### AT: Short-TF/Case O/W---2NC

#### Then why are you at a debate tournament?---this proves the politics of the plan are impotent and only the alt solves because it’s about how we agents situate ourselves vis-à-vis the environment

#### We have time to think about it---its your role to expose the fantasy of short-termism

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Calls for **alternative approaches** to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such **alternatives could only work in the long term** whereas **'something' needs to be done here and now**. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to **point to the fallacy of 'short-termism' in the conduct of current policy**. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as 'approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation'. Viewed as such, short-termism is the **enemy of true strategic thinking**. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that **might eventually become** self-defeating.  The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually **backfired** in that US policymakers **now have to face the instability they have caused**. Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and **the role Western states have played** in failing them through **varied forms of intervention**. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state 'failure'.  Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of 'state failure' in relation to different time increments shaping policymaking might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167–170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa'eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, 'strong'/'weak' states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice **given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision**. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also **distorts information**.  Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are **subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns**. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the 'war on terror' be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories.  Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode 'wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds', towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to 'failed states', the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of 'failure' raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention frompractitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.

#### Don’t be blackmailed by their threats of immediate consequences

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The thought that inhabits critique is not bent on achieving quick and efficient solutions. Nor is critique simply a means for some eventual action; for Foucault, the distinction between theory and practice is shallow, as thought is a practice, and practice is always informed by thought. Yet despite the close relationship between thought and action, the practice of critique operates according to a mode of thought quite different from the calculative thinking that drives technological practices. This other mode of thinking is what Heidegger would call "meditative thought." Meditative thought is characterized by its disengagement from the technological imperative to react. 14 This is not to say that meditative thought does not result in action, but rather, thought is not reducible to action, as if its only function were to usher in a solution: "thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it is applied" (LH 217). Thought has value in and of itself. It allows us to take stock of our ontological situation. As Foucault explains, Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather it is what allows one to step back away from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and question it as to its meaning, its conditions, its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, and establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem. (PPP 388)15 Heidegger echoes these sentiments when he writes, "Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called into question. ,16 The calculative mode of engaging the world is forever asking, "What should I do?"; it is bent on producing immediate and practical solutions. Problems take on an urgency that demand quick action, and calculative thought eschews the task of thinking as a luxury that cannot be afforded. But § Marked 15:09 § as Heidegger points out, "All attempts to reckon existing reality morphologically, psychologically, in terms of decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe and destruction, are merely technological behavior. That behavior operates through the device of the enumerating of symptoms whose standing-reserve can be increased to infinity and always varied anew" (T 48). The call for action already operates with the understanding that the world is an ordered whole that can be manipulated as necessary to avoid imminent danger. As long as reality is problematized as one crisis after the other, action will always beat out thought as the preferred mode of engagement. For Heidegger and Foucault both, this knee jerk sense of action is systemically destined to produce nothing but more of the same. By failing to engage problems at the level of thought, that is, the level at which the problem is understood as a problem for thought, the imperative to act merely operates on superficial features of reality, applying band-aids to wounds when the real injury is festering way beneath the surface. The first step in overcoming the calculative understanding of reality is to recognize that it is only one understanding among many. This is much more difficult than it might sound. First of all, the calculative mode of revealing the world, Enframing, is something that conceals itself in the process of revealing the world (QT 27). The mode of revealing is so pervasive that it is invisible to us, unless we reflect on it. When we are mired in the concerns of the everyday, Enframing is not encountered, it is only lived. That is, as someone thinking technologically, reality reveals itself to me as a series of objects. I am attuned to that objectness when I am engaging with the world. Precisely because Enframing is not an object, but a mode of revealing, it itself will not show up within my observational field. In order for me to confront technological thought for what it is, a way of revealing, I have to be prepared to momentarily suspend my calculative mode of thinking and pursue ontological questions. Second, the continued successes of technological thought blinds us to the fact that it is only an interpretation of reality and not reality in itself. As Heidegger warns, "The approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking “(DT 56). For every time that a scientific theory pans out, or technological planning achieves desired ends, we are less capable of viewing technology as only one of many different ways to reveal the world. Heidegger is not arguing that science is false or useless. In fact, he recognizes that technological representations of reality often do allow us to make correct determinations about the world: "In a similar way the unconcealment in accordance with which nature presents itself as a calculable complex of the effects of forces can indeed permit correct determinations; but precisely through these successes the danger can remain that in the midst of all that is correct the true will withdraw" (QT 26). While it might be the case that a river that can yield a calculable amount of hydropower, this does not mean that the river is, in its essence, a source of energy. But for every power plant built on a river it becomes increasingly more difficult to appreciate that rivers are not primarily stockpiles of potential energy waiting to be unleashed.

