### 1NC -T

#### Energy production is the generation of power from raw materials – excludes extraction of those materials

Vaekstfonden 6 Vaekstfonden is a Danish government backed investment fund that facilitates the supply of venture capital in terms of start-up equity and high-risk loans "THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IN DENMARK- perspectives on entrepreneurship and venture capital" No Specific Cited, Latest Data From 2006 s3.amazonaws.com/zanran\_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf

In all, 20 industry experts were interviewed about the composition and dynamics of the Danish energy sector. Insights from a minimum of 3 industry experts have been assigned to each of the stages in the value chain. Following is a brief description of what the different stages encompass.¶ Raw material extraction¶ This stage encompass the process before the actual production of the energy. As an example it is increasingly expensive to locate and extract oil from the North Sea. Likewise coal, gas and waste suitable for energy production can be costly to provide.¶ Energy production¶ Energy production encompasses the process, where energy sources are transformed into heat and power. Transmission and distribution¶ Energy transmission and distribution is in this report defined as the infrastructure that enables the producers of energy to sell energy to consumers.¶ Consumption¶ The last stage in the value chain is consumption. This stage encompasses products and services that geographically are placed near the consumers. As an example, decentralized energy production via solar power systems is part of the consumption stage.

#### Vote negative

#### Limits---including extraction doubles the size of the topic and makes it bidirectional by allowing affs to affect both supply and demand sides of each energy---undermines preparedness for all debates---err neg because the terms incentives and restrictions serve no limiting function

#### Ground---all disads are based on increasing the actual amount of power available---they allow the aff to just extract raw materials without guaranteeing they’re ever used

### 1NC-CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should devolve authority over restrictions on oil drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf to the 50 states and all relevant territories. The 50 states and all relevant territories should substantially reduce restrictions on oil drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf.

#### Giving regulatory power to the states solves better – leaving power in the hands of the federal government guts solvency – THIS IS THE END OF THEIR SOLVENCY ARTICLE

Spakovsky and Loris 12 Hans A. von Spakovsky is a Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, and Nicolas D. Loris is the Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, August 13, 2012, “Offshore Drilling: Increase Access, Reduce the Risk, and Stop Hurting American Companies”, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/offshore-drilling-increase-access-reduce-the-risk-and-stop-hurting-american-companies>

\*\*\*\*\*Minnesota Card Begins Here\*\*\*\*\*\*

No New Access in the New OCS Plan¶ The recent lease sale in the Central Gulf of Mexico was a welcoming sign (especially since the Administration delayed part of the sale in 2010), but the new five-year leasing plan for 2012–2017 is extremely disappointing. The Administration failed to unlock the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, as well as the Eastern Gulf of Mexico and areas off Alaska’s coast. As a result, a meager 15 percent of America’s territorial waters are available for oil and gas exploration. The Minerals Management Service estimates that 101 billion barrels of oil and 480 trillion cubic feet of natural gas of proven reserves and undiscovered resources are awaiting exploration in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Opening these areas would generate hundreds of thousands of new jobs, generate hundreds of billions of dollars in government revenue, and bring more oil to the world market, thereby lowering gas prices.[9]¶ Congress Should Open Access, Reduce Risk¶ Opening access and reducing the onerous regulatory risk would give companies the certainty they need to expand job creation and increase energy supplies. Specifically:¶ Congress should require the Department of the Interior to open all of America’s territorial waters for leasing, exploration, and drilling. The Offshore Petroleum Expansion Now (OPEN) Act of 2012, for instance, would replace President Obama’s 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil & Gas Leasing Program with a much more robust plan that opens areas in the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and off Alaska’s coast.¶

\*\*\*\*\*Minnesota Card Ends Here\*\*\*\*\*\*

Congress should require the Department of the Interior to honor the permit deadlines (as required by law) unless the Interior finds specific and significant faults with the application. If Interior concludes that the permit application is not complete, it should outline specific steps the applicant could take to complete it. If Interior does not find fault with the application before the deadline expires, the permit application should be considered accepted upon expiration of the deadline so that companies can proceed with exploration and drilling.¶ Congress should reform liability caps for oil spills. Given the fact that uncapped tort liability yields frivolous lawsuits, removing the cap entirely without implementing a new system would subject covered industries to artificially high costs. Congress should reform liability caps in a way that accurately assigns risk and liability to those companies engaged in covered activities.[10]¶ **Congress should ultimately transition the permitting process to state regulators, who are best able to balance economic growth and environmental protection**. The permitting process needs to be taken out of the hands of Washington bureaucrats who report to a President hostile to oil and gas production—a Chief Executive who can arbitrarily stop such energy development across the nation by executive fiat.

### 1NC-K

#### Expanding energy production presupposes an ontological schema that subordinates nature to engineering and manipulation---leads to a loss of Being of all life

Gary Backhaus 9 Phil @ Loyola Maryland, "Automobility: Global Warming as Symptomatology" April 2009, [www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187)

The modern world "levels" the place-character of life through the automobility of material culture that has been made possible by the stored energy potential of fossil fuels. Leveling is defined as the disvaluing of spatially inscribed qualitative differentiation. The flows of goods made possible through the spatializing ether of fossil fuels allow for locale-transcendence. A single unearthed, unrooted material, fossil fuel, sounds innocuous, except for the fact that as stored energy it transforms all of culture in its image, especially manifest through revolutionizing transport. Stored energy allows for the automobility of all goods, which alters life foremost on the basis of revolutionizing spatiality. The transport capabilities of automobility "level" the placed-based character of goods. Goods can be brought from anywhere to any-other-where. The produce grown five miles away can be presented alongside produce brought from across the globe. Material objects from far away lands are no longer exotic, but common place, and the local ecology does not appear so important, because the local can be inundated with every other locale, which is a mere physical marker on a flowchart. Petroleum-based products can come from Thailand, (toys from McDonald's Happy Meals) along with some sort of beef product from agribusiness cows in newly formed pastures on land once Brazilian rainforest that are fed with genetically altered foodstuffs from some chemical company in New Jersey. No locatable real place need be the source for any of these products. The perfection of neo-liberal economics is for the unrooted flow of goods, which can be made anywhere and marketed anywhere. The earth is forced to function as merely a neutral grid for the flow of auto-mobile commodities. This leveling flow of automobile goods constitutes the dis-valuing of the place-being of material culture. There is another aspect of leveling that we have mentioned: those products that are made through mixture with the unearthed materials—plastics, various synthetic products, metals, etc. Where do such products come from? Geography has no relevance in their material production. Petroleum-based products, being artificially-formed are only possible on the basis of the admixture of unearthed material, take on the quality of being unearthed. These products formed from unearthed materials are immediately unrooted. Does it matter where your petroleum-based products, such as cellophane, are made? Still another aspect of leveling comes from automation. Do you have personal relationship with the machines that make your goods, or provide your service at self-check-outs? And even if you engage a person, there is no place-based relationship that they have with the goods they sell or the companies for which they work.

