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#### Interpretation—the resolution requires them to defend enactment of a topical USFG policy.

Ericson 3 Jon, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Impacts

#### A. Limits—failure to adhere to the communal topic leaves one side unprepared, resulting in shallow and un-educational debate—a balanced controversy is key to decision-making skills.

Steinberg and Freeley 8 – Justin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, and David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 43-45

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### B. Switch-side debate—only our framework creates a form of education that improves critical thinking and prevents violent dogmatism.

Olbrys 6—Stephen Gencarella Olbrys (Ph.D., Indiana University, 2003) is Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Massachusetts, Dissoi Logoi, Civic Friendship, and the Politics of Education, Communication Education, Vol. 55, No. 4, October 2006, pp. 353-369

Unlike the ABOR and Powell Memo, both of which institutionalize opposition, adaptation of dissoi logoi warrants engagement. The metaphor of balance shifts from one of equal distribution of opinions on campus to the action of keeping one’s poise, of teaching students to maintain an intellectual equilibrium through a deep understanding of their footing. The aim of practice in dissoi logoi is not simply awareness of other ideas\*often shorthand in consumer society for paying attention only to opinions one wishes to hear\*but rather the ability to reproduce them, to understand them, and to critique them all. This meets Bauerlein’s (2004) call for adversarial voices in higher education but also moves to internalize that process as a productive friction for the development of an individual’s intellect and character rather than simply externalize it through the establishment of a spokesperson marketplace; as such, this practice would place an onus on the student to take responsibility for their own education as a site of productive friction and on the professor for encouraging such responsibility and reflexivity. Judicious adaptation of dissoi logoi is thus necessary to combat the political divisiveness and enclaves ultimately encouraged by the Powell Memo and ABOR.

A thorough historical understanding of the Sophistic movement and early conceptualizations of democracy would benefit students in several ways. First, it provides ample preparation to argue one’s opinion eloquently. This is the closest sense to the Sophists’ notion, a way to influence the polity through oratorical finesse; the (ancient) metaphor here is a ‘‘throw,’’ the learned ability to parry an opponent in wrestling. Second, practice in dissoi logoi encourages the ethical appreciation of other positions, which in turn creates an empathy counter to the prevalent politics of ideological piety aiming for annihilation of differing opinions. A prochoice student assuming an anti-abortion role could not, for example, merely assert ‘‘I want to dominate women,’’ just as a anti-abortion student could not simply declare in opposition, ‘‘I want to kill babies.’’ Both would have to conduct considerable research to argue the contrary claim. Third, dissoi logoi in the curriculum places intellectual pressure on student ideologues of any persuasion, including those uncommitted to general education. Fourth, the responsibility to understand multiple perspectives activates an integrative approach to education (cf. Gayle, 2004). Earnest performances of dissoi logoi demand importing concepts, information, and experiences from other classes, while at the same time providing practical training for the adaptation of knowledge in nonclassroom situations. Fifth, dissoi logoi emphasizes necessary engagement with an alterity that is fundamental for the emergence of citizenship in democracy and public debate. It does not erase the significance of values\*indeed, a profitable topic for discussion could revolve around values as universals or as constructed conventions\*but locates them within historical contexts. Finally, appropriate performance of dissoi logoi affords an alternative to the shouting-matches or programmatic utterances that pass for contemporary debate; and, as a practice of listening (to others and to oneself) as much as speaking, it entails broad questions about human responsibility to other humans. In this manner, dissoi logoi aids a critical thinking marked by student involvement in their own education, but does not reduce talk in the public sphere to rational deliberation bereft of emotions or artistry. This is also a gesture to an ancient notion in which citizens learn to reach good judgments (personal and collective) by hearing various opinions on an issue.

Advocating the practice of dissoi logoi as an integral part of higher education will fuel criticism. Conservatives might argue against the inherent relativism implied by respect for contrary positions. Progressives might take issue with the justification for dominant order in expecting students to speak on its behalf, particularly in a classroom setting where opportunities to challenge that order are more readily available than in the ‘‘real’’ world. Both critiques are legitimate, and are related to concerns about deliberative democratic theories, notably the problems of unequal resources for expression (such as privileging particular cultural or gendered ways of speaking) and the normative approval of voicing opinion over silence. Both conservatives and progressives might call into question the definition of citizenship wrought through this practice, and assert that the other side would simply utilize dissoi logoi as a cover for indoctrination under the guise of neutrality. Likewise, they might note that intellectual exposure does not occur in a vacuum but is contingent upon outside social forces. In an era when progressivism reigns, students would be more inclined to accept progressive values, and vice versa when conservatism reigns. The problematic of detailing arguments for racist, sexist, classist, or homophobic beliefs might quickly arise as a serious concern for classroom decorum and institutional codes concerning hate and free speech, to say nothing of the unease in requiring a student to explain an opinion that they find reprehensible or for which there is no accepted widespread political value (such as fascism), but for which there exist seminal historical texts (such as Mussolini’s The Doctrine of Fascism).

Implementation of dissoi logoi within classroom practice is not simple. It requires an appreciation of the social contexts of education (in knowledge and in citizenship) as a kind of apprenticeship rather than as unchallenged instruction. The positions of power that distinguish students from professors would also require earnest address. While most formulations of academic freedom provide for assignments that require students to represent viewpoints with which they disagree as long as there is a reason germane to the subject matter and no hostility wrought upon the student, dissoi logoi necessitates a further step of open communication with students about the nature of pedagogy itself\*for example, its structure and aims\*if not involvement by the students in deciding upon controversies to engage, appropriate ways to assess their achievements, the possibility of conscientious objection, the shared responsibilities for safe expression, and the means to address inevitable tensions. Such a commitment also requires that professors interrogate their own pieties and practice engagement with adversaries (and the cultivation of civic friendship) themselves. Demonstration of sites of agreement and common human desires (itself a productive impiety in a world predicated on enclaves of political ideology) in tandem with respectful invitations for adversaries to present their case would not only be novel\*and thereby attractive to undergraduates\*but serve the purpose of modeling in the classroom the kind of democratic behavior hoped for outside it.

Before abandoning dissoi logoi as too risky or unsettling, then, let us consider the educative gains in its contentious nature. Let us assume that a class addresses terrorism from a perspective of dissoi logoi. The first topic for discussion might be whether this is even suitable for such a practice. That is, are some issues so obvious to common sense and community values that they cannot be made problematic, or so reprehensible that they should not be defended, even if hypothetically or in an attempt to understand the structure of their logic? A range of questions would follow. Beyond addressing the views on the left and the right for the causes of and responses to terrorism, would students need to discuss\*and therefore gain knowledge of\* militant fundamentalist Islam’s difference from mainstream Muslim religious practice? Should the history of Israel come into play, or European colonization of the Middle East? Should the representation of the United States in American media be juxtaposed to that on al-Jazeera? Should the United States close its borders to immigrants and keep tabs on minority communities? Should the sympathies and sensitivities of the classroom participants play in the decision to have a discussion in which all students would be responsible for voicing all opinions? All of these are important questions for serious public discussions concerning American responses to terrorism, and the pursuit of any of them requires thorough research and an abiding commitment to an active learning that challenges taken-for-granted assumptions.

Civic Friendship and the Question of Citizenship in Higher Education

Although they offer starkly different solutions, both the oppositional model of ABOR and the Powell Memo and the engagement model of dissoi logoi respond to the tyranny of any dominant ideology in higher education. Both also draw attention to the absence in contemporary American society of civic friendship as getting along with others whose opinions differ from one’s own. Discussions of civic friendship are missing from most assessments of pedagogy on either the left or the right, a lack that flatly impoverishes theories of democratic education to assist students in becoming citizens in a world predicated on pluralism and tolerance of other’s opinions.

Long theorized as a necessary component of healthy political order, the concept of civic friendship is itself currently in flux. Recent considerations have recognized its role in education (Blacker, 2003; Scorza, 2004) and as an antidote to what Kahane (1999) calls the politics of annihilation. These developments conceptualize civic friendship in a much different manner than do Neo-Aristotleans (who rely heavily on ancient notions of fraternity, similarity, and instrumentality), communitarians and civic republicans (who regard such bonds as a social obligation), theorists of an ethic of care (who require willing emotional capacities to embrace alterity), and traditional liberals (who locate friendship within the private sphere).

Blacker, for example, draws upon Rawlsian political liberalism in defining civic friendship as an expression of mutual respect and concern for democracy’s stability (Blacker, 2003, p. 249) but seeks a path that would accommodate the constitutional nonestablishment principle and the comprehensive moral groundings of religious and secular organizations in any given local community. In this model, civic friendship operates ‘‘in the service of deepening citizens’ chosen comprehensive allegiances’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 254), but also fosters exposure to the moral codes of others to assist in the understanding of democratic pluralism and to overcome mutual suspicions; public schools assist in creating contexts for discussion and interaction rather than overtly teaching specific moral orthodoxies. For Blacker, exposure to rather than sheltering from the deepest moral convictions of others (whether political, religious, or aesthetic) is the sine qua non of civic friendship, ‘‘where one develops an ability to perceive and, where appropriate, appreciate what lies beneath and behind the politics of those who agree and, most importantly, those who do not’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 261). To achieve these goals, he advocates a ‘‘school stamps’’ program for extracurricular activities and the creation of student counseling groups drawn from diverse community members. Blacker concludes with praise of civic friendship as a worthy challenge to an education that avoids controversy under the guise of decorum, and as sound pedagogical justification when ‘‘fundamentalist parents complain about environmentalist volunteers, atheist parents about clergy, and the whole lot of them about who-knows-what’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 267).

