduced role for the state in regulating economic transactions is associated with a decrease in internal conflicts. Countries where the government dominates the commercial realm experience an increase in the level of domestic violence. Scholars have traced the history of revolutions to explain the relationship between statism and internal upheavals. Contemporary authors also posit a relationship between economic liberty and peace. Statistical tests show a strong connection between economic freedom and conflict reduction during the past three decades.

#### Growth key to interdependence – solves all wars.

Valentin Krustev, Department of Political Science at Rice University, 2006, “Interdependence and the Duration of Militarized Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, sage

According to the opportunity-cost argument, interdependence promotes peace by raising the costs of militarized conflict (Polachek, 1980; Polachek, Robst & Chang, 1999). Conflict becomes more costly, in turn, because the fighting parties, in addition to bearing the costs of waging warfare, forfeit the potential gains from trading, owing to government-imposed restrictions and increased business risks. However, these conflict-inhibiting effects of interdependence are not limited only to the pre-conflict phase of a dispute, and the opportunity-cost argument can explain how the prospect of further trade losses provides incentives for conflict termination as well. As some scholars have observed, any theory of the effect of interdependence on conflict should be grounded in a solid understanding of the occurrence and dynamic of conflict itself (Morrow, 1999, 2003; Gartzke, 2003b). While traditionally multiple theories of conflict have proliferated in the study of IR, recent scholarship has drawn attention to its informational origins (Fearon, 1995; Gartzke, 1999). As Fearon (1995) argues, if most conflicts end in some negotiated settlement over the disputed issue, rational states should prefer to conclude that settlement prior to incurring the conflict costs, as the bargaining range of mutually acceptable settlements is guaranteed to be non-empty when these costs are positive. A very common reason for states sometimes being unable to reach a rational pre-conflict settlement emerges in the asymmetry of information, combined with states’ incentives to misrepresent their reservation values. Conflict, on the other hand, helps states to credibly communicate these reservation values by demonstrating their willingness to incur its costs or revealing the true magnitude of the costs, as an expanding informational literature on war suggests (e.g. Wagner, 2000; Filson & Werner, 2002; Slantchev, 2003). The opportunity-cost logic implies that interdependence can enter the theoretical framework outlined above through the conflict-cost parameters, as interdependence increases these costs. Following Fearon’s (1995) discussion, higher conflict costs increase the pre-conflict bargaining range and should, therefore, decrease the probability of conflict. In their calculus, states balance the size of their demands against the probability that these demands exceed the opponent’s reservation value and are rejected. Higher conflict costs due to greater interdependence worsen states’ conflict payoffs and push them to lower their demands, which, in turn, results in a reduced probability of conflict onset.8 Signaling arguments, on the other hand, suggest that interdependence allows states to credibly communicate their resolve or reservation values by severing an advantageous economic relationship that an unresolved state would not terminate. The credible communication made possible by interdependence reduces the uncertainty existing over the bargaining range and increases the likelihood of a settlement short of war (e.g. Gartzke, 2003a,b; Morrow, 2003). Thus, if we adopt Fearon’s (1997) terminology, signaling implies that interdependence allows states to ‘sink costs’, while the opportunitycost logic is more reminiscent of ‘tying hands’; that is, interdependence affects states’ behavior by changing their incentives. The opportunity-cost argument for why interdependence inhibits militarized conflict can be easily extended to account for the effect of interdependence on the duration of conflict. If interdependence raises the opportunity costs of conflict prior to its onset, then these costs should also remain high after onset, because, at least in the short term when firms have not permanently reoriented their business operations, they will gain if hostilities cease and normal trade with the adversary is restored. Then, just as the higher prospective costs of conflict push states to lower their demands and avert conflict prior to its onset, so do these higher prospective costs push states to settle early, even if conflict has not fully served its informational purpose and states might be forfeiting the better deal they can get if they know more. That is, the purpose of militarized conflict is to overcome asymmetric information, but conflict costs are the price states have to pay to extract that information. The higher these costs are due to interdependence, the more expensive the information-revelation process is, and the sooner are states likely to settle on unfavorable terms rather than continue fighting.

