### Off 1

#### Expanding energy production is caused by an ontology that subordinates nature to manipulation---that obscures consumption that’s the root cause of the case

Gary Backhaus 9 Phil @ Loyola Maryland, "Automobility: Global Warming as Symptomatology" April 2009, [www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187)

Gore unwittingly bases his exposition on unwarranted epistemological assumptions that comprise an ordering function in the received modern liberal worldview, which has enjoyed hegemony since the eighteenth-century bourgeois revolutions. His delineation of the modalities of morality, sociality, politics, economics, and technology implies that they are separate domains that are then linked through thought and forged together by cultural relations, which is an ideology based in the doctrine of atomistic association. Gore does not recognize a holistic interrelation whereby each of these modalities is already pregnant with the others, e.g., that some technology or other already implicates political, economic, social, and moral processes and structures in its very essence/Being. Gore's assumed doctrine of functional neutrality, i.e., "it depends on how you use it", carries some sense of correctness in that forms of implementation do matter within the overall cultural context, but the doctrine of technological neutrality remains dangerously naive. For example, with his concern for the lack of community, Gore seems not to recognize that certain forms of technology may indeed undermine the very possibility of community, and moreover by exacerbating this undermining in a free market system where people can basically buy and sell what they want, the proliferation of such community-disintegrative technology may destroy the possibility for the political will that he so cherishes. No such radical and critical reflection enters his discussions. The major consequence of his assumed modern epistemological atomism (in this case partitioned forms constitutive of a culture) is that Gore's evaluation of a need for cultural change and his proposed solutions to the environmental crisis do not go deep and far enough, if indeed we are to hold ourselves to the goal of sustainability. The concept-formation of sustainability is not compatible with an atomistic epistemology through which problem-solving directives issue forth only as the shallow implementations of instrumental rationality. My treatment of automobility as the fundamental obstacle in the way of developing sustainable forms of life involves a holistic ontological approach that uncovers the way of Being from which the auto¬mobile organization of life is its spatial concretization. Martin Heidegger's radical ontological hermeneutics can provide a clearing that supports the concept formation of sustainability by starting with a critical investigation into the restructuring matrix of automobility, the spatial moment of a modern technological way of life that is the anthropogenic source for global warming, or what we now call climate change.¶ In his discussion of technology and science, Gore writes of advances or progress and their unintended side-effects [1]. This way of speaking already fosters human-centered chauvinism in the sense that human intentions are taken as the hegemonic constitutive measure, while the unintended phenomena accompanying or associated with human activities are glitches in a humanly designed world, as if the earth/world does not have constitutive efficacy and as if human expressivities are not simply one set of agencies in a complex context of many agencies [2]. In addition, the doctrine of side-effects does not take into account that all cultural objectivations of human expressivities exhibit their own Being, incommensurate, to some degree or another, with our intentions [3]. Moreover, this received hubris of modern scientific ideology, "the control and elimination of side-effects", leads Gore to a sanguine position concerning the solving of the climate crisis—that we can tackle the crisis technologically through a new political will and with the recognition that we need not choose between environmental and economic health. His related enthusiastic adoption of the information age and computer technology is indicative of this fundamental belief in so-called technological progress [4].¶ On the issue of economics, many environmentalists that develop a doctrine of sustainability do not agree with him [5]. We will indeed have to continue to choose between environmental and economic health as long as we support an economic system that requires growth (e.g., surplus value and a continued consumerism) and we choose growth-oriented solutions (e.g., green products with green economic incentives as the way to eliminate unwanted side-effects are to be counted as a shallow approach). Green technologies contextualized in an economic system of growth remain impotent when considering the strident goal of developing viable policies of sustainability. Sustainability requires a new contextualization of human intentions whereby unintended results from continued growth are not a cue for a greater manipulation of the natural world, but less. In the cases just cited we see that intentions involving technological mastery and environmentalism as a function of economics must be called into question. Thus, automobility, as the major factor of global warming and other environmental problems, is treated in a way that calls for the continual hegemony of economic concerns, as green machines and vehicles are supposed to save us from our environmental degradation while economic expansion continues on its same course.

#### That results in destructive practices that make their impacts inevitable---ensures serial policy failure and extinction

Gary Backhaus 9 Phil @ Loyola Maryland, "Automobility: Global Warming as Symptomatology" April 2009, [www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187)

Many environmental thinkers have questioned the presupposed tenets, e.g., the doctrine of linear progress, on which Gore bases his belief in the success of a scientific/technological solution to global warming and environmental problems in general. "Professional ecologists such as Frank Egler have countered that 'Nature is not only more complex than we think, it is more complex than we can think [6]'". I believe that a commitment to sustainability must recognize limits to human cognition and thus must take a radically different approach. This does not mean that science and technology have reduced roles, but that their roles must be based on a new attitude of respectful humility [7]. The manipulation and appropriation of nature must no longer be our technological goals. Rather, we should be modifying our own societal/cultural forms, which include science and technology, to live in greater harmony within the context of natural conditions and agencies. Sciences and technologies that apprehend those conditions can serve to help us become much more respectful of natural conditions. Neither science nor technology needs to challenge natural processes; it rather needs to challenge us to live more responsibly. The chauvinist worldview with its doctrine of reactive reparation when it comes to environmental degradation, no longer can be promoted as a viable behavioral process. We can no longer appropriate nature and then deal with the so called "unintended side-effects"—a dealing that amounts to a continual re-engineering of nature, which leads to consequences that dangerously exceed our powers of forecasting. But a new pro-activity conducive to sustainability should be more focused on changing our relation to nature, not so much on changing nature. Gore's critical analysis merely focuses on wiser uses of technology; he does not call into question radically enough the doctrine of forcing nature to serve us and does not clearly advocate a science and technology that serves nature as first priority. This can be accomplished only by fundamental transformations in human interpretative praxes. In practical language the transformation advocated here means that we dramatically minimize our ecological footprints, which entails new geo- economic/political/social spatial productions, concerning which science and technology play a vital role. Cultural transformation for sustainability requires a new epistemological basis that recognizes the ontological structure of sustainable ecology as having priority over human intentions such that we eliminate certain of our expressivities and objectivations, rather than continuing with the manipulation of nature to accommodate our intentions— a move away from anthropocentric hegemony to a model of human contextualization that leads away from a worldview that presupposes the culture/nature dualism.¶ Bio-regionalists have called for new and radical political changes such as the re-construction of political boundaries to be correlative with biospheric boundaries so that the political domain becomes interfused with the natural domain in an organic development pattern [8]. Forms of human life then are organized in context with natural ecologies—an interrelation for mutual benefit. This ecological rootedness to a place, to its place-character or genius loci as the key to ecological bounded praxes, must be accomplished without the fascist tendencies of race/nation imperialisms of the past, which are avoidable through the political tactics of decentralization and networking and the value of diversity within local-bounds. Gore champions the democratic process but really offers no proposals that would restructure political bodies in a way that would support the implementation of sustainability. A society that culturally and politically does not attune its practices to place-bound ecologies and their interrelations does not merit the accolade of supporting sustainability. As I will show, to call into question the geography of automobility requires thinking about how the task to de-structure automobility might show us how to re-structure life toward the goal of sustainability.¶ There is still another point germane to the issue of automobility which shows the non-viability of Gore's shallow ecology. Peak oil theorists are issuing very serious warnings concerning non-renewable energy consumption [9]. Hypothetically, if we could immediately solve the global warming (climate change) problem in Gore's shallow, technological sense, then we would nevertheless still be in the most utterly grave circumstances concerning energy. Even if it were possible to solve the problem of global warming with the use of alternative energy sources, there still would remain an energy crisis both in terms of shortages and implementations that carry many unwanted so-called side-effects. A policy of sustainability would entail tackling the energy crisis directly, not because of its link to the global warming problem; sustainability entails more dramatic measures, necessary curbs on modern excesses promoted by neo-liberal economic globalization and the social structures that it constructs, concerning which Gore's sanguine liberal-based ideology is not prepared to face.¶ My fundamental criticism, however, is that Gore sees global warming as the problem rather than as a symptom of a much deeper flaw/problematic in culture, and this delimits his thinking to remain within a shallow ecological viewpoint, foiling an analysis that would develop toward a viable sustainability. His focus on global warming limits his solution to the environmental crisis to a shallow technological fix. Sure he advocates a change in forms of life, but these are merely a function of, or the requirement for, the implementation of technologies that will save us and the planet. In this way his thinking remains within the modern scientistic attitude that in a deep or foundational sense has led to the predicament in which we find ourselves [10]. The efforts to dominate nature, dominations implemented through modern technological praxes, have led to drastic changes to the planet as a whole in an extremely short time. We now see that those changes, based on considering our needs only (the mentality of natural resources to be ordered about on our terms), are destroying the life of, and on, the planet.