Blacker’s comments coincide with Scorza’s, for whom civic friendship is best modeled on Emerson’s ‘‘turbulent union,’’ a regard for one’s friend as a ‘‘beautiful enemy’’ who tempts us to become like them (Scorza, 2004, p. 95). Emerson’s political friendship opposes as anti-democratic those ‘‘conceited’’ forms of interaction that seek only to conquer rather than to learn from the other. As such, Emerson (and Scorza) posit the communicative norms of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘tenderness’’ at the root of civic friendship, meaning a coupling of a frankness and the ‘incivility’ to speak one’s mind with a respect and the civility to engage the other as a worthy equal. Like Scorza, Kahane recognizes that friendships (personal and civic) evolve, and locates a recognition of the ‘‘ongoing relationship\*not shared objective qualities or capacities’’ (Kahane, 1999, p. 269) as the basis for this practice, since such evolving commitment also permits friends to disagree and even to fight but to likewise establish limits preventing a total dissolution of the friendship. Scorza (2004, p. 91) upholds the case of Jefferson and Adams as an example of a friendship that developed over time and between fierce political rivals. Similarly for Kahane, an ongoing relationship necessitates a developing sense of a history of contact to cement a valued coformation and encourage its repeated performance in the future.

Blacker, Scorza, and Kahane do not declare a one-to-one correlation between personal friendship and civic friendship but do perceive politically significant structural similarities. Recognizing also that friendship cannot be imposed from authority, they all suggest that materialized opportunities for civic friendship (without long-standing artificialities or limits to communication, as installed by many versions of discourse ethics) might ignite very positive ventures for the individual’s moral development and for the improvement of democratic pluralism by fostering respect for alterity. This is not to suggest a naı¨vete´ about what leads contemporary undergraduates to establish bonds of friendship, nor to deny the massive number of influences beyond the classroom that may pull them against civic friendship with those who differ ideologically, nor to propose that higher education should unconditionally and primarily become a conduit for friendship. It is, instead, to recognize a correlation between undergraduates struggling to define themselves as citizens in a society marked by lip-service to diversity and extreme divisiveness in politics on the one hand, and the possible function of education to assist the young in becoming participants in a pluralist democracy on the other.

Civic friendship provides a context for the appreciation of citizenship as both a subject of intellectual inquiry and a communicative practice. In turn, the question of citizenship emerges as an apt topic for disputation within the classroom. The differences between the Powell Memo, ABOR, and Campus Compact might, for example, provide a point of entry for students to examine the different configurations of citizenship within liberal democracy depending on the inflection of liberal democracy or liberal democracy. That is, all three programmatic statements suggest a correlation between ideas taught in the classroom and behaviors of matriculated students in public culture. The Powell Memo does not specifically address higher education’s role in civic education but implies such influence in the argument against radicalizing pedagogies. The actual word ‘‘citizen’’ appears infrequently in the document, but in usage reveals an intimate connection between education and citizenship. Powell claims, for example, that business executives must be ‘‘good citizens,’’ dismisses the head of the AFL-CIO as not ‘‘the most endearing or publicminded of citizens’’ from a business perspective, and justifies ‘‘citizen groups’’ who rewrite textbooks. ‘‘Citizen’’ here functions rhetorically in two ways: as a catch phrase for someone whose behavior is judged by others and as an organized political group. Given the context of the corporate mission outlined by Powell, it would be judicious to view this notion of citizenship within the lens of liberal democracy, which emphasizes particular rights (property and voting especially) and maintains a close kinship with consumer identity.

The language of ABOR differs from the Powell Memo in this regard, a point that would be instructive for students to recognize so as not to assume all oppositional models of education are alike. ABOR opens with a direct commentary on the mission of the university as the pursuit of truth, the discovery of new knowledge through scholarship and research, the study and reasoned criticism of intellectual and cultural traditions, the teaching and general development of students to help them become creative individuals and productive citizens of a pluralistic democracy, and the transmission of knowledge and learning to a society at large. This commitment to citizenship aligns ABOR with the aforementioned Campus Compact Presidents’ Declaration, which warrants that institutions provide students opportunities to ‘‘embrace the duties of active citizenship and civic participation’’ and to demonstrate and teach democratic principles. A cynical reading of ABOR might take its abundant mission statement as parasitic, drawing upon metaphors from the Ivory Tower and civic education to appear authentic to both. Let us assume, however, that the language of ABOR is genuine and in agreement with Campus Compact. If so, they advance a notion of citizenship as a performative mode, one that emphasizes the democratic more strongly than liberalism.

Drawing the distinction between these two inflections of liberal democracy\*or between those that argue higher education should have no role in the training of citizens (as Fish’s aforementioned essay does) and those that do (such as the Memo, ABOR, and Campus Compact)\*is no easy task but certainly one that exists within the purview of legitimate academic exercise, especially in classes dedicated to the theory and practice of rhetoric. The nuances and multiple variations of each theme require substantial intellectual work, and any position on citizenship taken by students could be held responsible to such informed research. Yet, the students’ discussion need not terminate solely with demonstration of knowledge of the histories and trajectories of various conceptualizations of citizenship. They might also become the topic for a formidable exchange over the nature and needs of citizenship in contemporary society, and might likewise entail debate over the ‘‘best’’ kind of ‘‘education suited to the realization of citizenship’’ (Callan 2004, p. 71). In other words, through their research on the subject of citizenship, students could be encouraged towards reflexive action that asks them to debate the values they come to understand. Such a cultivation of reflexivity, performed within a context of dissoi logoi, also suggests that the question of citizenship in higher education is not left strictly to faculty and administrators to decide. Rather, students must come to terms with and take up the question of citizenship themselves. A pedagogy that encourages civic friendship provides a stable and ‘safe’ ground for this unfolding, a scaffolding into citizenship through civic friendship.

Conclusion

In the interest of all students, it is important to treat seriously the recent call for diversity in higher education by conservative critics. Analysis of the rhetorical structures of the Powell Memo and ABOR reveals, however, a similarity that justifies cause for alarm among progressive, moderate, and even libertarian educators. These texts call for higher education to be moved by degrees to serve corporate conservatism rather than the general good. Still, throughout ABOR and other calls for civic education such as Campus Compact, there arises a common exhortation for a balanced relationship between teaching knowledge and training in citizenship in public higher education. One problem inherent in oppositional models of education such as ABOR (or its progressive equivalents) is the development of a history of contact between different political traditions and moralities. ABOR and the Powell Memo establish forums for opposition, not exchange; taken to their extremes, the end result is that youth simply pen themselves into their own tribe’s enclaves and never test ideas and beliefs against alternatives. This would be a disaster in terms of student intellectual and ethical development. In contrast, an emphasis on engagement models of education such as dissoi logoi would address this absence of contact, and through them the classroom would become a site for lively disputation over public virtues and the impetus for fostering relationships predicated on respect and understanding.

In direct response to those who, like Fish, assert that educators ‘‘do their job,’’ I contend that training in democratic citizenship is an important part of the work of scholars in rhetoric, following a tradition that hearkens to antiquity. Adaptations ofdissoi logoi are necessary to expand the practice’s applicability for the intellectual development and civic engagement of all students in contemporary society, but such practice echoes an ancient expectation for a mixture of knowledge and oratorical display in presenting a case. This emphasis on knowledge united with rhetorical performance should satisfy those who seek the academic benefits of the Ivory Tower and those who regard public education as civic training. To require participation in this practice within the classroom would provide an antidote to the apathy permeating contemporary public culture and prevent higher education from becoming an instrument of party politics without resorting to closed enclaves of thought.

Both oppositional and engagement models raise the question of suitable contexts to cultivate civic friendships through which students gain a more thorough understanding of their own moral capacities and of those in others with whom they must find a way to get along in pluralist democratic society. Although there are no definitive reasons why an oppositional model could not promote civic friendship, when such opposition unfolds on campus merely as the creation of antagonist enclaves rather than opportunities for students to struggle internally and with others over political ideas that inform their social worlds and identities, the meaningfulness of the gesture of friendship is easily lost. This essay has argued that the practice of dissoi logoi more readily serves the purpose of civic friendship, particularly if it puts into play debate over the very meanings of citizenship and friendship, and the role of higher education in the cultivation of both. In this manner, all educators and students may participate in the discussion of public virtues as an intellectual and civic enterprise, and appreciate higher education as a place to interrogate everything and to take nothing for granted in the pursuit of understanding and knowledge.

#### Dogmatic decision-making causes extinction—the habits of thinking formed by switch-side debate solve every global problem.

