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#### Effective deliberation requires a forum of discussion that facilitates political agonism and the capacity to substantively engage the topic at hand---in short, a forum of switch side debate where the negative can predict and respond to the aff is the most intellectually effective---this is crucial to affecting productive change in all facets of life---the process in this instance is more important than the substance of their advocacy

#### In this context, a defense of the word “should” requires them to URGE an action from the agent of the resolution—Proving that Plutonium has agency does not shift the Agent of the topic at hand. They must defend the manifestation of a topical USFG policy

Ericson 3 Jon, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

This policy should reduce restrictions on and/or substantially increase financial incentives for energy production in the United States of one or more of the following: coal, crude oil, natural gas, nuclear power, solar power, wind power.

They should lose the debate for eliminating our ability to adequately test their ideas— Their parsing of the resolution is without conclusion. Failure to adhere to the communal topic leaves one side unprepared, resulting in shallow and un-educational debate—a balanced controversy is key to decision-making skills.

Steinberg and Freeley 8 – Justin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, and David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 43-45

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decision-making is the only portable skill—means framework turns case.

Steinberg and Freeley 8 – Justin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, and David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 9-10

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions everyday. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

Affirming an EXPECTATION is not a defense of the value of the action itself. They NEGATE agency by displacing responsibility for an action on the status quo instead of ADVOCATING a change in federal government policy through which we can TEST and debate over—Only our framework creates a form of education that improves critical thinking and prevents violent dogmatism that they actively promote—

Olbrys 6—Stephen Gencarella Olbrys (Ph.D., Indiana University, 2003) is Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Massachusetts, Dissoi Logoi, Civic Friendship, and the Politics of Education, Communication Education, Vol. 55, No. 4, October 2006, pp. 353-369

Unlike the ABOR and Powell Memo, both of which institutionalize opposition, adaptation of dissoi logoi warrants engagement. The metaphor of balance shifts from one of equal distribution of opinions on campus to the action of keeping one’s poise, of teaching students to maintain an intellectual equilibrium through a deep understanding of their footing. The aim of practice in dissoi logoi is not simply awareness of other ideas\*often shorthand in consumer society for paying attention only to opinions one wishes to hear\*but rather the ability to reproduce them, to understand them, and to critique them all. This meets Bauerlein’s (2004) call for adversarial voices in higher education but also moves to internalize that process as a productive friction for the development of an individual’s intellect and character rather than simply externalize it through the establishment of a spokesperson marketplace; as such, this practice would place an onus on the student to take responsibility for their own education as a site of productive friction and on the professor for encouraging such responsibility and reflexivity. Judicious adaptation of dissoi logoi is thus necessary to combat the political divisiveness and enclaves ultimately encouraged by the Powell Memo and ABOR.

A thorough historical understanding of the Sophistic movement and early conceptualizations of democracy would benefit students in several ways. First, it provides ample preparation to argue one’s opinion eloquently. This is the closest sense to the Sophists’ notion, a way to influence the polity through oratorical finesse; the (ancient) metaphor here is a ‘‘throw,’’ the learned ability to parry an opponent in wrestling. Second, practice in dissoi logoi encourages the ethical appreciation of other positions, which in turn creates an empathy counter to the prevalent politics of ideological piety aiming for annihilation of differing opinions. A prochoice student assuming an anti-abortion role could not, for example, merely assert ‘‘I want to dominate women,’’ just as a anti-abortion student could not simply declare in opposition, ‘‘I want to kill babies.’’ Both would have to conduct considerable research to argue the contrary claim. Third, dissoi logoi in the curriculum places intellectual pressure on student ideologues of any persuasion, including those uncommitted to general education. Fourth, the responsibility to understand multiple perspectives activates an integrative approach to education (cf. Gayle, 2004). Earnest performances of dissoi logoi demand importing concepts, information, and experiences from other classes, while at the same time providing practical training for the adaptation of knowledge in nonclassroom situations. Fifth, dissoi logoi emphasizes necessary engagement with an alterity that is fundamental for the emergence of citizenship in democracy and public debate. It does not erase the significance of values\*indeed, a profitable topic for discussion could revolve around values as universals or as constructed conventions\*but locates them within historical contexts. Finally, appropriate performance of dissoi logoi affords an alternative to the shouting-matches or programmatic utterances that pass for contemporary debate; and, as a practice of listening (to others and to oneself) as much as speaking, it entails broad questions about human responsibility to other humans. In this manner, dissoi logoi aids a critical thinking marked by student involvement in their own education, but does not reduce talk in the public sphere to rational deliberation bereft of emotions or artistry. This is also a gesture to an ancient notion in which citizens learn to reach good judgments (personal and collective) by hearing various opinions on an issue.

Advocating the practice of dissoi logoi as an integral part of higher education will fuel criticism. Conservatives might argue against the inherent relativism implied by respect for contrary positions. Progressives might take issue with the justification for dominant order in expecting students to speak on its behalf, particularly in a classroom setting where opportunities to challenge that order are more readily available than in the ‘‘real’’ world. Both critiques are legitimate, and are related to concerns about deliberative democratic theories, notably the problems of unequal resources for expression (such as privileging particular cultural or gendered ways of speaking) and the normative approval of voicing opinion over silence. Both conservatives and progressives might call into question the definition of citizenship wrought through this practice, and assert that the other side would simply utilize dissoi logoi as a cover for indoctrination under the guise of neutrality. Likewise, they might note that intellectual exposure does not occur in a vacuum but is contingent upon outside social forces. In an era when progressivism reigns, students would be more inclined to accept progressive values, and vice versa when conservatism reigns. The problematic of detailing arguments for racist, sexist, classist, or homophobic beliefs might quickly arise as a serious concern for classroom decorum and institutional codes concerning hate and free speech, to say nothing of the unease in requiring a student to explain an opinion that they find reprehensible or for which there is no accepted widespread political value (such as fascism), but for which there exist seminal historical texts (such as Mussolini’s The Doctrine of Fascism).

