## 1NC

### K 1NC

**Risk is an ideological construction signifying anxiety over our inability to ever achieve a complete understanding of reality. This is part of the ever-present trauma of modernity where risk is embedded in everyday life and extinction is an ontological specter.**

Michael **Gunder in 8** University of Auckland, New Zealand, Ideologies of Certainty In a Risky Reality: Beyond the Hauntology of Planning, Planning Theory, vol 7 (2): 186-206.

In the wider social science literature, **two perceptions of risk tend to dominate** leading conceptualizations of the term (Cutter, 1993; Evanoff, 2005; Healy, 2004; Jasanoff, 1999; Lidskog et al., 2006; Snary, 2004). **The first** perspective, ‘**which has tended to dominate governmental and scientific discussions of risk, espouses a positivistic** (or realist) **theory of knowledge** and a bureaucratic-rationalistic policy orientation’ (Jasanoff, 1999: 137). **Risk**, in this view, **is something that can be measured, observed, mapped and generally controlled**. An institutional failure to manage risk is therefore either a consequence of its knowledge and capability being disparate to the mission, or a ‘lack of political will to take unpalatable action’ (p. 137). **The second** perspective **is** a **constructionist** one, **where risks ‘do not directly reflect natural reality but are refracted in every society through lenses shaped by history, politics, and culture’**, and/or focused by the discourses – after Foucault – of the ‘specialized languages and sets of practices’ ‘which serve to channel power in society’ (p. 137). In this context ‘[r]isk is not an objective condition, but a social construction of reality, which starts with the question of how people explain misfortune’ (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 606). **Risk**, in this mode of interpretation, **is inherently an ideological construct addressing a lack of understanding that in turn seeks an authoritarian response, or closure, that purports to control this** unknowable, or **unpredictable ‘Thing’** – what is missing – **and provides**, at least **the illusion of certainty**, of control, over this unrevealed threatening spectre. That is: what is lacking, missing, empty is filled, covered over, resolved or given the illusion of safety and certainty (Gunder and Hillier, 2007a). Consequently, Tierney (1999: 223) observes that **‘political power**, organizational agendas, **and economic interests drive the science of risk assessment’ and that any effective cultural understanding of risk requires that the relationship of power and risk be explored.** As Bruno Latour (1993) amply demonstrates in We Have Never Been Modern, power, politics and science are inherently and always intertwined when addressing the unknown ‘Thing’. In this regard**, the ‘invention of facts is not, however, a discovery of the things that are out there; it is an anthropological creation that redistributes God, will, love, hatred, and justice’ in light of**, and through **the** filtering and **interpretation mechanisms of empirical observation** (Latour, 1993: 83–4). This article develops this constructivist slant and suggests a somewhat divergent perspective, conflating relevant works of Beck (1992, 1995, 1999, 2006) on ‘risk society’ and Derrida (1994, 2000b) on ‘hauntology’ to suggest that **risk is a fear of the undecidable and unknown**, which inherently haunts society as a spectre seeking exorcism. **This is what Kristeva (1982: 1) calls the abject: ‘a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside**, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable’ so that ‘the one haunted by it [is] literally beside himself’. Further, **a response to this cultural fear**, or haunting, and its desired resolution, **results in the constant seeking of an impossible absoluteness of knowledge to provide**, or at least give the illusion of, **certainty towards a safe tomorrow** – a core tenet of planning. Moreover, **this seeking of comprehensive knowledge** and/or construction of illustrating discourses that, at least, give the illusion of certainty of knowledge, underlies and **empowers both the positivistic and constructionist perspective put forward by Jasanoff as well as underlying planning’s central ontology of purpose**. Following Beck, this article contends**, that we increasingly reside in a lifeworld of fear and anxiety largely constituted by a loss of trust in our own ability and that of our institutions to both ultimately know and deliver a better world, or even to provide a predictable and secure state of existence**. **Overwhelmed ‘by complex institutional logics** and technologies that we do not understand, **we experience a lack of faith in our own agency**; exhausted by the failure of bureaucratic and political attempts to make the world a better place, **we lose faith in the power of humans to solve problems’** (Lavin, 2006: 259). This occurs while we still maintain a contradictory vision of the world as a stage that has been largely shaped by human will and ability in the struggle for continued existence and progressive betterment. Moreover, **this illusionary vision and expectation of our institutions to provide for continued societal security**, if not outright progress and betterment, **persists, despite daily experiences of the general failure of institutions to successfully address the underlying causes that induce this constant fear and anxiety induced by the unknown** (Lavin, 2006). At best**, the responses of traditional institutions of government**, including those of planning, **displace this fear rather than address and conquer it, resulting in a constant state of ongoing ontological anxiety and distrust. There is fear both of the ‘absolute threat of extinction’, and the corresponding ‘relative threat to self-preservation** and self-enhancement’ induced by our perceived lack of security and control (Hendrix, 1967: 64). For many, **this state of fear and anxiety with regard to ontological safety is inherently a condition of the current state of modernity, without hope of resolution and escape**, what Beck (1992) refers to as the risk society (Ungar, 2001). This anxiety is further compounded by a ‘dislocation, disintegration and disorientation associated with the vicissitudes of detraditionalization’ as a consequence of the ‘collapse of inherited norms, values, customs and traditions’ as a direct consequence of globalization, or as Beck argues: the emergence of the cosmopolitan state (Beck, 2004, 2005b; Ekberg, 2007).

**Emphasis on the state’s security of sufficient resources amplifies global insecurity by envisioning resource scarcity as a problem of management rather than one of economic structure. The impact is policy gridlock that ensures planetary annihilation.**

Nafeez Mosaddeq **Ahmed in 2011**, international security analyst specialising in the historical sociology and political ecology of mass violence. He is Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, Global Change, Peace & Security Vol. 23, No. 3, October 2011, 335–355

