## 1NC

### Off

#### a. Interp—AFF has to specify their agent

#### b. They didn’t—Vote NEG

#### Education- 90% of the plan is implementation

Elmore '80 (Professor of Public affairs @ University of Washington Polysci Quarterly Pages 79-80)

Analysis for policy choices matters very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood. In the normal case, it was about 10%, leaving 90% in the realm of implantation.

#### Ground and Clash- We lose 90% of our ground for case dumps, specific counterplans, and specific disads; they can always shift out of a certain part of the USFG

#### Voting issue

### Off

#### CIR Will pass and PC key

CT Post 3-28 (“Immigration reform gaining support in Congress”, http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Immigration-reform-gaining-support-in-Congress-4393187.php)

WASHINGTON -- A Republican Party in desperate search for relevance to Latino voters. An expanded Democratic advantage in the Senate. A second-term President with his legacy on the line.¶ Does all that add up to enough to break decades of impasse and produce comprehensive immigration reform? As expectations -- and tensions -- rise, the answer won't be long in coming.¶ A bipartisan bill could be filed in the Senate as early as next week, followed in relatively short order by a House bill, also crafted by a bipartisan group, aiming at a compromise on the key issue of citizenship.¶ The efforts are being applauded by President Barack Obama, who is using every ounce of his political clout to try to get comprehensive reform.¶ Obama said the time has come "to work up the political courage to do what's required to be done."¶ "I expect a bill to be put forward. I expect a debate to begin next month. I want to sign that bill into law as soon as possible," Obama said at a White House naturalization ceremony.¶ In addition to the issue of eventual citizenship for 11 million undocumented immigrants, Congress is expected to address the need for temporary or guest worker programs.¶ Congress last passed comprehensive bipartisan reform legislation in 1986, when President Ronald Reagan signed a law that granted citizenship to several million undocumented immigrants and created a guest worker program.¶ Up until now, Republicans have opposed citizenship programs as an "amnesty" for lawbreakers who entered the country illegally, and labor has chafed at guest worker programs.¶ But Republican losses in the 2012 elections and increased public support for reform have many in the GOP talking compromise.¶ "If there is one issue that the two parties could produce something meaningful on in this Congress, it would be immigration," said Stephen Hess, a political expert at The Brookings Institution.¶ Hess said an eventual bill "will have lots of provisos, and it will go back and forth, but it would be hard not to produce something given the general feeling that something has to be produced."¶ More and more Republicans are moving toward immigration-reform measures as the party seeks to reach out to Latinos, the nation's largest -- and growing -- minority voting bloc.¶ Public opinion is behind them.¶ A recent poll showed 63 percent of Americans supported a path to citizenship for undocumented workers provided they meet certain requirements, according to a survey by the Public Religion Research Institute.¶ Notable Republicans who have recently spoken in favor of compromise on citizenship proposals include Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky.; former Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour; and Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis.¶ And a March report by the National Republican Committee, considered a "post mortem" on the 2012 elections, recommended the GOP embrace comprehensive immigration reform to shore up its shaky standing with minorities -- Latinos, in particular.¶ Roy Beck, executive director of Numbers USA, which advocates lower numerical numbers on immigration, predicted a majority of Republican senators would oppose citizenship.¶ Groups like Numbers USA are working to hold GOP senators in line. They sent 13,000 emails to Kentucky voters that claimed Paul's position was "more radical and pro-immigration than anything proposed by President Obama."¶ The group has targeted Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., one of the "Gang of Eight" senators writing the Senate bipartisan bill, as a lawmaker who favors foreign workers over unemployed South Carolinians.¶ Democrats from conservative-leaning states could also feel political heat.¶ Beck said if five to 10 Democrats in the Senate oppose a bill, proponents would need 10 to 15 Republicans to reach the 60 votes needed to cut off debate and vote on legislation.¶ "You do the math," Beck said.¶ In 2007, an effort to cut off debate on a Senate immigration reform bill died on a 46-53 vote.¶ But immigrant reform proponents, such as America's Voice, say there is a "tectonic shift" in the GOP, and the Democrats also have expanded their Senate majority to 53-45, plus two independents who caucus with them. They predict the Senate will muster the votes necessary to pass a reform bill.

#### The plan causes bipartisan opposition – perceived as massive deficit spending and undermining the EPA

Weiss 10 (Daniel J., September 17th, Senior Fellow and the Director of Climate Strategy at American Progress, “Efforts to Save Coal Could End Up Destroying It”, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/09/coal_senators.html/>) CC

Some senators from coal states want the federal government to invest billions of dollars into CCS research rather than require reductions in global warming pollution because they view this nascent technology as a silver bullet that can reduce pollution while allowing coal combustion.¶ For instance, Sens. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and George Voinovich (R-OH) introduced the Carbon Capture and Storage Deployment Act, S. 3591. It would provide $850 million in federal research money for CCS as well as raise $2 billion annually from a “wire charge” (a levy or tax) on all fossil-fuel-generated electricity.¶ There are two fundamental problems with this approach. First, there would be no market for CCS technology unless there are global warming pollution reductions in place. The Government Accountability Office concluded that a mandatory reduction in carbon pollution was essential for CCS to blossom.¶ Without a tax or a sufficiently restrictive limit on CO2 emissions, plant operators lack an economic incentive to use CCS technologies. Reports by IPCC, NAS, and the Global CCS Institute have all highlighted the importance of a carbon policy to incentivize the use of CCS.¶ Second, without a pollution reduction program to generate revenue to invest in CCS research and development, some of the money for it will have to come from general revenues. The large federal budget deficit, however, has fueled opposition to more government spending. APA and the American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, would have provided billions of dollars for CCS research using revenue raised from selling pollution dumping permits under global warming pollution reduction legislation. It is difficult to imagine Congress appropriating money for CCS when so many existing programs will be facing severe budget cuts.¶ The senators’ strategy of attempting to stave off pollution reductions from coal-fired power plants also flies in the face of overwhelming support for such health protections. A just-conducted poll conducted by Infogroup/Opinion Research Corporation for the Natural Resource Defense Council found strong bipartisan support for EPA to limit global warming pollution from power plants.¶ About three out of four Americans (73 percent) support “protecting the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s authority” to “take steps that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions from electric utilities and other major industrial polluters.” Support is fairly evenly divided between “strongly” (38 percent) and “somewhat” (34 percent).¶ By contrast, only about one in four Americans (24 percent) oppose the EPA’s authority to control carbon dioxide pollution, with just 15 percent in the “strongly oppose" category.¶ Little variation is seen among regions in the level of support for the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions: Northeast (75 percent); Midwest (68 percent); South (72 percent); and West (75 percent). A majority of Republicans (54 percent), Independents (78 percent) and Democrats (91 percent) favor protecting the EPA’s authority.¶ The poll further found that if Congress’s efforts to stop EPA from setting pollution limits succeed people would feel that Congress would be letting special interests off the hook.¶ Seven out of 10 Americans (71 percent) agree with the following statement: “If Congress blocks the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency from doing its job of reducing greenhouse gas emissions from electric utilities and other major industrial polluters, it would send the wrong message to polluters, namely, that Congress isn't willing to hold polluters accountable.”¶ A majority of Republicans (55 percent), Independents (70 percent), and Democrats (89 percent) agree with this statement.¶ Sen. Rockefeller said at the rally funded by big-coal, "I don't want somebody who is not elected, whose agency is divided by all kinds of stovepipes, telling us what we ought to do.” But the poll found that Americans believe that “scientists and other experts at the EPA are ‘the most qualified to make decisions about how best to safeguard the American public when dealing with greenhouse gas emissions and other major pollutants,’ compared to fewer than one in 10 Americans (9 percent) who said Congress should make such decisions.” Sen. Rockefeller may want Congress to make these decisions, but Americans clearly prefer technical experts to do so.

#### Immigration reform expands skilled labor --- spurs relations and economic growth in China and India

Los Angeles **Times**, 11/9/**2012** (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### US-India relations solves South Asian nuclear war.

**Schaffer**, Spring **2002** (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

### Off

#### The United States federal government should conduct a binding regulatory negotiation over the substance, implementation and enforcement of increasing contracts for coal to liquid fuels in the Department of Defense

#### **The CP *accelerates* energy development and overcomes bureaucratic issues**

Lemaire Professor at University College London Energy Institute ’12 (Xavier, “SERN,” <http://www.reeep.org/830/sern.htm>, Mike)

The Sustainable Energy Regulation Network (SERN) facilitates exchange of experience and knowledge between regulators and government officials on policy and regulatory mechanisms that promote and accelerate the development of sustainable energy. SERN is co-ordinated by researchers at University College London - Energy Institute (UK). The SERN aims to: secure greater understanding of the benefits of energy efficiency and renewable energy amongst energy regulators and government departments; secure regulatory mechanisms (e.g. price controls, network development incentives etc) that incentivize energy efficiency, renewable energy and distributed generation. SERN activities include: This communication facility which acts as a focal and link point for information on renewable energy, energy efficiency and distributed generation geared to the needs of energy regulators and others with an interest in energy regulation. A course on sustainable energy and regulation and case studies of regulation as it affects sustainable energy has been developed as a training package (see http://africa-toolkit.reeep.org/) Literature and web reviews and a glossary of key terms in sustainable energy regulation (see “publications”). The coordination of a policy and regulatory review (the current edition covers more than 165 countries, see the Policy Database ONLINE); more than 100 countries have been updated in 2012 Facilitating contacts between regulators and policy makers. Facilitating contacts between regulators and policy makers. Running training courses, seminars and other events in collaboration with REEEP regional secretariats, REEEP partners and others. SERN newsletter is disseminated to more than 900 individuals from energy regulatory agencies, government departments, consultants, academics and other stakeholders with an interest in regulation. Members are drawn from all continents. SERN works with the main associations of regulators of the energy sector in African countries, Caribbean countries and South Asia. SERN also develops links with funding agencies, regional energy organisations and energy NGOs. Key SERN activities in 2006-12 included: Publications Policy and regulation review, this on-line document outlines policy frameworks, regulatory institutions and mechanisms relevant to renewable energy and energy efficiency, country by country in several regions – Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean; the whole African continent; South Asia; Russia and the former Soviet Union; Central and Eastern Europe; Middle East, Asia Pacific and Australasia. The fourth edition of the policy and regulation review included a special report on India and Indian states launched at the World Forum of Energy Regulators in Athens in October 2009, and a special report on China, launched at Wilton Park in June 2010. SERN newsletters and interviews – with a focus on various regions covered by REEEP SERN literature reviews – these reviews present a selection of important documents and websites on regulation and sustainable energy. Capacity building SERN has participated at the World Forum on Energy Regulation III, in Washington, October 2006, at the WFER IV in Athens, October 2009, and at the WFER V in Quebec City, May 2012, organising a side-event on feed-in tariff policies for developing countries Lecture at the 15th Commission on Sustainable Development – Learning Centre, United Nations, New York, 8 May 2007. Participation in two IEA Expert meetings on Global Best Practice in Renewable Energy Policy in Paris, June 2007 and Berlin, October 2007. SERN and the REEEP regional secretariat collaborated with the Eastern Europe Energy Regulators Regional Association ERRA, to organize a workshop on "guarantees of origin" in Budapest, June 2006, and a workshop on "regulating for distributed energy" in Budapest, July 2007. SERN made a presentation at the OOCUR – Organization of Caribbean Utility Regulators - General Assembly in Georgetown, Guyana November 2007 and in Barbados, November 2011 and also at a CARICOM expert meeting on harmonized legislation for the reform of the electricity sector in Dominica, February 2008. Collaboration with World Resources Institute (WRI), Asian Development Bank and others on a workshop on Clean Energy, Good Governance and Regulation for regulators from SE and South Asia, in Singapore in March 2008 and in Johannesburg, May 2010. Leonardo Energy Webinar on "Off-Grid Regulation: how to provide cost-effective and sustainable rural energy services in remote areas of developing countries," given in May 2009. Workshop on Policy and Regulation for Energy Efficiency in Southern Africa organised by SERN and REEEP Southern Africa Regional Secretariat in Johannesburg, in July 2009. Workshop on Feed-in Tariff in Africa with more than 120 participants, organised by SERN and REEEP Southern Africa Regional Secretariat in Johannesburg in November 2010. • Workshop on Energy Efficiency and workshop on Feed-in Tariff, in Manila in June 2011 and 2 days side-event on energy access and regulation, in Manila, June 2012 organised as side-events of the Asian Development Bank Clean Energy Forum Support to specific projects Input to a UNIDO-REEEP training course for regulators in Africa on sustainable energy issues. The course is now made available as a CD-ROM training package for African institutions and on-line at http://toolkits.reeep.org/ Advisor on a REEEP funded project on off-grid regulation and rural electrification with solar photovoltaic ESCOs in Africa; advices on a REEEP project on feed-in tariff in Namibia,... Expertise provided for a GOF – TERI Project on a “Framework for Renewable Energy Certificate System in Maharashtra”. This follows a similar REEEP project lead by TERI with SERN in 2006 on “Capacity Building for Regulators and Policy Makers in Andhra Pradesh” and contributed to the implementation of green certificates in India. Research/Documentation/Policy advisor SERN works as a research/resource centre on the implementation of policies and regulatory mechanisms to promote sustainable electricity in the specific context of developing countries. SERN acts as advisor to integrate sustainable energy in energy policies and regulatory frameworks mainly at the request of governments or regulatory bodies in three fields. On-grid regulation Mechanisms and policies to support on-grid connection RET include notably targeted feed-in tariff laws or green certificates markets. The conditions of success of these policies are now well documented. Off-grid regulation SERN has developed a good knowledge on how to implement off-grid regulation and institutions adapted to the diffusion of stand-alone and mini-grid systems with renewable energy technologies. Energy efficiency Energy efficiency measures are considered as the most cost-effective way to reduce carbon emissions. Some countries have accumulated a lot of experience in this field (labels and standards, energy audits, white certificates, Demand-Side management programmes) and SERN can put interested regulatory bodies in relation with energy efficiency experts.