#### This requires a rejection of their symptom-focus in favor of an ontological reconfiguration of our relationship to nature that does not render it a standing reserve

Gary Backhaus 9 Phil @ Loyola Maryland, "Automobility: Global Warming as Symptomatology" April 2009, [www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187](http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187)

The twentieth-century philosopher Martin Heidegger provides an approach that allows us to transcend the ideological-bound techno-rationalization represented in Gore's analysis of the problem of global warming so that we engage a more fundamental analysis that uncovers deeper interpretive roots. A more reflective total approach (versus the instrumental rationality of problem-solving) is necessary to inform the development of sustainability, for we must uncover the presuppositions of the worldview that deliver us over to auto-mobility, which opens us to a new reflection on sustainability. In his magnus opus, Being and Time, Heidegger puts forth a thesis—that Being itself is not a being/entity— that strikes at the core of Western thinking [15]. For example, Aristotle privileged primary substance, the individual entity, as the fundamental being, linking all other manners of being to it, his ten categories. According to Heidegger, Western thinking has continued to misunderstand the question of Being as a question of beings. In doing so, correctness, or the relation between a statement and a state of affairs, has substituted for a deeper sense of truth. When we focus on beings, trying to properly define them, Being hides, for Being is other than the entities brought forth from its context. Being is the whole or horizonal context that allows for the appearing of beings in the first place. This sounds like mysticism to those who don't understand the metaphysical tradition of the West. But Heidegger's notion here is no less understandable the scientific principle of Gestalt psychology that the whole is different than the sum of the parts. So, if your way of knowing limits you to examining parts, you will not understand the meaning of the whole. A way of Being (a whole—a worldview) is what we are seeking to understand through this attempt to engage in a deeper analysis. Thus, Being must be pursued in a way that we arrive at the happening of truth, how a particular way of Being brings forth or unconceals beings, which means that we must think beyond the whatness of beings in terms of the correctness of definitions. Truth involves unconcealment of the essence of something through a way, an interpretive form of Being. "Some things" concretely manifest through socio-historical worldviews that allow entities to be brought into the clearing, that is, to be recognized/understood as something, as a type of being/entity. Before correctness can be established, the being must first be allowed to appear as something and this unconcealment is the deeper domain of truth. So a way of Being is an ontological agency, an ontological interpretive filter that allows certain beings to appear as the something that they appear as, as a function of the interpretive context. It is this essence/Being of automobility indicated by its symptom, global warming, that we must seek to uncover.¶ Taking up Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology in its reflection on Being allows us to envision global warming as a symptom, as an appearing, complex phenomenon through a particular way, the interpretive form of Being to which modern human life has been claimed. We are led to the essence of which global warming is an appearing symptom, which is other than its correct definition—one of the goals of Gore's book is to responsibly inform the average non-scientifically educated person as to the whatness of global warming, a correct saying of the phenomenon. From a Heideggerian standpoint, Gore's shallow analysis is blind to deeper truths that concern more than establishing correct statements describing the whatness of global warming.¶ In the analysis of a later treatise, "The Question Concerning Technology'", Heidegger maintains that the essence of technology is not something technological—its Being is not to be interpreted as itself a being (a technology). He provides what is regarded as the (standard/accepted) correct definition of technology as a human activity and as a means to an end. By contrast to the correct definition, Heidegger's analysis shows that the truth in the revealing/unconcealment or the essence/Being of modern technology that allows for modern technological entities to show themselves as such is a "challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it [16]". The challenging is a setting-in-order, a setting upon nature, such that "the earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district" and "what the river is now, a water-power supplier, derives from the essence of the power station [16]". What is the character of this unconcealment? "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it standing reserve [16]". And the challenging that claims man to challenge nature in this way Heidegger labels, enframing. "Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that the way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern technology and that is itself nothing technological [16]". Modern physics, which interprets nature as a system of calculable forces is the herald of enframing. The way of Being through which entities stand in the clearing, as technological instrumentalities, is enframing and the way of Being of those entities is that of standing reserve.¶ This very brief discussion of Heidegger is important for two reasons. First, because my conception of automobility emphasizes the spatial organization of standing reserve, which Heidegger does not treat, and because automobility entails an empirical manifestation of man's ordering attitude and behavior in terms of spatial production, we recognize an already established ontological analysis from which automobility is to be interpreted. Secondly, we have an exemplar by which we can see what is to be done to uncover the Being that allows something to appear as that something, which is always other than the appearing beings. Heidegger's hermeneutics provides the possibility to claim that the solution to the technologically induced problem of global warming is not itself something technological, if indeed we are to open ourselves to other possible interpretational modes of Being such that other kinds of entities would then be unconcealed. We want to free ourselves up to sustainability as a way of Being by being open for a new way of interpretation, a new worldview, a new paradigm for living, other than enframing, by which new kinds of entities other than those of standing reserve will show themselves from its clearing.¶ 3.3. Redirecting Reflection from Symptom to Source ¶ Al Gore is correct in stating that global warming is caused by the increase of greenhouse gasses trapping infrared radiation, with CO2 being the most prevalent. In the U.S., coal burning power plants and automobiles are the chief contributors. He also states correctly that methane and nitric oxide are also contributors to global warming, which reach dangerous levels through industrialized orderings of farm animals, etc. All of these involve environmental contamination, what Gore would call side-effects of technological, industrialized society. But if we reflect on the essence of fossil fuel energy, we will be led to the way of Being that brings the symptom of global warming to unconcealment. Global warming is a symptom of the spatial productions of automobility manifesting the enframing that challenges nature and transforms living-spaces of the earth into sites of energy orderings in a dialectical intensification: the more storage of energy, the more production of auto-mobile spatiality. We want to redirect attention in order to come to terms with the disease rather than its symptomatic manifestation.

### Off 2

#### Obama will win now but it’s close and could reverse

Burns and Schultheis 9/19 Alexander and Emily are writers for Politico. “Mitt Romney needs poll vault to win,” 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81392.html