### Link---2NC

#### 2 central issues from the 1NC

#### ---Technological addiction---in the face of ecological ruin the call for more energy production and innovation is part of an ontology of managerialism that constantly attempts to innovate its way out of its collateral damage---it naturalizes consumptive practices by taking as given an ontological schema of the earth as a standing reserve for our usage---resulting exploitation ensures mass environmental and structural violence---especially true in the context of nuclear reactors which produce radioactive waste that disproves any distinction they make about claiming to solve finitude---the aff approach to energy and the earth cedes an authentic ontological relationship with nature to further the chess game that’s US hegemony that’s Backhaus

#### ---Epistemology---energy and environmental policy analysis is based on fundamental axioms of human and natural behavior that cannot incorporate non-linearities---attachment to mapping and management set up the world as a chessboard but has no ontological basis for how each piece moves---means you should be skeptical of their advantages and solvency---that’s Backhaus ---If we win that eschewing an ontological relationship with nature skews the way in which we ontologically order the world at large—proves there’s no heg net benefit to the permutation

### AT: Perm

#### And, the alt solves the root cause of the case case so the perm is irrelevant and has no NB

#### If they win the perm kick the alt for us---our framework means if we win the ontological underpinnings of the aff are faulty they lose automatically because it taints their harms and solvency claims---renders the perm and alt irrelevant to your decision

#### Technological strategies overwhelm the perm

Thiele 95 Leslie Paul Professor of Political Science at University of Florida Timely Meditations, pgs. 200-201

The Midas touch of technology is ontologically devastating. Its defining characteristic is not simply that it reveals the world in a particular way, but that it usurps all other modes of revelation**.** In the most fundamental event of the contemporary age, the world becomes totally enframed as a picture. Worldly life becomes the analogue of film production, a celluloid reality whose boundaries depend only on our own imaginations and technological skills.

With everything standing in reserve for our use, "distance" disappears. Heidegger is speaking here not of distance as a literal extension in space, but as an existential sense of our proximity to horizons: chiefly those between earth and sky, mortals and immortals. Indeed, as our relation to the world becomes technologized, we gradually cease to differentiate distance and nearness. With everything awaiting production or made ready for consumption, we find ourselves without the means to discriminate between what sits within our court and what remains beyond our ken. This blurring and transgression of borders is the chief indicator of an unconditioned anthropomorphism. Heidegger writes: "In the absence of distance, everything becomes equal and indifferent in consequence of the one will intent upon the uniformly calculated availability of the whole earth. This is why the battle for the dominion of the earth has now entered its decisive phase. **The all-out challenge to secure dominion over the earth can be met only by occupying an ultimate position beyond the earth from which to establish control over the earth.** The battle for this position, however, is the thoroughgoing calculative conversion of all connections among all things into the calculable absence of distance. This is making a desert of the encounter of the world's fourfold—it is the refusal of nearness" (WL 105-6). In other words, enframing brings the world completely within our grasp. Like a closely held picture, Heidegger foresaw early on, everything becomes "overseeable, controllable, definable, connectable, and explicable." The refusal of nearness marks a lost sense of relatedness to the world as a place of boundaries.

### AT: Heg

#### Orthodox liberal IR securitizes and militarizes policy responses---it’s the root cause of every impact, guarantees policy failure and means only the alt solves

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The twenty-first century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While the structure of global economic activity is driving the unsustainable depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating greenhouse gas emissions resulting in global warming. Both global warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on global industrial food production, as well as on global financial and economic instability. Conventional policy responses toward the intensification of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as separate processes. Yet increasing evidence shows they are deeply interwoven manifestations of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is embedded. In this context, orthodox IR's flawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their ‘securitisation’, reifying the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conflicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the ‘Otherisation’ of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy. Yet this relationship between global crises and conflict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a wider epistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes.

In 2009, the UK government's chief scientific adviser Sir John Beddington warned that without mitigating and preventive action 'drivers' of global crisis like demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion could lead to a 'perfect storm' of simultaneous food, water and energy crises by around 2030.1 Yet, for the most part, conventional policy responses from national governments and international institutions have been decidedly inadequate. Part of the problem is the way in which these crises are conceptualised in relation to security. Traditional disciplinary divisions in the social and natural sciences, compounded by bureaucratic compartmentalisation in policy-planning and decision-making, has meant these crises are frequently approached as largely separate processes with their own internal dynamics.