### 2AC AT: Environment

#### Tech and markets solve ecological destruction

Jonathan H. Adler, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Fall 2008, “Green Bride to Nowhere,” The New Atlantis, http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/green-bridge-to-nowhere

According to Speth, “most environmental deterioration is a result of systemic failures of capitalism.” This is an odd claim, as the least capitalist nations of the world also have the worst environmental records. The ecological costs of economic statism are far worse than those of economic liberty. The environmental record of the various Soviet regimes amply bears this out: The West’s ecological nightmares were the Soviet bloc’s environmental realities. This is not due to any anomaly of the Soviet system. Nations with greater commitment to capitalist institutions experience greater environmental performance. While Speth occasionally acknowledges pockets of environmental progress, he hardly stops to consider the reasons why some environmental resources have been conserved more effectively than others. Fisheries are certainly declining throughout much of the world—some 75 percent of fisheries are fully or over-exploited—but not everywhere. It is worth asking why. Tropical forests in less-developed nations are declining even as most temperate forests in industrialized nations are rebounding. Recognizing these different trends and identifying the key variables is essential to diagnosing the real causes of environmental deterioration and prescribing a treatment that will work. Speth acknowledges that much of the world is undergoing “dematerialization,” such that economic growth far outpaces increases in resource demand, but seems not to appreciate how the capitalist system he decries creates the incentives that drive this trend. Were it not for market-driven advances in technological capability and ecological efficiency, humanity’s footprint on the Earth would be far greater. While modern civilization has developed the means to effect massive ecological transformations, it has also found ways to produce wealth while leaving more of the natural world intact. Market competition generates substantial incentives to do more with less—thus in market economies we see long and continuing improvements in productive efficiency. This can be seen everywhere from the replacement of copper with fiber optics (made from silica, the chief component in sand) and the light-weighting of packaging to the explosion of agricultural productivity and improvements in energy efficiency. Less material is used and disposed of, reducing overall environmental impacts from productive activity. The key to such improvements is the same set of institutional arrangements that Speth so decries: property rights and voluntary exchange protected by the rule of law—that is, capitalism. As research by Wheaton College economist Seth Norton and many others has shown, societies in which property rights and economic freedoms are protected experience superior economic and environmental performance than those societies subject to greater government control. Indeed, such institutions have a greater effect on environmental performance than the other factors, such as population growth, that occupy the attention of Speth and so many other environmental thinkers. Speth complains that capitalism is fundamentally biased against the future; but the marketplace does a far better job of pricing and accounting for future interests than the political alternative. “Future generations cannot participate in capitalism’s markets [today],” says Speth. Fair enough, but they cannot vote or engage in the regulatory process either. Thus the relevant policy question is what set of institutions does the best—or least bad—job of accounting for such concerns, and here there is no contest. However present-oriented the marketplace may be, it is better able to look past the next election cycle than any plausibly democratic alternative. Speth pays lip service to the virtues of markets, but he still calls for a replacement of the capitalist system with something else. He acknowledges that “no better system of allocating scarce resources has yet been invented” than capitalism, and yet can’t seem to grasp why. He tries to define and dissect the nature of capitalist economics, but is unable to distill its essence. Quoting neo-Marxist critiques is not a likely path to enlightenment about the market economy. Insofar as firms in the marketplace seek to “externalize” the costs of economic activity (such as by polluting) or “rent seek” to receive special benefits from government, they are seeking to escape the market discipline fostered by capitalist economics, rather than participate in it. Voluntary exchange of private rights is central to the market process. When firms obtain goods or services, such as natural resources or waste disposal, without contracting for them, firms are acting outside of the market process and free from market discipline. If the goal is to “internalize” the environmental effects of economic activity, the most fruitful course is to expand market institutions, rather than impose additional layers of political controls.