**Under** traditional **neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must involve the expansion of** **state**-military **capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised governance** structures **whose task is to regulate the** international **distribution of natural resources, as well as to ensure that a particular state’s own resource requirements are protected.** **Neorealism understands inter-state competition**, rivalry and warfare **as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty** about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximise its power relative to all other states is simply a reﬂection of its rational pursuit of its own security. **The upshot is the normalisation of political violence in the international system**, **including practices such as over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy** – **even though this** ultimately **ampliﬁes global systemic insecurity**. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual beneﬁt is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states. The problem is that **neorealism cannot explain in the ﬁrst place the complex interdependence and escalation of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system that is not simply a set of states,** but a transnational global structure based on a speciﬁc exploitative relationship with the biophysical environment**, neorealism can only theorise global crises as ‘new issue areas**’ appended to already existing security agendas. 59 Yet **by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes**. In effect, despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, **neorealism’s approach to issues like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame these ‘non-traditional’ issues purely as ampliﬁers of quite traditional threats**. As Susanne Peters argues, **the neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy a pragmatic and necessary response** to issues such as resource scarcities – **yet, in doing so, it entails the inevitable escalation of ‘resource wars’** in the name of energy security. Practically, **this serves** not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but **to debilitate international security through the proliferation of violent conﬂict to access and control diminishing resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies**. 60 **Neorealism thus negates its own theoretical utility and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the global systemic ampliﬁers of ‘insecurity**’, **despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of warding off** collective destruction, if not **planetary annihilation**? 61

**Alternative- reject the affirmative plan even in the face of their crisis politics.**

**This radical act disrupts the fantasy of a market driven managerial state as political, and creates space for new political imaginaries based on socio-ecological equality**

Erik **Swyngedouw in 11** Geography, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester, Interrogating post-democratization: Reclaiming egalitarian political spaces, Political Geography 30 (2011)

Third, **the proper response to the injunction to undertake action**, to design the new, to be different (but which is already fully accounted for within the state of the situation), **is to follow Bartleby’s modest, yet radically transgressive, reply to his Master, ‘I’d prefer not to .’: the refusal to act, to stop asking what they want from me, to stop wanting to be liked. The refusal to act is also an invitation to think or**, rather, **to think again. There is an urgent task that requires the formation of new egalitarian imaginaries/fantasies and the resurrection of thought that has been censored**, scripted out, suspended**. In otherwords, the key question to be posed today is if it is still possible to think the design of democratic**, polemical, **equitable, free common spaces** for the 21st century? **Can we still think through the** censored **metaphors of equality, communism**, living-incommon, solidarity, proper **political democracy**? **Are we condemned to rely on** our humanitarian sentiments and on **the ethical injunction to** care and to **manage socially to the best of our** technomanagerial **abilities the perversities of late capitalist** post-political **spatiality, or can a different politics** and geographical inscription of the process of being-in-common **be thought**? If both the critical socio-spatial analysis of the state of the situation, of the police order and the call for ethical re-inscription of politics fail in their emancipatory desire, **thought has to be redirected towards a re-inscription of the political that revolves around re-centring/**re-designing **space as an egalibertarian political field of dispute**/disagreement, **literally opening up spaces that permit speech acts that claim a place in the order of things** (see Swyngedouw, 2011). **The key lesson to be learned** from this intervention **is that politics does not arise from the choreography of the social, but stands as the meeting point of police and the political**. The political configures its own theatre, one that opens up a new spatiality, albeit within the given distribution of times and spaces, within the specific historical-geographical configurations and their unevenness that mark the existing socio-spatial order. It appears from within the police order, but acts at a distance from the state of the situation. **The emergence of the political under the name of equality** and freedom **denotes a universalizing aspiration and**, therefore, **always operates at a certain minimal distance from the State**/the police7: **it emerges not from within the dispositive of the police, but** where it is not supposed to be, i.e. **in public space**. The political is theatrically staged and enacted in the act of transgressing the socio-spatial configuration such that simultaneously equality is performed and the ‘wrong’ (the inegalitarian practice inscribed in the police) exposed. However, the unfolding of a political procedure, in turn, articulates with and is enmeshed in the complex spatial configurations and uneven geographies that mark its evental location. **Politics occurs when the universalizing aspirations of the political event meet with the ‘local’ specificities of the police order**. While in the examples mobilized in this paper certain universalizing procedures can be discerned, they always enmesh with the specific, complex and uneven geographies that the very emergence of the political seeks to transform. **All this centres on re-thinking equality politically,** i.e**. thinking equality not as a sociologically verifiable concept** or procedure that permits opening a policy arena which will remedy the observed inequalities (utopian/normative/moral) some time in a utopian future (i.e. the standard recipe of left-liberal urban policy prescriptions), **but as the axiomatically given and presupposed**, albeit contingent, **condition of democracy**. The emergence of political space as the space for the institutionalization of the social (society) and equality as the foundational gesture of political democracy (presumed, axiomatic, yet contingent foundation) requires extraordinary designs (both theoretically and materially), ones that cut through themaster signifiers of consensual governance. Elements of such transgressive metonymic re-designs include thinking the spatialities of opposition/dissenssus, of polemic, of agonistic (ac)count and performative staging of equality. **Radical imaginaries of concrete spatio-temporal utopias as immediately necessary** and realizable **and their articulation with emergent practices of egalibertarian staging need fostering and nurturing. The** final and perhaps **most important task is to traverse the fantasy of the elites, a fantasy that is sustained and nurtured by the imaginary of an autopoietic world, the hidden-hand of market exchange that self-regulates and self-organizes, serving simultaneously the interests of the Ones and the All,** the private and the common. **The socialism for the elites** (Virno, 2004) **that sutures the space of contemporary politics is really one that mobilizes the commons in the interests of the elite through the** mobilizing and **disciplinary registers of post-democratic politics. It is a fantasy that is further sustained by a double** phantasmagorical **promise: on the one hand the promise of eventual enjoyment** e “believe us and our designs will guarantee your enjoyment”. **It is an enjoyment that is forever postponed**, that becomes a true utopia. **On the other hand, there is the recurrent invocation of the specter of catastrophe and disintegration if the elites’ fantasy is not realized, one that is predicated upon the relentless cultivation of fear** (ecological disintegration, excessive migration, terrorism, economicefinancial crisis, etc.), a fear **that can only be managed through** technocratice **expert knowledge and elite governance arrangements. This fear of catastrophe has** debilitating and **disempowering effects - it sustains the impotence for naming and designing truly alternative places, truly different emancipatory spatialities** and urbanities. **Traversing elite fantasies requires the intellectual** and political **courage to imagine the collective production of space**, **the inauguration of newpolitical trajectories of living life in common, and,most importantly, the courage to choose,** to take sides, **to declare fidelity to the egalibertarian practices already pre-figured in some of the evental place-moments that mark contemporary insurgencies**. Most importantly, **traversing the fantasy** of the elites **means recognizing that the social and ecological catastrophe that is announced everyday as tomorrow’s threat is not a promise**, not something to come, **but is already the Real of the present. In that sense, we have to reclaim spatial egalibertarian utopias as an utmost necessity for today**. As the Invisible Committee put it in The Coming Insurrection (p. 138), “**It’s useless to wait** e for a breakthrough, **for the** revolution, the **nuclear apocalypse or a social movement. To go on waiting is madness. The catastrophe is not coming, it is here. We are already situated within the collapse of a civilization. It is within this reality that we must choose sides**”