Implementation of dissoi logoi within classroom practice is not simple. It requires an appreciation of the social contexts of education (in knowledge and in citizenship) as a kind of apprenticeship rather than as unchallenged instruction. The positions of power that distinguish students from professors would also require earnest address. While most formulations of academic freedom provide for assignments that require students to represent viewpoints with which they disagree as long as there is a reason germane to the subject matter and no hostility wrought upon the student, dissoi logoi necessitates a further step of open communication with students about the nature of pedagogy itself\*for example, its structure and aims\*if not involvement by the students in deciding upon controversies to engage, appropriate ways to assess their achievements, the possibility of conscientious objection, the shared responsibilities for safe expression, and the means to address inevitable tensions. Such a commitment also requires that professors interrogate their own pieties and practice engagement with adversaries (and the cultivation of civic friendship) themselves. Demonstration of sites of agreement and common human desires (itself a productive impiety in a world predicated on enclaves of political ideology) in tandem with respectful invitations for adversaries to present their case would not only be novel\*and thereby attractive to undergraduates\*but serve the purpose of modeling in the classroom the kind of democratic behavior hoped for outside it.

Before abandoning dissoi logoi as too risky or unsettling, then, let us consider the educative gains in its contentious nature. Let us assume that a class addresses terrorism from a perspective of dissoi logoi. The first topic for discussion might be whether this is even suitable for such a practice. That is, are some issues so obvious to common sense and community values that they cannot be made problematic, or so reprehensible that they should not be defended, even if hypothetically or in an attempt to understand the structure of their logic? A range of questions would follow. Beyond addressing the views on the left and the right for the causes of and responses to terrorism, would students need to discuss\*and therefore gain knowledge of\* militant fundamentalist Islam’s difference from mainstream Muslim religious practice? Should the history of Israel come into play, or European colonization of the Middle East? Should the representation of the United States in American media be juxtaposed to that on al-Jazeera? Should the United States close its borders to immigrants and keep tabs on minority communities? Should the sympathies and sensitivities of the classroom participants play in the decision to have a discussion in which all students would be responsible for voicing all opinions? All of these are important questions for serious public discussions concerning American responses to terrorism, and the pursuit of any of them requires thorough research and an abiding commitment to an active learning that challenges taken-for-granted assumptions.

Civic Friendship and the Question of Citizenship in Higher Education

Although they offer starkly different solutions, both the oppositional model of ABOR and the Powell Memo and the engagement model of dissoi logoi respond to the tyranny of any dominant ideology in higher education. Both also draw attention to the absence in contemporary American society of civic friendship as getting along with others whose opinions differ from one’s own. Discussions of civic friendship are missing from most assessments of pedagogy on either the left or the right, a lack that flatly impoverishes theories of democratic education to assist students in becoming citizens in a world predicated on pluralism and tolerance of other’s opinions.

Long theorized as a necessary component of healthy political order, the concept of civic friendship is itself currently in flux. Recent considerations have recognized its role in education (Blacker, 2003; Scorza, 2004) and as an antidote to what Kahane (1999) calls the politics of annihilation. These developments conceptualize civic friendship in a much different manner than do Neo-Aristotleans (who rely heavily on ancient notions of fraternity, similarity, and instrumentality), communitarians and civic republicans (who regard such bonds as a social obligation), theorists of an ethic of care (who require willing emotional capacities to embrace alterity), and traditional liberals (who locate friendship within the private sphere).

Blacker, for example, draws upon Rawlsian political liberalism in defining civic friendship as an expression of mutual respect and concern for democracy’s stability (Blacker, 2003, p. 249) but seeks a path that would accommodate the constitutional nonestablishment principle and the comprehensive moral groundings of religious and secular organizations in any given local community. In this model, civic friendship operates ‘‘in the service of deepening citizens’ chosen comprehensive allegiances’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 254), but also fosters exposure to the moral codes of others to assist in the understanding of democratic pluralism and to overcome mutual suspicions; public schools assist in creating contexts for discussion and interaction rather than overtly teaching specific moral orthodoxies. For Blacker, exposure to rather than sheltering from the deepest moral convictions of others (whether political, religious, or aesthetic) is the sine qua non of civic friendship, ‘‘where one develops an ability to perceive and, where appropriate, appreciate what lies beneath and behind the politics of those who agree and, most importantly, those who do not’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 261). To achieve these goals, he advocates a ‘‘school stamps’’ program for extracurricular activities and the creation of student counseling groups drawn from diverse community members. Blacker concludes with praise of civic friendship as a worthy challenge to an education that avoids controversy under the guise of decorum, and as sound pedagogical justification when ‘‘fundamentalist parents complain about environmentalist volunteers, atheist parents about clergy, and the whole lot of them about who-knows-what’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 267).

Blacker’s comments coincide with Scorza’s, for whom civic friendship is best modeled on Emerson’s ‘‘turbulent union,’’ a regard for one’s friend as a ‘‘beautiful enemy’’ who tempts us to become like them (Scorza, 2004, p. 95). Emerson’s political friendship opposes as anti-democratic those ‘‘conceited’’ forms of interaction that seek only to conquer rather than to learn from the other. As such, Emerson (and Scorza) posit the communicative norms of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘tenderness’’ at the root of civic friendship, meaning a coupling of a frankness and the ‘incivility’ to speak one’s mind with a respect and the civility to engage the other as a worthy equal. Like Scorza, Kahane recognizes that friendships (personal and civic) evolve, and locates a recognition of the ‘‘ongoing relationship\*not shared objective qualities or capacities’’ (Kahane, 1999, p. 269) as the basis for this practice, since such evolving commitment also permits friends to disagree and even to fight but to likewise establish limits preventing a total dissolution of the friendship. Scorza (2004, p. 91) upholds the case of Jefferson and Adams as an example of a friendship that developed over time and between fierce political rivals. Similarly for Kahane, an ongoing relationship necessitates a developing sense of a history of contact to cement a valued coformation and encourage its repeated performance in the future.