#### The aff gets watered down by lack of unified energy policy, resistance from fossil fuel industries, and citizen opposition – the CP is key to avoid politics

Nolon Director of Land Use Law Center at Pace University Law School ’11 (Sean, “Negotiating the Wind: A Framework to Engage Citizens in Siting Wind Turbines,” *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 12 no. 2, accessible online via <http://cojcr.org/vol12no2/327-372.pdf>, Mike)

The need for more renewable sources of energy is unequivocal and the call can be heard from many quarters.1 Fossil fuel stocks are being depleted and what remains will be increasingly costly to extract and use.2 The scientific community has documented the long-predicted arrival of climate change as a result of increased greenhouse gas production.3 Renewable sources of energy must be addressed to limit the adverse impacts of these emissions, to live more sustainably, and to provide a hospitable planet for future generations. Yet, despite the pressing need for renewable energy and proven technological capacity, the U.S. is struggling to replace the carbon dependent energy system with more renewable sources.4 The lack of progress is not for want of technological innovation— our ability to produce energy through solar, wind, hydro and geothermal sources has increased dramatically.5 Other obstacles include the low cost of energy from fossil fuel sources, the lack of a unified energy policy, resistance to change from the fossil fuel industry, the need for new transmission lines to deliver electricity to population centers, and citizen opposition to siting of renewable energy facilities such as wind turbines, solar panels and dams.6 The limited purpose of this article is to address the obstacle of citizen opposition to the siting of wind turbines. While there is little empirical data available on the impact of citizen opposition, several high profile cases have captured the media’s attention and highlighted the need for improved siting procedures. The framework proposed herein recommends dealing with siting opposition by involving citizens “upstream” in policy development as well as “downstream” in siting negotiations. This framework relies on federal state-local partnerships that integrates citizens into a process that identifies areas appropriate for turbines, provides for mitigation of adverse effects, designates fossil fuel reductions, creates model leases and ordinances, provides for decommissioning, and enables siting negotiations at the local level.

### Off

#### Clean coal co-opts renewable rhetoric give to itself an illusion of environmental safety

Pond ’13 (Kate, writer for The Carbon Brief. “What makes clean coal 'clean': A rhetorical look” http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2013/03/the-rhetoric-of-clean-energy)

What does clean coal mean? What makes a wind farm clean, or a coal plant dirty? When is nuclear power, or shale gas, dirty, or clean? The concept of cleanliness plays a fundamental role in discussion of energy technologies. ¶ But the concept of 'clean' in relation to energy production is problematic: all forms of power production create pollution of some kind. ¶ In energy policy, there's a simplified sliding scale from clean(est) to dirty(est). According to the rhetoric of energy, renewable technologies sit at one end, and traditional fossil fuels at the other. But it gets a bit more complex than that. ¶ Sometimes, less polluting traditional fossil fuels like natural gas are described as clean, as gas has around half the emissions of unabated coal. But the fuel still accounted for20 percent of global emissions in 2010. ¶ Meanwhile, the US National Mining Association claims new 'clean coal' plants will emit 90 percent less pollutants than the coal power stations of the 1970s. Even so, this clean coal will still be a highly polluting power source. ¶ Nuclear power famously produces problematic nuclear waste. But with the focus now on greenhouse gas emissions as the most important form of pollution, nuclear is enjoying a new identity as a clean technology. ¶ Even renewable technologies are not without pollution problems: siting onshore wind farms on pristine peat bog can release CO2; hydropower can have a negative impact upon aquatic ecosystems; and there is the oft-mentioned visual impact of wind turbines. But do these make renewables 'dirty'? And if not, why not? ¶ Rigid designators¶ To understand what's going on here in rhetorical terms, let's turn to a rhetorical construct called a 'rigid designator'; a linguistic term coined by philosopher and linguist Saul Kripke. ¶ Language is important to how we view the world, but its connection to reality is subjective and changeable. The theory goes that words (or 'signifiers') float around in ideological space until they become attached to a master-signifier - a word that appears to give associated words their meaning. The meaning of the words then depends entirely upon the master-signifier, which pins the floating words together. ¶ Make sense? How about the practical example: In this case, the master signifier is 'clean'. The words (or 'floating signifiers') that rely on 'clean' to get their meaning include 'clean coal', 'nuclear', 'natural gas', 'renewable technologies' and 'non-polluting'. ¶ The master-signifier unifies the signifiers to create what Slavoj Žižek calls an ideology. In this case, it's the concept of 'clean energy'. Clean becomes a word that does not refer to anything in the real world, but only to the other signifiers.¶ As a rigid designator, 'clean' cannot be held to account in the real world: it has no properties outside of the words it pins. So in discourse on energy production, 'clean' can give meaning to 'clean coal', 'nuclear', 'natural gas', renewable technologies' and so on, and they in turn are defined by the rhetoric of 'clean'. Its means of functioning is tautological and self-perpetuating. ¶ 'Clean energy' as an ideology¶ But if these concepts are getting meaning from each other, how do we assess which energy sources are clean or dirty? And by what criteria? ¶ Repeatedly using the rigid designator in politics and industry is what gives 'clean energy' the appearance of having internal logical consistency. In other words, it sounds authoritative because it is spoken by those in authority.¶ How can this happen?¶ This is how technologies that are cleaner than ordinary fossil fuels can be presented as non-polluting. If we return to the sliding scale mentioned above and consider how the act of classification works, we could group clean coal, gas and nuclear alongside renewables as 'clean energy sources'.¶ These technologies - and their advocates - can borrow the language of renewable technologies in order to tap into the narrative of non-pollution. This is possible because they all share in the rigid designator, 'clean'. ¶ As such, because renewable technologies are identified as 'clean energy sources', using the same language to talk about coal, natural gas and nuclear taps into this same designation of 'non-polluting'.¶ The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) uses the 'clean' rhetoric to promote nuclear power as environmentally friendly. The NEI website says: "Nuclear energy is America's largest source of clean-air, carbon-free electricity". Clean Energy America calls nuclear "a clean, reliable and affordable source of energy". ¶ Coal gets a similar treatment. The American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity (ACCCE) website says the organisation is "committed to a clean energy future with coal", and the company Clean Coal Technologies Incorporated even uses 'Pristine' as a brand name for its fuel products. ¶ But interestingly, renewable energy industry tends to use the adjectives 'renewable' or 'sustainable', while 'clean' appears mostly in a political context - if at all. The Renewable Energy Corporation (REC) describes the source of solar energy as clean rather than its production. TheNational Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL) website has the tagline: 'Leading clean energy innovation', and the US Department of Energy website talks about 'clean, renewable energy'. ¶ On the whole, clean coal, gas and nuclear industries are keen to tap into the rhetoric of non-pollution through the use of 'clean', whereas renewables are less inclined. Arguably, because they have less to prove they have less need for the rigid designator. ¶ How clean is 'clean'? ¶ Use of the 'clean' rigid designator has led to some notable results. For example, in the mainstream debate in the UK and US, the acceptable measure of cleanliness is carbon emissions, which lets nuclear energy be repositioned as 'clean'. If this is the only measure, then this is not unreasonable.¶ It is important to note the black and white framing of 'clean' and 'dirty'. By assessing cleanliness solely in terms of carbon emissions, a complex issue is diminished to a single, reductive strand that does not account for pollution outside of its either/or frame; the problem of nuclear waste, for example, or visual pollution. ¶ The natural gas industry uses this frame to improve on the fossil fuel image of conventional and unconventional gas, primarily with the use of the adjective 'cleanest'. Shale gas is called "the cleanest fossil fuel" by Shale Gas Europe, and "the cleanest burning hydrocarbon" by the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). ¶ In the case of clean coal, environmental groups and other commentators are working to expose the rigid designator. For example, the Coen Brothers recently made a TV advert on the subject: "clean coal harnesses the awesome power of the word 'clean'!". And the Quit Coal website states: ¶ "Clean coal is a myth created by marketing, advertising and public relations experts to try and convince the US public that the dirtiest source of power in their country is somehow environmentally friendly."¶ The rigid designator is a powerful rhetorical tool used to great effect in the ideology of 'clean' energy, and has little to do with how polluting a given means of energy production actually is. To challenge this ideology, the rigid designator at its heart must be exposed

#### The financialization of life and extensions of neoliberal policy creates a death drive – the spectre of authoritarianism driven by our plutocracy culminates in the extermination of undesirable populations

Giroux 12 – Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University

(Henry, The end of American Democracy? October 4, 2012. http://philoforchange.wordpress.com/2012/10/04/the-end-of-american-democracy/)

Neoliberal Ideology and the Rhetoric of Freedom¶ In addition to amassing ever expanding amounts of material wealth, the rich now control the means of schooling and education in the United States. They have disinvested in critical education, while reproducing notions of common sense that incessantly replicate the basic values, ideas, and relations necessary to sustain the institutions of economic Darwinism. Both parties support educational reforms that increase conceptual illiteracy. Critical learning is now reduced to mastering test-taking, memorizing facts, and learning how not to question knowledge and authority. This type of rote pedagogy, as Zygmunt Bauman points out, is “the most effective prescription for grinding communication to a halt and for [robbing] it of the presumption and expectation of meaningfulness and sense.”[11]¶ This type of market-driven illiteracy has eviscerated the notion of freedom, turning it largely into the desire to consume and invest exclusively in relationships that serve only one’s individual interests. Citizens are treated by the political and economic elite as restless children and are “invited daily to convert the practice of citizenship into the art of shopping.”[12] Shallow consumerism coupled with an indifference to the needs and suffering of others has produced a politics of disengagement and a culture of moral irresponsibility. Language has been stripped of the terms, phrases, and ideas that embrace a concern for the other. With meaning utterly privatized, words are reduced to signifiers that mimic spectacles of violence, designed to provide entertainment rather than thoughtful analysis. Sentiments circulating in the dominant culture parade either idiocy or a survival-of-the-fittest ethic, while anti-public rhetoric strips society of the knowledge and values necessary for the development of a democratically engaged and socially responsible public.¶ In such circumstances, freedom has truly morphed into its opposite. Neoliberal ideology has construed as pathological any notion that in a healthy society people depend on each other in multiple, complex, direct and indirect ways. As Lewis Lapham points out, “Citizens are no longer held in thoughtful regard… just as thinking and acting are removed from acts of public conscience.”[13] Economic Darwinism has produced a legitimating ideology in which the conditions for critical inquiry, moral responsibility, and social and economic justice disappear. The result is that neoliberal ideology increasingly resembles a call to war that turns the principles of democracy against democracy itself. Americans now live in an atomized and pulverized society, “spattered with the debris of broken interhuman bonds”[14] in which “democracy becomes a perishable commodity”[15] and all things public are viewed with disdain. Increasingly, it appears the only bond holding American society together is a perverse collective death-drive. Neoliberal Governance¶ At the level of governance, neoliberalism has turned politics into a tawdry form of money laundering in which the spaces and registers that circulate power are controlled by those who have amassed large amounts of capital. Elections, like mainstream politicians, are now bought and sold to the highest bidder. In the Senate and House of Representatives, 47 percent are millionaires and the “estimated median net worth of a current U.S. senator stood at an average of $2.56 million while the median net worth of members of Congress is $913,000.”[16] Elected representatives no longer do the bidding of the people who elect them. Rather, they are now largely influenced by the demands of lobbyists who have enormous clout in promoting the interests of the elite, financial services, and mega corporations. Currently, there are over 14,000 registered lobbyists in Washington, D.C., which amounts to approximately 23 lobbyists for every member of Congress. Although the number of lobbyists has steadily increased by about 20 percent since 1998, the Center for Responsive Politics found that “total spending on lobbying the federal government has almost tripled since 1998, to $3.3 billion.”[17]¶ As Bill Moyers and Bernard Weisberger succinctly put it, “A radical minority of the superrich has gained ascendency over politics, buying the policies, laws, tax breaks, subsidies, and rules that consolidate a permanent state of vast inequality by which they can further help themselves to America’s wealth and resources.”[18] Democratic governance has been replaced by the sovereignty of the market, paving the way for modes of governance intent on transforming democratic citizens into entrepreneurial agents. The language of the market and business culture have now almost entirely supplanted any celebration of the public good or the calls to enhance civil society characteristic of past generations.¶ Neoliberal governance has produced an economy and a political system almost entirely controlled by the rich and powerful — what a Citigroup report called a “Plutonomy,” an economy powered by the wealthy. [19] These plutocrats are what I have called the new zombies sucking the resources out of the planet and the rest of us in order to strengthen their grasp on political and economic power and fuel their exorbitant lifestyles. Policies are now enacted that provide massive tax cuts to the rich and generous subsidies to banks and corporations — alongside massive disinvestments in job creation programs, the building of critical infrastructures, and the development of crucial social programs, which range from health care to school meal programs for disadvantaged children. In reality, the massive disinvestment in schools, social programs, and an aging infrastructure is not about a lack of money.¶ The real problem stems from government priorities that inform both how the money is collected and how it is spent.[20] Over 60 percent of the federal budget goes to military spending, while only 6 percent is allocated towards education. The U.S. spends over $92 billion on corporate subsidies and only $59 billion on social welfare programs.[21] John Cavanagh has estimated that if there were a tiny tax imposed on Wall Street “stock and derivatives transactions,” the government could raise $150 billion annually.[22] In addition, if the tax code were adjusted in a fair manner to tax the wealthy, another $79 billion could be raised. Finally, Cavanagh points out that $100 billion in tax income is lost annually through tax haven abuse; proper regulation would making it costly for corporations to declare “their profits in overseas tax havens like the Cayman Islands.”[23]¶ At the same time, the financialization of the economy and culture has resulted in the poisonous growth of monopoly power, predatory lending, abusive credit card practices, and misuses of CEO pay. The false but central neoliberal tenet that markets can solve all of society’s problems has no way of limiting the power of money and has given rise to “a politics in which policies that favor the rich … have allowed the financial sector to amass vast economic and political power.”[24] As Joseph Stiglitz points out, there is more at work in this form of governance than a pandering to the wealthy and powerful: there is also the specter of an authoritarian society “where people live in gated communities,” large segments of the population are impoverished or locked up in prison, and Americans live in a state of constant fear as they face growing “economic insecurity, healthcare insecurity, [and] a sense of physical insecurity.”[25] In other words, the authoritarian nature of neoliberal political governance and economic power is also visible in the rise of a national security state in which civil liberties are being drastically abridged and violated.