**Prefer the alternative- only a holistic understanding of how economic production structures and orders international relations can provide policy makers with the frameworks needed to stop accelerating global crises**

Nafeez Mosaddeq **Ahmed in 2011**, international security analyst specialising in the historical sociology and political ecology of mass violence. He is Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, Global Change, Peace & Security Vol. 23, No. 3, October 2011, 335–355

The extent of orthodox IR theory’s complicity in this predicament is evident in its reduction of inter-state relations to balance-of-power dynamics, despite a lack of determinate bases by which to deﬁne and delineate the dynamics of material power. **While orthodox realism focuses inordinately on a military–political conceptualisation of national power, conventional attempts to extend this** conceptualisation **to include economic dimensions** (including the role of transnational corporations) – as well as production, ﬁnance, ideas and institutions beyond the state – **do not solve the problem**. 75 **This** Weberian **proliferation of categorisations** of the multiple dimensions of power, while useful, **lacks a unifying explanatory order of determination capable of rendering their interconnections intelligible**. As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from Rome to Spain – and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries – these **orders have always been inseparably conjoined with their constitutive relations of production as structured in the context of prevailing social– property relations**, illustrating the mutually-embedded nature of ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ power. 76 In contrast, **orthodox IR axiomatically fragments the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’** (and the latter further into ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, etc**.) into separate, autonomous spheres with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection**. 77 **It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental material conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical environment, as mediated through relations of production, and the way these are governed and contested through social–property relations**. 78 **By externalising the biophysical environmen**t – and thus human metabolism with nature – **from state praxis, orthodox IR simply lacks the conceptual categories necessary to recognise the extent to which socio-political organisational forms are mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the natural world**. 79 While further fragmenting the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state units whose behaviour can only be analysed through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, **orthodox IR is incapable of situating these units in the holistic context of the global political economy,** the role of transnational capitalist classes**, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on human and state behaviour**. 80

### Case

1. **Deterrence can’t be proven – there’s more evidence of its failure than success**

**Wilson** **2008**, Ward “THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, November 2008 http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/153\_wilson.pdf

**Some people try to make the case for nuclear deterrence not by explaining its theoretical basis but by** simply **pointing to its track record**. They assert that nuclear deterrence prevented nuclear attacks for the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 and claim that that is proof enough of its efficacy. There are problems with this, however. **In order to answer the question**, **‘‘did deterrence work**?**’’ you must** first **be able to know whether your opponent had a fully formed intention to attack and then refrained from doing so because of your threat**. **Questions of intention**, particularly the intention of world leaders\*who are typically reluctant to admit being thwarted in almost any circumstances\***are rarely documented**, **and** when documentary evidence is present, **difficult to judge**. As George and Smoke note, ‘‘It is difficult . . . to identify cases of deterrence success reliably in the absence of better data on the policy calculations of potential initiators who were presumably deterred. **Instances of apparently successful deterrence** . **. . may be spurious**.’’ 39 **There are also a number of other plausible explanations for the absence of war** during this period. **Most major wars are followed by periods,** sometimes quite long periods, **of relative peace**. The hundred years following the Napoleonic wars were for the most part ones of peace in Europe. The period following the Thirty Years War also was strikingly pacific. **Why does it make sense to attribute the peace following the Thirty Years War and the Napoleonic Wars to ‘‘war weariness,**’’ ‘‘economic exhaustion,’’ or ‘‘domestic political distraction,’’ **but the peace after World War II to nuclear deterrence**? **Consider**, for example, the case of **chemical weapons following World War I**. **The conditions necessary for deterrence with these weapons** of mass destruction **were present**. In the early 1920s, Germany, England, France, Italy, Russia, the United States, and others possessed the means necessary (industrial capacity to mass produce the chemical agents, bombers with sufficient range and carrying capacity, naval ships capable of firing large shells over long ranges) to use chemical weapons against the densely populated coastal and interior urban centers of their enemies.40 Such attacks, properly planned and executed, could have killed hundreds of thousands. They would certainly have ranked on a par with the most deadly city attacks in World War II. **Yet no** standard **histories of the post**-**World War I era ascribe the peace** that was maintained during those years **to a** ‘‘delicate **balance’’ of** deadly **weapons** of mass destruction. We do not rush to give deterrence the credit for the peace of those years. If nuclear weapons are seen as preventing war from 1950 to 1980, why is it that chemical weapons are not seen as having prevented war for the seven years from 1918 to 1925?41 **Locating the reason why an action** or phenomenon **did not occur**, finding the cause of an absence, **is always problematic**. **For example**, **I believe firmly that the garlic I wear around my neck has prevented vampire attacks**. **The proof**, I say, **is that no vampires have, as yet, attacked me**. **Yet objective observers might still be skeptical**. The problem with the claim about deterrence is that although there were contingency plans on both sides, there is little evidence that either the United States or the Soviet Union was ever on the brink of launching an aggressive war against the other. There is certainly no evidence of such an action that was planned, agreed to, and then thwarted by the threat of nuclear counterattack.42 **How is it possible to assert that deterrence prevented war without clear evidence that war was ever imminent**? It might be argued that while there is no particular war that was abandoned because of deterrence, deterrence did engender a general mutual restraint both in normal diplomatic relations and during the numerous crises of the Cold War. It is true that the large nuclear arsenals in the United States and the Soviet Union induced caution during this period. Numerous memoirs of leaders on both sides attest to this fact. But this is not evidence that deterrence worked. **The mutual caution of the Cold War is evidence that nuclear weapons are dangerous, not that they are effective** weapons of war **or useful** for threatening. To understand this, imagine a counterfactual involving biological weapons. No one argues that biological weapons are ideal weapons. They are blunt instruments, clumsy and difficult to employ effectively. Targeting with precision is a particular problem, as the wind has an unfortunate tendency to blow in unexpected directions, and the biological agents can, under certain circumstances, blow back on your own troops or population. No one argues that biological weapons are decisive weapons of war, crucial for security. They argue instead that biological weapons are dangerous, clumsy weapons that are best banned. Imagine, however, that following World War II the United States and Soviet Union had been armed with large arsenals of biological weapons mounted on missiles kept on hair-trigger alert. Is it difficult to believe that such arsenals would have induced caution on both sides? Yet we would not take this caution as proof that biological weapons were any less clumsy, difficult to aim, or difficult to control. We would not take this caution as proof that biological weapons are actually more militarily effective than we had previously thought. In the same way, nuclear weapons are dangerous (and induce caution) without being particularly effective. The caution on both sides during the Cold War is not proof of the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. **Although the successes of nuclear deterrence** over the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 **are speculative**, **its failures are not**. **Despite expectations to the contrary**, **the U.S. nuclear monopoly in the four years after World War II did not yield** significantly **greater diplomatic influence**.43 Far from being cowed, the Soviets were very tough in post-war negotiations, culminating in the 1948 showdown over access to Berlin. **Nuclear weapons also failed to give their possessors a decisive military advantage in war. The United States was fought to a draw in Korea and** subsequently **lost** a war fought **in Vietnam**, despite possessing the ‘‘ultimate weapon.’’ **The Soviet Union found that its nuclear arsenal could not prevent failure in its** own guerrilla **war in Afghanistan**. **Since Vietnam**, **the United States has fought in the Persian Gulf**, **Kosovo**, **Afghanistan, and Iraq**.44 **In none of these wars were its opponents intimidated into surrendering**, **nor could a practical use for nuclear weapons be devised**. Against these failures are often offered a range of explanations. The enemy had an ally who possessed nuclear weapons, the war was not sufficiently central to the interests of the nuclear power to justify using weapons of last resort, and so on. These **explanations**, however, **cannot account for the** striking **failure of deterrence in both the Yom Kippur War and the Falkland Islands War**. **Twice**, **during the Cold War**, **countries that had nuclear weapons were attacked**\*were made war on**\*by nations that did not have nuclear weapons. In both cases the threat of a nuclear retaliation failed to deter**. **How can these failures be accounted for?** One of the benefits of deterrence is that it is supposed to protect against conventional assault. Yet in both these cases nuclear weapons failed to provide this protection.