Fossil fuel energy is the material condition for modern technology's rendering of the natural world as a mere resource for creating the standing reserve necessary for automobility. Nature is to be ordered about according to the need of the requirements of an auto-mobile material culture. "Orderability" is indicative of the non-autonomy of automobility, for **the Being of natural entities is erased and becomes standing reserve waiting to be ordered about**; entities as standing reserve are on call as non-renewable energy orderings serving the auto-mobile function. Automobility is a totalizing ordering, an ordering that includes humankind. **By being ordered about in the image of automobility, there is no autonomy;** humankind as automata are unfree and **this unfreedom as a way of Being leads to the "destruction" of the earthed.** The self-moving machine technologies along with their auto-mobile loads order life on the basis of converting fossil fuel into energy for the unearthing, unrooting, and spatial leveling of all of the materials of the earth. So by the unearthing of fossil fuel everything is ordered about according to its Being, resulting in the dissolution of the earthly characteristics of being-earthed, rooted, and qualitatively differentiated on the basis of spatially inscribed environmental niches. This way of life is unsustainable.

#### The doctrine of continued re-engineering of nature results in more insidious destructive practices that make their impacts inevitable---unforeseen non-linearities ensure serial policy failure and extinction

Gary Backhaus 9 Phil @ Loyola Maryland, "Automobility: Global Warming as Symptomatology" April 2009, [www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187)

Many environmental thinkers have questioned the presupposed tenets, e.g., the doctrine of linear progress, on which Gore bases his belief in the success of a scientific/technological solution to global warming and environmental problems in general. "Professional ecologists such as Frank Egler have countered that 'Nature is not only more complex than we think, it is more complex than we can think [6]'". I believe that a commitment to sustainability must recognize limits to human cognition and thus must take a radically different approach. This does not mean that science and technology have reduced roles, but that their roles must be based on a new attitude of respectful humility [7]. The manipulation and appropriation of nature must no longer be our technological goals. Rather, we should be modifying our own societal/cultural forms, which include science and technology, to live in greater harmony within the context of natural conditions and agencies. Sciences and technologies that apprehend those conditions can serve to help us become much more respectful of natural conditions. Neither science nor technology needs to challenge natural processes; it rather needs to challenge us to live more responsibly. The chauvinist worldview with its doctrine of reactive reparation when it comes to environmental degradation, no longer can be promoted as a viable behavioral process. We can no longer appropriate nature and then deal with the so called "unintended side-effects"—a dealing that amounts to a continual re-engineering of nature, which leads to consequences that dangerously exceed our powers of forecasting. But a new pro-activity conducive to sustainability should be more focused on changing our relation to nature, not so much on changing nature. Gore's critical analysis merely focuses on wiser uses of technology; he does not call into question radically enough the doctrine of forcing nature to serve us and does not clearly advocate a science and technology that serves nature as first priority. This can be accomplished only by fundamental transformations in human interpretative praxes. In practical language the transformation advocated here means that we dramatically minimize our ecological footprints, which entails new geo- economic/political/social spatial productions, concerning which science and technology play a vital role. Cultural transformation for sustainability requires a new epistemological basis that recognizes the ontological structure of sustainable ecology as having priority over human intentions such that we eliminate certain of our expressivities and objectivations, rather than continuing with the manipulation of nature to accommodate our intentions— a move away from anthropocentric hegemony to a model of human contextualization that leads away from a worldview that presupposes the culture/nature dualism.

Bio-regionalists have called for new and radical political changes such as the re-construction of political boundaries to be correlative with biospheric boundaries so that the political domain becomes interfused with the natural domain in an organic development pattern [8]. Forms of human life then are organized in context with natural ecologies—an interrelation for mutual benefit. This ecological rootedness to a place, to its place-character or genius loci as the key to ecological bounded praxes, must be accomplished without the fascist tendencies of race/nation imperialisms of the past, which are avoidable through the political tactics of decentralization and networking and the value of diversity within local-bounds. Gore champions the democratic process but really offers no proposals that would restructure political bodies in a way that would support the implementation of sustainability. A society that culturally and politically does not attune its practices to place-bound ecologies and their interrelations does not merit the accolade of supporting sustainability. As I will show, to call into question the geography of automobility requires thinking about how the task to de-structure automobility might show us how to re-structure life toward the goal of sustainability.

There is still another point germane to the issue of automobility which shows the non-viability of Gore's shallow ecology. Peak oil theorists are issuing very serious warnings concerning non-renewable energy consumption [9]. Hypothetically, if we could immediately solve the global warming (climate change) problem in Gore's shallow, technological sense, then we would nevertheless still be in the most utterly grave circumstances concerning energy. Even if it were possible to solve the problem of global warming with the use of alternative energy sources, there still would remain an energy crisis both in terms of shortages and implementations that carry many unwanted so-called side-effects. A policy of sustainability would entail tackling the energy crisis directly, not because of its link to the global warming problem; sustainability entails more dramatic measures, necessary curbs on modern excesses promoted by neo-liberal economic globalization and the social structures that it constructs, concerning which Gore's sanguine liberal-based ideology is not prepared to face.

My fundamental criticism, however, is that Gore sees global warming as the problem rather than as a symptom of a much deeper flaw/problematic in culture, and this delimits his thinking to remain within a shallow ecological viewpoint, foiling an analysis that would develop toward a viable sustainability. His focus on global warming limits his solution to the environmental crisis to a shallow technological fix. Sure he advocates a change in forms of life, but these are merely a function of, or the requirement for, the implementation of technologies that will save us and the planet. In this way his thinking remains within the modern scientistic attitude that in a deep or foundational sense has led to the predicament in which we find ourselves [10]. The efforts to dominate nature, dominations implemented through modern technological praxes, have led to drastic changes to the planet as a whole in an extremely short time. We now see that those changes, based on considering our needs only (the mentality of natural resources to be ordered about on our terms), are destroying the life of, and on, the planet.

#### This requires a rejection of their symptom-focus in favor of an ontological reconfiguration of our relationship to nature that does not render it a simple standing reserve

Gary Backhaus 9 Phil @ Loyola Maryland, "Automobility: Global Warming as Symptomatology" April 2009, [www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187)

The twentieth-century philosopher Martin Heidegger provides an approach that allows us to transcend the ideological-bound techno-rationalization represented in Gore's analysis of the problem of global warming so that we engage a more fundamental analysis that uncovers deeper interpretive roots. A more reflective total approach (versus the instrumental rationality of problem-solving) is necessary to inform the development of sustainability, for we must uncover the presuppositions of the worldview that deliver us over to auto-mobility, which opens us to a new reflection on sustainability. In his magnus opus, Being and Time, Heidegger puts forth a thesis—that Being itself is not a being/entity— that strikes at the core of Western thinking [15]. For example, Aristotle privileged primary substance, the individual entity, as the fundamental being, linking all other manners of being to it, his ten categories. According to Heidegger, Western thinking has continued to misunderstand the question of Being as a question of beings. In doing so, correctness, or the relation between a statement and a state of affairs, has substituted for a deeper sense of truth. When we focus on beings, trying to properly define them, Being hides, for Being is other than the entities brought forth from its context. Being is the whole or horizonal context that allows for the appearing of beings in the first place. This sounds like mysticism to those who don't understand the metaphysical tradition of the West. But Heidegger's notion here is no less understandable the scientific principle of Gestalt psychology that the whole is different than the sum of the parts. So, if your way of knowing limits you to examining parts, you will not understand the meaning of the whole. A way of Being (a whole—a worldview) is what we are seeking to understand through this attempt to engage in a deeper analysis. Thus, Being must be pursued in a way that we arrive at the happening of truth, how a particular way of Being brings forth or unconceals beings, which means that we must think beyond the whatness of beings in terms of the correctness of definitions. Truth involves unconcealment of the essence of something through a way, an interpretive form of Being. "Some things" concretely manifest through socio-historical worldviews that allow entities to be brought into the clearing, that is, to be recognized/understood as something, as a type of being/entity. Before correctness can be established, the being must first be allowed to appear as something and this unconcealment is the deeper domain of truth. So a way of Being is an ontological agency, an ontological interpretive filter that allows certain beings to appear as the something that they appear as, as a function of the interpretive context. It is this essence/Being of automobility indicated by its symptom, global warming, that we must seek to uncover.

