### 1NC

#### Energy production is the generation of power from raw materials – excludes extraction of those materials

Vaekstfonden 6 Vaekstfonden is a Danish government backed investment fund that facilitates the supply of venture capital in terms of start-up equity and high-risk loans "THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IN DENMARK- perspectives on entrepreneurship and venture capital" No Specific Cited, Latest Data From 2006 s3.amazonaws.com/zanran\_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf

In all, 20 industry experts were interviewed about the composition and dynamics of the Danish energy sector. Insights from a minimum of 3 industry experts have been assigned to each of the stages in the value chain. Following is a brief description of what the different stages encompass.

Raw material extraction

This stage encompass the process before the actual production of the energy. As an example it is increasingly expensive to locate and extract oil from the North Sea. Likewise coal, gas and waste suitable for energy production can be costly to provide.

Energy production

Energy production encompasses the process, where energy sources are transformed into heat and power.Transmission and distribution

Energy transmission and distribution is in this report defined as the infrastructure that enables the producers of energy to sell energy to consumers.

Consumption

The last stage in the value chain is consumption. This stage encompasses products and services that geographically are placed near the consumers. As an example, decentralized energy production via solar power systems is part of the consumption stage.

#### Vote negative

#### Limits---including extraction doubles the size of the topic and makes it bidirectional by allowing affs to affect both supply and demand sides of each energy---undermines preparedness for all debates---err neg because the terms incentives and restrictions serve no limiting function

#### Ground---all disads are based on increasing the actual amount of power available---they allow the aff to just extract raw materials without guaranteeing they’re ever used

### Russia

Status quo oil indexed prices ensure Russia retains energy dominance – exports make global prices drop and ends reliance on Russia

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American unconventional gas has been a success story and a paradigm shift that has turned expectations upside-down. In essence, it has been a game changer for the emerging world gas market. The advantage of unconventional gas is that it is a domestic, national source of fuel supply enhancing the energy security of each country. Development of unconventional gas reserves brings foreign direct investment, creates new jobs and helps to diversify away from other imported fuels - or, as is the case in the US, helps the nation gain energy independence. In addition, natural gas is of growing importance to the European economies that will cause a rethink about energy security. Already, there is a growing realisation among European policy makers that natural gas in world energy markets will have wide-ranging and major geopolitical consequences. In addition, among the many policy options available, natural gas can be seen as the best transition fuel to a sustainable and renewable energy future. Therefore, gas is deemed to become one of the most important fuels of the decade. The extent of the natural gas resource base means that supplies are plentiful, the infrastructure transporting it to its consumers is in place, and it burns twice as clean as other fossil fuels – making it the cleanest of the fossil fuels and publicly accepted source of power generation. Combine this with the ever-increasing role of renewables for power generation and natural gas has the potential to become the major balancing energy source. But, the impact of the shale gas buzz is even greater. It has become the new elephant in the room, with global geopolitical implications that have caused a chain reaction. European gas prices are being renegotiated and revised. It has also caused an average of 15 per cent of Gazprom's supplies to be delinked from oil-indexation. And yet, the implications are greater still: relatively cheap and abundant gas, along with the carbon advantage of gas, makes nuclear and coal relatively more expensive than currently assumed. Switching from coal to gas means emissions can be reduced quickly at a very low cost. Indeed, making gas a major transition fuel through to 2030 - will help renewable energy efforts to reduce emissions in order to mitigate the impact of climate change. This chain of events also has the potential to remove Gazprom's European gas supply near-monopoly. In the fourth quarter of 2010, Russia's gas exports to Europe declined by 17 per cent owing to a market oversupply due to re-directed liquified natural gas cargoes and unseasonably warm weather. Unconventional gas has helped to shift the balance from a seller-dominated market to one dominated by buyers. Unconventional gas is nowadays the new policy option for European countries, giving buyers more leverage to renegotiate the high Russian oil-indexed gas price demands that are included in long-term contracts. Even without being produced in Europe, it puts a certain price cap on high Russian gas prices as it can become a potential source of diversification – particularly, if Russian gas prices are higher than the brake-even point for European unconventional gas. All this has the potential to make unconventional gas development economically feasible and, politically speaking, more appealing. Unconventional gas, and shale gas in particular, has become a negotiating tool in a changing gas market that is enhancing Europe's energy supply security by diversifying energy sources and enabling the prioritisation of a domestically located resource. Russia's options to respond are limited. Confronted with decreasing natural gas prices, Moscow's policies have become unintentionally the major enabler for unconventional gas developments in Europe. But, even if only a fraction of those unconventional gas resources become available for the European gas market, they still might be less expensive than the very high prices of the new Siberian gas fields of the Yamal Peninsula or Russia's Arctic offshore gas resources - like Shtokman - and offer another diversification source. Against this background, and the fear in Moscow of losing further markets shares in its most important export market for conventional gas and the geopolitical game - with Gazprom being the spear-point of foreign policy - it is hardly surprising that representatives of the Russian government try to downplay the importance of a shale gas. And they try to portray very negative implications of unconventional gas production in Europe - for its environment and the European Union's climate mitigation efforts.