2. Security rhetoric frames debate to ignore value questions and political recognition of structural violence – this allows countless injustices committed to allay fear and anxiety

Bigo, 2k11

[Didier, Department of War Studies at the University of Manchester, “Northern Ireland as metaphor: Exception, suspicion and radicalization  
in the ‘war on terror’,” “Security Dialogue, vol. 42 no. 6 483-498]

However, **the question is not to decipher what is the best between idealistic inaction and tough action, but** rather **to recognize that in any violent situation, a complex economy made of symbolic strategies is at stake**. **Such an economy reframes not only the reality of the threat but also the repertoire of actions undertaken in the name of the fight against the enemy.** Since the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, **the threefold relationship and balance between freedom, security and danger has been modified**. The same holds true in the European Union (Brysk and Shafir, 2007; Bigo, 2002). As the threat is reappraised, **security now has an entirely positive connotation, while the negative overtones linked to its impact on freedom are swept aside. Rather than considering security as a process, one forgets its consequences and is led to think that ‘more security is a good thing’.** Security is then seen as a set of measures established for a delimited time that will disappear when the causes of the danger have been eliminated. However, Northern Ireland can provide useful insights on a segmented society that has been living in a culture of exceptionalism in which rights have been ‘temporarily’ suspended for 80 years. Northern Ireland illustrates the precariousness of political discourses on violence in the short and long terms. **Because what is really at stake in this debate is the technique of a certain kind of violence or a certain vision of the future made of and fed by fears and anxieties. Suspicion – reinforced by the feeling that an enemy is masked, hidden and probably already infiltrated among ‘us’ – can destroy the keystone principle of presumption of innocence and thus paradoxically help to complete the work that clandestine groups may have begun with bomb attacks**. Derogation from the rule of law, particularly when associated with discourses on the ‘foreigner’, can open a breach not only in the limitations defined by legal and institutional frameworks but also in the basic rights of the citizens seen as strangers, war prisoners or criminal suspects. **This breach**, once forced open, **twists the borders and creates spaces between the rules of national and international law, between the constitutional protection of citizens and the basic rights of a shared humanity.** It also violates the law by trying and playing with the borders between domestic and international law to justify in fine the most ordinary and least ethical practices. However, **are we facing a generalized state of exception,** as defined by Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005), a situation that eventually leads to ‘bare life’? **Has a permanent and generalized state of exception risen from the 9/11 events, under the unilateral sovereignty of the United States**? While according to Agamben we are in a logic in which exception is proclaimed by a sole sovereign, we **find ourselves on the contrary in a diffracted process in which bureaucratic practices are daily routines and derogation is justified a posteriori as a necessity. We live in a non-imperial and non-Schmittian world in which unilateralism produces resistance, in which the definition of exception is always contested, even at a late stage, by judges or civil society** (Guild, 2003: 498; 2007), and **in which logics of resistance and reassessment prevent the authorities from concretizing their dreams and reducing individual lives to a mere system of biological survival, even when and where humans are detained and tortured** (Guittet, 2008b). Though the announcement by the British government that it will provide millions of pounds in compensation to former Guantánamo Bay prisoners has been the subject of controversy among ministers and officials, it tends to underline that we are still far from the position of Giorgio Agamben regarding what the exception means (Bigo, 2006). **We are indeed still in liberal regimes, dealing with, reproducing and hiding illiberal practices. And the originality of these liberal regimes – something that Agamben does not mention – lies in their capacity to recognize the other even when that other is using violence as a tool**.

