### Off

Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced—

Anell 89. Chairman, WTO panel. "To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68) [<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/88icecrm.pdf>]

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

Energy production is the conversion of resources into usable energy.

DOE 80—Revised: An Analysis of Federal Incentives Used to Stimulate Energy Production, Feburary, http://www.scribd.com/doc/67538352/Federal-Incentives-for-Energy-Production-1980

Energy production is defined as the transformation of natural resources into commonly used forms of energy such as heat, light, and electricity. By this definition, the shining of the sun or the running of a river are not examples of energy production, but the installation of solar panels or the construction of a hydroelectric dam are. Energy consumption is defined as the use of one of these common, "manufactured" forms of energy. Under this definition sunbathing is not energy consumption, but heating water by means of a solar panel is. In both definitions, the crucial ingredient is the application of technology and resources to change a natural resource into a useful energy form.

Violation The plan transfers authority to an agency – This is NOT a direct reduction on energy production nor an increase in USFG financial incentives

Allowing regulations in the topic explodes limits by allowing cosmetic changes to law and undermines preparedness for all debates. There infinite ways to make production easier or faster-limits cases to removing statutory restrictions is key to in-depth research and clash.

### Off

Fiscal Cliff averted for two months – Obama needs polcap to avert total meltdown

Mahn 1-3 (Kevin, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2013/01/03/fiscal-cliff-deal-4-tax-provisions-handled-1-hiked-still-work-to-be-done/)

A last minute fiscal cliff deal/compromise was reached in Washington to avert the initial stages of a potential economic meltdown that was received warmly by the markets given the extent of the relief rally that we have experienced thus far on the first trading day of the New Year.¶ However, I don’t believe that we are anywhere close to signaling “all clear” on the Fiscal Cliff front and that the deal in question—while it averted some of the feared, short-term draconian tax increases associated with going over the cliff—did nothing to address the longer term, more encompassing budget issues as the compromise delayed any decisions on spending cuts for another two months.¶ The compromise also did not deal with the impending Debt Ceiling debate, which promises to have both political parties digging in on their ideological heels.¶ Removing some uncertainty from the markets, what has been addressed in the deal/compromise were changes to the revenue side of the fiscal budget equation primarily dealing with tax rates and income levels associated with these tax rates.¶ As I understand it at this point in time, based primarily upon a recent The Wall Street Journalarticle entitled, “Summary of Bill’s Tax Provisions,” here are some of the major provisions of the deal that were agreed to by the White House, Senate and House of Representatives—and one noteworthy tax that was not addressed in the deal.¶ 1. The personal income tax rate for families with incomes above $450,000 (individuals with incomes above $400,000 and heads-of-households with incomes above $425,000) will increase. Any excess income above these levels will now be taxed at 39.6%. This represents the largest income tax rate increase in nearly two decades. The tax rates for families, individuals and heads-of households with income below these thresholds will not change and will remain at their existing Bush-era tax bracket levels.¶ 2. The tax rate on capital gains and dividendswill rise to 20% from 15% for incomes above the levels described in (1) above. These tax rates will remain at 15% for all other applicable taxpayers below these thresholds. Avoiding the tax treatment of dividend income at ordinary income rates, as opposed to the agreed upon tax rates of 15% or 20%, is viewed as a major positive for investors–especially those with dividend oriented investment strategies in their portfolios.¶ 3. The estate tax will be increased from a top tax rate of 35% to 40% with a $5 million exemption level. This threshold will be indexed to inflation going forward.¶ 4. The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) was patched to avoid raising taxes, through the AMT, on more middle-class Americans by raising the income exemption from $33,750 (individuals) and $45,000 (married couples filing jointly), as it would have reverted to for the tax year 2012, to $50,600 (individuals) and $78,750 (married couples filing jointly) respectively. The exemption amounts will be indexed going forward as well.¶ 5. The deal did not address payroll taxes. As a result, the rate of payroll taxes for workers used to fund Social Security will increase from 4.2% (which was in place for the previous two tax years) to 6.2% as of January 1, 2013. According to The Tax Policy Center, approximately 77% of American households will face higher federal taxes in 2013—not just income tax increases on wealthier American households but payroll tax increases on middle and low income American households as well.¶ While the details of the “first Fiscal Cliff deal,” addressing revenue (i.e. taxes), show that the compromises reached helped to lessen the initial taxable impact that would have been experienced by many taxpayers and investors if no deal had been reached at all, I remain concerned with the lack of any type of deal on spending cuts at this time.¶ A “second Fiscal Cliff deal,” addressing spending cuts, would need to be reached within the next two months according to the outtakes of the first Fiscal Cliff deal. If an agreement between the two political parties on spending cuts cannot be reached in that timeframe, the Debt Ceiling debate would then return to the front burner as more debt would thus be needed (potentially involving another increase to the Debt Ceiling) to fund the existing Federal balance sheet imbalance.¶ Judging from past experience, I would anticipate that any agreement on a second Fiscal Cliff deal will probably come down to the wire, if not get postponed again, and that market volatility will likely continue to increase as we get closer to the new deadline.

Fiscal Cliff negotiations in particular require political capital – Obama can’t spend it elsewhere

Raum 12-11 (Tom, Associated Press, “The Reset: Obama Spending ‘Political Capital’,” http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/dec/10/the-reset-obama-spending-political-capital/)

President Barack Obama is trying to spend what former President George W. Bush called “political capital.”¶ That’s the good will and clout you get from a re-election victory. Obama’s predecessor boasted after his 2004 win that he’d amassed political capital and planned to “spend it” in his second term.¶ Obama is now trying to do the same ting, standing firm with Republicans in negotiations on averting the year-end fiscal cliff and refusing to budge on his insistence that top tax rates — not just overall tax revenues— go up in any bipartisan fiscal deal.¶ Clearly, his re-election win has given him more leverage.¶ He campaigned on letting Bush-era tax cuts expire for households earning over $250,000 a year. And polls show that if Congress can’t agree in the next three weeks and the economy goes over the “fiscal cliff” triggering large automatic spending cuts and tax increases, more voters will blame Republicans than Democrats.¶ Obama met House Speaker John Boehner Sunday for a rare one-on-one talk about the crisis. Otherwise, he’s been busy presenting his case elsewhere — including Monday’s campaign-like visit to Michigan auto workers.¶ Republicans gripe the president should be in Washington negotiating — not still out campaigning.¶ Obama says he’s mindful of “presidential overreach in second terms” and will proceed cautiously. Still, “I didn’t get reelected just to bask in reelection.”¶ Of course Bush found he had far less political capital than he’d imagined.¶ He campaigned across the country in early 2005 for a plan to partially privatize Social Security. After months on the road, he realized he couldn’t even sell his plan to many members of his own party on Capitol Hill.¶ Right now, Democrats are giving Obama running room. “He gets his way — up to a point,” said Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio.