Taking up Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology in its reflection on Being allows us to envision global warming as a symptom, as an appearing, complex phenomenon through a particular way, the interpretive form of Being to which modern human life has been claimed. We are led to the essence of which global warming is an appearing symptom, which is other than its correct definition—one of the goals of Gore's book is to responsibly inform the average non-scientifically educated person as to the whatness of global warming, a correct saying of the phenomenon. From a Heideggerian standpoint, Gore's shallow analysis is blind to deeper truths that concern more than establishing correct statements describing the whatness of global warming.

In the analysis of a later treatise, "The Question Concerning Technology'", Heidegger maintains that the essence of technology is not something technological—its Being is not to be interpreted as itself a being (a technology). He provides what is regarded as the (standard/accepted) correct definition of technology as a human activity and as a means to an end. By contrast to the correct definition, Heidegger's analysis shows that the truth in the revealing/unconcealment or the essence/Being of modern technology that allows for modern technological entities to show themselves as such is a "challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it [16]". The challenging is a setting-in-order, a setting upon nature, such that "the earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district" and "what the river is now, a water-power supplier, derives from the essence of the power station [16]". What is the character of this unconcealment? "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it standing reserve [16]". And the challenging that claims man to challenge nature in this way Heidegger labels, enframing. "Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that the way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern technology and that is itself nothing technological [16]". Modern physics, which interprets nature as a system of calculable forces is the herald of enframing. The way of Being through which entities stand in the clearing, as technological instrumentalities, is enframing and the way of Being of those entities is that of standing reserve.

This very brief discussion of Heidegger is important for two reasons. First, because my conception of automobility emphasizes the spatial organization of standing reserve, which Heidegger does not treat, and because automobility entails an empirical manifestation of man's ordering attitude and behavior in terms of spatial production, we recognize an already established ontological analysis from which automobility is to be interpreted. Secondly, we have an exemplar by which we can see what is to be done to uncover the Being that allows something to appear as that something, which is always other than the appearing beings. Heidegger's hermeneutics provides the possibility to claim that the solution to the technologically induced problem of global warming is not itself something technological, if indeed we are to open ourselves to other possible interpretational modes of Being such that other kinds of entities would then be unconcealed. We want to free ourselves up to sustainability as a way of Being by being open for a new way of interpretation, a new worldview, a new paradigm for living, other than enframing, by which new kinds of entities other than those of standing reserve will show themselves from its clearing.

3.3. Redirecting Reflection from Symptom to Source

Al Gore is correct in stating that global warming is caused by the increase of greenhouse gasses trapping infrared radiation, with CO2 being the most prevalent. In the U.S., coal burning power plants and automobiles are the chief contributors. He also states correctly that methane and nitric oxide are also contributors to global warming, which reach dangerous levels through industrialized orderings of farm animals, etc. All of these involve environmental contamination, what Gore would call side-effects of technological, industrialized society. But if we reflect on the essence of fossil fuel energy, we will be led to the way of Being that brings the symptom of global warming to unconcealment. Global warming is a symptom of the spatial productions of automobility manifesting the enframing that challenges nature and transforms living-spaces of the earth into sites of energy orderings in a dialectical intensification: the more storage of energy, the more production of auto-mobile spatiality. We want to redirect attention in order to come to terms with the disease rather than its symptomatic manifestation.

### 1NC-DA

#### Romney will win---best economic predictors

Skousen 9/11 Mark, Investment U Research, 2012, "Who Will Win in November? Economists Make Shocking Prediction", www.investmentu.com/2012/September/who-will-win-in-november.html

Will President Obama win re-election, or will Governor Romney occupy the White House in January?¶ Right now Intrade, the political futures market, shows Mr. Obama as the heavy favorite by 58% to 42%.¶ But much could change between now and November 6, and Intrade has had a checkered past in its ability to predict winners…¶ A better record has been recorded by several economists who have developed economic models that have been surprisingly accurate.¶ And all of them agree: President Obama is in serious trouble and is likely to lose in November!¶ Here are the results of four of the best forecasters in the business:¶ 1. Two political scientists at the University of Colorado, Ken Bickers and Michael Berry, used their economic indicator model to predict who would win in November. Their model has correctly predicted the outcome of the past eight elections, and this year they predict a big Romney victory with nearly 53% of the vote, with Romney winning almost all the swing states.¶ 2. Nigel Gault, the chief U.S. economist at HIS Global Insights, a Boston-based research firm, uses proprietary methods and various economic variables, shows the president in even worse shape. The high unemployment rate (8.1%) is a “crucial variable,” he states, and based on his model, Obama will garner only 45.4% of the popular vote.¶ 3. Two economists, David Rothschild of Microsoft Research and Patrick Hummel of Google, have created a model that is both political and economic, and they too show President Obama losing.¶ 4. Ray C. Fair, the Yale economics professor, has developed a successful prediction model that covers elections since 1916. His model depends entirely on the strength of the economy. Right now he has Romney leading by only one percentage point, 50.5% to Obama’s 49.5%, but he says there is a 2.5% “standard error,” so the election is “too close to call.”

#### Oil access has become a vital issue in key battleground states – OCS means Obama wins

Dlouhy 8/14 Jennifer is a writer at Chron.com. “Big Oil raises voice as election nears,” 2012, http://www.chron.com/business/article/Big-Oil-raises-voice-as-election-nears-3788595.php