And revenue prevents Russia economic collapse

**Bumpers** **12** Courtney, received her Juris Doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania Law School and her Certificate in Business and Public Policy from Wharton School of Business. She is currently an associate at King & Spalding, LLP in the area of Special Matters/Government Investigations 5/2 “Russia’s energy supply: A foreign policy tool?” http://www.fairobserver.com/360theme/russia%E2%80%99s-energy-supply-foreign-policy-tool

It is no wonder why Russia is commonly referred to as one of the world’s energy superpowers. The nation holds the world’s largest known natural gas reserves, the second largest known coal reserves, and the eighth largest known crude oil reserves. It leads the world in natural gas production and exportation and is one of the largest producers and exporters of oil. Because of the abundance of Russia’s energy supply, particularly natural gas and oil, it is one of the key players in the global energy market and could soon be a major player in foreign affairs.

Energy exports have played a significant role in Russia’s economy since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was the energy sector that helped fuel Russia’s economic recovery after the 1998 financial crisis and it is Russia’s oil and natural gas exports that have allowed Russia to reemerge as an international power. While the country has tried to diversify its economy to decrease its economic dependence on the energy sector, it is clear that not only is the country still heavily dependent on this resource, but also that the state of its economy depends on whether oil prices are rising or falling. The country’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined dramatically, about 8%, in 2009 due to decreases in oil prices and the world financial crisis. Russia’s GDP however grew by 4.2% in 2011, making its GDP growth the third highest behind China and India. This growth can be attributed to the rise in oil prices around the world. Although strategic initiatives related to Russia’s energy policy are necessary to ensure that Russia’s economy continues to grow, rises in oil and gas prices will help in ensuring the stabilization of Russia’s economy.

Russian economic decline causes nuclear war

Filger, 9 (Sheldon, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### 1NC Fossil Fuels

#### Expanding energy production presupposes an ontological schema that subordinates nature to engineering and manipulation---leads to a loss of Being of all life

Gary Backhaus 9 Phil @ Loyola Maryland, "Automobility: Global Warming as Symptomatology" April 2009, [www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187)

The modern world "levels" the place-character of life through the automobility of material culture that has been made possible by the stored energy potential of fossil fuels. Leveling is defined as the disvaluing of spatially inscribed qualitative differentiation. The flows of goods made possible through the spatializing ether of fossil fuels allow for locale-transcendence. A single unearthed, unrooted material, fossil fuel, sounds innocuous, except for the fact that as stored energy it transforms all of culture in its image, especially manifest through revolutionizing transport. Stored energy allows for the automobility of all goods, which alters life foremost on the basis of revolutionizing spatiality. The transport capabilities of automobility "level" the placed-based character of goods. Goods can be brought from anywhere to any-other-where. The produce grown five miles away can be presented alongside produce brought from across the globe. Material objects from far away lands are no longer exotic, but common place, and the local ecology does not appear so important, because the local can be inundated with every other locale, which is a mere physical marker on a flowchart. Petroleum-based products can come from Thailand, (toys from McDonald's Happy Meals) along with some sort of beef product from agribusiness cows in newly formed pastures on land once Brazilian rainforest that are fed with genetically altered foodstuffs from some chemical company in New Jersey. No locatable real place need be the source for any of these products. The perfection of neo-liberal economics is for the unrooted flow of goods, which can be made anywhere and marketed anywhere. The earth is forced to function as merely a neutral grid for the flow of auto-mobile commodities. This leveling flow of automobile goods constitutes the dis-valuing of the place-being of material culture. There is another aspect of leveling that we have mentioned: those products that are made through mixture with the unearthed materials—plastics, various synthetic products, metals, etc. Where do such products come from? Geography has no relevance in their material production. Petroleum-based products, being artificially-formed are only possible on the basis of the admixture of unearthed material, take on the quality of being unearthed. These products formed from unearthed materials are immediately unrooted. Does it matter where your petroleum-based products, such as cellophane, are made? Still another aspect of leveling comes from automation. Do you have personal relationship with the machines that make your goods, or provide your service at self-check-outs? And even if you engage a person, there is no place-based relationship that they have with the goods they sell or the companies for which they work.