Plan costs capital—

Boston Herald 7/17 (7/17/12, “Congressmen probe FAA’s Cape Wind approval” http://news.bostonherald.com/news/regional/view.bg?&articleid=1061146541&format=&page=1&listingType=Loc#articleFull, vh)

A pair of powerful GOP congressmen are launching a probe into the Federal Aviation Adminstration’s analysis of Cape Wind, saying they’re worried that political pressure from the Obama administration led the agency to ignore concerns about the danger the wind farm would pose to air traffic. In a letter today to FAA chief Michael Huerta, congressmen John Mica (R-Fla.) and Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) say they have “significant questions” about the role of politics in the agency’s approval of the project. “A politically based determination of the Cape Wind project by FAA is an unacceptable use of federal authority, contravenes FAA’s statutory mandate, and raises significant safety concerns for aviation in Nantucket Sound,” their letter states. An FAA spokeswoman said in a statement project reviews are “based on safety considerations and the available solutions to mitigate potential risks.” The statement was the same one the agency has issued to multiple requests for comment in recent weeks. Cape Wind spokesman Mark Rodgers said claims of political pressure in the approval process have “no merits” and “should be summarily dismissed.” He said Cape Wind opponents made similar claims about federal analysis of the project during the Bush administration. “The only politics being applied to this important clean energy project has been and continues to be on the part of project opponents,” Rodgers said. Cape Wind, more than a decade in the making, would be the nation’s first offshore wind farm. The 130-turbine proposal in Nantucket Sound has become a pet project for the Patrick administration and sits squarely within the Obama administration’s green-energy initiative. Last month, the Herald, citing internal FAA emails obtained by project opponents, reported that agency officials examining the turbine’s effect on radar systems and low-flying planes were aware of the proposal’s political implications. Those stories led to calls for an investigation by Florida congressman Cliff Stearns, who led the federal probe into the Obama administration’s Solyndra debacle. U.S. Sen. Scott Brown and congressman Paul Murphy (R-PA.) followed suit about two weeks later. The glut of congressional criticism of the approval process has bolstered the project’s dogged opponents. “We now have five congressional members who have sought additional evidence or called for a hearing,” said Audra Parker of the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound. “Clearly the Alliance is not the only one seeing a pattern of the FAA succumbing to political pressure.” “It’s further evidence that Cape Wind is in trouble, and recognition that Cape Wind has consistently been the recipient of political favoritism.”

Current deal isn’t enough – lack of a full deal will cause a full collapse

Delamaide 1-3 (Darrell, Marketwatch, “Tactical deal on “cliff” risks permanent damage,” http://www.marketwatch.com/story/tactical-deal-on-cliff-risks-permanent-damage-2013-01-03?link=MW\_latest\_news)

The bill passed with so much drama converted the temporary George W. Bush-era tax cuts into the permanent Obama tax cuts. As hard as it may be to not extend tax cuts that are due to expire, it’s much harder politically to actually raise tax rates.¶ The tax rates, originally adopted in response to a surging government surplus and then extended to avoid fiscal contraction during a recession, have now been set at a permanently low level, which could hinder the country from achieving its future economic and social goals.¶ This was the thrust of the argument made by one of the 16 Democratic congressmen who voted against the bill.¶ “We have concretized revenue at an extraordinarily low rate,” Rep. Jim Moran said Wednesday on MSNBC.¶ Moran, who represents some of the Washington suburbs in northern Virginia, said the tax rates enshrined in the legislation now signed into law by President Barack Obama meant “we will never bring in more than 15% of GDP.” But, he added, the U.S. has never enjoyed a robust economy without government spending of at least 20% of gross domestic product.¶ Moran, beginning his 12th term in Congress this week, noted the deal’s immediate consequences of leaving several ugly fiscal battles to fight in the coming weeks — raising the debt ceiling, disarming the “sequester” of automatic spending cuts, and passing a budget that enables the government to continue operating.¶ But the real issue is the long-term problem of starving the beast, with Obama at his moment of maximum leverage getting only $620 billion in added tax revenue over 10 years — instead of the $1.6 trillion he sought in earlier proposals.¶ “I wanted [Obama] to have a legacy he could be proud of,” Moran said, including investments in education and training to keep the country competitive economically. “I doubt that can be done with the limited resources we voted [Tuesday] night.”

Nuclear war

Burrows and Harris 9- Mathew J. Burrows is a counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, Jennifer Harris is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, The Washington Quarterly, April, http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to bedrawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies andmultiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and onthe sustainability ofmultilateral institutions (think League of Nationsin thesame period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion oftechnologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s mostdangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attack and newly emergentcollections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrowerin an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationshipthat existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emergenaturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. Thelack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missileflight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus onpreemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. Types of conflict that the world continuesto experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if governmentleaders deem assured access to energy resources,for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival oftheir regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopoliticalimplications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for navalbuildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup ofregional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, andcounterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer inAsia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in amoredog-eat-dog world.What Kind of World will 2025 Be? Perhaps more than lessons, history loves patterns. Despite widespread changes in the world today, there is little to suggest that the future will not resemble the past in several respects. The report asserts that, under most scenarios, the trendtoward greater diffusion of authority and power that has been ongoing for acouple of decades is likely to accelerate because of the emergence of new globalplayers, the worsening institutional deficit, potential growth in regional blocs,and enhanced strength of non-state actors and networks. The multiplicity of actors on the international scene could either strengthen the international system, by filling gaps left by aging post-World War II institutions, or could further fragment it and incapacitate international cooperation. The diversity in both type and kind of actor raises the likelihood of fragmentation occurring over the next two decades, particularly given the wide array of transnational challenges facing the international community. Because of their growing geopolitical and economic clout, the rising powers will enjoy a high degree of freedom to customize their political and economic policies rather than fully adopting Western norms. They are also likely to cherish their policy freedom to maneuver, allowing others to carry the primary burden for dealing with terrorism, climate change, proliferation, energy security, and other system maintenance issues. Existing multilateral institutions, designed for a different geopolitical order, appear too rigid and cumbersome to undertake new missions, accommodate changing memberships, and augment their resources. Nongovernmental organizations and philanthropic foundations, concentrating on specific issues, increasingly will populate the landscape but are unlikely to affect change in the absence of concerted efforts by multilateral institutions or governments. Efforts at greater inclusiveness, to reflect the emergence of the newer powers, may make it harder for international organizations to tackle transnational challenges. Respect for the dissenting views of member nations will continue to shape the agenda of organizations and limit the kinds of solutions that can be attempted. An ongoing financial crisis and prolonged recession would tilt the scales even further in the direction of a fragmented and dysfunctional international system with a heightened risk of conflict. The report concluded that the rising BRIC powers (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) seem averse to challenging the international system, as Germany and Japan did in the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies, but this of course could change if their widespread hopes for greater prosperity become frustrated and the current benefits they derive from a globalizing world turn negative.

### Off

CP Text: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its financial incentives for the development of biomass energy. The United States Federal Government should promote biomass energy through media campaigns and lobbying.

Biomass energy has the technology and the power to provide large quantities of cheap energy and to supplement the grid

Simet 2012 (Anna, Journalist with Pellet Mill Magazine, “Global Costs of Biomass Power,” http://biomassmagazine.com/authors/view/Anna\_Simet)