With less than three months until Election Day, the American Petroleum Institute is stepping up its advertising in key battleground states with a goal of **making sure voters are thinking about energy policy when they head to the polls**.¶ The new round of print and online ads by Big Oil's top trade group will target voters in Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, Ohio and Virginia - battlegrounds that could help determine who lives in the White House for the next four years.¶ Institute President Jack Gerard said the group wants to encourage a "realistic, robust debate" about energy issues - and get politicians to commit to substantive action.¶ Gerard said the advertising isn't wedded to any particular political party, but he sharply criticized the Obama administration's handling of oil and gas drilling on public lands, which he said was too restrictive. In a call with reporters, Gerard also criticized President Barack Obama for supporting wind-based energy at the expense of traditional fossil fuels.¶ "**We need to see more than lip service,**" Gerard said. "We need a pro-growth president who promotes more than just 1 percent of our energy mix."¶ Wind energy¶ Gerard's comments took a jab at Obama for touting wind energy during a visit to a farm in Haverhill, Iowa, on Tuesday. The state gets about 20 percent of its electricity from wind, making it one of the nation's leaders in wind energy.¶ Obama said that domestic manufacturing of wind turbines and towers has created new opportunities for workers.¶ "At a moment when we want to pursue every avenue for job creation, it's homegrown energy like wind that's creating good new jobs," the president said.¶ White House spokesman Clark Stevens said domestic oil and gas production has increased since Obama took office.¶ "Despite misleading rhetoric by some in Washington, the president has implemented an all-of-the-above approach to energy that has expanded a range of domestic energy sources, and the numbers speak for themselves," Stevens said.¶ The American Petroleum Institute's new ads are tied to its multimillion-dollar "vote 4 energy" campaign.¶ The ads assert that "the oil and natural gas industry can be a job engine," but suggest it is being held back by red tape.¶ For instance, one of the ads features an editorial cartoon that depicts the U.S. economy as a runner at a starting line bound by red tape. Another shows the U.S. with red tape along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, where offshore lease sales are ruled out for the next five years.¶ Alienating Democrats?¶ Some industry representatives have quietly grumbled that API is alienating Democrats - including a potential second-term Obama administration - with political moves that typically align with Republicans on Capitol Hill.¶ But Gerard rejected the notion that the new effort is overly political.¶ This is "not so much about the politics as it is engaging ... the American public and the voters in the discourse," he said. API aims to "put energy at the forefront of people's minds."¶ Already, many believe energy is an important issue heading into the election, according to a poll the industry group released on Tuesday. The survey, conducted by Harris Interactive with 1,016 registered voters, found 92 percent of respondents believed "energy security and producing more oil and natural gas here at home" is important to them as they look ahead to the election.¶ About seven out of 10 voters surveyed also said they support changing U.S. policy to allow more oil and natural gas development along the nation's coastline, a signal that Americans' views on offshore drilling have rebounded since the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill.

#### Romney will raise defense spending to 4% of the GDP – that’s key to preserve hegemony and NATO power

CFR 8/29 Council on Foreign Relations. “The Candidates on Defense Policy,” 2012, http://www.cfr.org/us-election-2012/candidates-defense-policy/p27569?cid=rss-fullfeed-the\_candidates\_on\_defense\_poli-082912&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+cfr\_main+%28CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed%29&utm\_content=Google+Reader

In a post about national defense on his campaign website, the Romney campaign proposed increased defense spending that would return the military to a budget baseline established in 2010, with the goal of setting core defense funding at a minimum 4 percent of GDP. In a January 2012 debate, Romney said, "It is absolutely wrong to balance our budget on the backs of our military. We need a strong military, so strong no one in the world would ever think of testing it."¶ In conjunction with that increase, Romney would pare down the Defense Department's civilian staff. His website post stated that since 2000, the "Pentagon's civilian staff grew by 20 percent while our active duty fighting force grew by only 3.4 percent. That imbalance needs to be rectified." ¶ Romney said he would also boost infrastructure, including increasing the Navy's shipbuilding rate from nine per year to approximately fifteen per year, as well as "commit to a robust, multi-layered national ballistic-missile defense system to deter and defend against nuclear attacks on our homeland and our allies." He also said he would seek to pass on-time budgets to allow the Defense Department and contractors to plan multi-year projects without delay and disruption.¶ At a GOP presidential debate in December 2011, Romney said he wanted to modernize the Air Force and add 100,000 new additional troops. "It is time for us to recognize once again a strong military does not create war. **A strong America prevents people from trying to test us around the world,**" he said. During another Republican primary debate, Romney touched on drone warfare, saying he was comfortable using drones to hunt terrorists in Pakistan, in part because that the United States had established the proper agreements to do so. Romney also admonished the Obama administration for not retrieving a downed drone in Iran, and instead asking Tehran to give it back.¶ In a May op-ed in the Chicago Tribune, Romney criticized President Obama's intention to cut U.S. military spending, noting the possible impact that could have for NATO. **"With the United States on a path to a hollow military, we are hardly in a position to exercise leadership in persuading our allies to spend more on security**," Romney wrote, saying he would work closely with partners to bolster NATO. "I will not allow runaway entitlement spending to swallow the defense budget as has happened in Europe and as President Obama is now allowing here."

#### NATO is key to solve for multiple scenarios of nuclear war

Zbigniew Brzezinski 9, former U.S. National Security Advisor, the Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, September/October 2009, “An Agenda for NATO,” Foreign Affairs

And yet, it is fair to ask: Is NATO living up to its extraordinary potential? NATO today is without a doubt the most powerful military and political alliance in the world. Its 28 members come from the globe’s two most productive, technologically advanced, socially modern, economically prosperous, and politically democratic regions. Its member states’ 900 million people account for only 13 percent of the world’s population but 45 percent of global GDP. NATO’s potential is not primarily military. Although NATO is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes predominantly from the United States, and that reality is not likely to change anytime soon. NATO’s real power derives from the fact that it combines the United States’ military capabilities and economic power with Europe’s collective political and economic weight (and occasionally some limited European military forces). Together, that combination makes NATO globally significant. It must therefore remain sensitive to the importance of safeguarding the geopolitical bond between the United States and Europe as it addresses new tasks. The basic challenge that NATO now confronts is that there are historically unprecedented risks to global security. Today’s world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial power. The paradox of our time is that the world, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for the first time in its entire history, is experiencing intensifying popular unrest made all the more menacing by the growing accessibility of weapons of mass destruction - not just to states but also, potentially, to extremist religious and political movements. Yet there is no effective global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity’s recent political awakening. The three great political contests of the twentieth century (the two world wars and the Cold War) accelerated the political awakening of mankind, which was initially unleashed in Europe by the French Revolution. Within a century of that revolution, spontaneous populist political activism had spread from Europe to East Asia. On their return home after World Wars I and II, the South Asians and the North Africans who had been conscripted by the British and French imperial armies propagated a new awareness of anticolonial nationalist and religious political identity among hitherto passive and pliant populations. The spread of literacy during the twentieth century and the wide-ranging impact of radio, television, and the Internet accelerated and intensified this mass global political awakening. In its early stages, such new political awareness tends to be expressed as a fanatical embrace of the most extreme ethnic or fundamentalist religious passions, with beliefs and resentments universalized in Manichaean categories. Unfortunately, in significant parts of the developing world, bitter memories of European colonialism and of more recent U.S. intrusion have given such newly aroused passions a distinctively anti-Western cast. Today, the most acute example of this phenomenon is found in an area that stretches from Egypt to India. This area, inhabited by more than 500 million politically and religiously aroused peoples, is where NATO is becoming more deeply embroiled. Additionally complicating is the fact that the dramatic rise of China and India and the quick recovery of Japan within the last 50 years have signaled that the global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific. And of the currently leading global powers—the United States, the EU, China, Japan, Russia, and India—at least two, or perhaps even three, are revisionist in their orientation. Whether they are “rising peacefully” (a self-confident China), truculently (an imperially nostalgic Russia) or boastfully (an assertive India, despite its internal multiethnic and religious vulnerabilities), they all desire a change in the global pecking order. The future conduct of and relationship among these three still relatively cautious revisionist powers will further intensify the strategic uncertainty. Visible on the horizon but not as powerful are the emerging regional rebels, with some of them defiantly reaching for nuclear weapons. North Korea has openly flouted the international community by producing (apparently successfully) its own nuclear weapons - and also by profiting from their dissemination. At some point, its unpredictability could precipitate the first use of nuclear weapons in anger since 1945. Iran, in contrast, has proclaimed that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes but so far has been unwilling to consider consensual arrangements with the international community that would provide credible assurances regarding these intentions. In nuclear-armed Pakistan, an extremist anti-Western religious movement is threatening the country’s political stability.