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Popular culture offers one other myth about decision-making which is worth questioning. And that is the belief that when we make reflective decisions we carefully weigh each of our options, giving due consideration to all of them in turn, before deciding which we will adopt. Although perhaps it should be, research on human decision-making shows that this simply is not what happens.4 When seeking to explain how people decide on an option with such conviction that they stick to their decision over time and with such confidence that they act on that decision, the concept that what we do is build a Dominance Structure has been put forth. In a nutshell this theory suggests that when we settle on a particular option which is good enough we tend to elevate its merits and diminish its flaws relative to the other options. We raise it up in our minds until it becomes for us the dominant option. In this way, as our decision takes shape, we gain confidence in our choice and we feel justified in dismissing the other options, even though the objective distance between any of them and our dominant option may not be very great at all. But we become invested in our dominant option to the extent that we are able to put the other possibilities aside and act on the basis of our choice. In fact, it comes to dominate the other options in our minds so much that we are able to sustain our decision to act over a period of time, rather than going back to re-evaluate or reconsider constantly. Understanding the natural phenomenon of dominance structuring can help us appreciate why it can be so difficult for us to get others to change their minds, or why it seems that our reasons for our decisions are so much better than any of the objections which others might make to our decisions. This is not to say that we are right or wrong. Rather, this is only to observe that human beings are capable of unconsciously building up defenses around their choices which can result in the warranted or unwarranted confidence to act on the basis of those choices. Realizing the power of dominance structuring, one can only be more committed to the importance of education and critical thinking. We should do all that we can to inform ourselves fully and to reflect carefully on our choices before we make them, because we are, after all, human and we are as likely as the next person to believe that we are right and they are wrong once the dominance structure begins to be erected. Breaking through that to fix bad decisions, which is possible, can be much harder than getting things right in the first place. There are more heuristics than only those mentioned above. There is more to learn about dominance structuring as it occurs in groups as well as in individuals, and how to mitigate the problems which may arise by prematurely settling on a “good enough” option, or about how to craft educational programs or interventions which help people be more effective in their System 1 and System 2 thinking. There is much to learn about human thinking and how to optimize it in individuals of different ages; how to optimize the thinking of groups of peers and groups where organizational hierarchies influence interpersonal dynamics. And, happily, there is a lot we know today about human thinking and decision-making that we did not know a few years ago. Which brings us to the final question, “Why is critical thinking of particular value?” Let us start with you first. Why would it be of value to you to have the cognitive skills of interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self- regulation? Why would it be of value to you to learn to approach life and to approach specific concerns with the critical thinking dispositions listed above? Would you have greater success in your work? Would you get better grades? Actually the answer to the grades question, scientifically speaking, is very possibly, Yes! A study of over 1100 college students shows that scores on a college level critical thinking skills test significantly correlated with college GPA.5 It has also been shown that critical thinking skills can be learned, which suggests that as one learns them one’s GPA might well improve. In further support of this hypothesis is the significant correlation between critical thinking and reading comprehension. Improvements in the one are paralleled by improvements in the other. Now if you can read better and think better, might you not do better in your classes, learn more, and get better grades. It is, to say the least, very plausible. Learning, Critical Thinking, and Our Nation’s Future But what a limited benefit — better grades. Who really cares in the long run? Two years after college, five years out, what does GPA really mean? Right now college level technical and professional programs have a half-life of about four years, which means that the technical content is expanding so fast and changing so much that in about four years after graduation your professional training will be in serious need of renewal. So, if the only thing a college is good for is to get the entry level training and the credential needed for some job, then college would be a time-limited value. Is that the whole story? A job is a good thing, but is that what a college education is all about, getting started in a good job? Maybe some cannot see its further value, but many do. A main purpose, if not the main purpose, of the collegiate experience, at either the two-year or the four-year level, is to achieve what people have called a “liberal education.” Not liberal in the sense of a smattering of this and that for no particular purpose except to fulfill the unit requirement. But liberal in the sense of “liberating.” And who is being liberated? You! Liberated from a kind of slavery. But from whom? From professors. Actually from dependence on professors so that they no longer stand as infallible authorities delivering opinions beyond our capacity to challenge, question, and dissent. In fact, this is exactly what the professors want. They want their students to excel on their own, to go beyond what is currently known, to make their own contributions to knowledge and to society. [Being a professor is a curious job — the more effective you are as a teacher, less your students require your aid in learning.] Liberal education is about learning to learn, to think for yourself, on your own and in collaboration with others. Liberal education leads us away from naïve acceptance of authority, above self- defeating relativism, and beyond ambiguous contextualism. It culminates in principled reflective judgment. Learning critical thinking, cultivating the critical spirit, is not just a means to this end, it is part of the goal itself. People who are poor critical thinkers, who lack the dispositions and skills described, cannot be said to be liberally educated, regardless of the academic degrees they may hold. Yes, there is much more to a liberal education, than critical thinking. There is an understanding of the methods, principles, theories and ways of achieving knowledge which are proper to the different intellectual realms. There is an encounter with the cultural, artistic and spiritual dimensions of life. There is the evolution of one’s decision making to the level of principled integrity and concern for the common good and social justice. There is the realization of the ways all our lives are shaped by global as well as local political, social, psychological, economic, environmental, and physical forces. There is the growth that comes from the interaction with cultures, languages, ethnic groups, religions, nationalities, and social classes other than one’s own. There is the refinement of one’s humane sensibilities through reflection on the recurring questions of human existence, meaning, love, life and death. There is the sensitivity, appreciation and critical appraisal of all that is good and all that is bad in the human condition. As the mind awakens and matures, and the proper nurturing and educational nourishment is provided, these others central parts of a liberal education develop as well. Critical thinking plays an essential role in achieving these purposes. Any thing else? What about going beyond the individual to the community? The experts say critical thinking is fundamental to, if not essential for, “a rational and democratic society.” What might the experts mean by this? Well, how wise would democracy be if people abandoned critical thinking? Imagine an electorate that cared not for the facts, that did not wish to consider the pros and cons of the issues, or if they did, had not the brain power to do so. Imagine your life and the lives of your friends and family placed in the hands of juries and judges who let their biases and stereotypes govern their decisions, who do not attend to the evidence, who are not interested in reasoned inquiry, who do not know how to draw an inference or evaluate one. Without critical thinking people would be more easily exploited not only politically but economically. The impact of abandoning critical thinking would not be confined to the micro-economics of the household checking account. Suppose the people involved in international commerce were lacking in critical thinking skills, they would be unable to analyze and interpret the market trends, evaluate the implications of interest fluctuations, or explain the potential impact of those factors which influence large scale production and distribution of goods and materials. Suppose these people were unable to draw the proper inferences from the economic facts, or unable to properly evaluate the claims made by the unscrupulous and misinformed. In such a situation serious economic mistakes would be made. Whole sectors of the economy would become unpredictable, and large scale economic disaster would become extremely likely**.** So, given a society that does not value and cultivate critical thinking, we might reasonably expect that in time the judicial system and the economic system would collapse. And, in such a society, one that does not liberate its citizens by teaching them to think critically for themselves, it would be madness to advocate democratic forms of government. Is it any wonder that business and civic leaders are maybe even more interested in critical thinking than educators? Critical thinking employed by an informed citizenry is a necessary condition for the success of democratic institutions and for competitive free-market economic enterprise. These values are so important that it is in the national interest that we should try to educate all citizens so that they can learn to think critically. Not just for their own personal good, but for the good of the rest of us too. Generalizing, imagine a society, say, for example, the millions of people living in the Los Angeles basin, or in New York and along the east coast, or in Chicago, or Mexico City, Cairo, Rome, Tokyo, Baghdad, Moscow, Beijing, or Hong Kong. They are, de facto, entirely dependent upon one another, and on hundreds of thousands of other people as well for their external supplies of food and water, for their survival. Now imagine that these millions permitted their schools and colleges to stop teaching people how to think critically and effectively. Imagine that because of war, or AIDS, or famine, or religious conviction, parents could not or would not teach their children how to think critically. Imagine the social and political strife, the falling apart of fundamental systems of public safety and public health, the loss of any scientific understanding of disease control or agricultural productivity, the emergence of paramilitary gangs, strong men, and petty warlords seeking to protect themselves and their own by acquiring control over what food and resources they can and destroying those who stand in their path. Look at what has happened around the world in places devastated by economic embargoes, one-sided warfare, or the AIDS epidemic. Or, consider the problem of global warming, and how important it is for all of us to cooperate with efforts to curtail our uses of fossil fuels in order to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Consider the “cultural revolutions” undertaken by totalitarian rulers. Notice how in virtually every case absolutist and dictatorial despots seek ever more severe limitations on free expression. They label “liberal” intellectuals “dangers to society” and expel “radical” professors from teaching posts because they might “corrupt the youth.” Some use the power of their governmental or religious authority to crush not only their opposition but the moderates as well -- all in the name of maintaining the purity of their movement. They intimidate journalists and those media outlets which dare to comment “negatively” on their political and cultural goals or their heavy handed methods. The historical evidence is there for us to see what happens when schools are closed or converted from places of education to places for indoctrination. We know what happens when children are no longer being taught truth-seeking, the skills of good reasoning, or the lessons of human history and basic science: Cultures disintegrate; communities collapse; the machinery of civilization fails; massive numbers of people die; and sooner or later social and political chaos ensues. Or, imagine a media, a religious or political hegemony which cultivated, instead of critical thinking, all the opposite dispositions? Or consider if that hegemony reinforced uncritical, impulsive decision making and the “ready-shoot-aim” approach to executive action. Imagine governmental structures, administrators, and community leaders who, instead of encouraging critical thinking, were content to make knowingly irrational, illogical, prejudicial, unreflective, short-sighted, and unreasonable decisions. How long might it take for the people in this society which does not value critical thinking to be at serious risk of foolishly harming themselves and each other? In 2007 world news reports spoke of school buildings and teachers being shot terrorists and violently extreme religious zealots. Education which includes a good measure of critical thinking skills and dispositions like truth-seeking and open- mindedness, is a problem for terrorists and extremists because they want to have complete control of what people think. Their methods include indoctrination, intimidation, and the strictest authoritarian orthodoxy. In the “black-and-white” world of “us vs. them” a good education would mean that the people might begin to think for themselves. And that is something these extremists do not want.

#### (\_) Decision-making is the only portable skill—means framework turns case.

Steinberg and Freeley 8 – Justin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, and David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 9-10

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions everyday. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### C.