#### The alternative is critical to reclaim public spaces foreclosed by neoliberalism – we need a collective politics inspired by critical pedagogy to actualize a democracy stripped of corporate interests – this is crucial to sustaining hope in the face of disposability

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(Henry, The end of American Democracy? October 4, 2012. http://philoforchange.wordpress.com/2012/10/04/the-end-of-american-democracy/)

The Role of Critical Education¶ One way of challenging the new authoritarianism is to reclaim the relationship between critical education and social change. Education both in and out of schools is the bedrock for the formative culture necessary to create not only a literate public but also a public willing to fight for its capacity to hold power accountable and to participate in the decisions and institutions that shape its everyday existence. The question of what kind of subjects and modes of individual and social agency are necessary for a democracy to survive appears more crucial now than ever before, and this is a question that places matters of education, pedagogy, and culture at the center of any understanding of politics. We live at a time when the American people appear to have no interest in democracy — beyond the four-year ritual performance of voting, and even this act fails to attract a robust majority of citizens. The term has been emptied of any viable meaning, hijacked by political scoundrels, corporate elites, and the advertising industry. The passion that democracy exhibits as an ongoing struggle for rights, justice, and a future of hope has been transmuted into a misplaced desire to shop, fulfill the pleasure quotient in spectacles of violence, and misappropriate the language of democracy to deploy it as a rationale for racist actions against immigrants, Muslims, and poor minorities of color and class.¶ Clearly, as the Occupy Movement and other youth movements around the world have demonstrated, the time has come not only to redefine the promise of democracy but also to challenge those who have poisoned its meaning. We have already witnessed such a challenge by protest movements both at home and abroad in which the struggle over education has become one of the most powerful fulcrums for addressing the detrimental effects of neoliberalism. What these struggles, particularly by young people, have in common is the attempt to merge the powers of persuasion and critical, civic literacy with the power of social movements to activate and mobilize real change. They are recovering a notion of the social and reclaiming a kind of humanity that should inspire and inform our collective willingness to imagine what a real democracy might look like. The political philosopher, Cornelius Castoriadis, rightly argues that “people need to be educated for democracy by not only expanding the capacities that enable them to assume public responsibility but also through active participation in the very process of governing.”[50] The current attack on democracy is directly linked to a systemic destruction of all those public spheres that expand the power of the imagination, critical inquiry, thoughtful exchange, and the formative culture that makes critical education and an engaged citizenry dangerous to fundamentalists of all ideological stripes.¶ As the crucial lens through which to create the formative culture in which politics and power can be made visible and held accountable, pedagogy plays a central role. But as Archon Fung points out, criticism is not the only public responsibility of intellectuals, artists, journalists, educators, and others who engage in critical pedagogical practices. “Intellectuals can also join citizens — and sometimes governments — to construct a world that is more just and democratic. One such constructive role is aiding popular movements and organizations in their efforts to advance justice and democracy.”[51] In this instance, understanding must be linked to the practice of social responsibility and the willingness to fashion a politics that addresses real problems and enacts concrete solutions. As Heather Gautney points out,¶ we need to start thinking seriously about what kind of political system we really want. And we need to start pressing for things that our politicians did NOT discuss at the conventions. Real solutions — like universal education, debt forgiveness, wealth redistribution, and participatory political structures — that would empower us to decide together what’s best. Not who’s best.[52] Critical thinking divorced from action is often as sterile as action divorced from critical theory. Given the urgency of the historical moment, we need a politics and a public pedagogy which make knowledge meaningful in order to make it critical and transformative. Or as Stuart Hall argues we need to produce modes of analyses and knowledge in which “people can invest something of themselves…something that they recognize is of them or speaks to their condition.”[53]¶ Let me conclude by quoting from James Baldwin, a courageous writer who refused to let the hope of democracy die in his lifetime and who offered that mix of politics, passion, and courage that deserves not just admiration but emulation. His sense of rage was grounded in a working-class sensibility, eloquence, and passion that illuminate a higher standard for what it means to be a public intellectual and an engaged intellectual. His words capture something that is missing from the American cultural and political landscape, something affirmative that needs to be seized upon, rethought, and occupied — as part of both the fight against the new authoritarianism and its cynical, dangerous, and cruel practices, and the struggle to reclaim a notion of justice and mutuality that seems to be dying in all of us. In The Fire Next Time, Baldwin writes:¶ One must say Yes to life, and embrace it wherever it is found — and it is found in terrible places… For nothing is fixed, forever and forever, it is not fixed; the earth is always shifting, the light is always changing, the sea does not cease to grind down rock. Generations do not cease to be born, and we are responsible to them because we are the only witnesses they have. The sea rises, the light fails, lovers cling to each other, and children cling to us. The moment we cease to hold each other, the moment we break faith with one another, the sea engulfs us and the light goes out.

### Adv 1

Manufacturing not key
Porter 12 (Eduardo, NY Times "The Promise Of Today's Factory Jobs," New York Times, April 3, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/business/economy/the-promise-of-todays-factory-jobs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>)

More important, perhaps, manufacturing is not the nation’s only cutting-edge industry. Many of the most innovative firms are not manufacturers but service companies. Apple is very competitive. But so are the companies that design applications running on its iPhones and iPads. Hollywood studios and marketing companies are big exporters. These firms need highly trained workers and pay high wages.¶Mr. Moretti says each job in an “innovation” industry, broadly understood, creates five other local jobs, about three times the number for an average job in manufacturing. Two of them are highly paid professional positions and three are low-paid jobs as waiters or clerks.¶ Innovation — not manufacturing —has always propelled this country’s progress. A strategy to reward manufacturers who increase their payroll in the United States may not be as effective as one to support the firms whose creations — whether physical stuff or immaterial services — can conquer world markets and pay for the jobs of the rest of us.

#### The US isn’t key to the global economy

Merrill Lynch 6 [Major US Financial Firm. “US Downturn Won’t Derail World Economy” [www.ml.com](http://www.ml.com) 9/18/6]

A sharp slowdown in the U.S. economy in 2007 is unlikely to drag the rest of the global economy down with it, according to a research report by Merrill Lynch’s (NYSE: MER) global economic team. The good news is that there are strong sources of growth outside the U.S. that should prove resilient to a consumer-led U.S. slowdown. Merrill Lynch economists expect U.S. GDP growth to slow to 1.9 percent in 2007 from 3.4 percent in 2006, but non-U.S. growth to decline by only half a percent (5.2 percent versus 5.7 percent). Behind this decoupling is higher non-U.S. domestic demand, a rise in intraregional trade and supportive macroeconomic policies in many of the world’s economies. Although some countries appear very vulnerable to a U.S. slowdown, one in five is actually on course for faster GDP growth in 2007. Asia, Japan and India appear well placed to decouple from the United States, though Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are more likely to be impacted. European countries could feel the pinch, but rising domestic demand in the core countries should help the region weather the storm much better than in previous U.S. downturns. In the Americas, Canada will probably be hit, but Brazil is set to decouple.

#### 11. Decline doesn’t cause war

Barnett 9, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25,

(Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything

#### 12. The economy is resilient

Zakaria 9 (Fareed Zakaria, Editor of Newsweek International, 12-21-2009, “The Secrets of Stability,” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425)

Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature. The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today. Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold War had a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model—capitalism—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong. This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. That means everyone is invested in the same system. Today, while the nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections throughout the West. The second force for stability is the victory—after a decades-long struggle—over the cancer of inflation. Thirty-five years ago, much of the world was plagued by high inflation, with deep social and political consequences. Severe inflation can be far more disruptive than a recession, because while recessions rob you of better jobs and wages that you might have had in the future, inflation robs you of what you have now by destroying your savings. In many countries in the 1970s, hyperinflation led to the destruction of the middle class, which was the background condition for many of the political dramas of the era—coups in Latin America, the suspension of democracy in India, the overthrow of the shah in Iran. But then in 1979, the tide began to turn when Paul Volcker took over the U.S. Federal Reserve and waged war against inflation. Over two decades, central banks managed to decisively beat down the beast. At this point, only one country in the world suffers from -hyperinflation: Zimbabwe. Low inflation allows people, businesses, and governments to plan for the future, a key precondition for stability. Political and economic stability have each reinforced the other. And the third force that has underpinned the resilience of the global system is technological connectivity. Globalization has always existed in a sense in the modern world, but until recently its contours were mostly limited to trade: countries made goods and sold them abroad. Today the information revolution has created a much more deeply connected global system. Managers in Arkansas can work with suppliers in Beijing on a real-time basis. The production of almost every complex manufactured product now involves input from a dozen countries in a tight global supply chain. And the consequences of connectivity go well beyond economics. Women in rural India have learned through satellite television about the independence of women in more modern countries. Citizens in Iran have used cell phones and the Internet to connect to their well-wishers beyond their borders. Globalization today is fundamentally about knowledge being dispersed across our world. This diffusion of knowledge may actually be the most important reason for the stability of the current system. The majority of the world's nations have learned some basic lessons about political well-being and wealth creation. They have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by peace, low inflation, and technology to plug in to the global system. And they have seen the indisputable results. Despite all the turmoil of the past year, it's important to remember that more people have been lifted out of poverty over the last two decades than in the preceding 10. Clear-thinking citizens around the world are determined not to lose these gains by falling for some ideological chimera, or searching for a worker's utopia. They are even cautious about the appeals of hypernationalism and war. Most have been there, done that. And they know the price. In fact, the most remarkable development in the last few years has been the way China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets have managed their affairs prudently, taming growth by keeping interest rates up and restricting credit in the middle of the bubble—just as an economics textbook (and common sense) would advise. Instead it was the advanced industrial world, which had always lectured everyone else about good political and economic management, that handled its affairs poorly, fueling bubble after bubble, being undisciplined in the boom, and now suffering most during the bust. The data reflect this new reality. By 2014 the debt of the rich countries in the G20 will be 120 percent of GDP, three times the level of debt in the big emerging-market countries. The students of the global system are now doing better than their teachers. Among the many realities that have become apparent in the last year, this is perhaps the most consequential. People in the West were quick to write off the developing nations after the crash, sure that they could not survive a recession in the centers of the global economy. But the strongest of the emerging markets have actually emerged. They have become large, mature, and connected enough that while affected by the West, their fortunes are not entirely dependent on it

#### 13. Royal’s wrong

Boehmer 7 – political science professor at the University of Texas (Charles, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”, WEA)

This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3

#### 14. The fear of economic insecurity is created by a culture of uncertainty—their scenarios for economic collapse are constructed from a discourse of danger

de Goede 3 (Marieke, Senior Lecturer Dept European Studies @ U of Amsterdam, “Beyond economism in international political economy,” Cambridge U Press, Review of International Studies, 29 : 79-97)

While modern risk technologies are still ‘forms of moral regulation’, as Baker (2000: 570) observes with regard to insurance, the effect of the language of economic efficiency and risk classification was the depoliticization of finance and insurance. In particular, speculation came to be regarded as a technical and economically logical response to objectively existing business risks, which made possible the silencing of political critiques of the financial exchanges through the discursive, albeit unstable, separation of gambling from finance. The gendered dangers of financial risk Repoliticizing financial risk requires that it is no longer understood as a reaction to objectively existing danger, but as a profitable cultural process, which rests upon gendered constructions of danger and security. One of the arguments of Ulrich Beck’s influential Risk Society (1992: 28) is that the scientific and objective appearance of modern risk assessment obscures the fact that at the heart of these technical procedures lies the question: ‘how do we wish to live?’ The identification and classification of, and attempts to insure against, dangers which lie at the heart of risk management entail a normative judgement on what kind of life is worth preserving or protecting, and which dangers are most urgently studied and expelled. However, despite his emphasis on the fact that risks must be perceived and calculated, Beck (e.g. 2002) implicitly assumes that risk management reacts to the existence of an undeniable prior reality of, most importantly, ecological, financial, and terrorist dangers. Nor, indeed, does Beck question who we are: Beck’s risk society does not acknowledge that ‘our’ identity is defined through what we are not, or what we are endangered by. In David Campbell’s words, ‘discourses of danger . . . by virtue of telling us what to fear, have been able to fix who “we” are’ (1992: 195). The work of Michael Dillon argues that danger itself is a cultural and historical construction, the identification of which is highly political. According to Dillon, the political significance of a search for security is that it seeks to expel and exclude that which is defined as causing insecurity. ‘It is evident’, writes Dillon, that any discourse of security must always already, simultaneously and in a plurality of ways, be a discourse of danger too. For example, because security is engendered by fear (fundamentally aroused by the uncanny, uncertain, different, awesome, and uncalculable), it must also teach us what to fear when the secure is being pursued. . . . Hence, while it teaches us what we are threatened by, it also seeks in its turn to proscribe, sanction, punish, overcome – that is to say, in its turn endanger – that which it says threatens us. (Dillon 1996: 120–1) What does Dillon’s argument tell us about finance? What is the danger that financial securities seek to expel? It becomes possible to observe that the dangers constructed in financial discourse are the dangers of secular time and the unpredictable future. While the hedging of commodity price fluctuations was still regarded with considerable moral suspicion in the nineteenth century, it now has become morally and economically compulsory for large companies to insure themselves against any type of uncertainty, including those due to currency fluctuations, stock price fluctuations, creditor default, and political risk. In modern political culture, leaving things to chance, not just in business and finance but in conducting one’s private life as well, has become morally suspicious and a sign of irresponsibility. The unpredictable future needs to be faced boldly, rationally, and responsibly, through a combination of individual action and actuarial techniques (O’Malley 1996: 199). It is important to emphasize the gendered nature of the dangers identified in financial discourse. Historically, the uncertainties of secular time and the vicissitudes of life have often been represented as a feminized danger. In his examination of the beginnings of a speculative economy in eighteenth-century Britain, for example, the historian J. G. A. Pocock has found that the uncertain time horizon associated with credit was often represented in the same terms as the medieval Goddess Fortuna. ‘[I]t is an evident fact,’ Pocock writes, ‘that masculine minds constantly symbolise the changeable, the unpredictable and the imaginative as feminine. . . . The random and the recurrent, the lunar and the cyclical, were summarised by Roman and Renaissance minds in the figure of Fortuna’ (1985: 99). Since the Middle Ages, Fortuna has been the personification of disorder, chance, and chaos. She is traditionally associated with time and is sometimes seen to do the work of time, such as controlling the seasons, causing ruin, and presenting opportune moments (Patch 1967[1927]: 115–17; Daston 1988: 151–63). She was often depicted with a wheel to represent variation and change, or standing on a ball to represent the instability of her wishes. In the nineteenth century, the dangers associated with Fortuna became embodied by the gambler. Gamblers were seen as being effeminate and idle, having no regard for the future and being unable to provide for their families. Participants in the financial markets, in contrast, became regarded as intelligent and responsible forecasters of the future, displaying specifically masculine virtues in the face of Fortuna’s dangers. Speculators came to be seen as having a very special relationship to Fortuna. Their professional practice, as I have argued, became articulated as risk calculation, classification and prediction. At the same time, however, they were regarded as better placed to assume the business risks that companies sought to shed, and were, in Hardy’s words, ‘responsible men [who] . . . take the risks on their own shoulders’ (1923: 4). For the speculator, then, Fortuna’s dangers present a combination of threat, temptation, and opportunity, and the speculator’s identity became defined through this complex relationship to risk. For example, a 1919 pamphlet defending the New York Stock Exchange seeks to dispel the notion that speculation is a gambling practice, and casts the financial practitioner as one who displays both self-discipline and masculine predatory strength. ‘Some persons think that only those should speculate who can afford to lose,’ Martin writes: nothing could be further from the true spirit of speculation, than to hold such a theory, because true speculation, while contemplating loss – considers all the risks, provides against them, and so surrounds one’s judgement with reserves of capital as to insure against loss. It is true, however, that many persons should not speculate – for instance, those whose minds are easily influenced, those without strict and sterling business principles, persons of feeble judgement, those who allow anxieties to prey upon them. (Martin 1919: 34) On the other hand, financial crisis has historically been often understood as caused by financial man’s excessive risk-taking under influence of Fortune’s temptations (de Goede 2000). Martin’s portrayal of financial risk management emphasizes a combination of strength, intelligence, and masculinity that can still be perceived at the heart of financial discourse today. As Charlotte Hooper shows in her analysis of the representational practices of The Economist, the way in which risks are portrayed to a contemporary business audience has shifted from ‘a necessary evil to be managed’ to ‘a heroically and glamorously masculine’ enterprise (2001: 178). In neo-liberal enterprising ideology, Pat O’Malley argues similarly, risk is increas- ingly valued as a ‘condition of opportunity [and] an avenue for enterprise and the creation of wealth’ (1996: 204). In the words of management guru Tom Peters, in the neo-liberal era, ‘chaos and uncertainty will be market opportuni- ties for the wise’ (quoted in O’Malley 2000: 463). The speculator’s masculine and positive relationship to risk is perhaps best understood in terms of what Jonathan Simon calls the ‘summiteering’ discourse, or the ‘valorisation of risk taking in pursuit of reward’ (2002: 179). Simon (2002: 193) discusses the culture of extreme sports in neo-liberalism and shows how in mountain climbing, the summiteering discourse treats the risk of the climb as a ‘wholly natural obstacle’, fetishizes the summit, and emphasizes the achieve- ment of the individual, thereby obscuring the work of the community of climbers, guides, and Sherpas which makes mountain climbing for (wealthy) amateurs possible (cf. Amoore this issue). Similarly, the financial speculator is valorized for willingly exposing himself to extreme and naturalized risk, which, if he operates wisely, holds out the promise of unprecedented profit. However, this discourse obscures the aggregate risk to financial practices resulting from increased speculation, and the regressive distribution of wealth often associated with financial crises.

