# 1nc

### Topicality --- 1NC

#### A --- Interpretation --- restrictions are direct governmental limitations on production

Annamaria Viterbo 12 , Assistant Professor in International Law at the University of Torino, PhD in International Economic Law from Bocconi University and Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, 2012, International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to States' Sovereignty and Dispute, p. 166

In order to distinguish an exchange restriction from a trade measure, the Fund chose not to give relevance to the purposes or the effects of the measure and to adopt, instead, a technical criterion that focuses on the method followed to design said measure.

An interpretation that considered the economic effects and purposes of the measures (taking into account the fact that the measure was introduced for balance of payments reasons or to preserve foreign currency reserves) would have inevitably extended the Fund's jurisdiction to trade restrictions, blurring the boundaries between the IMF and the GATT. The result of such a choice would have been that a quantitative restriction on imports imposed for balance of payments reasons would have fallen within the competence of the Fund.

After lengthy discussions, in 1960 the IMF Executive Board adopted Decision No. 1034-(60/27).46 This Decision clarified that the distinctive feature of a restriction on payments and transfers for current international transactions is "whether it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such\*.47 This is a limitation imposed directly on the use of currency in itself, for all purposes.

#### “On” means in contact with and links “restrictions” only to energy production

Arthur Butler Graham 16, “Brief for Appellants – Wilson v. Dorflinger & Sons”, Court of Appeals, State of New York, Reg. 108, Fol. 387, 1916, p. 11-12

The Standard Dictionary defines the word “on” as follows:¶ “In or into such a position with reference to something, as a vehicle, a table, or a stage, as to be in contact with and supported by it; in a position, state, or condition of adherence; as, he go on before the wagon had fully stopped.”¶ In Webster’s International Dictionary, we find as follows:¶ “on—The General signification of “on” is situation, motivation, motion, or condition with respect to contact or support beneath as (1) at or in contact with, the surface or upper part of a thing, and supported by it; placed or lying in contact with the surface; as, the book lies on the table, which stands on the floor of a house on an island.”¶ It is submitted that an elevator is not operated on streets or on highways, as a car, truck or wagon is operated, and that by the use of the word “on” the Legislature intended to include only those appliances therein enumerated, namely, cars, trucks, and wagons. An elevator is not operated on anything, but is operated in or inside a shaft, and is controlled by guides, which deprive the operator of the power to change the course of the lift from right to left. Clearly the Legislature intended to include in Group 41, only those cars, trucks and wagons whose direction and guidance are controlled by the operator, in whatever direction he may deem advisable.

#### Energy production refers to the extraction, conversion, and distribution of energy

Koplow 4 Doug Koplow is the founder of Earth Track in Cambridge, MA. He has worked on natural resource subsidy issues for 20 years, primarily in the energy sector "Subsidies to Energy Industries" Encyclopedia of Energy Vol 5 2004www.earthtrack.net/files/Energy%20Encyclopedia,%20wv.pdf

3.2 Production

Energy production includes all stages from the point of resource location through distribution to the final consumers. Specific items examined here include resource extraction, resource conversion (including electricity), the various distribution links to bring the energy resource to the point of final use, and accident risks.

#### B --- Violation --- CFIUS doesn’t restrict --- it regulates which companies can produce energy

Douglas William Nigh 98, associate professor of international business at the University of South Carolina, and Douglas P. Woodward, associate professor of economics at the University of South Carolina, Foreign Ownership and the Consequences of Direct Investment in the United States: Beyond Us and Them, 1998, p. 144

How did the U.S. government respond to the influx of FDI that dates from the 1970s? The answer is “favorably,” with only nominal institutional constraints on investment flows. At the federal level, the institution directly responsible for addressing issues relating to FDIUS is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Created by President Gerald Ford as an oversight body in 1975, CFIUS monitors and regulates FDIUS from the standpoint of protecting national security. It is an interagency body composed of officials from the Departments of State, Commerce, Defense, and Justice, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers; it is usually chaired by a Treasury official.

#### 3 --- Precision --- restriction is narrower than regulation

US District Court 9—Judge Thomas E. Johnson, US District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/west-virginia/wvsdce/5:2009cv00152/61171/33

9 The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test refers to "regulation" of speech. 447 U.S. at 567. "Regulation" could be construed broadly as applying [\*\*29] a system of laws, including penalties, affecting a particular manner of commercial speech. However, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has employed the narrower word, "restriction," in place of "regulation." See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1989) ("[G]overnment restrictions upon commercial speech may be no more broad or no more expansive than 'necessary' to serve its substantial interests").

### 1NC Congress Only T

#### A. Reduce means to make less in amount

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 9 (“reduce”, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reduce, accessed 9-9-9)

\* Main Entry: re·duce \* Pronunciation: \ri-?dus, -?dyus\ \* Function: verb \* Inflected Form(s): re・duced; re・duc・ing \* Etymology: Middle English, to lead back, from Latin reducere, from re- + ducere to lead — more at tow \* Date: 14th century transitive verb 1 a : to draw together or cause to converge : consolidate <reduce all the questions to one> b (1) : to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number <reduce taxes> <reduce the likelihood of war**> (**2) : to decrease the volume and concentrate the flavor of by boiling <add the wine and reduce the sauce for two minutes> c : to narrow down : restrict <the Indians were reduced to small reservations> d : to make shorter :abridge

#### B. Courts can’t reduce restrictions, just rule them unenforceable

Treanor & Sperling 93 William - Prof Law at Fordham. Gene - Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy. “PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND THE REVIVAL OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATUTES,” Columbia Law Review, Dec 93, lexis

Unlike the Supreme Court, several state courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is overturned. n42 With one exception, they have concluded that such statutes are immediately enforceable.

The most noted instance in which the revival issue was resolved by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pronounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer [\*1913] Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded,

 The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid from the date it became effective. n43

Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action. n44

When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jawish v. Morlet n45 held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable, but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished; that so long as the decision stands the statute is dormant but not dead; and that if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date. n46

 The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in accord with the principle "that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law.' " n47 Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, " "Just about everybody was fooled.' " n48 Nonetheless, the court's view was that since the minimum wage law had always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need to reenact it. n49

Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have reached the same result as the Jawish court, using a similar formalistic [\*1914] analysis. n50 The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, n51 a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child support and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the applicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated:

 Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to constitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court - an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by the Constitution. n52

 The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival therefore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage [\*1915] of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making.

Jefferson has little analytic appeal. Its view of the separation of powers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jefferson rationale, a "revived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is, instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. n53 In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.

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The United States federal government should not allow national security justifications to limit the Freedom of Information Act disclosure of information during the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership negotiations, including but not limited to disclosure of relevant Intellectual Property Rights information. The United States federal government should substantially increase investment in smart grid technology, including but not limited to modeling military microgrid technology.

### LNG Exports---1NC

#### DOE will limit LNG exports now because of concerns about domestic supply and demand---the plan resolves those concerns and triggers exports

Charles Ebinger et al 12, a senior fellow and director of the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution; Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings; and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, May 2012, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf

From the perspective of the U.S. federal government, the issue of implications is viewed in terms of “public interest.” Under existing legislation, exports of natural gas to countries with a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States are, by law, deemed to be in the public interest and authorization is required to be given without modification or delay. Projects looking for authorization to export LNG to countries without an FTA, which account for roughly 96 percent of current global LNG demand, are required to be approved by the Secretary of Energy unless, after public hearing, the Department of Energy finds that such exports are not in the public interest.80 Although the legal definition of “public interest” is not explicitly given in existing legislation, according to public statements by officials from the Department of Energy, “public interest” includes:

• Adequate domestic natural gas supply; • Domestic demand for natural gas proposed for export; • Economic impacts of exports (on GDP, consumers, and industry); • U.S. energy security; • Job creation; • U.S. balance of trade; • International considerations; • Environmental considerations; • Consistency with DoE’s policy of promoting market competition through free negotiation of trade81

The first two of these criteria were addressed in Part I. The remainder focus on the various domestic and international implications of U.S. LNG exports.

Domestic Implications

The domestic implications of U.S. LNG exports include their impact on natural gas prices, natural gas price volatility, jobs and competitiveness, and on overall energy security.

Price of domestic natural Gas

The domestic price impact of natural gas exports will be a significant factor in determining whether or not the United States should export LNG. While it is generally acknowledged that a domestic price increase will result from largescale LNG exports, the size of the price increase is the subject of debate, with a number of studies suggesting a range of possible outcomes. The important considerations when analyzing the results and conclusions of the various existing studies are the assumptions and models that are used when making price forecasts. Below are the results and methodologies of five major pricing studies done by the EIA and three consultancies: Deloitte, ICF International, and Navigant Consulting, which published two studies.

2012 Energy information Administration study In January 2012, the EIA published a study entitled “Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets.”82 The study, conducted at the request of the Office of Fossil Energy of the Department of Energy, analyzed four different export scenarios across four different resource base or economic assumptions to project price responses to LNG exports. In addition to a “baseline” scenario, where no LNG is exported, the EIA model considered four different export scenarios: • A low export/slow growth scenario, where 6 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 1 bcf/day per year; • A low export/rapid growth scenario, where 6 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 3 bcf/day per year; • A high export/slow growth scenario, where 12 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 1 bcf/day per year; • A high export/rapid growth scenario, where 12 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 3 bcf/day per year. Given the uncertainty over the actual size of the shale gas resource base and the future growth of the U.S. economy, each of these scenarios (both “baseline” and export) were applied to four alternate background cases: • A reference case, based on the EIA’s 2011 Annual Energy Outlook; • A low-shale estimated ultimate recovery (EUR) case, in which shale gas production from new, undrilled wells is 50 percent below the reference case scenario; • A high-shale EUR case, in which shale gas production from new, undrilled wells is 50 percent higher than the reference case; • A high economic growth case, in which U.S. GDP grows at 3.2 percent as opposed to the 2.7 percent assumed in the reference case. Given the range of assumptions, the range of results was unsurprisingly wide. The results range from a 9.6 percent increase (from $3.56 to $3.90/ mcf) in domestic natural gas prices in 2025 due to exports (in the case of high shale gas recovery, low export volumes and a slow rate of export growth) to a 32.5 percent increase (in the case of low shale gas recovery, high export volumes and a high rate of export growth). The percentage premium for domestic natural gas prices in 2025 for each scenario relative to the baseline scenario price estimate is detailed in table 3. In addition to the price premium for exporting natural gas that exists in each case, the EIA study projected a short-term spike in natural gas prices as a result of LNG exports. As figure 7 below illustrates, in 2015, the first year that LNG exports occur, domestic natural gas prices rise rapidly until total export capacity is reached. In the “lowrapid” scenario prices peak in 2016, after the 6 bcf/day of export capacity is built over 2 years; in the “high-slow” scenario, natural gas prices peak in 2026, after the 12 bcf/day of export capacity is built over 12 years. The immediate jump in price becomes more pronounced in the scenarios where LNG export capacity increases quickly. In the “low-rapid” scenario, the price of natural gas peaks at nearly 18 percent above the baseline case; in the “high-rapid” scenario, natural gas prices peak at 36 percent above the baseline case. This price impact is exacerbated in the Low Shale EUR and High Macroeconomic Growth cases, as LNG exports further tighten domestic natural gas markets. In the most extreme example, the high-rapid scenario for exports in a Low Shale EUR case, the price for natural gas peaks at more than 50 percent than the baseline case.83 There are two factors that should be considered when interpreting the results of this price impact study. The first is the assumption regarding the rate at which LNG could be exported. The results of EIA’s analysis represent an extreme scenario for LNG exports. In the existing LNG market, it is particularly unlikely that either the “low-rapid” or the “high-rapid” scenarios would materialize. The former assumption stipulates that the United States would export 6 bcf/day of LNG by 2016. Given that, at the time of writing, only one facility has been approved to export 2.2 bcf/day to nonFTA countries starting in 2015, it is unlikely that another three plants would be approved and built in such a short time frame.84 The latter scenario, that the United States would be exporting 12 bcf/ day of LNG by 2018, suggests that in the next several years, the United States would grow from exporting negligible volumes of LNG to having roughly one-third of the global LNG export capacity. Not only would this supply growth outpace growth in global LNG demand, but this capacity addition would also have to compete with roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian-origin LNG that is expected to hit the market around the same time.85 The second issue is the model’s assumptions for incremental investment in natural gas production as a result of increased export capacity. The spike in price depicted in figure 7 occurs because investment from gas producers lags additional demand. In the model, producers respond to, rather than anticipate, additional demand. For this reason, prices peak once the export capacity is filled, before steadily decreasing. In reality, the expectation of future demand would likely induce gas producers to invest in additional production before incremental demand occurs. As a result, the increase in prices would likely begin earlier and peak at a lower level than suggested by the model. deloitte study An earlier study released in November 2011 from the Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions highlighted the producer-response in its model. In addition to finding that LNG exports would produce a smaller increase in gas prices than the EIA report suggests, the Deloitte study points out that “producers can develop more reserves in anticipation of demand growth, such as LNG exports. There will be ample notice and time in advance of the exports to make supplies available.”86 Using a dynamic model, in which production increased in anticipation of new demand, the Deloitte study found that 6 bcf/day of exports of LNG would result in, on average, a 1.7 percent increase (from $7.09 to $7.21/MMBtu) in the price of natural gas between 2016 and 2035. Further, the Deloitte study noted that there would be regional variations to the increase in natural gas prices resulting from LNG exports. As most of the proposed liquefaction terminals are expected to be on the Gulf Coast, the price of Henry Hub gas, which is the key benchmark for natural gas from the Gulf Coast, will increase by $0.22/ MMBtu by 2035 as a result of U.S. LNG exports. This is more than double the price increase projected in regions further away from the LNG export terminals. In New York and Illinois, natural gas prices are projected to increase by less than $0.10/MMBtu. This is particularly important in the Northeast, which historically experiences some of the highest natural gas prices in the country, but will benefit from the development and consumption of natural gas from the nearby Marcellus shale play. other studies Three other studies of note have analyzed the price impacts of U.S. LNG exports. In August 2010, Navigant Consulting found that 2 bcf/day of LNG exports would cause a price increase of between 7 and 7.9 percent from 2015 to 2035 relative to a scenario with no gas exports. ICF International found in August 2011 that 6 bcf/day of exports would result in an 11 percent ($0.64/MMBtu) increase in natural gas prices over the same period.87 More recently, Navigant released another study that analyzed the impact of two separate export scenarios. The first scenario modeled the impact of 3.6 bcf/day of LNG exports from three terminals in North America: Sabine Pass in Louisiana, Kitimat in British Columbia, and Coos Bay in Oregon. The second scenario modeled the impact of 6.6 bcf/day of LNG exports from the three aforementioned export projects and 2 bcf/day of added exports from the Gulf Coast and 1 bcf/day from Maryland.88 This Navigant study found that 6.6 bcf/day of LNG exports would result in a 6 percent ($0.35/MMBtu) increase in natural gas prices from 2015 to 2035. As with the EIA and Deloitte studies, the results of both Navigant and ICF’s studies must be analyzed in the context of their respective methodologies and assumptions. Navigant’s first study uses a more static supply model, which, unlike dynamic supply models, does not fully take account of the effect that higher prices have on spurring additional production. As a result, it takes a conservative estimate of supply growth potential. The report acknowledges that the price outcomes modeled in its analysis “establish the upper range of impacts that exports […] might have on natural gas prices.”89 This study also did not factor in the reemergence of the industrial sector as a major consumer of natural gas following the shale gas “revolution.” The study assumes that natural gas consumption by the industrial sector will decline by 0.3% per year to 2035. By contrast, the EIA model assumes that industrial sector demand will increase by roughly 1% per year over the same period.90 The ICF study factors in various levels of production response from an increase in price. Under its 6 bcf/day export scenario, the price impact ranges from a $0.52/ MMBtu increase in a more responsive drilling activity scenario to a $0.75/MMBtu increase in a less responsive drilling activity scenario. which study is right? Given that these studies forecast natural gas prices two decades into the future, it is difficult to determine which study is most accurate. (table 4 shows a comparison of the price impact forecasts of the various models.) However, policymakers would benefit from having a better understanding of the results that are generated from each report. This includes choosing the most relevant results from each report. For instance, following the release of the EIA study, many commentators were quick to highlight that natural gas prices could increase by more than 50 percent as a result of LNG exports. However, this ignored the assumptions behind this number: it was based on the price of natural gas in one year under the most extreme assumptions of exports and domestic resource base. A more comprehensive analysis should include an assessment of the average price impact from 2015 to 2035. When distinguishing between the various studies, policymakers should identify which assumptions most resemble the existing natural gas market and its likely direction, and which models are most reflective of the complex nature of domestic and global natural gas trade. Assuming realistic volumes of natural gas exports as well as a reasonable supply response by natural gas producers are important considerations. It is important to note that the supply curves in the various studies reflect different interpretations of the economics of marginal production. The Power sector and industrial sector Part I indicated that the power-generation and industrial sectors would account for most of the demand for newly available natural gas resources. As shown above, LNG exports are likely to increase domestic prices of natural gas, suggesting negative consequences for these two competing sectors. In their analyses, both Deloitte and EIA found that the majority—63 percent, according to both studies—of the exported natural gas will come from new production as opposed to displaced consumption from other sectors. By contrast, between 17 and 38 percent of supply of natural gas for export would be met by reduced demand, as higher prices pushes some domestic consumers to use less gas.