Policy discussions are key – improves decision-making skills and political engagement.

Esberg & Sagan 12 \*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Debating energy policy is key to addresses future energy needs- must evaluate those consequences

Wirth, Gray & Podesta, 2003 The Future of Energy Policy Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden Gray, and John D. Podesta Timothy E. Wirth is President of the United Nations Foundation and a former U.S. Senator from Colorado. C. Boyden Gray is a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and served as Counsel to former President George H.W. Bush. John D. Podesta is Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and served as Chief of Staff to former President Bill Clinton. Volume 82 • Number 4 Foreign Affairs 2003 Council on Foreign Relations

¶ A century ago, Lord Selborne, the ﬁrst lord of the Admiralty,¶ dismissed the idea of fueling the British navy with something other than¶ coal, which the island nation had in great abundance. “The substitution¶ of oil for coal is impossible,” he pronounced, “because oil does not¶ exist in this world in su⁄cient quantities.” Seven years later, the young¶ Winston Churchill was appointed ﬁrst lord and charged with winning¶ the escalating Anglo-German race for naval superiority. As Daniel¶ Yergin chronicled in The Prize, Churchill saw that oil would increase¶ ship speed and reduce refueling time—key strategic advantages—and¶ ordered oil-burning battleships to be built, committing the navy to¶ this new fuel. Churchill’s was a strategic choice, bold, creative, and¶ farsighted. The energy choices the world faces today are no less¶ consequential, and America’s response must be as insightful. ¶ Energy is fundamental to U.S. domestic prosperity and national¶ security. In fact, the complex ties between energy and U.S. national¶ interests have drawn tighter over time. The advent of globalization,¶ the growing gap between rich and poor, the war on terrorism, and¶ the need to safeguard the earth’s environment are all intertwined¶ with energy concerns.¶ The profound changes of recent decades and the pressing challenges¶ of the twenty-ﬁrst century warrant recognizing energy’s central role in¶ America’s future and the need for much more ambitious and creative¶ approaches. Yet the current debate about U.S. energy policy is mainly¶ about tax breaks for expanded production, access to public lands, and¶ nuances of electricity regulation—di⁄cult issues all, but inadequate for¶ the larger challenges the United States faces. The staleness of the policy¶ dialogue reﬂects a failure to recognize the importance of energy to¶ the issues it aªects: defense and homeland security, the economy, and the¶ environment. What is needed is a purposeful, strategic energy policy,¶ not a grab bag drawn from interest-group wish lists.¶ U.S. energy policies to date have failed to address three great challenges. The ﬁrst is the danger to political and economic security¶ posed by the world’s dependence on oil. Next is the risk to the global¶ environment from climate change, caused primarily by the combustion¶ of fossil fuels. Finally, the lack of access by the world’s poor to modern¶ energy services, agricultural opportunities, and other basics needed¶ for economic advancement is a deep concern.¶ None of these problems of dependence, climate change, or poverty¶ can be solved overnight, but aggressive goals and practical short-term¶ initiatives can jump-start the move to clean and secure energy practices.¶ The key challenges can be overcome with a blend of carefully targeted¶ policy interventions that build on the power of the market, publicprivate partnerships in ﬁnancing and technology development, and,¶ perhaps most important, the development of a political coalition¶ that abandons traditional assumptions and brings together energy¶ interests that have so far engaged only in conﬂict. Turning this¶ ambitious, long-term agenda into reality requires a sober assessment¶ of the United States’ critical energy challenges and the interests that¶ can be mobilized for the necessary political change.

### Case

The 1AC’s obsession with the aesthetic and artistic ignores the dark side of the politics- when we give art and aesthetics the power to propel our political engagement and action we grant it the power to spiral into mass violence. Art can be beautiful but there are those who think atrocity and violence are art- this is a dangerous way to situate the aff and must be rejected

[Michal Lando](http://forward.com/authors/michal-lando/) [freelance writer living in Tel Aviv. She was the New York correspondent for the Jerusalem Post from 2006-2008. Her articles have appeared in the New York Times and the Forward, and her poems have been published in the Masachusetts Review and Chelsea] February 17, 2009. The Aesthetics of Violence Examined A Myriad of Global Approaches on Show in Haifa http://forward.com/articles/103116/the-aesthetics-of-violence-examined/

Following the collapse of the Twin Towers in 2001, German composer Karlheinz Stockhausen was caught musing that the event was “the greatest work of art that is possible,” a statement that provoked widespread outrage and led to the cancellation of several concerts of his work. Though New York Times music critic Anthony Tommasini, among others, perceived Stockhausen’s words as “an affront,” they continue to reverberate, as critics, curators and artists weigh in on the complicated relationship between aesthetics and violence. In the wake of 9/11 and of Stockhausen’s comments and Damien Hirst’s echoes of those comments, thinkers such as Slavoj Zizek (in his book “Welcome to the Desert of the Real”) and Paul Virilio (in his book “Art and Fear”) have tried to unravel our fascination with the violent “spectacle” — arguing that violence is sometimes also aesthetic, as uncomfortable as that may be.It is this exploration that Israeli curators Tami Katz-Freiman and Hadas Maor tapped when they began organizing an ambitious and wide-ranging cluster of exhibits on violence, on display at the Haifa Museum of Art. Israel, no stranger to violence, offers the perfect, if unfortunate, backdrop for art that seeks to deal with the subject of violence and its ability — or inability — to represent it.Leading Israeli artists, including Sigalit Landau, Gilad Efrat, Michal Heiman and Yael Bartana, as well as such renowned international artists as Norbert Bisky (Germany), Ernesto Neto (Brazil), Lida Abdul (Afghanistan) and Biljana Durdevic (Serbia), explore violence and the different responses to it in a series of eight exhibitions that take up the entire three-floor museum — including the stairwell and the entranceway. The implication is that there is no way to escape: Violence is everywhere. The ubiquity of violence did, in part, inspire the series, but among the range of complex political, philosophical and psychological contexts, you will find no straightforwardly documentary approaches.“We made a decision to create distance, to understand the filters artists are using to represent violence,” said Katz-Freiman, chief curator. “We see violence everywhere; it overwhelms our existence. But I was interested in what happens when you turn this into art, and how artists respond to the spectacle of violence.”Ironically, violence weighed heavily on the process of curating the current exhibits. The project is the brainchild of Katz-Freiman, who has been working on it for the past two years. It was delayed because of significant budget cuts following the Second Lebanon War, which reduced the number of new exhibits the museum could afford. In a further irony, the display opened on January 24, one week after the operation in Gaza ended, with the sounds of rockets and bombs still reverberating in the Israeli psyche.But the recent war did more than simply provide an unfortunate context altering not only how the exhibit would be viewed, but also what would be seen. Viewers cannot miss an empty black room where a video of Artur Zmijewski, considered to be one of the most prominent, radical figures on the Polish art scene, was supposed to be. It took almost two years to acquire Zmijewski’s “Them,” a piece that looks at ideological fanaticism, for the exhibit. Katz-Freiman told the Forward that she saw it as a central building block of the exhibit, and so she scheduled significant educational programming around it.But a week before the opening, Zmijewski, who is currently an artist in residence at the Digital Art Lab in Holon, Israel, wrote an e-mail stating that in light of the operation in Gaza, he did not want his video to be exhibited, as it is no longer “relevant.” He offered instead a video piece based on an anti-war protest that took place in Tel Aviv one day before the cease-fire. “Although we freaked out, we said we are open to see his other work,” Katz-Freiman explained. “We are liberal and open-minded.” But after seeing the video two days before the opening, the curators decided against it. “We thought it was a very simplistic art work which doesn’t have the layers and artistic depth we are looking for,” Katz-Freiman said.This year has been designated Polish Year in Israel, and despite Zmijewski’s withdrawal, Poland is represented by Power Games, an exhibit co-organized in Warsaw by the Adam Mickiewicz Institute. The exhibit comprises a range of works created by six prominent visual artists currently working in Poland, and features members of three different generations. Despite their obvious differences, contemporary Polish and Israeli artists seem to share a preoccupation with victimhood, history, nationality and memory. Katz-Freiman, who visited Warsaw and Gdansk in December 2006, was struck by an overwhelming concern with the trauma of World War II. “It seems that the War has become a central component of the search for identity undertaken by many Polish artists,” Katz-Freiman writes in her introduction, showing that while the artistic response to violence is personal, violence is — like political power — centralized and vested in the state. One painting that is especially representative of the exhibit’s themes is by Bisky, a young German artist whose work is one of three solo exhibitions that are part of the exhibit Aesthetics of Violence. “Schwarzmaler” (“Painter of Darkness”), painted in bright colors reminiscent of neo-pop images, features an artist painting a flame from a black cloud of smoke that seems to be erupting out of the blue sky. Bisky captures a moment of strange duality: the artist who creates catastrophe while contemplating aesthetic nuances, such as color and form. His work seizes the uncomfortable affinity between beauty and horror, what Zizek calls our simultaneous attraction to, and repulsion of, violence. But it also touches on the larger themes of translation — turning violence into art, or seeing aesthetics in violence.