### Adv 2

#### Crude prices sharply down

MARKET WATCH 2/22: Crude prices fall to lowest level this year for front-month contract

HOUSTON, Feb. 22

02/22/2013

Crude prices fell sharply for the second consecutive day Feb. 21, with the front-month contract down 2.5% to the lowest level this year in the New York market following a bigger-than-expected jump in the commercial US inventory. The price of crude lost almost 5% in the Feb. 20-21 sessions.

“Yesterday was a reality check for oil bulls with the Department of Energy reporting a fifth consecutive week of crude inventory builds. US oil stockpiles are currently at a seasonal all-time high,” said analysts in the Houston office of Raymond James & Associates Inc. Fallout for energy stocks was “relatively mild” with the SIG Oil Exploration & Production Index declining 0.2% and the Oil Service Index down 1.5% after larger losses the previous session. “Broader markets fell a second straight day with US employment concerns and the Euro-zone still dominating sentiment. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index closed down 0.6%,” they said.

DOE’s Energy Information Administration said commercial US crude inventories escalated 4.1 million bbl to 376.4 million bbl in the week ended Feb. 15, well above Wall Street’s consensus for a 2 million bbl gain. Gasoline stocks dropped 2.9 million bbl to 230.4 million bbl in the same period, outstripping analysts’ outlook for a 900,000 bbl decline. Finished gasoline inventories increased while blending components decreased. Distillate fuel stocks fell 2.3 million bbl to 123.6 million bbl, below market expectations of 1.8 million bbl loss (OGJ Online, Feb. 21, 2013).

#### Prices – there down – a lot – not reflected at pumps yet

Boston Globe 2/22 Oil prices down sharply for a 2nd day http://bostonglobe.com/business/2013/02/22/oil-prices-down-sharply-for-day/qO7zvYLW1xfhZNIyKXZ58J/story.html

Oil prices plunged for a second day Thursday, raising hopes a rise in gasoline prices may slow or reverse, at least temporarily.

US benchmark crude fell $2.38, or 2.5 percent, to finish at $92.84 per barrel, the second drop of 2 percent in two days. Brent crude, used to price oil used to make gasoline in many US refineries, fell $2.07 to end at $113.53.

Crude oil’s recent slide is a result of ample supplies and speculation that the Federal Reserve may soon allow interest rates to rise, which would reduce the supply of easy cash investors have been using to buy commodities like oil.

The drop in crude has not translated into lower pump prices yet. The average US retail gasoline price rose a penny to $3.78 per gallon Thursday, according to AAA and others. Gasoline has risen for 34 days.

#### 1. New weapon systems level the playing field

Goon and Kopp 10 -- \*Graduate of the US Naval Test Pilot School and \*\*First Class Honours from the University of Western Australia, Ph.D., M.A. from Monash University, Senior Member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Member of the Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (\*Peter and \*\*Carlo, "A Perspective on the Quadrennial Defense Review", Air Power Australia, February 10th 2010, June 1st 2010, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-100210-1.html)

In the air combat domain, anti-access and area-denial weapons technologies comprise rapidly deployable, highly mobile advanced radars and Surface to Air Missile systems, counter-stealth radars, passive geolocation sensors, and advanced digital air defence C4 networks, all of which were developed to work in concert with advanced fighter aircraft such as the Su-35S Flanker and the stealthy, “F-22-like” Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA, unveiled last week. In the maritime combat domain, anti-access and area-denial weapons technologies comprise advanced air, sea, sub and coastal battery launched supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), terminally guided anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), quiet submarines armed with digital torpedoes, including supercavitating designs. In the basing domain, proliferating cruise missiles and terminally guided ballistic missiles render many existing US foreign bases effectively unusable for deployment of aircraft, warships and ground forces, and the logistical elements needed to sustain these. These weapons are now seriously challenging the ability of the United States and its close allies to conduct military interventions in many parts of the world. A nation which is equipped with much less than the full gamut of anti-access and area-denial weapons will be in the position to hold key US and allied in theatre assets at serious risk. Over the coming decade, this trend will drive the United States toward disproportionate responses if a contingency demands intervention, as many elements of the existing and currently planned US force structure will simply be unusable.

#### 2. US airpower will be used against civilian targets because it’s not effective militarily – this will increase the risk of protracted conflicts

Crane 1 (Conrad, Director of the U. S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, and fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute, The National Interest, Fall, lexis)

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review season is hard upon us, but this year's energies are being expended in a new context. Previous exercises were mainly about preserving Service resource shares in a mostly stagnant intellectual and budgetary environment. This year there is, first and foremost, the major review undertaken by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, a review that promises-or threatens, depending on one's point of view-a significant reallocation of resources among the Services. Additionally, the defense dollars available to the Services for existing missions are being squeezed from two sides: by a large bill for national missile defense, and by a large tax cut. What has not changed is the art of special pleading. Thus have some commentators claimed anew that the NATO bombing campaigns against Yugoslavia in 1995 and 1999 herald a new era of warfare in which precision weapons and airpower alone promise swift and decisive results with little loss of life or collateral damage. As historian John Keegan has put it, not only did the Kosovo campaign demonstrate that "war can be won by airpower alone", it also provided a showcase for the Western world's "superior technology and higher public morality."1 It's just not so. On the one hand, the weapons themselves are still hardly free of major glitches, as the failure in February of Navy Joint Standoff Weapons used in attacking Iraqi air defenses showed. Even the newest technology is susceptible to inclement weather, enemy countermeasures or, in this case, just wind. More important than technical problems with the weapons are misconceptions about how tactics accumulate into a strategy for their use. A close examination of the 1999 Kosovo air campaign demonstrates that, talk of humane warfare notwithstanding, air bombardment remains an extremely destructive action that is most effective in achieving strategic goals when targeted against the civilian elements of a society. Unpleasant as this conclusion may be, it should not surprise anyone familiar with military history. It is not uncommon that new technologies which appear to have decisive application on the battlefield soon end up being turned upon civilians. In 1870, for example, the Prussians decided that the quickest and ultimately the most humane way to reduce French fortresses was to shell the civilian population with modern artillery until it forced the garrison to surrender. Giulio Douhet incorporated this and similar lessons into his post-World War I theories about bombing cities. American airmen in the 1930s, however, developed a different approach based on the promise of precision attacks. Studying New York City as a model, they concluded that destroying only seventeen targets within its transportation, water and electrical systems would render the city uninhabitable without inflicting mass casualties. They expanded their concept of exploiting key vulnerabilities in the economies of industrialized nations and developed a coherent precision-bombing doctrine that has shaped the evolution and application of American airpower ever since. Resulting Air Corps studies asserted that the principal mission for airpower was "the attack of those vital objectives in a nation's economic structure which will tend to paralyze the nation's ability to wage war", while service school texts proclaimed: "Direct attack of the civil populace is rejected as an air objective due to humanitarian considerations." Unfortunately, practice has let theory down. Though technology has continued to advance, public expectations and U.S. Air Force promises about airpower's decisiveness and accuracy have advanced faster. As a result, key decisions about the application of military force in most American wars in the air age have been shaped by an overestimation of airpower's effectiveness against military and industrial targets, and disappointing results have led repeatedly to the escalation of aerial operations against civilians-confirming Douhet's theories and confounding America's precision bombing enthusiasts. Such escalations have long-lasting implications. It may be, for example, that current North Korean programs to develop ballistic missiles are motivated by memories of the destruction of most of their cities and towns by American bombing between 1950 and 1953. Recent air operations over Yugoslavia repeated the pattern of the Korean War: anticipatory claims of decisiveness, followed by disappointment, followed by escalation against civilian targets. Frustrated by seemingly interminable peace talks and the failure of aerial interdiction, American airmen adopted a strategy they called "Air Pressure": coercion through the destruction of key dual-use civilian-military targets. These targets eventually included hydroelectric power facilities, almost every city and town in North Korea, and irrigation dams for rice fields. Again in Kosovo there were high expectations for what airpower, along with the newest precision-guided munitions and information warfare, could accomplish. While airpower was in the end the primary offensive arm that produced a settlement without risking U.S. and allied ground casualties, the results were not at all those envisioned when the campaign started.

#### 3. Airpower doesn't deter – only ground forces are perceived

Allan 94 (Charles, Air Force National Defense Fellow at the CSIS,"Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?" Washington Quarterly, Summer, 1994)

Information. As we have seen, imperfect information about a defender's commitment may be present for both the defender and the attacker. Prior to the crisis, the "intended deterrees [themselves] will not know how much of a politically and technically credible threat it would take to deter them" (Gray 1991, 14). In addition, as Arquilla and Davis point out (Arquilla and Davis 1992; Davis and Arquilla 1991), adversaries have historically discounted key elements of U.S. power such as strategic mobility, precision weapons, maritime power, and airpower due to lack of familiarity with these systems. Without understanding these elements of U.S. military strength, the regional aggressor will view the absence of U.S. heavy ground forces as evidence of a lack of both capability and commitment. Moreover, Adam Garfinkle (1992) asserts that third world leaders are frequently misled into overly optimistic views of their own forces' capabilities. Without clear recognition of U.S. power, deterrence cannot hold.

#### . Heg solves nothing—Past two decades prove

Mearsheimer 11 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis)

One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

#### 7. Heg decline doesn’t trigger war

Buzan 11 (Barry, London School of Economics, Department of International Relations, "A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism")

In 2004 I argued, in line with much mainstream thinking, that the most likely scenario for the coming decades was continuation of the US as the sole superpower accompanied by several great powers. This idea still forms the core of the debates about polarity. Its main theme is whether or not the US will be able to preserve its sole superpower status, or whether rising challengers, mainly China, will soon return the world order to bipolarity. It is typical of the Western part of this debate to be looking for ways to preserve US hegemony/leadership either by maintaining and exploiting a power advantage or by re- legitimizing its leading role using institutions to accommodate rising powers.1 My sec- ond most likely scenario from 2004 was one in which there would be no superpowers, only great powers, and I argued that this would produce a rather uncertain world. I now think that this scenario is becoming more likely, but can be seen in a more positive light. I argue here that it offers an alternative third way of thinking about the coming world order: not whether there will be one superpower or more, but no superpowers, only great powers. We may be heading quite quickly into such a world, and this may be no bad thing. The mainstream polarity debates typically ignore the fact that there is an alternative to having either to balance against the US or bandwagon with it. Others can, and increasingly do, use the diminished power and authority of the US as a reason to ignore or circumscribe it, and to carve their own pathways in regional and global politics.2 Continued US leadership is neither necessary nor, arguably, desirable to keep the world order from falling into 1930s-style imperial competition.

#### 8. The drive to hegemony makes decline inevitable

Lifton 3 [Robert Jay, Visiting professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World p. 191-192]

What we call the historical process is largely unpre­dictable, never completely manageable. All the more so at a time of radical questioning of the phenomenon of nation­alism and its nineteenth- and twentieth-century excesses. In addition, there has been a general decline in confidence in the nation state, and in its ability to protect its people from larger world problems such as global warming or weapons of mass destruction. The quick but dangerous substitute is the superpower, which seeks to fill the void with a global­ized, militarized extension of American nationalism. The traditional nation state, whatever its shortcomings, could at least claim to be grounded in a specific geographic area and a particular people or combination of peoples. The super­power claims to "represent" everyone on earth, but it lacks legitimacy in the eyes of those it seeks to dominate, while its leaders must struggle to mask or suppress their own doubts about any such legitimacy. The American superpower is an artificial construct, widely perceived as illegitimate, whatever the acquies­cence it coerces in others. Its reign is therefore inherently unstable. Indeed, its reach for full-scale world domination marks the beginning of its decline. A large task for the world, and for Americans in particular, is the early recog­nition and humane management of that decline.

#### China is incapable of going to war – 3 reasons

Badeaux 9 (Christopher, “The Failure of the Multipolar World,” The New Ledger, The Atlantic, Badeaux was admitted to the Georgia Bar, the Bar of the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court, the Bar for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the Bar of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and The Florida Bar (which includes all trial and appellate courts), and has been an attorney for several powerful firms in the Atlanta area, <http://newledger.com/2009/03/the-failure-of-the-multipolar-world/>, March 24)

#### While China is haltingly driving toward a bluewater navy and carrier fleet, it has no real experience with either of these things, and only a few years in which to learn them. Even assuming we believe Beijing’s own numbers on its economic growth and stability — an assumption that makes as much sense as it did for the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany — China has seen tens of millions of people head inland from the coasts to villages incapable of supporting them over the past year, a number that will only escalate as the recession worsens. Domestic unrest, even outside the brutal repression of Tibet and Xinjiang, will grow over time. If India is marked by wild income disparities, China is notable for incredible income chasms. Before it becomes too old to economically compete in the world, it must, in our President’s words, spread the wealth to its incredibly poor non-coastal dwellers, a project not strongly favored by the coastal elites and much of the Communist Party leadership (which is largely drawn from the coastal elites). Where China will magically produce the resources to offset a rapidly graying population and all of its other needs as it tries to match American military dominance is a question best left to the magicians of the world. Oh, and none of China’s neighbors, especially but not exclusively India, trust it worth a damn. The not-really-veiled subtext of half of the defense pacts and alliances in the area is the need to counterbalance China.