In the power generation and industrial sectors, the price impacts of LNG exports are likely to have modest impacts. In the power sector, natural gas has historically been used as a back up to coal and nuclear base-load generation. For such gas used at the margin, the increase in electricity prices as a result of LNG exports would be limited by its competitiveness relative to other fuels: as soon as it becomes more expensive than the alternative for back up generation, power producers will substitute away from gas.91 According to ICF International, a $0.64/MMBtu increase in the price of natural gas would result in an electricity price increase of between $1.66 and $4.97/megawatt-hour (MWh), depending on how often gas is used as the marginal fuel for electricity. Deloitte estimates that the price increase of electricity would not be more than $1.65/MWh. 92 EIA estimates that electricity price impacts will be marginal as well (between $1.40/MWh and $2.90/MWh) except in the “highrapid” export scenario.93 The EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2011 estimates that, without exporting LNG, the average price of electricity (across all fuels) in 2035 will be $92/MWh.94

In the longer term, natural gas is itself likely to be used for more base-load generation. The rapid increase in shale gas production, coupled with the retirements of as much as 50 gigawatts (GW) of coal-fired electricity due to plant age or inability to adhere to possibly forthcoming EPA regulations is likely to increase the demand for natural gas in the power sector. According to some analysts, the near-term demand caused by the retirements of the oldest and least efficient coal-fired power plants could result in an additional natural gas demand of 2 bcf/day.95 Given the lack of environmentally and economically viable alternatives, a moderate increase in gas prices is unlikely to result in a large move away from natural gas, although increased costs will be transferred to customers. Natural gas consumption in the power sector has been considered economic at prices much higher than those resulting from LNG exports in even the highest price-impact projections. Even prior to the shale gas “revolution,” when natural gas prices were high, natural gas demand was increasing in the power sector. The EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2005— published in a year when average well head prices were over $7/MMBTU—projected that natural gas demand in the electricity sector would increase by 70 percent between 2003 and 2015.96

Unlike the power sector, which continued to build natural-gas fired generation during a period of increasing gas prices, the industrial sector was negatively affected by growing natural gas import dependence, high gas prices, and gas price volatility. Between 2000 and 2005, the price of natural gas increased by 99 percent and LNG imports more than doubled.97 By 2005, the ratio of the price of oil to the price of natural gas was approximately 6:1, just below the 7:1 oil-to-gas price ratio at which U.S. petrochemical and plastics producers are globally competitive.98 That same year Alan Greenspan, then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, noted that because of natural gas price increases “the North American gas-using industry [was] in a weakened competitive position.”99 Since then the price of natural gas has collapsed. In 2011, the oil-to-natural gas price ratio was more than 24:1. In 2012 it has been even higher. The decline in natural gas prices has galvanized the industrial sector. A joint study by PwC and the National Association for Manufacturers, an industry trade group, found that the development of shale gas could save manufacturers as much as $11.6 billion per year in feedstock costs through 2025.100 New investments in petrochemical and plastics producing facilities are occurring throughout the East and Southeast, largely predicated on the availability of inexpensive natural gas. Opponents of LNG exports contend that such investments would be deterred in the future as a result of increases in the price of natural gas. However, the evidence suggests that the competitive advantage of U.S. industrial producers relative to its competitors in Western Europe and Asia is not likely to be affected significantly by the projected increase in natural gas prices resulting from LNG exports. As European and many Asian petrochemical producers use oil-based products such as naphtha and fuel oil as feedstock, U.S. companies are more likely to enjoy a significant cost advantage over their overseas competitors. Even a one-third decline in the estimated price of crude oil in 2035 would result in an oil-to-gas ratio of 14:1.101 There is also the potential for increased exports to help industrial consumers. Ethane, a liquid byproduct of natural gas production at several U.S. gas plays, is the primary feedstock of ethylene, a petrochemical product used to create a wide variety of products. According to a study by the American Chemistry Council, an industry trade body, a 25 percent increase in ethane production would yield a $32.8 billion increase in U.S. chemical production. By providing another market for cheap dry gas, LNG exports will encourage additional production of natural gas liquids (NGL) that are produced in association with dry gas. According to the EIA, ethane production increased by nearly 30 percent between 2009 and 2011 as natural gas production from shale started to grow substantially. Ethane production is now at an alltime high, with more than one million barrels per day of ethane being produced.102 Increased gas production for exports results in increased production of such natural gas liquids, in which case exports can be seen as providing a benefit to the petrochemical industry.

natural gas price volatility

A major concern among domestic end users of natural gas is the possibility of an increase in natural gas price volatility resulting from an increase in U.S. LNG exports. As figure 8 demonstrates, the price volatility experienced during the 2000s was the highest the domestic gas market has experienced in the past three decades.

The volatility of the natural gas market in the 2000s was largely caused by a tight supply-demand balance. Natural gas demand increased substantially as the U.S. economy grew and natural gas was viewed as environmentally preferable to coal for power generation. This increase in demand coincided with a reduction in domestic supply and an increased reliance on imports. The recent surge in U.S. natural gas production has resulted in less market volatility since 2010. According to EIA, the standard deviation of the price of natural gas (a general statistical indicator of volatility) between 2010 and 2011 was one-third what it was during the 2000s.103 Potential exports of U.S. LNG concerns some domestic consumers for two principal reasons: greater volatility in domestic natural gas prices; and exposure of domestic natural gas prices to higher international prices resulting in a convergence between low U.S. prices and high international prices.

There is an insufficient amount of data and quantitative research on the relationship between domestic natural gas price volatility and LNG exports. However, certain characteristics of the LNG market are likely to limit volatility. LNG is bound by technical constraints: it must be liquefied and then transported on dedicated tankers before arriving at terminals where a regasification facility must be installed. Liquefaction facilities have capacity limits to how much gas they can turn into LNG. If they are operating at or close-to full capacity, such facilities will have a relatively constant demand for natural gas, therefore an international price or supply shock would have little impact on domestic gas prices. Moreover, unlike oil trading, in which an exporter—theoretically—sells each marginal barrel of production to the highest bidder in the global market, the capacity limit on LNG production and export means that LNG exporters have an infrastructure-limited demand for natural gas leaving the rest of the natural gas for domestic consumption. As most LNG infrastructure facilities are built on a project finance basis and underpinned by long-term contracts, this demand can be anticipated by the market years in advance, reducing the likelihood of volatility. The macroeconomy and jobs The macroeconomic and job implications of LNG exports depend on two principal factors: the gains from trade from exploiting pricing differentials and inefficiencies of the global market; and the employment implications of those gains, higher domestic natural gas prices, and greater domestic natural gas production. The Department of Energy has commissioned a study on both the macroeconomic and employment implications of U.S. LNG exports, which will be released later this year. This study will provide a qualitative assessment of the implications of LNG exports to the U.S. economy and employment. LNG exports are likely to be a net benefit to the U.S. economy, although probably not a significant contributor in terms of total U.S. GDP. Exports of U.S. natural gas will take advantage of the benefits of the existing producer’s surplus resulting from the pricing differentials between the natural gas markets in the United States, Europe, and Asia. Contractual terms will determine how this surplus is shared between U.S. sellers and foreign buyers.104 The benefit of this trade will likely outweigh the cost to domestic consumers of the increase in the price of natural gas as most of the natural gas demanded by exports will come from new natural gas production as opposed to displacing existing production from domestic consumers. On the other hand, LNG exports from the United States are likely to put marginal upward pressure on the relative value of the U.S. dollar. In March 2012, Citigroup released a report on North American hydrocarbon production that included a model of the macroeconomic impact of U.S. oil and gas exports. The Citi analysis found that oil and gas exports would cause a nearly two percent decline in the current account deficit by 2020, but that the exchange rate implications would be modest. By 2020, the U.S. dollar would appreciate by between 1.6 and 5.4 percent.105 The implications of LNG exports on job creation are similarly difficult to quantify. Other than temporary construction jobs created by the need to build liquefaction capacity, pipelines, and other ancillary infrastructure, the operation of the liquefaction facility will likely provide little permanent employment benefit. As outlined in the section on price impacts above, as much of the gas for export will come from new production, rather than the displacement of consumption in other sectors, the negative economic, and therefore jobrelated, effects on those sectors is likely to be limited. Beyond the labor required for additional gas production to satisfy LNG exports, the net impact of LNG exports is likely to be minimal. Further upstream, the job potential may be greater. By increasing domestic natural gas production, employment from additional oil and gas producers will increase, as will the demand for manufacturers of equipment for oil and gas production, gathering, and transportation. domestic energy security

Aside from the price impact of potential U.S. LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports would diminish U.S. “energy security”; that exports would deny the United States of a strategically important resource. The extent to which such concerns are valid depends on several factors, including the size of the domestic resource base, and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes of LNG export under consideration would not materially affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market. Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6 bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for shale gas reserves are uncertain, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected, domestic natural gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic. In the long-term, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities) to import gas when economic.

A further gas-related consideration with regard to energy security is the effects of increased production of associated natural gas with the increasing volumes of U.S. unconventional oil. As the primary energy-security concern for the United States related to oil, the application of fracking and horizontal drilling in oil production is reducing U.S. oil import dependence, while simultaneously producing substantial volumes of natural gas, which, given the relative economics of oil and gas, is effectively delivered at zero (or, in the case of producers who have to invest in equipment to manage flaring and venting, negative) cost. To the extent that associated gas from unconventional oil production is used for LNG export, it can be seen as a consequence of—rather than a threat to—increased U.S. energy security. international implications The international implications of LNG exports from the United States can be divided into pricing, geopolitics, and environment. international Pricing As discussed in Part I, the global LNG market is informally separated into three markets: North America, the Atlantic Basin (mostly Europe), and the Pacific Basin (including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and India). These markets are separated because of important technical differences that impact the pricing structure for LNG in each market. The North American natural gas market is competitive and prices are traded in a transparent and open market. The Atlantic Basin is dominated by European LNG consumers such as the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Italy, and is a hybrid of a competitive U.K. market that was liberalized in the mid-1990s and a Continental European market that is dominated by oil-linked, take-or-pay contracts. In recent years, the U.K. hub, the National Balancing Point (NBP), has traded at a premium to the U.S. hub, the Henry Hub. The Pacific Basin is a more rigid market that depends heavily on oilindexed contracts that are more expensive than those used in the Atlantic Basin. While they have no central trading hub, the Pacific Basin consumers such as Japan and South Korea (which is implementing its recently-signed free-trade agreement with the United States) currently import LNG based on a pricing formula known informally as the Japan Crude Cocktail, the average price of custom-cleared oil imports into Tokyo. Many Pacific Basin contracts have a built-in price floor and price ceiling depending on the price of oil.106 Without exporting any natural gas, the U.S. shale gas “revolution” has already had a positive impact on the liquidity of global LNG markets. Many LNG cargoes that were previously destined for gas-thirsty U.S. markets were diverted and served spot demand in both the Atlantic and Pacific Basins. The increased availability of LNG cargoes has helped create a looser LNG market for other consumers (see figure 9). This in turn has helped apply downward pressure to the terms of oillinked contracts resulting in the renegotiation of some contracts, particularly in Europe. Increased availability of LNG cargoes also accelerated a recent trend of increasing reliance of consumers on spot LNG markets. In 2010 short-term and spot contracts represented 19 percent of the total LNG market, up from only a fraction one decade earlier.107 In this case, increasing demand for spot cargoes indicates that consumers are taking advantage of spot prices that are lower than oilindexed rates. LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG market beyond 2015 (see figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly 10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japan’s nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets, it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates.108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by establishing an alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure. As previously mentioned, this impact is already being felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions to the oil-price linkage.109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract.110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however, Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts.111 There are other limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020. Also, the impact of U.S. LNG exports could be limited by a number of external factors that will have a larger bearing on the future of global LNG prices. For instance, a decision by the Japanese government to phase-out nuclear power would significantly tighten global LNG markets and probably displace any benefit provided by U.S. LNG exports. Conversely, successful and rapid development of China’s shale gas reserves would limit the demand of one of the world’s fastest-growing natural gas consumers. However, to the extent that U.S. LNG exports can help bring about a more globalized pricing structure, they will have economic and geopolitical consequences. Geopolitics A large increase in U.S. LNG exports would have the potential to increase U.S. foreign policy interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific basins. Unlike oil, natural gas has traditionally been an infrastructure-constrained business, giving geographical proximity and political relations between producers and consumers a high level of importance. Issues of “pipeline politics” have been most directly visible in Europe, which relies on Russia for around a third of its gas. Previous disputes between Moscow and Ukraine over pricing have led to major gas shortages in several E.U. countries in the winters (when demand is highest) of both 2006 and 2009. Further disagreements between Moscow and Kiev over the terms of the existing bilateral gas deal have the potential to escalate again, with negative consequences for E.U. consumers. The risk of high reliance on Russian gas has been a principal driver of European energy policy in recent decades. Among central and eastern European states, particularly those formerly aligned with the Soviet Union such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the issue of reliance on imports of Russian gas is a primary energy security concern and has inspired energy policies aimed at diversification of fuel sources for power generation. From the U.S. perspective such Russian influence in the affairs of these democratic nations is an impediment to efforts at political and economic reform. The market power of Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, is evident in these countries. Although they are closer to Russia than other consumers of Russian gas in Western Europe, many countries in Eastern and Central Europe pay higher contract prices for their imports, as they are more reliant on Russian gas as a proportion of their energy mixes. In the larger economies of Western Europe, which consume most of Russia’s exports, there are efforts to diversify their supply of natural gas. The E.U. has formally acknowledged the need to put in place mechanisms to increase supply diversity. These include market liberalization approaches such as rules mandating third-party access to pipeline infrastructure (from which Gazprom is demanding exemption), and commitments to complete a single market for electricity and gas by 2014, and to ensure that no member country is isolated from electricity and gas grids by 2015.112 Despite these formal efforts, there are several factors retarding the E.U.’s push for a unified effort to reduce dependence on Russian gas. National interest has been given a higher priority than collective, coordinated E.U. energy policy: the gas cutoffs in 2006 and 2009 probably contributed to the acceptance of the Nord Stream project, which carries gas from Russia into Germany. Germany’s decision to phase out its fleet of nuclear reactors by 2022 will result in far higher reliance on natural gas for the E.U.’s biggest economy. The environmental imperative to reduce carbon emissions—codified in the E.U.’s goal of essentially decarbonizing its power sector by the middle of century—mean that natural gas is being viewed by many as the short-to medium fuel of choice in power generation. Finally, the prospects for European countries to replicate the unconventional gas “revolution” that has resulted in a glut of natural gas in the United States look uncertain. Several countries, including France and the U.K., have encountered stiff public opposition to the techniques used in unconventional gas production, while those countries, such as Poland and Hungary, that have moved ahead with unconventional-gas exploration have generally seen disappointing early results. Collectively, these factors suggest that the prospects for reduced European reliance on Russian gas appear dim. The one factor that has been working to the advantage of advocates of greater European gas diversity has been the increased liquidity of the global LNG market, discussed above. Russia’s dominant position in the European gas market is being eroded by the increased availability of LNG. Qatar’s massive expansion in LNG production in 2008, coupled with the rise in unconventional gas production in the United States as well as a drop in global energy demand due to the global recession, produced a global LNG glut that saw many cargoes intended for the U.S. market diverted into Europe. As mentioned previously, with an abundant source of alternative supply, some European consumers, mainly Gazprom’s closest partners, were able to renegotiate their oil-linked, takeor-pay contracts with Gazprom. As figure 10 illustrates, however, in the wake of the Fukushima natural disaster and nuclear accident in Japan and a return to growth in most industrialized economies, the LNG market is projected to tighten considerably in the short-term, potentially returning market power to Russia. However, there is a second, structural change to the global gas market that may have more lasting effects to Russia’s market power in the European gas market. LNG is one of the fastest growing segments of the energy sector. The growth of the LNG market, both through long-term contract and spot-market sales, is likely to put increasing pressure on incumbent pipeline gas suppliers. A significant addition of U.S. LNG exports will accelerate this trend. In addition to adding to the size of the market, U.S. LNG contracts are likely to be determined on a “floating” basis, with sales terms tied to the price of a U.S. benchmark such as Henry Hub, eroding the power of providers of long-term oil linked contract suppliers such as Russia. While U.S. LNG will not be a direct tool of U.S. foreign policy—the destination of U.S. LNG will be determined according to the terms of individual contracts, the spot-price-determined demand, and the LNG traders that purchase such contracts—the addition of a large, market-based producer will indirectly serve to increase gas supply diversity in Europe, thereby providing European consumers with increased flexibility and market power. Increased LNG exports will provide similar assistance to strategic U.S. allies in the Pacific Basin. By adding supply volumes to the global LNG market, the U.S. will help Japan, Korea, India, and other import-dependent countries in South and East Asia to meet their energy needs. The desire on the part of Pacific Basin countries for the U.S. to become a gas supplier to the region has been underlined by the efforts of the Japanese government, which has attempted to secure a free-trade agreement waiver from the United States to allow exports. As with oil price-linked Russian gas contracts in Eu-rope, U.S. LNG exports linked to a floating Henry Hub benchmark, have the potential to weaken the market power of incumbent LNG providers to Asia, increasing the negotiating power of consumers and decreasing the price. As U.S. foreign policy undergoes a “pivot to Asia,” the ability of the U.S. to provide a degree of increased energy security and pricing relief to LNG importers in the region will be an important economic and strategic asset. Beyond the basin-specific considerations of U.S. LNG exports, they would provide a source of predictable natural gas supply that is relatively free from unexpected production or shipping disruption. With Qatar representing roughly one-third of the global LNG market, a blockade or military intervention in the Strait of Hormuz or a direct attack on Qatar’s liquefaction facilities by Iran would inflict chaos on world energy markets. While the United States government will be unable to physically divert LNG cargoes to specific markets or strategic allies that are most affected (gas allocation will be made by the market players), additional volumes of LNG on the world market will benefit all consumers. international Environmental implications Proposed LNG exports from the United States have encountered domestic opposition on environmental grounds. As outlined in Part I, natural gas production causes greenhouse gas emissions in the upstream production process through leakages, venting, and flaring. The greenhouse gas footprint of shale gas production has been the subject of vigorous debate, with some studies suggesting that methane from the production process leads to shale gas having a higher global warming impact than that of other hydrocarbons including coal. While the methodology underlying such studies has been widely criticized, there is no doubt that leakage and venting of natural gas is a serious negative environmental consequence of natural gas production and transportation: EPA has estimated that worldwide leakages and venting volumes were 3,353.5 bcf in 2010.113 By contrast, some advocates of U.S. exports of LNG maintain that they have the potential to bring global environmental benefits if they are used to displace more carbon-intensive fuels. According to the IEA, natural gas in general has the potential to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 740 million tonnes in 2035, nearly half of which could be achieved by the displacement of coal in China’s power-generation portfolio. Natural gas—in the form of LNG—also has the potential to displace more carbon-intensive fuels in other major energy users, including across the EU and in Japan, which is being forced to burn more coal and oil-based fuels to make up for the nuclear generation capacity lost in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. In addition to its relatively lower carbon-dioxide footprint, natural gas produces lower emissions of pollutants such as sulfur dioxide nitrogen oxide and other particulates than coal and oil. Natural gas—both in the form of LNG and compressed natural gas—is also being viewed as a potential replacement for oil in the vehicle transportation fleet, with large carbon dioxide abatement potential.114 However, as discussed in Part I, even the United States with its low gas prices is unlikely to see any significant move toward natural gas vehicles in the absence of government policies; the prospects for such vehicles entering the European or Asian markets, where gas is several times as expensive, are remote. On the other hand, additional volumes of natural gas in the global power generation fleet may also have longer-term detrimental consequences for carbon emissions. According to the IEA, by backing out nuclear and renewable energy generation, natural gas could add 320Mt of carbon dioxide by 2035.115 Whether U.S. LNG exports contribute to reduced carbon dioxide emissions through the displacement of coal fired power generation or to the crowding out of renewable and nuclear energy in the global energy mix is something of a moot point. According to the IEA, global power generation is projected to exceed 27,000 terawatt hours per year by 2020.116 Even assuming U.S. exports of 6 bcf/day (on the upper end of the range of expectations), zero losses due to transportation, regasification, and transmission, and a high natural gas power plant efficiency level of 60 percent, such volumes would account for just over one percent of total global power generation.117 Therefore, although the domestic environmental impacts associated with shale gas extraction may, pending the outcome of further study, prove to be a cause for concern with respect to greenhouse gas emissions, the potential for U.S. LNG exports to make a meaningful impact on global emissions through changes to the global power generation mix is negligible. Part III: Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper has attempted to answer two questions: Are U.S. LNG exports feasible? If so, what are the implications of U.S. LNG exports? For exports to be feasible, several demand and supply-related conditions need to be met. On the supply side, adequate resources must be available and their production must be sustainable over the long-term. The regulatory and policy environment will need to accommodate natural gas production to ensure that the resources are developed. The capacity and infrastructure required to enable exports must also be in place. This includes the adequacy of the pipeline and storage network, the availability of shipping capacity, and the availability of equipment for production and qualified engineers.