Blacker, Scorza, and Kahane do not declare a one-to-one correlation between personal friendship and civic friendship but do perceive politically significant structural similarities. Recognizing also that friendship cannot be imposed from authority, they all suggest that materialized opportunities for civic friendship (without long-standing artificialities or limits to communication, as installed by many versions of discourse ethics) might ignite very positive ventures for the individual’s moral development and for the improvement of democratic pluralism by fostering respect for alterity. This is not to suggest a naı¨vete´ about what leads contemporary undergraduates to establish bonds of friendship, nor to deny the massive number of influences beyond the classroom that may pull them against civic friendship with those who differ ideologically, nor to propose that higher education should unconditionally and primarily become a conduit for friendship. It is, instead, to recognize a correlation between undergraduates struggling to define themselves as citizens in a society marked by lip-service to diversity and extreme divisiveness in politics on the one hand, and the possible function of education to assist the young in becoming participants in a pluralist democracy on the other.

Civic friendship provides a context for the appreciation of citizenship as both a subject of intellectual inquiry and a communicative practice. In turn, the question of citizenship emerges as an apt topic for disputation within the classroom. The differences between the Powell Memo, ABOR, and Campus Compact might, for example, provide a point of entry for students to examine the different configurations of citizenship within liberal democracy depending on the inflection of liberal democracy or liberal democracy. That is, all three programmatic statements suggest a correlation between ideas taught in the classroom and behaviors of matriculated students in public culture. The Powell Memo does not specifically address higher education’s role in civic education but implies such influence in the argument against radicalizing pedagogies. The actual word ‘‘citizen’’ appears infrequently in the document, but in usage reveals an intimate connection between education and citizenship. Powell claims, for example, that business executives must be ‘‘good citizens,’’ dismisses the head of the AFL-CIO as not ‘‘the most endearing or publicminded of citizens’’ from a business perspective, and justifies ‘‘citizen groups’’ who rewrite textbooks. ‘‘Citizen’’ here functions rhetorically in two ways: as a catch phrase for someone whose behavior is judged by others and as an organized political group. Given the context of the corporate mission outlined by Powell, it would be judicious to view this notion of citizenship within the lens of liberal democracy, which emphasizes particular rights (property and voting especially) and maintains a close kinship with consumer identity.

The language of ABOR differs from the Powell Memo in this regard, a point that would be instructive for students to recognize so as not to assume all oppositional models of education are alike. ABOR opens with a direct commentary on the mission of the university as the pursuit of truth, the discovery of new knowledge through scholarship and research, the study and reasoned criticism of intellectual and cultural traditions, the teaching and general development of students to help them become creative individuals and productive citizens of a pluralistic democracy, and the transmission of knowledge and learning to a society at large. This commitment to citizenship aligns ABOR with the aforementioned Campus Compact Presidents’ Declaration, which warrants that institutions provide students opportunities to ‘‘embrace the duties of active citizenship and civic participation’’ and to demonstrate and teach democratic principles. A cynical reading of ABOR might take its abundant mission statement as parasitic, drawing upon metaphors from the Ivory Tower and civic education to appear authentic to both. Let us assume, however, that the language of ABOR is genuine and in agreement with Campus Compact. If so, they advance a notion of citizenship as a performative mode, one that emphasizes the democratic more strongly than liberalism.

Drawing the distinction between these two inflections of liberal democracy\*or between those that argue higher education should have no role in the training of citizens (as Fish’s aforementioned essay does) and those that do (such as the Memo, ABOR, and Campus Compact)\*is no easy task but certainly one that exists within the purview of legitimate academic exercise, especially in classes dedicated to the theory and practice of rhetoric. The nuances and multiple variations of each theme require substantial intellectual work, and any position on citizenship taken by students could be held responsible to such informed research. Yet, the students’ discussion need not terminate solely with demonstration of knowledge of the histories and trajectories of various conceptualizations of citizenship. They might also become the topic for a formidable exchange over the nature and needs of citizenship in contemporary society, and might likewise entail debate over the ‘‘best’’ kind of ‘‘education suited to the realization of citizenship’’ (Callan 2004, p. 71). In other words, through their research on the subject of citizenship, students could be encouraged towards reflexive action that asks them to debate the values they come to understand. Such a cultivation of reflexivity, performed within a context of dissoi logoi, also suggests that the question of citizenship in higher education is not left strictly to faculty and administrators to decide. Rather, students must come to terms with and take up the question of citizenship themselves. A pedagogy that encourages civic friendship provides a stable and ‘safe’ ground for this unfolding, a scaffolding into citizenship through civic friendship.

Conclusion

In the interest of all students, it is important to treat seriously the recent call for diversity in higher education by conservative critics. Analysis of the rhetorical structures of the Powell Memo and ABOR reveals, however, a similarity that justifies cause for alarm among progressive, moderate, and even libertarian educators. These texts call for higher education to be moved by degrees to serve corporate conservatism rather than the general good. Still, throughout ABOR and other calls for civic education such as Campus Compact, there arises a common exhortation for a balanced relationship between teaching knowledge and training in citizenship in public higher education. One problem inherent in oppositional models of education such as ABOR (or its progressive equivalents) is the development of a history of contact between different political traditions and moralities. ABOR and the Powell Memo establish forums for opposition, not exchange; taken to their extremes, the end result is that youth simply pen themselves into their own tribe’s enclaves and never test ideas and beliefs against alternatives. This would be a disaster in terms of student intellectual and ethical development. In contrast, an emphasis on engagement models of education such as dissoi logoi would address this absence of contact, and through them the classroom would become a site for lively disputation over public virtues and the impetus for fostering relationships predicated on respect and understanding.

In direct response to those who, like Fish, assert that educators ‘‘do their job,’’ I contend that training in democratic citizenship is an important part of the work of scholars in rhetoric, following a tradition that hearkens to antiquity. Adaptations ofdissoi logoi are necessary to expand the practice’s applicability for the intellectual development and civic engagement of all students in contemporary society, but such practice echoes an ancient expectation for a mixture of knowledge and oratorical display in presenting a case. This emphasis on knowledge united with rhetorical performance should satisfy those who seek the academic benefits of the Ivory Tower and those who regard public education as civic training. To require participation in this practice within the classroom would provide an antidote to the apathy permeating contemporary public culture and prevent higher education from becoming an instrument of party politics without resorting to closed enclaves of thought.