#### Kuznets curve means growth saves the environment

John Tierney, science columnist for the New York Times, journalism degree from Yale U, cites Nobel Prize winning economist Simon Kuznets, Ph.D from Columbia U, 4-20-2009, [tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/the-richer-is-greener-curve/

In my Findings column, I explain how researchers have discovered that, over the long term, being richer often translates into being greener. Many environmental problems get worse as a country first industrializes, but once it reaches a certain level of income, the trend often reverses, producing a curve shaped like an upside-down U. It’s called a Kuznets curve (in honor of the economist Simon Kuznets, who detected this pattern in trends of income inequality). As promised in the column, here are some graphic examples of Kuznets curves for sulphur dioxide pollution, as measured in an assortment of rich and poor countries, and also as measured over time in the United States. Each line is an environmental Kuznets curve for a group of countries during the 1980s. The levels of sulphur dioxide pollution (the vertical axis) rise as countries becomes more affluent (the horizontal axis). But then, once countries reach an economic turning point (a gross domestic product close to $8,000 per capita), the trend reverses and air pollution declines as countries get richer. In this analysis by Xiang Dong Qin of Clemson University, the green line shows countries with strong protections for property rights; the red curve shows countries with weaker protections. I’m not trying to argue that all environmental problems fit these curves, or that these improvements happen automatically. How fast the environment improves depends not just on money but on whether a country has an effective government, educated citizens, healthy institutions and the right laws. (For discussions of the variability of these curves and the factors that affect them, see this PERC report by a group led by Bruce Yandle of Clemson University and this article in Environment, Development and Sustainability by Kuheli Dutt of Northeastern University.) But rising incomes can make it more likely that improvements will come, and these Kuznets curves give more reason for optimism than the old idea that economic growth endangered the planet. In the 1970s, rich countries were urged to “de-develop” by Paul Ehrlich and John P. Holdren, now the White House science adviser. I welcome your thoughts on what can be learned from Kuznets curves — and whether people at opposite ends of the curves can find common ground. As America got richer in the the 20th century, emissions of sulphur dioxide rose. But thanks to new technologies, new laws and new desires for cleaner air, the trend reversed, and sulphur-dioxide pollution declined even though population and wealth kept rising.