#### 12. Chinese threat construction assumes a knowable and essentially violent Chinese Other—this Western lens makes militarization and conflict inevitable

Pan 4, IR @ Australian National University, 04

[Chengxin, "The 'China Threat' in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 29, no. 3 (2004)”]

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist, ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo)realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo)realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other," (45) and "All other states are potential threats." (46) In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other." (47) The (neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo)realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy." (50) And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." (51) Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result?" (52) Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger. (53) In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely.... Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences.... U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"

#### No North Korean escalation

Koehl 9 (Defense analyst of twenty-four years, Research Fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Center for Transatlantic Relations, former Senior Analyst at ARDAK Corporation, former Director of Research, IPAC/The Columbus Group, former Senior Associate at JHF, co-authored US Army Field Manual FM 100-17-3, Stuart, “Endgame in Korea?; Lacking the military wherewithal to defeat the South, Kim's regime is simply trying to extend its miserable existence through extortion”, The Weekly Standard, L/N, REQ)

What then of North Korea's nuclear program? Again, one has to view it as an attempt by Kim to maintain a degree of leverage over South Korea and the United States in order to wring out regime-extending concessions. But there is almost no chance that North Korea would initiate first use of nuclear weapons, because that would be, in a very literal sense, suicidal. President Ahmedinejad and the Mullahs in Iran may have eschatological pretensions, but the North Korean leadership is very much interested in staying alive and in power. North Korea's nuclear ambitions pose two threats to the United States. First, North Korea is a proven proliferator of nuclear technology, as its recent project in Syria demonstrates. The North can transfer nuclear technology to other enemies of the U.S., thereby complicating our foreign policy and causing us to divert resources away from the Korean Peninsula. But a close blockade and inspection regime--recently joined by South Korea--is quite capable of preventing any major proliferation program from succeeding. The second threat is posed by the marriage of nuclear warheads to long range ballistic missiles. Here, it seems clear that North Korean strategy aims to decouple the United States (not to mention other regional allies such as Japan) from South Korea, holding Tokyo or Los Angeles at risk in order to prevent any response to North Korean aggression against South Korea. Similar reasoning was behind the Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate range missiles to Eastern Europe in the 1980s. Our response then was the deployment of our own intermediate range nuclear force, extending our deterrent umbrella over our NATO allies without elevating the nuclear threat to the strategic level. Today, we have the ability to provide extended deterrence against North Korean ballistic missiles using defensive technology. That is, completion of our National Missile Defense (NMD) system would obviate the threat of Kim's necessarily small ICBM force. Closer to the region, we already have Patriot PAC-3 missiles deployed in South Korea, which by themselves are very capable against short-range missiles. The deployment in the next few years of the Theater Area High Altitude Air Defense System (THAADS) will provide a long range "upper tier) interception capability, to defeat Kim's medium range missiles. In addition, both the United States and Japan have deployed the AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system based on the Standard SM-3 missile, which, stationed off the coasts of North Korea, can provide a limited "boost phase" interception capability; i.e., destroying Kim's missiles while they are still climbing through the atmosphere, and still over North Korea. Here, the Obama administration has missed a trick by canceling development of the Airborne Laser (ABL) program, which is ideally suited for the Korean situation. A powerful chemical laser mounted on a Boeing 747, the ABL has demonstrated the ability to defeat ballistic missiles by burning through their thin-skinned booster rockets; each ABL has the capacity to destroy dozens of ascending missiles in a single sortie. Orbiting over South Korea or over international waters on either side of North Korea, a handful of ABLs would trump all of Kim's ballistic missiles in one move. What we see, then, is not a North Korea intent on refighting--and winning--a second Korean War, but a failing dictatorship trying desperately to extend its miserable existence by getting its enemies to pay it to behave. One by one, though, Kim is losing his ability to gain leverage over the U.S. and South Korea as we develop the means to neutralize each of his offensive threats. Comprehensive ballistic missile defense would be the last piece needed to place Kim's regime in checkmate, at which point, North Korea can either resign the game, or sit staring at the board while we go off and do other things. Of course, this assumes we have the will to put the last pieces in the proper

#### 10. Moralizing stances of North Korea makes the conflict inevitable

Datta 4 [Monti Narayan, Fellow at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, “U.S. Policy Toward a Nuclear North Korea”, Bad Subjects # 67]

As mentioned earlier, President Bush has labeled North Korea part of an "axis of evil," implying that North Korea is an evil regime that somehow needs to be purged of its evilness. Although such rhetoric is persuasive to some extent in the context of an apprehensive and understandably angry post 9-11 American public, I believe it is fundamentally flawed -such language generates a self-fulfilling prophecy. If President Bush believes, or constructs that North Korea is "evil," then he will only see and induce an "evil" relationship, thus encouraging political, economic and military policies based on a lack of trust, similar to the prisoner's dilemma. In the prisoner's dilemma, two criminals have been caught, and are held in separate rooms by the police, who makes each prisoner a deal. Since both prisoners do not trust one another, they invariably opt for the worst strategy of defection, thus ensuring each receives the greatest amount of mutual punishment. In the world of nuclear weapons, mutual punishment could mean mutual annihilation via nuclear weapons.

#### No South Korean escalation

Feigenbaum 10 – Council on Foreign Relations [Evan, Korean conflict: Could it escalate? December 8th, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/08/korean-conflict-could-it-escalate/

Just over a week into the Korea crisis, the constraints on retaliation by Seoul and Washington have become increasingly apparent. Both fret that Pyongyang lacks escalation control and remain (deeply) anxious about the consequences of a tit-for-tat escalation. To my mind, at least, events of the past week have mostly underscored the basic calculations of the main parties: North Korea is prone to provocative behavior, in large part for domestic reasons. But the North has been emboldened because its closest partner, China, has sought to rationalize Pyongyang’s actions, caveat its entreaties to Pyongyang for “restraint,” and shield the North from retaliation. This has almost certainly made North Korea more prone to act provocatively since its actions have invited few consequences from its principal benefactor. Indeed, Chinese diplomacy since last week has struck a mostly even-handed tone, calling for restraint by all parties while hinting that China views US and South Korean military displays, not just North Korean artillery strikes, as provocative. This context shapes North Korea’s cost/benefit calculations: Since it has been given few disincentives to do otherwise, the North will continue to challenge South Korea around the Northern Limit Line and engage in other provocations. By contrast, Seoul is more constrained. President Lee Myung-bak is under intense domestic pressure to further loosen the South’s military rules of engagement. And some in South Korea seem to be itching for a rematch, not least because the military performed poorly in last week’s confrontation. But Seoul remains more cautious in deed than word. The rhetoric has sharpened. Lee replaced his defense minister. The South Korean military now has greater license to shoot back. But the central problem for Seoul remains structural: Weakness could invite additional North Korean provocation, but striking peninsular North Korean targets could invite rapid and very consequential escalation. In practice, then, I suspect Seoul will seek to preserve a ladder of escalation in its future responses to North Korean actions: (1) firing at North Korean vessels offshore, as in the past; (2) discrete and limited counterbattery responses to specific sources of North Korean artillery fire; and (3) weighing a wider counterbattery target package only in extremis. And that  innate conservatism reflects South Korea’s own cost/benefit calculus. The South, having built something over the last forty years, has everything to lose. Short of war, North Korea benefits more from escalation. So Seoul will remain risk-averse. Put bluntly, Seoul is certain to respond to a repeat performance by North Korea, but the scope and scale of its response will remain constrained. At most, Seoul will respond proportionately. More likely, it will respond conservatively. What now? As I argued in my last post, the North has plenty of options for additional provocations, including a third nuclear test, another long-range missile test, or conventional attacks beyond the NLL. But further conventional attacks would be especially destabilizing: they would raise questions about whether the conventional deterrence that has kept the peace in Korea for decades is eroding under the shadow of Pyongyang’s nuclear capability. So, for now, Seoul and Washington seem to be betting that failure to respond to future attacks would further undermine deterrence and invite additional North Korean provocations. But both seem anxious not to escalate tensions and will likely focus on joint military displays to bolster conventional deterrence while rejecting Chinese entreaties for talks with Pyongyang. My bets are off if North Korea attacks US military assets—for instance, in a future joint exercise—or targets peninsular South Korea. But, for the moment, the bet in Seoul and Washington seems to be that common sense and Chinese leverage will set limits on rapid escalation by Pyongyang.

#### Emissions limits increase demand for chemical industry products – offsets losses

CAMPOY 9. [ANA, journalist, “Chemical makers poised to gain in new cap and trade system” Wall Street Journal – Jun 5]

With legislation pending in Congress that could put a price on greenhouse-gas emissions, the energy-gulping chemical industry is trying to position itself to emerge as an unlikely winner. Chemical makers are one of the biggest energy users among manufacturers, expelling about 5% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, according to government data. They face heavy costs under a proposed system to cap emissions that would require the industry to purchase permits to pollute. But a so-called cap-and-trade system would also boost demand for some chemical companies' products, from insulation to solar-panel components, because those products would help others cut back on the energy use. "This is really our sweet spot," said Calvin Dooley, chief executive of the American Chemistry Council, an industry trade group.

#### Clean coal production/use causes massive pollution

Chameides 2009 (Bill Chameides, Nicholas Professor of the Environment Earth & Ocean Sciences at Duke, February 2, 2009, “Clean Coal’s Dirty Secret - When 'Clean' Isn't Clean,” http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/thegreengrok/morecoalwaste/)

Coal is the dirtiest fossil fuel. Burning it produces a myriad of noxious air pollutants. That's a problem. Clean coal technology supposedly scrubs those pollutants before they get into the atmosphere. Problem gone, right? Not quite. Guess where those pollutants end up.¶ It has always amazed me that the best we've been able to do with waste from nuclear power plants is let it pile up at the plant itself – just not a sustainable solution. Little did I know that the same short-sighted model is being adopted at our nation’s coal-fired power plants.¶ When coal, a complex mixture of hydrocarbons and minerals, is burned, it generates not just electricity but byproducts in the form of air pollutants and solid waste including fly ash. I remember years ago asking someone who should know, what happens to the waste; he said it was recycled, put into construction materials and the like.¶ Another Turn of the Screw in the Story of Coal¶ That turns out to be only a small part of the story. And as a result of the coal ash spill at the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Kingston coal-fired power plant in Tennessee, the whole story of coal waste is beginning to see the light of day.¶ Since 2002 coal-fired power plants in the United States have produced an average of more than 120 million short tons of coal waste each year. In 2007 the United States produced more than 131 million short tons of coal waste. Only about 40 percent of that is recycled, and the rest is dumped into landfills and containment ponds like the one that gave way in Kingston. Every year we burn more coal, more of the stuff ends up in these ponds. Talk about toxic waste dumps.¶ But there’s more to this story than the leftover ash. There is also the serious problem of air pollutants: these include sulfur oxides (SOX), nitrogen oxides (NOX) and particulate matter (PM), which contribute to acid rain and smog, and a plethora of toxic metals such as mercury, which

#### Extinction

**Driesen 2003** (David Driesen, Associate Professor at Syracuse University Law, 10 Buffalo Environmental Law Journal, Fall/Spring, Lexis)

Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem upon which all life depends and harming the health of both future and present generations. The Rio Declaration articulates six key principles that are relevant to air pollution. These principles can also be understood as goals, because they describe a state of affairs that is worth achieving. Agenda 21, in turn, states a program of action for realizing those goals. Between them, they aid understanding of sustainable development's meaning for air quality. The first principle is that "human beings. . . are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature", because they are "at the center of concerns for sustainable development." While the Rio Declaration refers to human health, its reference to life "in harmony with nature" also reflects a concern about the natural environment. 4 Since air pollution damages both human health and the environment, air quality implicates both of these concerns. 5

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#### We must rethink the ideologies that inform neoliberalism before acting

Giroux 05 (Henry, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, “The Terror of Neoliberalism”, College Literature, 2005)PM

Neoliberalism has to be understood and challenged as both an economic theory and a powerful public pedagogy and cultural politics. That is, it has to be named and critically understood before it can be critiqued. The commonsense assumptions that legitimate neoliberalism's alleged historical inevitability have to be unsettled and then engaged for the social damage they cause at all levels of human existence. Such a recognition suggests identifying and critically examining the most salient and powerful ideologies that inform and frame neoliberalism. It also suggests a need on the part of progressives to make cultural politics and the

notion of public pedagogy central to the struggle against neoliberalism, particularly since education and culture now play such a prominent political and economic role in both securing consent and producing capital (Peters 2002). In fact, this implies as Susan Buck-Morss has insisted that "[t]he recognition of cultural domination as just as important as, and perhaps even as the condition of possibility of, political and economic domination is a true 'advance' in our thinking" (2003, 103). Of course, this position is meant not to disavow economic and institutional struggles but to supplement them with a cultural politics that connects symbolic power and its pedagogical practices with material relations of power. Engaging the cultural politics and economics of neoliberalism also points to the need for progressives to analyze how neoliberal policies work at the level of everyday life through the language of privatization and the lived cultural forms of class, race, gender, youth, and ethnicity. Finally, such a project must employ a language of critique and possibility, engagement and hope as part [End Page 14] of a broader project of viewing democracy as a site of intense struggle over matters of representation, participation, and shared power. Central to the critique of neoliberalism is the belief, as Alain Touraine argues, that neoliberal globalization has not "dissolved our capacity for political action" (2001, 2). Such action depends on the ability of various groups—the peace movement, the anti-corporate globalization movement, the human rights movement, the environmental justice movement—within and across national boundaries—to form alliances in which matters of community and solidarity provide a common symbolic space and multiple public spheres where norms are created, debated, and engaged as part of an attempt to develop a new political language, culture, and set of relations. Such efforts must be understood as part of a broader attempt not only to collectively struggle against domination, but also to defend all those social advances that strengthen democratic public spheres and services, demand new rights, establish modes of power sharing, and create notions of social justice adequate to imagining and sustaining democracy on a global level. Consider, for example, the anti-corporate globalization movement's slogan "Another World is Possible!" which demands, as Alex Callinicos insightfully points out, a different kind of social logic, a powerful sense of unity and solidarity. Another world—that is, a world based on different social logic, run according to different priorities from those that prevail today. It is easy enough to specify what the desiderata of such an alternative social logic would be—social justice, economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, and democracy—but much harder to spell out how a reproducible social system embodying these requirements could be built. And then there is the question of how to achieve it. Both these questions—What is the alternative to capitalism? What strategy can get us there?—can be answered in different ways. One thing the anti-capitalist movement is going to have to learn is how to argue through the differences that exist and will probably develop around such issues without undermining the very powerful sense of unity that has been one of the movement's most attractive qualities. (Callinicos 2003, 147) Callinicos's insight suggests that any viable struggle against neoliberal capitalism will have to rethink "the entire project of politics within the changed conditions of a global public sphere, and to do this democratically, as people who speak different political languages, but whose goals are nonetheless the same: global peace, economic justice, legal equality, democratic participation, individual freedom, mutual respect" (Buck-Morss 2003, 4-5). One of the most central tasks facing intellectuals, activists, educators, and others who believe in an inclusive and substantive democracy is the need to use theory to rethink the language and possibilities of politics as a way to imagine a future outside the powerful grip of neoliberalism and the impending [End Page 15] authoritarianism that has a different story to tell about the future, one that reinvents the past in the image of the crude exercise of power and the unleashing of unimaginable human suffering. Critical reflection and social action in this discourse must acknowledge how the category of the global public sphere extends the space of politics beyond the boundaries of local resistance. Evidence of such actions can be found in the World Social Forums that took place in 2003 in Porto Alegre, Brazil and in Hyderabad, India in 2004. Successful forms of global dissent can also be observed in the international campaign to make AIDS drugs affordable for poor countries as well as in the international demonstrations against multinational corporations in cities from Melbourne and Seattle to Genoa and New York City. New alliances among intellectuals, students, labor unions, and environmentalists are taking place in the streets of Argentina, the West Bank, and in many other places fighting globalization from above. At the same time, a new language of agency and resistance is emerging among many activists and is being translated into new approaches to what it means to make the pedagogical more political as part of a global justice movement. Politics can no longer exclude matters of social and cultural learning and reproduction in the context of globalization or ignore the ways in which, as Imre Szeman asserts, globalization itself constitutes "a problem of and for pedagogy" (2002, 4). The slogan,"Another World is Possible!" reinforces the important political insight that one cannot act otherwise unless one can think otherwise, but acting otherwise demands a new politics in which it is recognized that global problems need global solutions along with global institutions, global modes of dissent, global intellectual collaboration, and global social movements.