On the demand side, LNG exports will compete with two main other domestic end uses for natural gas: the power-generation sector, and the industrial and petrochemical sector. According to most projections, the U.S. electricity sector will see an increased demand for natural gas as it seeks to comply with policies and regulations aimed at reducing carbon-dioxide emissions and pollutants from the power-generation fleet. Cheaper natural gas in the industrial sector has the potential to lower the cost of petrochemical production and to improve the competitiveness of a range of refining and manufacturing operations. Advocates of natural gas usage in the transportation fleet – particularly in heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) – see it as a way to decrease the country’s dependence on oil, although absent major policy support, this sector is unlikely to represent a significant source of gas demand.

For increased U.S. LNG exports to be feasible, they will also need to be competitive with supplies from other sources. The major demand centers that would import U.S. LNG would be Pacific Basin consumers (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and increasingly China and India), and Atlantic Basin consumers, mostly in Europe. The supply and demand balance in the Atlantic and Pacific Basins and, therefore the feasibility for natural gas exports from the United States, depend heavily on the uncertain outlook for international unconventional natural gas production. Recent assessments in countries such as China, India, Ukraine, and Poland indicate that each country has significant domestic shale gas reserves. If these reserves are developed effectively—which is likely to be difficult in the short-term due to a lack of infrastructure, physical capacity, and human capacity—many of these countries would dramatically decrease their import dependence, with negative implications for existing and newcomer LNG exporters.

Detailed analysis of the foregoing factors suggests that the exportation of liquefied natural gas from the United States is logistically feasible. Based on current knowledge, the domestic U.S. natural gas resource base is large enough to accommodate the potential increased demand for natural gas from the electricity sector, the industrial sector, the residential and commercial sectors, the transportation sector, and exporters of LNG. Other obstacles to production, including infrastructure, investment, environmental concerns, and human capacity, are likely to be surmountable. Moreover, the current and projected supply and demand fundamentals of the international LNG market are conducive to competitive U.S.-sourced LNG.

While LNG exports may be practically feasible, they will be subject to approval by policy makers if they are to happen. In making a determination on the advisability of exports, the federal government will focus on the likely implications of LNG exports: i.e. whether LNG exports are in the “public interest.” The extent of the domestic implications is largely dependent upon the price impact of exports on domestic natural gas prices. While it is clear that domestic natural gas prices will increase if natural gas is exported, most existing analyses indicate that the implications of this price increase are likely to be modest. Natural gas producers will likely anticipate future demand from LNG exports and will increase production accordingly, limiting price spikes. The impact on the domestic industrial sector is likely to be marginal: to the extent that LNG exports raise domestic gas prices above the level at which they would have been in the absence of such exports, they will negatively affect the competitiveness of U.S. industry relative to international competitors. However, the competitiveness of natural-gas intensive U.S. companies relative to their counterparts is likely to remain strong, given the large differential between projected U.S. gas prices and oil prices, which are the basis for industrial feedstock by competitor countries. Further, LNG exports are likely to stimulate domestic gas production, potentially resulting in greater production of natural gas liquids such as ethane, a valuable feedstock for industrial consumers. LNG exports are also unlikely to result in an increase in price volatility. The volume of LNG exports is capped by the capacity limitations of liquefaction terminals. If liquefaction terminals are running at close to full capacity, an increase in international demand will do little to affect domestic demand for —and therefore domestic prices of —natural gas.

#### Expanding renewable energy reduces natural gas demand and prices

Ryan Wiser 7 and Mark Bolinger, Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Can deployment of renewable energy put downward pressure on natural gas prices? Original Research Article, Energy Policy, Volume 35, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 295-306

Renewable energy has historically been supported because of its perceived economic, environmental, economic-development, and national-security benefits. Recently, extreme price volatility in wholesale electricity and natural gas markets has led to discussions about the potential risk mitigation value of renewable resources in the United States and elsewhere. Deepening concerns about the ability of conventional gas production to keep up with demand have also resulted in a growing number of voices calling for resource diversification (see, e.g., Bernstein et al., 2002; Henning et al., 2003; NARUC, 2003; NPC, 2003a).¶ Renewable energy provides a direct hedge against volatile and escalating gas prices when it reduces the need to purchase variable-price natural gas-fired electricity generation, replacing that generation with fixed-price renewable energy (see, e.g., Bolinger et al., 2003; Awerbuch, 2003). In addition to this direct contribution to price stability, by displacing gas-fired generation, renewable energy may also reduce demand for natural gas and thus indirectly place downward pressure on gas prices.¶ Many recent modeling studies of increased renewables deployment in the United States have demonstrated that this “secondary” effect of putting downward pressure on natural gas prices could be significant, with the consumer benefits from reduced gas prices in many cases more than offsetting any increase in electricity costs caused by renewables deployment. As a result, this price effect is increasingly cited as justification for policies promoting renewable energy.1

#### U.S. LNG exports send a signal of energy competition with Russia---destroys energy coop key to broader relations

Richard Weitz 13, senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Affairs at Hudson Institute, 1/29/13, “Global Insights: Oil Sector a Challenge for Russia, Opportunity for U.S.,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12672/global-insights-oil-sector-a-challenge-for-russia-opportunity-for-u-s>

In the view of Russians interviewed by the authors, this paucity of cooperation results from perceived impediments erected by the U.S. government. Similarly, Russian officials see the shale gas revolution as a conspiracy on the part of the United States to undermine Russia’s role in energy markets.

Absent forward momentum, the Russia-U.S. energy relationship might even deteriorate. The United States could soon become a major energy exporter again, which would lead to direct energy sales competition between Russia and the United States for the first time in history. One major opportunity for enhanced partnership, as opposed to competition, is the deal reached last August between Exxon Mobil and Rosneft. The project has only recently begun the preliminary seismic surveys, technical assessments and environmental studies that would allow any substantial drilling to start.

Bringing the project to fruition, and augmenting it with near-term cooperation on tight oil and other energy projects, is important for both sides. Concrete Russia-U.S. energy collaboration could help dispel mutual misconceptions and perhaps spur U.S. and Russian economic cooperation in other areas. That in turn could help to increase the number of stakeholders in both countries that share an interest in maintaining good relations. These kinds of private-sector ties, as much as political will in Washington and Moscow, will contribute to the health of bilateral ties moving forward.

#### Extinction

Graham Allison 11, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, 10/30/11, “10 reasons why Russia still matters,” http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar [CTR] Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions.

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#### Immigration reform will pass because Obama’s spending capital

Charles Castaldi 3-27 | Take Two | KPCC – California Public Radio, March 27th, 2013, LA Archbishop Gomez keeps Mahony's promise to push for immigration reform

President Obama said he expects Congress to introduce an immigration reform bill next month. The Los Angeles Archdiocese has played a key role in advocating for change. Before he was stripped of his duties for mishandling sex abuse cases, Cardinal Roger Mahony was a leading voice on immigration reform.¶ In 2010, Cardinal Mahony spoke to a crowd of thousands at the Washington mall at a rally in support for immigrant’s rights.¶ Mahony promised the Catholic Church would stand beside immigrants in the fight for immigration reform. This was just one of many examples of his bringing his activism out to the street.¶ “Cardinal Mahony was very clear that he was going to use the pulpit and he was going to use the airwaves,” says Angelica Salas, the executive director of CHIRLA, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles. “He was going to march with us, he was going to use whatever public space there was in order to get the word out.”¶ Salas says that Mahony’s successor, Archbishop Jose Gomez, might not be speaking at rallies as much and certainly maintains a lower public profile, but he is very active in pushing for immigration reform.¶ “I was in a meeting with President Obama a couple of weeks ago at the White House with religious leaders,” Gomez says. “And we all came out of the meeting with the conviction that now is the time and that the president is committed to work on immigration reform. So we are enthusiastic about the possibility of an immigration reform law soon.”¶ Gomez is the chairman of the Immigration Committee of US Catholic Bishops, which makes him a key voice on immigration matters not only in the church, but also in Washington as well. Both he and Salas agree that this is a moment when there’s a real chance to see an actual immigration reform bill come out of Congress, especially with the President as committed as he is.¶ “Lots of things have also changed even within the Obama administration,” Salas says. “In 2010, I had the opportunity to meet with President Obama in much the same way that Archbishop Gomez did and at that time we were in a very different situation in which for the first time we were seeing deportations exploding. Something we were shocked to our core about. And so it was a different kind of engagement with our president."¶ But since then, she has seen a change in tone from Washington.¶ "Since that time and after a lot of pushing, he has provided deferred action for childhood arrivals, (Obama) has opened up opportunities for prosecutorial discretion," Salas says. "I think that his entire team at every single level is now committed to making sure that immigration reform gets across the finish line.”¶ Public opinion on immigration has also shifted substantially since Mahony took up the cause more than 20 years ago. Now, according to a recent USC/LA Times poll, about two-thirds of Californians support providing undocumented immigrants a path to citizenship. According to Mike Madrid, a Republican political consultant, Gomez’s low key lobbying might be a better fit for the times.

#### Plan empirically causes massive backlash---no supporters

Downs 10 Erica S. Downs is a Fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. “Who’s Afraid of China’s Oil Companies?” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/7/china%20oil%20downs/07\_china\_oil\_downs

Who’s afraid of China’s national oil companies? **Quite a few people,** if the reaction to the unsolicited offer made by China National Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd. (CNOOC Ltd.) for Unocal is any guide. The furor that erupted **inside the Beltway** in response to CNOOC Ltd.’s bid to break up the merger between Unocal and Chevron **highlighted** the **anxiety** thatmany **U.S. policymakers**, pundits, and oil companies **harbor about** the growing global footprint of **China’s** national oil companies (**NOCs)**. The objections raised by opponents of CNOOC Ltd.’s attempted acquisition are rooted in popular perceptions of the Chinese NOCs’ international expansion. The conventional wisdom views the NOCs as arms of the Chinese government that are aggressively snapping up exploration and production assets around the world to enhance China’s energy security at the expense of that of other consumers. Moreover, it contends that the state ﬁnancial support that Beijing provides to China’s NOCs to achieve this noncommercial objective **violates the rules** of the game for international mergers and acquisitions because it is not available to Western, publicly traded ﬁrms. Consequently, the Chinese government and oil companies are turning the global competition for oil into a game that major international oil companies (IOC) like Chevron cannot even compete in, let alone win.

#### CIR’s critical to economic growth---multiple internals

Klein 1/29 Ezra is a columnist for The Washington Post. “To Fix the U.S. Economy, Fix Immigration,” 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-29/to-fix-the-u-s-economy-fix-immigration.html

Washington tends to have a narrow view of what counts as “economic policy.” Anything we do to the tax code is in. So is any stimulus we pass, or any deficit reduction we try. Most of this mistakes the federal budget for the economy.¶ The truth is, the most important piece of economic policy we pass -- or don’t pass -- in 2013 may be something we don’t think of as economic policy at all: immigration reform.¶ Congress certainly doesn’t consider it economic policy, at least not officially. Immigration laws go through the House and Senate judiciary committees. But consider a few facts about immigrants in the American economy: About a tenth of the U.S. population is foreign-born. More than a quarter of U.S. technology and engineering businesses started from 1995 to 2005 had a foreign-born owner. In Silicon Valley, half of all tech startups had a foreign-born founder.¶ Immigrants begin businesses and file patents at a much higher rate than their native-born counterparts, and while there are disputes about the effect immigrants have on the wages of low-income Americans, there’s little dispute about their effect on wages overall: They lift them.¶ The economic case for immigration is best made by way of analogy. Everyone agrees that aging economies with low birth rates are in trouble; this, for example, is a thoroughly conventional view of Japan. It’s even conventional wisdom about the U.S. The retirement of the baby boomers is correctly understood as an economic challenge. The ratio of working Americans to retirees will fall from 5-to-1 today to 3-to-1 in 2050. Fewer workers and more retirees is tough on any economy.¶ Importing Workers¶ There’s nothing controversial about that analysis. But if that’s not controversial, then immigration shouldn’t be, either. Immigration is essentially the importation of new workers. It’s akin to raising the birth rate, only easier, because most of the newcomers are old enough to work. And because living in the U.S. is considered such a blessing that even very skilled, very industrious workers are willing to leave their home countries and come to ours, the U.S. has an unusual amount to gain from immigration. When it comes to the global draft for talent, we almost always get the first-round picks -- at least, if we want them, and if we make it relatively easy for them to come here.¶ From the vantage of naked self-interest, the wonder isn’t that we might fix our broken immigration system in 2013. It’s that we might not.¶ Few economic problems wouldn’t be improved by more immigration. If you’re worried about deficits, more young, healthy workers paying into Social Security and Medicare are an obvious boon. If you’re concerned about the slowdown in new company formation and its attendant effects on economic growth, more immigrant entrepreneurs should cheer you. If you’re worried about the dearth of science and engineering majors in our universities, an influx of foreign-born students is the most obvious solution you’ll find.

#### US economic decline makes global nuclear war likely

O’Hanlon and Lieberthal 12 Michael O’Hanlon, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. Kenneth Lieberthal, Ph.D., is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings. “The real national security threat: America's debt,” July 3, LA Times Op-Ed, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/03/opinion/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform-20120703

Lastly, American economic weakness **undercuts U.S. leadership** abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline**. If this perception becomes more widespread**, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. **Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue** nuclear weapons **for their own security**, for example; **adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight** in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

### Security 1nc

#### Security is a psychological construct—the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other

Mack 91 – Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 \*Gender modified)

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one's own contribution to that threat-**by distortions of perception**, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.

#### Try or die---our response is to interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac---this is a prereq to successful policy

Ahmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis

While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.

The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.

As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves.

There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them.

Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.

Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

### China

#### China’s leading clean tech development now---it’s zero-sum with U.S. renewable development---key to Chinese growth, CCP stability, Chinese soft power, and warming

McMahon 13 Tamsin is a reporter for the National Post. “How China is going to save the world,” 1/27, http://www2.macleans.ca/2013/01/27/business/

China’s ongoing struggles with pollution have been a blight on the country’s international reputation. The world’s image of China is that of an industrial behemoth fuelled by the dirtiest of energies, coal. On the surface, the reputation is well deserved. No country pumps out as much CO2 as China (not even the U.S. comes close). But behind the smog, China’s environmental woes have become an unexpected boon to the global renewable energy industry. Last week’s air quality emergency sent Chinese green energy stocks soaring on the hope that the political fallout will prompt the Communist party to offer up more public money for the country’s burgeoning environmental protection sector.¶ Investors are counting on it. Even as it remains the scourge of environmentalists for being the largest emitter on the planet, **China is** also **emerging as the world’s biggest spender on green energy.**¶ Globally, green energy investment fell 11 per cent last year, according to a recent Bloomberg New Energy Finance report. Indebted European countries slashed subsidies, India cut its spending by more than 40 per cent and the U.S. witnessed a string of solar power manufacturer bankruptcies. China’s investment in renewable energy, meanwhile, was a bright spot. It rose 20 per cent to nearly $68 billion, or a full quarter of the $269 billion global total.¶ From having virtually no green energy infrastructure as recently as 2008, China has built 133 gigawatts of renewable energy—mainly wind turbines—enough to power as many as 53 million homes, or every household in Canada four times over. The International Energy Agency predicted that China would overtake Europe as the world’s top renewable energy growth market. It’s a market expected to be worth more than $470 billion by 2015, according to state-owned China Merchants Securities, or almost double what it was in 2009 and equal to about eight per cent of the country’s GDP.¶ That investment has caught the eye of **clean-tech companies in** Europe and **North America**, who **are flocking to China** in hopes of selling their technologies **after seeing demand stagnate or collapse in their home markets.** “All the key players are going to China these days,” says Changhua Wu, Greater China director of the Climate Group, a London-based agency that promotes green energy investment. “Everyone is trying to figure out what the potential for opportunity is, partly because everyone recognizes that China could potentially be the largest market for clean tech in the world.”¶ As China takes the lead, everyone will benefit from the technology that is developed and exported. China is saving itself, but might also be saving the world in the process.¶ While the Middle Kingdom’s smog problems have earned plenty of headlines, it has also been quietly attracting a host of very unlikely supporters, including praise from the Pew Charitable Trust and the World Wildlife Foundation, which gave its “climate solver” award this year to several Chinese companies that manufacture technology to capture and recycle wasted heat, water and chemical emissions to power everything from factories to refrigerators. Greenpeace predicted the country would be on track to install 400 gigawatts of wind energy by 2030 and could become the largest solar market in the world.¶ The argument that China is the world’s environmental bad guy “is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to make given China’s recent policies,” wrote the authors of an October report for the Climate Institute, an Australian think tank. The country has closed more coal-fired power plants since 2006 than the entire capacity of Australia’s electrical grid, and exported more than $35-billion worth of renewable energy technology—equal to the total value of shoes exported from China that year. This year, China is rolling out pilot projects that could eventually lead to the world’s largest carbon trading system.¶ “The broad scheme of things is that China believes it wants to become a resource-conserving, environmentally friendly society and that’s the way they describe it, in those exact words,” says Arthur Hanson, one of Canada’s leading experts on sustainable development. The former founding director of Dalhousie University’s School for Resource and Environmental Studies, Hanson is in Beijing this week in his role as international chief adviser to the China Council for International Co-operation on Environment and Development.¶ Granted, China has **little choice but to invest in renewables** as it seeks out more sources of energy to help power its rapidly developing economy, with GDP growth expected just shy of eight per cent this year and an urban population rising by an estimated 2.3 per cent a year. **Green energy is** also **seen as a political tool for the Chinese government that can** quell rising environmental protests and appease political dissent. “The leadership in China is really recognizing that **in order to manage and govern the country better you need to find a universal underlying theme to make sure everyone is with you,”** says Wu. “**Green growth or sustainable development happens to be the only one.”¶** But beyond the obvious political and economic advantages of green energy, China is also pinning its hopes on the belief that demand for clean technology will enable the country to transform both its domestic economy and its exports.¶ Until now, China’s green energy sector has largely done what the country does best: import technology developed elsewhere, reproduce it for less money and then export it back to the West. That’s changing as China pours billions into research and development and advanced education in hopes that clean tech can help shift China from being merely the low-cost factory of the world to being a global leader in developing innovative technology.¶ China’s current five-year plan, which runs through 2015, includes an economic development blueprint that will see more than $1.5 trillion invested in seven industries, all of them related in some way to environmental protection and renewable energy technology.

#### China’s economic rise prevents CCP instability and lashout --- decline tubes the global economy, US primacy, and Sino relations

Mead 9 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, 2/4/9, http://www.tnr.com/story\_print.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8

The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops.