### 2AC Sustainable

#### sustainable – tech causes decoupling

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In the twenty-first century, industrial processes will be revolutionized by new electrotechnologies, including lasers, plasmas, microwaves, and electron beams for materials processing, as well as electrochemical synthesis and electroseparation for chemical processing. Manufacturing will be revolutionized by a host of emerging technology platforms--for example, nanotechnology, biotechnology, biomimetics, high-temperature superconductivity, and network technology including the combining of advanced sensors with information technology to create adaptive, intelligent systems and processes. Future industrial facilities using advanced network technologies will be operated in new ways to simultaneously optimize productivity energy use, materials consumption, and plant emissions. Optimization will extend beyond the immediate facility to webs of facilities supporting industrial and urban ecology with the waste of one stream becoming the feedstock of the next. In the aggregate, the penetration of all the emerging technologies into the global economy should make it possible to sustain industrial productivity growth rates above 2% per year for many decades. The same technology platforms will be used to improve the efficiency of land, energy and water use, For example, distributed sensors and controls that enable precision farming can improve crop yields and reduce land and water use. And doubling or even tripling global energy efficiency in the next century is well within our means. Given the inefficiencies that now exist at every stage in the process--from mining and drilling for fuel through the use of energy in automobiles, appliances, and processes--the overall efficiency of the energy chain is only about 5%. From a social standpoint, accelerating productivity is not an option but rather an imperative for the future. It is necessary in order to provide the wealth for environmental sustainability, to support an aging population in the industrialized world, and to provide an economic ladder for developing nations. The second area of opportunity for technology lies in its potential to help stabilize global population at 10-12 billion sometime in the twenty-first century, possibly as early as 2075. The key is economics. Global communications, from television to movies to the Internet, have brought an image of the comfortable life of the developed world into the homes of the poorest people, firing their own aspirations for a better quality of life, either through economic development in their own country or through emigration to other countries. If we in the developed world can make the basic tools of prosperity--infrastructure, health care, education, and law--more accessible and affordable, recent history suggests that the cultural drivers for producing large families will be tempered, relatively quickly and without coercion. But the task is enormous. The physical prerequisites for prosperity in the global economy are electricity and communications. Today, there are more than 2 billion people living without electricity, or commercial energy in any form, in the very countries where some 5 billion people will be added in the next 50 years. If for no other reason than our enlightened self-interest, we should strive for universal access to electricity, communications, and educational opportunity. We have little choice, because the fate of the developed world is inextricably bound up in the economic and demographic fate of the developing world. A third, related opportunity for technology is in decoupling population growth from land use and, more broadly, decoupling economic growth from natural resource consumption through recycling, end-use efficiency, and industrial ecology. Decoupling population from land use is well under way. According to Grubler, from 1700 to 1850 nearly 2 hectares of land (5 acres) were needed to support every child born in North America, while in the more crowded and cultivated regions of Europe and Asia only 0.5 hectare (1.2 acres) and 0.2 hectare (0.5 acre) were needed, respectively. During the past century, the amount of land needed per additional child has been dropping in all areas of the world, with Europe and North America experiencing the fastest decreases. Both crossed the "zero threshold" in the past few decades, meaning that no additional land is needed to support additional children and that land requirements will continue to decrease in the future. One can postulate that the pattern of returning land to nature will continue to spread throughout the world, eventually stemming and then reversing the current onslaught on the great rain forests. Time is critical if vast tracts are to be saved from being laid bare, and success will largely depend on how rapidly economic opportunities expand for those now trapped in subsistence and frontier farming. In concept, the potential for returning land to nature is enormous. Futurist and scholar Jesse Ausubel of the Rockefeller University calculates that if farmers could lift average grain yields around the world just to the level of today's average U.S. corn grower, one-half of current global cropland--an area the size of the Amazon basin--could be spared. If agriculture is a leading indicator, then the continuous drive to produce more from less will prevail in other parts of the economy Certainly with shrinking agricultural land requirements, water distribution and use around the world can be greatly altered, since nearly two-thirds of water now goes for irrigation. Overall, the technologies of the future will, in the words of Ausubel, be "cleaner, leaner, lighter, and drier"--that is, more efficient and less wasteful of materials and water. They will be much more tightly integrated through microprocessor-based control and will therefore use human and natural resources much more efficiently and productively. Energy intensity, land intensity, and water intensity (and, to a lesser extent, materials intensity) for both manufacturing and agriculture are already heading downward. Only in agriculture are they falling fast enough to offset the surge in population, but, optimistically, advances in science and technology should accelerate the downward trends in other sectors, helping to decouple economic development from environmental impact in the coming century. One positive sign is the fact that recycling rates in North America are now approaching 65% for steel, lead, and copper and 30% for aluminum and paper. A second sign is that economic output is shifting away from resource-intensive products toward knowledge-based, immaterial goods and services. As a result, although the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) increased 200-fold (in real dollars) in the twentieth century, the physical weight of our annual output remains the same as it was in 1900. If anything, this trend will be accelerating. As Kevin Kelly, the editor of Wired magazine, noted, "The creations most in demand from the United States [as exports] have lost 50% of their physical weight per dollar of value in only six years.... Within a generation, two at most, the number of people working in honest-to-goodness manufacturing jobs will be no more than the number of farmers on the land--less than a few percent. Far more than we realize, the network economy is pulling us all in." Even pollution shows clear signs of being decoupled from population and economic growth. Economist Paul Portney notes that, with the exception of greenhouse gases, "in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, the favorable experience [with pollution control] has been a triumph of technology That is, the ratio of pollution per unit of GDP has fallen fast enough in the developed world to offset the increase in both GDP per capita and the growing number of 'capitas' themselves." The fourth