#### Clean coal aint so clean

Biggers 12

Posted by Jeff Biggers at 6:48 pm

October 17, 2012 5 COMMENTS

Clean Coal Is A Hoax, Mr. President, and You Know It, So Drop It.¶ Out of all the meaningless slogans bantered around this election season, President Obama's clinging to the " clean coal" banner ranks as one of the most specious.¶ "Clean coal" is a hoax, and the president knows it, and outside of appeasing a few Midwestern Big Coal sycophants and his Duke Energy coal buddy Jim Rogers, who helped to underwrite the Democratic Convention this summer in Charlotte, Obama has little to gain from invoking the offensive phrase.¶ You're offensive, President Obama, to use your own words.¶ Offensive to coal miners and their families who have paid the ultimate price, offensive to people who live daily with the devastating impacts of coal mining and coal ash in their communities and watersheds, and offensive to anyone who recognizes the spiraling reality of climate change.¶ If Ameren, one of the biggest coal-supporting utility companies in the nation, can throw in the towel on the FutureGen "clean coal" boondoggle in Obama's adopted state of Illinois, then why can't our president at least state the truth during his election -- or drop the sloganeering?¶ It's sad enough to watch the president mock Republican Mitt Romney for his dead-on realization, once upon a time, that coal-fired plants kill.¶ It's even sadder, as our nation drifts along in Titanic denial toward climate destabilization, for our president to crow about being a friend of a deadly rock.¶ And it's downright tragic for Obama apologists -- all of whom live in Washington, D.C. or non-coal mining areas -- to turn a blind eye to Obama's unleashing of massive coal mining permits in the Powder River Basin, to the regulated humanitarian and health disaster of mountaintop removal in Appalachia, and the destructive operations of longwall mining for farm communities in the heartland.¶ Coal is not and will never be clean, and President Obama and all of his apologists know it.¶ Mitt Romney is right: Coal kills.¶ Coal kills three miners daily, as black lung has spiked during the Obama administration.¶ Coal mining and burning pollutants contribute to four of the five leading causes of mortality in the U.S., according to the Physicians for Social Responsibility: "Heart disease, cancer, stroke, and chronic lower respiratory diseases. This conclusion emerges from our reassessment of the widely recognized health threats from coal. Each step of the coal life cycle -- mining, transportation, washing, combustion, and disposing of post combustion wastes -- impacts human health."¶ Coal slurry, coal ash, mercury, strip mining, silicosis -- the deadly list goes on and on.¶ President Obama: Stop using the "clean coal" slogan.

#### **Neoliberalism propagates powerful corporations that exploit both laws and the environment – creates scientific consensus manipulated by the market**

Nixon 9 (Rob, Professor of English at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. “Neoliberalism, Slow Violence, and the Environmental Picaresque” MFS Modern Fiction Studies, Volume 55, Number 3, Fall 2009, muse)

The power of Animal's People flows largely from Sinha's singlehanded¶ invention of the environmental picaresque.2 By creatively¶ adapting picaresque conventions to our age, Sinha probes the underbelly¶ of neoliberal globalization from the vantage point of an indigent¶ social outcast. His novel gives focus to three of the defining characteristics¶ of the contemporary neoliberal order: first, the widening¶ chasm—within and between nations—that separates the mega-rich¶ from the destitute; second, the attendant burden of unsustainable¶ ecological degradation that impacts the health and livelihood of the¶ poor most directly; and third, the way, under cover of a free market¶ ideology, powerful transnational corporations exploit the lopsided¶ universe of deregulation, whereby laws and loopholes are selectively¶ applied in a marketplace a lot freer for some societies and classes¶ than for others.¶ A neoliberal ideology that erodes national sovereignty and turns¶ answerability into a bewildering transnational maze makes it easier¶ for global corporations like Union Carbide to sustain an evasive geopolitics¶ of deferral in matters of environmental injury, remediation,¶ and redress. Thus, among the many merits of Sinha's novel is the¶ way it gives imaginative definition to the occluded relationships that¶ result both from what I call slow violence and from the geographies¶ of concealment in a neoliberal age.3¶ The role of what I call slow violence in the dynamics of concealment¶ derives largely from the unequal power of spectacular and¶ unspectacular time. In an age that venerates instant spectacle, slow¶ violence is deficient in the recognizable special effects that fill movie¶ seats and flat-screen TVs with the pyrotechnics of Shock and Awe.¶ Instead, chemical and radiological slow violence is driven inward,¶ somatized into cellular dramas of mutation, into unobserved special¶ effects. From a narrative perspective, such invisible, mutagenic¶ theater is slow-paced but open-ended, eluding the tidy closure, the¶ narrative containment, imposed by the visual orthodoxies of victory¶ and defeat.¶ Maintaining a media focus on slow violence poses acute challenges,¶ not only because it is spectacle deficient but also because¶ the fallout's impact may range from the cellular to the transnational¶ and (depending on the specific character of the chemical or radiological¶ hazard) may stretch beyond the horizon of imaginable time.¶ The contested science of damage further compounds the challenge,¶ as varied scientific methodologies may be mobilized to demonstrate¶ or discount etiologies, creating rival regimes of truth, manipulable¶ by political and economic interests. Moreover, the official dimensions¶ of the contaminated zone may shrink or dilate depending on which¶ political forces and which research methodologies achieve the upper¶ hand. What emerges, then, is a contest over the administration of¶ difference between those who gain official recognition as sufferers¶ and those dismissed as nonsufferers because their narratives of¶ injury are deemed to fail the prevailing politico-scientific logic of¶ causation or, for that matter, because they lack the political contacts¶ to gain admission to the inner circle of certified sufferers and thus to¶ potential compensation. These unstable, complex procedures—and¶ hierarchies—of recognition may create novel forms of biological citizenship,¶ as in the long aftermaths of the 1984 Bhopal disaster and¶ the 1986 Chernobyl explosion.4¶ The varieties of biological citizenship that emerged in the aftermaths¶ of Bhopal and Chernobyl were, in certain ways, distinct, as¶ were the media responses.

#### The ecology of fear promoted by the 1AC justifies and recreates itself in anxieties that reinforce the neoliberal order responsible for environmental destruction

Swyngedouw 10 (Erik, Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester. “Apocalypse Forever? Post-political Populism and the Spectre of Climate” Theory Culture Society 2010 27: 213. Muse)

The Desire for the Apocalypse and the Fetishization of CO2¶ It is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of¶ capitalism. (Jameson, 2003: 73)¶ We shall start from the attractions of the apocalyptic imaginaries that infuse¶ the climate change debate and through which much of the public concern¶ with the climate change argument is sustained. The distinct millennialist¶ discourse around the climate has co-produced a widespread consensus that¶ the earth and many of its component parts are in an ecological bind that¶ may short-circuit human and non-human life in the not too distant future if¶ urgent and immediate action to retroﬁt nature to a more benign equilibrium¶ is postponed for much longer. Irrespective of the particular views of Nature¶ held by different individuals and social groups, consensus has emerged over¶ the seriousness of the environmental condition and the precariousness of¶ our socio-ecological balance (Swyngedouw, forthcoming). BP has rebranded itself as ‘Beyond Petroleum’ to certify its environmental credentials, Shell plays a more eco-sensitive tune, eco-activists of various political¶ or ideological stripes and colours engage in direct action in the name of¶ saving the planet, New Age post-materialists join the chorus that laments¶ the irreversible decline of ecological amenities, eminent scientists enter the¶ public domain to warn of pending ecological catastrophe, politicians try to¶ outmanoeuvre each other in brandishing the ecological banner, and a wide¶ range of policy initiatives and practices, performed under the motif of¶ ‘sustainability’, are discussed, conceived and implemented at all geographical scales. Al Gore’s evangelical ﬁlm An Inconvenient Truth won him the¶ Nobel Peace price, surely one of the most telling illustrations of how eco -¶ logical matters are elevated to the terrain of a global humanitarian cause¶ (see also Giddens, 2009). While there is certainly no agreement on what¶ exactly Nature is and how to relate to it, there is a virtually unchallenged consensus over the need to be more ‘environmentally’ sustainable if disaster is to be avoided; a climatic sustainability that centres around stabilizing the CO2¶ content in the atmosphere (Boykoff et al., forthcoming).¶ This consensual framing is itself sustained by a particular scientiﬁc¶ discourse.¶ 1¶ The complex translation and articulation between what Bruno¶ Latour (2004) would call matters of fact versus matters of concern has been¶ thoroughly short-circuited. The changing atmospheric composition, marked¶ by increasing levels of CO2¶ and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere,¶ is largely caused by anthropogenic activity, primarily (although not exclusively) as a result of the burning of fossilized or captured CO2¶ (in the form¶ of oil, gas, coal, wood) and the disappearance of CO2¶ sinks and their¶ associated capture processes (through deforestation for example). These¶ undisputed matters of fact are, without proper political intermediation,¶ translated into matters of concern. The latter, of course, are eminently political in nature. Yet, in the climate change debate, the political nature of¶ matters of concern is disavowed to the extent that the facts in themselves¶ are elevated, through a short-circuiting procedure, on to the terrain of the¶ political, where climate change is framed as a global humanitarian cause.¶ The matters of concern are thereby relegated to a terrain beyond dispute,¶ to one that does not permit dissensus or disagreement. Scientiﬁc expertise¶ becomes the foundation and guarantee for properly constituted politics/¶ policies.¶ In this consensual setting, environmental problems are generally¶ staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind, announcing¶ the premature termination of civilization as we know it and sustained by¶ what Mike Davis (1999) aptly called ‘ecologies of fear’. The discursive¶ matrix through which the contemporary meaning of the environmental¶ condition is woven is one quilted systematically by the continuous invocation of fear and danger, the spectre of ecological annihilation or at least¶ seriously distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near¶ future. ‘Fear’ is indeed the crucial node through which much of the current¶ environmental narrative is woven, and continues to feed the concern with¶ ‘sustainability’. This cultivation of ‘ecologies of fear’, in turn, is sustained¶ in part by a particular set of phantasmagorical imaginaries (Katz, 1995).¶ The apocalyptic imaginary of a world without water, or at least with endemic¶ water shortages, ravaged by hurricanes whose intensity is ampliﬁed by¶ climate change; pictures of scorched land as global warming shifts the geopluvial regime and the spatial variability of droughts and ﬂoods; icebergs¶ that disintegrate around the poles as ice melts into the sea, causing the sea¶ level to rise; alarming reductions in biodiversity as species disappear or are¶ threatened by extinction; post-apocalyptic images of waste lands reminiscent of the silent ecologies of the region around Chernobyl; the threat of¶ peak-oil that, without proper management and technologically innovative¶ foresight, would return society to a Stone Age existence; the devastation of¶ wildﬁres, tsunamis, diseases like SARS, avian ﬂu, Ebola or HIV, all these¶ imaginaries of a Nature out of synch, destabilized, threatening and out of control are paralleled by equally disturbing images of a society that continues piling up waste, pumping CO2¶ into the atmosphere, deforesting the¶ earth, etc. This is a process that Neil Smith appropriately refers to as¶ ‘nature-washing’ (2008: 245). In sum, our ecological predicament is sutured¶ by millennial fears, sustained by an apocalyptic rhetoric and representational tactics, and by a series of performative gestures signalling an overwhelming, mind-boggling danger, one that threatens to undermine the very¶ coordinates of our everyday lives and routines, and may shake up the¶ foundations of all we took and take for granted. Table 1 exempliﬁes some¶ of the imaginaries that are continuously invoked.¶ Of course, apocalyptic imaginaries have been around for a long time¶ as an integral part of Western thought, ﬁrst of Christianity and later emerging¶ as the underbelly of fast-forwarding technological modernization and its¶ associated doomsday thinkers. However, present-day millennialism¶ preaches an apocalypse without the promise of redemption. Saint John’s¶ biblical apocalypse, for example, found its redemption in God’s inﬁnite love.¶ The proliferation of modern apocalyptic imaginaries also held up the¶ promise of redemption: the horsemen of the apocalypse, qqqwhether riding¶ under the name of the proletariat, technology or capitalism, could be tamed¶ with appropriate political and social revolutions. As Martin Jay argued, while traditional apocalyptic versions still held¶ out the hope for redemption, for a ‘second coming’, for the promise of a ‘new¶ dawn’, environmental apocalyptic imaginaries are ‘leaving behind any hope¶ of rebirth or renewal . . . in favour of an unquenchable fascination with being¶ on the verge of an end that never comes’ (1994: 33). The emergence of new forms of millennialism around the environmental nexus is of a particular¶ kind that promises neither redemption nor realization. As Klaus Scherpe¶ (1987) insists, this is not simply apocalypse now, but apocalypse forever. It¶ is a vision that does not suggest, preﬁgure or expect the necessity of an event¶ that will alter history. Derrida (referring to the nuclear threat in the 1980s)¶ sums this up most succinctly:¶ . . . here, precisely, is announced – as promise or as threat – an apocalypse¶ without apocalypse, an apocalypse without vision, without truth, without¶ revelation . . . without message and without destination, without sender and¶

#### The combination of security concerns with energy policy universalizes security to touch ALL aspects of life – turns the most minor forms of violence into total war while simultaneously making war banal and tolerable via a disengaged and fragmented method of communicating risk

Ciuta 10 (Felix, PhD in International Relations from Manchester University, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University College of London, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security,” Security Dialogue 2010 41: 123, sage)