Mitt **Romney faces an** increasingly daunting **path to victory in the 2012 presidential race,** as a wave of national and state-level polling suggests that President Barack **Obama has cemented a** small but meaningful lead **across the battleground states.**¶Individual polls show varying snapshots of the Obama-Romney race: NBC News and the Wall Street Journal gave Obama a 5-point national lead in a survey published Tuesday night, while an AP-GfK poll released Wednesday morning pegged the president’s lead at just 1 point. Gallup’s tracking poll, meanwhile, showed Obama’s post-convention polling bounce fading to a 1-point lead.¶ The rosiest picture of the race for Obama came this afternoon from the Pew Research Center, which found Obama drawing **51 percent of the vote to Romney’s 43 percent**, leading on nearly every issue question and fighting his challenger to a draw on who would better handle the economy.¶ From the fog of survey data available on the 2012 race, some consistent, post-convention trends have clearly begun to emerge. In the most credible national polls, Obama rarely leads Romney by more than a few points. **But the president is almost invariably in the lead**.¶ These polls were taken after the parties’ conventions, but mostly before the release this week of a controversial video of Romney this week in which he says that 47 percent of people don’t pay income taxes and are dependent on the government for services. Some data was collected before the attacks on U.S. diplomatic outposts in North Africa; some was collected afterward.¶ More problematic for Romney is the state-level data that gives Obama a slight edge in more than enough states to block his challenger from amassing 270 electoral college votes. Because of the makeup of the electoral map, Romney has to win nearly all the swing states on the table, while Obama only has to win a handful.¶ Of the biggest prizes up for grabs — Ohio, Virginia, Florida and North Carolina — Obama is the favorite in two, according to public surveys. NBC/Wall Street Journal polling and the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling gave Obama an edge in Ohio in the mid-to-high single digits. In Virginia, one survey from the Washington Post and another from Quinnipiac University, CBS News and the New York Times placed Obama at or above the 50 percent mark.¶ There has been little public polling in Florida — without which it becomes much harder for Romney to win — and strategists on both sides say the race there remains close. Only in North Carolina is Romney believed to have a slim edge.¶ In the bigger picture, it would take a national shift of several percentage points or the flipping of more than a few major swing states to put Romney back in the lead, and the momentum — with less than two months to go, doesn’t seem to be moving in the challenger’s direction.¶ Even if Romney were to win Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, Iowa, Colorado and New Hampshire — all states Obama won in 2008 — the Republican would still be three electoral votes short of victory.¶ And right now, Romney is not leading in many of those states, leaving him well short of the threshold he needs to clear and under urgent pressure to reshuffle the race’s dynamics.¶ “The bottom line is, you’d rather be in **Obama**’s shoes than Romney’s. He **has a lead in the battleground states and he probably has to carry fewer of them**,” said Marist College pollster Lee Miringoff, who conducts swing-state polls for NBC and the Wall Street Journal.¶ The problem for Romney, Miringoff said, is that Romney has to be “drawing an inside straight” in the state-by-state numbers in order to cross the 270-vote threshold.¶ “If you take Florida away from Romney, then it becomes paramount for him to do lots of other states. You take Ohio away, it’s not quite as dramatic but it still leads to the same conclusion,” Miringoff said. “Having said that, **there’s also the** possibility **that the national numbers shift** two or three points. The battleground states, although they’re obviously all separate, could react similarly.”¶ Purple Strategies pollster Doug Usher emphasized the severity of Romney’s electoral college challenge, agreeing that the loss of any one mega-state, like Florida, would deepen Romney’s problems by an order of magnitude everywhere else.¶ “Florida is a must-win for Romney by any measure. If he doesn’t win Florida, he has to win Ohio and Pennsylvania and Colorado and a bunch of other states that he’s not going to win in combination, and certainly not going to win in an electorate where Florida goes for Obama,” Usher said.¶ Michael Dimock, associate director of the Pew Research Center, said his organization’s data illustrated “the seriousness of the problem for Romney right now, not only in the margin but in all of the internals.”¶ ”Even on an issue like the deficit, where Romney had an advantage earlier in the year, that advantage is now a virtual tie on who would best handle that situation, as well as the job situation,” he said. “Earlier in the year, there was a clearer [contrast], on the one hand Obama’s more likable but people trust Romney on the economy … That’s not really holding in the current poll.”¶ Republicans have taken issue with more than a few national and state-level polls, which they say oversample Democrats and show Obama leading by wider margins than private polling suggests. But while GOP strategists argue with the magnitude of Obama’s advantage conveyed in public surveys, few dispute that the president is currently leading.¶ If private Republican polling suggests that Obama has an entirely surmountable advantage, the polls still show him with an advantage in big electoral prizes like Ohio, as well as struggling in smaller swing states such as Nevada and Colorado.¶ There is also fading optimism in the GOP about Romney’s ability to stretch the electoral map by competing in Democratic-leaning states such as Michigan and Wisconsin, though Romney’s super PAC is currently running a new round of TV ads in both states. Pennsylvania, where Obama has led in the high single digits and low teens, appears to have fallen off the map for Republicans entirely.¶ A Wednesday morning poll from Quinnipiac, the New York Times and CBS gave Obama a 6-point lead in Wisconsin and placed him over the 50-percent mark. The Michigan pollster EPIC/MRA had Obama 10 points ahead there and Romney is not running TV ads in the state.¶ Even if — under an optimistic scenario — Romney is actually faring 3 or 4 points better in most states than public data indicates, he would still need to make up additional ground in order to take the lead nationally.¶ Republican pollster David Winston said that Obama has a “small advantage” nationally at the moment, but questioned whether it was more of an edge than the incumbent has had for most of the year. The challenge for Romney, he said, was changing the contours of a race that has stubbornly resisted attempts to shake it up.¶ “This political equilibrium, as it exists, is a slight advantage for President Obama. The challenge for the Romney campaign is, how do they change this political equilibrium, given that additional attacks [from both campaigns] tend to reinforce the equilibrium?” Winston said. “The Romney campaign’s got to figure out a way to change that equilibrium. Because if they don’t, the race continues the way it has been.”¶ Ipsos pollster Julia Clark, whose firm conducts surveys for Reuters, said that Obama has a “pretty constant, couple-point lead,” though still nothing dramatically outside the range of 2 to 4 percentage points. The most encouraging trend for Obama is the modest rise in the percentage of Americans saying the country is on the right track and the economy is improving.

#### The base hates nuclear

Koch 10 Wendy is a writer for USA Today. “Obama's call for nuclear power plants angers supporters,” 1/30, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/greenhouse/post/2010/01/obamas-call-for-new-nuclear-power-plants-triggers-outrage/1#.UElvKI1lScw

President Obama's call Wednesday, in his State of the Union Address, for a "new generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants" was panned by some environmentalists and Democratic backers.¶ It was considered the worst part of his 71-minute speech by 10,000 members of MoveOn, a non-profit progressive advoacy group that has raised millions of dollars for Democratic political candidates. They had signed up to evaluate the speech live and every few seconds would hit a button to reflect how they felt about it, ranging from "awful" to "great."¶ "The most definitive drop in enthusiasm is when President Obama talked about nuclear power and offshore drilling," says Ilyse Hogue, MoveOn's director of political advocacy. "They're looking for clean energy sources that prioritize wind and solar."¶ Greenpeace, an environmental group, was also disappointed. "Despite his statement, the president knows better," Daniel Kessler, the group's press officer, says in a commentary posted on its website. He adds:

#### They’re key

Silver 9/6 Nate is the chief pollster for the New York Times’ FiveThirtyEight blog. “Obama Would Be Big Favorite With ‘Fired Up’ Base,” 2012, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/obama-would-be-big-favorite-with-fired-up-base/

There’s one advantage that President Obama has that Mitt Romney probably doesn’t. **If he can get a good turnout from his base, he’ll be the** heavy **favorite to win in November** — even if Mr. Romney gets a strong turnout as well.¶ On average over the last five public surveys, 35 percent of registered voters identify themselves as Democrats and 30 percent as Republicans. That advantage is down somewhat for Democrats since 2008, but it is an advantage nevertheless.¶ In essentially every recent presidential election, however, the Democratic candidate has performed worse among actual Election Day voters than among the broader pool of registered voters. There is no reason to think that this year will be an exception. Recent surveys that compare likely-voter with registered-voter results suggest that there could be a turnout gap of around three percentage points favoring Mr. Romney. That’s larger than the historical average, when it’s been in the range of one or two points.¶ Our election forecasts build in a likely voter adjustment for this reason. If a pollster publishes both registered-voter and likely-voter results, we use the likely-voter version of their numbers. And if only a registered-voter version is available, we shift the numbers by two or three points toward Mr. Romney in order to make it equivalent to a likely-voter poll.¶ But what would happen if all those registered voters really did turn out?¶ I decided to run a version of our “now-cast” — our estimate of what would happen if the election were held today — on a registered-voter rather than likely-voter basis. (The “now-cast” is a little simpler than our Nov. 6 forecast, which also incorporates a convention bounce adjustment and measures of economic performance, and so the now-cast is a little simpler to interpret for purposes of measuring the effects of the likely-voter adjustment.)¶ This special, registered-voter version of the “now-cast” applies just the opposite of our usual process. If both registered-voter and likely-voter versions of a poll are available, I instruct the model to use the registered-voter numbers. And if there’s only a likely-voter survey, the model shifts the numbers toward Mr. Obama by a couple of points as a proxy for a registered voter poll.¶ In the regular, likely-voter version of our “now-cast,” Mr. Obama is estimated to have a 68 percent chance of winning the Electoral College in an election held today. But on the basis of registered voters, he would be a 91 percent favorite. Instead of being ahead in the popular vote by a hair over one point, he’d be expected to win by around four. And he’d be projected to win 322 electoral votes, rather than 291.¶ It’s very unlikely, of course, that Democrats will turn out as high a percentage of their voters as Republicans do. The demographic groups that favor Democrats are just harder to get to the polls.¶ But if Mr. Obama can narrow Republicans’ advantage in this area — reducing the gap between registered-voter and likely-voter polls to one or two points rather than three, **he can** get halfway there, and **make** Mr. **Romney’s task much harder.**