opportunity for science and technology stems from their enormous potential to unlock resources not now available, to reduce human limitations, to create new options for policymakers and businesspeople alike, and to give us new levels of insight into future challenges. Technically resources have little value if we cannot unlock them for practical use. With technology, we are able to bring dormant resources to life. For example, it was only with the development of an electrolytic process late in the nineteenth century that aluminum--the most abundant metal on earth--became commercially available and useful. Chemistry unlocked hydrocarbons. And engineering allowed us to extract and put to diverse use untapped petroleum and gas fields. Over the course of history, technology has made the inaccessible accessible, and resource depletion has been more of a catalyst for change than a longstanding problem. Technology provides us with last-ditch methods (what economists would call substitutions) that allow us to circumvent or leapfrog over crises of our own making. Agricultural technology solved the food crisis of the first half of the nineteenth century. The English "steam crisis" of the 1860s, triggered by the rapid rise of coal-burning steam engines and locomotives, was averted by mechanized mining and the discovery and use of petroleum. The U.S. "timber crisis" that Teddy Roosevelt publicly worried about was circumvented by the use of chemicals that enabled a billion or so railroad ties to last for decades instead of years. The great "manure crisis" of the same era was solved by the automobile, which in a few decades replaced some 25 million horses and freed up 40 million hectares (100 million acres) of farmland, not to mention improving the sanitation and smell of inner cities. Oil discoveries in Texas and then in the Middle East pushed the pending oil crisis of the 1920s into the future. And the energy crisis of the 1970s stimulated the development of new sensing and drilling technology, sparked the advance of non--fossil fuel alternatives, and deepened the penetration of electricity with its fuel flexibility into the global economy. Thanks to underground imaging technology, today's known gas resources are an order of magnitude greater than the resources known 20 years ago, and new reserves continue to be discovered. Technology has also greatly extended human limits. It has given each of us a productive capability greater than that of 150 workers in 1800, for example, and has conveniently put the power of hundreds of horses in our garages. In recent decades, it has extended our voice and our reach, allowing us to easily send our words, ideas, images, and money around the world at the speed of light. But global sustainability is not inevitable. In spite of the tremendous promise that technology holds for a sustainable future, there is the potential for all of this to backfire before the job can be done. There are disturbing indications that people sometimes turn in fear and anger on technologies, industries, and institutions that openly foster an ever-faster pace of change. The current opposition to nuclear power genetically altered food, the globalization of the economy and the spread of American culture should give us pause. Technology has always presented a two-edged sword, serving as both cause and effect, solving one problem while creating another that was unintended and often unforeseen. We solved the manure crisis, but automotive smog, congestion, and urban sprawl took its place. We cleaned and transformed the cities with all-electric buildings rising thousands of feet into the sky. But while urban pollution was thereby dramatically reduced, a portion of the pollution was shifted to someone else's sky. "Limits to growth" was a popular theme in the 1970s, and a best-selling book of that name predicted dire consequences for the human race by the end of the century. In fact, we have done much better than those predictions, largely because of a factor the book missed--the potential of new technology to break limits. Repeatedly, human societies have approached seemingly insurmountable barriers only to find the means and tools to break through. This ability has now become a source of optimism, an article of faith, in many parts of the world. Today's perceived limits, however, look and feel different. They are global in nature, multicultural, and larger in scale and complexity than ever before. Nearly 2 billion people in the world are without adequate sanitation, and nearly as many are without access to clean drinking water. AIDS is spreading rapidly in the regions of the world least able to fight it. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are more than 30% greater than preindustrial levels and are climbing steadily. Petroleum reserves, expected to be tapped by over a billion automobiles worldwide by 2015, may last only another 50-100 years. And without careful preservation efforts, the biodiversity of the planet could become as threatened in this coming century as it was at the end of the last ice age, when more than 70% of the species of large mammals and other vertebrates in North America disappeared (along with 29% in Europe and 86% in Australia). All these perceived limits require innovation of a scope and intensity surpassing humankind's current commitment. The list of real-world problems that could thwart global sustainability is long and sobering. It includes war, disease, famine, political and religious turmoil, despotism, entrenched poverty, illiteracy, resource depletion, and environmental degradation. Technology can help resolve some of these issues--poverty and disease, resource depletion, and environmental impact, for example--but it offers little recourse for the passions and politics that divide the world. The likelihood is that we will not catch up and overtake the moving target of global sustainability in the coming century, but given the prospects for technology, which have never been brighter, we may come surprisingly close. We should put our technology to work, striving to lift more than 5 billion people out of poverty while preventing irreversible damage to the biosphere and irreversible loss of the earth's natural resources. We cannot see the future of technology any more clearly than our forebears did--and for much the same reason. We are approaching the threshold of profound change, moving at great speed across a wide spectrum of technology, ranging today from the Internet to the Human Genome project. Technology in the twenty-first century will be turning toward biological and ecological analogs, toward microminiature machines, toward the construction of materials atom by atom, and toward the dispersion of microprocessor intelligence into everyday objects subsequently linked into neural networks. Computing power continues to double every 18 months, as postulated in Moore's law, promising to enable us to create much more powerful tools for everyday tasks, optimize business services and processes along new lines, understand complex natural phenomena like the weather and climate, and design technical systems that are self-diagnostic, self-healing, and self-learning. The networked, digital society of the future should be capable of exponential progress more in tune with biological models of growth than with the incremental progress of industrial societies. If history tells us anything, it is that in the long term we are much more likely to underestimate technology than to overestimate it. We are not unlike the excited crowds that in 1909 tried to imagine the future of flight as they watched Wilbur Wright loop his biplane twice around the Statue of Liberty and head back to Manhattan at the record-breaking speed of 30 miles per hour. As wild as one's imagination and enthusiasm might have been, it would have been inconceivable that exactly 60 years later humans would fly to the moon and back.