#### Extinction

Yee and Storey 2 Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability.Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario- nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords. From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

### Grid

#### Meltdowns are low level

**Jaworowski 98** (Zbigniew, professor at the central laboratory for radiological protection in Warsaw, has also served as the chairman of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic radiation (UNSCEAR), “Radiation Risks in the 20th Century; Reality, Illusions and Risks,” 17-20 September, http://www.angelfire.com/mo/radioadaptive/anniversary1.html)

We are all exposed to natural ionizing radiation, which penetrates all living organisms. Radiation comes from the cosmos and from radionuclides present in rocks, buildings, and air, and in our own body. Each flake of snow, grain of soil, drop of rain, a flower, and even each man in the street is a source of this radiation The average individual dose of natural radiation received by the world population is now about 2.4 mSv per year. Every day, over a billion particles of natural radiation impact our bodies. However, in some regions, for example, in India and Iran, the natural radiation dose is up to hundred times higher. No adverse genetic, cancerogenic or other effects of these higher doses were observed among the people who have lived in these areas since time immemorial. In the 1990s, man-made radiation has increased the global average radiation dose by about 20 percent, mainly as a result of x-ray diagnostics in medicine. Other important man-made sources, like nuclear power, nuclear weapons tests, or the Chernobyl accident, contributed only a tiny fraction, <0.1 percent, of the total increase. In those regions of the former Soviet Union that were highly contaminated by Chernobyl fallout, the additional dose to inhabitants is much less than the dose in areas of high natural radiation (Figure 1). The entire man-made contribution to radiation dose amounts to only about 0.2 percent of natural dose in areas of high natural radiation.

#### Chernobyl can’t happen in the US

Robert Morris, PhD in Science Education and retired Environmental Consultant, *The Environmental Case for Nuclear Power,* 2000, pg 127-8

There are some very crucial differences between U.S.-built nuclear power reactors and Russian-built reactors. In the U.S. reactors, the uranium fuel rods are surrounded by water which acts as a moderator and also serves to transfer the heat generated by the fuel rods. If a U.S. reactor loses water, the nuclear reaction stops all by itself because the moderator, which is necessary for the reaction, is gone. But, in many Russian-built reactors, graphite is used as the moderator, and the water which is used to transfer heat actually slows down the reaction. This means that when water is lost from a Russian reactor, the chain reaction accelerates rapidly, and an engineer in the plant must act immediately to stop the rapidly increasing reaction rate and heat. Reactors of the Chernobyl type are so dangerous that they could never be licensed to generate electricity in the U.S., or in most Western countries. Secondly, U.S. nuclear power plants are built with multiple layers of containment. Usually, several 8-inch-thick steel jackets and a steel reinforced concrete containment up to 3-and-one-half feet thick enclose the reactor and insure that nothing can escape from it. But, at Chernobyl, this kind of safety containment was completely absent. Figure 7.1 shows this containment. Unlike Western-built power reactors, Chernobyl was built to serve a dual purpose: As it generated electricity, it was producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. Because the plutonium must be removed frequently, a heavy concrete containment would be in the way and, therefore, was never built. After the accident, observers studying the situation concluded that had containment such as is used in U.S. nuclear power plants been present, there would have been no escape of radioactive materials from the plant. At the time of the accident, electrical engineers—not nuclear engineers—were carrying out an electrical experiment which led to nuclear conditions so dangerous that plant rules strictly forbid operating under such conditions. However, the electrical engineers in charge disregarded these rules and proceeded with their experiment. Apparently, no nuclear engineers were on hand to emphasize how dangerous this was. At 1:23 A.M., on April 26, 1986, an automatically-generated computer print-out warned plant operators that the reactor should be shut down immediately, but the operators ignored this warning. Only minutes later, two explosions occurred almost simultaneously. Although the U.S. media failed to make the point clear, the explosion was not nuclear, but was either chemical or a steam explosion such as occurs when a water heater without a safety valve becomes overheated. In addition to the fact that not enough of the fissionable isotope of uranium is present for a nuclear explosion to occur, the fact that only two people were killed in the two explosions further indicates that the explosions were not nuclear.

#### People have the same chance of dying in a nuclear power accident as they do of being struck by a meteor

London Times, September 2, 2002

Its safety record is, however, very good: even including Chernobyl, the statistical probability of a member of the public dying in a nuclear accident is about the same as being struck by a meteorite. Modern reactors release virtually no extra radiation, and claims that there are "leukaemia clusters" around nuclear installations are largely rejected by scientists.

#### Nuclear power accidents don’t kill folks, the only reason Chernobyl was deadly was that people panicked

Atlanta Journal and Constitution, September 20, 2002

He and his 18 colleagues noted that much of the public's fear of nuclear power stems from the accident at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania in 1979 and the catastrophic accident at Chernobyl in the Ukraine in 1986. The Three Mile Island meltdown, however, caused no significant environmental damage or injury to any person, they wrote. "Even if containment had been severely breached, little radioactivity would have escaped," they pointed out. The Chernobyl accident caused 30 deaths and spewed radioactivity high into the atmosphere. But "the terrible and widespread consequences of that accident --- increased suicide, alcoholism, depression, and unemployment, plus 100,000 unnecessary abortions --- were caused by fear of radiation and by poor planning based on that fear," the group wrote.

### 1NC No Spillover

#### The aff doesn’t set a precedent – the court will limit the plan to maintain the status quo, even if they can’t overrule it. Nothing the aff does changes the mindset of the justices and Roberts is a pro at undermining precedent.

William D. Araiza, Law Prof @ Brooklyn, Summer 2012, “PLAYING WELL WITH OTHERS-BUT STILL WINNING,” 46 Ga. L. Rev. 1059, ln

How can a judge undermine precedent while still following it? This Essay considers the methods by which Supreme Court Justices may weaken precedent without explicitly overruling cases by strategically adopting an approach to stare decisis that is less explicitly aggressive than their colleagues'. Adding to the literature of "stealth overruling," this Essay considers examples of such methods from Chief Justice Roberts's first five years on the Supreme Court. These examples indicate that Chief Justice Roberts knows how to engage in stealth overruling and, more broadly, how to use his colleagues' preferences to maintain a formal commitment to judicial humility while achieving jurisprudential change. As such, they reveal important insights about how Justices can operate strategically to achieve their preferences within both the opportunities and the confines inherent in a multi-judge court. After five years, many have accused the Roberts Court of aggressively attacking precedent. No less a figure than Justice O'Connor, whose retirement marked the effective start of that Court, has expressed concern about the Roberts Court's willingness to overrule prior decisions. n1 Then-Judge Roberts's famous confirmation hearing analogy of judging to umpiring n2 and his professed respect for stare decisis n3 make for a dramatic narrative in which a nominee piously describes a humble role for judges but then, once safely confirmed, sets out with a wrecking ball. The charge may have merit, but a short essay is not the vehicle to make that determination. Simply pointing to a few high-profile [\*1061] overrulings, as critics sometimes do, proves little. n4 Rather, an in-depth examination of the issue requires considering the situations where the overruling dog did not bark-that is, where the Court could have overruled a prior case but declined to do so. n5 Such an investigation also calls for both historical perspective and nuance. n6 Reaching interesting conclusions about the Roberts Court's treatment of stare decisis requires that we identify a baseline of how previous Courts have treated that principle. If impressionistic conclusions based on a few dramatic examples are enough to consider the charge proven, then the Rehnquist n7 and Warren n8 Courts are presumably guilty also. Moreover, not all overrulings are created equal. Determining the extent of the Roberts Court's alleged disregard of precedent also requires considering the importance of the precedents the Court has in fact rejected. Consider Justice White's dissent in INS v. Chadha. n9 White characterized the majority's rejection of the legislative veto as effectively striking down hundreds of statutes and eliminating a then-major feature of the modern administrative state. n10 Chadha was not a case where the Court overruled precedent. Justice White's complaint about the far-reaching nature of the Court's decision, however, reminds us that identifying judicial aggressiveness, whatever its form, requires [\*1062] more than simply adding up the number of cases where the Court has acted aggressively. n11 This Essay considers the Roberts Court and stare decisis from a different angle. It examines several methods by which Chief Justice Roberts arguably has used the multi-judge nature of the Supreme Court to his advantage in undermining precedent without explicitly calling for its overruling. n12 These examples do not prove that the Court as a whole, or the Chief Justice in particular, is bent on undoing the work of prior Courts. Instead, they illustrate the ways in which a Justice can work within the formal confines of precedent to achieve fundamentally different results, either in the short or long term. n13 The methods described below depend in part on the distinction between the result a court reaches in a case and the reasoning it employs. The nature of the Supreme Court as a multi-judge court makes this distinction possible: often times, the Court may agree on a result but split sharply on its reasoning. n14 This opens up room for a creative Justice to undermine precedent, even as the Justice expresses reasons that appear moderate-in particular, more moderate than those who are more inclined to overrule explicitly. In so doing, the Justice may create the conditions for the ultimate rejection of that precedent, even while publicly counseling restraint-indeed, even while voting to uphold that [\*1063] precedent. n15 In short, this Essay considers methods by which Justices can play well with others-both those that came before (via respect for stare decisis) and current colleagues (by strategically positioning themselves among them)-and still achieve their ultimate goal. n16 This Essay situates itself at the intersection of two ongoing debates about judicial behavior. The first examines the concept of stealth overruling-the practice of limiting or even eviscerating a precedent while ostensibly remaining faithful to it. n17 This phenomenon has become a major topic of scholarly discussion during the last five years, n18 as scholars have identified and analyzed examples of the Roberts Court engaging in such conduct-conduct generally thought to have resulted from the replacement of a sometimes centrist Justice O'Connor with a more reliably conservative Justice Alito. n19 The examples in this Essay illustrate instances where the Court or a plurality thereof arguably has engaged in such conduct. n20 The lessons one can draw from these examples will help shape an understanding of the stealth overruling phenomenon, and the extent to which the Roberts Court performs it. Second, this Essay engages the debate about the implications of the Supreme Court's character as a collegial body. Scholars long have acknowledged that critiques of the Court must account for its collegial nature rather than simply treating it as a purposive [\*1064] individual. n21 This Essay contributes to that debate by considering how Chief Justice Roberts may in certain cases strategically use his colleagues' calls for more explicit overruling of precedent as a tool in maintaining his and the Court's reputation as faithful to stare decisis while nevertheless pushing the law away from precedents.

#### Disease inevitable—multiple global hotspots and always a risk of mutations—the aff doesn’t solve world wide

#### No extinction

Posner 5—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease.

#### No impact to the environment and no solvency

Holly Doremus 2k Professor of Law at UC Davis, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse," Winter 2000 Washington & Lee Law Review 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis

Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is **less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s.** Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, n213 the **complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely.** n214 **Life is remarkably robust**. **Nor is human extinction probable** any time soon. Homo sapiens is **adaptable to nearly any environment**. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215 One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. n216 But this too may be **overstating the case**. Most ecosystem functions are **performed by multiple species**. This **functional redundancy** means that **a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse**. n217 Another response drops the horrific ending and returns to a more measured discourse of the many material benefits nature provides humanity. Even these more plausible tales, though, suffer from an important limitation. They call for nature protection only at a high level of generality. For example, human-induced increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels may cause rapid changes in global temperatures in the near future, with drastic consequences for sea levels, weather patterns, and ecosystem services. n218 Similarly, the loss of large numbers of species undoubtedly reduces the genetic library from which we might in the future draw useful resources. n219 But it is difficult to translate these insights into convincing arguments against any one of the small local decisions that contribute to the problems of global warming or biodiversity loss. n220 It is easy to argue that **the** material **impact of any individual decision to increase** carbon **emissions slightly or to destroy a small amount of habitat will be small.** It is difficult to identify the specific straw that will break the camel's back. Furthermore, **no unilateral action at the local or even national level can solve these global problems**. Local decisionmakers may feel paralyzed by the scope of the problems, or may conclude that any sacrifices they might make will go unrewarded if others do not restrain their actions. In sum, at the local level at which most decisions affecting nature are made, the material discourse provides little reason to save nature. Short of the ultimate catastrophe, the material benefits of destructive decisions frequently will exceed their identifiable material costs. n221

#### Their impact evidence is alarmist and empirically denied

Kaleita 7 Amy Kaleita is an Environmental Studies Fellow and Assistant Professor of agricultural and biosystems engineering at Iowa State University. She holds a PhD in agricultural engineering from the University of Illinois. "Hysteria's History: Environmental Alarmism in Context," Pacific Research Institute, http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/20070920\_Hysteria\_History.pdf

Apocalyptic stories about the irreparable, catastrophic damage that humans are doing to the natural environment have been around for a long time. These hysterics often have some basis in reality, but are blown up to illogical and ridiculous proportions. Part of the reason they’re so appealing is that they have the ring of plausibility along with the intrigue of a horror flick.

In many cases, the alarmists identify a legitimate issue, take the possible consequences to an extreme, and advocate action on the basis of these extreme projections. In 1972, the editor of the journal *Nature*pointed out the problem with the typical alarmist approach: “[Alarmists’] most common error is to suppose that the worst will always happen.”82 But of course, if the worst always happened, the human race would have died out long ago.

When alarmism has a basis in reality, the challenge becomes to take appropriate action based on that reality, not on the hysteria. The aftermath of*Silent Spring*offers examples of both sorts of policy reactions: a reasoned response to a legitimate problem and a knee-jerk response to the hysteria.

On the positive side,*Silent Spring* brought an end to the general belief that all synthetic chemicals in use for purposes ranging from insect control to household cleaning were uniformly wonderful, and it ushered in an age of increased caution on their appropriate use. In the second chapter of her famous book, Carson wrote, “It is not my contention that chemical insecticides must never be used. I do contend that… we have allowed these chemicals to be used with little or no advance investigation of their effect on soil, water, wildlife, and man himself.”

Indeed, Carson seemed to advocate reasoned response to rigorous scientific investigation, and in fact this did become the modern approach to environmental chemical licensure and monitoring. An hour-long CBS documentary on pesticides was aired during the height of the furor over*Silent Spring*. In the documentary, Dr. Page Nicholson, a water-pollution expert with the Public Health Service, wasn’t able to answer how long pesticides persist in water once they enter it, or the extent to which pesticides contaminate groundwater supplies. Today, this sort of information is gathered through routine testing of chemicals for use in the environment.

Ironically, rigorous investigation was not used in the decision to ban DDT, primarily due to the hysteria*Silent Spring*generated. In this example, the hysteria took on a life of its own, even trumping the author’s original intent. There was, as we have seen, a more sinister and tragic response to the hysteria generated by*Silent Spring*. Certain developing countries, under significant pressure from the United States, abandoned the use of DDT. This decision resulted in millions of deaths from malaria and other insect-borne diseases. In the absence of pressure to abandon the use of DDT, these lives would have been spared. It would certainly have been possible to design policies requiring caution and safe practices in the use of supplemental chemicals in the environment, without pronouncing a death sentence on millions of people.

A major challenge in developing appropriate responses to legitimate problems is that alarmism catches people’s attention and draws them in. Alarmism is given more weight than it deserves, as policy makers attempt to appease their constituency and the media. It polarizes the debaters into groups of “believers” and “skeptics,” so that reasoned, fact-based compromise is difficult to achieve. Neither of these aspects of alarmism is healthy for the development of appropriate policy.

Further, alarmist responses to valid problems risk foreclosing potentially useful responses based on ingenuity and progress. There are many examples from the energy sector where, in the presence of economic, efficiency, or societal demands, the marketplace has responded by developing better alternatives. That is not to say that we should blissfully squander our energy resources; on the contrary, we should be careful to utilize them wisely. Butenergy-resource hysteria should not lead us to circumvent scientific advancement by cherry-picking and favoring one particular replacement technology at the expense of other promising technologies.

Environmental alarmism should be taken for what it is—a natural tendency of some portion of the public to latch onto the worst, and most unlikely, potential outcome. Alarmism should not be used as the basis for policy. Where a real problem exists, solutions should be based on reality, not hysteria.

#### No food shortages

Goklany 9**—**Worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for over 35 years. Worked with IPCC before its inception as an author, delegate and reviewer. Negotiated UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Managed the emissions trading program for the EPA. Julian Simon Fellow at the Property and Environment Research Center, visiting fellow at AEI, winner of the Julian Simon Prize and Award. PhD, MS, electrical engineering, MSU. B.Tech in electrical engineering, Indian Institute of Tech. (Indur, “Have increases in population, affluence and technology worsened human and environmental well-being?” 2009, http://www.ejsd.org/docs/HAVE\_INCREASES\_IN\_POPULATION\_AFFLUENCE\_AND\_TECHNOLOGY\_WORSENED\_HUMAN\_AND\_ENVIRONMENTAL\_WELL-BEING.pdf, AMiles)

Although global population is no longer growing exponentially, it has quadrupled since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or GDP per capita) has sextupled, global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4 But contrary to Neo- Malthusian fears, average human well-being, measured by any objective indicator, has never been higher. Food supplies, Malthus’ original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased from 2,254 Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide. The proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1969–71 and 2001–2003 despite an 87 percent population increase (Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006).

#### No food crisis

Urquhart 8(Sam, Food Crisis, Which Crisis?, July 2008, http://www.zcommunications.org/food-crisis-which-crisis-by-sam-urquhart, AMiles)

Despite the atmosphere of crisis and very real spiraling prices, the truth is food supplies are not particularly tight. There is no Malthusian crisis on the near horizon, at least not owing to climate change or the exhaustion of arable lands to cultivate. There was a record global grain harvest in 2007. As a Food First paper "From Food Rebellions to Food Sovereignty: An urgent call to fix a broken food system" puts it, this is "at least 1.5 times current demand." In fact, over the last 20 years, food production has "risen steadily at over 2.0 percent a year, while the rate of population growth has dropped to 1.14 percent a year." Moreover, in 2006, 854 million people were food insecure. Hence, the dysfunctional food system was starving people well before the current crisis.

#### No famine—agriculture resilient

Michaels 7 – PhD in climatology. Former Research Professor of Environmental Sciences from the University of Virginia. (Patrick, 4/26, U.N. Climate Scientists Write Off Africa, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=8214, AG)

The resilience of modern agricultural technology is obvious. Consider a climatically diverse state like Virginia. Temperatures average 6 degrees Fahrenheit warmer in the agriculturally intensive southeast than they do in the in the Shenandoah Valley to the northwest. The southeast gets over 25% more rain than the northwest. But, corn yields are the same. Operationally, there's little difference between a farmer moving to another climate or the climate moving around the farmer. In resilient economies, both adapt. Yet the specter of famine is a constant theme. How many American adults were taught in school that India -- now populated with over a billion people -- was on the verge of starvation? Paul Ehrlich's 1968 book, The Population Bomb, taken as gospel then, stated "India couldn't possibly feed two hundred million more people by 1980," and "I have yet to meet anyone familiar with the situation who thinks that India will be self-sufficient in food by 1971." Obviously Ehrlich was wrong. India adopted high-yielding "Green Revolution" wheat in the early 1970s, followed by similar advances in rice production, at it became a substantial net exporter of food, as it is today. And, even if there were widespread crop failures, the now-diversified Indian economy would have little problem purchasing food on the international market.