The renewable energy industry may be labeled a pipedream by fossil fuel tycoons and stakeholders, but expert analysis is making it difficult to deny its potential, and not just in the U.S. On a global scale, the wind, solar and hydro industries are worth more than $1 billion annually, and developing countries continue to embrace the waste-based technologies of biogas and biomass power. While cost has typically been the biggest development hindrance, that is slowly starting to change. The International Renewable Energy Agency points out that recent years have seen dramatic cost reductions as a result of research and development and accelerated deployment, but unfortunately, policymakers are often exposed to outdated information. Since most are unaware of the latest cost data, progress is not where it could be.¶ In order to disperse and make available current renewable energy market data, IRENA has published a five-part renewable energy cost analysis series, with the hopes that it will assist in policymaking, especially in its 102 member countries. Michael Taylor, IRENA renewable energy cost status and outlook analyst, explains that the organization has a mandate from its members to accelerate the deployment of all types of renewable energy, and as part of this mandate, IRENA’s Innovation and Technology Centre has a specific program that focuses on the costs and performance of renewable technologies.¶ “The rapid growth in installed capacity of renewable energy technologies, coupled with technology improvements and associated cost reductions, means that even data from one or two years ago can significantly overestimate the cost of electricity from these technologies,” Taylor says. “The lack of accurate, reliable data on the cost and performance of renewable technologies is a significant barrier to their uptake.” Simply stated, renewable energy data becomes outdated in a hurry, and that isn’t widely known.¶ IRENA data collection for the cost analysis series included acquiring information from industry associations, project developers, development banks, consultancies, market research data, government reports and auction data. Additionally, IRENA worked with GIZ, a German-based sustainable development corporation, to collect detailed, real-world project data for 79 projects from 11 developing countries. And, data collection is still an ongoing effort.¶ One of the core conclusions of IRENA's research so far shows that the total installed costs of biomass power generation technologies vary significantly by technology and country, according to Taylor.¶ Technology and Feedstock Costs¶ “The challenge when talking about biomass power generation is to convey the idea that we are actually talking about a series of technologies,” Taylor says. “The simple combustion of biomass to generate steam requires a very different technology than that required to gasify wood chips and then burn that gas to provide steam to power a turbine, and these technologies vary substantially in technology terms and cost. The situation is also complicated by the fact that some technologies are more mature than others.”¶ For example, the total installed costs of stoker boilers ranged between $1,880 and $4,260 per kilowatt (kW) in 2010, while those of circulating fluidized bed boilers were between $2,170 and $4,500 per kW. Anaerobic digester power systems had a significantly wide range of capital costs from $2,570 up to $6,100 per kW, and gasification technologies had total installed capital costs of between $2,140 and $5,700 per kW.¶ While IRENA’s report recognizes that there are many possible influences on cost, its modeling is based off of three key drivers: equipment cost from factory gate to site delivery; total installed project cost, including fixed financing costs; and the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), a calculation of the cost of generating electricity at the point of connection to a load or electricity grid.¶ The LCOE of biomass-fired power plants range from 6 to 29 cents per kWh based on capital costs and feedstock costs. Where low-cost feedstocks are available and capital costs are modest, biomass can be a very competitive power generation option, according to the analysis, and where low-cost agricultural or forestry residues and wastes are available, biomass can often compete with conventional power sources. Even where feedstocks are more expensive, the LCOE range for biomass is still more competitive than for diesel-fired generation, making biomass an ideal solution for off-grid or minigrid electricity supply.

### Off

The 1ac leaves unchallenged the referent object of security - not only is the impact extinction, but this makes warfare, threat construction and human insecurity inevitable, turning the aff. Be suspect of their specific scenarios - national security is a ploy used by security elites to leave citizens in a constant state of fear.

Lal 7 - Master of Arts in International Relations (Preerna, 2007, http://gwu.academia.edu/PrernaLal/Papers/646118/Critical\_Security\_Studies\_Deconstructing\_the\_National\_Security\_State)

Under the lens of critical theory, there are many problems with the current framework of national security. First, security is a paradox for the more we add to the national security agenda, the more we have to fear. As Barry Buzan (1991, 37) points out in People, States and Fear, the security paradox presents us with a cruel irony in that to be secure ultimately, would mean “being unable to escape.” Thus, to secure oneself, one would need to be trapped in a timeless state, for leaving this state would incur risks. The current neo-realist realization of national security is quite narrow and does not take into account threats to human welfare, health, social problems, and domestic sources of insecurity. However, in Security: A New Framework of Analysis, several CSS theorists put forward the case for widening the field of security studies and separating these into five different sectors under state control: military, politics, environment, society and economy (Buzan, De Wilde and Waever 1998, 21-23). But, since these wideners leave the referent object of security as the state, widening the field of security studies becomes even more troubling because it risks more state control over our lives, the militarization of social issues such as drugs and crime, which would further legitimize and justify state violence, leaving us all the more insecure. Accordingly, it becomes clear that a mere re-definition of “security” away from its current neo-realist framework does not solve the security dilemma if the referent object of security is left unchanged. This goes to prove that it is the state as the referent object that requires questioning in terms of its supposed provision of security rather than the problems with widening the field of security. Without a state-centric concept of security, there would be no national security agenda left to widen, as our security concerns would be human-centered, hence, the paradox of security would dissipate. A second part of the security paradox is that security and insecurity are not binary opposites. On a micro-level, if security is the state of being secure, than insecurity should be the state of not being secure. However, what we do feel secure about is neither part of the national security agenda nor a conscious thought or feeling. The state of being secure is thus, not conceptualized as an absence of insecurity. On a policymaking level, Robert Lipschutz (1995, 27), Associate Professor of Politics at University of California, Santa Cruz, notes in On Security that our desire to achieve security through the acquisition of arms and a national missile “defense” system, serves to insecure those whom we label and treat as threats. This encourages the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and offensive posturing by those we wish to secure ourselves against, causing us to feel more insecure as the end result of our search for security. More recently, when George W. Bush included North Korea in his illogical “Axis of Evil” and named it as a threat to the United States, the peripheral state had no nuclear capability and would never have thought to use the threat of weapons of mass destruction to blackmail Western powers into giving aid. However, alarmed at the thought of being the next Afghanistan or Iraq, North Korea retaliated within a year by revealing its nuclear arsenal. The United States watched helplessly as one more previously benign nation became a real security problem. As a consequence, imagined enemies become real threats due to the ongoing threat construction by the state, and this poses the security dilemma of creating self-fulfilling prophecies in the current framework of security. Our notion of security is what the state says it is, rather than what we feel it is. Yet, this entrenched view of security is epistemologically flawed, which is our second dilemma; meaning that our knowledge of security as it is defined is based in certain realist assumptions that do not hold up under scrutiny. Our perception of what and from whom we need to be secured is not based on the actual threats that exist, but on the threats that we are told to perceive by the state. Thus, terrorists, drugs, illegal immigrants, “Third World” dictators, rogue states, blacks, non-Christians, and the Other, are considered as threats to the national security apparatus, and consequently, as threats to the individual American. This state construction of threats pervades our minds, causing a trickle-down effect that encourages a culture of fear, where the only limit to the coming danger is our imagination. Lipschutz (2000, 44-45) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “the national security state is brought down to the level of the household, and each one arms itself against the security dilemma posed by its neighbor across the hedge of fence.” Lipschutz seems to be saying that it is national security that eventually encourages the creation of a dichotomy between the self and the Other in our everyday lives. Indeed, it is the discourse of security by the rulers and elites, which creates and sustains our bipolar mindset of the world. A final dilemma presented by the current security framework is that security is ontologically unstable, unable to exist on its own, requiring the creation of certain conditions and categories, specifically, the creation of the Other. James Der Derian (1995, 25), Associate Professor of Political Science at U Mass (Amherst), notes in On Security that we are taught to consider security as “an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread belief in it.” Yet, national security is a highly unstable concept and changes over time, with the construction of new threats and enemies. Due to its unstable nature, security can then, be considered as a constant fluid that is constructed and re-defined by the discourse of the state and security elites. Ole Waever, a senior researcher at the Center for Peace and Conflict Research, contends that the very act of uttering “security” places it on the security agenda, thereby giving the state and its elite, power over the issue. In On Security, he notes that “in naming a certain development a security problem, the state can claim a special right, one that in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites” (1995, 55). This process is termed as “securitization,” which simply means treating an event or issue as a problem of national security rather than first questioning whether it should even be treated as a security issue. Such an act serves the interests of the state and its elites, starting with security discourse by the state, which constructs and perpetuates state identity and existence.

The 'threats' are not 'out there' as the 1AC wants you to believe - they are right here. Our alternative is grass-roots citizen activism - we must make the people, not the state, the referent object of security.

Lal 7 - Master of Arts in International Relations (Preerna, 2007, http://gwu.academia.edu/PrernaLal/Papers/646118/Critical\_Security\_Studies\_Deconstructing\_the\_National\_Security\_State)

Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how national security is an antonym for human security. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the mans and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.” Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare. The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that “economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security. The question that arises next is how to put critical theory into practice and deconstruct the national security state. Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth. In other words, there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist Foucaultian analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse. The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality. Thus, citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.” This calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The United States has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations. As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually. In the past two years, India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations. Therefore, our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation.