#### Romney will label China a currency manipulator – causes a trade war

Palmer 12 Doug is a Reuters trade reporter. “Romney would squeeze China on currency manipulation-adviser,” Mar 27, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/us-usa-romney-china-idUSBRE82Q0ZS20120328

(Reuters) - Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney is looking at ways to increase pressure on China over what he sees as currency manipulation and unfair subsidy practices, a Romney campaign adviser said on Tuesday.¶ "I think **he wants to maximize the pressure**," Grant Aldonas, a former undersecretary of commerce for international trade, said at a symposium on the future of U.S. manufacturing. Aldonas served at the Commerce Department under Republican President George W. Bush.¶ Romney, the front-runner in the Republican race to challenge President Barack Obama for the White House in November, has promised if elected he would quickly label China a currency manipulator, something the Obama administration has six times declined to do.¶ That would set the stage, under Romney's plan, for the United States to impose countervailing duties on Chinese goods to offset the advantage of what many consider to be China's undervalued currency.¶ Last year, the Democratic-controlled Senate passed legislation to do essentially the same thing.¶ However, the measure has stalled in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, where leaders say they fear it could start a trade war, and the Obama administration has not pushed for a House vote on the currency bill.

#### Great power war

Landy 7 [Ben Landy, Director of Research and Strategy at the Atlantic Media Company, publisher of the Atlantic Monthly, National Journal, and Government Executive magazines April 3, 2007, <http://chinaredux.com/2007/04/03/protectionism-and-war/#comments>,]

The greatest threat for the 21st century is that these economic flare-ups between the US and China will not be contained, but might spill over into the realm of military aggression between these two world powers. Economic conflict breeds military conflict. The stakes of trade override the ideological power of the Taiwan issue. China’s ability to continue growing at a rapid rate takes precedence, since there can be no sovereignty for China without economic growth. The United States’ role as the world’s superpower is dependent on its ability to lead economically. As many of you will know from reading this blog, I do not believe that war between the US and China is imminent, or a foregone conclusion in the future. I certainly do not hope for war. But I have little doubt that protectionist policies on both sides greatly increase the likelihood of conflict–far more than increases in military budgets and anti-satellite tests**.**

### Off 3

#### Text: The United States federal government should develop a system of microgrids that use a combination of solar power, wind power, and diesel to power its military bases.

#### Microgrids using solar and diesel solve grid reliance

Kwartin et. al 12 (Vice president of ICF International, consulting firm that partners with government and commercial clients to deliver professional services and technology solutions in the energy, environment, and infrastructure; health, social programs, and consumer/financial; and public safety and defense markets, Robert Kwartin, Sarah Alexander, Martin Anderson, Donald Clark, John Collins, Chris Lamson, Garrett Martin, Ryan Mayfield, Lindsay McAlpine, Daniel Moreno, Jeffrey Patterson, Craig Schultz, and Emily Stiever, “Solar Energy Development on Department of Defense Installations in the Mojave and Colorado Deserts”, January, Pdf)

For the purpose of this discussion, it is assumed that a military installation already has a microgrid installed, which, among other things, is connected to all existing critical loads. A microgrid is required to exploit solar power for emergency backup. It also provides significant security benefits for a backup system that relies solely on diesel generators. Beyond their energy security benefits, microgrids also offer the potential to provide economic and power quality benefits while an installation is tied to the utility grid.¶ The potential sources of on-site power generation are: 1) diesel generators tied to the existing microgrid in the cantonment area, 2) remote third party owned solar not tied to microgrid, and 3) cantonment third party solar that is tied to the existing microgrid. Most DoD facilities already have some level of emergency backup power that is supplied by diesel generators. Many of the installations also currently host third-party owned solar projects, either adjacent to the cantonment or in other areas, or have the technical and economic capability to do so, as discussed in the Solar Potential Assessment chapter.¶ Based on these three sources of on-site power, multiple operational scenarios can be envisioned. They range from reliance solely on diesel generators and making no use of solar generation to reliance on solar to provide some or all of the power required for the critical load. The most likely future scenario would be a hybrid system using a mix of diesel generators and on-site solar to slow the draw-down of generator fuel stored on base and to meet a portion of the peak demand.¶ For a diesel-only configuration, the number and size of the diesel generators must match the expected peak power requirement with sufficient redundancy for reliability. In addition, sufficient fuel must be stored on site to provide for the duration of an expected grid failure, adjusted for expectations that fuel replenishment from outside the installation would either be continued or interrupted. To meet energy security requirements beyond that already provided by the existing diesel generators would require significant capital investments in generators, fuel storage infrastructure, and fuel. Ongoing O&M costs would include maintenance of the generators and fuel for testing to ensure reliability. These costs are sensitive to the total critical load and the duration of outage. ¶ Reliance on solar to provide a 24-hour resource for critical load requires a significant amount of energy storage, which as discussed above is expensive. To meet energy security requirements beyond that already provided by any existing diesel generators would require significant capital investments in large-scale electric power storage and associated O&M costs for maintenance. In addition to these costs, a remote area solar plant (sited at a distance from the cantonment area) would require significant capital costs for transmission and associated O&M costs for the interconnect. It will also require a call option with the third party owner and operator of the remote solar PV plant. These costs are sensitive to the total critical load of the outage.¶ A hybrid system that uses diesel generators plus solar in the cantonment area is likely to be a more cost effective solution than reliance on solar alone to fully meet the critical load requirement. Under this approach, the levels of energy and fuel storage could both be minimized. Designing an optimal system will be sensitive to both the size of the load and to the expected frequency and duration of a grid outage.

### Prolif

#### SMR use goes global—makes theft and prolif inevitable

Barczak 10 (Sara Barczak, the Safe Energy Director for Southern Alliance For Clean Energy (SACE), “Smaller Size, Big Price Tag: Small modular reactors are risky”, 12/24, http://blog.cleanenergy.org/2010/12/24/small-modular-reactors/)

Claim: SMR’s would be safer, posing fewer security risks.

Reality: “Mini-nukes” would threaten national security. The United States is not the only country looking to construct SMR’s. In fact, it has been heavily marketed to developing countries whose transmission systems cannot handle large-scale reactors. If pursued in the U.S., Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center believe that such a program “would open up the door for France and Russia to also start selling these small reactors to nations around the world.” Many of the countries where these “mini-nukes” are being marketed for do not have stable political systems, can be fraught with corruption and security forces are not properly trained to protect the technology and materials which can be used to create nuclear bombs. Additionally, if the U.S. hailed nuclear energy and small modular reactors as the future of energy, it would be impractical if not impossible to simultaneously deny the technology to the rest of the world.

#### Vital internal to stopping nuclear terrorism

Gallucci 11 (president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, previously, served as Dean of Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, served for 21 years with the U.S. Department of State as Ambassador at Large, “Leadership and the Future of Nuclear Energy,” 6/9, http://www.macfound.org/site/c.lkLXJ8MQKrH/b.4462613/apps/s/content.asp?ct=10875785)