Both oppositional and engagement models raise the question of suitable contexts to cultivate civic friendships through which students gain a more thorough understanding of their own moral capacities and of those in others with whom they must find a way to get along in pluralist democratic society. Although there are no definitive reasons why an oppositional model could not promote civic friendship, when such opposition unfolds on campus merely as the creation of antagonist enclaves rather than opportunities for students to struggle internally and with others over political ideas that inform their social worlds and identities, the meaningfulness of the gesture of friendship is easily lost. This essay has argued that the practice of dissoi logoi more readily serves the purpose of civic friendship, particularly if it puts into play debate over the very meanings of citizenship and friendship, and the role of higher education in the cultivation of both. In this manner, all educators and students may participate in the discussion of public virtues as an intellectual and civic enterprise, and appreciate higher education as a place to interrogate everything and to take nothing for granted in the pursuit of understanding and knowledge.

Our particular type of decision-making skills actually influence the energy agenda

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list.

These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48

Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishmento f a temporary parliamentaryco mmissiont o studye nergyp olicy,w hichf or the first time would draw all concernedp articipantst ogetheri n a discussiono f both short-termc hoicesa nd long-termg oals of energyp olicy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49T hese commissionsg ave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernizationa nd technicali nnovation in energy policy.

Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurizationd evices. With proddingf rom the energyc ommission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection.

III. Conclusion

The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general.

One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic.

Parliamentary Politics

In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry.

Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program.

This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.

Technical Debate

In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators.

The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria.

Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic.

In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56

In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

### OFF

Nuclear energy production is not benign or the solution to our energy needs- rather, it reinforces environmental racism and exploits the most vulnerable members of the population

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When the apocalyptic cloud erupted over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world woke up to the dawn of the nuclear age. Today, if we survey the landscape of nuclear development across the planet, we see that the destructive impacts of the technology are often paired with the dehumanizing impacts of environmental racism.¶ At every point in the nuclear production chain, the industry has sloughed a disproportionate share of the risk on marginalized communities, from [native peoples in the Southwest United States](http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/pfsejfactsheet.htm) to the [Australian outback](http://antinuclear.net/2010/02/25/aboriginal-people-across-australia-will-fight-radioactive-waste-transport-and-dumping/). While the rest of the world hums along with nuclear power, many of these communities have fought a losing battle against the standard corporate line that technological advancements have led to seamless safety.¶ Last week in South Africa, environmental activists [recharged their anti-nuclear campaign](http://www.earthlife.org.za/) in light of the [metastasizing disaster in Japan](http://www.npr.org/2011/03/23/134782109/tokyo-says-radiation-in-tap-water-above-limit).¶ Today, in the shadow of Fukushima, the African continent’s [one nuclear power plant](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koeberg_Nuclear_Power_Station), near Cape Town, is no longer a symbol of South Africa’s relative industrial advancement. Rather, it is an emblem of a ruthless pursuit of new fuel at the public’s expense. Under the government’s energy program, designed to wean the country of its current dependency on coal, nuclear power will grow to about 23 percent of new energy generated by 2031, from just 2 percent in 2009, [according to Bloomberg](http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-03-17/s-africa-commits-to-nuclear-power-as-china-halts-expansion.html).¶ Advocates for the poor, women and other disenfranchised communities say the environmental harms of nuclear power will aggravate the social inequalities that persist despite the end of apartheid. In an email from Cape Town, Muna Lakhani, co-coordinator of [Earthlife Africa’s Unplug Nuclear Campaign](http://www.earthlife.org.za/?p=1523), told Colorlines that the government’s new nuclear agenda “was received with shock by civil society and labour formations” and amounted to “effectively an ‘up yours’ response to the citizens of our country”:¶ One would think that the South African government would pause for a moment, in the aftermath of the ongoing nuclear catastrophe at Fukushima in Japan, about committing us to a nuclear future…. ¶ Effectively, this message says to all of us: 1) we do not care about your health and safety; 2) we would rather support and pay for foreign technologies than develop local industry; 3) we would rather pay foreign workers than generate more jobs in South Africa; 4) we do not care that we will be responsible for poisoning Mother Africa for hundreds of thousands of years.¶ In the coastal region of Bantamsklip, [plans to site a nuclear reactor](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/24/nuclear-power-south-africa) have sparked a [passionate campaign](http://www.savebantamsklip.org/place.php) to protect the area’s wildlife and local communities.¶ South Africa’s nuclear dreams fall on a [historical trajectory](http://etd.auburn.edu/etd/handle/10415/420) stretching from imperialism to modern-day resource exploitation. Decades ago, South Africa led the continent in nuclear development and capitalized on its native uranium stores. Although today South Africa is ignored in the geopolitical discourse on non-proliferation, nuclear power is entwined in roots of [apartheid and its massive security state](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-weapons).¶ [David Fig](http://www.democracynow.org/2011/3/16/south_africans_question_push_to_go), author of “Uranium Road: Questioning South Africa’s Nuclear Direction,” broke down the country’s atomic evolution on “Democracy Now!”:¶ South Africa had a lot of uranium. And so, the first time that we were integrated into the world nuclear industry was through providing uranium to the bomb programs of your country, the United States, and Britain, in the ’40s and ’50s. And then, as prizes, we were given research reactors by President Eisenhower. And later, during apartheid, the world turned a blind eye while we made nuclear weapons. And so, the nuclear energy industry was just a smokescreen, in a way, for arming apartheid during the Cold War.¶ Nuking the Global South¶ South Africa is not alone, however. Conflicts over uranium mining, waste, and nuclear energy development have emerged across the Global South, including recently in [Niger](http://www.beyondnuclear.org/human-rights-niger/) and [South Asia](http://s-asians-against-nukes.org/).¶ [Jim Green of Friends of the Earth Australia](http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/racism/RadRacismLong.doc/view) noted that Australian [aboriginal communities have resisted radioactive waste dumping](http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/07/22/2961025.htm) on their lands in violation of their sovereignty and human rights. Globally, he said, “the nuclear industry profits from and reinforces racism. Backed by its political partners, the industry forces uranium mines, nuclear reactors, radioactive waste dumps and weapons tests on to the land of indigenous peoples.”¶ Although the specter of nuclear weaponry still looms in debates on North Korea and Iran, the core of today’s nuclear crisis lies in the gears of global capitalism. After a long chill following the disasters in [Chernobyl and Three Mile Island](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-16/comparing-nuclear-events-at-fukushima-chernobyl-three-mile-island-q-a.html), governments have in recent years responded to climate change issues by rebranding nuclear as a [fossil fuel alternative](http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2011/mar/18/nuclear-power-climate-change-risks). We don’t know if the fallout from Fukushima will brake the [industry’s renewed momentum](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/71e780f2-54a7-11e0-b1ed-00144feab49a.htm) [in the U.S.](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/after-japans-disaster-will-nuclear-energy-have-a-future-in-america/2011/03/18/ABngjKs_story_1.html), but as long as truly clean energy sources like wind and solar remain starved of investment—and the public memory of past meltdowns fade—the temptations of nuclear power may continue to eclipse fears of its global consequences.¶ Richard Falk, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, [commented in Al Jazaeera](http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/03/201131691422585897.html) on the link between the Cold War lust for nuclear weapons and the harnessing of nuclear power for “civilian” energy exploitation. To understand the lessons of Fukushima, he wrote: ¶ [W]e must take account of the incredible Faustian bargain sold to the non-nuclear world: give up a nuclear weapons option and in exchange get an unlimited ”pass” to the ”benefits” of nuclear energy… ¶ And we know that governments will be under great pressure to renew the Faustian bargain despite what should have been clear from the moment the bombs fell in 1945: This technology is far too unforgiving and lethal to be managed safely over time by human institutions, even if they were operated responsibly, which they are not.¶ If safety in the nuclear age can’t be guaranteed for all, the industry and its friends in government can always try a more efficient method of managing risk: confine the danger zone to the populations they see as less worthy of protection.¶