Fossil fuel energy is the material condition for modern technology's rendering of the natural world as a mere resource for creating the standing reserve necessary for automobility. Nature is to be ordered about according to the need of the requirements of an auto-mobile material culture. "Orderability" is indicative of the non-autonomy of automobility, for **the Being of natural entities is erased and becomes standing reserve waiting to be ordered about**; entities as standing reserve are on call as non-renewable energy orderings serving the auto-mobile function. Automobility is a totalizing ordering, an ordering that includes humankind. **By being ordered about in the image of automobility, there is no autonomy;** humankind as automata are unfree and **this unfreedom as a way of Being leads to the "destruction" of the earthed.** The self-moving machine technologies along with their auto-mobile loads order life on the basis of converting fossil fuel into energy for the unearthing, unrooting, and spatial leveling of all of the materials of the earth. So by the unearthing of fossil fuel everything is ordered about according to its Being, resulting in the dissolution of the earthly characteristics of being-earthed, rooted, and qualitatively differentiated on the basis of spatially inscribed environmental niches. This way of life is unsustainable.

#### The doctrine of continued re-engineering of nature results in more insidious destructive practices that make their impacts inevitable---unforeseen non-linearities ensure serial policy failure and extinction

Gary Backhaus 9 Phil @ Loyola Maryland, "Automobility: Global Warming as Symptomatology" April 2009, [www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187)

Many environmental thinkers have questioned the presupposed tenets, e.g., the doctrine of linear progress, on which Gore bases his belief in the success of a scientific/technological solution to global warming and environmental problems in general. "Professional ecologists such as Frank Egler have countered that 'Nature is not only more complex than we think, it is more complex than we can think [6]'". I believe that a commitment to sustainability must recognize limits to human cognition and thus must take a radically different approach. This does not mean that science and technology have reduced roles, but that their roles must be based on a new attitude of respectful humility [7]. The manipulation and appropriation of nature must no longer be our technological goals. Rather, we should be modifying our own societal/cultural forms, which include science and technology, to live in greater harmony within the context of natural conditions and agencies. Sciences and technologies that apprehend those conditions can serve to help us become much more respectful of natural conditions. Neither science nor technology needs to challenge natural processes; it rather needs to challenge us to live more responsibly. The chauvinist worldview with its doctrine of reactive reparation when it comes to environmental degradation, no longer can be promoted as a viable behavioral process. We can no longer appropriate nature and then deal with the so called "unintended side-effects"—a dealing that amounts to a continual re-engineering of nature, which leads to consequences that dangerously exceed our powers of forecasting. But a new pro-activity conducive to sustainability should be more focused on changing our relation to nature, not so much on changing nature. Gore's critical analysis merely focuses on wiser uses of technology; he does not call into question radically enough the doctrine of forcing nature to serve us and does not clearly advocate a science and technology that serves nature as first priority. This can be accomplished only by fundamental transformations in human interpretative praxes. In practical language the transformation advocated here means that we dramatically minimize our ecological footprints, which entails new geo- economic/political/social spatial productions, concerning which science and technology play a vital role. Cultural transformation for sustainability requires a new epistemological basis that recognizes the ontological structure of sustainable ecology as having priority over human intentions such that we eliminate certain of our expressivities and objectivations, rather than continuing with the manipulation of nature to accommodate our intentions— a move away from anthropocentric hegemony to a model of human contextualization that leads away from a worldview that presupposes the culture/nature dualism.

Bio-regionalists have called for new and radical political changes such as the re-construction of political boundaries to be correlative with biospheric boundaries so that the political domain becomes interfused with the natural domain in an organic development pattern [8]. Forms of human life then are organized in context with natural ecologies—an interrelation for mutual benefit. This ecological rootedness to a place, to its place-character or genius loci as the key to ecological bounded praxes, must be accomplished without the fascist tendencies of race/nation imperialisms of the past, which are avoidable through the political tactics of decentralization and networking and the value of diversity within local-bounds. Gore champions the democratic process but really offers no proposals that would restructure political bodies in a way that would support the implementation of sustainability. A society that culturally and politically does not attune its practices to place-bound ecologies and their interrelations does not merit the accolade of supporting sustainability. As I will show, to call into question the geography of automobility requires thinking about how the task to de-structure automobility might show us how to re-structure life toward the goal of sustainability.

There is still another point germane to the issue of automobility which shows the non-viability of Gore's shallow ecology. Peak oil theorists are issuing very serious warnings concerning non-renewable energy consumption [9]. Hypothetically, if we could immediately solve the global warming (climate change) problem in Gore's shallow, technological sense, then we would nevertheless still be in the most utterly grave circumstances concerning energy. Even if it were possible to solve the problem of global warming with the use of alternative energy sources, there still would remain an energy crisis both in terms of shortages and implementations that carry many unwanted so-called side-effects. A policy of sustainability would entail tackling the energy crisis directly, not because of its link to the global warming problem; sustainability entails more dramatic measures, necessary curbs on modern excesses promoted by neo-liberal economic globalization and the social structures that it constructs, concerning which Gore's sanguine liberal-based ideology is not prepared to face.