3. Evaluate structural violence first

Žižek 2008

[Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology @ Univ. of Ljubljana, Violence, p. 1-2]

If there is a unifying thesis that runs through the bric-a-brac of reflections on violence that follow, it is that a similar paradox holds true for violence. At the forefront of our minds, the obvious signals of violence are acts of crime and terror, civil unrest, international conflict. But we should learn to step back, to disentangle ourselves from the fascinating lure of this directly visible "subjective" violence, violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent. We need to perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts. A step back enables us to identify a violence that sustains our very efforts to fight violence and to promote tolerance.This is the starting point, perhaps even the axiom, of the present book: subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that also includes two objective kinds of violence. First, there is a "symbolic" violence embodied in language and its forms, what Heidegger would call "our house of being." As we shall see later, this violence is not only at work in the obvious-and extensively studied-cases of incitement and of the relations of social domination reproduced in our habitual speech forms: there is a more fundamental form of violence still that pertains to language as such, to its imposition of a certain universe of meaning. Second, there is what I call "systemic" violence, or the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.The catch is that subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as a perturbation of the "normal," peaceful state of things. However, objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this "normal" state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious "dark matter" of physics, the counterpart to an all-too visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be "irrational" explosions of subjective violence.

4. Realism has oversimplified the paradigm of security into an analysis of the interaction of state that ignores the composition of those states – this privileges a military focused agenda

Bilgin in 2005(Pinar, Assistance Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, “Regional Security in the Middle East: A critical perspective”, p. 18)

Contemporary critics of realism are sometimes (rightly) criticised for caricaturing an old and sophisticated body of thought. Such a fallacy is partly in the nature of the task of summarising a rich and diverse tradition; crucial details and nuances inevitably get lost in the process. But, as will be argued below, **sometimes realists themselves presented such simplistic pictures of their own thinking**. Furthermore, from the mid-1950s onwards, students of realism moved away from the more sociological approaches of classical realism. Indeed, as the Cold War waxed and waned**, classical realism was obscured by its more simplified and purportedly ‘scientific’ variant**. Within the context of Security Studies **this shift manifested itself in the discipline becoming increasingly state-centric and non-military dimensions of security being marginalised in favour of a military- focused security agenda** (Baldwin 1995: 117–23; also see McSweeney 1999: 31–2; Tickner 1997: 618). **State-centrism could be defined as treating the state as the central actor in world politics and concentrating on states’ practices when studying international phenomena. Realism’s state-centred outlook introduced a degree of neatness and clarity to the study of the complexity of international phenomena.** However, as with all simplifications, **many crucial aspects were lost in the process** (see Enloe 1996: 186–202). During the Cold War, the state-centric character of **security thinking manifested itself in the notion that security is about the state and the state is about security** (Buzan et al. 1998: 37). Though this may come as an oversimplification to some, **it is** nevertheless **difficult to deny the way the state was viewed as both the primary referent and agent in Security Studies**. Even some students of Third World security, who were otherwise critical of the Cold War security discourse, produced state-centric analyses (see, for example, Ayoob 1986; Azar and Moon 1988). However, **despite this focus on states, state building was under-theorised; states were taken to be ‘black boxes’, the internal components of which were not considered worth investigating**. As Georg Sorensen (1996: 371) has argued, **the problem with International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular has had ‘less to do with an exaggerated focus on the state than a lack of analysis of the state’** (also see Halliday 1987).

5. Techno-strategic discourse is used to only consider the rational aspects concerning the existence of nuclear weapons and their use. This is a product of gender coding where “masculine” ideals of rationality are used as a means to silence “feminine’ objections concerning the violence that these calculations produce.

Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick in 2005(Carol, Director of the Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, Felicity, Greenpeace International Political Adviser on Nuclear and Disarmament Issues, former Peace & Security Advisor to UNIFEM's Governance Peace and Security team, Sara, Professor Emerita of Philosophy and Feminist Studies at Lang College of the New School for Social Research, “The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Adapted from a presentation on June 12, 2005)

Why did he feel that way? First, he was transgressing a code of professional conduct**. Expressing concern about human bodies is not the way you talk within the terms of the strategic expert discourse,** which is, after all, a discourse about weapons and their relation to each other, not to human bodies. But even worse than that, he evinced some of the characteristics on the “female” side of the dichotomies – **in his “blurting” he was being impulsive, uncontrolled, emotional, concrete, upset and attentive to fragile human bodies.** Thus, **the hegemonic discourse of gender positioned him as feminine, which he found doubly threatening. It was not only a threat to his own sense of self as masculine, his gender identity; it also positioned him in the devalued or subordinate position in the discourse.** Thus, both his statement, “I felt like a woman,” and his subsequent silence in that and other settings, are completely understandable. To find the strength of character and courage to transgress the strictures of both professional and gender codes and to associate yourself with a lower status is very difficult. This story is not simply about one individual, his feelings and actions; it illustrates the role and meaning of gender discourse in the defence community. **The impact of gender discourse in that room (and countless others like it) is that some things are excluded and get left out from professional** deliberations. Certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings and meanings are marked in national security discourse as feminine, and devalued. They are therefore very difficult to speak, as exemplified by the physicist who blurted them out and wished he hadn’t. And **if they manage to be said, they are also very difficult to hear, to take in and work with seriously**. For the others in the room, the way in which the physicist’s comments were marked as feminine and devalued served to delegitimate them; it also made it very unlikely that any of his colleagues would find the courage to agree with him. This example should not be dismissed as just the product of the idiosyncratic personal composition of that particular room; it is replicated many times and in many places. Women, in professional and military settings, have related experiences of realising that something terribly important is being left out but feeling constrained, as if there is almost a physical barrier preventing them from pushing their transgressive truths out into the open. What is it that cannot be spoken? **First, any expression of an emotional awareness of the desperate human reality behind the sanitised abstractions of death and destruction in strategic deliberations. Similarly, weapons’ effects may only be spoken of in the most clinical and abstract terms, and usually only by those deemed to have the appropriate professional qualifications and expertise. What gets left out, then, is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity – all of which are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse.** In other words, **gender discourse informs and shapes nuclear and national security discourse, and in so doing creates silences and absences.** It keeps things out of the room, unsaid, and keeps them ignored if they manage to get in. As such, **it degrades our ability to think well and fully about nuclear weapons and national security, and so shapes and limits the possible outcomes of our deliberations.** With this understanding, **it becomes obvious that defence intellectuals’ standards of what constitutes “good thinking” about weapons and security have not simply evolved out of trial and error; it is not that the history of nuclear discourse has been filled with exploration of other ideas, concerns, interests, information, questions, feelings, meanings and stances which were then found to create distorted or poor thought**. On the contrary, **serious consideration of a whole range of ideas and options has been preempted by their gender coding, and by the feelings evoked by living up to or transgressing normative gender ideals**. To borrow a strategists’ term, we can say that gender coding serves as a “preemptive deterrent” to certain kinds of thought about the effects and consequences of strategic plans and WMD.vi