Increased incentives for nuclear power results in social injustice - uranium mining targets poor and minority populations disproportionately.

Fettus & McKinzie 12 - National Defense Council (Geoffrey H., Matthew G., March, *Nuclear Fuel's Dirty Beginnings: Environmental Damage and Public Health Risks From Uranium Mining in the American West,* http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/uranium-mining-report.pdf)

Uranium mining anywhere poses significant environmental, economic, and social risks. In the high plains, Rocky Mountains, and intermountain West, however, where water resources are already scarce, it is inevitable that water-intensive uranium extraction poses significant risks to the region’s environmental and public health. Nonetheless, domestic and international mining companies are showing renewed interest in recovering uranium that lies beneath the iconic landscapes and fragile ecosystems of the American West. Projections of a U.S. and global “nuclear renaissance” have sparked forecasts of a uranium supply shortfall and rising uranium prices, spurred by the prospect of significant public subsidies for new nuclear power generation, and ultimately prompting a flood of uranium mining claims and applications for exploration permits in water-limited states such as Colorado and Utah. The vast majority of proposed uranium mines are “in-situ leach” (ISL) solution mines, which typically use large wellfields of hundreds of wells, diesel-powered pumps, and huge volumes of groundwater to dissolve the uranium from the ore bearing rock and bring it to the surface. This development is cause for concern, given that during earlier uranium mining booms—spurred by construction of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and more than a hundred nuclear power plants during the Cold War— uranium mining and milling practices were not regulated in any meaningful way. In fact, it was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s that Congress, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), finally instituted a legal and regulatory framework to address the environmental and public health impacts of uranium milling. That effort, however, resulted in a splintered patchwork of controls that has remained largely ineffective. Furthermore, the federal government has never regulated conventional mining (i.e., underground and open pit) since exempting production of uranium ore from licensing in the Atomic Energy Act of 1961. Consequently, uranium extraction in the American West has left behind a tainted legacy of serious damage to the environment and human health. Many of the communities affected by uranium recovery have been disproportionately low-income or minority populations, representative of an all too common pattern of environmental and economic injustice with respect to resource extraction.

The aff's support of nuclear power results in more mining on Indigenous lands.

Tsosie 10 - Professor of Law, Executive Director of the Indian Legal Program at the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University. (Rebecca, SYMPOSIUM: Keynote Address\*\*: Indigenous Peoples and Global Climate Change: Intercultural Models of Climate Equity, Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 25 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 7, LexisNexis)

The situation within Indian Country is not identical to that outside of Indian Country because of trust land restrictions. If nuclear power is touted as a source of green energy, there will be significant pressure on tribes to develop their uranium resources, possibly without adequate safeguards if the best and most current technology imposes undue costs. Approximately twenty-five percent of the recoverable uranium in the United States is located within the Navajo Nation, and many other reservations hold rich deposits as well. n17 In recognition of the tremendous and continuing harms caused by uranium mining on the Navajo Nation, the Tribe enacted the Dine Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005, which prohibited uranium mining within Navajo Indian Country. n18 If coal mining is curtailed on the Navajo Nation, will the tribe be forced to reexamine its stance on uranium production? Is such a choice defensible? Should the United States be compelled to remediate the existing contamination before promoting further uranium production? These issues must be addressed using an intercultural model of climate equity.