Terrorism, on the other hand, poses a different kind of threat. The disaster at Fukushima could just as well have been the result of a deliberate attack. An attacker would only have needed to know the weaknesses in facility design and operation in order to put the fuel and reactor cores at risk. This logic also applies to theft and diversion.¶ For more than a decade, American presidents have said that the greatest threat confronting our country is that a terrorist will detonate a nuclear device in one of our cities.¶ Some say this is farfetched. **I am convinced it is perfectly feasible**, a risk low in probability but high in consequence.¶ Terrorists would have a hard time getting their hands on a ready-made nuclear weapon and would therefore more likely aim to build an improvised nuclear device (or IND). It would probably be a “gun-type device,” like the one dropped on Hiroshima. Making a plutonium bomb, like that dropped on Nagasaki, is far harder. But it would be a mistake to assume that terrorists would be unable to build a plutonium bomb – imperfect or inefficient as it might be by the standards of the designers at Livermore or Los Alamos.¶ The consequences of either device would be catastrophic. A bomb on the scale of Hiroshima could kill a quarter of a million people in a major city. A smaller device could kill tens of thousands over several weeks. The economic and political costs would be incalculable.¶ **The biggest impediment to making a nuclear weapon is getting the fissile material**, either highly enriched uranium or plutonium.¶ So our objective in addressing the security risks of nuclear power is simple: **make sure that terrorists cannot get their hands on fissile material from the nuclear fuel cycle**.¶ I would argue that we need to carefully control enrichment technology, because it can be used to produce HEU; and we need to stop the spread of reprocessing technology because it does produce plutonium.¶ There is a debate over whether spent fuel reprocessing is a prudent or irrational way to manage radioactive waste and conserve uranium, from both economic and technical points of view. I take the latter view.¶ My reasoning (I have discovered that foundations call this a "logic model"):¶ The more fissile material there is available, the more likely it is that an IND will be manufactured and an act of nuclear terrorism will occur.¶ If energy producers choose to recycle plutonium in thermal reactors, it will be impossible adequately to account for plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle. The risk of theft or diversion would rise.¶ The introduction of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel into any country's nuclear fuel cycle increases the risk that plutonium will be acquired by a would-be nuclear terrorist.¶ So any nation thinking about recycling plutonium needs to be aware of, and take account of, the additional risk of nuclear terrorism.¶ In my view, there is nothing to be won by the introduction of plutonium fuels into the nuclear fuel cycle that is not substantially off-set by an increased risk to security.¶ **If we eliminate the possibility of terrorists obtaining fissile material, we eliminate most of the risk of a nuclear terrorist attack**.

#### The US would retaliate --- causes great power nuclear war

Robert Ayson 10, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July,

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a **massive exchange of nuclear weapons** between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41¶ Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?¶ Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

#### New proliferators will build small arsenals which are uniquely stable.

**Seng 98** (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “Strategy for Pandora's Children: Stable Nuclear Proliferation Among Minor States”, p. 203-206)

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage those arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' **greatly diminishes the statistical probability** that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may not have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

#### Prolif will be slow

Tepperman 9Deputy Editor at Newsweek. Frmr Deputy Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs. LLM, i-law, NYU. MA, jurisprudence, Oxford. (Jonathan, Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb, http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome\_files/nukes\_Final.pdf)

The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors—Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say—might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

#### US is still the nuclear tech leader

Pete Domenici 12, senator and Warren Miller, co-chair of Nuclear Initiative, former DOE Assist. Sec., July 2012, “Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets,” Bipartisan Policy Center

Nuclear power already plays an important role in the U.S. energy supply mix: The nation’s existing fleet of 104 reactors currently accounts for close to 20 percent of overall electricity production. In many parts of the country, nuclear plants help to assure grid stability and have been a major source of cost-effective, low-carbon base-load power for decades. The NRC, the industry’s chief regulatory overseer, is expected to approve extension of the operating licenses for most of these plants to 60 years while striving for improved safety and increasingly efficient operations. At present, the domestic nuclear industry is looking at limited opportunities for expansion in terms of increasing the number of U.S. plants. Currently, four new Generation III+ nuclear reactors have been licensed by the NRC and are under construction in the Southeast. In addition, the Tennessee Valley Authority has restarted construction activities at Watts Bar II. Given this near-term expansion, the United States will continue to be a world leader in the development of advanced reactor technologies, including Generation III+ advanced passive reactors and SMRs. International interest in developing new nuclear-generating capacity, on the other hand, presents potentially substantial business opportunities for the domestic nuclear industry. Commercial nuclear exports generate obvious economic benefits for U.S. firms and for the nation’s overall balance of trade. Importantly, they also help the United States retain a major role in the evolution and maintenance of international nuclear safety and nonproliferation regimes. Other nations not only look to the U.S. industry for operational expertise, they see the NRC as setting the international gold standard for safety and physical security regulation. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, meanwhile, has a great deal of influence over the nonproliferation aspects of international fuel-cycle issues.

### Heg

#### U.S. primacy isn’t key to peace---their data is flawed

Christopher Preble 10, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, August 3, 2010, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?,” online: <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions.¶ But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

#### Obama’s enabling managed great-power retrenchment---boosting influence triggers overstretch and makes inevitable decline more violent---means only the aff triggers “go down swinging” args

Adam Quinn 11, Lecturer in International Studies at the University of Birmingham, July 2011, “The Art of Declining Politely: Obama’s Prudent Presidency and the Waning of American Power,” International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, p. 803-824

As for the administration’s involvement in the ‘Arab Spring’, and latterly military intervention from the air in Libya, these episodes also serve better to illustrate Obama’s tendency towards restraint and limitation than to showcase bold ambition. Both its record of public statements during the unfolding of the Egyptian ‘revolution’ and inside accounts after the event suggest that the administration’s strategy was to ride with caution a wave of events largely beyond its own control. The United States thus edged over a period of days from expressing confidence in Mubarak to seeking a months-long quasi-constitutional transition to eventually facilitating his abrupt defenestration, as events on the ground changed the balance of probabilities as to the ultimate outcome. In eschewing either rigid public support for Mubarak, as some regional allies would have preferred, or early and vocal backing for the protesters, Obama was successful in what was surely the primary objective: to avoid rendering America’s interests hostage to a gamble on either the success or the failure of the protests. 91 Given Egypt’s strategic importance, such ‘dithering’, as contemporary critics often termed it, might justifiably be praised as a sensible reluctance to run out ahead of events. 92¶ In its approach to Libya, the administration seems similarly to have been guided more by the movement of events on the ground than by any overarching plan, and to have retained a default instinct of reluctance throughout. 93 The decision to intervene directly with air power was made only after it became clear that anti-Qadhafi rebels were in imminent danger of total defeat in their last redoubt of Benghazi, after which bloody reprisals by the government against disloyal citizens could be expected. In a major presidential address to the American people regarding operations in Libya, a chief priority was to reassure them as to the limits of the operation. The President insisted that his decisions had been ‘consistent with the pledge that I made to the American people at the outset … that America’s role would be limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya; that we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.’ Once the first wave of bombing was complete, he explained, the United States would retreat to ‘a supporting role’, with the transfer of responsibility to others ensuring that ‘the risk and cost of this operation—to our military and to American taxpayers—will be reduced significantly’.¶ Although it was right and necessary for the US to intervene, he said, there would be no question of using American resources on the ground to achieve regime change or nation-building. ‘To be blunt,’ he observed, ‘we went down that road in Iraq … That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.’ His vision of leadership was one whereby the US reserved the right to use unilateral military force to defend ‘our people, our homeland, our allies and our core interests’, but in cases where ‘our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and our values are … the burden of action should not be America’s alone’. ‘Real leadership’, he argued, ‘creates the conditions and coalitions for others to step up as well; to work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs.’ 94 On the very same day that Obama outlined his vision for American and western leadership in the defence of liberal values at Westminster in May 2011, he also made remarks at a press conference with Prime Minister David Cameron that underlined the limits of what America would contribute to the campaign in Libya, making it apparent that the high-flown ideals of Westminster Hall would be closely circumscribed in their implementation in practice. 95¶ It was explications such as these of the meaning of American ‘leadership’ in the new era that inspired the unfortunate phrase ‘leading from behind’. 96 Thus the chief message emanating from the Libyan intervention was not, in fact, broad endorsement of liberal intervention as a general principle. Rather, one of the clearest signals from the President was that nothing resembling the resourceintensive operation in Iraq (or perhaps, by implication, Afghanistan) could or should ever be attempted again.¶ Captain of a shrinking ship¶ As noted in the opening passages of this article, the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. Facing this incipient period of decline, America’s leaders may walk one of two paths. Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible. Or it can ‘rage against the dying of the light’, refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. President Obama’s approach, defined by restraint and awareness of limits, makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that, to cite one example, his predecessor was not. He is, in short, a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him; in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed, they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline. 97¶ If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline, then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment, trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. As part of such a project, it can, as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested, use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power, preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran; deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia; commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade; a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism, regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa.¶ President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear, not for the first time, that he is no pacifist, spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’, and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year, even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’, he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things,’ he declared. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. Evidently this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream, either by advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength as a good in itself or by disavowing liberal universalist global visions, as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. 100 No doubt sensibly, given the likely political reaction at home, it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. Nevertheless, this is a president who, within the confines of the mainstream, embraces caution and restraint to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift in the intellectual framework of American foreign policy-making. 101¶ In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of global power, it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. It may well be, as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe, that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not, on reflection, fill any westerner with glee, whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of American decline. It may be a process that unfolds gradually and peacefully, resulting in a new order that functions with peace and stability even in the absence of American primacy. Alternatively, it may result in conflict, if the United States clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon, or continues to be drawn into wars with middle powers or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. Which outcome occurs will depend on more than the choices of America alone. But the likelihood that the United States can preserve its prosperity and influence and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy rather than go down thrashing its limbs about destructively will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource—in short, leaders who can master the art of declining politely. At present it seems it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill.