# 2nc

## Meltdowns

#### No meltdowns

Rod **Adams 12**, Former submarine Engineer Officer, Founder, Adams Atomic Engines, Inc., “Has Apocalyptic Portrayal of Climate Change Risk Backfired?”, May 2, <http://atomicinsights.com/2012/05/has-apocalyptic-portrayal-of-climate-change-risk-backfired.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AtomicInsights+%28Atomic+Insights%29>

Not only was the discussion enlightening about the reasons why different people end up with different opinions about climate change responses when presented with essentially the same body of information, but it also got me thinking about a possible way to fight back against the Gundersens, Caldicotts, Riccios, Grossmans and Wassermans of the world. That group of five tend to use apocalyptic rhetoric to describe what will happen to the world if we do not immediately start turning our collective backs on all of the benefits that abundant atomic energy can provide. They spin tall tales of deformed children, massive numbers of cancers as a result of minor radioactive material releases, swaths of land made “uninhabitable” for thousands of years, countries “cut in half”, and clouds of “hot particles” raining death and destruction ten thousand miles from the release point. Every one of those clowns have been repeating similar stories for at least two solid decades, and continue to repeat their stories even after supposedly catastrophic failures at Fukushima have not resulted in a single radiation related injury or death. According to eminent scientists – like Dr. Robert Gale – Fukushima is unlikely to EVER result in any measurable increase in radiation related illness. One important element that we have to consider to assess cancer risks associated with an accident like Fukushima is our baseline risk for developing cancer. All of us, unfortunately, have a substantial risk of developing cancer in our lifetime. For example, a 50-year-old male has a 42% risk of developing cancer during his remaining life; it’s almost the same for a 10-year-old. This risk only decreases when we get much older and only because we are dying of other causes. It’s true that excess radiation exposure can increase our cancer risk above baseline levels; it’s clear from studies of the survivors of the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of people exposed to radiation in medical and occupational settings, and of people exposed to radon decay products in mines and home basements. When it comes to exposures like that of Fukushima, the question is: What is the relative magnitude of the increased risk from Fukushima compared to our baseline cancer risk? Despite our fears, it is quite small. If the nuclear industry – as small and unfocused as it is – really wanted to take action to isolate the apocalyptic antinuclear activists, it could take a page from the effective campaign of the fossil fuel lobby. It could start an integrated campaign to help the rest of us to remember that, despite the dire predictions, the sky never fell, the predicted unnatural deaths never occurred, the deformations were figments of imagination, and the land is not really irreversibly uninhabitable for generations. The industry would effectively share the story of Ukraine’s recent decision to begin repopulating the vast majority of the “dead zone” that was forcibly evacuated after the Chernobyl accident. It would put some context into the discussion about radiation health effects; even if leaders shy away from directly challenging the Linear No Threshold (LNT) dose assumption, they can still show that even that pessimistic model says that a tiny dose leads to a tiny risk. Aside: My personal opinion is that the LNT is scientifically unsupportable and should be replaced with a much better model. We deserve far less onerous regulations; there is evidence that existing regulations actually cause harm. I hear a rumor that there is a group of mostly retired, but solidly credentialed professionals who are organizing a special session at the annual ANS meeting to talk about effective ways to influence policy changes. End Aside. Most of us recognize that there is no such thing as a zero risk; repeated assertions of “there is no safe level” should be addressed by accepting “close enough” to zero so that even the most fearful person can stop worrying. The sky has not fallen, even though we have experienced complete core meltdowns and secondary explosions that did some visible damage. Nuclear plants are not perfect, there will be accidents and there will be radioactive material releases. History is telling me that the risks are acceptable, especially in the context of the real world where there is always some potential for harm. The benefits of accepting a little nuclear risk are immense and must not be marginalized by the people who market fear and trembling.

#### Risk of meltdown is tiny and decreasing

Cappiello**,** 2011(Dina Cappiello reporter for the AP March 29, 2011 “AP IMPACT: Long Blackouts Pose Risk to US Reactors” The Post and Courier http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2011/mar/29/ap-impact-long-blackouts-pose-risk-us-reactors/?print)

The Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1, in Pennsylvania had the greatest risk of core melt -- 6.5 in 100,000, according to the analysis. But that risk may have been reduced in subsequent years as NRC regulations required plants to do more to cope with blackouts. Todd Schneider, a spokesman for FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co., which runs Beaver Creek, told the AP that batteries on site would last less than a week.¶ In 1988, eight years after labeling blackouts "an unresolved safety issue," the NRC required nuclear power plants to improve the reliability of their diesel generators, have more backup generators on site, and better train personnel to restore power. These steps would allow them to keep the core cool for four to eight hours if they lost all electrical power. By contrast, the newest generation of nuclear power plant, which is still awaiting approval, can last 72 hours without taking any action, and a minimum of seven days if water is supplied by other means to cooling pools.¶ Despite the added safety measures, a 1997 report found that blackouts -- the loss of on-site and off-site electrical power -- remained "a dominant contributor to the risk of core melt at some plants." The events of Sept. 11, 2001, further solidified that nuclear reactors might have to keep the core cool for a longer period without power. After 9/11, the commission issued regulations requiring that plants have portable power supplies for relief valves and be able to manually operate an emergency reactor cooling system when batteries go out.¶ The NRC says these steps, and others, have reduced the risk of core melt from station blackouts from the current fleet of nuclear plants.¶ For instance, preliminary results of the latest analysis of the risks to the Peach Bottom plant show that any release caused by a blackout there would be far less rapid and would release less radiation than previously thought, even without any actions being taken. With more time, people can be evacuated. The NRC says improved computer models, coupled with up-to-date information about the plant, resulted in the rosier outlook.¶ "When you simplify, you always err towards the worst possible circumstance," Scott Burnell, a spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said of the earlier studies. The latest work shows that "even in situations where everything is broken and you can't do anything else, these events take a long time to play out," he said. "Even when you get to releasing into environment, much less of it is released than actually thought."

#### Solar flares decreasing

Wall 11/17 (Mike, Space.com Staff Writer, " Epic Sun Storm Dry Spell Ahead? Not Necessarily, New Study Says," 2011, http://www.space.com/13660-solar-activity-cycle-grand-minimum.html, )

A new "Maunder minimum?" Solar activity waxes and wanes on an 11-year cycle, but it also displays broader patterns over longer time scales. The sun's rumblings are of interest to us on Earth, as solar flares and CMEs can knock out satellites and temporarily disrupt communications systems and power grids. Scientists have been tracking solar activity for about 300 years by noting the comings and goings of sunspots, temporary dark patches on the solar surface that often give rise to powerful flares and CMEs. These records show that virtually no sunspots were observed from 1645 to 1715 — a period of prolonged solar quiescence now known as the Maunder minimum. The sun recently came out of a 70-year-long "grand maximum" of high activity, and some astronomers have suggested that our star could now be transitioning toward another Maunder-like minimum.

#### Solar flare impacts are empirically denied

Fox News 3/8 (" Sun fires off 2 huge solar flares, could impact weather on Earth," 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2012/03/07/sun-fires-off-2-huge-solar-flares-could-impact-weather-on-earth/, )

A massive solar storm arrived at Earth early Thursday, and is expected to shake the globe's magnetic field until early Friday morning, while expanding the Northern Lights. A giant blast of plasma spat from the sun at as much as 4 million miles per hour Tuesday -- by some measures the largest solar event since late 2006 -- and it could lead to serious issues on Earth, forcing some planes to reroute, knocking out power grids, and blacking out radios. The sun unleashed the cosmic double whammy late March 6, erupting with two major flares to cap a busy day of powerful solar storms, Space.com reported. One of the flares is the most powerful solar eruption so far this year.

#### No impact to solar flares - empirics

Moskowitz 8/9/11 (Clara, reporter for CBS news, “Biggest solar flare in years as sun erupts” http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/08/09/scitech/main20090118.shtml)

(CBS News) An extremely powerful solar flare, the largest in over four years, rocked the sun early Tuesday (Aug. 9), but is unlikely to wreak any serious havoc here on Earth, scientists say. "It was a big flare," said Joe Kunches, a space scientist with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)'s Space Weather Prediction Center. "We lucked out because the site of the eruption at the sun was not facing the Earth, so we will probably feel no ill effects." Today's solar flare began at 3:48 a.m. EDT (0748 GMT), and was rated a class X6.9 on the three-class scale scientists use to measure the strength of solar flares. The strongest type of solar eruption is class X, while class C represents the weakest and class M flares are medium-strength events. The flare is the largest one yet in the sun's current cycle, which began in 2008 and is expected to last until around 2020. Solar activity waxes and wanes over an 11-year sun weather cycle, with the star currently heading toward a solar maximum in 2013.

#### The newest, most qualified study disproves your advantage - solar flares CANNOT cause widespread blackouts

National Defense, Citing the JASON Advisory Panel of the Department of Homeland Security, 11 (" Report: Solar Flares Unlikely to Spark Electrical Armageddon," 12/22, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=626, )

Energy from solar flares can indeed harm electrical grids on Earth, but a new study says the sun probably won’t plunge the United States into the Dark Ages, as some theorists have imagined. Working on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security, members of the JASON advisory panel, an independent group of scientists, recently published a report on the vulnerability of the nation’s electrical grid to solar flares. “Impacts of Severe Space Weather on the Electric Grid” concludes that while energy blasts from the sun, called coronal mass ejections, can damage transmission lines, it is unlikely that the entire grid could be brought down.

#### Solar flares don't threaten power outages - new tech solves

Worth 11 (Katie, Examiner Staff Writer, " Solar flares threaten to disrupt devices as sun enters active phase," 8/19, http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/08/solar-flares-threaten-disrupt-devices-sun-enters-active-phase, )

But there is still controversy about exactly how damaging a solar flare could be, said Bob Rutledge, lead forecaster for the national Space Weather Prediction Center in Colorado. A federal report released a few years ago took a dire outlook on the risks, and estimated that an especially sizeable flare could knock out as many as 300 major transformers across the country. However, an industry group tasked with looking at the issue has since disputed that estimate, arguing that newer technology is much less vulnerable to solar flares than older models. “So the jury is still out,” Rutledge said. There are actions power companies can take to protect their grid if they know a solar flare is coming — and such predictions may now be easier to make. This week, Stanford scientists announced they’d developed a new technique using sound waves to predict a flare a day or two before it happens.

## China

#### China’s wind sector is rapidly expanding---our ev cites momentum

Hannam 2/4 Peter is a carbon economy editor at Brisbane Times. “China's wind energy industry spirals higher,” 2013, http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/business/carbon-economy/chinas-wind-energy-industry-spirals-higher-20130204-2dua3.html

China installed more than a third of the world’s new wind turbines in 2012 and is on course to beat the government’s 2015 target of 100 gigawatts of generation capacity by more than a year, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) data.¶ Wind energy in China now accounts for 5.3 per cent of the country’s generating capacity and supplies about 2 per cent of its electricity, placing it behind only coal and hydro power.¶ While new installations slowed from 2011’s record levels, China’s 15.9GW of new wind capacity exceeded the 15.5GW of new hydro power and dwarfed the 1.2GW of solar and 700 megawatts of nuclear capacity added last year.¶ “This year however, **project approvals have sped up and we forecast a modest recovery in both financing activity and construction in 2013**,” Demi Zhu, China wind analyst at BNEF, said. “The fact that China wind overtook nuclear as a generation source even in its most challenging year of recent times is a testament to **the massive scale and** momentum **of the industry in this country.”**

#### It’s their top focus---wind and grid capacity are expanding---they’re the global leader

PR Newswire 1/7 “China's Offshore Wind Industry Entering Era of Large-Scale Development,” 2013, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/chinas-offshore-wind-industry-entering-era-of-large-scale-development-185876602.html

**"Wind power has become the third-largest electric power in China,"** said Liu Qi, deputy director general of the National Energy Administration. "There is no electric power to substitute the position of wind power as No. 3, following thermal power and hydropower." It was said in the report of the 18th CPC National Congress that "China is determined to promote the revolution of energy generation and consumption, to control the total consumption of energy, to improve energy conservation, and to support the development of energy conservation and the low carbon industry as well as renewable energy in order to ensure the safety of national energy."¶ The State Council recently released its white paper, "China's Energy Policy", which clearly indicates that "Wind power is the non-hydro renewable energy with the biggest possibility of large-scale development and market utilization at the moment. Wind power shall be developed efficiently. China's wind power development is the most rapid in the world. During China's 12th Five-Year Plan, wind power shall be developed in both concentrated and distributed formats, and the development layout shall be optimized. Wind farm construction will be promoted in areas abundant in wind resources, including the Northwest, North China and the Northeast, and the utilization of distributed wind resources will be accelerated. Offshore wind power shall be developed steadily. Standards and industry monitoring for wind power equipment shall be improved. Wind power enterprises will be encouraged to strengthen research of key technologies to speed up the upgrading of the wind power industry. The **consumption capacity** of power systems **shall be increased by strengthening grid construction, improving grid dispatching, enhancing equipment** performance, advancing wind power predictions and forecasts, and so on. By 2015, China's total wind turbine installed capacity will hit 100 million kW, including 5 million kW offshore."

#### China’s leading the race to develop clean technology now---it’s zero-sum and wind is key---the plan reverses this

Harvey 11 Fiona is an environment correspondent at the Guardian. “Developing world ups ante in cleantech 'arms race',” Oct 18, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/eveloping-world-lead-wind-power-renewable-energy>

Last year was a turning point in the global race to develop clean technology. It marked the first time that more new wind power generating capacity was installed in developing countries than in the rich world. **China led the way,** according to the Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC), **and now has the most wind generating capacity in the world**, thanks to favourable government policies. A record capacity of 19 gigawatts was added in China last year, taking the total to more than 42GW. India also showed strong growth, in line with the government target of adding more than 10GW of new capacity by 2012, and there are industry estimates that 100GW is possible. According to GWEC, the growth illustrates the advantages of investing in green power. "This puts an end to the assertion that wind power is a premium technology only for rich countries which cannot be deployed at scale in other markets," it says in its annual report. "It is also testament to the inherent attractiveness of wind power for countries striving to diversify their energy mix, improve their security of supply in the face of rapidly growing demand and relieve national budgets of the burden of expensive fossil fuel imports at volatile prices." In the developed world, by contrast, growth was inhibited by the financial crisis and recession: while €50bn was invested and about 39GW added around the world, the overall market for wind energy was static compared with 2009. The US market fared particularly badly, with only half as much new wind capacity built as in the previous year. Europe's growth also slowed down, with 7.5% less capacity added than in 2009, according to GWEC. Even an increase in the offshore wind market and growth in eastern Europe was not enough to make up for the slack elsewhere. The rapid growth of wind energy in emerging economies also shows how **power is shifting in the clean technology world.** Three of the world's top 10 wind turbine manufacturers are now Chinese, and the country makes turbines capable of producing 30GW a year, of which an increasing number are now destined for the export market. India also boasts 17 companies making wind power equipment, the biggest and best known being Suzlon. By 2013, according to estimates for the World Institute for Sustainable Energy, Indian companies will be making turbines to produce 17GW a year, many to be exported around the world. Other forms of clean technology are also growing rapidly in the developing world – China, for instance, is also the world's biggest manufacturer of solar power equipment, the vast majority of it exported. European governments facing severe fiscal crises have given less attention to promoting clean technology than in the past, and some have cut back on subsidies to save money. But this neglect carries a potential cost and a risk, as if Europe falls behind it will struggle to make up the lost ground. Connie Hedegaard, climate change commissioner for the EU, warned a European Wind Energy Association event earlier this year that unless governments upped their game, Europe as a whole would lose out. "We should not be losing this race, because these are the growth industries of the future, that will generate wealth and create jobs," she said. In the US, there are similar fears among clean technology advocates. President Obama called in 2009 for a doubling of renewable energy within three years, but this now looks less likely to be achieved. There are doubts over some of the support available for renewables – many of the relevant grants and loans are due to expire this year, and there is hostility towards such mechanisms from some quarters. The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) has called for support to be stepped up, against attacks from some politicians and sections of the media. Rob Gramlich, senior director of public policy for AWEA, claims that conventional forms of electricity have benefitted from subsidies for years. "Tax incentives have been the most effective means of bringing new energy sources to the market," he says. "Previously they brought us much of our domestic oil and gas supply, including the new shale gas resources. They typically apply in the early and middle stages of development, so it's not surprising that in any given year, new sources receive much more than conventional sources." Steven Lang, clean tech leader for the UK and Ireland at Ernst and Young, says government policies are one of the **key determinants for how fast new clean technologies grow.** "Governments need to send a very clear signal to the market, that they are committed to this. Financial incentives are also very important," he says. Lang points to Alex Salmond, the leader of Scotland's devolved administration, who has put renewable energy firmly at the heart of his economic agenda, and a particular focus on new marine technologies such as wave and tidal power. The first minister told a conference in September: "I'm confident that by 2025 we will produce at least 100 per cent of our electricity needs from renewables alone, and together with other sources it will enable us to become a net exporter of clean, green energy." Salmond even won the praise of Al Gore recently for his "inspiration". The world is engaged in a "clean tech arms race", Lang says, but he argues that all countries have opportunities in different types of clean technology. For instance, in the UK offshore wind is likely to be a winner, and has been championed by the government because it avoids the problems associated with obtaining planning permission for onshore wind farms. Carbon capture and storage is another potential British winner, if government plans for as many as four demonstration projects are successful.

#### Squo solves

Solidiance 1/8 Solidiance is Asia’s premier marketing and innovation strategy consulting firm. “China’s Renewable Energy Sector: An Overview of Key Growth Sectors,” 2013, <http://www.solidiance.com/whitepaper/china-renewable.pdf>

\*Note---[the] added to correct grammatical error

Before 2011, the wind power industry was poorly regulated, with no coordination between local governments, the national government and the industry. Wind power facility installations were approved at provincial level, often by unscrupulous local officials eager to meet and exceed their local economic development targets, which meant permits were obtained quickly and easily. With subsidies arranged according to installed capacity figures rather than grid connected capacity, wind power facilities were erected without being grid connected. According to Liu Mingliang, an analyst from the China Wind Energy Association, this led to the construction speed of wind power facilities occurring faster than the network planning, which has resulted in a serious shortage of grid connected wind power. The Chinese government is now attempting to restrain this kind of growth. In order to have access to national subsidies or feed in tariffs, new wind power facilities must now receive approval from the central government. According to a senior project manager at Sinovel, one of China’s leading wind turbine manufacturers, this has seriously slowed the approval process, resulting in the decline in domestic installations. However, according to Qiao Liming, the Director for China at the Global Wind Energy Council, **this slowdown should be perceived as a positive step, building a more solid platform from which the industry can continue to grow in [the] future.** “This is the time for the industry to reflect on a lot of issues. The fast development of the wind industry has diverted people’s attention from a number of important issues, including technological, planning and coordination issues between the grid and the wind farm developers. Now is the right time to slow down and to intensively adjust regulations in order to better drive future growth in the sector”. Currently, at least 30% of the installed wind power capacity in China is not connected to the grid and due to problems with the old fashioned electric grid system in China, the power that is connected to the grid suffers from curtailment and transmission problems. (source – own interviews) This critical oversight in the rapid establishment of wind power in China has rendered its capabilities fruitless. The fact remains that a meagre 1% of China’s electricity is generated by wind power. The latest Five Year Plan seeks to address these problems, shifting policy away from targeting just capacity and towards grid connectivity.