To reiterate, the issue here is neither identifying correctly the risks to energy security nor deciding whether insurance is the best way of dealing with them. Rather, it is to observe the mutual modulations of energy/security and their effects on the meaning of security. Up to this point, we noted that the totality and reflexivity of energy are transferred onto security predominantly through the vector of risk. Another noticeable effect is the arrival of biological terminology in the vocabulary of security, where energy is synonymous with ‘blood’, and oil is the ‘lifeblood’ of society (Cleveland & Kaufmann, 2003: 488). But, does the securitization of energy in this logic remove the hierarchies that bound sustenance, the environment and growth, mashing them up indistinguishably in the shape of insurance products? Does security really mean something else? Not according to Dillon (2008: 328), for whom ‘the subject of risk-based securities is also preoccupied with survival’. His conclusion is perhaps inherent in the Foucauldian-inspired understanding that the biopolitics of security take ‘life as their referent object’ (Dillon, 2008: 310).¶ In order to decide whether a new meaning of security has emerged, we must ask an even stronger question. Does security still mean anything at all, if indeed security is everywhere and in everything – **as it must be according to the total logic of energy security?** Is total energy security a banal kind of security? Is this the end of security, as the naysayers of the broad security agenda warned us? (And a banal death it would be indeed, since it went unnoticed in the torrent of news about the geopolitics of oil.) **Emphatically, my answer is no**. Total energy does take security everywhere, but this does not empty security of its meaning. **Energy hooks itself on particular meanings of security, which it then takes everywhere**. The key is that security can take different meanings. Only once this taboo of security studies is overcome can we fully grasp the modulation of energy and security.¶ As always, there is some good news about this, and then there is some bad news too. Also as always, it is perhaps better to start with the bad news. The bad news is that, as we have seen in the war logic, **energy can attach itself to a conflictual understanding of security, which it takes everywhere owing to its total and reflexive nature**. If, as Lovins & Lovins argue ([1982] 2001: 10), ‘threats to national security are expressed through the energy system’, the result is as inevitable as it is alarming: to draw again on the analogy between energy and information, energy security assimilates ‘the principle of war . . . into the very weft and warp of the socio-economic and cultural networks’ (Dillon & Reid, 2001: 42). The totality of energy makes war total in scope and paroxysmic in intensity, so energy security becomes the node where **the** quasiDarwinian **scramble for resources, the** Clausewitzian **logic of total war and the** Schmittian inescapable **politics of enmity meet**. From this point of view, the issue is not the banalization of security, but rather **the banalization of war.** Yet, energy security need not prompt only despair. The good news is that energy can potentially attach itself to any definition of security. Cooperative and non-conflictual understandings of security can also be carried by energy in all spheres of activity, so neither the militarization of energy nor its survivalist principle is inevitable. **Energy is not, in this sense, the problem**: the problem is that of formulating different concepts of security and creating contexts where these can acquire legitimacy and political grip – and as a result could also arrest issues other than energy.

#### **The frame of decision-making on energy excludes the perspective of the poor, destroying the environment to generate green energy**

Teelucksingh and Poland 11 (Cheryl and Blake, Int J Environ Res Public Health. “Energy Solutions, Neo-Liberalism, and Social Diversity in Toronto, Canada” 2011 January; 8(1): 185–202. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3037069/)

Energy concerns—and the steps taken to alleviate them - translate into household level impacts on housing, transportation and subsistence, and these impacts are felt differentially by different segments of society. Starting in the 1990s, American environmental justice researchers and activists have reinforced the connection between energy use/depletion and social issues at the micro level. As Lee [18] argues, ‘poor people and people of colour are benefitting the least and paying the most for this society’s wasteful dependency on fossil fuels, and nuclear power, and from the resulting air pollution’ ([18], p. 1). Household energy consumption is tied to income; for instance, poor households cannot afford larger houses and/or multiple appliances like gas plasma TVs that consume more energy [18]. Despite using less energy, these households are more vulnerable: higher heating prices may contribute to some low-income households losing their homes altogether. Similarly, poor households are more likely to drive cars that are older and less energy efficient, and/or rely more heavily on public transportation [18]. There is also a procedural justice dimension to energy, as poor communities and racialized communities have been largely excluded from the arenas where energy policy decisions are made. qqqqqqMarginalized people often have less information about energy rebates, although their houses and apartments are among the least energy efficient, and the solutions that are presented (e.g., investing in home improvement measures such as insulation or Energy Star appliances) are often not feasible (e.g., for renters). More broadly, while the natural resources needed to produce energy are often located in or near poor or Aboriginal communities, the views of these communities are often not given much weight in decisions about the extraction and production of energy, despite the potential negative impact on the physical environment and communities nearby [19,20]. The connection between environmental justice and the study of environmental policy in Canada remains under-explored in scholarship in part due to the emphasis on applying environmental justice to explain problems of distributional injustices. In response to this identified gap, in this paper we apply environmental justice to examine the theory and practice of environmentalism and energy policy in Toronto.

#### The impact is the reduction of the developing world to a commodity for our national security

Giroux 06(Henry, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, “The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: Political Culture Under the Bush/Cheney Administration”, Symploke, 2006)PM

It is virtually impossible to understand the rise of such multi-faceted authoritarianism in American society without analyzing the importance of neoliberalism as the defining ideology of the current historical moment.[16](http://muse.uq.edu.au/journals/symploke/v014/14.1giroux.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT16) While fascism does not need neoliberalism to develop, **neoliberalism creates the ideological and economic conditions that can promote a uniquely American version of fascism**.[17](http://muse.uq.edu.au/journals/symploke/v014/14.1giroux.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT17) Neoliberalism not only undermines vital economic and political institutions and public spaces central to a democracy but also **has no vocabulary for recognizing anti-democratic forms of power**. Even worse, **it accentuates a structural relationship between the state and the economy that produces hierarchies, concentrates power in relatively few hands, unleashes the most brutal elements of a rabid individualism,** destroys the welfare state, incarcerates large numbers of its "disposable" population, economically disenfranchises large segments of the lower and middle classes, and **reduces entire countries to pauperization**.[18](http://muse.uq.edu.au/journals/symploke/v014/14.1giroux.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT18) **Under neoliberalism, the state now makes a grim alignment with corporate capital and transnational corporations**. Gone are the days when the state "assumed responsibility for a range of social needs"; instead, agencies of government now pursue a wide range of "'deregulations,' privatizations, and abdications of responsibility to the market and private philanthropy" (Steinmetz 337). Deregulation promotes "widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation's basic productive capacity" (Bluestone and Harrison 6). Flexible production encourages wage slavery at home. And the search for ever greater profits leads to outsourcing, which accentuates the flight of capital and jobs abroad. **Neoliberalism has now become the prevailing logic in the United States**, and according to Stanley Aronowitz**, "the neoliberal economic doctrine proclaiming the superiority of free markets over public ownership, or even public regulation of private economic activities, has become the conventional wisdom, not only among conservatives but among social progressives**" (2003, 21). The ideology and power of neoliberalism also cut across national boundaries. Throughout the globe, the forces of neoliberalism are on the march**,** dismantling the historically guaranteed social provisions provided by the welfare state, defining profit-making as the essence of democracy, and equating freedom with the unrestricted ability of markets to "govern economic relations free of government regulation" (101). **[End Page 136]** Transnational in scope, **neoliberalism now imposes its economic regime and market values on developing and weaker nations through structural adjustment policies enforced by powerful financial institutions such as the** World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization **(WTO). Secure in its dystopian vision that there are no alternatives,** as Margaret Thatcher once put it, **neoliberalism obviates issues of contingency,** struggle, and social agency **by celebrating the inevitability of economic laws in which the ethical ideal of intervening in the world gives way to the idea that we "have no choice but to adapt both our hopes and our abilities to the new global market"** (Aronowitz 1998, 7). Coupled with a new culture of fear, market freedoms seem securely grounded in a defense of national security, capital, and property rights. **In its capacity to dehistoricize and depoliticize society, as well as in its aggressive attempts to destroy all of the public spheres necessary for the defense of a genuine democracy, neoliberalism reproduces the conditions for unleashing the most brutalizing forces of capitalism and for accentuating the most central elements of proto-fascism**. qqAs the late Pierre Bourdieu argued, neoliberalism is a policy of depoliticization that attempts to liberate the economic sphere from all government controls: Drawing shamelessly on the lexicon of liberty, liberalism, and deregulation, it aims to grant economic determinisms a fatal stranglehold by liberating them from all controls, and to obtain the submission of citizens and governments to the economic and social forces thus liberated . . . [T]his policy has imposed itself through the most varied means, especially juridical, on the liberal—or even social democratic— governments of a set of economically advanced countries, leading them gradually to divest themselves of the power to control economic forces. (2003, 38)

**They say no prior questions – but Owen votes neg – interrogating method is a prior question**
**Owen 2** [David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3]
The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and postmodernist IR ‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the introduction to this section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’,12 or find Keohane asserting sniffily that Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled.13 We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because the issue at stake for the practitioners of this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ is the picturing of international politics and the implications of this picturing for the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline, namely, the constitution of what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. The kind of accounts provided by practitioners of this type are not competing theories (hence Keohane’s complaint) but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory- construction, namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in the course of the debate between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint). Thus, for example, Michael Shapiro writes: The global system of sovereign states has been familiar both structurally and symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed. The persistence of this international imaginary has helped to support the political privilege of sovereignty affiliations and territorialities. In recent years, however, a variety of disciplines have offered conceptualizations that challenge the familiar, bordered world of the discourse of international relations.14 The point of these remarks is to call critically into question the background picture (or, to use another term of art, the horizon) against which the disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted in order to make this background itself an object of reflection and evaluation. In a similar vein, Rob Walker argues: Under the present circumstances the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites a degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. . . . The most pressing questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions, but also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together.15 The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten fact that our existing ways of picturing international politics emerge from, and in relation to, the very practices of international politics with which they are engaged and it is entirely plausible (on standard Humean grounds) that, under changing conditions of political activity, these ways of guiding reflection and action may lose their epistemic and/or ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required. Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required, it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise. After all, as Quentin Skinner has recently reminded us, it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our own intellectual heritage. . . . As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them.16 In this respect, one effect of the kind of challenge posed by postmodernists like Michael Shapiro and Rob Walker is to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched.

**– politics is already ceded to the right – alternative is key**

Butler and Stevens 06 [Rex Butler and Scott Stephens, Lecturers at U of Queensland, “Play Fuckin Loud: Zizek vs. the Left,” The Symptom, Issue 7, Spring 2006 (http://www.lacan.com/symptom7\_articles/butler.html) ]

Here, we might say, in a nutshell is everything Zizek writes against. And it is just at this point that the true distinctions – because they are the hardest, the most unpopular, the most difficult – need to be made. It is just at this moment that Zizek breaks with a “well-wishing” Left in the name of a proper Hegelio-Marxist critique. To begin with, Zizek absolutely takes a distance from the classical model of the philosopher giving meaning to events, providing a solution to problems – the philosopher as Big Other bringing about narrative and conceptual closure. (Ironically, in another post from her website, Dean even admits that one of the things at stake in Zizek’s work is the doing away with the Big Other like this.) Giving meaning, providing solutions, bringing about closure: this is what French politicians from the Centre-Left like Dominique de Villepin (who criticised the French State) to the Right like Nicolas Sarkozy (who blamed the rioters) rushed to do in the days immediately following the riots. It is what innumerable media critics and commentators, both in France and abroad, scrambled to do in order that there was no empty air time in which actually to think. How flimsy, how pathetic, how desperate they all sounded, when we know that, within the current configuration of the French State within capitalism, there can be no solution.[2](http://www.lacan.com/symptom7_articles/butler.html#_edn2#_edn2) (The same point might even be made of the media coverage of Hurricane Katrina: for all of the criticisms made of the Bush Government for acting too slowly in response to the crisis, this is again to assume that the problem was only natural, that everything could be made right by the timely intervention of the State, when in fact it is the State itself that is the problem.) In both cases, there is no “solution”, and therefore no meaning, no closure to events. And it is just *this* that Zizek is trying to think in his essay – admittedly, with great difficulty, against the “best wishes” of his supporters. More than this, Zizek is accused in Dean’s essay not only of not providing the meaning of the French riots to us, but also to the rioters themselves. In the most traditional conception of philosophy, he is expected to speak for others, bears a responsibility for “articulating the violence”. But the real point here is that, if these riots are to constitute a real “event”, they must provide *their own meaning*. And it is the failure of the rioters to do this, to make of what happened an event, that Zizek indicates by the simple “mathemic” repetition of his previous work (mostly passages of *Ticklish Subject*) in response to them.[3](http://www.lacan.com/symptom7_articles/butler.html#_edn3#_edn3) The riots do not provide an occasion for new thought; they merely play out an existing impasse. But, again, it is just this – this lack of any wider meaning, the present inability of the rioters, of all of us, to formulate an authentic utopian moment, to make of what happened a “universal” – that Zizek attempts to think in his refusal to clutch at “solutions”, to suggest possible alternatives, to issue philosophical nostrums from some higher place, not “mired in the situation”. Perhaps the only true equivalent to Zizek’s authentic ethical stance here, his refusal to offer placebos, his taking of the time to think, strangely enough, was the response of French President Jacques Chirac, who several days after the riots – and he too was criticised for his delay – put forward an equally mathemic decree: “The French State will not concede to the rioters”. We sense behind his words here, as with Zizek, a frank admission that the riots did not constitute an authentic event, that the only true crisis (for Capital) will be that of Capital itself… So what, then, is Zizek attempting to do in ‘Some Politically Incorrect Reflections’? What is the role for philosophy he proposes there? What does he mean by saying that the philosopher’s task is “not to propose solutions, but to reframe the problem itself”? If we can begin by answering these questions in a slightly programmatic way, the role of philosophy is to provide space for us and the protestors to *think*. It is to enable us to reflect upon the fact that the rioters are able to propose no solution, and to make of this problem the beginning of a solution itself. It is the rush to judgement, the proposing of solutions without seeing the prior problem, that Zizek is seeking to avoid.[4](http://www.lacan.com/symptom7_articles/butler.html#_edn4#_edn4) And it is this time of thinking that we call his “patience”, and that is variously theorised in his work as “separation”, “uncoupling” “aggressive passivity” and Bartleby’s “I prefer not to”. It is to stop before acting and to ask why all of the available alternatives are insufficient, merely different versions of the same thing. (In the full-length version of the essay, posted on Lacan.com, Zizek makes a crucial distinction between two different responses to capitalism and the separation it enforces between truth and meaning: on the one hand, there are “conservative [but we would also say pseudo-Leftist] reactions to re-enframe capital within some field of meaning”; and, on the other, there is the attempt to raise the question of the “real of capitalism with regard to its truth-beyond-meaning (what, basically, Marx did)”. It is absolutely this distinction that is at stake in Zizek’s attempt to tear the events of the French riots away from their various commentators, both Left and Right, in thinking their “truth-outside-meaning”.) And this is why, finally – we see it again in this misunderstanding between Zizek and his blogger – we can say that philosophical thinking as such is always political, is not to do nothing. This is why we can say that thinking, truly thinking – and here we are reminded of Dylan’s insistence that all of his songs are protest songs, even when they do not take up the topical issues of the day – is that rarest of events, and constitutes the only real resistance to what must be called the “complicity” of the well-meaning Left, which in its desire for immediate results is indistinguishable from its hated rival (the narcissism of small differences), neo-liberalism