6. Their rhetoric of security relies on an ontology that assumes security can be made certain – this makes war inevitable, leads to escalation, and lengthens conflict duration

Burke, 2k7

[Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, Theory and Event 10.2, *ontologies of war: violence, existence, and reason*, project muse]

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given **sequence of events**, threats, **insecurities and political manipulation**, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors **are important** to be sure, and should not be discounted, **but** they **flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has** not only **come to form** a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently **solid ground of the real itself**. In this light, **the** two 'existential' and **'rationalist' discourses of war-making** and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war **are more than merely arguments**, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. **They are truth-systems of the most** powerful and **fundamental kind that we have** in modernity: **ontologies**, **statements about truth and being** which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of **ontology in both** its **senses**: ontology **as** both **a statement about the** nature and ideality **of being** (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), **and** as **a statement of epistemological truth** and certainty, **of methods** and processes **of arriving at certainty** (in this case, **the** development and **application of** strategic **knowledge for the** use of armed force, and the creation and **maintenance of** geopolitical **order, security and national survival**). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.[17](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.mnl.umkc.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn17" \o ") In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see **ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth**, identity, existence and action; **one that is not** essential or **timeless, but** is **thoroughly** historical and **contingent**, that is **deployed** and mobilised **in a** fraught and **conflictual socio-political context** of some kind. In short, **ontology is the 'politics of truth'**[18](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.mnl.umkc.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn18" \o ") **in its most** sweeping and **powerful form**. I see **such a drive for ontological certainty** and completion **as particularly problematic for a number of reasons**. **Firstly, when it takes the form of the** existential and **rationalist ontologies of war**, **it amounts to a** hard and **exclusivist claim**: **a drive** for ideational hegemony and closure **that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a** particular, **closed system of logic**, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. **The second is its intimate relation with violence**: **the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence**. **Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence** (strategy) **joined to an ontology of violence** (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, **the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone** (and doubly in combination) **tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects.** In such a context **violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being**.   This essay describes firstly the **ontology of the national security state** (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) **and** secondly **the rationalist ontology of strategy** (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they **crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system** of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. **The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they** embody and **reinforce a norm of war** -- **and because they enact** what Martin Heidegger calls **an 'enframing' image of technology** and being **in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use**, control **and destruction,** and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.mnl.umkc.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn19" \o ") The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,[20](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.mnl.umkc.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn20" \o ") the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. [21](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.mnl.umkc.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn21" \o ")

7. The closed narrative of the 1ac risks subjecting decision-making processes to epistemic confusion which is at the heart of violent encounters with otherness

Kelley in 8

Patrick A; Major, U.S. Army, Director of National Intelligence, and National Defense Intelligence College Research Fellow; *Imperial Secrets. Remapping the Mind of Empire*; National Defense Intelligence College, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Washington, DC; p. 162-163

Tufte’s paean to the visual provides additional clues to the appeal of ekphrasis. **While appearing to offer the clarity and comprehensiveness of vision, the text contains both more and less than the image. The primary “value-added” content of a textual manifestation of spatial phenomena is in the format of text itself. Text provides narrative, direction and structure**—it harnesses and guides the “diversity of individual viewer styles.” In doing so, **it introduces into the ungoverned space of the image tools for ordering and classification,** for expressing the overarching obsession of antique rhetoric.385 **Less is provided insofar as narrative text**—a string of unbroken words, phrases and sentences—**viscerally offers no gaps; the paragraph conceals the empty spaces that are incorporated into an image or map. Negative information**, but information all the same, **is lost in the unity and completeness of text**. Similar to the conflation of understandings between fact and fiction noted earlier, **this theme raises another enduring problem of imperial intelligence for distinguishing (or not) between “showing” and “telling.”** While my modern references are always in danger of being outpaced by events, in a brief moment of pessimism I feel confident that the modern manifestation of this phenomenon will be relevant long after my writing—i.e. PowerPoint, or variants thereof. **Anyone familiar with decision-making processes in a large, modern organization, and especially the U.S. military and civilian government, will be familiar with the issue**. Far beyond the pedestrian dangers of “death-by-PowerPoint,” **this mode of information transmission risks serious epistemological confusions** of the kind I am exploring through traces from two millennia ago. These slides, or computer screens, are practically the apotheosis of this conflating technique. They look and feel like pictures, and are often liberally sprinkled with actual images of one kind or another—practically, they are “seen” before (if ever) they are “read.” Yet **in a performative sleight-of-hand, they are also texts of a particularly rigid, narrative and hierarchical type, reflecting the nature of the organizations opprobrium in which this technique is held**, however, **it remains, and will regretfully likely remain, ubiquitous and persistent because its very defects fulfill the dual functions of addition and deletion stemming from imperial information needs**. **Ekphrasis,** in my broader reading, **is then a way of transfiguring a vision of the world**—with all its apparent objectivity and openness to multiple readings— **into a structured discourse. Once so constituted, this discourse takes on a logocentric character, classifying the polyvalent possibilities of the image into a series of binary sets—same/different, domestic/foreign, interior/exterior, male/female—where one element is more or less self-contained, while the other is inferior, opposite or affected,**387 **forestalling the interpenetration of identity which genuinely characterizes the imperial encounter more accurately than the concepts of “conquest” or “colonization.”**388 **It** also thereby **conceals potentially fruitful sources of information, intelligence which cannot be assimilated because it simply doesn’t “fit.”** **If**, as Derrida would have it, **“there is no outside to the text,”**389 **the imperial information producer is straitjacketed from the outset.** Julia **Kristeva** would **multiply these constraints, noting that “every text is from the outset under the jurisdiction of other discourses which impose a universe on it**.”390 **These other discourses, and their intertextual relations**, however, **may offer escape routes from the normalizing rhetoric of narrative, providing alternative glimpses of the image beyond the ekphrasis**.