Mixing aesthetic concerns with political argument entices a mad melding of power and mass murder in the name of art

Teachout 2003 (Terry, Commentary music critic and the drama critic of the Wall Street Journal, Commentary, September 2003, proquest)

Hitler, in short, was a deranged idealist, a painter who sought power over others in order to make his romantic dreams real, then grew ever more bloodthirsty when the human beings who were his flesh-and-blood medium resisted his transforming touch. He was not the first such murderous artist. As Irving Babbitt wrote of the similarly mad idealists who had unleashed their own reign of terror on France: Robespierre and Saint-Just were ready to eliminate violendy whole social strata that seemed to them to be made up of parasites and conspirators, in order that they might adjust this actual France to the Sparta of their dreams; so that the Terror was far more than is commonly realized a bucolic episode. It lends color to the assertion that has been made that the last stage of sentimentalism is homicidal mania. To READ Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics is to reflect not only on power but on the various ways in which artists through the ages have responded to power, and more specifically to the politicians and political ideas of their time. In Nazi Germany, this response, as Frederic Spotts reminds us, was overwhelmingly positive. The list of distinguished non-Jewish artists who left the country after Hitler came to power is brief to the point of invisibility when placed next to the rogues' gallery of those who stayed behind, in many cases not merely accepting the inevitability of Nazi rule but actively collaborating with the regime. The composers Carl Orff and Richard Strauss, the conductors Wilhelm Furtwangler and Herbert von Karajan, the Nobel Prize-winning author Gerhart Hauptmann, the filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl, the actor Emil Jannings, the stage designer Caspar Neher-all these and many more were perfectly prepared to make their peace with Nazism. What drove these men and women? No doubt, in some cases, the motive was the crudest sort of self-interest. For not only did Hitler subsidize the arts, he subsidized individual artists as well, in many cases lavishly. And even those who were not the direct objects of his personal largesse benefited from his open-handed arts policy, which included exemption from military service, as well as from the fact that the emigration and slaughter of prominent Jewish artists left more room at the top of the heap. In addition, many German artists were true Nazi believers; ironically, their number included a few, like the twelve-tone composer Anton Webern and the Expressionist painter Emil Nolde, whose modernist art was anathema to the Nazis. Others, whatever their reservations about specific policies, shared Hitler's loathing for modernism and endorsed his vision of Germany as the savior of the West. The relationship of these artists to the Nazi regime remains relevant to mis day. Though artists vary widely in their political awareness-from total indifference on the one hand to passionate involvement on the other-many, perhaps most, find it hard to resist the blandishments of politicians who appear to take an informed interest, however specious, in the arts. Shelley's famous assertion that "poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world" can also be read as a rueful admission that the world deigns at any given moment to acknowledge only a handful of serious artists. The rest are regarded with comparative indifference, especially in market-based democracies where no natural mechanism exists to introduce the "masses" to high art. Some artists accept their comparatively lowly status, finding sufficient reward in the practice of their calling. But others are enraged by it, particularly those romantics who long to remake the world so as to bring it into closer accord with their private visions. Such artists are irresistibly drawn to men of power, and are sometimes willing to pervert their art in the name of politics. Hitler, both a romantic and an artist manque, understood this temptation and made the most of it. The historian Paul Johnson understands it as well, and has it in mind when he writes: "Art, no less than politics, carries with it a whiff of sulphur, the stench of the charnel-house." It is tempting to try to excuse this as mere foolishness. As Hitler himself once remarked, "Artists are simple-hearted souls. Today they sign this, tomorrow that; they don't even look to see what it is, so long as it seems to them well-meaning." But as he knew-better, perhaps, than any other politician of the 20th century-ideas have consequences, and the artist who succumbs to the temptation to dabble in ill-digested political ideas, be he a Nazi, a Communist, or a pacifist, is as morally responsible for their ultimate consequences as any other human being. In the end, beauty excuses nothing, least of all mass murder.

Focus on aesthetics and art is manipulated by fascists and is a central justification for terrorism

Young 2003 (James E. Young, PhD, professor and chair of Judaic & Near Eastern studies at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, “The Terrible Beauty of Nazi Aesthetics,” Forward, April 25, <http://www.forward.com/articles/8694/>)

Hitler was both a product of his time’s aesthetic temper (as retrograde as his tastes may have been) and possibly the greatest producer of political design and choreography who ever lived. We cannot separate his deeds, his policies and his Nazi ideology from his aesthetic temper. Our reflex may be to protect the aesthetic realm from the ugliness and barbarism committed in its name. But without recognizing the central role aesthetics actually played in the Nazis’ murderous regime, we ignore the basic historical fact at the heart of Spotts’s book: Art, beauty and aesthetics were not benign byproducts of the Nazi Reich, but part and parcel of its malevolent logic. Beauty and terror, aesthetics and power, may not only be paired after the historical fact but might now be regarded as historical forces that also drive events as they actually unfold.

Terrorism must be defeated to make room to affirm life

Elshtain, 2003 Jean Bethke, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, and is a contributing editor for The New Republic. “Just War Against Terror”

The implacable hatred that animates the man who orchestrated the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon mystifies us. This depth of hatred does not derive from any specific action, or lack of ac­tion, on the part of those who are its target. As St. Augustine taught, evil is a turning of one's back on the good. It is a depletion. It cannot generate. It can only destroy. It spreads like a fungus over the living sur­face of things, said Hannah Arendt, herself a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany, but it lacks true depth. We try to give evil depth with our ex‑ planations. But it just keeps spreading. That is why we must stop it: So that the good might be revealed before us. None of the goods that human beings cherish can flourish without a measure of civic peace and security. Those who plot in darkness and se­crecy, who operate stealthily and refuse to take responsibility for their wrongdoing, perpetrate harm beyond the immediate violent event. They would drive us behind closed doors and obstruct the simple but profound goods that we all cherish and that people in a free society can realize: par­ents raising their children, men and women going to work, citizens of a great city making their way on streets and subways, people traveling to visit family members, the faithful attending their churches, synagogues, and mosques without feat This quotidian ideal is a great good, as we have learned so shockingly. September 11 reminded us that we have but one brief life to live. How are we to live it now that we know how fragile it is? As we struggle individually to answer this basic, existential question, gov­ernments must strive to sustain the civil space that permits us to do so.

Terrorism causes extinction

Rhodes 2009 – Richard, affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Former visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and author of “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” which won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award. “Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety” 12-14, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/reducing-the-nuclear-threat-the-argument-public-safety

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005. This group of 85 experts judged that the possibility of a WMD attack against a city or other target somewhere in the world is real and increasing over time. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. There was strong, though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist organization than by a government. The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. “The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem,” Lugar wrote in the report’s introduction. “It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. “The bottom line is this,” Lugar concluded: “For the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.” It’s paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely initiate a new round of nuclear armament and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

Vote Neg- The aesthetic framing of the 1AC compounds on itself which produces a unique instance of psychic terror which should be rejected- prefer our impact framing

Bernadette Buckley (author, analyst, philosopher- British International Studies Association) The workshop of filthy creation: or do not be alarmed, this is only a test *Review of International Studies; London, Oct* 2009*; Vol.35, Iss.4* –[Proquest- Online]

In this description then, Frankenstein is already doubly haunted by terror. But the effect is tripled when we turn to Shelley’s description of her ‘own’ creation of the creator of the Creature who creates terror. This endlessly self-replicating wave of creation and terror brings me to my third reason as to why Frankenstein o.ers an opportunity to reconceptualise the relationship between art and terror. Frankenstein’s terror at having created ‘the Creature’, or at having been trapped in his own creation, is, it transpires, only a repetition of Mary Shelley’s terror at having created the creator of the creature. This point is broached for us by Shelley herself when, in her introduction to the 1831 edition of her novel, she recalls how the original idea for Frankenstein came to her in a ‘waking dream’. The image jolts Shelley from her vision and she exclaims how she is forced to, ‘open[ed] my eyes in terror’.25 Thus the terror of Frankenstein-as-creator of the creature who creates terror is revealed and redoubled as the terror of the creator-of-Frankenstein. This troubling link between the self-replicating process of creation, terror and destruction is therefore one which, at one and the same time, extends out in different directions – in the ‘created’ event (of fiction/Art) and in the (‘real’) event of ‘creation’.

Rejecting ethical norms means the will-to-power reigns supreme – guarantees extinction

Fasching 1993 (Darrell J., Professor of Religious Studies at University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Pp. 28-29)

Our modern technological civilization offers us seemingly infi­nite utopian opportunities to recreate ourselves (e.g., genetic engi­neering, behavioral engineering) and our societies (social engineer­ing) and our world (chemical engineering, atomic engineering). But having transcended all limits and all norms, we seem bereft of a normative vision to govern the use of our utopian techniques. This normlessness threatens us with demonic self-destruction. It is this dark side of technical civilization that was revealed to us not only at Auschwitz and but also at Hiroshima. Auschwitz represents a severe challenge to the religious traditions of the West: to Christians, because of the complicity of Christian‑ity in the anti-Judaic path that led to Auschwitz renders its theological categories ethically suspect; to Jews, because their victim status presses faith in the God of history and in humanity to the breaking
point. But the path to Auschwitz, and from Auschwitz to Hiroshima, represents a challenge, equally severe, for the scientific and technical, secular culture of the Enlightenment. We do not seem to have fared any better under a secular ethic than we did under a religious one. Indeed we have fared worse. Genocide it seems is a unique product of the modern secular world and its technically competent barbarians. Auschwitz stands for a demonic period in modern Western civi‑lization in which the religious, political and technological develop‑ments converged to create a society whose primary purpose was the most efficient organization of that entire society for the purpose of exterminating all persons who were regarded as aliens and strangers—especially the Jews. The Nazi vision of the pure Aryan society repre‑sents a utopian vision of demonic proportions—a vision that inspired an apocalyptic revolutionary program of genocide. It reveals at once both a time of "The Death of God" in the Nietzschean sense and yet the resurgence of religion, that is, a demonic religiosity that creates a new public order in which all pluralism is eliminated from the public square and in which virtually nothing is sacred—not even human life. The period of the Holocaust stands as prophetic warning to a technological civilization that has no other norm than the will to power. If Auschwitz embodies the demonic use of technology against targeted populations to commit genocide, Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the last such use of technology. For with the coming of Nuclear warfare, technology has outstripped human intentionality so that if the bomb is ever used again, genocide will be transformed into collective suicide or omnicide—the destruction of all life. Having ene­mies is a luxury no community on the face of the earth can any longer afford. If there is a next time, it will not matter who is right and who is wrong, we shall all perish in the flames. Auschwitz and Hiroshima suggest that the millennium which brought us the utopian age of progress threatens to bring itself to an abrupt apocalyptic conclusion. The age of the bomb seems to have shattered and restructured the millennial myth. No longer can we imagine that apocalypse will be followed by utopia. The myth of unfolding stages seems to have broken apart into an absolute Either-Or: either Apocalypse or Utopia. Not wishing to face the terror of the first option we enthusiastically (although uneasily) embrace the second. Through a somewhat forced utopian euphoria we try to repress the prophetic warnings of Ausch­witz and Hiroshima which remind us that a normless world will inevitably end in apocalyptic self-destruction.