As an intellectual, you must reject the specific policies which embody the security paradigm.

Burke 02 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Alternatives 27)

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available - and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired - which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse who we are . **Just as security rules** subjectivity **as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail** and promise, **it is at these levels** that **we can intervene**. We can **critique the** machinic **frameworks of possibility represented by** law, **policy**, economic regulation, and diplomacy, **while challenging the way these institutions** **deploy language** **to draw individual subjects into their** consensual **web**. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." **We must**, he says, "**observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its** shifting **boundaries** ... by doing so, **discursive terrains of dissent** all of a sudden **appear where forces of domination** previously **seemed invincible**." **Pushing** **beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels** - **that empower individuals to** **recognize the larger** social, cultural, and economic **implications of the everyday forms of desire,** subjection, **and discipline** they encounter, **to challenge** and rewrite **them, and that** in turn **contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain** (and have been sustained by) **these forms**. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Connolly, and Moria Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics" - an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. Thus while the sweep and **power** of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves" - a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. **It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its** shimmering **possibilities might be**.

### The Grid

Multple alternate causalities – The Plan Solves NONE of them—1ac author

Heyes 8-15-12

J.D. Heyes is a writer for Natural News.com August 15, 2012

Overloaded US power grid stretched to capacity; Will America follow in India's footsteps?

http://www.naturalnews.com/036808\_power\_grid\_collapse\_outages.html#ixzz23glXL83u

Could the U.S. really suffer the kinds of widespread power outages that struck two-thirds of India's billion-plus population recently? Absolutely, say experts, and fixing the problem won't be cheap. While the nation's power infrastructure is referred to as a "grid," suggesting seamless interconnectivity, "the network more closely resembles a patchwork quilt stitched together to cover a rapidly expanding nation," the Washington Post reported. Experts note that the U.S. really doesn't yet face the kind of issues with its electrical infrastructure that left about 670 million Indians without power in what became the largest outage in history. But, at the same time, industry analysts say the nation's grid is definitely showing signs of aging. And, they say, it's stretched to capacity. More often than not, the grid falls victim to decrepitude rather than, say, the forces of nature, as in tornadoes and powerful storms. Nonetheless the grid is beginning to fail, say experts, who fear that such failures that caused blackouts in New York, San Diego and Boston could become ever more common as the country's demand for power grows exponentially. To fix the problem, industry analysts say it will take a multi-billion, multi-year investment if we're to avoid more frequent large-scale outages in the future. More plants needed, but the delivery system is weak "I like to think of our grid much like a water system, and basically all of our pipes are at full pressure now, and if one of our pipes bursts and we have to shut off that line, that just increases the pressure on our remaining pipes until another one bursts, and next thing you know, we're in a catastrophic run and we have to shut the whole water system down," Otto J. Lynch, vice president of Wisconsin-based Power Line Systems, told the Post. The problem in India and similar developing nations with growing pains is one of power generation. The country is stuck with old and aging coal-fired power plants and is meeting resistance internally to atomic plants. Recently, a number of plants shuttered suddenly, leaving customers without power once more. In the U.S., the problem is somewhat different. Though more plants will be needed in the future, to be sure, the larger problem is that the system of delivery is beginning to fail more frequently. The network of steel towers and power lines that span the country, along with the power transmission stations those lines feed, are the "pipes" of the system that Lynch spoke of. Electricity storage is difficult and besides, most electricity, the Post said, is used within a second of it being produced. The system is designed to shunt power to regions where it is most needed, at the push of a button or, in a growing number of systems, when a computer managing the grid senses the need to shift power. The system is further designed to go around bottlenecks or other interruptions that could slow down the electrical flow. Tens of billions needed to update, upgrade power grids Towers themselves are designed to withstand large gusts of wind but increasingly, towers are collapsing when they shouldn't, and that's a symptom of the aging electrical infrastructure, analysts note. "The aging of equipment explains some of the equipment failures that lead to intermittent failures in power quality and availability," says a report by the American Society of Civil Engineers, released earlier this year. "The capacity of equipment explains why there are some bottlenecks in the grid that can also lead to brownouts and occasional blackouts." To keep the country's power grid operational - and reliable - an additional investment of about $107 billion would be needed by 2020, the ASCE said. Once considered an indulgence, electricity is now a necessity for modern life. "Electricity was primarily a luxury when the majority of our grid was built 50, 60 years ago," Lynch told the Post. "Most people didn't require computers to do their jobs every day. They didn't need the Internet access. iPhones didn't need to be charged, and communication was all hard-wired, so you could still make a phone call when the electricity was out."

No meltdowns impact.

Epstein 11— fellow at the Ayn Rand Center for Individual Rights, specializing in energy issues, Alex, Fox News, 7-23, Nuclear Power Is Extremely Safe -- That's the Truth About What We Learned From Japan, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/07/23/nuclear-power-is-extremely-safe-thats-truth-about-what-learned-from-japan/#ixzz24DXlmp38

The key to nuclear power’s safety, Beckmann explains, is that it uses a radioactive energy source--such as uranium. In addition to having the advantage of storing millions of times more energy per unit of volume than coal, gas, or water, the radioactive material used in power plants literally cannot explode. Ridiculing the scare tactics that a nuclear power plant poses the same dangers as a nuclear bomb, Beckmann observes: “An explosive nuclear chain reaction is no more feasible in the type of uranium used as power plant fuel than it is in chewing gum or pickled cucumbers.”

The one danger of running a nuclear plant is a large release of radiation. This is extremely unlikely, because nuclear plants contain numerous shielding and containment mechanisms (universal in the civilized world but callously foregone by the Soviets in their Chernobyl plant).

But in the most adverse circumstances, as Fukushima illustrated, the cooling system designed to moderate the uranium’s heat can fail, the backups can fail, the radioactive material can overheat to the point that the plant cannot handle the pressure, and a radiation release is necessary.

Yet, even then, it is extremely unlikely that the radiation levels will be high enough to cause radiation sickness or cancer--and radiation in modest quantities is a normal, perfectly healthy feature of life (your blood is radioactive, as is the sun). And even the worst nuclear accident gives neighbors a luxury that broken dams and exploding refineries do not: time.

While many, many things went wrong at Fukushima, as might be expected in an unprecedented natural disaster, what is more remarkable is that thanks to the fundamental integrity of the nuclear vessel and the containment building, none of the power plant’s neighbors have died, nor have any apparently been exposed to harmful levels of radiation. (The Japanese government has announced that eight of 2,400 workers have been exposed to higher-than-allowed amounts of radiation, but these amounts are often hundreds of times less than is necessary to do actual damage.)

Fukushima proves no impact.

Biello 12—David, How Safe Are U.S. Nuclear Reactors? Lessons from Fukushima, Scientific American, 3-9, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-safe-are-old-nuclear-reactors-lessons-from-fukushima

But even at a reactor that does not fare as well in a large earthquake and is not immune to the loss of off-site power, there is "essentially zero risk of early fatalities," according to the NRC worst-case modeling. Even when a release of radioactive material reaches the environment, "it's small enough and takes so long to reach the community that people have already been evacuated or otherwise protected," NRC's Burnell argues. "The public avoids any short-term dose large enough to kill." And that is exactly what happened at Fukushima.