### 1NC-DA

#### The plan collapses oil prices overnight---the link is huge and unique

Poruban 12 Steven Poruban "API: Raising US oil supplies key to lowering gasoline prices" 3/26 www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-3c/general-interest/api-raising-us-oil.html

A major component to relieving upward pressure on gasoline prices in the US will come from increasing domestic oil production and not from raising taxes, American Petroleum Institute Pres. and Chief Executive Officer Jack Gerard told reporters Mar. 20 during a conference call from Washington, DC.¶ He said President Barack Obama's administration needs a "reality check" as well as a revision to the unclear signals it is sending the market. This is something that US voters understand as well, Gerard noted, citing statistics from a poll conducted earlier this month by Harris Interactive on behalf of API among 1,009 registered voters in the US.¶ "Voters understand that raising taxes is not a solution for high gasoline prices," Gerard said, adding, "No economist in the world will tell you gas prices can be reduced by increasing taxes, and the Congressional Research Service just released a study saying so," Gerard said.¶ "A true all-of-the-above energy strategy would include greater access to areas that are currently off limits, a regulatory and permitting process that supported reasonable timelines for development, and immediate approval of the Keystone XL pipeline to bring more Canadian oil to US refineries. This would send a positive signal to the market and could help put downward pressure on prices," he said.¶ A large majority of these polled voters, API said, "also believe that more US oil and natural gas development could reduce gasoline prices (81%), lead to more American jobs (90%), and enhance America's energy security (84%)."¶ Gerard said, "Most US resources have been placed off-limits. The US oil and natural gas industry is currently allowed to explore, develop, and produce on less than 15% of the federal offshore areas. More than 85% of those areas are off limits, denying all Americans the benefits of producing those resources—benefits like greater supplies of crude oil and natural gas, job creation, and significant returns on our treasury in taxes, rents, royalties, and bonus bids."¶ Market perception¶ The very notion that the Obama administration is proposing the release of oil supplies from the nation's Strategic Petroleum Reserve or asking other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, to boost oil production, is a "clear admissions that supply matters" in the case of relieving gasoline price pressure, Gerard said.¶ Markets are largely driven by perception, Gerard said, and when Obama in his early days in office sent out the message to the market that oil and gas production from the Gulf of Mexico, for example, would be higher today than it was then, that is part of the reason we're experiencing higher gasoline prices in the US.¶ To illustrate this point about clear market signals, Gerard recalled the example of when US gasoline prices were surpassing $4/gal during George W. Bush's presidency, his administration lifted the moratorium on offshore drilling and in a matter of days, oil prices fell by $15-16/bbl.

#### Prolonged dip in prices collapses all producer states, causes political repression and state collapse, and unleashes wars across the world

Hulbert 12 Matthew Hulbert is an analyst at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations "The political perils of low oil prices" July 9 2012 www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.php?id=3796&id\_mailing=295&toegang=49182f81e6a13cf5eaa496d51fea6406

As unedifying as all that might be, the bigger problem producer states have is that internal repression has no guarantee of success these days. It didn't work for Gadhafi in Libya, and it's unlikely to work for Assad in Syria in the long term. As fierce as the rear-guard battles have been, they’ve not been militarily conclusive or conducive to on-going hydrocarbon production. ¶ Follow that argument through and it is clear that if the bulk of producer regimes were struggling to hang on in a $125/b world, they stand little chance of pulling through in an $80/b (or less) environment. So we reach the third step, and logical conclusion of our argument. The lower prices go, the more likely political unrest creates serious supply disruptions affecting physical supplies, with concomitant effects on paper markets. That obviously puts a radically new spin on what 'cyclical' means as far as price and political instability is concerned, but when we look across producer states, it’s hard to find any major players not sitting on a powder keg of political risk these days. ¶ More likely than not, it will be some of the smaller players that get caught in the cross fire first. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is already deeply concerned about Bahrain relative to its Eastern Province. State implosion in Yemen is seen as an internal issue of the al-Saud to deal with, while serious deterioration in Iraq is becoming increasingly problematic in the North. Libya could see any post-war oil gains rapidly wiped out, Sudanese production has already fallen prey to intractable internal disputes, Kazakhstan remains entirely 'dispensable' in Central Asia given a lack of external clout in the region, while Nigeria has new civil strife problems to confront with Boko Haram. That’s before we consider intractable problems in Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. Any one of these jurisdictions could end up with a scorched earth policy if financing gaps aren’t closed. ¶ Go further up the producer state 'food chain', and some of the world's largest players all have the same structural political problems, be it in the Middle East, Eurasia or Latin America. Any sign that a bigger petro-beast is losing control, and prices would rapidly lift. That might be welcome news for producer states lucky enough to ride the price wave and remain intact, but it's a very dangerous game to play. ¶ And that's the whole problem here - the gap between geological costs of production and the geopolitical cost of survival is simply too wide for producers to cover without falling back on draconian measures. If this 'self-correcting' mechanism between price and political unrest starts supporting an informal price floor then so be it, but we shouldn't be fooled that this is serving anyone's interests - on either side of the consumer-producer ledger. Yes, it will help firm prices when certain producers struggle to adapt to rapidly shifting economic conditions, but assuming that more and more producer states hit political problems as prices slip, we're merely cementing the 'too big to fail' status of the very largest oil producers. Seeing petro-states dropping like political flies as prices correct isn't a proper 'solution' for a floor, not only because prices will rebound with a vengeance when markets tighten, but because it will make us even more dependent on a handful of key suppliers. As we all know from previous problems in Iraq (2.9 mb/d), Iran (3 mb/d), Libya (1.48 m/bd), Nigeria (2.4 mb/d) and even Venezuela (2.7 mb/d), once things go politically wrong, it takes a very long time, if ever, to get back to optimal production levels. It's the antithesis of where consumers want to be in terms of sourcing plentiful and fungible supplies.¶ Final scene: corpses all over the stage¶ By way of reminder, as much as petro-states currently face a systemic crisis trying to set a price floor, it was only in March that we saw how badly placed OPEC is to moderate the market at the top. Seeing petro-states in a pickle might warm the hearts of many right now, but markets can turn, and turn fast. When they do, the oil weapon will shift target as well. It will no longer be pointed at petro players heads, but directly at consumer states. That's the consequence of a dysfunctional energy system - not just with a $50-$150/b outlook eminently possible, but swings well beyond that 'price band' all too likely. ¶ Splitting this price directly in two and sticking close to $100/b might not be that bad an idea after all: Mopping up the mess from producer state implosion would require an effort far beyond the international systems capabilities and reach. Carefully agreed truces are always better than outright wars, particularly for those squeamish about collateral damage. Corpses would litter the entire energy stage.