Their rejection of ethics transitions to a world where might makes right – guarantees genocide and extinction

Fasching 1993 (Darrell J., Professor of Religious Studies at University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Pp. 25-27)

Scarcely more than half a century after Nietzsche's madman had un­leashed his prophecy the Nazis came along to embrace his vision of a normless will to power. Nietzsche had offered a vision of a new type of individual who would have to take charge of human history after the death of God; namely, the Ubermensch or self-transcending person. Such individuals would have the courage to "transvalue all values" and remake the world in their own image. Nietzsche, of course, had a somewhat aristocratic vision of these new individuals. But his vision was easily usurped by the Nazis who imagined themselves, the pure Aryan race, as the natural embodiment of this superior human being who would recreate the world through a will to power**.** The Nazi pro­gram of attempted genocide of the Jews is a logical outcome of this new normless situation expressed in Nietzsche's parable of "the Death of God." In a world where power is the final arbiter of values and might makes right, deicide is inexorably followed by genocide. It is not the will to power itself which is unique to the modern situation. The will to power has been present in every age and every culture. What is unique is the presence of the will to power in a culture without counterbalancing norms to hold it in check. In tradi­tional or premodern societies religion played a central and public role in influencing the social order. What all traditional societies have in common is the belief that the order of society is part of a normative order of nature as structured by the sacred ancestors, gods or God. Because the order of society was considered part of the order of na­ture as divinely established, such societies were conservatively or­dered. Society, like nature, was viewed as fixed and given and not an object to be manipulated and changed. Modern society differs fundamentally from all traditional soci­eties in that in the modern world we now understand society as artificial rather than natural. We now see society as a construct, shaped by human decisions, rather than as an extension of nature. The essence of technological civilization is not the transformation of nature, nor is it the proliferation of machines. It is, rather, the aware­ness of self and society as human constructs that can be shaped and changed. Neither astronomy nor chemistry nor even physics has pro­duced the revolution in self-understanding in which we are caught up. These sciences were revolutionary for an industrial society. The revolutionary sciences for a technological civilization are the human sciences—especially history, sociology, and anthropology. It was the new comparative sociohistorical consciousness accompanying the emergence of the social sciences in the nineteenth century that gave birth to a consciousness of society as a human product rather than an extension of nature. Society, so understood, is the expression of mod­ern technological consciousness. Industrial society, which attempted to shape and change nature, has been superseded by a technological civilization that seeks to shape and change not only nature but the human self and society. The problem is that the very process by which human beings have come to think of society as capable of being shaped and changed is a secularizing or desacralizing process. The public order of tradi­tional societies was stabilized by the firm belief that this order was part of a value-laden natural order determined by the gods and ances­tors. Each society saw its social order through the lens of a sacred myth or story, what Peter Berger calls a *sacred canopy,* which made its social order appear to be a direct expression of the natural order. But with the emergence of sociohistorical consciousness in the nineteenth century, the variety of cultures strung out through time and across cultural boundaries came to be compared. As a result the natural order of each society came to be seen as an artificial construct and all cultural values came to be thought of as relative. These values no longer appeared, as they had from within each society, as firmly fixed in a cosmic order. Now they appeared as subjective, culturally rela­tive, human options. This is the point at which the fundamental crisis of modern society appears. Because human values in premodern societies were typically embedded in normative myths of natural order, their de­mythologization, which made it possible to think of changing society at the same time undermined the very norms by which such decisions could be made. Precisely at that point at which human beings became conscious of their ability to shape and change society they lost access to the norms needed to make those decisions. It is this situation, which Nietzsche addresses with his parable of the death of God, that unchained the earth from its sun so that we now drift aimlessly in space without any sense of up or down. We have lost our sense of moral direction. The world we have made for ourselves seems to be the embodi­ment of Babel—a confusing pluralism of voices and values. We live, it seems, in a sea of cultural and ethical relativism in which all ethical choice is reduced to arbitrary personal preference. With no rational way to adjudicate moral disputes such disagreements are reduced to ideological struggles based on the will to power. It is the tragic para­dox of our time that the increase of our power over nature and society has been in inverse proportion to our capacity to discover a normative consensus by which to govern the exercise of this power. We are faced now with what I believe to be the most serious and pressing problem of our time: the discovery and articulation of the philosophical and theological foundations of a normative social ethic whereby culture itself can be critiqued and hence shaped and changed through those public policies and personal commitments that truly promote the human good.

We’ll turn their freedom claims – rejecting norms means individuals are enslaved within the command to be free

Fasching 1993 (Darrell J., Professor of Religious Studies at University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Pp. 188-189)

The modern sense of human dignity is directly rooted in these experiences of the irreducible inalienable transcendence of the self to its social identity that are now embedded in the urban consciousness of the naked self. Paralleling the experience of the holy, the modern naked (existential) self now experiences itself as radically other—as that which cannot be captured by the sociocosmic or bureaucratic imagination and hence cannot be reduced to its social role in some sacred cosmic order. Every ideology begins by defining the human in a language of natural differences so as to separate the superior from the inferior, whether by race or sex or class. Defining the human inevitably occurs only for the purpose of violating someone's human dignity. But the human cannot be defined. To put it another way, the human can be defined only by its undefinability. Our inalienable dignity is rooted in our undefinability. However, without the transformative experience of the empti­ness or imagelessness of the self found in holy communities, the existential self-transcendence of the modern urban self is liable to find itself in the situation of Nietzsche's Ubermensch, who takes self-transcendence to be an act of self-creation in which the self can never allow itself to be put in question or open to the infinite. The plunge of the Nietzchean self or Ubermensch into the abyss of inwardness, be­cause it will never allow itself to be put in question, replaces a genuine openness to the infinite with the infinitizing of the self—the will to power. The Ubermensch is a naked self that will not allow itself to discover its own emptiness, its own openness to the infinite, but rather remains imprisoned in the icy light of its own "solar will." Apart from the transforming experiences of openness to the infinite nurtured through prayer-meditation and through the alternative myths and rituals of holy communities (or its secular philosophical equiva­lent of surrendering to the questions) the modern self-transcending self ends up trapped in the egoistic individualism of the will to power, which reduces rights claims to the struggle of all against all. What the experience of the emptiness or imagelessness of the holy-infinite does is to transform the anarchic individualism of the urban self into an authentic experience of the interdependence of the utopian becoming of all things, an experience of interdependence whose authenticity is measured by the readiness to welcome the stranger. When the Platform Sutra tells us that in the Buddha nature "there is neither north nor south"54 *(north* and *south* representing class differences in China) it is making an affirmation that parallels the statement of Paul of Tarsus, that "there is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3:28). In both cases what is being affirmed is that the experience of the self as empty, as being without image, leads to a realization that all selves are equal and interdependent. But neither of these affirmations of the inherent tran­scendence and equality of all selves is as radical as the Jewish affirma­tion that the test of faith lies in welcoming the stranger.