#### Growth prevents all shortage problems – and its self-regulating.

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In fact, perhaps the time has arrived for the species to reconsider the very concept of density altogether. The Macroindustrial society’s stu­pendous ability to construct artificial islands, underground cities and city-buildings, obliterates timeworn and obsolete notions of “popula­tion” density in much the same way that skyscrapers rewrote earlier concepts of overcrowding. In fact, when people want more land, it is within their ability to go out and create it. Israelis are reclaiming the Negev Desert through the use of hydroponics, the agricultural tech­nique that recycles all water and nutrients, is nonpolluting, and needs little land and no soil at all. Holland has been reclaiming land from the sea for centuries. Between 1951 and 1971, India’s total cultivated land acreage in­creased by 20 percent. In fact, it would surprise most Westerners bom­barded with dire media predictions about that country’s fate to discover that India is not now densely populated. Measured by the number of persons per acre of arable land, Japan and Taiwan, neither of which can be considered suffering from malnourishment, are about five times as densely populated as India. So it would seem that the argument that a growing population will outdistance the supply of food, materials, and energy cannot withstand empirical scrutiny. Nonetheless advocates of zero growth periodically revive such alarmist arguments, exploiting fears harbored deep inside the human psyche since the dawn of the human species: mass starva­tion, drought, and ecological Armageddon. The arguments can be safely ignored. The world population, which at present stands at about 5 billion persons, will peak over the next century and a half at around twice that. What conditions must prevail for a population to add another 5 billion individuals to its ranks? For one, its members must be sufficiently healthy to reach puberty, must be physically resilient enough to bear healthy children, and must re­main in good health to care for the children and to produce goods and services to support this next generation. In a sense, the zero-growth advocates have turned the argument on its head to produce a concept that is ultimately illogical. How could a starving, unhealthy, disease-ridden society, which we supposedly will become if we keep increasing our population, even sustain itself to double in size? Such societal breakdowns—famine, drought, and plague—are the very factors that prevented humanity from reaching any sizable population level until A.D. 1800, after 30,000-plus years of attempted expansion. In other words, our expansion from 5 billion to 11 billion, instead of being a harbinger of shortages and deterioration, will be proof positive that the Macroindustrial revolution has delivered what it promised—a healthy, well-fed, technologically advanced global society that supports 5 billion more people than lived on the planet at the era’s inception! In truth, the decision to consider the newborn child as a mouth to feed instead of a being whose brain will contribute to the world’s knowl­edge and whose hands will help build the universe more reflects the observer’s own prejudices and pessimism than any reality we know. From the above, it is obvious that the technological breakthroughs and material improvements of the Macroindustrial Era will sustain a much larger population. At the same time, that growing population will contribute the labor and creativity necessary to support the continued progress of the species. As we have seen, these advances in the agricultural, energy, and materials fields demonstrate the species’ ability to overcome the restrictions of nature and to recast the concept of limits and boundlessness. The implications of these advances are many. We can finally see the light at the end of the tunnel in terms of eliminating hunger and malnutrition from the face of the planet.