8. **The world is characterized by unavoidable complexity – attempts to simplify that complexity through Newtonian models does not provide a coherent method for dealing with modern problems. Only a recognition of complexity in our research solves.**

**Ang 2011** Ien, Centre for Cultural Research, University of Western Sydney, Parramatta, Australia “Navigating complexity: From cultural critique to cultural intelligence,” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies Vol. 25, No. 6, December 2011, 779–794

It is a truism now to say that **we live in a world burdened by** exceptionally **complex and intractable problems**. **Economic instability**, **the** widening **gap between rich and poor**, **climate change and** the **environmental crisis**, **the unstoppable transnational flow of refugees** despite increasingly harsh regimes of border control, **the threat of terrorist movements**, rising **geopolitical tensions as** the **hegemony** of the West **declines**, **urban gridlock and conflict in** our **hyper-diverse cities**, **the unsustainable costs of health care** in times of population ageing, **and** the unsettling impact of **rapid technological change** – these are only a few of the large conundrums facing our globalized, interconnected world today. **Such challenges are the product of long-term developments which do not have a single origin**, **and their fallout manifests itself in a wide range of spheres and at varying scales**, from the intimately local to the encompassingly global. **They affect people’s livelihoods in radically contradictory ways.** In short, everywhere in the world **complexity** is staring us in the face; its overwhelming impact – socially, economically, ecologically – **is** increasingly **undeniable and inescapable**. **That the world is terribly complex is now a vital part of global cultural experience**, a structure of feeling which has grown more pervasive in the twenty-first century. What remains unclear, however, is how we should respond to this complexity in practice. **How can we navigate the complex realities of our time and find effective ‘solutions’** for managing them? I put ‘solutions’ in quotation marks here because it is all too evident that **there are**, as the saying goes, **no silver bullets for the complex challenges of our time**. In other words, **in a complex world problem-solving can only be a partial**, **provisional and indefinite affair**, **with uncertain and indeterminate outcomes. But the reality of this complexity is difficult to communicate**, **let alone make palatable to the public at** large. As Laidi puts it, ‘The complexification of the real creates the need for a simplification of its enunciation’ (2007, 178). This means that **dealing with complexity requires a way of making it easier to handle**, **not least in the imagination.** That is, we should see simplification as a necessary, but never definitive way of dealing with complexity. Simplification is enabling: it allows us to ‘contain’ the complex and to act on it. However, it provides only a temporary relief from the paralyzing effects of the latter. As Mol and Law (2002, 3) observe, **simplifications that reduce a complex reality to a simple scheme tend to ‘forget’ about the complex, but the latter may reappear later as a surprising or disturbing element that could not be fit into the simple scheme**. Thus, **rather than imposing an absolute simplicity,** as in the case of being simplistic, **simplification is part of an ongoing process**. **While being simplistic is tantamount to a reductionism which dispenses with complexity, simplification allows us to plot a course through complexity**. Indeed, contemporary societies are awash with simplifying mechanisms designed to navigate the multiplying complexities of modern life. The point here, as Mol and Law (2002) argue, is not simply to reject or denounce simplifications, but to examine how they work as more or less effective ways of handling complex realities. Indeed, while simplifying things is often necessary if we are to act in a complex world, **making our accounts of that world too simple may** in fact **be counter-productive**. To put the question simply, how does one simplify without being simplistic? This is an empirical question, to be asked within the context of particular problems or challenges occurring in particular instances of social practice. The essays in this special issue of Continuum address the question of complexity in this way. Each of them focuses on a concrete subject matter or issue, drawing attention to its distinctive complexities. More than just describing those complexities, however, the authors also discuss how we might effectively act on these complex realities. Some propose possible modes of strategic simplification, while others demonstrate that it is only by taking complexity seriously that we may find practical ways of addressing the problems raised. **Whatever the case may be**, this special issue showcases how **cultural research can go beyond deconstructive cultural critique**, **and engage with the real-world need for dealing with complexity by contributing to** what I call **‘cultural intelligence’**. I will return to this at the end of this essay. **Cultural intelligence involves a mode of analysis which does not reduce the complexity of particular realities to some underlying simplicity, but proceeds by acknowledging that complexity is inherent and open-**ended. We argue that **the development of sophisticated and sustainable responses to the world’s complex problems needs the recognition of complexity, not for complexity’s own sake, but because simplistic solutions will no longer be sustainable** – **in government**, **in policy**, **in organizations, in public culture, in everyday life**. In other words, this special issue asks: how do we square the recognition of complexity with imaginative, non-simplistic ways of dealing with it?

## Block

### 2NC K

**Deterrence is non-falsifiable and cannot be proven – it actively trades off with cooperation to solve global problems**

**Krieger 2011,** David, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, February 07, “Ten Serious Flaws in Nuclear Deterrence Theory”, online

As volcanoes often give off strong warning signals that they may erupt, so we have witnessed such signals regarding nuclear arsenals and the failure of nuclear deterrence theory over the course of the Nuclear Age. Nuclear arsenals could erupt with volcano-like force, totally overwhelming the relatively flimsy veneer of “protection” provided by nuclear deterrence theory. In the face of such dangers, we must not be complacent. Nor should we continue to be soothed by the “experts” who assure us not to worry because the weapons will keep us safe. There is, in fact, much to worry about, much more than the nuclear policy makers and theorists in each of the nuclear weapon states have led us to believe. I will examine below what I believe are ten serious flaws in **nuclear deterrence** theory, flaws that lead to the conclusion that the theory is unstable, unreliable and invalid. 1. It **is only a theory**. **It is not proven and cannot be proven. A theory may posit a causal relationship**, for example, **if one party does something**, **certain results will follow. In the case of nuclear deterrence theory**, **it is posited that if one party threatens to retaliate with nuclear weapons, the other side will not attack**. **That an attack has not occurred**, however, **does not prove that it was prevented by** nuclear **deterrence**. **That is**, in logic, **a false assumption of causality**. In logic, **one cannot prove a negative**, that is, that doing something causes something else not to happen. **That a nuclear attack has not happened may be a result of any number of other factors**, **or simply** of exceptional **good fortune**. **To attribute the absence of nuclear war to** nuclear **deterrence is to register a false positive**, **which imbues** nuclear **deterrence with a false sense of efficacy**. 2. **It requires a commitment to mass murder**. **Nuclear deterrence leads to policy debates about how many threatened deaths with nuclear weapons are enough to deter an adversary**? **Are one million deaths sufficient** to deter adversary A? Is it a different number for adversary B? How many deaths are sufficient? One million? Ten million? One hundred million? More? **There will always be a tendency to err on the side of more deaths, and thus the creation of more elaborate nuclear killing systems**. **Such calculations**, in turn, **drive arms races**, **requiring huge allocations of resources to weapons systems that must never be used**. **Leaders** must **convince** their own **populations that the threat of mass murder** and the expenditure of resources **to support this threat make them secure and is preferable to other allocations of** scientific and financial **resources**. **The result is** not only **a misallocation of resources**, but **also a diversion of effort away from cooperative solutions to global problems**. 3. It requires effective communications. In effect, nuclear deterrence is a communications theory. Side A must communicate its capability and willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in retaliation for an attack by adversary B, thereby preventing adversary B from attacking. The threat to retaliate and commit mass murder must be believable to a potential attacker. Communications take place verbally in speeches by leaders and parliamentary statements, as well as news reports and even by rumors. Communications also take place non-verbally in the form of alliance formations and nuclear weapons and missile tests. In relation to nuclear deterrence, virtually everything that each side does is a deliberate or inadvertent form of communication to a potential adversary. There is much room for error and misunderstanding. 4. **It requires rational decision makers. Nuclear deterrence will not be effective against a decision maker who is irrational**. For example, side A may threaten nuclear retaliation for an attack by adversary B, but the leader of side B may irrationally conclude that the leader of side A will not do what he says. Or, the leader of side B may irrationally attack side A because he does not care if one million or ten million of his countrymen die as a result of side A’s nuclear retaliation. I believe two very important questions to consider are these: **Do** all **leaders of** all **states behave rationally at all times**, **particularly under conditions of extreme stress** when tensions are very high? Can we be assured that all leaders of all states will behave rationally at all times in the future? Most people believe the answer to these questions is an unqualified No.