My fundamental criticism, however, is that Gore sees global warming as the problem rather than as a symptom of a much deeper flaw/problematic in culture, and this delimits his thinking to remain within a shallow ecological viewpoint, foiling an analysis that would develop toward a viable sustainability. His focus on global warming limits his solution to the environmental crisis to a shallow technological fix. Sure he advocates a change in forms of life, but these are merely a function of, or the requirement for, the implementation of technologies that will save us and the planet. In this way his thinking remains within the modern scientistic attitude that in a deep or foundational sense has led to the predicament in which we find ourselves [10]. The efforts to dominate nature, dominations implemented through modern technological praxes, have led to drastic changes to the planet as a whole in an extremely short time. We now see that those changes, based on considering our needs only (the mentality of natural resources to be ordered about on our terms), are destroying the life of, and on, the planet.

#### This requires a rejection of their symptom-focus in favor of an ontological reconfiguration of our relationship to nature that does not render it a simple standing reserve

Gary Backhaus 9 Phil @ Loyola Maryland, "Automobility: Global Warming as Symptomatology" April 2009, [www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187)

The twentieth-century philosopher Martin Heidegger provides an approach that allows us to transcend the ideological-bound techno-rationalization represented in Gore's analysis of the problem of global warming so that we engage a more fundamental analysis that uncovers deeper interpretive roots. A more reflective total approach (versus the instrumental rationality of problem-solving) is necessary to inform the development of sustainability, for we must uncover the presuppositions of the worldview that deliver us over to auto-mobility, which opens us to a new reflection on sustainability. In his magnus opus, Being and Time, Heidegger puts forth a thesis—that Being itself is not a being/entity— that strikes at the core of Western thinking [15]. For example, Aristotle privileged primary substance, the individual entity, as the fundamental being, linking all other manners of being to it, his ten categories. According to Heidegger, Western thinking has continued to misunderstand the question of Being as a question of beings. In doing so, correctness, or the relation between a statement and a state of affairs, has substituted for a deeper sense of truth. When we focus on beings, trying to properly define them, Being hides, for Being is other than the entities brought forth from its context. Being is the whole or horizonal context that allows for the appearing of beings in the first place. This sounds like mysticism to those who don't understand the metaphysical tradition of the West. But Heidegger's notion here is no less understandable the scientific principle of Gestalt psychology that the whole is different than the sum of the parts. So, if your way of knowing limits you to examining parts, you will not understand the meaning of the whole. A way of Being (a whole—a worldview) is what we are seeking to understand through this attempt to engage in a deeper analysis. Thus, Being must be pursued in a way that we arrive at the happening of truth, how a particular way of Being brings forth or unconceals beings, which means that we must think beyond the whatness of beings in terms of the correctness of definitions. Truth involves unconcealment of the essence of something through a way, an interpretive form of Being. "Some things" concretely manifest through socio-historical worldviews that allow entities to be brought into the clearing, that is, to be recognized/understood as something, as a type of being/entity. Before correctness can be established, the being must first be allowed to appear as something and this unconcealment is the deeper domain of truth. So a way of Being is an ontological agency, an ontological interpretive filter that allows certain beings to appear as the something that they appear as, as a function of the interpretive context. It is this essence/Being of automobility indicated by its symptom, global warming, that we must seek to uncover.

Taking up Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology in its reflection on Being allows us to envision global warming as a symptom, as an appearing, complex phenomenon through a particular way, the interpretive form of Being to which modern human life has been claimed. We are led to the essence of which global warming is an appearing symptom, which is other than its correct definition—one of the goals of Gore's book is to responsibly inform the average non-scientifically educated person as to the whatness of global warming, a correct saying of the phenomenon. From a Heideggerian standpoint, Gore's shallow analysis is blind to deeper truths that concern more than establishing correct statements describing the whatness of global warming.

In the analysis of a later treatise, "The Question Concerning Technology'", Heidegger maintains that the essence of technology is not something technological—its Being is not to be interpreted as itself a being (a technology). He provides what is regarded as the (standard/accepted) correct definition of technology as a human activity and as a means to an end. By contrast to the correct definition, Heidegger's analysis shows that the truth in the revealing/unconcealment or the essence/Being of modern technology that allows for modern technological entities to show themselves as such is a "challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it [16]". The challenging is a setting-in-order, a setting upon nature, such that "the earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district" and "what the river is now, a water-power supplier, derives from the essence of the power station [16]". What is the character of this unconcealment? "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it standing reserve [16]". And the challenging that claims man to challenge nature in this way Heidegger labels, enframing. "Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that the way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern technology and that is itself nothing technological [16]". Modern physics, which interprets nature as a system of calculable forces is the herald of enframing. The way of Being through which entities stand in the clearing, as technological instrumentalities, is enframing and the way of Being of those entities is that of standing reserve.