Turn—Relativism—Replacing God with the Ubermensch leads to nihilistic ethical relativism capable of exterminating the world – The Alternative is a false hope and only leads to the individual becoming lost and never achieving pleasure or happiness

Fasching 1993 (Darrell J., Professor of Religious Studies at University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Pp. 38-41)

Technicism is a reduction of our humanity to a fixed and autono­mous order of nature in a Cartesian mode. As Jacques Ellul has sug­gested, the technological or technicist society has come to serve the role nature once did in human experience. Even as nature once was, so now the technicist society is experienced as that all-encompassing environment which provides human beings with life and abundance and also threatens them with the possibility of capricious annihilation and death. The technicist society, like nature, is experienced as the object of both fascination and dread, Rudolf Otto's classical description of the sacred.23 Even as technique is uprooting and transforming our humanity, its technicist deformation permits it to appear as our new nature, in the sense of a new, fixed, autonomous, sacralized order to which we must conform in order to survive. Unable to imag­ine existence "outside" the technicist society, experiencing an abso­lute dependence on it in life and death, acquiescent to its autonomous requirements because of the hope that it will ultimately fulfill all hu­man desires, human beings in the technicist society are seduced into embracing technicism and giving up the utopian freedom to tran­scend and define our world. We settle for the pseudo-utopian ideolo­gy of a technicist society that, although promising the new, ever more securely conforms us to the status quo. Nietzsche's Ubermensch is unlikely to become a dominant cultural type in this technicist society, for in Nietzsche's view, human be­ings prefer the comfortable and secure morality of "the herd." Rather than face the reality of the artificiality of the human, the terrifying freedom of self-creation, people cling willingly to the illusion that their values represent the fixed and natural order of human existence. In this way human beings cosmicize their world, imputing to it the sacred status of an unchanging cosmological order. This is the first manner in which the utopianism of technology is transformed, or rather deformed. By this process technology becomes an autonomous and unchangeable reality subject to the apocalyptic destiny of the technicist imperative—If it can be done it must be done. This cosmological order with its "herd" morality protecting the status quo seemed to Nietzsche to be legitimized by the "pathetic" God of Jews and Christians as mediated through bourgeois medi­ocrity in nineteenth-century Europe. In this context, the advent of the technological self, that is, of the Ubermensch, to transcend and trans­value the world could only mean the death of God. This death, Nietzsche insisted, was in fact an act of murder, the necessary act of the self-transcending self in the exercise of its "solar will." If God's existence legitimizes the fixed order of the present, then the overcom­ing of this order means overcoming God. The self-transcending Uber­mensch replaces God as creator of the world."If there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! Hence there are no gods."24 The loss of "human nature" that occurs with the appearance of the self-transcending self and the murder of God renders the universe a void that must be filled by the autonomous creativity of the self-transcending self, alone and without guidance. This rejection of the "cosmological" status of the world in favor of the "transvaluation of all values" by Nietzsche's Ubermensch repre‑sents the other extreme in the apocalyptic distortion of utopian free­dom. It is one we could call the existentialist distortion of technological utopianism. If it rejects technicism, it does so only in the name of a countertechnicism***.***It does so only with the intention of delivering on the promise of technological utopianism that technicism both offers and subverts. It is in effect a total rejection of the cosmological status of the world implied by the Procrustean mythos of technicism in favor of the countertechnicist mythos of Proteus—the myth of our infinite capacity to transform our selves and our world into whatever we desire.25 Contrary to the technicist myth, the Protean myth sees the world not so much as "the cosmos writ small" but rather as "the human writ large." If the cosmological distortion of utopianism would smother human freedom and creativity in a world of necessity and secure mediocrity that invites an apocalyptic totalitarianism, the existential distortion of technological utopianism, at the other ex­treme, threatens the stability required by every human society with the danger of an anarchistic-apocalyptic conflict of opposing Nietz­chean wills to power. If the cosmological distortion would impose an absolute normative order on society, the existentialist distortion threatens to submerge the human city in a sea of anarchic freedom and nihilistic ethical relativism. In reflecting on the murder of God, Nietzsche asks: "How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Back­ward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left?" Replacing God as creator of the world is a terrifying experi­ence, for suddenly there is no frame of reference, no guiding star, no direction from which one can get one's bearings and begin. In the heroic world of the *Ubermensch,* where the fixed order of the world has been overcome with the murder of God, self-creativity becomes an unrelenting burden, for without it the world would dis­solve into the void. Nietzsche speaks of this burden in the confession of "The Night Song" from Zarathustra:Light am I; ah, that I were night! But this is my loneliness that I am girt with light. Ah, that I were dark and nocturnal! How I would suck the breasts of light! . . . But I live in my own light; I drink back into myself the flames that break out of me. I do not know the happiness of those who receive; and I have often dreamed that even stealing must be more blessed than receiv‑ing. This is my poverty, that my hand never rests from giv­ing. . . . My happiness in giving died in giving; my virtue tired of itself in its overflow. . . . Alas ice is all around me, my hand is burned by the icy [sic]. Alas, thirst is within me that languishes after your thirst. Night has come: alas that I must be light! And thirst for the nocturnal! "The Night Song" is a moving confession of the isolated ego of the technological *Ubermensch,* the Protean self burdened with the task of continuous self-transformation, in its striving to "overcome." The movement of overcoming is the hand that "never rests from giving." It is the confession of one imprisoned in the icy light of one's own existence: "But I live in my own light; I drink back into myself the flames that break out of me." The Ubermensch can no longer know the happiness of those who receive. The eros of the "inexorable solar will" must never stop from creating and overcoming. It can never leave off from asserting itself. The Ubermensch can never enter into the "mystic night" nor experience a noetic encounter with the otherness of being (or more precisely, with the *otherness* of the becoming of the beings that compose the universe) through which one might receive light as a gift out of the darkness. Such a gift would be an insight as to the direction of the path that lies ahead. But for Nietzsche there can be no path, no order of being (or becoming), only an overcoming through self-creation.

Their values only affirm life insofar as it is strong, guarantees devaluation and genocide

Schutte 1984(Ofelia Schutte is a professor of philosophy at the University of South Florida, “Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks,”

The University Of Chicago Press, p. 189-190)

The main problem that appears to delimit Nietzsche's philosophical affirmation of life is his failure to value human life as much as life in its totality. His advances over nihilism are rooted in the notion that there is no need to invent a more perfect form of life (as in the notion of an afterlife) since life already has sufficient meaning and value. The Dionysian struggle against the Socratic approach to existence is based on the view that reason has exceeded its role when it purports to define the meaning of life in terms of reason itself. And yet, the same opportunity that Nietzsche would like to see given to life is denied to human life. There is an irresistible tendency on Nietzsche's part to deny the value of human life as such and to accept it as valuable only if it is perfect, noble, or strong. The dualism between good and evil is maintained as a measure of human worth. The fact that the dualism remains, however, means that the broader project of the affirmation of life in its totality is blocked. Zarathustra's position serves as an illustration of this dilemma. His love of life is stifled by the torture he experiences at the thought that "small" human beings will recur eternally. Human weakness and failure elicit in Zarathustra a sense of nausea for the whole of existence. His perception and appraisal of reality appear to be out of balance. Even though Zarathustra finally accepts the idea of the recurrence, he makes his choice at the cost of his separation from humanity. He drops all human contact and stays in the mountains, desiring intercourse with eternity alone. There is an important split between his desire to affirm life and his inability to affirm human life. Human life still appears to be too small, too insignificant and wretched to Nietzsche. Thus he constantly seeks grandeur. Nietzsche noted that human life has dwindled because human beings lack opportunities for integrated and creative activities. It is a mistake, however, to link creativity and integration with the quality of greatness. The demand for greatness involves a value- judgment against anything that is not exceptionally powerful or distinguished. This involves a devaluation of the ordinary aspects of human life. If these aspects do not count toward making human life meaningful, however, then one is still exhibiting a nihilistic attitude toward human existence. Nietzsche is right in claiming that nihilism must be overcome in order for human beings to lead creative and resourceful lives. On the other hand, when he associates the latter values with the creation of a strong and majestic culture, he delimits the meaning of creativity. The expectations he places upon it are nihilistic as long as creativity is made to fit under a paradigm of domination.

**Focus on art justifies Nazism, which found justification in its beauty**

Comte-Sponville 1997 (Andre, Why We Are Not Nietzscheans, Edited ByLuc Ferry And Alain Renaut, Translated By Robert De Loaiza, Univ. Of Chicago Press p. 55-56)

What is an aesthete? Someone who loves beauty? If it were only that, we would all be aesthetes and the word would lose its usefulness. The aesthete is not he who loves beauty but he who loves only beauty; he who, as the French *Petit Robert* dictionary specifies, demonstrates his "skepticism towards other values." To be an aesthete is to love the beautiful more than the true or the good, and even instead of the true and the good. The aesthete is he for whom aesthetics takes the place of logic and of morality! (An artist's ideology? Hardly. What creator, among the great ones in any case, has not also had to deal with the good and the true? Could we imagine Rembrandt or Beethoven, Rodin or Proust, being uninter­ested in the truth of what they have to express? Can we believe that their message isn't moral [even if, happily, it isn't moralizing! as much as it is aesthetic? Can we imagine that the only thing art is good for is to make pretty things? Aestheticism is not an artist's ideology; it is an art lover's ideology—when he no longer can love anything but the beautiful, when everything else frightens, bores, or tires him. Not, then, an artist's ideol­ogy, but art—amputated of its ethical function and of its knowledge­ content—as ideology!*)* That Nietzsche was an aesthete in that sense is hardly to be doubted. "For us, only the aesthetic judgment is law" ( *WP,* French edi­tion, III, 59).I will not insist on the moral and political dangers of that attitude: go fight Nazism by merely arguing how inaesthetic it is! Walter Benjamin, on the contrary, saw in Nazism the first political movement to have explicitly seen itself as aesthetic*,* and that was surely not entirely false. But can anyone believe that to fight against that aesthetic another one would be enough? Don't we have any better reason to disapprove of the death camps than that they were ugly?