#### Hegemonic retrenchment’s key to avoid great power war---maintaining unipolarity’s self-defeating which internal link-turns their offense

Nuno P. Monteiro 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40

From the perspective of the overall peacefulness of the international system, then, no U.S. grand strategy is, as in the Goldilocks tale, “just right.”116 In fact, each strategic option available to the unipole produces significant conflict. Whereas offensive and defensive dominance will entangle it in wars against recalcitrant minor powers, disengagement will produce regional wars among minor and major powers. Regardless of U.S. strategy, conflict will abound. Indeed, if my argument is correct, the significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades will continue for as long as U.S. power remains preponderant.¶ From the narrower perspective of the unipole’s ability to avoid being involved in wars, however, disengagement is the best strategy. A unipolar structure provides no incentives for conflict involving a disengaged unipole. Disengagement would extricate the unipole’s forces from wars against recalcitrant minor powers and decrease systemic pressures for nuclear proliferation. There is, however, a downside. Disengagement would lead to heightened conflict beyond the unipole’s region and increase regional pressures for nuclear proliferation. As regards the unipole’s grand strategy, then, the choice is between a strategy of dominance, which leads to involvement in numerous conflicts, and a strategy of disengagement, which allows conflict between others to fester.¶ In a sense, then, strategies of defensive and offensive dominance are self-defeating. They create incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to bolster their capabilities and present the United States with a tough choice: allowing them to succeed or resorting to war in order to thwart them. This will either drag U.S. forces into numerous conflicts or result in an increasing number of major powers. In any case, U.S. ability to convert power into favorable outcomes peacefully will be constrained.117¶ This last point highlights one of the crucial issues where Wohlforth and I differ—the benefits of the unipole’s power preponderance. Whereas Wohlforth believes that the power preponderance of the United States will lead all states in the system to bandwagon with the unipole, I predict that states engaged in security competition with the unipole’s allies and states for whom the status quo otherwise has lesser value will not accommodate the unipole. To the contrary, these minor powers will become recalcitrant despite U.S. power preponderance, displaying the limited pacifying effects of U.S. power.¶ What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”120¶ At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level of conflict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major powers and the magnitude of the conflicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system.¶ Finally, my argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.”121 By putting other states in extreme self-help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid being involved in wars. If the unipole fails to exercise restraint, other states will develop their capabilities, including nuclear weapons—restraining it all the same.122 Paradoxically, then, more relative power does not necessarily lead to greater influence and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect, unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint.

#### Attempting to preserve hegemony backfires---causes counterbalancing and great power war

Bruce Jones 11, director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, director of the Managing Global Order project and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at The Brookings Institution, senior external advisor for the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security, and Development, consulting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, March 14, 2011, “Managing a Changing World,” Foreign Policy, online: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/14/building\_the\_new\_world\_order?page=full