This very brief discussion of Heidegger is important for two reasons. First, because my conception of automobility emphasizes the spatial organization of standing reserve, which Heidegger does not treat, and because automobility entails an empirical manifestation of man's ordering attitude and behavior in terms of spatial production, we recognize an already established ontological analysis from which automobility is to be interpreted. Secondly, we have an exemplar by which we can see what is to be done to uncover the Being that allows something to appear as that something, which is always other than the appearing beings. Heidegger's hermeneutics provides the possibility to claim that the solution to the technologically induced problem of global warming is not itself something technological, if indeed we are to open ourselves to other possible interpretational modes of Being such that other kinds of entities would then be unconcealed. We want to free ourselves up to sustainability as a way of Being by being open for a new way of interpretation, a new worldview, a new paradigm for living, other than enframing, by which new kinds of entities other than those of standing reserve will show themselves from its clearing.

3.3. Redirecting Reflection from Symptom to Source

Al Gore is correct in stating that global warming is caused by the increase of greenhouse gasses trapping infrared radiation, with CO2 being the most prevalent. In the U.S., coal burning power plants and automobiles are the chief contributors. He also states correctly that methane and nitric oxide are also contributors to global warming, which reach dangerous levels through industrialized orderings of farm animals, etc. All of these involve environmental contamination, what Gore would call side-effects of technological, industrialized society. But if we reflect on the essence of fossil fuel energy, we will be led to the way of Being that brings the symptom of global warming to unconcealment. Global warming is a symptom of the spatial productions of automobility manifesting the enframing that challenges nature and transforms living-spaces of the earth into sites of energy orderings in a dialectical intensification: the more storage of energy, the more production of auto-mobile spatiality. We want to redirect attention in order to come to terms with the disease rather than its symptomatic manifestation.

### 1NC

#### Obama will win now---top models prove but events could alter the outcome

Rainey 9/12 James, LA Times, "Two election models, like recent polls, tilt toward Obama", 2012, www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-two-election-models-obama-20120912,0,2273167.story

There are two competing temptations when looking at the boost in support for President Obama after the Democratic National Convention: to take the surge too seriously or not seriously enough.¶ With eight weeks to go until the election, plenty of time remains for unforeseen events (a dramatic economic event, a candidate’s stumble, a terrorist attack or some other calamity) to change the dynamic. But a couple of statistical analyses suggest that the recent polling has some significant, if not conclusive, meaning. And the findings all accrue to Obama’s benefit.¶ Politics Now cited a University of Colorado election model that several weeks ago projected a Mitt Romney win in the presidential election. But that model subsequently came in for a beating from analysts such as New York Times statistical whiz Nate Silver, who found “glaring problems” with the methodology used by the Colorado political scientists. Among other problems, the Colorado model put a huge weight on unemployment rates — but only with a Democrat sitting in the White House.¶ Silver and others modeling the election, including the financial prognosticator NerdWallet.com, now find that Obama’s chances of reelection have surged to a high for the year. The Obama bounce has been solid, if not exactly breathtaking, and certainly nothing like what might be known as the “Lehman Bounce” in 2008.¶ Four years ago, many Americans interpreted the bankruptcy of financial giant Lehman Bros. as a strong sign that the Republican Party should no longer be managing the nation’s economic affairs. Silver recalled in his blog Monday how, after the Lehman collapse, it was clear Republican John McCain would lose, “with Barack Obama’s projected probability of winning the Electoral College increasing by about 25 percent in a period of just 48 hours.” McCain never fully recovered.¶ Silver’s model, factoring in the candidates’ chances of victory in key swing states, has put the likelihood of an Obama victory at 60% to 70% through much of the summer. But on Tuesday it set the chances of a second Obama term at a high of 79.8%.¶ NerdWallet, a company that started analyzing credit card rates, extended its data analysis to fields such as education and politics. Joanna Pratt, who heads election analysis for the company, acknowledges that the political sideline was intended to bring more attention to the company’s core business. ¶ The company looks at polls, particularly in battleground states, and their historical performance in elections. In general, the company notes that polls become more predictive of final outcomes as election day approaches. (No huge surprise there.)¶ On Tuesday, NerdWallet put Obama’s chance of reelection at 78.4% — just shy of the probability predicted by Silver. Of 12 states that analysts expect to be most closely contested, NerdWallet projects only two — Missouri and North Carolina — as most likely to go to Romney. Obama has more than a 50% chance of victory in 10 other battleground states: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin.¶ Among the possibilities that could cause the analysis to misfire, according to NerdWallet: “Dramatic events or substantial new information between now and the election....”

#### The plan’s unpopular – the public loves fracking regulations – specifically true in Ohio

Bloomberg 12 Jim Efstathiou. “Tighter Fracking Regulations Favored by 65% of U.S. in Poll,” 3/14, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-15/tighter-fracking-regulations-favored-by-65-of-u-s-in-poll.html

The U.S. public favors greater regulation of hydraulic fracturing, a natural gas drilling technique that has reduced prices for consumers while raising environmental concerns.¶ More than three times as many Americans say there should be more regulation of fracturing, known as fracking, than less, according to a Bloomberg News National Poll conducted March 8-11. The findings coincide with recent surveys in Ohio and New York where people who believe fracking will cause environmental damage outnumber those who say the process is safe.