#### Newest evidence confirms

Shen 1/11 Feifei is a writer for Bloomberg. “China Working to Cut Idled Wind Farm Capacity,” 2013, Renewable Energy World, <http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/01/china-working-to-cut-idled-wind-farm-capacity>

Beijing, China -- China, the world's biggest carbon emitter, is making progress in connecting idled wind farms to the electricity grid, **helping to address a roadblock slowing** **the development of wind power.** "The issue is in the process of improvement, given the efforts made by grid companies," Jiang Liping, vice president of the State Grid Energy Research Institute, said in a phone interview on Jan. 10, without disclosing the connection rate.

#### Consolidation solves---long term prospects are good

Solidiance 1/8 Solidiance is Asia’s premier marketing and innovation strategy consulting firm. “China’s Renewable Energy Sector: An Overview of Key Growth Sectors,” 2013, <http://www.solidiance.com/whitepaper/china-renewable.pdf>

\*Note: Article is written in present tense but is referring to 2011 activities

2011 marks the beginning of a period of adjustment in the Chinese wind power industry as government regulations and requirements increase, the overheated market begins to consolidate and power grid capabilities take time to catch up to meet the unharnessed production output of current installed capacity. With key industry trends including consolidation and internationalisation, the Chinese wind power market is taking the opportunity to mature. While long term market growth is still likely, the unpredictable outcome of this adjustment phase makes short term growth patterns uncertain.

#### The whole supply chain follows demand---means leadership is zero-sum---if they solve their advantages they definitely link to the DA

Caperton et al 11 Richard W. Caperton is a Policy Analyst with the Energy Opportunity team at the Center for American Progress; Kate Gordon is Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center; Bracken Hendricks is a Senior Fellow at the Center; and Daniel J. Weiss is a Senior Fellow and Director of Climate Strategy at the Center. “Helping America Win the Clean Energy Race,” Feb 7, http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/ces\_brief.pdf

This is no way to build a modern industry. Already we have seen cutting-edge solar power manufacturing companies begin to close their doors, either permanently or to move to other countries with strong and dedicated clean energy markets. Evergreen Solar Inc., for example, recently announced plans to close its Massachusetts plant to put more funds into solar panel manufacturing in China. The company followed on the heels of SpectraWatt Inc. in New York and Solyndra Inc. in California closing some of their facilities. As General Electric Co.’s chairman and chief executive, Jeff Immelt, said at last year’s ARPA-E summit, those countries with strong demand for renewable energy products will naturally pull these companies into their borders because “innovation and supply chain strength gets developed where the demand is the greatest. Similarly, wind manufacturers in Iowa, once a state leader in this industry, are laying off workers as new orders fail to materialize. Leading global financier Deutsche Bank decided to move billions of investment dollars out of the U.S. clean energy market, and into China and Europe as soon as it was clear there would be no comprehensive climate and energy legislation coming out of the 111th Congress. China and our other economic competitors in Asia, Europe, and emerging markets are not waiting for America to regroup. The home team can win the clean energy race These stories share a common theme: investment dollars leav[e]ing the United States to be deployed among our global competitors who have fully embraced the economic and environmental imperative to enter a new era of cleaner, more sustainable and domestic energy. China is the most striking example. In 2009, even as the United States was installing more wind turbines, China driven by stable long-term demand for its products, became the world’s largest manufacturer of wind power systems. It was already the world’s largest solar manufacturer and developer of efficient nuclear and coal technologies. All these countries have comprehensive programs in place to spur robust and stable demand for low-carbon energy, which then creates a market for businesses to manufacture and install the technologies to meet that demand. Last June, China announced its plan to meet a renewable energy standard of 20 percent by 2020, matching the European Union’s target. Germany has set a target of 60 percent by 2050. The country already gets 16 percent of all its power from renewables, well on its way to meeting this ambitious goal, and some think it may reach 100 percent by 2050. Denmark has gone a step further, actually announcing its intention to become 100 percent independent of fossil fuels by 2050, something that at least one of its islands has already achieved. This occurred in a country that in 1970 was almost completely dependent on foreign fossil fuels. These countries prove that strong clean energy standards build growing economies. But even more than that, strong clean energy standards are now imperative if we are to compete on the same playing field as China and Europe. America over the course of the 20th century took command of the Industrial Revolution and the communications revolution, and then led the world into the Information Age. It is time for us to lead the clean-tech revolution, too. Today, others are beating us to the punch, not because we lack the technology and innovation to lead this new revolution, but because we are not providing the market signals needed for our private-sector entrepreneurs need to invest over the long haul. This clean energy investment gap is rapidly becoming the greatest threat to America’s technology leadership.

#### Renewables companies are going to China now because of lack of incentives---empirics prove

Freedman 11 David is a Guest Contributor @ MIT’s Technology Review. “China Beckons for Green-Energy Startups,” Sept 27, http://www.technologyreview.com/article/425560/china-beckons-for-green-energy-startups/

Many in the U.S. have an interest in getting clean-tech ventures off the ground. Among them are the government, capital markets, industry, and science labs. But China seems ready to do more on every front to make such projects happen, and to do it right now—without red tape or concern about economic turmoil. Leading-edge battery maker Boston Power appears to have come to that conclusion. The company is set to move to China, where the government is helping to cut the firm a $125-million deal that no one else is likely to match. The deal could leave the company poised to be a part of what could be a mushrooming market there in electric vehicles. “This is really the next chapter for us,” says Christina Lampe-Onnerud, who founded Boston Power in 2005. Lampe-Onnerud, a former star technology consultant at Arthur D. Little and top scientist at Bell Communications Research, has been much lauded in the world of high-tech green startups, thanks to Boston Power’s innovations in the chemistry of lithium-ion batteries, and to the success the company has had in selling the resulting higher-capacity, faster-charging batteries to Hewlett-Packard for laptops. Boston Power seemed even hotter in 2008 when Lampe-Onnerud announced she was setting her sights on producing batteries for the electric-vehicle market. But this market has been slow to materialize and highly competitive, pitting Boston Power against other high-flying startups, including A123 Systems, based in Waltham, Massachusetts. In 2009, Boston Power failed to win a substantial loan guarantee from the U.S. Department of Energy that would have financed a Massachusetts factory—the company currently manufactures via Taiwanese partner GP Batteries. That same year, a deal backed by the Swedish government to help put the company’s batteries in electric vehicles from foundering Saab went nowhere. The new deal should put Boston Power, which has raised nearly $200 million in funding, in a better position to compete for at least a foothold in what is expected to eventually be a large global market for electric-vehicle batteries. The deal was set up by GSR Ventures, based in Beijing and Palo Alto, California. GSR has more than $1 billion under management and is investing mostly in high-tech startups doing business in China. Neither GSR’s managing director, Sonny Wu, nor Lampe-Onnerud would provide details on the exact breakdown of the new financing, but both confirmed that the $125-million value represents a mix of private equity and Chinese-government grants, low-interest loans, and financial and tax incentives. The equity investment comes from venture-capital firms Oak Investment Partners and Foundation Asset Management, which are previous Boston Power investors, as well as from GSR. And the $125 million might not be all there is to the deal, hinted Lampe-Onnerud. “Even more will unfold over the next six months,” she says. Lampe-Onnerud says the company will soon break ground on a new plant near Shanghai that is expected to turn out 18 million battery cells a year, about three times the company’s current capacity. And while the company is retaining some R&D capabilities in the U.S.—it is headquartered in Westborough, Massachusetts—most of its engineering operations will be based near Beijing, and the company is laying off about a third of its 100 U.S. employees. GSR’s Wu is becoming chairman of Boston Power in the deal, essentially taking the reins from Lampe-Onnerud, who says she will remain on the board and will continue to work closely with the company, but will not move to China. The company is currently looking for a CEO to replace Keith Schmid, who took over the slot in February from Lampe-Onnerud. Lampe-Onnerud says the company was driven to strike a China deal **because the country has demonstrated an intention to use** generous incentives and funding to push its clean-tech markets, and its electric-vehicle market in particular, versus the shakier support in the United States. “China, by far, is the biggest market for us, and this was a chance to get to profitability very quickly,” she explains. “We would have loved to manufacture here, but every entrepreneur in this business who wants to stay in the U.S. will have to make some tough choices.” Wu seconds the notion that China’s willingness to throw government resources at electric-vehicle growth makes the country increasingly hard to resist for startups in the industry. The Chinese government has already started building a large network of vehicle-recharging stations in major cities, he says, and has stated goals to get at least 300,000 electric vehicles on the road within two years, goosing the market with incentives worth more than $15,000 per car. “Being in China has become a necessary and sufficient condition for success in electric vehicles,” he adds. “U.S. startups are feeling they need to be in China for this market in the same way that Israeli high-tech companies in the early 1990s felt they had to be in the U.S.” Marianne Wu, a partner at Mohr Davidow Ventures with experience in Asian markets, also agrees that China is likely to prove irresistible to a growing number of startups in the electric-vehicle and other clean-tech markets. The fact that China is simply buying more cars and just about everything else due to its rapid industrialization, along with its lower manufacturing costs, are reasons enough to focus operations there, she says, adding that any government help with financing is icing on the cake. “The Chinese government seems willing to provide large incentives to companies in industries that it views as strategic, to foster these industries through infancy,” she says. “EV batteries appear to be one of them, along with renewable energy in general.”

#### It’s zero-sum---demand is key---plan causes firms to relocate to the US

Bradsher 1/30 Keith is a writer at the NY Times. “China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy,” 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/energy-environment/31renew.html?pagewanted=all>

The United States and other countries are offering incentives to develop their own renewable energy industries, and Mr. Obama called for redoubling American efforts. Yet **many** Western and Chinese executives **expect China to prevail in the energy-technology race.**¶ Multinational corporations are responding to the rapid growth of China’s market by building big, state-of-the-art factories in China. Vestas of Denmark has just erected the world’s biggest wind turbine manufacturing complex here in northeastern China, and transferred the technology to build the latest electronic controls and generators.¶ “You have to move fast with the market,” said Jens Tommerup, the president of Vestas China. “Nobody has ever seen such fast development in a wind market.”¶ Renewable energy industries here are adding jobs rapidly, reaching 1.12 million in 2008 and climbing by 100,000 a year, according to the government-backed Chinese Renewable Energy Industries Association.¶ Yet renewable energy may be doing more for China’s economy than for the environment. Total power generation in China is on track to pass the United States in 2012 — and most of the added capacity will still be from coal.¶ China intends for wind, solar and biomass energy to represent 8 percent of its electricity generation capacity by 2020. That compares with less than 4 percent now in China and the United States. Coal will still represent two-thirds of China’s capacity in 2020, and nuclear and hydropower most of the rest.¶ As China seeks to dominate energy-equipment exports, it has the advantage of being the world’s largest market for power equipment. The government spends heavily to upgrade the electricity grid, committing $45 billion in 2009 alone. State-owned banks provide generous financing.¶ China’s top leaders are intensely focused on energy policy: on Wednesday, the government announced the creation of a National Energy Commission composed of cabinet ministers as a “superministry” led by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao himself.¶ Regulators have set mandates for power generation companies to use more renewable energy. Generous subsidies for consumers to install their own solar panels or solar water heaters have produced flurries of activity on rooftops across China.¶ China’s biggest advantage may be its domestic demand for electricity, rising 15 percent a year. To meet demand in the coming decade, according to statistics from the International Energy Agency, China will need to add nearly nine times as much electricity generation capacity as the United States will.¶ So while Americans are used to thinking of themselves as having the world’s largest market in many industries, China’s market for power equipment dwarfs that of the United States, even though the American market is more mature. That means Chinese producers enjoy enormous efficiencies from large-scale production.

#### Investment is also zero-sum---plan causes flight from China by creating certainty in the US

Luke Schoen 12, World Resources Institute, “CLEAN TECH’S RISE, PART I: Will the U.S. and China Reap the Mutual Benefits?”, China FAQS issue brief, April 2012, http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/ChinaFAQs\_IssueBrief1\_MutualBenefits.pdf

China itself, meanwhile, is becoming a critical market. In¶ recent years, it has become the world’s largest source of,¶ and destination for, investment in clean energy.¶ 9¶ China is¶ expected to invest at least $300 billion in domestic clean¶ energy technologies over the next five years¶ 10¶ as part of its¶ drive to curb greenhouse gas emissions, gain economic¶ benefits, and improve energy security, in pursuit of¶ aggressive renewable energy deployment targets in its¶ 12¶ th¶ Five-Year Plan¶ 11¶ (see table).¶ “There is no doubt that the¶ country remains committed to the ongoing development¶ of its renewable energy sector,” notes a recent analysis¶ from Ernst & Young.¶ 12¶ The investment race, meanwhile,¶ is heating up. In 2010, China invested a world-leading $45¶ billion in clean energy, while the U.S. slipped to second¶ place with about $33.7 billion.¶ In 2011, however, the U.S.¶ recaptured the lead, with investment surging to¶ $48 billion, while China invested $45.5 billion.¶ 13¶ China’s clear commitment to clean energy has made it¶ “attractive to U.S. and international investors” because it¶ offers “the certainty they are looking for before investing,”¶ notes Deborah Seligsohn, a China specialist with the ¶ World Resources Institute and WRI’s ChinaFAQs project.¶ Companies including First Solar, GE, Duke Energy,¶ American Electric Power, and many other U.S. firms have¶ all invested or expressed interest in investing in China,¶ and “increasingly entrepreneurs with new ideas are¶ looking to China to make those ideas become a reality.”

#### Financing is leaving the US for China now because of lack of production incentives

Romm 11 Dr. Joseph Romm is a Senior Fellow @ American Progress. “United States slipped to third in clean energy race,” March 29, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/03/29/207777/united-states-third-clean-energy-race/

 “The United States’ position as a leading destination for clean energy investment is declining because its policy framework is weak and uncertain,” said Phyllis Cuttino, director of Pew’s Clean Energy Program. “We are at risk of losing even more financing to countries like China, Germany and India, which have adopted strong policies such as renewable energy standards, carbon reduction targets and/or incentives for investment and production. In today’s global economic race, the United States can’t afford to be to be a follower in this sector.” That China passed us a couple of years ago should have been a wake-up call (see Steven Chu on why China’s bid for clean energy leadership should be our “Sputnik Moment”). Dropping to third behind Germany, though, should be equally worrisome. It means U.S. clean energy manufacturing is being squeezed from every side. Michael Liebreich, CEO of Bloomberg New Energy Finance, added, “The United States remains the global leader in clean energy innovation, receiving 75 percent of all venture capital investment in the sector, a total of $6 billion in 2010, but the U.S. has not been creating demand for deployment of clean energy. As a result it is losing out on opportunities to attract investment, create manufacturing capabilities and spur job growth. For example, worldwide, China is now the leading manufacturer of wind turbines and solar panels.”

#### Plan reverses uncertainty---brings in tons of investment from the sidelines

Pew 10 Pew Charitable Trust. “Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race?” http://www.pewenvironment.org/uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/G-20Report-LOWRes-FINAL.pdf

Although clean energy investment increased 51 percent in 2010 to $34 billion, the United States fell to third place among G-20 members, one year after it lost top billing and slid to second place. Current-year investments in the United States are roughly equivalent to the $33 billion recorded in 2007. For a variety of reasons, the United States’ competitive position appears to be eroding. Stimulus funding that helped the clean energy industry recover from sharp recessionary declines will expire this year, and there is little indication of any significant policies or incentives to fill the gap in the near future. In fact, investors have noted ongoing uncertainty in United States. policy as a key reason that total investment directed toward the solar sector among G-20 members and remains one of the largest producers of solar panels in the world. capital is sitting on the sidelines, or looking for certainty and opportunity abroad. Concerns include a lack of clarity on the direction of energy policy, uncertainty surrounding continuation of key financial incentives (e.g., production and investment tax credits), and disproportionate government supports for century-old fossil energy sources. These uncertainties for clean energy are reflected in the United States’ subpar standing on a variety of key measures, including the five-year rate of investment growth and investment intensity. The United States also has fallen to second place in installed clean energy capacity, behind China and just ahead of Germany. Although it is second in wind energy capacity globally, the United States installed 50 percent fewer gigawatts of wind power in 2010 than it did in 2009. Its installed solar power capacity ranks fifth in the world. The United States continues to hold an overwhelming advantage in the area of venture capital/private equity investment, accounting for 73 percent of the G-20 total in 2010. The United States also attracted two-thirds of all G-20 investment in energy efficiency, in part because the nation’s efficiency level trails that of European and other G-20 members. Absent adoption of predictable, ambitious, longterm clean energy policies, the United States will have substantial difficulty keeping pace with China and other rapidly growing clean energy economies.

#### Chinese economic collapse causes World War III

Plate 3 Tom is the Distinguished Scholar of Asian and Pacific Studies at Loyola Marymount University. Mr. Plate is a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, the Century Association of New York and the Phi Beta Kappa Society. “WHY NOT INVADE CHINA?” June 30, The Straits Times, Lexis

But imagine a China disintegrating -- on its own, without neo-con or CIA prompting, much less outright military invasion -- because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. Refugees by the gazillions would head for Indonesia and other poorly border-patrolled places, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their chops for World War II Redux and look to annex a slice of China. That would send small but successful Singapore and Malaysia -- once Japanese colonies -- into absolute nervous breakdowns. India might make a grab for Tibet, and while it does, Pakistan for Kashmir. Say hello to World War III Asia-style!

#### Chinese lashout results in biological and nuclear strikes

The Epoch Times, Renxing San, 8/4/2005, 8/4, http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-4/30931.html

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that all will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: that of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

#### Bioweapons cause extinction

Ochs 2 | Past president of the Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition, Member of the Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project, and M of the Chemical Weapons Working Group [Richard Ochs, , June 9, 2002, “Biological Weapons Must Be Abolished Immediately,” <http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>]

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a “nuclear winter,” resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope?

## CP

#### Hegemonic retrenchment’s key to avoid great power war---maintaining unipolarity’s self-defeating which internal link-turns their offense

Nuno P. Monteiro 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40

From the perspective of the overall peacefulness of the international system, then, no U.S. grand strategy is, as in the Goldilocks tale, “just right.”116 In fact, each strategic option available to the unipole produces significant conflict. Whereas offensive and defensive dominance will entangle it in wars against recalcitrant minor powers, disengagement will produce regional wars among minor and major powers. Regardless of U.S. strategy, conflict will abound. Indeed, if my argument is correct, the significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades will continue for as long as U.S. power remains preponderant.

From the narrower perspective of the unipole’s ability to avoid being involved in wars, however, disengagement is the best strategy. A unipolar structure provides no incentives for conflict involving a disengaged unipole. Disengagement would extricate the unipole’s forces from wars against recalcitrant minor powers and decrease systemic pressures for nuclear proliferation. There is, however, a downside. Disengagement would lead to heightened conflict beyond the unipole’s region and increase regional pressures for nuclear proliferation. As regards the unipole’s grand strategy, then, the choice is between a strategy of dominance, which leads to involvement in numerous conflicts, and a strategy of disengagement, which allows conflict between others to fester.