**structural violence outweighs**

Kim in 84

Samuel; Department of Political Science Monmouth College; Global Violence and Just World Order; Journal of Peace Research; MUSE

**The Nuremberg principle of 'crimes against humanity' can be applied holistically to assess the effects of global violence on 'human security' defined as the realization of human potential**. **Conventional peace/world order thinking has focused too narrowly on the visible effects of warfare and thus** has **become** an **inadequate, and** even **misleading**, response to the unconventional and multidimensional threats of contemporary global militarization to human life and health. Table I draws the linkages between and among the effects of violence on human life (and security) in four value domains. Given the scope and magnitude of its vertical and horizontal contagion (proliferation), violence works as a direct and indirect assault on four world order values: human survival, human needs, human rights, and human habitat. Put in epidemiological terms, **violence presents a clear and continuing threat to people's security through its life-destroying, life-diminishing, life-devaluing, and life-degrading effects**. The main assumption in this epidemiological approach is that **the wages of violence go beyond human casualties in war, including indirect, invisible effects on life-supporting and life-enhancing processes**. **It has been estimated that 'structural violence, the violence of starvation and malnutrition, accounts annually for the death of upwards of 18 million people'** (Alcock 1977, p. 340; see also Kohler & Alcock 1976). **This amounts to the detonation of 129 Hiroshima bombs each year** based on the more recent casualty estimate of 140,000 (? 10,000) deaths - or 340 Hiroshima bombs based on the earlier lower estimate of 53,000 deaths.4 **The failure to see this hidden dimension of global violence is in itself a major cause of growing violence**.

### 1NR K

**Holistic approach is superior- failure to understand how the structure of the system generates crises guarantees failure in policy approaches**

Nafeez Mosaddeq **Ahmed in 2011**, international security analyst specialising in the historical sociology and political ecology of mass violence. He is Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, Global Change, Peace & Security Vol. 23, No. 3, October 2011, 335–355

**Global** ecological, economic and energy **crises thus expose a core contradiction at the heart of modernity – that the material progress delivered by scientiﬁc reason** in the service of unlimited economic growth **is destroying the** very social and environmental **conditions of modernity’s very existence**. **This stark contradiction between** ofﬁcial **government recognition of** the potentially **devastating security implications of resource scarcity and the continued abject failure of government action to mitigate these security implications represents a fundamental lacuna that has been largely overlooked in IR theory and policy analysis**. **It reveals an analytical framework that has focused** almost **exclusively on potential symptoms of scarcity**. But **a truly complete picture of the international relations of resource scarcity would include not only a map of projected impacts, but would also seek to grasp their causes by confronting how the present structure of the** international **system itself has contributed to the acceleration of scarcity**, while inhibiting effective national and international responses.

.

**State-based security approaches to managing crises intensify global violence by failing to understand structural socioeconomic causes - this a racist form of epistemology that blames foreign targets for problems generated by the socio economic policies of the US**

Nafeez Mosaddeq **Ahmed in 2011**, international security analyst specialising in the historical sociology and political ecology of mass violence. He is Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, Global Change, Peace & Security Vol. 23, No. 3, October 2011, 335–355

While recommendations **to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism** toward a ‘human security’ approach are valid, this **cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to ‘non-traditional’ security issues**. 106 **By occluding the structural origin** and systemic dynamic **of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them**. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means **they operate largely at the level of ‘surface’ impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect** quite **traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity**, such as international terrorism, violent conﬂict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these ‘surface’ impacts – which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. **The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies – as a discourse – is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven** ultimately **by an epistemological failure to interrogate** the **systemic causes** of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). **This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the** subliminal normative **presumption that** the **social relations of** the **perpetrators**, in this case Western states, **must be protected** and perpetuated **at any cost – precisely because the efﬁcacy of the prevailing** geopolitical and **economic order is** ideologically **beyond question**. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conﬂict per se. **Neither ‘resource shortages’ nor ‘resource abundance’** (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) **necessitate conﬂict by themselves**. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conﬂict**.** The ﬁrst is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. **To understand** these **factors accurately requires** close **attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between** different social groups and **classes**. **Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms,** in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. **This can lead to** externalisation of those groups, and **the legitimisation of violence** towards them. Ultimately, **this systems approach to** global **crises strongly suggests that conventional policy ‘reform’ is woefully inadequate**. Global **warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation** which is **in overshoot**. **The** current **scale** and organisation **of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental** and natural resource **systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded.** This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global ﬁnancial system. In short, **industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable**. **This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition** to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. **Yet conventional** theoretical and **policy approaches fail to** (**1) fully engage with the gravity of research** in the natural sciences **and** (2**) translate the social science implications of this research** in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence**, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reﬂection** and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, **they reify** and normalise **mass violence against diverse ‘Others’**, newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously ampliﬁed by global crises – **a process that guarantees the intensiﬁcation and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe**. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences – drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences – is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues. <354-355>