### OFF

CP Text: **United States federal government should increase financial incentives for nuke power production**

The term “nuke” is preferable to “nuclear weapon[s]” because it challenges the lingo of the nuclearist status quo – rather than expect the squo, we should engage in mockery of nuclear technology and of the bomb

William Chaloupka. [book] Knowing Nukes The Politics and Culture of the Atom. 1992 (pp.xv-xvi)

A short note on terms is in order. I will use "nuclearism" and its variants - to describe the position taken by the managers and leaders of nuclear states, even if they seldom identify this as an identifiable political stance. Nuclear technology encompasses the artifacts of nuclearism, including bombs and electrical generating facilities. The ties between these diverse artifacts have been widely discussed. "Nuclear criticism" and its variants will refer to the position of poststructuralists and deconstructionists on these questions. It is less descriptive but more practical than these other, more technical terms of literary criticism. "Nuclear criticism," then, in­tends to call to mind "literary criticism." "Nuclear opposition" and "antinuclearism" refer to the broad range of antinuclear positions and the activities of their proponents. My use of the word "nuke," in the title and throughout the text, is an intentional interjection of a common, colloquial term into a book where one would usually not expect to find it. Using this term, Americans nor­malize a bit of the transgressive impulse implied by the Richland High example. Or, perhaps, they reverse the transgression, turning it back on the weapons masters, as if to say, "We, too, can play with these icons." "Nuke," then, is short (rudely, playfully, or even deconstructively short) for nuclear technology of all sorts.

The logic of nuclearism inevitability turns on itself causing us to want the Bomb culminating in nuclear destruction

William Chaloupka. [book] Knowing Nukes The Politics and Culture of the Atom. 1992 (pp.60-61)

As Deleuze and Guattari emphasize, this displacing process continu­ally breaks away from the ego, canceling it with several identifiable processes. The law tells us: You will not marry your mother, and you will not kill your father. And we docile subjects say to ourselves: so that's what I wanted! ... There we have a ... displacement. For what really takes place is that the law prohibits something that is perfectly fictitious in the order of desire or of the "instincts," so as to persuade its subjects that they had the intention corresponding to this fiction.' Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly use that exclamation — "So that's what I wanted!" — to bring a metonymy to the fore. This process can be applied to our discussion of nukes. Faced with the Law, the egoistic expression of values, we exclaim, "nobody could possibly want nuclear war." But, un­mistakably, war preparations are everywhere. The reverse logic of deterrence—the weird mission of preparing nukes never to be used—comes home to roost. Desire breaks out of the censorship planned for it. Even if nobody wants nuclear war, people are acting as if they do. So that's what 1 wanted! In this way, the simple repression of nuclearism that liberal humanism tries to turn into a first value, a base agreement, twists out of control. A metonymy forms under the sign of the exclamation heard constantly in American political talk over the last forty years: "Nuke 'em!" The robot, then, may be the ultimate nuclear-age metonymy. We "de­siring machines" (as Deleuze and Guattari refer to modern selves) pro­duce a mirror image onto which these desires and displacements can be grafted. Desire is a feature of bodies, so we give the nuke a body. The opaque machine— a machine-without-parts—becomes a body (in Deleuze and Guattari's schema, a "body without organs"). Rather than making the leap to conclude that all the puzzlement of this new technology must imply a meaning at the core of human life, we could turn the equation around. We could reinterpret the projects surrounding electronic technology. And when we do that, we can hardly miss that a rage for embodiment has been accu­mulating. Computer partisans, critics, and

### Case

Their ethics are impossible –

Harvey, 1999 (David, Distinguished Professor at the City University of New York, *Global Ethics & Environment,* Edited by Nicholas Low, “Considerations on the environment of justice,” , Page 123)

This conception is species-centred and thereby commits me resolutely to a particular form of anthropocentrism (or speciesism in Singer’s terms). I simply cannot see that we can ever avoid asserting our own identity, being expressive of who we are and what we can become, and asserting our species’ capacities and powers in the world we inhabit. To construe the matter any other way is, in my view, to fool ourselves (alienate ourselves) as to who and what we are. In this sense the Marxian concept of ‘species-being’ continues to resonate. But if our task is, as White (1990) puts it, ‘to be distinctively ourselves in a world of others’, this does not mean that we cannot, if we wish, ‘create a world of others’, this does not mean that we cannot, if we wish, ‘create a frame that includes both self and other, neither dominant, in an image of fundamental equality’. We can strive to think like a mountain, like the Ebola virus or like the spotted owl, and construct our actions in response to such imaginaries, but it is still we who do the thinking and we who choose to use our capacities and powers that way. An that principle applies cross-culturally too. I can strive to think like an Aborigine, like a Chipko peasant, like Rupert Murdoch (for he inhabits a cultural world I find hard to comprehend). In these cases, however, my capacity to empathize and put myself in the other’s shoes if further aided by the possibility to translate across languages and to study activities through careful observation. But it is still an ‘I’ who does the imagining and the translation, and it is always in the end through my language that the thinking gets expressed. The ethical thrust here lies, of course, in the choice to try to think like the other, the choice of who or what I try to think like (why a mountain and not the Ebola virus?) and the efforts to build frames of thought and action that relate across self and others in particular ways.

Dunayer, 2005 (Joan, “Reply to a self-proclaimed speciesist,” Vegan Voice, Sept/Nov, http://www.animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/Morality/Speciesism/ProudSpeciesist.htm)