In a sense, then, strategies of defensive and offensive dominance are self-defeating. They create incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to bolster their capabilities and present the United States with a tough choice: allowing them to succeed or resorting to war in order to thwart them. This will either drag U.S. forces into numerous conflicts or result in an increasing number of major powers. In any case, U.S. ability to convert power into favorable outcomes peacefully will be constrained.117

This last point highlights one of the crucial issues where Wohlforth and I differ—the benefits of the unipole’s power preponderance. Whereas Wohlforth believes that the power preponderance of the United States will lead all states in the system to bandwagon with the unipole, I predict that states engaged in security competition with the unipole’s allies and states for whom the status quo otherwise has lesser value will not accommodate the unipole. To the contrary, these minor powers will become recalcitrant despite U.S. power preponderance, displaying the limited pacifying effects of U.S. power.

What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”120

At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level of conflict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major powers and the magnitude of the conflicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system.

Finally, my argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.”121 By putting other states in extreme self-help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid being involved in wars. If the unipole fails to exercise restraint, other states will develop their capabilities, including nuclear weapons—restraining it all the same.122 Paradoxically, then, more relative power does not necessarily lead to greater influence and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect, unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint.

#### Attempting to preserve hegemony backfires---causes counterbalancing and great power war

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On major questions of global economy and security, interests, not ideology or an anti-U.S. leadership strategy, are driving emerging powers' shifting alliances. Despite efforts to find a West/Rest or democratic/autocratic divide in international order, such divisions are not dominant thus far. Cooperation on global finance and counterterrorism in no way guarantees cooperation on energy and climate, or regional security. The United States has been as likely to find support from China as from Europe on many of the major challenges it confronts. At the Toronto meeting of the G-20, the United States, China, India and Brazil banded against the United Kingdom, Germany and Australia on questions of stimulus versus fiscal restraint. The U.S. perspective on terrorism has been closer to the Indian or Russian standpoint than to the European approach. The United States and Europe worked closely with Russia to persuade a reluctant China to join hands on Iran. On climate change, the United States is no more closely aligned to Japan or Europe than it is to India or China. The Western alliance (but not a democratic alliance) lives on in issues dominated by values debates-human rights, democracy promotion, and to a lesser degree, development.

The result is a partial shift in the U.S. position. True, the United States no longer enjoys the status of unrivaled hyper-power that it maintained after the end of the Cold War, or the status of "leader of the free world" that characterized its position in the western alliance during the Cold War. U.S. dominance is dulled, but its influence remains substantial. With the change in the structure of international order, the U.S. position has morphed into something equivalent to the position of the largest minority shareholder in a modern corporation-a position not of control, but of substantial influence. Its influence, however, has to be wielded in a new mode.

With today's power distribution, no one actor, and no one set of actors, commands an automatic majority of "votes." Setting the rules of the game, solving crises and taking advantage of opportunities requires coalitions among "shareholders." On any given vote among shareholders, the largest minority shareholder can be outvoted if the rest band together-as the United States found in Copenhagen. But by the same token, the largest shareholder, even if a minority shareholder, has more options available to them than any other actor to forge temporary alliances to produce enough of a majority-sometimes a decisive majority-to win a specific vote. The United States can work with India and African states to win a vote on peacekeeping issues, with China and Brazil to win a decision on financial regulation, and with Russia and Europe on the management of Iran.

No other state has anything like this range of tactical alliances available to them. This extends to convening power. The largest minority shareholder cannot demand a shareholder meeting; but if they call for one, most other shareholders are likely to agree to attend. For all of the fact of the prominence of the emerging powers in the G-20 response to the financial crisis, efforts by other states to generate a coordinated response floundered; only the United State had the authority to convene the G-20 summit. Theoretically, India or China could have convened the Nuclear Security Summit-but it was the United States that did so.

This is a complex game, where the United States can no longer get its way just by force of its own position, or lead a stable alliance against a common threat. Crafting decisions requires complex "voting alliances" that will need to be forged vote by vote, or issue by issue. This requires courting relationships with a wide range of shareholders and a willingness to return favors of a variety of types. Still, it is a position of substantial influence. The comparative ease with which the largest minority shareholder can pull together a coalition to reach a blocking majority confers a role that can best be described as "gravitational pull." No other shareholder can afford to band permanently against you, lest it risk seeing its interests in the "board" vitally damaged. Some shareholders may occasionally be tempted to play spoiler roles on individual votes, but if they push this too far they will provoke banding behavior by other shareholders protecting their interests-as China learned on currency issues and Russia learned in its efforts to annex South Ossetia, roundly condemned by the emerging powers as well as the West. When this occurs, the others will look first to the largest minority shareholder to lead the way.

But this comparative advantage cannot be overplayed. If the United States attempts to portray its position as that of global hub, or if its strategy were perceived to be one of a resurrection of dominance, it would likely backfire, triggering a deeper banding together of the other powers and middle powers against the U.S. position. To succeed in wielding influence from its new, influential but less dominant position, the United States needs a new mindset about strategy.

PART 2: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

That all of this matters can be illustrated by imagining the negative scenarios if the United States withdraws from leadership functions, no one else steps in, or the powers fail to find ways to cooperate on global challenges-what David Gordon calls the "G-Zero" scenario. In global finance, the results would be swift and disastrous; cooperation this time around prevented something akin to the Great Depression on a global scale. Similarly, consequences would arise if no lead actor or constellation of actors was providing naval assets to secure trade. If global economic negotiations grind to a halt, global trade and finance will begin to erode.

Of course, the primary purpose of international order-to prevent major power war-is even more fundamental. But well short of active conflict between the major powers, mismanagement of the changing international system can pose tremendous costs for the United States and virtually everyone else.

Avoiding a G-Zero scenario, a major power conflict, and continued high U.S. expenditure against leadership functions that produce stability should be key U.S. goals. And that requires three elements of strategy: fostering cooperation and burden-sharing on global finance, transnational threats and development; renegotiating rules of the road for economic, energy and climate competition; and investing in tools for crisis de-escalation and management. This should be complemented by frank debate, but not firm divides, on human rights.

Fostering cooperation on global finance and transnational threats

In the realm of global finance, the United States has adapted to the new realities swiftly and gracefully. The creation of the G-20 Summit, the decision to accept new International Monetary Fund (IMF) monitoring on U.S. financial decisions, and a new agreement to give China, India and other rising economies a greater percentage of shares at the IMF have been remarkable. The creation of the new Financial Stability Board and the shift in global economic order have also been significant. This outcome was indicative of changed realities and a changing American mindset in favor of new voting rights for the rising powers at the IMF, at the expense of European seats.

Extending cooperation to other issues is easy to wish for, harder to do. But as noted above, U.S. and emerging powers' interests align in several areas, including on some security issues. The Bush administration, its rhetoric notwithstanding, pursued an agenda of cooperation on security issues, through formal and informal arrangements-pushing for an enormous expansion in UN peacekeeping, fostering informal arrangements to tackle nuclear smuggling (the Proliferation Security Initiative), and building strong bilateral cooperation with China, India and Russia on terrorism issues. The Obama administration has taken a similar two-track approach: fostering informal arrangements like the Nuclear Security Summit, which has translated into ongoing cooperation to protect nuclear materials; and using the UN Security Council to coordinate major power approaches to Iran and North Korea, with some important success.

A similar combination of formal and informal approaches could help to solidify cooperation on terrorism and other transnational threats. For example, navel cooperation against piracy is being pursued and could be extended. The U.S. Navy patrolling alongside the Chinese, Indian, Russian, Japanese and European navies off the coast of Somalia provides a compelling case study of shared interests. The fact of a UN Security Council resolution completes the picture, and provides an interesting model that squares the circle between the U.S. instinct for informal arrangements, and the European and emerging powers' desire to reinforce the formal arrangements of the UN. Over time, aspects of this model could be extended to burden-sharing on trade security in more sensitive locations.

It is debatable whether such cooperation could be extended to active crises, for example on Afghanistan/Pakistan. Certainly Russia, China and India do not have an interest in the return of the Taliban or the ascendancy of al Qaeda, or in the further destabilization of Pakistan. But there are two basic problems. First, is a classic of cooperation problems. The threat is shared, but unequally. Relative costs matter. Both China and Russia lose from insecurity in western Pakistan-but India and the United States lose more. A challenge for strategy is to find arrangements that create incentives for cooperation or regulated competition, even in the non-collapse scenarios. This is a key role for institutional arrangements, as opposed to ad hoc cooperation. In ad hoc cooperation, the relative losses question will loom large, whereas institutional approaches can create bureaucratic and elite interests that trump relative losses. A second set of problems are habit, capacity and trust. Few of the emerging powers have the habit, or even the tools, for strategy cooperation on security problems. The United States has tried to engage China on scenario planning on North Korea, for example, and has been rebuffed. India's diplomatic capacity is thin and already over-stretched. These constraints will change rapidly, though, and it might be wise not to start on North Korea or Pakistan, but rather to build trust in significant, second order problems such as Somalia or Yemen.

A further area where cooperation can grow is development. Sustaining global economic recovery will require a serious effort to support growth for middle income and less-developed states. After resisting the agenda, the G-20 has created a development group that, so far, has found far more common ground than differences. Before that, the new monies and new ideas emanating from the emerging powers had been treated as a threat rather than a source of new energy. The West's and the emerging powers' interests in development do not entirely align, especially on issues like corruption, but there is a base of shared interest in new and stable growth. Given the continuing failure of western development strategies, an open mind and genuine dialogue seem warranted.

Cooperative efforts serve two purposes. They are important for functional reasons; the issues need to be managed, and their distributed nature means that collective efforts are a necessity, not a luxury. However, fostering deeper collaboration has a second, ordering effect-forging a sense of what the Obama administration has called "shared security." This matters both for government-to-government relations and the broader public narrative. The domestic resonance of competitive and conflictual dynamics tends to outweigh cooperation. Every Chinese and Japanese citizen knows their two countries clashed over maritime issues in September 2010; hardly any know that they are patrolling jointly in the Gulf of Aden. Counterterrorism cooperation is one area that can compete in domestic salience. For U.S. audiences, against the charge that China is cheating on currency rules, "they're helping us on trade security" sounds abstract; "they're helping us on al Qaeda" carries more punch. Counterterrorism cooperation should have greater visibility in both countries.

Shared interests in tackling transnational threats will only be a part of an overall sense of security. Other security issues-regional security and energy security-will drive divergence. But deeper collaboration on shared threats can contextualize the inevitable confrontations ahead.

Regulating economic and energy competition

In other areas, the nature of U.S., European and emerging power interests will push towards competitive rather than cooperative dynamics. The G-20 has already shifted-perhaps too quickly-from a mode of crisis response to negotiating new modes of regulation to prevent future crises. That takes it into the terrain of negotiating the rules of competition (on currency, regulation of financial products, etc.). Here again, issues of relative loss loom large. Everyone loses if the bottom drops out from global financial systems, but states profit or lose differently from different regulations; hence fierce competition.

Similar competitive dynamics over the rules have blocked deeper trade cooperation in recent years. In the WTO, divergences between the United States, Europe and the emerging powers have stymied new openings in the Doha round, as every actor plays for optimal outcomes, resulting in no outcome at all. Such dynamics will likely be increasingly common in international negotiations on global economic regulation. In some settings, the emerging powers are divided. On the issue of regulating intellectual property rights, for example, China has avoided siding with other developing countries that challenge the existing rules. Still, in this realm of the "software"of globalization, the United States may have no choice but to pay more attention to the interests and ideas of new powers, and to give some ground. U.S. dominance has enabled a somewhat less than level playing field, tilted to our advantage. Trying too hard to retain that advantage runs the risk of triggering the G-Zero scenario. One way or another, global economic diplomacy will matter more in the years ahead, and that must be reflected in the allocation of diplomatic resources-as indeed is acknowledged in the QDDR's proposals for "elevating economic diplomacy."

Issues of relative loss and relative gain may be particularly hard to manage on questions of energy, carbon and scarce resources. The issues will shape the question of whether contemporary relationships between the United States and the other major powers tilt towards the collaborative, the competitive or the conflictual. This is not the place to spell out in detail the kinds of area or resource specific agreements that may help ameliorate the worst of "race to the bottom" behavior that might otherwise characterize the sphere of energy security and climate change. Suffice it to say, a component of U.S. order strategy should be to balance U.S. economic and energy needs with the long-term risks of failure to forge an agreement on climate and the short-term conflict risks of unregulated competition over energy.

This does not mean abandoning any sense that some of these areas can serve as zones of cooperation. There is a great deal of loose talk about scarce water and the likelihood of an uptick in conflict over water resources. History suggests otherwise. Countries that have competing needs for access to a water source have more frequently forged agreements to cooperate on preserving and sharing that source than fought over it. U.S.-China joint initiatives on carbon-sequestering technology also illustrate the potential for win-win approaches. Still, competitive mindsets prevail. Genuine shortages of strategic minerals, food supplies and arable land, combined with mercantile policy, do seem set to cause rough competition, veering into conflict.

Investing in tools for crisis de-escalation and management

Because competition is inevitable, and because regional security dilemmas will almost certainly prove more complicated over time, a third and critical component of strategy will be to invest up front in tools for crisis de-escalation and management.

Much of this will be region specific. But across the board, a key element for the United States is to be imaginative in using flexible coalitions of other countries (or "shareholders") to bolster its own diplomacy. When the United States sought to isolate Russia over its effort to annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia, western unity was not the death-blow to Russia's effort-it was China's firm condemnation of Russia's position. When the United States sought to respond to China's growing assertiveness in the South China Seas, the most helpful request for U.S. engagement was not the predictable one from Japan, but the surprising one from Vietnam. So long as the United States is viewed as a critical part of managing the global balance of power, its presence will help defuse clashes with the emerging powers.

We can also be creative about the role of middle powers. Against a backdrop of mounting competition and tense exchanges between the Arctic powers, it was Norway and Denmark, that drafted agreements with Russia and the United States which led to a lowering of tensions and agreement to use International Maritime Organization conventions to manage boundary disputes in the Arctic. Could similar middle power roles be used to defuse boundary tensions or create third-party de-escalation mechanisms in other regions? At the most creative, one could imagine a third-party mechanism being on call for China, Japan, Russia and the United States to help resolve boundary disputes and/or naval incidents in the South China Seas. One such multi-nation mechanism was used by South Korea to investigate the Cheonan sinking, but because that mechanism was not pre-agreed by China, it had modest impact on crisis diplomacy. Could a more robust, if still informal, third-party mechanism provide more concrete crisis prevention and management tools? These issues warrant quiet exploration.

The United States can and should also invest in reinforcing the UN Security Council (UNSC). During the Cold War, the UNSC gave the United States and the Soviet Union a joint tool for crisis de-escalation. In the Middle East, for example, faced with crises between their respective Israeli and Arab allies, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on several occasions to Security Council ceasefire resolutions and peacekeeping deployments. These halted crises before they could escalate into direct superpower confrontations.

Growing use of the UNSC has been a point of surprising commonality between the Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. This, however, was during a period of U.S. dominance. With new influence for new actors, the issue of membership reform hangs over the Security Council's future utility. The issue is probably less complicated than generally believed, and it is worth noting that if India and Japan were full members, the UNSC would have all the Asian powers-creating a crisis management platform for that region where the shift in the balance of power will be most volatile.

Still, even if there were a positive vote in the General Assembly (GA) today for membership change, it would be years before the required two-thirds of the GA's membership had undertaken the necessary domestic ratification procedures for Charter reform. So, pursuing UNSC expansion does not negate the need for interim measures. Functional cooperation with the emerging powers on nuclear security, counterterrorism and piracy helps, but does not provide either a crisis response mechanism per se, or the underlying relationships between senior national security officials that can be called upon in times of an acute crisis. (The fact of a pre-existing G-20 mechanism among finance ministers was vital for allowing swift alignment between G-20 leaders during the financial crisis.)

Crisis management capacity could be developed in several ways: creating an informal mechanism that links national security advisors or foreign ministry officials of the P5 plus the emerging powers around common threats; involving foreign ministries in G-20 sherpa mechanisms (as was often done for the G7); or having a separate process through which G-20 (or G8 plus 5) foreign ministers meet. A more radical, but perhaps interesting, idea is to take the UNSC's Military Staff Committee out of retirement and bring the emerging powers (and others) into its deliberations as relevant to the specific topic or crisis. This could provide a "trial run" of UNSC reform that neither threatens the legitimacy of the UN, nor risks diluting the focus of the G-20, nor locks the United States into untested membership change.

And there are interesting models of both informal and semi-formal major power cooperation in crisis containment under UNSC mandates. In Afghanistan, NATO operates under a UNSC mandate that enables not only NATO allies but also others, like Australia, the UAE and Singapore, to deploy. In Southern Lebanon, at America's behest, France, Germany, Italy, India and China are all deployed under a UNSC mandate, and with a bespoke management arrangement (the Strategic Military Cell) that operates outside the normal command structures of the UN Secretariat. And again, there is the example of counter-piracy cooperation in the Horn of Africa.

Frank debate, not firm divides, on human rights

Finally, it is important to touch on what may be the most contentious of issues between the United States and the emerging powers, namely human rights.

On basic human rights issues, the key dynamic will be between the West and China. Neither domestic reality, nor good strategy, will allow the United States to ignore the human rights issues with China. But U.S. diplomacy on the issue should be cognizant of the relatively limited impact that outside pressure will have on China's evolution and the broader context to the relationship-a balance admirably struck by President Obama during President Hu Jintao's January 2011 visit to Washington. President Hu's acknowledgment that China had "issues" with human rights was a mild opening, but certainly one worth pursuing.

More broadly, using human rights standards or issues of democracy promotion as a yardstick for cooperation will backfire. On both issues, emerging power behavior combines a defense of sovereignty (fundamental to their security) with a tradition of resisting western interventionism. Democratic India, Brazil and South Africa routinely vote with their NAM friends and against the West in the Human Rights Council. Moreover, while issues like "the responsibility to protect" are presumed to divide the "West from the rest," and do so in rhetoric, reality is more complex. India and South Africa spoke out strongly against NATO's action in Kosovo, which was supported by the Organization of Islamic Countries; France, Russia and Germany banded together to block U.S. action in Iraq.

So, contentious, yes; neatly dividing the west from the rest, no. There is complexity not cleavage here. And an effort to use human rights or democratic criteria to drive hard cleavages in the international system would likely provoke more serious banding together by the emerging powers-against, not in favor of, our strategy.

CONCLUSION

America has rebounded from dips in its influence before. An oil price rise before economic downturn, a brewing crisis in Iran, a rising competitor, domestic divides and a Democratic president facing a resurgent right-welcome to 1978. Still, absent dramatic change, an economic shift to "the rest" will continue, and political influence will follow.

If we foster cooperation where interests allow, and devote serious resources to global economic and energy diplomacy, we can balance the contentious dynamics of regional security and human rights. Preparing for crises by investing in management tools can help de-escalate them when they arrive.

This may fail, as the domestic resonance of competition drives out awareness of shared interests. And it will certainly face substantial obstacles. Europe reluctantly gave up seats at the IMF to accommodate the rising powers, and will resist further reforms. Chinese nationalists may overplay their hand, triggering Western antibodies. Brazil and India can overreach. And an inward looking Congress can undermine the credibility of U.S. strategy, on issues both foreign and so-called domestic (climate, energy, currency). The alternatives, though, are unpalatable: an effort to re-assert American dominance that will almost certainly backfire, or the manifestation of the G-Zero scenario, with risks of direct conflict between the powers.