#### Ohio is by far the most important state – statistics prove

Silver 8/29 Nate is chief pollster for the New York Times’ FiveThirtyEight blog. “Aug. 29: So Much Depends Upon Ohio,” 2012, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/30/aug-29-so-much-depends-upon-ohio/

The broader point is simply that Ohio is so important to the electoral calculus that it’s good news for a candidate when a polling firm shows him doing relatively well there compared with the other states that it polls. Ohio has a 30 percent chance of being the tipping-point state, meaning that it would cast the decisive votes in the Electoral College. **That’s as much as** the next two states on the list, **Florida and Virginia, combined. It’s also as much as Colorado, Nevada, Iowa, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Michigan and North Carolina combined**.¶ All of these states are competitive. But really, they exist along a continuum of electoral power rather than falling into binary categories of “important” and “unimportant.” Ohio is at the extreme end of that continuum.¶ The reason our tipping-point calculus rates Ohio so highly is because it would usually suffice to provide Mr. Obama with a winning map, **even if he lost many of those other states.** If you give Ohio to Mr. Obama, plus all the states where the forecast model now estimates that he has at least 75 percent chance of winning, he’s up to 265 electoral votes. That means he could win any one of Colorado, Virginia, Iowa, Wisconsin, Florida or North Carolina to put him over the top.

#### Romney causes Iran Strikes –Obama doesn't

AP 7/29 Kasie Hunt. "Adviser: Romney would back strike against Iran," 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/adviser-romney-back-strike-against-iran-072640314.html

JERUSALEM (AP) — Mitt **Romney would back an Israeli military strike against Iran** aimed at preventing Tehran from obtaining nuclear capability, a top foreign policy adviser said Sunday, outlining the aggressive posture the Republican presidential candidate will take toward Iran in a speech in Israel later in the day.¶ **Romney has said he has a** "zero tolerance" **policy toward Iran obtaining the capability to build a nuclear weapon.¶** "If Israel has to take action on its own, in order to stop Iran from developing the capability, the governor would respect that decision," foreign policy adviser Dan Senor told reporters ahead of the speech, planned for late Sunday near Jerusalem's Old City.¶ Romney believes the option of a U.S. attack should also be "on the table." He has said he will do "the opposite" of what U.S. President Barack Obama would do in his approach to Israel.¶ The Obama administration hasn't ruled out the military option, but Obama has so far been relying on sanctions and diplomatic negotiations to discourage Iran from building a nuclear bomb.

#### Extinction

Hirsch 5 - Professor @ UC San Diego (Jorge, “Can a nuclear strike on Iran be averted,” November 21st)

The Bush administration has put together all the elements it needs to justify the impending military action against Iran. [Unlike in the case of Iraq](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html), it will happen without warning, and most of the justifications will be issued after the fact. We will wake up one day to learn that facilities in Iran have been bombed in a joint U.S.-Israeli attack. It may even take another couple of days for the revelation that some of the U.S. bombs were nuclear. Why a Nuclear Attack on Iran Is a Bad Idea Now that we have outlined what is very close to happening, let us discuss briefly why everything possible should be done to prevent it. In a worst-case scenario, the attack will cause a violent reaction from Iran. Millions of "[human wave](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_wave_attack)" Iranian militias will storm into Iraq, and just as Saddam [stopped them with chemical weapons](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/n01232003_200301234.html), the U.S. will stop them with nuclear weapons, resulting potentially in hundreds of thousands of casualties. The Middle East will explode, and popular uprisings in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries with pro-Western governments could be overtaken by radical regimes. Pakistan already has nuclear weapons, and a nuclear conflict could even lead to Russia's and Israel's involvement using nuclear weapons. In a best-case scenario, the U.S. will destroy all nuclear, chemical, and missile facilities in Iran with conventional and low-yield nuclear weapons in a lightning surprise attack, and Iran will be paralyzed and decide not to retaliate for fear of a vastly more devastating nuclear attack. In the short term, the U.S. will succeed, leaving no Iranian nuclear program, civilian or otherwise. Iran will no longer threaten Israel, a regime change will ensue, and a pro-Western government will emerge. However, even in the best-case scenario, the long-term consequences are dire. The nuclear threshold will have been crossed by a nuclear superpower against a non-nuclear country. Many more countries will rush to get their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent. With no taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, they will certainly be used again. Nuclear conflicts will occur within the next 10 to 20 years, and will escalate until much of the world is destroyed. Let us remember that the destructive power of existing nuclear arsenals is approximately [one million times that of the Hiroshima bomb](http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1997/00/00_babst_consequences.htm), enough to erase Earth's population many times over.