"I am a speciesist myself and make no apologies for that," Peter Milne writes in "Disagreeing with Speciesism Theory" (June–August 2005 Vegan Voice). No doubt, he never would announce with equal pride, "I’m a racist." Feminists and gay-rights advocates don’t declare themselves sexists and homophobes. In sad contrast, people who consider themselves advocates for nonhuman animals tolerate, even espouse, the very bigotry that they should be combating: speciesism. What is speciesism? A failure, on the basis of species, to accord anyone equal consideration. It’s speciesist to deny anyone equal consideration either because they aren’t human or because they aren’t human-like. Nonspeciesists advocate equally strong basic rights—for example, to life and liberty—for all sentient beings. According to Milne, vegans are speciesist because they "discriminate" between plants and animals. By definition, to discriminate against members of any group means to discount their interests. Being insentient, plants have no interests; therefore we can’t discriminate against them. "We pass judgment that plant lives are less significant than animal lives in the realm of feeling and emotions," Milne states. Plants’ feelings and emotions aren’t "less significant"; they’re nonexistent. "Some tests indicate that plants have a basic consciousness," Milne says. No tests that scientists regard as valid. Milne’s claim that it’s speciesist to eat plants but not animals is sheer nonsense. In Milne’s view I exclude plants (and other organisms without a nervous system) from equal consideration because I don’t recognize "differences in the consciousness of different species." As someone whose graduate research in psychology focused on nonhuman cognition, I’m well aware that the consciousness of every sentient being differs from that of every other. Along with his belief that plants are conscious, Milne’s preposterous claim that insects live "constantly in fear of being devoured or killed in some other way" shows his dearth of scientific knowledge. Milne’s worldview is religious rather than based on evidence and logic. He believes in a hierarchical "Kingdom of God". (That phrase evokes a male, anthropomorphic deity.) Milne ranks humans above other animals, nonhuman mammals above birds, birds above reptiles, and reptiles above insects and arachnids. (Even his use of personal names assigns higher and lower status: except when he gives full names, he refers to Peter Singer as "Singer", in keeping with professional courtesy, but refers to me as "Joan".) Milne draws this false analogy: plants differ from animals as insects differ from mammals. Plants and animals differ in a way crucial to the issue of basic rights: animals are sentient; plants aren’t. Insects and mammals differ in ways irrelevant to basic rights: both are sentient. Like mammals and unlike plants, insects should have rights to life and liberty because they can experience life and liberty.

Consequentialism is key to make their values coherent

Hägglund, PhD candidate in Comparative Literature at Cornell University, 2006

(Martin, “The Necessity of Discrimination,” Project Muse)

For the same reason, Derrida's notion of "infinite responsibility" should not be conflated with Levinas's. For Derrida, the infinitude of responsibility answers to the fact that responsibility always takes place in relation to a *negative infinity* of others. The negative infinity of responsibility is both spatial (innumerable finite others that exceed my horizon) and temporal (innumerable times past and to come that exceed my horizon). Far from confirming Levinas's sense of responsibility, the negative infinity of others is fatal for his notion of an originary encounter that would give ethics the status of "first philosophy" and be the guiding principle for a metaphysical "goodness." Even if it were possible to sacrifice yourself completely to another, to devote all your forces to the one who is encountered face-to-face, it would mean that you had disregarded or denied all the others who demanded your attention or needed your help. For there are always more than two*,* as Richard Beardsworth has aptly put it [137]. Whenever I turn toward another I turn away from yet another, and thus exercise discrimination. As Derrida points out in *The Gift of Death,* "I cannot respond to the call, the demand, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others" [68]. Consequently, Derrida emphasizes that the concept of responsibility lends itself *a priori* to "scandal and aporia" [68]. There are potentially an endless number of others to consider, and one cannot take any responsibility without excluding some others in favor of certain others. What makes it possible to be responsible is thus at the same time what makes it impossible for any responsibility to be fully responsible. Responsibility, then, is always more or less discriminating, and infinite responsibility is but another name for the necessity of discrimination. The necessity of discrimination is at the heart of Derrida's thinking, and anyone who wishes to articulate a deconstructive understanding of ethico-political problems needs to elaborate it. I insist on this point since it calls for an approach that is opposed to the numerous attempts to forge an alliance between Derrida and Levinas. One of the first to argue for such an alliance was Robert Bernasconi, who paved the way for later Levinasian readings of Derrida.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/diacritics/v034/34.1hagglund.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT23) In his essay "The Trace of Levinas in Derrida," Bernasconi claims that "Violence and Metaphysics" should not be understood as taking issue with Levinas's philosophy, but only as pointing out certain necessities that impose themselves on philosophical discourse. Derrida's critique of Levinas would then be limited to the way Levinas uses metaphysical language, and Bernasconi insists **[End Page 56]** that "this should not be confused with passing judgment on what Levinas says" [26]. Thus, Bernasconi disregards the central arguments in Derrida's essay and does not even address the notion of violence that is elaborated there. Bernasconi asserts that "we let the finite stand for the totalizing thought of the tradition of Western ontology, as the infinite stands for the attempt to surpass it" [15]. This is a misleading matrix for discussing Derrida's essay, since Derrida demonstrates the incoherence of such a set-up. Derrida argues that the finite cannot be a totality and that the idea of totality is the idea of the (positive) infinity that Levinas posits as a challenge to the idea of totality. Hence Derrida's insistence on taking "history, that is, finitude, seriously . . . in a sense which tolerates *neither finite totality, nor positive infinity*" [*WD* 117/172, my emphasis]. Because Bernasconi disregards the logic of this argument—which pervades Derrida's entire essay—he misconstrues the difference between Derrida and Levinas. In his later essay "Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics" [128], Bernasconi claims that Derrida's argument concerning how alterity already is *in* the Same has been adequately responded to by Levinas, through the latter's recognition that the idea of the Other is reflected within history and within Western ontology, in Plato's Good beyond being and Descartes's idea of the Infinite. But in fact, none of Derrida's criticisms are answered by this move. Derrida's argument is, on the contrary, that alterity cannot be thought in terms of the positive infinity that Levinas subscribes to in Plato and Descartes. Rather, alterity is indissociable from the violence of spacing, which is always already at work in the infinitefinitude of différance. Instead of recognizing this argument, Bernasconi reiterates his claim that Derrida is not at odds with Levinas. According to Bernasconi, Derrida never really intended to show that "certain of Levinas's central terms were incoherent" [129]. Rather, Bernasconi formulates the ethics of deconstruction in Levinasian terms, as originating in a face-to-face relation.