YOU DON’T SOLVE HACKING—if it’s true people have tech now to start a nuclear weapon then grid reliability can’t overcome it. A blackout would only eliminate hacker outlets to access systems

Even if Cyber attacks happen, they won’t be against anything useful

Poulsen, 2007 (Kevin, Writer for Wired magazine, “ ‘Cyberwar’ and Estonia’s panic attack,” August 22, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/cyber-war-and-e.html)

There's no doubt that the May packet floods were far more disruptive to tiny Estonia than similar attacks have been to the U.S. and others. But in some ways, Estonia's attacks were less sophisticated than previous "cyberwars" -- like those between Israeli and Palestinian hackers, India and Pakistan, China and the U.S. In 2001, Chinese hackers successfully targeted hundreds of U.S. servers following an international incident involving one of our spy planes, even penetrating unclassified military systems. In all these skirmishes, the attackers actually hacked their target's systems, instead of just temporarily flooding them from afar as in Estonia's "Web War One." Even those attacks fell short of cyberwar, at least as experts have defined the term for over a decade. Cyberwars were supposed to target critical infrastructures beyond the internet, like the SCADA systems that control elements of the power grid; air traffic control networks; nuclear power plant safety systems. In other words,  realcyberwarriors aren't interested in clogging the public internet like spammers; they use the internet as a path to sensitive, private networks where sabotage has some hope of causing physical, real-world mayhem that outlasts the attack. (DDoS barely rated a walk-on role in DHS's comprehensive Cyber Storm exercise last year.) **I'm skeptical that real** cyberwar, or**cyberterrorism, will ever take place**. But what is certain is that the Estonia DDoS does nothing to illuminate our risk of it. **No new attack techniques surfaced; the level of traffic was not surprising; the mitigation tactics were** tried and true and, of course, **successful.** That Estonia's public internet is small and easily overrun doesn't change anything for the U.S.I write that, by the way, at great personal risk of being labeled a "what-me-worry" voice by  cyberhawk and former Iraq-war booster Ralph Peters. In a commentary accompanying the Estonia article, Peters lambastes the New York Times and "other publications" (read THREAT LEVEL) for being overly dismissive of the Estonia attacks. He offers this grave warning for a slumbering America (at this point, please have children leave the room): The United States could be next, and attacks against our servers would be "far more devastating." In truth, U.S. **network operators already deal with DDoS attacks** of a similar, or greater, magnitude than the ones that hit Estonia.  Peters argues that critical U.S. military networks and weapons systems could fall.**Malware is getting** pretty **sophisticated**, I'll admit, **but I've yet to see a bot that can send packets from the public internet to a classified, air gapped Air Force network.** If it exists, it can also do your laundry and walk your dog.

Dual phenomenology means they can’t spoof early warning systems—they would have to create an alarm in the exact same place for both radar and satellites.

Fritz 9 – BS (St. Cloud), MIR (Bond), Jason, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”. June 2009. The International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament.

One tool designed by the US for initiating a nuclear launch is the ‘nuclear football’. It is a specially outfitted briefcase which can be used by the President to authorize a nuclear strike when away from fixed command centres. The President is accompanied by an aide carrying the nuclear football at all times. This aide, who is armed and possibly physically attached to the football, is part of a rotating crew of Presidential aides (one from each of the five service branches). The football contains a secure satellite communication link and any other material the President may need to refer to in the event of its use, sometimes referred to as the ‘playbook’. The attack options provided in the football include single ICBM launches and large scale pre- determined scenarios as part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan. Before initiating a launch the President must be positively identified using a special code on a plastic card, sometimes referred to as ‘the gold codes’ or ‘the biscuit’. The order must also be approved by a second member of the government as per the two-man rule (Pike 2006) In terms of detecting and analysing a potential attack, that is, distinguishing a missile attack from the launch of a satellite or a computer glitch, **the US employs dual phenomenology**. This means **two different systems must be used to confirm an attack, such as radar and satellite. Terrorists trying to engage a launch by falsifying this data would need to determine which two systems were being used in coordination** at the target location **and spoof both** systems. Attempting to falsify commands from the President would also be difficult. Even if the chain of command is identified, there are multiple checks and balances. For example, doctrine recommends that the President confer with senior commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the primary military advisor to the President. However, the President may choose to consult other advisors as well. Trying to identify who would be consulted in this system is difficult, and falsification may be exposed at any number of steps. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes that new systems of command and control must be survivable in the event of cyber warfare attacks. On the one hand, this shows that the US is aware of the potential danger posed by computer network operations and are taking action to prevent it. On the other hand, this shows that they themselves see computer network operations as a weakness in their system. And the US continues to research new ways to integrate computer systems into their nuclear command and control, such as IP-based communications, which they admit, “has not yet been proven to provide the high degree of assurance of rapid message transmission needed for nuclear command and control” (Critchlow 2006).

Their extinction impact is from the GUARDIAN -

### Readiness

Constraints on hegemony will force peaceful drawdown of commitments – solves great power wars.

MacDonald and Parent 11 – Asst Prof. of PoliSci @ Williams College and Parent, Asst Prof. PoliSci @ U of Miami, Paul and Joseph, “Graceful Decline?” International Security, 35.4, Project MUSE

Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. **Based on** the **historical** track **record of great powers facing** acute relative **decline**, **the U**nited **S**tates should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States **is ripe to** overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to **decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to** initiate and **become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes** than the average great power **and** to **settle these** disputes more **amicably**. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. **Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them**. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was **the Anglo-American transition**, which took place around 1872 and was **resolved without** armed **confrontation**. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although **China and** **the** **U**nited **S**tates differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both **are** **large**, relatively **secure continental** great **powers**, a fact **that mitigates** potential geopolitical **competition**.93 **China faces** a variety of **domestic political challenges**, including strains among rival regions, **which** may **complicate its ability to** sustain its economic performance or **engage in** foreign policy **adventurism**.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the **incentives for either** side **to run risks** by courting conflict **are minimal.** The **U**nited **S**tates **would still possess** upwards of **a third of** the share of **great power GDP**, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 **Given** the **importance of the** U.S. **market** to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, **the U**nited **S**tates **should be able to reduce** its **foreign policy commitments** in East Asia in the coming decades **without** **inviting** Chinese **expansionism**. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in [End Page 42] Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict.98 Moreover, Washington's support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order.99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments **or** unleash destabilizing regional **security dilemmas**. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, **it is unclear** that **China will have** the **force projection capabilities** necessary **to take** and holdadditional **territory**.100 By incrementally **shifting burdens to** regional **allies and multilateral institutions, the U**nited **S**tates **can strengthen** the **credibility of its core commitments while accommodating** the interests of a rising **China**. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. **Immense forward deployments** will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and **risk unnecessary clashes**.101 Conclusion This article has advanced three main arguments. First, retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. **States often curtail their commitments** and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. Second and related, declining great powers react **in a prompt and proportionate manner to** their **dwindling fortunes**. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: **international incentives are strong inducements**. [End Page 43] In the high-stakes world of great power politics, states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. Third, the rate of relative decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The faster the rate of decline, the more likely states are to reform their militaries, increase reliance on allies, and refrain from using force in international disputes. Taken together, these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything, we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change.

Retrenchment prevents extended deterrence breakdowns and nuclear war with Russia.