While it is increasingly acknowledged that cross-disciplinary approaches are necessary, these have largely failed to recognise just how inherently interconnected these crises are. As Brauch points out, 'most studies in the environmental security debate since 1990 have ignored or failed to integrate the contributions of the global environmental change community in the natural sciences. To a large extent the latter has also failed to integrate the results of this debate.\*" Underlying this problem is the lack of a holistic systems approach to thinking about not only global crises, but their causal origins in the social, political, economic, ideological and value structures of the contemporary international system. Indeed, it is often assumed that these contemporary structures are largely what need to be 'secured\* and protected from the dangerous impacts of global crises, rather than transformed precisely to ameliorate these crises in the first place. Consequently, policy-makers frequently overlook existing systemic and structural obstacles to the implementation of desired reforms.

§ Marked 15:11 § In a modest effort to contribute to the lacuna identified by Brauch, this paper begins with an empiric ally-oriented, interdisciplinary exploration of the best available data on four major global crises — climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity and global financial instability — illustrating the systemic interconnections between different crises, and revealing that their causal origins are not accidental but inherent to the structural failings and vulnerabilities of existing global political, economic and cultural institutions. This empirical evaluation leads to a critical appraisal of orthodox realist and liberal approaches to global crises in international theory and policy. This critique argues principally that orthodox IR reifies a highly fragmented, de-historicised ontology of the international system which underlies a reductionist, technocratic and compartmentalised conceptual and methodological approach to global crises. Consequently, rather than global crises being understood causally and holistically in the systemic context of the structure of the international system, they are 'securitised\* as amplifiers of traditional security threats, requiring counter-productive militarised responses and/or futile inter-state negotiations. While the systemic causal context of global crisis convergence and acceleration is thus elided, this simultaneously exacerbates the danger of reactionary violence, the problematisation of populations in regions impacted by these crises and the naturalisation of the consequent proliferation of wars and humanitarian disasters. This moves us away from the debate over whether resource 'shortages\* or 'abundance\* causes conflicts, to the question of how either can generate crises which undermine conventional socio-political orders and confound conventional IR discourses, in turn radicalising the processes of social polarisation that can culminate in violent conflict.

#### Global conflict can only emerge in a world of unipolarity---hegemony monopolizes all legitimate forms of expression, which requires that suppressed antagonisms use radical tactics to negate the universalization of American norms---this is the root cause of terrorism and threats to global stability

Mouffe 7 Chantal Mouffe, Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 2007, “Carl Schmitt’s warning on the dangers of a unipolar world,” in The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, Edited by: Odysseos and Petito, p. 152

I submit that it is high time to acknowledge the pluralist character of the world and to relinquish the Eurocentric tenet that modernization can only take place through Westernization. We should relinquish the illusion that antagonisms could be eliminated through unification of the world, achieved by transcending the political, conflict and negativity. It is also necessary to abandon the idea that the aim of politics is to establish consensus on one single model. The central problem that our current unipolar world is facing is that it is impossible for antagonisms to find legitimate forms of expression. It is no wonder, then, that those antagonisms, when they emerge, take extreme forms, putting into question the very structure of the existing international order. It is, in my view, the lack of political channels for challenging the hegemony of the neo-liberal model of globalization which is at the origin of the proliferation of discourses and practices of radical negation of the established order. In order to create channels for the legitimate expression of dissent we need to envisage a pluralistic world order constructed around a certain number of great spaces and genuine cultural poles.

The new forms of terrorism reveal the dangers implicit in the delusions of the universalist globalist discourse which postulates that human progress requires the establishment of world unity based on the adoption of the Western model. § Marked 15:12 § This is why, against the illusions of the universalist-humanitarians, it is urgent to listen to Schmitt when he reminds us that ‘[t]he political world is a pluriverse, not a universe’ (Schmitt 1976: 53). This is, I believe, the only way to avoid the ‘clash of civilizations’ announced by Huntington (1996) and to which, despite its intentions, the universalist discourse is, in fact, contributing.

### AT: Alt Prevents Action/Policy---2NC

#### We’re impact turning the only action the alt prevents

#### No link and turn---the alt is key to more sustainable energy policy---increasing production is only a tool to further consumptive and managerial practices---an ontological investigation breaks down hierarchial power relations that cause over-consumption that is the root cause of hegemonic motivation in the first place---we result in more reflective and less compulsive action

### Ontology First---2NC

#### Ontology first---each theory about how the world works relies on particular commitments in each category---it’s nonsensical to claim they can be divorced from an evaluation of the plan because whether they want to acknowledge it or not i.e. consumptive practices v. our relationship with heg, the 1AC does rely on an ontology, epistemology and method---if we disprove the usefulness of those prior commitments it necessarily disproves the desirability of the plan---that’s **Cavalcante**

### Framework---Theory/AT: Judge Choice---2NC

#### Our links are all of the plan.

#### Forcing the aff to defend their ontological assumptions prior to determining the value of the plan is more productive---think about the aff like a math proof---the truth of the conclusion is irrelevant if the axiomatic assumptions that underpin their logic are fauly.