### 1NC Global Econ Resilient

#### Global economy resilient

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One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s.¶ Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression."¶ Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets.¶ Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization.¶ One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.¶ A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"¶ This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies.¶ It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit.¶ Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

### 1NC No War

#### Econ decline doesn’t cause war

Barnett 9**—**senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide **recession has had** virtually **no impact** whatsoever **on** the **international security** landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly **unrelated to** global **economic trends**. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: •No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); •The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); •Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); •No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); •A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and •No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets § Marked 17:06 § and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

### 1NC US Econ Resil

#### Economy shortfalls are natural part of the business cycle, it’ll bounce back

Cooley, 09- (Thomas-- Ph.D. in Economics, Professor of Economics and Dean of New York University's Stern School of Business, Financial booms and busts 'are inevitable'; Academic expects the next economic crisis to follow the same path as the one the world is experiencing now and it will involve a similar breakdown in confidence", South China Morning Post, November 25th 2009, December 1st 2009, Lexis Nexis,)

Another financial crisis is inevitable because booms and busts are simply part of the business cycle, a leading academic told a seminar organised by Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Dr Thomas F. Cooley, professor of economics and dean of New York University's Stern School of Business, recently spoke at a Global Finance Seminar Series event entitled "The Next Financial Crisis" at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) offices. Edmond Lau, executive director of the HKMA's monetary management department and a board member of the Treasury Markets Association, delivered opening remarks, while Reginald Chua, editor-in-chief of the South China Morning Post, later moderated a panel discussion between Cooley and K.K. Tse, executive vice-president of State Street Bank and Trust Company. Cooley would not say when he thought the next financial crisis would occur but said it definitely would come because booms and busts were part of the business cycle. He said the next crisis would have the same characteristics and follow the same path as the present one - flowing from a loss of confidence."History is replete with examples of financial crises and bank panics," he said. "Just in the United States alone, in the 20th century we had the panic of 1907, the stock market crash of 1929 and banking panics of the 1930s. Then we had a long period of relative success and calm, and then we had episodes such as the savings and loan crisis, and the failures of Continental Illinois Bank and Long Term Capital Management. "That's just in the US. In the past two decades we've had financial crises in Asia, Mexico, Chile, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Russia, so financial crises occur with some frequency, but what they don't do is occur with predictability," he said.

#### US economy resilient

Coy 9—Economics editor for BusinessWeek. BA in history from Cornell (Peter, Why It's Smart To Be Optimistic, 13 August 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09\_34/b4144040812940.htm?chan=magazine+channel\_special+report)

The optimistic scenario is that the recession is correcting the excesses of the euphoric bubble years, when the global economy was on an unsustainable path. Americans were overspending on big houses and cars, and the nation was paying for an unaffordable lifestyle by issuing IOUs to trading partners such as the Chinese. That had to change—and now it has. Leave it to an adman to put a nice gloss on the idea: "I think we're ushering in a new era of doing better with less," says Roy M. Spence Jr., chairman and CEO of Austin (Tex.) advertising agency GSD&M Idea City. Shortly before he died on June 5 at age 90, economic consultant Peter L. Bernstein wrote an article for the July/August issue of *Harvard Business Review* in which he argued that getting whacked on the nose was good capitalism. People are no longer taking crazy, overleveraged risks, so they're less vulnerable to blowing up again, Bernstein said. "For these reasons," he wrote, "instability leads inevitably to stability." Optimists see the recession as a forest fire that clears out dead brush, § Marked 17:07 § making room for new growth. "I think crisis plays a wonderful role in capitalism. It's exactly what allows you to grow faster over time relative to other economic systems that don't allow the dips," says James W. Paulsen, chief investment strategist for Wells Capital Management in San Francisco. When the crisis struck last year, he says, "we totally paralyzed our healthy homes and households into inactivity. If they're still in O.K. shape, then this thing could turn around quicker and start growing better than people imagine." Even the drying up of capital for new enterprises in this recession, while generally negative, has a positive aspect. It forces entrepreneurs to be more efficient and lets them keep more of their companies' equity, says John Dietz, co-founder of startup Adometry, which measures the effectiveness of Internet advertising. Bravely, he and co-founder Robert Perrier announced last September, at the height of the financial crisis, that they were leaving well-paid jobs at Walt Disney Internet Group (DIS) to launch Adometry. As stocks plunged 25% in the following weeks, says Dietz, "There were times when we thought about saying, 'You know, we were just kidding about leaving.' " Instead, they stuck it out. Now Adometry is just about ready for prime time. Adometry illustrates the ongoing benefits of technological progress. Dietz and Perrier found they were able to develop their data-intensive ad monitoring technology cheaply by harnessing the power of something from Amazon.com (AMZN) called the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud—essentially, high-powered computing available as a service on the Web rather than as a bunch of expensive boxes. Says Dietz: "A lot of the stuff we're doing now would have been impossible even five years ago."