Their impact claims must be subjected to empirical testing – we must test, not assert, whether or not management of nature becomes domination

Light, 2002 (Andrew, Assistant Professor of Environmental Philosophy in the Applied Philosophy Group at New York University, as well as Research Fellow at the Institute for Environment, Philosophy & Public Policy at Lancaster University in England “Symposium Introduction: Eric Katz’s *Nature As Subject,*” Ethics & the Environment, 7.1, 102-108)

Does Katz contradict himself? Should we restore or not? I will resist an attempt to comment on this issue here and leave the conclusion to the reader. It is worth noting, however, that the best answer to Katz's critique of restoration in this paper may in the end be empirical. We'll only know if restoration will lead us to feel "omnipotent" in our ability to manage nature by going out and looking at what other practices restoration seems to encourage. Katz's first argument that remediation is often the best policy stems from his insistence, consistent with his dualism, that there is nothing necessarily wrong with interfering in a realm that has already been made an artifact. But Katz's second argument, that restoration leads us down a slippery slope to manipulation and management of all of nature, is at bottom a psychological and not an ontological claim. It will rest on an empirical proof that people actually behave in this way. Finally, if Katz has done us a service by putting the possibility of a nature-culture dualism on the table in this exchange, then he has also done us a service by openly questioning whether environmental ethics should have any positive role to play in forming better environmental policies. While I must admit to being a bit taken aback to read my co-editor from EnvironmentalPragmatism (1996) taking such a position, again, I think that this is a view that has been assumed by many in the field with little by way of anyone being willing to openly defend it. Katz is straightforward [End Page 106] though: as stated above, he is not interested in "developing an environmental ethics that is a management ethic." Intervention in nature itself (not the nature we have already manipulated) is a form of "oppression and domination." So if Katz's position leads to unacceptable consequences for standard environmental policies, then, as he says, so much the worse for the policies. Again, readers will no doubt have many questions on such a position. On the face of it, it leaves little role for environmental ethicists in larger efforts to improve global environmental conditions. But this may be exactly what we need in the field: an open debate on why we are doing environmental philosophy at all. Is it to create a new body of philosophical debates that are of interests mostly to other philosophers, or is it to find a place for ourselves in these broader discussions?

Our ethical orientation towards nature isn’t relevant, our policy positions are

Taylor, 1991 (Bob Pepperman, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont. “Environmental Ethics & Political Theory”, Polity, Vol. 23, No. 4, (Summer, 1991), pp. 567-583)

It is my suspicion that much of this lack of political sophistication in the environmental ethics literature results from the tendency to treat deep ethical theory as an environmentalist litmus test. This is especially the case in the debate between biocentric and anthropocentric environmental ethics. In my view, much less is at stake politically than many of the par- ticipants suspect. Moreover, I do not find the biocentric position to be entirely coherent. The effect of this debate has been to sidetrack the liter- ature from a more astute political perspective which would lead to more productive and consequential debates than those we often find today. It is a commonplace in the environmentalist literature to find argu- ments by biocentric theorists that the conventional anthropocentrism of the dominant western ethical systems is in some manner responsible for the ecological problems of contemporary society. Devall and Sessions, for example, write, "the humanistic anthropocentrism of the Western liberal arts orientation has been deeply implicated in the global environ- mental crisis."27 Most often, however, the view that this issue is of the greatest political importance is simply implied from the nature of the criticism that is offered of the history and structure of anthropocentric ethics. At the same time, many authors do not provide a sustained argu- ment about the advantages of a biocentric environmental ethics. For them, the choice is apparently clear simply from their criticism of anthro- pocentrism. Paul Taylor has attempted to give more systematic form to these com- mon assumptions. He speaks directly to this point: "It makes a practical difference in the way we treat the natural environment whether we accept an anthropocentric or a biocentric system."21 He presents a biocentric environmental ethics based upon "respect for nature," arguing that such an ethics will be demonstrably superior in guiding us through the practi- cal problems raised by environmental ethics. On this point, however, Taylor's analysis is unconvincing. Although it is intuitively appealing to believe that those individuals with a biocentric view of nature will treat nature in a more environmentally sound manner than those who subscribe to some form of anthropocentrism, this posi- tion becomes less defensible when one moves beyond initial intuitions. When we examine Taylor's discussion to see what he understands the most important elements of "respect for nature" to be, we find com- ments like the following: "Our most fundamental duty toward nature ... is to do no harm to wild living things as far as this lies within our power."29 Similarly, at the conclusion of his study: "The most apt phrase for describing this 'best possible world' in its simplest terms is: a world order on our plant where human civilization is brought into har- mony with nature."'3 What is most impressive about these comments is the degree to which almost any environmental ethics could agree with them. It is simply not the case that one has to be a biocentrist to hold these views. One merely has to look at the literature in which liberal an- thropocentrism is defended to see that anthropocentrists and biocentrists alike can hold a strong "respect for nature."3' By the time Taylor has formulated the environmental sensibilities that must inform our ethical relationship with nature, it is clear that his initial claim about the prac- tical importance of a biocentric outlook is more of an unsubstantiated in- tuition than a demonstrated, developed, and defended argument.

Their manifestation results in global genocide

James B. Reichmann, professor emeritus of philosophy at Seattle University, 2k (Evolution, Animal ‘Rights’, and the Environment p 303)

 Dombrowski readily acknowledges that it was Darwin's theory of the origin of man that started a "revolution in our perception of animals" (p. 17). If [hu]man derives from animals as a result of sexual selection alone, as Darwin theorizes, then there is no firm basis for arguing that the human is worthy of a special respect not accorded the nonhuman animal. This represents the double irony attached to the position that animals possess rights: elevating the animal to the level of the human jeopardizes the fundamental goal of securing more humane treatment for animals. The scales can be made to tip either way. If the human is seen as only incidentally superior to the animal, then rather than awarding rights to the animal, one might with equal consistency deny rights to both, arguing that, 'human rights' is nothing more than an empty phrase, having as little value for the nonhuman animal as for the human. As will be recalled, Peter Singer favors eliminating the term `rights' altogether. In short, it is might that now makes a right. In pursuing the goal of liquidating all forms of anthropocentrism, the actual result of the vegetarian movement could be the elimination of any basis whatever for showing respect either to the human or to the nonhuman animal. Such an attitude could theoretically lead to a repeat of Auschwitz and Belsen on a global scale.