### Heg Adv

#### Oil dependence key to hegemony---military power, credibility, and dollar primacy

Hulbert 12 Matthew Hulbert is senior fellow at the Clingendael International Energy Programme "America Will Deeply Regret Its Fixation On Energy Independence" 8/19/12 www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/19/why-america-will-deeply-regret-us-energy-independence/4/

The U.S. energy independence debate is getting very tetchy of late. Seasoned energy experts are trading cheap blows, principally for sitting on opposite sides of the fence. Nobody doubts that U.S. energy output will keep growing, but whether it ever amounts to full ‘independence’ is at best tenuous. More importantly, it spells total disaster for America’s role in the world. No global oil role, forget being a global hyper power. Those days will be gone. ¶ The allure of energy independence is a compelling story to tell. The U.S. can shut up shop, source all its energy from home shores, never having to step foot outside the Americas to get its energy fix. The U.S. will supposedly be able to boast 15 million barrels a day of liquids by 2020 from a raft of shale oil plays, with massive new oil plays feeding in from Canada in the North, inching production up to around 22mb/d. Unconventional resources are expected to explode from Latin America in the South. Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela will all see rapid supply growth, with Mexico having nothing short of a second energy revolution. Boil the numbers down, the Americas sits on 6.4 trillion unconventional barrels vs. 1.2 trillion conventional barrels across the Middle East. The U.S. will not only be the world’s largest single producer of crude; oil will flow from North to South across the America’s, not East to West across the globe. America can declare total energy independence, import dependency (already clipped to 45%) will be banished; the deficit will be fixed. Oil receipts will replenish the Federal Reserve, not OPEC states. Millions of hydrocarbon jobs will be created in the U.S. to boot. American oil, for American consumers, at American (WTI) prices. Whatever’s left over could be the swing supply for the rest of world, dictating how much everyone pays for a barrel of oil. Epic stuff, no doubt.¶ Whether you believe all these numbers doesn’t really matter. Few U.S. politicians (or analysts) pay much regard to depletion rates, cost uncertainties for viable extraction, local environmental risks, or contrasting production priorities across the Americas, not to mention the small fact that Asian NOCs have been making some of the main investments across North America. The fact that oil and gas only accounts for 1% of U.S. GDP, is also rather conveniently overlooked. Energy independence is already being touted as a self-fulfilling prophecy playing out in real time today, not as a gradual process of increments and change. This not only flies in the face of global hydrocarbon fundamentals that will see OPEC market share become more concentrated than ever over the next decade, (50% or more), it’s already creating serious geopolitical gaps across international energy markets.¶ That’s deeply problematic, precisely because supply side dynamics are looking more fragile than they have for a very long time. America has not only gone ‘missing in action’ to underwrite global supplies, it’s contributing to the international malaise by putting perceived political interests ahead of global oil stability. This comes in two forms, ‘passive’ and ‘aggressive’ from Washington – both built on the single idea that the U.S. can play a new geopolitical game thanks to energy independence beckoning just around the corner.¶ Passive = Libya, where the U.S. made it abundantly clear to Europe that Tripoli was not considered a vital national security interest for the U.S., despite prices hitting $127/b. Britain and France were left picking up the pieces, with U.S. firepower providing back-up support, rather than frontline artillery. The chances of that happening had the U.S. not struck oil would have been unthinkable in the 2000s. Conversely, aggressive = Iran. The U.S. has decided that chimerical nuclear containment is a higher priority than collateral impacts Iranian sanctions have had on global oil markets. The conclusions are now chillingly clear. The U.S. will increasingly only act in its own perceived national security interests. As long as those interests went hand in hand with safeguarding international oil supplies, consumer state could all rest easy. But U.S. energy independence has torn up the script: We’ve entered a brave new world where Washington is not only unwilling to cover supply gaps through military / political action (Libya), and if needs be, is willing to put narrow interests above and beyond oil market stability (Iran).¶ No one should blame, or bemoan the U.S. for doing this. It’s entirely up to the U.S. whichever path they chose to take. You could even argue it’s exactly what Washington should be doing to create serious foreign policy optionality: pick and choose whatever it does where, when, and how for the rest of the world to fall back on. All fair enough, but the downside risk this presents to Washington has already been captured in the ‘Kuwait Question’: Would the U.S. take assertive action to secure some of the key producer states of the world, or would they now turn the cheek? We all know the U.S. is no longer dependent on Middle East supplies; it hasn’t been for a long time given it sources less than 15% of its oil from the sand. But we also know that the decision to underwrite MENA supplies is nothing to do with U.S. consumption – and everything to do with retaining a dominant global geopolitical role. Ensure that hydrocarbons globally flow to the East and West, and much else follows as the geo-economic and geo-political lynchpin of the world. Lose it, and you’ll be geopolitically downgraded quicker than credit analysts can get stuck into Greek debt. That’s before we consider where Gulf States decide to recycle their petrodollars in future. No security, no $? It’s certainly a question for the U.S. to ponder – not only in terms of who they are going to sell their Treasuries to, but what currency oil is priced in. Hence the bottom line for the U.S.; Middle East energy isn’t about oil for America, it’s ultimately about power. If the U.S. wasn’t part of the Gulf energy game, it would hold zero sway with Saudi, no powers of persuasion over Iranian nukes, no say in the Arab Awakening, or how Gulf Monarchies handle critical succession problems in future. Let alone shaping vested interests to promote and extend U.S. influence across the globe.

**Iran prolif good—improves deterrence and spurs peace communications**

**Sadr 5** – PhD Candidate @ Univ Maryland in Poli Sci (El, The Impact of Iran’s Nuclearization on Israel, Middle East Policy 12.2, Wiley Interscience)

The above analysis indicates that a nuclearized Iran is extremely unlikely to pose an existential threat to Israel. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction holds in the Iranian context: Iran’s clerical rulers, anxious to protect their own power, citizens and civilization, will not launch a war that will lead to their own destruction. Iran’s rulers are extremely unlikely to pass nuclear material on to terrorist actors whose loyalty they cannot ensure. They are also unlikely to step up conventional or terrorist harassment of Israel for fear of the escalation of hostilities to nuclear warfare. The impact of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons upon Israel’s regional interests is less problematic than one might think. Although the regime-change option would be off the table, it is not clear that it has ever been a feasible alternative given current geopolitical realities. Any increase in domestic political support for the Iranian regime is likely to be temporary. Iran may indeed be empowered to pursue its own regional interests, but such pursuit is not necessarily bad for Israeli interests. Finally, it will be many years before Iran’s weapons stockpile begins to approach Israel’s and the latter is compelled to engage in an expensive arms race. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Iran’s access to nuclear weapons may increase the prospects for regional stability and even Middle East peace. Given the horrendous consequences of an accidental nuclear war, it will be imperative that Iran and Israel develop some sort of ability to communicate with one another directly. It is not outside the realm of possibility that the institutionalization of such communications may be the first step in the normalization of relations between the two countries and the future integration of Israel into its neighborhood. This is not to say that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is a good thing for Israel, the United States or the world as a whole. There are many legitimate reasons to be concerned about nuclear proliferation in any country, and the international community should do all it can to dissuade Iran and other nations from their nuclear aspirations and encourage current members of the nuclear club to reduce and even eliminate their stockpiles**. The analysis presented above does suggest, however, that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic is not likely to lead to any more nuclear events than the world has witnessed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki--that is, zero.**

**That solves terrorism and nuclear war**

**Sadr 5** – PhD Candidate @ Univ Maryland in Poli Sci (El, The Impact of Iran’s Nuclearization on Israel, Middle East Policy 12.2, Wiley Interscience)

Finally, even if the acquisition of nuclear weapons does enhance Iran’s ability to pursue its regional interests, there is no reason to assume that Israeli interests will automatically be trampled as a result. There are significant areas of overlapping and complementary interests between the two countries. Both will benefit, for example, from increased stability in Iraq, the containment of fundamentalist strands of Islam, and – most important – the moderation of conflicts that might escalate to nuclear war.