Bandow 2009 - Senior Fellow @ Cato Institute and Former Special Adviser to Reagan, Doug, “More Friends, More War”, Cato Institute, July 13, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10348

Today, however, Washington hands out security guarantees the way hotels provide chocolates: one on every pillow, with an extra candy for anyone who asks. The commitments are viewed as costless. Indeed, the common assumption is that alliance guarantees automatically prevent war, and thus never need be implemented. It's a wonder that alliance advocates have not suggested that the United States promise to defend every nation against attack by every other nation, since, given the prevailing theory, doing so should inaugurate an era of perpetual peace. **NATO expansion is** promoted with the greatest enthusiasm. It also is **one of the most critical disputes between America and Russia**. Moscow held war games in the Caucasus shortly after NATO's military exercises in Georgia. During President Barack Obama's summit visit to Moscow the two governments reached agreement over reductions in nuclear armaments, not Georgia's entry into NATO. The argument for incorporating Tbilisi into the alliance reflects fear of Russian domination of the region, yet it is striking how ineffective Moscow has been in intimidating members of the "near abroad." If anything, the war with Georgia appears to have reduced Russia's clout. Observes Ellen Barry in the New York Times: "Rather than being cowed into obedience, as most Western observers feared, the former republics seem to have grown even more protective of their sovereignty." Washington has nothing to gain from antagonizing Russia and much to lose. In any case, expanding NATO into the Caucasus is no solution. Washington has nothing to gain from antagonizing Russia and much to lose. Moscow has agreed to open its airspace for the United States to supply the latter's forces in Afghanistan. America is seeking Russian cooperation against Iran and North Korea. Arms control and energy supplies also are on the agenda. Most important, **the U**nited **S**tates **wants** to forge **a stable relationship with the** world's second biggest **nuclear power to reduce** the **potential for war**. Further **expanding** **NATO would make** all of these **objectives harder** to achieve. The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, now more than sixty years old, was created with a specific purpose: to protect Western Europe from Soviet aggression. Although it played a political role, its core mission was military. Having just fought Nazi Germany to liberate Europe, the United States was not prepared to accept Soviet domination of the continent. NATO's mission disappeared two decades ago when the Berlin wall fell, the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the Soviet Union collapsed. For a time policy makers actually questioned the alliance's future. What, pray tell, would the anti-Soviet alliance do without a Soviet Union? But NATO quickly found new tasks. First, it became a parallel European Union, serving as an organization to unite the old Soviet empire with "old" Europe. Second, it became a tool to conduct "out of area" military actions. Neither role makes much sense from America's standpoint. The EU always was far better equipped to promote the development of democratic capitalism in the former communist countries. "Out of area" operations in Europe, such as Kosovo, served European rather than American interests. Moreover, most alliance members have proved unwilling to provide meaningful backing for U.S. operations elsewhere, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In short, whatever the continuing value of NATO for Europe, it has ceased to serve a serious security role for the United States. Yet **rather than reduce** America'scontinental **military commitments, Washington has been promising to go to war for** ever **more countries. Albania and Croatia** have just joined NATO—Americans are now on the hook to defend these two from threats unknown. So, too, with the **Baltic nations**, formerly part of both the Soviet Union and imperial Russia. The Bush administration vigorously pushed NATO to move even further east, **advocating** the **addition of Georgia and Ukraine**. How are Georgia and Ukraine related to American security? Not at all. There's an obvious reason to wish them well as independent states. Neither lives up to the images cultivated in the West; moreover, evidence abounds that Tbilisi shares the blame for the war last August. But even if these two countries were paragons of democratic virtue, Washington should not threaten to go to war on their behalf. Don't worry, say NATO expansion advocates. The United States would never have to make good on its promises. After all, Russia would never dare challenge America. More specifically, if only in April 2008 NATO had moved Tbilisi closer to membership, Russia would never have risked going to war. Sally McNamara of the Heritage Foundation writes: "Although it is completely un-testable, it is worth pondering whether Russia would've invaded Georgia if Germany and France hadn't colluded with Moscow to deny Georgia NATO's Membership Action Plan at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008." Even more so, if NATO invited Georgia to join, runs the argument, Moscow would never consider challenging the alliance. Issue the Article V guarantee, and all opponents—in this case Russia—would shrink back in fear and horror. Faced with the threat of allied—in this case really meaning American—intervention, Moscow would never act against Georgia, irrespective of circumstance. Neither argument withstands scrutiny. Precious little is known about decision making in the Putin-Medvedev government. Nevertheless, **Moscow** has **demonstrated** that **it views border security as worth war.** It would not be enough for Washington to threaten war to defend Georgia. Russia would have to believe the threat, that it lacks the ability to deter Washington from carrying out the threat and that it would not prevail in whatever confrontation might occur. How likely would a Membership Action Plan (MAP) or full NATO membership be to convince Moscow? First, the United States and Europe have spent more than a decade expanding their relationship with Georgia. Tbilisi joined the NATO-run North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 and the Partnership for Peace in 1996. Two years later Georgia submitted its first Individual Partnership Plan. In 1997, Georgia approved a status of forces agreement and a year later established official ambassadorial relations with the alliance. The first joint military action was held in 2001. Tbilisi began its efforts to join NATO in 2005. In June 2008, the NATO Trust Fund Project, designed to pay for eliminating old missile stockpiles, was established. Two weeks before the Georgia-Russia war, a NATO Maritime Group visited Batumi, Georgia. (After the war with Russia, the NATO-Georgia Commission was established, according to NATO, to "serve as a forum for both political consultations and practical cooperation to help Georgia achieve its goal of membership in NATO.") The United States has been particularly solicitous of Tbilisi. Total financial assistance for Georgia so far approaches $2 billion. Military aid began in 2002. Three years later, Washington initiated the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program. In 2007 Georgia contributed troops, flown home by America after the Russian invasion last year, to the Iraqi occupation. Washington then promised an additional $1 billion in assistance through next year. President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice all visited Georgia. Last January, Washington signed an agreement with Georgia to establish a "strategic partnership." In short, by all evidence last August Georgia remained on the road to NATO despite the April detour. Moreover, the United States had done everything possible to suggest that Tbilisi was a close geopolitical and even military ally. Would adding MAP make any difference? MAP neither carries a security commitment nor even guarantees NATO membership. Ironically, to the extent that Moscow feared the prospect of NATO membership for Georgia, establishing MAP might have accelerated war. Then Russia would have had an incentive to attack before Tbilisi enjoyed the benefits of an Article 5 security guarantee. No more effective would be other measures recently suggested to bolster Tbilisi, including reiterating the West's commitment to Georgian sovereignty and increasing nonmilitary ties with the Georgian government. What about NATO membership, carrying Washington's promise to go to war? Maybe, but history is replete with examples of alliances that fail to stop conflict. And when deterrence fails, they become transmission belts of war. The worst war of human history, **W**orld **W**ar **II, began despite** the extension of **security guarantees** designed to deter conflict. Both France and Great Britain promised to go to war if Germany attacked Poland. Germany attacked Poland and both France and Great Britain ended up at war with Germany. One can argue about whether the commitments to Poland were prudent. But they obviously failed to deter war. Japan entered the war by attacking British and Dutch colonies in East Asia. Tokyo simultaneously attacked the Philippines and Pearl Harbor, guaranteed to bring the United States into the war as well. Japan was not deterred. **W**orld **W**ar **I provided an even more dramatic example** of alliances expanding rather than restricting conflict. The Entente squared off against the Central Powers. Both sides believed the other one would back down and, if not, that war was both necessary and winnable. So much for the deterrent value of security guarantees. The phenomenon of deterrence failing to prevent war is not limited to the twentieth century. Alliances have been common throughout history and conflicts with and between alliances have been almost as common. The causes of war are complex and some alliances were created for offensive rather than defensive purposes. Nevertheless, nations have routinely ignored security guarantees issued by third and fourth countries and gone to war nonetheless. The Peloponnesian War, which occurred in the fifth century BC, featured opposing alliances: the Delian League, led by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta. The respective groupings expanded, intensified, and prolonged conflict rather than preventing it. The Roman Republic was part of and fought against alliances. Countervailing agreements and confederations did not deter it from conducting the Samnite Wars and the Latin War. The First Punic War grew out of intervention on behalf of allies against states backed by the other power. Carthage invaded Italy in the Second Punic War despite Rome's alliance with nearby states. The Thirty Years' War featured the League of Evangelical Union versus the Catholic League (and more territories as the conflict developed). In the Anglo-Dutch wars, both the English and Dutch possessed allies. French King Louis XIV's aggressive empire-building spawned a broad alliance against him, but did little to curb his ambitions, leading to the Nine Years' War. The eighteenth century featured a series of conflicts among a kaleidoscope constantly changing coalitions. Every government was aware that initiating war likely would entail conflict with several states, yet that did not prevent the War of the Spanish Succession, War of the Quadruple Alliance, Austro-Russo-Turkish War, Russo-Turkish War, War of the Polish Succession, Seven Years' War and Crimean War. More by Doug Bandow Although France was the dominant single power during the Napoleonic wars, there were alliances and coalitions on both sides. Paris could assume that any continental military action would bring it against an alliance including Great Britain, France's constant opponent—but Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte rarely hesitated in acting militarily, including invading (most disastrously) Russia. Before World War I, the members of the anti-Ottoman coalition in the First Balkan War had a falling out, leading Bulgaria to turn on its erstwhile allies. Most of these conflicts were extraordinarily complex and assessing the exact role of alliances in restraining or promoting war is difficult. Noteworthy, however, is how often alliance memberships and security guarantees did not prevent conflict. In many cases, contending **parties** either **discount** the **likelihood of countries acting on** their **promises** **or believe** the **stakes warrant risking war. Both** likely **apply to Russia in** **Georgia. Moscow has far greater interests in the region,** diminishing the likelihood of U.S. intervention. Moreover, in the event of war, **Russia can** more easilyintervene **initially** and **counter American action, forcing Washington** to take the greater riskof **escalating**. If an outsider had to bet on which country would back down in a crisis, the odds would have to be on the United States.