**Focus on utilitarian calculus without an understanding of the underlying role of desire replicates the case harms**

**Gaete 2K** [Rolando Gaete, “ARTICLE: Law & The Sacred: Desecration, Law and Evil,” Law/Text/Culture, 2000, p. lexis]

This is the terror that Burke wrote about, "terror of a 'there is nothing', which threatens without making itself known" (Lyotard 1990: 32). But meaninglessness can produce a different kind of understanding. The understanding of Kant when looking at the stars above and at his heart inside. The fundamental insight into the sacred is that of meaningless, the glimpse of a purposeless Universe which does not follow a pre-designed plan or which is not there to reach a pre-designed goal. It is sacred because it makes it impossible to think of it in the way one thinks about a thing, existing within the framework of the Universe, which has no value, plan or goal -- like a stone in a desert or a broken washing machine on a rubbish dump. The analogy to useless play, whose purpose is to play the play, is better (Fink 1966: 235; Gadamer 1979: First Part, II, 1). The withdrawal of meaning opens a clearing for the experience of the sacred, the terrifying modern experience of being before the absence of a rational God, an experience that Pascal and Kierkegaard explored (Bataille 1988). This experience and the effort to confront and understand it may be painful. But a banalisation of human existence that reduces all human phenomena to a utilitarian calculation can lead to even more painful consequences. [\*394]  Challenged by the development of fascistic communities that ground a seductive culture of hatred on a perverted sense of the sacred, we are presented with a hard choice between either paying 'the unbearable price of freedom' which censors all forms of censorship, or engaging in a comparative calculation of harms which can never provide clear guidelines. These approaches will not help us to identify the point at which legal intervention becomes necessary unless we confront and increase our understanding of the drives and desires that were at play in the Nazis' structures of motivation. "What is not confronted critically does not disappear; it tends to return as the repressed" (La Capra 1992: 126).

The neoliberal order will ultimately collapse, ensuring a devastated global economy, famine, massive poverty, and a rise in terrorism and fundamental nationalism throughout the globe

**Shiva in 3** (Vandana, ZNet Daily Commentaries, *Globalisation and Its Fallout*, April 2, http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2003-04/02shiva.cfm)

**Globalization was imposed on the world with a promise of peace and prosperity. Instead we are faced with war and economic crisis. Not only has prosperity proved elusive, the minimal economic securities of people and countries are fast disappearing. Hunger deaths have started to occur in countries such as Argentina where hunger was never a problem, and starvation has returned to countries like India which had driven away famine like the one of 1942 which killed 2 million people under colonial**, and provided food security through public policy shaped by the democratic process of an independent and sovereign country**. Even the rich economies of U.S., Europe and Japan are facing a decline. Globalization has clearly failed to improve the well being of citizens or countries.**  It has helped some corporations increase their profits and markets, but **many corporations like AOL/Time Warner and Enron whose non-sustainable growth was based on deregulation accompanying globalization have themselves either gone bankrupt or lost their value. Following the globalization path is proving to be a recipe for non-sustainability for the rich and impoverishment and destitution for the poor. Peace was the other promise of globalization but terrorism and war is what we have inherited. Peace was to be a result of increased global prosperity through globalization. Increased poverty is the unfolding reality. And economic insecurity and exclusion is creating conditions for the rise of terrorism and fundamentalism. Economic and political exclusion, and the erosion of national economic sovereignty is making many young men turn to terrorism and violence as a way of achieving their goals. The erosion of economic nationalism and the growth of economic security is also providing fertile ground for the rise of right wing fundamentalist politics, with parties using the reality of economic insecurity to fan the flames of cultural insecurity, and filling the vacuum left by the collapse of economic nationalism and economic sovereignty with the pseudo nationalist agenda of "cultural nationalism**".

**NEOLIBERALISM ONLY PERPETUATES VIOLENCE AGAINST OTHERS BECAUSE IT RELEGATES HUMANS AS COMMODITIES TO BE TRADED. THIS DESTROYS THE VALUE OF CULTURE AND JUSTIFIES ETHNIC CLEANSING**

**Shiva in 2k3** (Vandana, physicist, ecologist, activist, editor, and author of many books, ZNet Daily Commentaries, *Globalisation and Its Fallout*, April 2, <http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2003-04/02shiva.cfm>)

The first is **the market fundamentalism of globalization** itself. This fundamentalism **redefines life as commodity, society as economy, and the market as the means and end of the human enterprise. The market is being made the organizing principle for the provisioning of food, water, health, education and other basic needs, it is being made the organizing principle for governance, it is being made the measure of our humanity. Our being human** is no longer predicated on the fundamental human rights enshrined in all constitutions and in the U.N. declaration of human rights. It **is now conditional on our ability to "buy" our needs on the global marketplace in which the conditions of life** -- food, water, health, knowledge h**ave become the ultimate commodities controlled by a handful of corporations. In the market fundamentalism of globalization, everything is a commodity, everything is for sale. Nothing is sacred,** there are no fundamental rights of citizens and no fundamental duties of governments. The market fundamentalism of globalization and the economic exclusion inherent to it is giving rise to, and being reinforced and supported by politics of exclusion emerging in the form of political parties based on "religious fundamentalism"/xenophobia/ethnic cleansing and reinforcement of patriarchies and castism. The culture of commodification has increased violence against women, whether it is in the form of rising domestic violence, increasing cases of rape, an epidemic of female foeticide, and increased trafficking in women.

## 1NR

### FW

#### They isolate policy from politics, —condensing advocacy to a 4 second plan means you can’t assess who debated better—plan focus trains you not to defend the process by which you make conclusions, which turns their offense

**Gunder et al**, Aukland University senior planning lecturer, **2009**

(Michael, Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning pgs 111-2)

The hegemonic network, or bloc, **initially shapes the debates** and draws on¶ appropriate policies of desired success, such as the needs of bohemians, knowledge¶ clusters, or talented knowledge workers, as to what constitutes their desired¶ enjoyment (cobblestones, chrome and cappuccinos at sidewalk cafes) and what¶ is therefore lacking in local competitiveness. In tum, this defines what is blighted¶ and dysfunctional and in need of economic, spatial planning, or other, remedy.¶ Such an argument is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a¶ lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness (for surely they¶ are one and the same) is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Lack¶ and its resolution are generally presented as technical, rather than political issues.¶ Consequently, technocrats in partnership with their "dominant stakeholders” can¶ ensure the impression of rationally seeking to produce happiness for the many,¶ whilst, of course, achieving their stakeholders' specific interests (Gunder and¶ Hillier 2007a, 469).

The current “post-democratic” milieu facilitates the above through avoidance¶ of **critical** policy **debate challenging** favoured orthodox positions and **policy**¶ **approaches**. Consideration of policy deficiencies, or alternative “solutions”, are¶ eradicated from political debate so that while “token institutions of liberal democracy”:¶ are retained, conflicting positions and arguments are negated (Stavrakakis 2003,¶ 59). Consequently, “the safe names in the field who feed the policy orthodoxy are¶ repeatedly used, or their work drawn upon, by different stakeholders, while more¶ critical voices are **silenced by** their **inability to shape policy debates**' (Boland 2007,¶ 1032). The economic development or spatial planning policy analyst thus continues¶ to partition reality ideologically by deploying only the orthodox "˜successful' or¶ "best practice' economic development or spatial planning responses. This further¶ maintains the dominant, or hegemonic, status quo while providing "a cover and¶ **shield against critical** thought by acting in the manner of a "buffer" isolating the¶ political held from any research that is independent and radical in its conception¶ as in its implications for public policy' (Wacquant 2004, 99). At the same time,¶ adoption of the hegemonic orthodoxy tends to generate similar policy responses¶ for every competing local area or city-region, largely resulting in a zero-sum game¶ (Blair and Kumar 1997).

### Perm

#### Doesn’t test competition, even if it’s compatible in the abstract—here’s an advocate for rejection

**Glover et al 2006** – \*Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware, \*\*Directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs, selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013, \*\*\*2007 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware, Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (Leigh Glover, Noah Toly, John Byrne, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, in “Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict”, p. 1-32, http://www.ceep.udel.edu/energy/publications/2006\_es\_energy\_as\_a\_social\_project.pdf, WEA)

When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy¶ **discourse appears impoverished**. Many of its leading voices proclaim great¶ things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that¶ power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some¶ participants may **petition for a progressive middle ground**, acknowledging¶ that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of¶ energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but **it**¶ **hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy** and politics **is the reasonable social response**. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice¶ of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, **acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals**,¶ **that hardly envision incremental consequences**, would **indulge a form of self-deception rather than represent a serious discursive position**.¶ An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford¶ (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The¶ preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about¶ both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, perhaps, for its environmental performance).¶ The Technique of Modern Energy Governance¶ While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the¶ achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration¶ of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern¶ proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery¶ has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c;¶ Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective¶ norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In¶ this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members¶ have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu¶ what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul,¶ 1964: 133 – 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed¶ sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality.¶ From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant¶ Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar,¶ technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to¶ drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has¶ noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique¶ [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the¶ sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical¶ expertise.” **Even the vanguard of a sustainable** energy **transition seems swayed**¶ **by** the magnetism of **technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast**¶ **and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics**.¶ Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative¶ status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies¶ and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people”¶ consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding¶ the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and¶ sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the¶ energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its¶ operations.¶ Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and¶ sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford¶ suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of¶ related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that¶ affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and¶ technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in¶ both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being¶ recognized as the **emblems of modernist politics**. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which “deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process,¶ [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over¶ physical nature, ultimately control over man himself, the chief purpose of¶ existence” (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically¶ and technologically unassailable.¶ **Triumphant Energy Capitalism**¶Where the power to govern is not vested in experts, it is given over to¶ market forces in both the conventional and sustainable energy programs. Just¶ as the transitions envisioned in the two paradigms are alike in their technical¶ preoccupations and governance ideologies, they are also alike in their political-economic commitments. Specifically, modernist energy transitions operate in, and evolve from, a capitalist political economy. Huber and Mills (2005)¶ are convinced that conventional techno-fixes will expand productivity and¶ increase prosperity to levels that will erase the current distortions of inequality. Expectably, conventional energy’s aspirations present little threat to the¶ current energy political economy; indeed, the aim is to reinforce and deepen¶ the current infrastructure in order to minimize costs and sustain economic¶ growth. The existing alliance of government and business interests is judged¶ to have produced social success and, with a few environmental correctives¶ that amount to the modernization of ecosystem performance, the conventional energy project fervently anticipates an intact energy capitalism that¶ willingly invests in its own perpetuation.¶ While advocates of sustainable energy openly doubt the viability of the¶ conventional program and emphasize its social and environmental failings,¶ there is little indication that capitalist organization of the energy system is¶ faulted or would be significantly changed with the ascendance of a renewables-based regime. The modern cornucopia will be powered by the profits of a¶ redirected market economy that diffuses technologies whose energy sources¶ are available to all and are found everywhere. The sustainable energy project,¶ according to its architects, aims to harness nature’s ‘services’ with technologies and distributed generation designs that can sustain the same impulses of¶ growth and consumption that underpin the social project of conventional¶ energy. Neither its corporate character, nor the class interests that propel¶ capitalism’s advance, are seriously questioned. The only glaring difference¶ with the conventional energy regime is the effort to modernize social relations with nature.¶ In sum, conventional and sustainable energy strategies are mostly quiet¶ about matters of concentration of wealth and privilege that are the legacy of¶ energy capitalism, although both are vocal about support for changes consistent with middle class values and lifestyles. We are left to wonder why such¶ steadfast reluctance exists to engaging problems of political economy. Does¶ it stem from a lack of understanding? Is it reflective of a measure of satisfaction with the existing order? Or is there a fear that critical inquiry might¶ jeopardize strategic victories or diminish the central role of ‘energy’ in the¶ movement’s quest?¶ **Transition without Change: A Failing Discourse**¶After more than thirty years of contested discourse, the major ‘energy¶ futures’ under consideration appear committed to the prevailing systems of¶ governance and political economy that animate late modernity. The new¶ technologies—conventional or sustainable—that will govern the energy sector¶ and accumulate capital might be described as centaurian technics¶ 21¶ in which¶ the crude efficiency of the fossil energy era is bestowed a new sheen by high¶ technologies and modernized ecosystems: capitalism without smoky cities,¶ contaminated industrial landscapes, or an excessively carbonized atmosphere.¶ Emerging energy solutions are poised to realize a postmodern transition¶ (Roosevelt, 2002), but their shared commitment to capitalist political economy¶ and the democratic-authoritarian bargain lend credence to Jameson’s assessment (1991) of postmodernism as the “cultural logic of late capitalism.”¶ Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is¶ important—even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the¶ two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of¶ more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a¶ sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy¶ visions equally presume that a social order governed by a ‘democratic’ ideal¶ of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological¶ marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start¶ the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and¶ social justice is studiously observed by both proposals. Likewise, both agree¶ to, or demur on, the question of capitalism’s sustainability.¶ 22¶ Nothing is said¶ on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be.¶ If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct,¶ then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of¶ acquiescence to things as they are. Building an **inquiry into energy as a social**¶ **project will require** the recovery of a **critical voice that can interrogate**, rather¶ than concede, **the discourse’s current moorings in technological politics and**¶ capitalist **political economy**. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate¶ an energy-society order in which **energy systems evolve in response to social**¶ **values** and goals, **and not simply according** to the dictates of technique,¶ **prices**, or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability¶ camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is¶ non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources¶ need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage¶ the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent¶ possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the¶ global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy¶ services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to¶ between 550º and 900º Fahrenheit (300º and 500º Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance¶ of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed¶ professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the¶ life-world of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to¶ design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life.¶ Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot¶ overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe¶ of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism¶ are successfully declined. In 1928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965:¶ 52) explained why **the democratic-authoritarian bargain** and Western capitalism **should be rejected:**¶God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the¶ West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today¶ keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, **it would strip the world bare** like locusts. Unless the capitalists of¶ India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and¶ by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of¶ the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or¶ being destroyed by them.¶ As Gandhi’s remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric¶ light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places¶ efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social¶ problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our¶ political-economic problem.¶ The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.