#### Their Kapul ev proves interdependence prevents China war

#### No China war – mutual interests outweigh

Yang 11—Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China (Jiechi, 6 January 2011, A Conversation with Yang Jiechi, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/23777/conversation_with_yang_jiechi.html>)

We have good reason to believe that with the efforts of both sides, President Hu's state visit this time will forcefully move forward the positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship in the new era. It will take our practical cooperation to a new high and enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples. And it will demonstrate the will of China and the United States to act together for world peace, stability and development. Ladies and gentlemen, President Hu's upcoming visit to the United States will take place when the Obama administration concludes its second year in office. We commend the good progress the China-U.S. relations have made over the past two years. The China-U.S. relationship is an extremely important bilateral relationship in today's world. We believe that though China-U.S. relationship has seen some difficulties in the past two years, it has made important overall progress, particularly in the following areas. First, the exchanges and communication between the two countries at the high level and various other levels have never been closer. China-U.S. relations achieved a smooth transition shortly after President Obama took office. In the past 24 months, the two presidents have had seven successful meetings. I had the good fortune to be present at all the seven meetings. And I always came away with a deep impression of the sincerity of the leaders in their discussion about how to move forward the relationship, how to face the challenges and how to work for the common good of our two peoples and the people of the world. President Obama paid a state visit to China, and now President Hu will come to the United States for a state visit. Officials of the two countries at various levels have had frequent contacts in diverse forms. The two sides have established the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues and the high-level consultation on people-to-people exchange. This time in Washington, we discussed when to have the third round of SED, Strategic and Economic Dialogues. I think it will happen sometime in mid-2011. Setting up unique and effective -- I mean, these exchanges are setting up unique and effective platforms to enhance mutual trust and cooperation between China and the United States. Second, the desire and resolve of the two countries to strengthen their cooperation have never been stronger. In April 2009, President Hu and President Obama reached an important agreement when they met in London that the two sides should work together to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century. This has charted the course for the growth of China-U.S. relations in the new era. President Hu emphasizes on many occasions that a sound China-U.S. relationship is in the fundamental interests of the two countries and serves peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. He stressed that the Chinese government places high importance on its relations with the United States it and will work to promote cooperation with the United States. Likewise, President Obama attaches a great deal of importance to China-U.S. relations. The U.S. government has stressed its commitment to stronger cooperation between the two countries. Third, the Chinese and American interests have converged as never before. Today, we have tackled the international financial crisis, pushed forward the reform of global economic governance and played an important role in spurring world economic recovery. The China-U.S. business ties have been taken to a new level. Two-way trade is expected to top $380 billion U.S. dollars in 2010. China has been the fastest-growing major export market of the United States for nine consecutive years. Investment by Chinese enterprises in the United States has rapidly increased. By the end of November 2010, Chinese businesses had made over 4.4 billion U.S. dollars of non-financial direct investment in the United States. All this has contributed to the economic recovery and the protection of jobs in the United States. Our bilateral exchanges and cooperation in a wide range of areas, including energy and the environment, have been growing in breadth and depth. Fourth, the two peoples have never been engaged in China-U.S. relations in such a broad and in-depth manner. Today, around 120,000 Chinese students are studying in the United States and more than 20,000 American students are studying in China. According to Chinese statistics, over 3 million tourists visit each others' countries every year and 110 plus passenger flights fly between the two countries every week. China and the United States have forged 36 pairs of friendship, province-state and 161 sister-city relationships. Such close interactions have built countless bridges of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Fifth, the communication and coordination between China and the United States on major regional and international issues have never been better. The two countries have maintained effective coordination on regional hotspot issues, such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Iranian nuclear issue and South Asia. And now during this visit of mine, we discussed these issues. We also discussed the situation in Sudan, which figures prominently in the coming weeks. Also, on global issues, including climate change, G-20, the U.N. reform and fighting transnational crimes, working together the two countries have played an important and positive role in upholding world peace and security and promoting global sustainable development. The China-U.S. cooperation has become more strategic in terms of substance and more important in terms of global impact. What is it that has brought China and the United States closer to each other in the course of cooperation in the past two years? I believe that it is our growing common interests. It is the growing sense of any important reality that China-U.S. relations in the 21st century should be anchored in joint efforts to seize common opportunities and address common challenges for the welfare of our two peoples and the people of the world. With regard to issues in China-U.S. relations, whatever the differences, there is a basic consensus between China and the United States: namely, the China-U.S. relationship is far too important. The two countries have far more common interests than disagreements and cooperation is always the defining feature of this relationship.

#### The US would resort to diplomacy

Dobbins et al ’11 – James Dobbins is the director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, David C. Gompert is a Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation. He is also former Senior Advisor for National Security and Defense for the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, David A Shlapak is a Senior International Policy Analyst with Rand Corporation, and Andrew Scobell is Senior Political Scientist at RAND's Washington, DC, office and former Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (“Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,” RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP344>)

If U.S. localized direct defense is endangered by Chinese anti-access capabilities in the near term, and U.S. escalation is constrained by growing risks and growing Chinese military reach in the mid to long term, the United States may be increasingly left without good military operational alternatives in regional contingencies involving Chinese forces. As several of these cases suggest, this may weigh against U.S. involvement in contingencies where important U.S. interests are not at stake. Unless China commits naked and large-scale aggression—which, to be clear, is not indicated by its current pattern of use of force—this may involve greater reliance on U.S. diplomacy and attempts to head off conflict by accommodating Chinese interests, especially if they have merits. Of course, the declining efficacy of direct defense and increasing riskiness of escalation (and thus of deterrence) would deplete U.S. influence over the outcome of disputes, from maritime and territorial questions up to and including the fate of North Korea and Taiwan.