On major questions of global economy and security, interests, not ideology or an anti-U.S. leadership strategy, are driving emerging powers' shifting alliances. Despite efforts to find a West/Rest or democratic/autocratic divide in international order, such divisions are not dominant thus far. Cooperation on global finance and counterterrorism in no way guarantees cooperation on energy and climate, or regional security. The United States has been as likely to find support from China as from Europe on many of the major challenges it confronts. At the Toronto meeting of the G-20, the United States, China, India and Brazil banded against the United Kingdom, Germany and Australia on questions of stimulus versus fiscal restraint. The U.S. perspective on terrorism has been closer to the Indian or Russian standpoint than to the European approach. The United States and Europe worked closely with Russia to persuade a reluctant China to join hands on Iran. On climate change, the United States is no more closely aligned to Japan or Europe than it is to India or China. The Western alliance (but not a democratic alliance) lives on in issues dominated by values debates-human rights, democracy promotion, and to a lesser degree, development.¶ The result is a partial shift in the U.S. position. True, the United States no longer enjoys the status of unrivaled hyper-power that it maintained after the end of the Cold War, or the status of "leader of the free world" that characterized its position in the western alliance during the Cold War. U.S. dominance is dulled, but its influence remains substantial. With the change in the structure of international order, the U.S. position has morphed into something equivalent to the position of the largest minority shareholder in a modern corporation-a position not of control, but of substantial influence. Its influence, however, has to be wielded in a new mode. ¶ With today's power distribution, no one actor, and no one set of actors, commands an automatic majority of "votes." Setting the rules of the game, solving crises and taking advantage of opportunities requires coalitions among "shareholders." On any given vote among shareholders, the largest minority shareholder can be outvoted if the rest band together-as the United States found in Copenhagen. But by the same token, the largest shareholder, even if a minority shareholder, has more options available to them than any other actor to forge temporary alliances to produce enough of a majority-sometimes a decisive majority-to win a specific vote. The United States can work with India and African states to win a vote on peacekeeping issues, with China and Brazil to win a decision on financial regulation, and with Russia and Europe on the management of Iran. ¶ No other state has anything like this range of tactical alliances available to them. This extends to convening power. The largest minority shareholder cannot demand a shareholder meeting; but if they call for one, most other shareholders are likely to agree to attend. For all of the fact of the prominence of the emerging powers in the G-20 response to the financial crisis, efforts by other states to generate a coordinated response floundered; only the United State had the authority to convene the G-20 summit. Theoretically, India or China could have convened the Nuclear Security Summit-but it was the United States that did so. ¶ This is a complex game, where the United States can no longer get its way just by force of its own position, or lead a stable alliance against a common threat. Crafting decisions requires complex "voting alliances" that will need to be forged vote by vote, or issue by issue. This requires courting relationships with a wide range of shareholders and a willingness to return favors of a variety of types. Still, it is a position of substantial influence. The comparative ease with which the largest minority shareholder can pull together a coalition to reach a blocking majority confers a role that can best be described as "gravitational pull." No other shareholder can afford to band permanently against you, lest it risk seeing its interests in the "board" vitally damaged. Some shareholders may occasionally be tempted to play spoiler roles on individual votes, but if they push this too far they will provoke banding behavior by other shareholders protecting their interests-as China learned on currency issues and Russia learned in its efforts to annex South Ossetia, roundly condemned by the emerging powers as well as the West. When this occurs, the others will look first to the largest minority shareholder to lead the way. ¶ But this comparative advantage cannot be overplayed. If the United States attempts to portray its position as that of global hub, or if its strategy were perceived to be one of a resurrection of dominance, it would likely backfire, triggering a deeper banding together of the other powers and middle powers against the U.S. position. To succeed in wielding influence from its new, influential but less dominant position, the United States needs a new mindset about strategy. ¶ PART 2: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER¶ That all of this matters can be illustrated by imagining the negative scenarios if the United States withdraws from leadership functions, no one else steps in, or the powers fail to find ways to cooperate on global challenges-what David Gordon calls the "G-Zero" scenario. In global finance, the results would be swift and disastrous; cooperation this time around prevented something akin to the Great Depression on a global scale. Similarly, consequences would arise if no lead actor or constellation of actors was providing naval assets to secure trade. If global economic negotiations grind to a halt, global trade and finance will begin to erode. ¶ Of course, the primary purpose of international order-to prevent major power war-is even more fundamental. But well short of active conflict between the major powers, mismanagement of the changing international system can pose tremendous costs for the United States and virtually everyone else. ¶ Avoiding a G-Zero scenario, a major power conflict, and continued high U.S. expenditure against leadership functions that produce stability should be key U.S. goals. And that requires three elements of strategy: fostering cooperation and burden-sharing on global finance, transnational threats and development; renegotiating rules of the road for economic, energy and climate competition; and investing in tools for crisis de-escalation and management. This should be complemented by frank debate, but not firm divides, on human rights. ¶ Fostering cooperation on global finance and transnational threats¶ In the realm of global finance, the United States has adapted to the new realities swiftly and gracefully. The creation of the G-20 Summit, the decision to accept new International Monetary Fund (IMF) monitoring on U.S. financial decisions, and a new agreement to give China, India and other rising economies a greater percentage of shares at the IMF have been remarkable. The creation of the new Financial Stability Board and the shift in global economic order have also been significant. This outcome was indicative of changed realities and a changing American mindset in favor of new voting rights for the rising powers at the IMF, at the expense of European seats. ¶ Extending cooperation to other issues is easy to wish for, harder to do. But as noted above, U.S. and emerging powers' interests align in several areas, including on some security issues. The Bush administration, its rhetoric notwithstanding, pursued an agenda of cooperation on security issues, through formal and informal arrangements-pushing for an enormous expansion in UN peacekeeping, fostering informal arrangements to tackle nuclear smuggling (the Proliferation Security Initiative), and building strong bilateral cooperation with China, India and Russia on terrorism issues. The Obama administration has taken a similar two-track approach: fostering informal arrangements like the Nuclear Security Summit, which has translated into ongoing cooperation to protect nuclear materials; and using the UN Security Council to coordinate major power approaches to Iran and North Korea, with some important success. ¶ A similar combination of formal and informal approaches could help to solidify cooperation on terrorism and other transnational threats. For example, navel cooperation against piracy is being pursued and could be extended. The U.S. Navy patrolling alongside the Chinese, Indian, Russian, Japanese and European navies off the coast of Somalia provides a compelling case study of shared interests. The fact of a UN Security Council resolution completes the picture, and provides an interesting model that squares the circle between the U.S. instinct for informal arrangements, and the European and emerging powers' desire to reinforce the formal arrangements of the UN. Over time, aspects of this model could be extended to burden-sharing on trade security in more sensitive locations. ¶ It is debatable whether such cooperation could be extended to active crises, for example on Afghanistan/Pakistan. Certainly Russia, China and India do not have an interest in the return of the Taliban or the ascendancy of al Qaeda, or in the further destabilization of Pakistan. But there are two basic problems. First, is a classic of cooperation problems. The threat is shared, but unequally. Relative costs matter. Both China and Russia lose from insecurity in western Pakistan-but India and the United States lose more. A challenge for strategy is to find arrangements that create incentives for cooperation or regulated competition, even in the non-collapse scenarios. This is a key role for institutional arrangements, as opposed to ad hoc cooperation. In ad hoc cooperation, the relative losses question will loom large, whereas institutional approaches can create bureaucratic and elite interests that trump relative losses. A second set of problems are habit, capacity and trust. Few of the emerging powers have the habit, or even the tools, for strategy cooperation on security problems. The United States has tried to engage China on scenario planning on North Korea, for example, and has been rebuffed. India's diplomatic capacity is thin and already over-stretched. These constraints will change rapidly, though, and it might be wise not to start on North Korea or Pakistan, but rather to build trust in significant, second order problems such as Somalia or Yemen. ¶ A further area where cooperation can grow is development. Sustaining global economic recovery will require a serious effort to support growth for middle income and less-developed states. After resisting the agenda, the G-20 has created a development group that, so far, has found far more common ground than differences. Before that, the new monies and new ideas emanating from the emerging powers had been treated as a threat rather than a source of new energy. The West's and the emerging powers' interests in development do not entirely align, especially on issues like corruption, but there is a base of shared interest in new and stable growth. Given the continuing failure of western development strategies, an open mind and genuine dialogue seem warranted. ¶ Cooperative efforts serve two purposes. They are important for functional reasons; the issues need to be managed, and their distributed nature means that collective efforts are a necessity, not a luxury. However, fostering deeper collaboration has a second, ordering effect-forging a sense of what the Obama administration has called "shared security." This matters both for government-to-government relations and the broader public narrative. The domestic resonance of competitive and conflictual dynamics tends to outweigh cooperation. Every Chinese and Japanese citizen knows their two countries clashed over maritime issues in September 2010; hardly any know that they are patrolling jointly in the Gulf of Aden. Counterterrorism cooperation is one area that can compete in domestic salience. For U.S. audiences, against the charge that China is cheating on currency rules, "they're helping us on trade security" sounds abstract; "they're helping us on al Qaeda" carries more punch. Counterterrorism cooperation should have greater visibility in both countries. ¶ Shared interests in tackling transnational threats will only be a part of an overall sense of security. Other security issues-regional security and energy security-will drive divergence. But deeper collaboration on shared threats can contextualize the inevitable confrontations ahead. ¶ Regulating economic and energy competition¶ In other areas, the nature of U.S., European and emerging power interests will push towards competitive rather than cooperative dynamics. The G-20 has already shifted-perhaps too quickly-from a mode of crisis response to negotiating new modes of regulation to prevent future crises. That takes it into the terrain of negotiating the rules of competition (on currency, regulation of financial products, etc.). Here again, issues of relative loss loom large. Everyone loses if the bottom drops out from global financial systems, but states profit or lose differently from different regulations; hence fierce competition. ¶ Similar competitive dynamics over the rules have blocked deeper trade cooperation in recent years. In the WTO, divergences between the United States, Europe and the emerging powers have stymied new openings in the Doha round, as every actor plays for optimal outcomes, resulting in no outcome at all. Such dynamics will likely be increasingly common in international negotiations on global economic regulation. In some settings, the emerging powers are divided. On the issue of regulating intellectual property rights, for example, China has avoided siding with other developing countries that challenge the existing rules. Still, in this realm of the "software"of globalization, the United States may have no choice but to pay more attention to the interests and ideas of new powers, and to give some ground. U.S. dominance has enabled a somewhat less than level playing field, tilted to our advantage. Trying too hard to retain that advantage runs the risk of triggering the G-Zero scenario. One way or another, global economic diplomacy will matter more in the years ahead, and that must be reflected in the allocation of diplomatic resources-as indeed is acknowledged in the QDDR's proposals for "elevating economic diplomacy." ¶ Issues of relative loss and relative gain may be particularly hard to manage on questions of energy, carbon and scarce resources. The issues will shape the question of whether contemporary relationships between the United States and the other major powers tilt towards the collaborative, the competitive or the conflictual. This is not the place to spell out in detail the kinds of area or resource specific agreements that may help ameliorate the worst of "race to the bottom" behavior that might otherwise characterize the sphere of energy security and climate change. Suffice it to say, a component of U.S. order strategy should be to balance U.S. economic and energy needs with the long-term risks of failure to forge an agreement on climate and the short-term conflict risks of unregulated competition over energy. ¶ This does not mean abandoning any sense that some of these areas can serve as zones of cooperation. There is a great deal of loose talk about scarce water and the likelihood of an uptick in conflict over water resources. History suggests otherwise. Countries that have competing needs for access to a water source have more frequently forged agreements to cooperate on preserving and sharing that source than fought over it. U.S.-China joint initiatives on carbon-sequestering technology also illustrate the potential for win-win approaches. Still, competitive mindsets prevail. Genuine shortages of strategic minerals, food supplies and arable land, combined with mercantile policy, do seem set to cause rough competition, veering into conflict. ¶ Investing in tools for crisis de-escalation and management¶ Because competition is inevitable, and because regional security dilemmas will almost certainly prove more complicated over time, a third and critical component of strategy will be to invest up front in tools for crisis de-escalation and management. ¶ Much of this will be region specific. But across the board, a key element for the United States is to be imaginative in using flexible coalitions of other countries (or "shareholders") to bolster its own diplomacy. When the United States sought to isolate Russia over its effort to annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia, western unity was not the death-blow to Russia's effort-it was China's firm condemnation of Russia's position. When the United States sought to respond to China's growing assertiveness in the South China Seas, the most helpful request for U.S. engagement was not the predictable one from Japan, but the surprising one from Vietnam. So long as the United States is viewed as a critical part of managing the global balance of power, its presence will help defuse clashes with the emerging powers. ¶ We can also be creative about the role of middle powers. Against a backdrop of mounting competition and tense exchanges between the Arctic powers, it was Norway and Denmark, that drafted agreements with Russia and the United States which led to a lowering of tensions and agreement to use International Maritime Organization conventions to manage boundary disputes in the Arctic. Could similar middle power roles be used to defuse boundary tensions or create third-party de-escalation mechanisms in other regions? At the most creative, one could imagine a third-party mechanism being on call for China, Japan, Russia and the United States to help resolve boundary disputes and/or naval incidents in the South China Seas. One such multi-nation mechanism was used by South Korea to investigate the Cheonan sinking, but because that mechanism was not pre-agreed by China, it had modest impact on crisis diplomacy. Could a more robust, if still informal, third-party mechanism provide more concrete crisis prevention and management tools? These issues warrant quiet exploration. ¶ The United States can and should also invest in reinforcing the UN Security Council (UNSC). During the Cold War, the UNSC gave the United States and the Soviet Union a joint tool for crisis de-escalation. In the Middle East, for example, faced with crises between their respective Israeli and Arab allies, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on several occasions to Security Council ceasefire resolutions and peacekeeping deployments. These halted crises before they could escalate into direct superpower confrontations. ¶ Growing use of the UNSC has been a point of surprising commonality between the Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. This, however, was during a period of U.S. dominance. With new influence for new actors, the issue of membership reform hangs over the Security Council's future utility. The issue is probably less complicated than generally believed, and it is worth noting that if India and Japan were full members, the UNSC would have all the Asian powers-creating a crisis management platform for that region where the shift in the balance of power will be most volatile. ¶ Still, even if there were a positive vote in the General Assembly (GA) today for membership change, it would be years before the required two-thirds of the GA's membership had undertaken the necessary domestic ratification procedures for Charter reform. So, pursuing UNSC expansion does not negate the need for interim measures. Functional cooperation with the emerging powers on nuclear security, counterterrorism and piracy helps, but does not provide either a crisis response mechanism per se, or the underlying relationships between senior national security officials that can be called upon in times of an acute crisis. (The fact of a pre-existing G-20 mechanism among finance ministers was vital for allowing swift alignment between G-20 leaders during the financial crisis.) ¶ Crisis management capacity could be developed in several ways: creating an informal mechanism that links national security advisors or foreign ministry officials of the P5 plus the emerging powers around common threats; involving foreign ministries in G-20 sherpa mechanisms (as was often done for the G7); or having a separate process through which G-20 (or G8 plus 5) foreign ministers meet. A more radical, but perhaps interesting, idea is to take the UNSC's Military Staff Committee out of retirement and bring the emerging powers (and others) into its deliberations as relevant to the specific topic or crisis. This could provide a "trial run" of UNSC reform that neither threatens the legitimacy of the UN, nor risks diluting the focus of the G-20, nor locks the United States into untested membership change. ¶ And there are interesting models of both informal and semi-formal major power cooperation in crisis containment under UNSC mandates. In Afghanistan, NATO operates under a UNSC mandate that enables not only NATO allies but also others, like Australia, the UAE and Singapore, to deploy. In Southern Lebanon, at America's behest, France, Germany, Italy, India and China are all deployed under a UNSC mandate, and with a bespoke management arrangement (the Strategic Military Cell) that operates outside the normal command structures of the UN Secretariat. And again, there is the example of counter-piracy cooperation in the Horn of Africa. ¶ Frank debate, not firm divides, on human rights¶ Finally, it is important to touch on what may be the most contentious of issues between the United States and the emerging powers, namely human rights. ¶ On basic human rights issues, the key dynamic will be between the West and China. Neither domestic reality, nor good strategy, will allow the United States to ignore the human rights issues with China. But U.S. diplomacy on the issue should be cognizant of the relatively limited impact that outside pressure will have on China's evolution and the broader context to the relationship-a balance admirably struck by President Obama during President Hu Jintao's January 2011 visit to Washington. President Hu's acknowledgment that China had "issues" with human rights was a mild opening, but certainly one worth pursuing.¶ More broadly, using human rights standards or issues of democracy promotion as a yardstick for cooperation will backfire. On both issues, emerging power behavior combines a defense of sovereignty (fundamental to their security) with a tradition of resisting western interventionism. Democratic India, Brazil and South Africa routinely vote with their NAM friends and against the West in the Human Rights Council. Moreover, while issues like "the responsibility to protect" are presumed to divide the "West from the rest," and do so in rhetoric, reality is more complex. India and South Africa spoke out strongly against NATO's action in Kosovo, which was supported by the Organization of Islamic Countries; France, Russia and Germany banded together to block U.S. action in Iraq.¶ So, contentious, yes; neatly dividing the west from the rest, no. There is complexity not cleavage here. And an effort to use human rights or democratic criteria to drive hard cleavages in the international system would likely provoke more serious banding together by the emerging powers-against, not in favor of, our strategy.¶ CONCLUSION¶ America has rebounded from dips in its influence before. An oil price rise before economic downturn, a brewing crisis in Iran, a rising competitor, domestic divides and a Democratic president facing a resurgent right-welcome to 1978. Still, absent dramatic change, an economic shift to "the rest" will continue, and political influence will follow.¶ If we foster cooperation where interests allow, and devote serious resources to global economic and energy diplomacy, we can balance the contentious dynamics of regional security and human rights. Preparing for crises by investing in management tools can help de-escalate them when they arrive. ¶ This may fail, as the domestic resonance of competition drives out awareness of shared interests. And it will certainly face substantial obstacles. Europe reluctantly gave up seats at the IMF to accommodate the rising powers, and will resist further reforms. Chinese nationalists may overplay their hand, triggering Western antibodies. Brazil and India can overreach. And an inward looking Congress can undermine the credibility of U.S. strategy, on issues both foreign and so-called domestic (climate, energy, currency). The alternatives, though, are unpalatable: an effort to re-assert American dominance that will almost certainly backfire, or the manifestation of the G-Zero scenario, with risks of direct conflict between the powers.