Hegemony destroys effective institutions global public goods.

Ikenberry et al 9 **-** G. John Ikenberry is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, Michael Mastanduno is a professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, William C. Wohlforth is a professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, World Politics, 61.1, Jan, MUSE

Unipolarity and Revisionism: Is the Unipole a Satisfied State? The stability of any international system depends significantly on the degree to which the major powers are satisfied with the status quo.17 In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin argued that **leading states “will** attempt to **change** the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.”18 In the quarter century since that book’s publication, international relations scholars have never seriously debated whether the “expected net gain” of systemic revisionism might be positive for the United States. It is hardly surprising that scholars set aside the question of revising the territorial status quo—it is hard to imagine plausible arguments for the utility of large-scale conquest in an age of nuclear weapons and economic globalization. But the territorial status quo is only a part of what Gilpin meant by “international system.” The other part comprises the rules, **institutions**, and standards of legitimacy that frame daily interactions. Why has there been no scholarly debate on whether the United States might seek to revise that aspect of the system? In the 1980s, to be sure, the question did not seem relevant. Scholars believed that the United States was in relative decline, so the costs of changing the system were simply assumed to be high, and a U.S. preference for the status quo appeared obvious. The transition from bipolarity to unipolarity arguably represented a dramatic power shift in favor of the United States, altering Gilpin’s equation toward revisionism. Yet the question of whether, as a new unipole, the United States might adopt a more revisionist stance has not figured centrally in international relations research. The reason was a key assumption built into almost all research on hegemonic stability and power transition theory: that the leading state in any international system is bound to be satisfied. Hence, research on the origins of satisfaction and revisionism is soverwhelmingly about subordinate states, not the dominant state.19 [End Page 12] Robert Jervis’s article in this issue demonstrates that this assumption is no longer tenable. While the case can be made that a unipole—particularly one that achieved this status in an international system already strongly shaped by its power and preferences—might rationally opt for conservatism,20 international relations scholarship is rich with hypotheses proposing that the opposite is equally if not more likely. Jervis argues that **unipolarity offers powerful** structural **incentives** for the leading state **to be revisionist.** These include the **absence of countervailing power,** the **tendency for** both the **interests and the fears of the** leading **state to increase as** its relative **capabilities increase**, and the psychological tendency to worry more about the future to the extent the present situation is desirable. Jervis also suggests that these structural incentives are **reinforced by** particular features of the American approach to unipolarity—**the sense** **after** the attacks of **September 11**, 2001, that **the world** could and **must be transformed** **and the** enduring and **widespread belief** that international **peace** and cooperation **will** **be** sustained **only when** **all** other important **states are democratic**. The structural and contingent features of contemporary unipolarity point plausibly in the direction of a revisionist unipole, one simultaneously powerful, fearful, and opportunistic. Unipolarity and the Provision of Public Goods Public or collective goods may be consumed by multiple actors without those actors necessarily having to pay the full costs of producing them. The classic theoretical insight is that if enough actors follow their rational self-interest and choose to free ride on the efforts of others, public goods will be underproduced or not produced at all.21 Overcoming the free-rider problem therefore requires cooperation among self-interested actors.22 A good part of the ir literature, in particular that associated with hegemonic stability theory, hypothesizes that cooperation in international relations requires the leadership of a dominant state.23 [End Page 13] Given its preponderance of economic and military resources, the dominant state has the ability to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of providing international collective goods such as an open world economy or a stable security order. The dominant state has an interest in bearing those costs because it benefits disproportionately from promoting systemwide outcomes that reflect its values and interests. During the cold war the United States took on the responsibilities that Kindleberger argued were needed to promote international economic stability, such as serving as an open market of last resort and allowing the use of its currency for exchange and reserve purposes. International economic stability among the Western powers reinforced their security alliance against the Soviet Union. The United States also bore a disproportionate share of the direct costs of Western alliance security. The Soviet Union, on its side of the international divide, ultimately shouldered disproportionate alliance costs as well.24 Waltz took the argument a step further, arguing that in the bipolar system the United States and the Soviet Union may have been adversaries but, as the two dominant powers, shared a mutual interest in system stability, an interest that prompted them to cooperate in providing public goods such as nuclear nonproliferation.25 Hedley Bull makes a similar point in his classic study of the international system as a society of states.26 How might the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar system affect the inclination of the now singularly dominant state to provide international public goods? Two hypotheses arise, with contradictory behavioral expectations. First, we might expect a unipole to take on an even greater responsibility for the provision of international public goods. The capabilities of a unipole relative to other major states are greater than those of either dominant power in a bipolar structure. The unipole’s incentive should be stronger as well, since it now has the opportunity to influence international outcomes globally, not just in its [End Page 14] particular subsystem. We should expect the unipole to try to “lock in” a durable international order that reflects its interests and values.27 A second hypothesis, however, suggests the opposite. **We should expect a unipolar power to underproduce public goods** despite its preponderant capabilities. The fact that it is unthreatened by peer competitors and relatively unconstrained by other states creates incentives for the unipole **to pursue** more **parochial interests** even **at the expense of a stable** **international order**. The fact that it is extraordinarily powerful means that **the unipole will be more** **inclined to force adjustment costs on others**, rather than bear disproportionate burdens itself. Two of the contributions below address these issues. Michael Mastanduno’s analysis of the global political economy shows that the dominant state will be both system maker and privilege taker—it will seek simultaneously to provide public goods and to exploit its advantageous structural position for parochial gain. It enlists the cooperation of other states and seeks, with varying degrees of success, to force adjustment burdens upon them. Jervis suggests that because the unipole has wide discretion in determining the nature and the extent of the goods provided, **its efforts are** likely to be **perceived** by less powerful states **as hypocritical attempts to mask** the actual pursuit of **private goods**.

Extinction.