#### No impact to heg

Maher 11---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The § Marked 12:23 § United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. **A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United S**tates for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

### Econ

#### Their unemployment link is non-unique – assumes double

#### Global economy resilient

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One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s.¶ Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression."¶ Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets.¶ Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization.¶ One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.¶ A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"¶ This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies.¶ It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit.¶ Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

#### Economy shortfalls are natural part of the business cycle, it’ll bounce back

Cooley, 09- (Thomas-- Ph.D. in Economics, Professor of Economics and Dean of New York University's Stern School of Business, Financial booms and busts 'are inevitable'; Academic expects the next economic crisis to follow the same path as the one the world is experiencing now and it will involve a similar breakdown in confidence", South China Morning Post, November 25th 2009, December 1st 2009, Lexis Nexis,)

Another financial crisis is inevitable because booms and busts are simply part of the business cycle, a leading academic told a seminar organised by Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Dr Thomas F. Cooley, professor of economics and dean of New York University's Stern School of Business, recently spoke at a Global Finance Seminar Series event entitled "The Next Financial Crisis" at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) offices. Edmond Lau, executive director of the HKMA's monetary management department and a board member of the Treasury Markets Association, delivered opening remarks, while Reginald Chua, editor-in-chief of the South China Morning Post, later moderated a panel discussion between Cooley and K.K. Tse, executive vice-president of State Street Bank and Trust Company. Cooley would not say when he thought the next financial crisis would occur but said it definitely would come because booms and busts were part of the business cycle. He said the next crisis would have the same characteristics and follow the same path as the present one - flowing from a loss of confidence."History is replete with examples of financial crises and bank panics," he said. "Just in the United States alone, in the 20th century we had the panic of 1907, the stock market crash of 1929 and banking panics of the 1930s. Then we had a long period of relative success and calm, and then we had episodes such as the savings and loan crisis, and the failures of Continental Illinois Bank and Long Term Capital Management. "That's just in the US. In the past two decades we've had financial crises in Asia, Mexico, Chile, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Russia, so financial crises occur with some frequency, but what they don't do is occur with predictability," he said.¶

#### US not key—global economies decoupling

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We went through a terrifying moment back in the fall of 2008. The financial system in the United States was imploding. It was impossible to predict how the effects would ripple through the rest of the world, but one outcome seemed inevitable: Developing economies were going to take a terrible hit. There was just no way they could escape the maelstrom without seeing millions of their citizens impoverished. Many emerging-market countries did experience sharp drops in GDP. Their capital markets tanked. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), sounded downright apocalyptic: "All this will affect dramatically unemployment, and beyond unemployment for many countries it will be at the roots of social unrest, some threat to democracy, and maybe for some cases it can also end in war." The Economist recently noted, "The Institute of International Finance (IIF), a think-tank in Washington, DC, forecast that net private capital flows into poor countries in 2009 would be 72% lower than at their peak in 2007, an unprecedented shrinkage." Virtually everyone expected to see the countries that had benefited so dramatically from growth in the years leading up to the crisis to suffer disproportionately in its wake. An entirely rational assumption -- except it hasn't turned out that way at all. To be sure, there were far too many poor people in the world before the crisis, and that still remains the case. Some 3 billion people still live on less than $2.50 a day. But the global economic crisis hasn't added appreciably to their ranks. Just take China, India, and Indonesia, Asia's three biggest emerging markets. Although growth in all three slowed, it never went into reverse. China's robust growth through the crisis has been much publicized -- but Indonesia's, much less conspicuously. Those countries, as well as Brazil and Russia, have rebounded dramatically. The Institute of International Finance -- the same people who gave that dramatically skepticism-inducing estimate earlier -- now says that net private capital flows to developing countries could reach $672 billion this year (double the 2009 amount). That's less than the high point of 2007, to be sure. But it still seems remarkable in light of the dire predictions. In short, the countries that have worked the hardest to join the global marketplace are showing remarkable resilience. It wasn't always this way. Recall what happened back in 1997 and 1998, when the Thai government's devaluation of its currency triggered the Asian financial crisis. Rioting across Indonesia brought down the Suharto government. The administration of Filipino President Joseph Estrada collapsed. The turbulence echoed throughout the region and into the wider world, culminating in the Russian government default and August 1998 ruble devaluation. Brazil and Argentina trembled. The IMF was everywhere, dispensing advice and dictating conditions. It was the emerging markets that bore the brunt of that crisis. So what's different this time around? The answers differ from place to place, but there are some common denominators. Many of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) learned vital lessons from the trauma of the late 1990s, hence the IMF's relatively low-key profile this time around. (The fund has been most active in Africa, where they still need the help -- unless you count Greece, of course.) Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis with healthy balance sheets. In most cases governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus programs or even expanding poverty-reduction programs. Increasingly, the same countries that have embraced globalization and markets are starting to build social safety nets. And there's another factor: Trade is becoming more evenly distributed throughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters than the United States. Some economists are talking about "emerging market decoupling." Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the Swiss bank UBS, showed in one recent report how car sales in emerging markets have actually been rising during this latest bout of turmoil -- powerful evidence that emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America catches a cold. Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, a consultant for the British-based aid organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on Southeast Asian economies. "The research so far shows that the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were expecting," she says. Indonesia is a case in point: "People in this region and at the policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy domestic demand cushioned the shock when the crisis hit export-oriented industries; the government weighed in immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has been surprised by the extent to which families throughout the region have kept spending money on education even as incomes have declined for some. And that, she says, reinforces a major lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from the crisis: "Governments should focus more on social policy, on health, education, and services. They shouldn't be intervening so much directly in the economy itself." This ought to be a big story. But you won't have much luck finding it in the newspapers -- perhaps because it runs so contrary to our habitual thinking about the world economy. The U.N. Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank recently published a report that attempts to assess what effect the crisis will have on the world's progress toward the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, benchmarks that are supposed to be achieved by 2015. At first glance the report's predictions are daunting: It states that 21 million people in the developing world are "at risk" of slipping into extreme poverty and warns that the goals are unlikely to be met. Many experts wonder, of course, whether the V-shaped crisis we've witnessed so far is going to turn into a W, with another sharp downturn still to come. Some argue that the Great Recession's real damage has yet to be felt. Yet the report also contains some interesting indications that this might not be the case. "The global economic crisis has been widely predicted to affect international migration and remittances adversely," it notes. "But as the crisis unfolds, it is becoming clear that the patterns of migration and remittances may be more complex than was previously imagined." In other words, these interconnections are proving to be much more resilient than anyone might have predicted earlier. As the report notes, receipts of remittances have so far actually increased in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Perhaps migrant workers -- those global experts in entrepreneurship and risk-taking -- know something that a lot of the rest of us don't. So why should we care? Anirudh Krishna, a Duke University political scientist who studies poverty reduction, says that there's a moral to the story: "Certainly cutting countries and people off from markets is no longer a sensible thing to do. Expanding those connections, bringing in a larger part of a talent pool into the high-growth sector -- that is what would make most countries grow faster and more individuals climb out of poverty." Echoing Nguanbanchong, he argues that governments are well-advised to concentrate on providing their citizens with education and health care -- the great enablers in the fight for social betterment. Microfinance and income subsidy programs can fill important gaps -- as long as they aim to empower future entrepreneurs, not create cultures of entitlement. This is not to say the outlook is bright on every front, of course. As the Economist noted, the number of people facing hunger recently topped 1 billion, the highest since 1970. The reason for that has more to do with the 2007-2008 spike in food prices than with the financial crisis. (Remember how the price of rice shot up?) We are still a long way from conquering poverty. There is still a huge -- and in some cases growing -- gap between the world's rich and poor. Yet how remarkable it would be if we could one day look back on the 2008-2009 crisis as the beginning of a more equitable global economy**.**