#### Back to prolif…

#### US cred doesn’t solve global prolif

Chris Jones, Intern at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 7-22-2009, “The Credibility Asterisk,” http://csis.org/blog/credibility-asterisk

Two things seem to be the case: -The nonproliferation regime is at a tipping point -The United States is on a quest to restore its nonproliferation credibility. Ideally, increasing the second can be used to prevent a negative outcome of the first. Unfortunately, it may not be that easy. There are a number of factors that complicate that equation: A. The U.S. is just getting back to zero-- While it is likely that the U.S. will try to take steps such as negotiating a START follow-on and ratifying the CTBT in the lead up to the May 2010 RevCon in part to score image points, it begs the question of what we look like right now. U.S. credibility has eroded to the point were CTBT ratification, for example, will be seen as making good on long overdue debts (the 1995 RevCon indefinite extension deal) rather than leading the charge forward. Countries will also continue to criticize us that we still have not gone far enough to meet Article VI demands. B. Nuclear elephants in the room 1. Russia/China- U.S. nonproliferation credibility is only a fraction of the problem for NNWS concerned about nuclear weapons. China may sign the CTBT at or around the time of the U.S. and does not like being isolated internationally but at the same time there are strongly opposed to transparency measures (necessary for any serious move towards zero) and show no signs of slowing modernization. Likewise, a START follow-on is probably in Russia's interest but they are also modernizing and increasing reliance on nuclear weapons in their posture to offset conventional inferiority. These are both huge obstacles to progress that will not be easy to tackle. 2. Israel/India/Pakistan- These 3 nuclear elephants represent fundamentally unacceptable circumstances for some countries. Egypt, for example, held the 2005 RevCon hostage and will not discuss CTBT ratification (necessary for entry into force) because of the Israel question. While the prospects for roping these countries into the NPT are dim, this will be a challenge that has to be dealt with at some point for major nonproliferation gains to be made. C. NPT Loopholes- Even if U.S. nonproliferation credibility is top of the line, the credibility of the NPT hinges on its ability to prevent NNWS members from acquiring nuclear weapons. The ability for countries to stay in bounds and learn about things nuclear and then call no joy under Article X (North Korea) or make potentially worrying progress towards a nuclear weapons capability while roughly staying in bounds (Iran) casts doubt on the NPT as a whole to be an effective mechanism for curbing proliferation. U.S. credibility may lead to slightly increased international support for punitive measure (although by no means guaranteed) but does not serve as a major driver for whether these type of countries make the decision to try for a bomb. The argument is not that we should not pursue nonproliferation credibility but the estimated impact it will have needs to be realistically assessed. One small step for US nonproliferation credibility does not automatically mean one giant leap for nonprolif kind.

oo./