Aestheticly focused presentations are incomplete- they can only express ideas but never arguments

Fleming 1996 (David, MBA [Cranfield University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cranfield_University), Argumentation and Advocacy, Summer)

Now, why can't a picture satisfy this demand, that is, be structured so that claim-like and support-like entities can be identified? The answer appears to have something to do with the fact that a picture typically functions as a simultaneous whole rather than a sequence of bits. It lacks, in other words, the internal linear arrangement that characterizes verbal discourse. Argument requires a structure in which conceptually-distinct ideas can be sequentially linked (thus, "X, therefore Y," "X because of Y," etc.). Hintikka and Bachman (1991,p. 8), for example, define argument as a "line of reasoning," while Andrews, Costello and Clark (1993) characterize it as a sequence or chain. Langer's (1942) distinction between presentational and discursive symbols rests on this same notion of linearity (see pp. 63-83). For Postman (1985,p. 26), the sequentiality of verbal arguments has an almost ethical quality to it; in arguing, each participant must delay his or her verdict until the other's turn is finished. Without syntactic arrangement, then, the visual can present or express ideas but cannot state them, an act which requires a more restricted structure. For Langer (1942,p. 75), visual forms are capable of combination, but not discursive combination. That is, the relation of constituents in a picture is grasped in one act of vision, "given all at once to the intelligent eye" (p. 77), and allowing simultaneous presentation of a direct, continuous articulation of reality. Although some claim a vocabulary and syntax for visual communication (Bowman, 1968, p. 8), it is more typically asserted that the visual lacks both lexicon and syntax. For Gombrich (1982,p. 138), this means that the visual, while "supreme" at arousal, is altogether incapable of statement. Goodman (1976,1978) concurs: the non-verbal can exemplify, but it cannot denote.

Resentment is productive, it drives us to achieve. Even Nietzsche overcame Resentment- it’s not a permanent state and can be used as motivation for achievement

AJ. Hoover [Professor of History at Abilene Christian University] Publisher: [Praeger](http://www.questia.com/searchglobal?q=publisher%21Praeger%21AllWords) Place of publication: Westport, CT Publication year: 1994 “Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Thought”Pp 126-129

One of the most traumatic episodes of Nietzsche's life occurred during the writing and publication of Gay Science, just before the writing of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*--the affair involving Lou Salomé. 19 Nietzsche had met Lou in Rome in May 1882 through two close friends, Paul Rée and Malwida von Meysenbug. Lou was a most unusual girl. The daughter of a Russian general, she was twenty-one years old, highly intelligent, and very ambitious, the kind of female intellect, as Peter Gast noted, who comes along five or six times a century. Most women in Nietzsche's life were Victorian prudes compared to her; she was "precocious, quick, and brash; eager to meet famous people . . . and proud of being free of old-fashioned inhibitions." 20 Nietzsche must have considered her a walking incarnation of the free spirit, the gay science. Nietzsche's relation with Lou remains obscured by the gossip circulated among the principals involved. He became so infatuated with her that she was able to lead him by the nose for several months. His attraction was both intellectual and sexual. He was thirty-eight and she was twenty-one. He considered her the ideal student, one with whom he could discuss his "most abysmal thoughts" such as eternal recurrence. Lou put out the word (now rendered dubious) that both Nietzsche and Rée had proposed to her and that Nietzsche was so shy he asked Rée to make his proposal for him. Franziska and Elisabeth disliked Lou increasingly, the more they learned about her. Elisabeth was jealous of Lou because she was intellectually superior, and feared she would take her brother away. Lou claimed that Nietzsche had suggested a triple marriage, a trinity, a "wild marriage"-- which set all the tongues around Naumburg to wagging. Elisabeth warned her brother that he might lose his university pension if all this were revealed. Nietzsche planned for the three to go to Paris in the winter of 1882 and return to school, but this project fell through. Having in a sense given up his mother and sister for Lou, he found that she apparently did not seem to appreciate the sacrifice he had made. The whole affair burned itself out by November of 1882 and left Nietzsche with hostile feelings toward everyone: Franziska, Elisabeth, Lou, and Paul Rée. He indulged in a great deal of introspection that contributed to his thoughts on resentment and revenge. This may have been the first time in his life that Nietzsche seriously contemplated suicide. He says he took an enormous dose of opium, but many biographers think he wrote this just to frighten and shame his relatives. At any rate, immediately after this affair he began to write *ThusSpake Zarathustra* Spake Zarathustra, his greatest work. Psychological processes are difficult to prove, especially posthumously, but one thesis here seems highly probable: Nietzsche wrote *Zarathustra* as therapy. He had wished to create a female disciple; instead he created a son, the Persian prophet of his new religion. If he had still been a Christian, he might have said, "God works in mysterious ways!" It may be one of the finest examples of *sublimation* in psychological history. His repressed passions became creative alchemy, turning muck into gold. Later, in *Ecce Homo*, he spoke kindly of both Rée and Lou ( *EH, III*, 3). He conquered his resentment and employed it in his own personal moral development.

In the context of political aesthetic endeavors Nietzche’s notion of Resentment is limited and rooted in dualistic understandings of the world

Caroline Joan Picart [author, radio host and producer. University of Florida Levin College of Law] Publisher: Pennsylvania State University Press Place of publication: University Park, PA Publication year: 1999¶ Resentment and the "Feminine" in Nietzche's Politico-Aesthetics. Pp 173-174

Within this cross-cultural and gendered politico-aesthetic, therefore, to make a claim for multi-culturalism is not to advocate the juxtaposition-opposition of several cultures whose frontiers remain impermeable, nor is it to subscribe to a complacent "melting pot" concept that would seek to level all differences, thus enabling the return of the all too Nietzschean spectres of Author and ressentiment. It lies, instead, in an intercultural acceptance and active exploration of risks, unexpected detours, and the complexities of binding break and closure. A philosophy of the future, if it is to try to overcome its roots in resentment and the persistence of modern A/authority requires that such boundaries be ceaselessly called into question, undermined, modified, and reinscribed. Nietzsche's recurrent tropes of sickness versus health must, in my view, be revalued as entailing gradations of sickness/resentment as intertwined with health/the vigilant resistance to resentment. A politico-aesthetic of transformation, rather than obliteration-redemption must, in my opinion, critically approach, question, and rewrite its mythic, gendered, and cultural foundations and manifestations. Such a critical inquiry should be animated by the search for different approaches to politico-aesthetic experience(s), different ways of relating to them without categorizing/fixing them in the deadly dualisms Nietzsche struggled against, yet did not manage to free himself from.

Our argument is not that art or aesthetics are bad but rather the 1AC’s nonreflexive approach to this political framing is problematic. For every positive aspect of art and aesthetic focuses there is a more insidious dark side the 1AC does not question but papers over- we think you should be skeptical of their knee-jerk affirmation

Bernadette Buckley (author, analyst, philosopher- British International Studies Association) The workshop of filthy creation: or do not be alarmed, this is only a test *Review of International Studies; London, Oct* 2009*; Vol.35, Iss.4* –[Proquest- Online]

Is it ‘good’ to create? What is so fascinating then about Frankenstein as both description/enactment of (the event of) Art, is its focus on terror as necessarily implicated within the creative event. Such an understanding of creation/creativity stands in contrast with other contemporaneous, but more frequently evoked notions of Art as ‘fine’ and art-making or ‘creativity’ as ‘good’ – or as an essentially benevolent value. This explains why the suggestion that a structural link exists between Art and Terrorism at first is hard to swallow – because such a link makes a mockery of many of the inherited or commonsensical understandings of Art, as described by Western Art History over the past three to four centuries at least. It stands in opposition to the much more palatable view put forward for example by Kant’s Critique of Judgement. For in the latter – published only a couple of decades before Frankenstein – ‘the scene’ of creation is evoked, literally, as one of harmony: ‘genius’ exists ‘in th[at] happy relation’ which leads, firstly, to the discovery of ‘ideas for a given concept’, and secondly, to ‘a way of expressing these ideas.’ The discovery and expression of these ideas will subsequently ‘communicate to others [. . .] the mental attunement that those ideas produce’.26 In other words, for Kant, the creation of (fine) Art is analogous with a kind of force for ‘good’:27 that is to say, the activity of art-making enlarges our mental powers in new ways and in so doing, enhances social communication and demonstrates culture’s ability to transcend itself.28 Indeed the assumption that a structural link exists between Art and ‘goodness’ is consistently put forward in Western aesthetics and philosophy. For Hegel too, lecturing not long after Shelley has written Frankenstein, ‘the scene’ of creativity has a beneficent quality to it. Thus, following Kant, the Hegelian artist is a kind of martyr (another variety of the above force for ‘good’), whose life is dedicated to creating the conditions for the progress of the ‘spirit’ and for whom, art ‘passes over into higher forms of consciousness’.29 Hegelian creativity has ‘the Idea’ being ‘shaped forward into reality’; or alternatively expressed, the Idea is ‘advanced to immediate unity and correspondence with this reality’.30 Such creation is ‘good’ because as Hegel tells it, it forms a question, it makes a ‘call to the mind of the spirit’, while at the same time producing a substantial expression of ideas.31 In a similar vein, but writing nearly a century later, Heidegger concurs in his depiction of creativity as a tranquil, serene productive activity: ‘all creation’ he says, ‘is a drawing, as of water from a spring’.32 The Heideggerian artist (albeit in a di.erent way from that of the Hegelian and Kantian artist) is thus still a mechanism for the production of some kind of ‘good’. A kind of elicitor of truth, Heidegger’s artist takes ‘a founding leap’, which ‘brings something into being from out of the source of its nature’ and thus, he prepares for ‘the setting into work of truth’.33 Here, creativity is seen as supporting some kind of ‘good’. ‘Art’ says Heidegger ‘lets truth originate’.34 What then are we to make of Mary Shelley’s evocation of the creative event as that which unlooses some kind of monstrosity? On reading Frankenstein, one is constantly struck by the slippage which again and again, arises between the monstrous ‘Creature’ and the work or activity of creation. In fact the Creature is often referred to directly as ‘the creation’ and this reciprocity which exists between creator, creativity and creation is understood both by Frankenstein and by Shelley, as being a highly dangerous one.35 It is this interchangeability between ‘the Creature’ and creation which suggests that for Shelley, the creative event may well be a force for destruction, if it is also to be a force for ‘good’.