DC 4 – Magazine for Development and Cooperation, funded by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Where Markets Fail, March, http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/03-2004/edit\_art1.html

There are also **public goods at the global level**. They **include** the **control of** dangerous **diseases, fair rules to govern** international **trade**, **protection of the atmosphere and** of **biodiversity**, **peace** and security, **as well as a stable finance system**. Only multilateral coordination can handle deficits that arise globally. In political and conceptual terms, an International Task Force on Global Public Goods is working on getting a clearer grip of humankind’s shared interests. The aim is to improve the capacity for action at intergovernmental and supranational levels. The German Development Ministry supports the Task Force (Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, p. 100). The UNDP Director who has drawn international attention to the concept of public goods emphasises the useful impact it might have on multilateral politics (interview with Inge Kaul, p. 104). However, the **unfulfilled** **need for international coordination is evidence of the weaknesses of the current** multilateral **system** (Dirk Messner, p. 111). Moreover, the debate does not, of course, take place in a power vacuum. The question is how to make the Global Public Goods agenda palatable for developing countries. Many of them have so far experienced multilateral politics subjected to orders from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and as wallflowers in the World Trade Organisation rather than as partners with equal rights (Mariama Williams, p. 113). Without doubt, a utopian element of hope marks the debate on Global Public Goods. However, its core of the – economically defined – public interest is brilliantly rational. After all, economics is originally the science of the intelligent use of resources. Unfortunately, economics jargon is far too often abused for non-sense rhetoric with the intention of making political cases seem irrefutable. Citizens then become customers, public administrations are turned into management agencies, and matters of public interest are reduced to objects of narrow-minded bean-counting. This is not so in the case of Global Public Goods. Here **we are dealing with** correctly defined **issues of humankind’s** welfare and **survival**. The very fact that the concept has not yet been made operational in political terms makes the debate about Global Public Goods all the more relevant. The converging global society must meet enormous challenges – and that implies that **governments have to pursue** strategies of **cross-border cooperation**. It may be impossible to check what happens with every single German tax euro in a multilateral policy context and, indeed, the negotiations are prone to be more complicated and time-consuming than in the case of bilateral agreements. The **challenges** of globalisation, however, **will not be mastered with** **individual** bilateral **projects** – **no matter how successful** they might turn out.

Hegemony causes prolif, makes collapse and war inevitable.

Jervis 9 – Professor of international politics at Columbia University, Robert, World Politics, 61.1, Jan, MUSE

Failure would not mean that the system will soon cease being unipolar, however. Only if Europe truly unites (an increasingly distant prospect) could bipolarity be restored. Barring drastic internal instability, the PRC is likely to continue to rise but cannot be a global challenger in the foreseeable future. **The most likely system-changing force is proliferation,** and ironically **unipolarity gives** many **states good reasons to seek nuclear weapons**. Although allies sometimes doubted the American commitment during the cold war, the very strength of the Soviet Union meant that the U.S. would pay a high price if it did not live up to its promises to defend them**. The unipole has more freedom of action.** Even if the unipole’s costs of protecting others are lower, those states have less reason to be confident that it will stand by them forever. The existence of a security community does not entirely displace the fear of an uncertain future that is the hallmark of international politics**. American enemies like North Korea and Iran face** more immediate **incentives to defend themselves**, incentives that were increased but not created by the overthrow of Saddam’s regime. Indeed, the U.S. has spurred proliferation by stressing the danger posed by “rogue” states with nuclear weapons, treating North Korea much more gingerly than Iraq, and indicating that it can be deterred by even a few atomic bombs. Its very efforts to stop other countries from getting nuclear weapons imply that the consequences of their succeeding will be great, a belief that is questionable but could easily be self-fulfilling. Furthermore, regional domino effects are likely: a growing North Koreannuclear force could lead Japan to develop nuclear weapons, and if Iran continues its program others in the region may follow suit. Thus both American overexpansion and the fear that it will eventually withdraw will encourage others to get nuclear weapons. This raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system **in a proliferated world**. The **American ability to coerce others would decrease** but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents.55 The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. How they would use this increased security is far from clear, however. **They might intensify conflict with neighbors because they no longer fear all-out war**, or, on the contrary, they might be willing to engage in greater cooperation [End Page 212] because the risks of becoming dependent on others would be reduced. In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important. Unipolarity—at least under current circumstances—may then have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification, and the resulting world would pose interesting challenges to both scholars and national leaders. [End Page 213]

Withdrawal won’t cause Asian war—China won’t be expansionist.

Glaser, PhD Prof PoliSci @ George Washington U, 2011

Charles, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?”, Foreign Affairs, 90.2

Some realist pessimists argue that in order to be highly secure, China will find itself compelled to pursue regional hegemony, fueling conflict along the way. However, **China's size, power, location, and nuclear arsenal will** **make it very challenging to attack successfully**. China will not need to push the United States out of its region in order to be secure, because a forward U.S. presence will not undermine China's core deterrent capabilities. A major **U.S. withdrawal,** moreover, **would not automatically yield Chinese regional hegemony, because Japan and South** **Korea might then acquire stronger** conventional **military capabilities** and nuclear capabilities of their own, greatly **reducing China's coercive potential. A Chinese drive for regional hegemony**, therefore, **would be** both **unnecessary and infeasible**.

China isn’t a regional threat – no risk of war.

Dyer, 2005 (Gwynne, “China unlikely to engage in military confrontation,” March 12,The Jakarta Post, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/03/12/china-unlikely-engage-military-confrontation.html)

Given America's monopoly or huge technological lead in key areas like stealth bombers, aircraft carriers, long-range sensors, satellite surveillance and even infantry body armor, Goss's warning is misleading and self-serving. **China cannot project** a **serious** **military force even 200 miles** (km) **from home**, while American forces utterly dominate China's ocean frontiers, many thousands of miles (kilometers) from the United States. But the drumbeat of warnings about **China's ""military build**-**up"**" continues. Just the other week U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was worrying again about the expansion of the Chinese navy, which is finally building some amphibious landing ships half a century after Beijing's confrontation with the non-Communist regime on the island of Taiwan began. And Senator Richard Lugar, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that if the European Union ends its embargo on arms sales to China, the U.S. would stop military technology sales to Europe. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that the major U.S. defense review planned for this year will concentrate on the rising ""threat"" from China, or that this year for the first time the joint U.S.-Japanese defense policy statement named China as a ""security concern"", or that the Taiwan government urged the ""military encirclement"" of China to prevent any ""foreign adventures"" by Beijing. It comes as no surprise -- but it still makes no sense. China's defense budget this year is 247.7 billion yuan: Around US$30 billion at the official exchange rate. There are those in Washington who will say that it's more like $60 billion in purchasing power, but then there used to be ""experts"" who annually produced hugely inflated and frightening estimates of the Soviet defense budget. Such people will always exist: to justify a big U.S. defense budget, you need a big threat. It's true that 247.7 billion yuan buys an awful lot of warm bodies in military uniform in the low-wage Chinese economy, but it doesn't actually buy much more in the way of high-tech military systems. It's also true that the Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years: This year it's up by 12.6 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing, and it's about what you have to spend in order to convert what used to be a glorified peasant militia into a modern military force. It would be astonishing if China chose NOT to modernize its armed forces as the rest of the economy modernizes, and the end **result is not** **going to be a military machine that towers above all others**. If you project the current growth rates of military spending in China and the United States into the future, China's defense budget catches up with the United States about the same time that its Gross Domestic Product does, in the late 2030s or the early 2040s. As to China's strategic intentions, the record of the past is reassuring in several respects. **China has** **almost never been militarily expansionist** beyond the traditional boundaries of the Middle Kingdom (which do include Tibet in the view of most Chinese), and **its border clashes with** **India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam** in the first decades of Communist rule generally **ended with** a **voluntary** **Chinese withdrawal** from the disputed territories. The same moderation has usually applied in nuclear matters. The CIA frets that China could have a hundred nuclear missiles targeted on the United States by 2015, but that is actually evidence of China's great restraint. The first Chinese nuclear weapons test was forty years ago, and by now China could have thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on the U.S. if it wanted. (The United States DOES have thousands of nuclear warheads that can strike Chinese targets.) The Beijing regime is obsessed with economic stability, because it fears that a severe downturn would trigger social and political upheaval. The last thing it wants is a military confrontation with its biggest trading partner, the United States. It will go on playing the nationalist card over Taiwan to curry domestic political favor, but **there is no massive military build-up and no plausible threat of impending war in East Asia.**