### 1NC Unipolarity Fails

#### Unipolarity causes policy failure---they can’t access any impact

Charles L. Glaser 11, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at the George Washington University and the director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security and Conﬂict Studies, June 2011, “Why unipolarity doesn’t matter (much),” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 135-147

A still different type of argument holds that unipolar powers tend to adopt expanded interests and associated goals that unipolarity then enables them to achieve. To the extent that these goals are actually in the unipole’s true interest, unipolarity is good for the unipole. In broad terms, this argument follows the claim that states’ interests and goals grow with their power. 19

These expanded goals can be attributed to three different types of factors. 20 The ﬁrst is a permissive structure, which allows the state to pursue more ambitious goals. The state’s interests do not change, but its increased ability to pursue them results in a redeﬁnition of its goals. A state could have goals that were previously unachievable at acceptable cost; by lowering the costs, unipolarity places these goals within reach, enabling the state to make itself better off. A unipole’s desire for a higher degree of security can be an example of this type of expanded goal, reﬂecting the means that it can wield. Second, the state can acquire new interests, which are generated by the unipole’s greater territorial and institutional reach. For example, a state that controls more territory may face new threats and, as a result, conclude that it needs to control still more territory, acquire still more power, and/or restructure international institutions to further protect its interests. Third, the unipole’s goals can be inﬂuenced by what is commonly described as human nature and by psychology. A unipolar state will be inclined to lose track of how secure it is and consequently pursue inappropriate policies that are designed to increase its security but turn out to be too costly and/or to have a high probability of backﬁring. One variant of this type of argument expects unipolar powers to conclude that they need to spread their type of governance or political ideology to be secure. These dangers can be reinforced by a tendency for a unipolar power to see its new interests, which are optional, as necessary ones.

The ﬁrst two types of expanded interests and goals can make the unipole better off. The question here is whether the interests the United States might ﬁnd within its reach due to its unipolar position are very valuable. With respect to security, the answer is ‘no’. For the reasons summarized above, the United States can be very secure in bipolarity, and unipolarity is important only in an extreme and unlikely case. Other US goals, for example, spreading democracy and free markets, do not depend on unipolarity, at least not its military dimension. Instead, whether these liberal systems spread will depend most heavily on their own effectiveness. Regarding the down side, there does not appear to be an overwhelming reason that the United States cannot avoid the dangers of unipolar overreach. The Bush administration certainly proved itself vulnerable to these dangers and the United States is continuing to pay for its ﬂawed judgments. Arguably, strands of overreach can be traced back to the Clinton administration’s emphasis on democratic enlargement, although the means that it chose were much more in line with US interests. 21 And the Obama administration’s decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan may well be an example of striving for too much security. Nevertheless, none of the basic arguments about unipolarity explain why these errors are unavoidable. The overreach claim is more an observation about the past than a well-supported prediction about the future. We do not have strong reasons for concluding that the United States will be unable to beneﬁt from analyses of its grand strategy options, learning to both appreciate how very secure it is and at the same time to respect the limits of its power.

In sum, then, under current conditions, unipolarity does little to enable the United States to increase its security. Given the limited beneﬁts of unipolarity and the not insigniﬁcant dangers of unipolar overreach, the United States will have to choose its policies wisely if it is going to be better off in a unipolar world than a bipolar one.

### 1NC Lashout

#### No U.S. lashout---retrenchment causes caution and restraint---reduces the risk of war

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

With regard to militarized disputes, declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes, and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2).68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist's argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively, declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims, or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers.

### 1NC Regs Good --- Backlash

#### Federal regulation prevents future backlash --- states are insufficient

Friedman 12 Thomas Friedman – winner of three Pulitzer Prizes, columnist for Foreign affairs, Previously chief economic correspondent in the Washington bureau and chief White House correspondent. “Get It Right on Gas,” August 4, 2012, The New York Times)

On July 19, Forbes interviewed George Phydias Mitchell, who, in the 1990s, pioneered the use of fracking to break natural gas free from impermeable shale. According to Forbes, Mitchell argued that **fracking needs to be regulated by the** D**epartment** o**f** E**nergy, not just states: “**Because if they don’t do it right, there could be trouble,” he says. There’s no excuse not to get it right. “There are good techniques to make it safe that should be followed properly,” he says. But, the smaller, independent drillers, “are wild.” “It’s tough to control these independents. If they do something wrong and dangerous, they should punish them.”¶ Adds Fred Krupp, the president of the Environmental Defense Fund who has been working with the government and companies on drilling standards: “The economic and national security advantages of natural gas are obvious, but if you tour some of these areas of intensive development the environmental impacts are equally obvious.” We need nationally accepted standards for controlling methane leakage, for controlling water used in fracking — where you get it, how you treat the polluted water that comes out from the fracking process and how you protect aquifers — and for ensuring that communities have the right to say no to drilling. “The key message,” said Krupp, “is you gotta get the rules right. States need real inspector capacity and compliance schemes where companies certify they have done it right and there are severe penalties if they perjure.”¶ **Energy companies who want to keep regulations lax need to understand that a series of mishaps around natural gas will** — justifiably — trigger an environmental backlash to stop it.