#### Our framework is theoretically superior---

1. Predictable and real world---judges are educators, not policy-makers---you don’t have the ability to put the plan into effect but you do have the ability to criticized their racialized framing of the world.
2. Plan focus is bad—it’s unpredictable and kills critical thinking—it reduces a 9 minute advocacy to a 4 second sentence and trains irresponsible students who don’t defend their assumptions and the process by which they formulate problems/solutions.
3. Reciprocity---they get a strategic advantage from being about to outweigh disadvantages---they should incur a strategic cost if we impact turn

( ) The neg should get to pick the framework for the debate—it’s reciprocal and key to fairness—the aff picks the focus of the debate and gets the first and last speech and infinite prep.

( ) Predictability is a practice—they chose what to research—infinite number of CPs, DAs, affs, and advantages mean their arguments are inevitable

#### And, if they win policy-making good it’s a reason why we can endorse the aff without the justifications we’re critiquing---it’s reciprocal and fair for all the reasons above

### Being o/w Extinction

#### It’s better to die than to live as slaves to technological thought

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 Heidegger now launches an extended discussion of the danger inherent in modern technology. It needs to be underlined that for Heidegger the threat is not simply to human existence. **The prime danger is not** that high-tech devices might get out of hand and wreck havoc on their creators by way of a radioactive spill or an all-encompassing **nuclear holocaust**. **The danger is not that** by disposing of so many disposables **we will defile the planet and make it uninhabitable**. For Heidegger the danger—the prime danger—does not lie in technological things but in the essence of technology. Technological things are indeed dangerous; the rampant exploitation of natural resources is deplorable; the contamination of the environment is tragic. We need to conserve and to keep hightech things from disposing of us. Yet, for Heidegger, conservation, by itself, is not the answer. Conservation alone is not radical enough. Conservation is aimed at things, technological things and natural things, but it does not touch the outlook or basic attitude that is the essence of modern technology, and it is there that the danger lies. It may well be that conservation will succeed and that technology will solve its own problems by producing things that are safe and nonpolluting; nevertheless, the prime danger, which lies deeper down, will remain. For the danger is not primarily to the existence of humans but to their essence: "The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal effects of the machines and devices of technology. The genuine threat has already affected humans—in their essence" (FT, 29/28). In a sense, the threat inherent in modern technology has already been made good. Though we have thus far averted a nuclear disaster, that does not mean the genuine threat has been obviated. Humans still exist; they are not yet on the endangered species list. It would of course be tragic if humans made that list. Yet, for Heidegger, **there could be something more tragic,** namely **for humans to go on living but to lose their human dignity, which stems from their essence.** Here lies the prime danger, the one posed not by technological things but by the disclosive looking that constitutes the essence of modern technology. The prime danger is that humans could become (and in fact are already becoming) enslaved to this way of disclosive looking. Thus what is primarily in danger is human freedom; if humans went on living but allowed themselves to be turned into slaves—that would be the genuine tragedy. The § Marked 15:14 § danger in modern technology is that humans may fail to see themselves as free followers, fail to see the challenges directed at their freedom by the current guise of Being, and fail to see the genuine possibilities open to them to work out their destiny. Then, not seeing their freedom, humans will not protect it. They will let it slip away and will become mere followers, passively imposed on by modern technology, i.e., slaves to it, mere cogs in the machine. For Heidegger, there is an essential connection between seeing and freedom. The way out of slavery begins with seeing, insight. But it is the right thing that must be seen, namely, one's own condition. The danger is that humans may perfect their powers of scientific seeing and yet be blind to that wherein their dignity and freedom lie, namely the entire domain of disclosedness and their role in it. Humans would then pose as "masters of the earth," and yet their self-blindness would make them slaves.

### AT: Owen/Pragmatism---Top Shelf/Defense Of Theory-Driven IR---2NC

#### It’s circular---their evidence says pragmatism is necessary to solve problems---our K calls into question the very existence of those problems

#### False dichotomy---their evidence distinguishes between theory and action---our Duncombe evidence says violence is always cultural before it’s political---this means the K is key to effective policy action