#### A grand strategy of primacy requires the unipole to freeze the global distribution of power---causes, counter-balancing, and war

Nuno P. Monteiro 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power.60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples.

To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions.61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.”62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions.63

Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conflict but at the price of their external autonomy.64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to benefit greatly from being part of the unipolar system.65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor.66

Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole.

The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conflict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers.67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973.68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable.69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning.

In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor.70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist.71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities.72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme self-help.

There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufficient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The first two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing.

To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons.73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers.

Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt.

The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security.74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue.

#### Framing issue---our evidence contains the only rigorous data-based analysis of the conflict-producing effects of unipolarity---it’s highly war-prone and their ev relies on faulty data

Nuno P. Monteiro 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40

In 1999, however, William Wohlforth challenged the consensus that unipolarity would soon end. Indeed, in “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” he underscored its durability.11 U.S. preponderance is so marked, he wrote, that “[f]or many decades, no state is likely to be in a position to take on the United States in any of the underlying elements of power.”12

Wohlforth further argued that a durable unipolar world is also a peaceful world. In his view, “the existing distribution of capabilities generates incentives for cooperation.”13 U.S. power preponderance not only ends hegemonic rivalry but gives the United States incentives to manage security globally, limiting competition among major powers.14 This benevolent view of unipolarity, which Wohlforth developed further in World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy with his coauthor, Stephen Brooks, emerged as one of the most influential perspectives in debates about current international politics, echoing Francis Fukuyama’s popular view of the “end of history” and the universalization of Western liberal democracy.15

The question of unipolar durability remains the subject of spirited debate. Many analysts, such as Robert Kagan, continue to argue that “American predominance is unlikely to fade any time soon.”16 Others, however, believe that it is in serious decline.17 Potential peer competitors, especially China, are on the rise.18 U.S. travails in Afghanistan and Iraq seem to confirm Paul Kennedy’s argument on the inevitability of imperial overstretch,19 and some see the financial crisis that began in 2008 as the death knell of U.S. predominance.20 Given all of these factors, Robert Pape argues that “the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end.”21

In contrast, the question of unipolar peacefulness has received virtually no attention. Although the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of security studies, with much scholarship on such conflict-generating issues as terrorism, preventive war, military occupation, insurgency, and nuclear proliferation, no one has systematically connected any of them to unipolarity. This silence is unjustified. The first two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but peaceful. U.S. forces have been deployed in four interstate wars: Kuwait in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, and Iraq between 2003 and 2010.22 In all, the United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the end of the Cold War.23 Put another way, the first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation’s total time at war.24 And yet, the theoretical consensus continues to be that unipolarity encourages peace. Why? To date, scholars do not have a theory of how unipolar systems operate.25 The debate on whether, when, and how unipolarity will end (i.e., the debate on durability) has all but monopolized our attention.

In this article, I provide a theory of unipolarity that focuses on the issue of unipolar peacefulness rather than durability. I argue that unipolarity creates significant conflict-producing mechanisms that are likely to involve the unipole itself. Rather than assess the relative peacefulness of unipolarity vis-à-vis bipolar or multipolar systems, I identify causal pathways to war that are characteristic of a unipolar system and that have not been developed in the extant literature. To be sure, I do not question the impossibility of great power war in a unipolar world. Instead, I show how unipolar systems provide incentives for two other types of war: those pitting the sole great power against another state and those involving exclusively other states. In addition, I show that the type of conflict that occurs in a unipolar world depends on the strategy of the sole great power, of which there are three. The first two—defensive and offensive dominance—will lead to conflicts pitting the sole great power against other states. The third—disengagement—will lead to conflicts among other states. Furthermore, whereas the unipole is likely to enter unipolarity implementing a dominance strategy, over time it is possible that it will shift to disengagement.

I support my theory with several empirical examples. These do not aim at systematically testing my argument, for two reasons. First, the unipolar era is too short a period to test structural mechanisms. Second, the United States has consistently implemented a strategy of dominance, limiting opportunities to test my claims on the consequences of disengagement.26

#### Hegemonic retrenchment’s key to prevent war with Russia and China---defuses Georgia, Taiwan and the South China Seas

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, November/December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6

Curbing the United States' commitments would reduce risks, but it cannot eliminate them. Adversaries may fill regional power vacuums, and allies will never behave exactly as Washington would prefer. Yet those costs would be outweighed by the concrete benefits of pulling back. A focus on the United States' core interests in western Europe would limit the risk of catastrophic clashes with Russia over ethnic enclaves in Georgia or Moldova by allowing the United States to avoid commitments it would be unwise to honor. By narrowing its commitments in Asia, the United States could lessen the likelihood of conflict over issues such as the status of Taiwan or competing maritime claims in the South China Sea. Just as the United Kingdom tempered its commitments and accommodated U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere at the turn of the last century, the United States should now temper its commitments and cultivate a lasting compromise with China over Taiwan.

#### U.S. involvement in Georgia means conflict goes nuclear

Guldseth 9, Adviser in Strategic Communication. Post graduate in "Media, Communication and ICT" Russia's new military doctrine opens for first strike nuclear attacks in "local or regional wars", Eistein Guldseth, 10-14-2009

http://writern.blogspot.com/2009/10/russia-might-open-for-first-strike.html

The Russian newspaper Izvestia reports that Cremlin is working on a new military doctrine on first strike use of nuclear arms against “aggressors”. That must include Georgia according to President Medvedev’s statement after the war in Georgia in 2008: “The aggressor has been punished”.

Patrushev: “Nuclear weapons could be used in case of a nuclear attack, but also in 'regional or even local wars.”

According to Izvestia, “Russia will insist on the right to pre-emptive nuclear strikes against aggressor countries in its new military doctrine”, the head of the country's Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, said.

A greater threat to Russia's neighboring countries

This new doctrine is contrary to US nuclear military policy, which do not allow for first strike attacks. This leads us once more to seriously wonder what’s going on in the Cremlin. Such an aggressive move means a further treat to Russia’s bordering countries and serves no civilized purpose. As we have seen the later period, US’ reset has had no impact on the hawks in Moscow when it comes to serious cooperation on for instance Iran. Judging from this doctrine, one could on the contrary be led to believe that Russia today poses a significant greater danger to civilization than Iran: The combination of Putins restoration of Stalin as "a great leader", Russia claiming a priveledged sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, and now the suggested doctrine of first strike use of nuclear arms against local/regional wars and "agressors" should really start to worry all governments in the modern world.

Who's the target?

Georgia certainly will have to seriously consider it self as a prime target for a nuclear attack from Russia.

The latest Russian accusations of Georgia supporting and aiding Al Quaeda operations in Russia is a reminder of the fact that the war is not over. Russia uses all means available to portray Georgia as an aggressor, and thus threatens Georgia with first strike use of nuclear arms if neccessary. Judging by Russia’s willingness to use excessive force in the attack on Georgia in 2008, this represents a real threat to Georgia and also Ukraine, where the situation on the Crimean peninsula is gradually heating up. In fact the whole of North Caucasus might be targeted due to uprise and intensivated terrorist attacs in several regions.

# 1nr

### 2NC No Spillover

#### The court will functionally nullify the aff’s precedent without overruling it – even when future cases are almost identical

Michael J. Gerhardt, Assoc. prof @ William and Wary, Nov. 1991, ‘The Role Of Precedent,’ 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68, p ln

Sometimes, however, the Court can destroy a precedent without overruling it by distinguishing precedents in ways that practically nullify them, thereby obscuring the differences between distinctions and implicit overrulings. 169 The Court's decisions on proportionality of punishment present such a quandary. In 1980, Rummel v. Estelle 170 held by a 5-4 vote that Texas' statutory requirement of mandatory life sentence for a defendant convicted of three felonies, consisting in that case of fraudulent practices cumulatively depriving people of property totaling less than two hundred dollars, did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. But this holding cast doubt on the validity of the Court's prior practice of applying, beyond the death penalty context, the standard that the Eighth Amendment prohibited imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. 171 Subsequently, the Court by a 5-4 vote in Solem v. Helm 172 struck [\*109] down a punishment scheme almost identical to Rummel, except that Solem involved a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. Justice Blackmun was the swing vote in Solem, but he did not write an opinion. Rather, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Solem was virtually identical to his Rummel dissent, prompting the dissenters in Solem to claim that Rummel was being overruled sub silentio. 173 In Harmelin v. Michigan, 174 the Court recently tried to resolve the confusion Rummel and Solem had generated. The five-member majority upheld Michigan's imposition of a mandatory life sentence without parole for drug possession but split over how to deal with Solem. While Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia argued that Solem should be overruled because it embodied an unworkable standard and was inconsistent with prior decisions and original intent, 175 Justice Kennedy in a separate concurrence (joined by Justices Souter and O'Connor) refused the entreaty to overrule Solem and instead tried to reconcile Solem and Harmelin on the ground that the Eighth Amendment "forbids only extreme sentences that are *'grossly* disproportionate to the crime.'" 176

#### The aff doesn’t set a precedent – Court can limit the impact to the aff

Stephen F. Smith, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, April 2002, Texas Law Review, Activism As Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1057

The end result after decades of case-by-case refinement (and frequently revisionism) was a considerable change in Miranda doctrine, but not a complete evisceration of Miranda. Neither Warren nor Rehnquist got to have his first-best preference. What they did get was a second-best approach in which the suspect must be given basic information as to his rights and has the power, by making (and sticking to) an unequivocal request for counsel, to stop all questioning. Of course, the police have ample latitude to use persuasion or clever, noncoercive means to cause suspects not to exercise that power and, ultimately, to make incriminating statements that can be used against them at trial. n213 After Dickerson, it would appear that Miranda law is finally at an equilibrium that almost all of the Justices - including supporters and critics of Miranda - can accept, as shown by the fact that seven of the nine Justices signed onto without comment an opinion reaffirming both Miranda and all of the limitations and exceptions adopted over the ensuing three decades. n214 This is the advantage of reactivism - it provides an efficacious means by which a Court that fundamentally disagrees with earlier precedents, but is unwilling or unable to overrule them explicitly, can move the law (and, with it, actual case outcomes) back in what it believes to be the right direction. The legal system and the public thereby gain, to varying degrees, the benefits of the overruling. At the same time, reactivism allows risk-averse Justices and the Court as an institution to avoid the unpleasant consequences of overruling that have historically made Justices so reluctant [\*1112] to overrule even the most indefensible decisions. n215 Thus, the law gets "fixed" in a way that avoids sharp doctrinal shifts.

\*\*\*FYI – “reactivism” includes “limiting or distinguishing prior precedent in ways that undermine the precedent, as well as adopting compensating rules, such as decision rules in criminal procedure, that do not undermine the precedential value of the earlier decision but nevertheless, in practical terms, reduce the real-world impact of the decision.”\*\*\*

#### Court will distinguish the scope of the aff’s plan – even if fiat is durable, they can’t control future application

Thomas G. Hansford & James F. Spriggs, 8-7-2007, “The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court,” http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8204.html

Second, the Court can negatively interpret a precedent by restricting its reach or calling into question its continuing importance. The Court can, for example, distinguish a precedent by finding it inapplicable to a new factual situation, limit a case by restating the legal rule in a narrower fashion, or even overrule a case and declare that it is no longer binding law (see Baum 2001, 142; Gerhardt 1991, 98-109; Johnson 1985, 1986; Maltz 1988, 382-88; Murphy and Pritchett 1979, 491-95). With this kind of interpretation, the Court expresses some level of disagreement with the precedent and, as a result, may undercut the legal authority of a precedent and diminish its applicability to other legal disputes.

## T

#### Including energy regulations adds five million research hours

Tugwell 88 Franklin Tugwell joined The Asia Foundation's Board of Trustees in 2010. Dr. Tugwell has served as the President and CEO of Winrock International since 1999. Previously, Dr. Tugwell was the executive director of the Heinz Endowments of Pittsburgh, the founder and president of the Environment Enterprises Assistance Fund, and as a senior consultant for International Projects and Programs at PG&E Enterprises. He served as a deputy assistant administrator at USAID (1980-1981) and as a senior analyst for the energy program at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1979-1980). Dr. Tugwell was also a professor at Pomona College and an adjunct distinguished professor at the Heinz School of Carnegie Mellon University. Additionally, he serves on the Advisory Board and International Committee of the American Council on Renewable Energy and on the Joint Board of Councilors of the China-U.S. Center for Sustainable Development. He also serves on the Board of Eucord (European Cooperative for International Development). Dr. Tugwell received a PhD in political science from Columbia University. “The Energy Crisis and the American Political Economy,” ISBN 0-8047-1500-9

 Finally, administering energy regulations proved a costly and cumbersome endeavor, exacting a price all citizens had to pay. As the energy specialist Paul MacAvoy has noted: "More than 300,000 firms were required to respond to controls, ranging from the three dozen major refining companies to a quarter of a million retailers of petroleum products. The respondents had to file more than half a million reports each year, which probably took more than five million man-hours to prepare, at an estimated cost alone of $80 mil- lion."64 To these expenditures must be added the additional costs to the government of collecting and processing these reports, monitor- ing compliance, and managing the complex process associated with setting forth new regulations and adjudicating disputes. All to- gether, it seems likely that the administrative costs, private and public, directly attributable to the regulatory process also exceeded $1 billion a year from 1974 to 1980.^

#### Including energy regs is too big---it’s torture for the neg

Edwards 80 Opinion in BAYOU BOUILLON CORP. v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit. May 5

Comprehending the applicability and complexity of federal energy regulation necessitates both a stroll down the tortuous legislative path and a review of legal challenges so numerous as to require the establishment of a Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.

#### That destroys education---too much to comprehend

Stafford 83 G. William is an Associate at Ross, Marsh and Foster. Review of “Federal Regulation of Energy” by William F. Fox, Jr, http://felj.org/elj/Energy%20Journals/Vol6\_No2\_1985\_Book\_Review2.pdf

It may safely be said that any effort to catalogue "the entire spectrum of federal regulation of energy"' in a single volume certainly requires an enterprising effort on the part of the author. In this regard, Mr. Willam F. Fox, Jr., an Associate Professor of Law at Catholic University of America, has undertaken an examination of a vital aspect of United States policy in Federal Regulation of Energy, published in 1983 with an annual pocket supplement available. Despite the complex nature of the subject of his work, Mr. Fox has prepared a text that provides a significant description of many aspects of federal energy regulatory policy. Initially, the book's title may prove somewhat misleading in that it approaches the subject from an historical perspective focused more on substantive than procedural issues. Although a reader gets the impression that the author at time has tried to do too much -at least from the standpoint of the energy practitioner- the historical and technical insights it offers the student of federal energy relation are valuable. Moreover; its detailed explanations of the methods used to tneet federal energy goals are useful for those in the position of initiating energy policy. This strength notwithstanding, it appears unlikely that an energy law practitioner would benefit significantly from its use, other than from its historical point of view. A general impression is that the author may have been overly ambitious in his effort to undertake the monumental task of evaluating laws, regulations, and significant judicial decisions in a single work.

#### Exon-Florio is only a restriction on foreign investments – even though these may end up increasing energy production, the Amendment is not a restriction on the production itself

Marchick, Plotkin and Fagan 5 David, Mark and David, “National Security Regulation of Foreign Investments and Acquistions in the United States,” China Law and Practice, June, pg 1

The US holds, unquestionably, the greatest market potential for outward Chinese investment. As they explore investment options in the US, however, Chinese companies and their counsel must be aware of an important, but little known investment review law--the Exon-Florio Amendment. Exon-Florio enables the US government to restrict, reject or impose conditions on foreign investments into the country on national security grounds. The law has become increasingly relevant in the wake of the September 11 attacks. In particular, Chinese and other Asian companies and investment funds, together with their respective lawyers, need to be mindful of the US government's right to review FDIs on national security grounds when the contemplated transaction involves a US economic sector deemed to be "critical infrastructure".

#### Prefer our Anell evidence---he defines ‘restriction on production’---they don’t---key to predictability

Haneman 59 J.A.D. is a justice of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. “Russell S. Bertrand et al. v. Donald T. Jones et al.,” 58 NJ Super. 273; 156 A.2d 161; 1959 N.J. Super, Lexis

HN4 In ascertaining the meaning of the word "restrictions" as here employed, it must be considered in context with the entire clause in which it appears. It is to be noted that the exception concerns restrictions "which have been complied with." Plainly, this connotes a representation of compliance by the vendor with any restrictions upon the permitted uses of the subject property. The conclusion that "restrictions" refer solely to a limitation of the manner in which the vendor may [\*\*\*14] use his own lands is strengthened by the further provision found in said clause that the conveyance is "subject to the effect, [\*\*167] if any, of municipal zoning laws." Municipal zoning laws affect the use of property.¶ HN5 A familiar maxim to aid in the construction of contracts is noscitur a sociis. Simply stated, this means that a word is known from its associates. Words of general and specific import take color from each other when associated together, and thus the word of general significance is modified by its associates of restricted sense. 3 Corbin on Contracts, § 552, p. 110; cf. Ford Motor Co. v. New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry, 5 N.J. 494 (1950). The [\*284] word "restrictions," therefore, should be construed as being used in the same limited fashion as "zoning."

#### Evaluating hypothetical possibility of compliance is unreasonable

William L. Wehrum, William L. Wehrum, Hunton & Williams LLP, 8/3/12, WHITE STALLION ENERGY CENTER, LLC, et al., Petitioners, v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent, BRIEF OF INDUSTRY AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS, http://www.nam.org/~/media/2AA72BFA88F74E1B881D5BB46465B765/White\_Stallion\_Energy\_Center\_v\_EPA\_brief\_08032012.pdf

In other words, EPA’s floor methodology is based on what it believes is hypothetically “achievable” by some non-existent source, not what has been “achieved in practice” by the best actual source. And it does so without considering the beyond-the-floor factors as required under Section 112(d)(2). As EPA has explained elsewhere, such an approach is inconsistent with Section 112’s requirements: “[w]hen determining the existing source level of control, identification of a similar emission unit does not mean that the controls will automatically be applied to the MACT emission unit. Costs, non-air quality health and environmental impacts, and energy requirements should be used to assess the technologies ability to meet MACT criteria.” EPA 112(j) Guidelines at 3-19 to 3- 20 (emphasis added); see also 70 Fed. Reg. 59,402, 59,443 (Oct. 12, 2005) (rejecting a “straight emissions methodology” as creating “arbitrary” and “impermissible” results, including “a beyond the floor standard without consideration of the beyond the floor factors”).¶ C. MACT standards for new sources must be “achieved in practice,” not theoretically achievable by some nonexistent source.¶ Even if the statute is somehow deemed ambiguous, EPA’s pollutant-by- pollutant approach to setting the floor is unreasonable. “[A]chieved in practice” means more than the theoretical possibility of compliance from an imagined source:¶ It is reasonable to suppose that if an emissions standard is as stringent as “the emissions control that is achieved in practice” by a particular unit, then that particular unit will not violate the standard. This only results if “achieved in practice” is interpreted to mean “achieved under the worst foreseeable circumstances.”¶ Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). Instead of identifying the “best controlled similar source,” EPA established separate floors using emissions data from different sources representing the lowest emissions test result for each source, creating a set of standards reflecting the performance of a hypothetical source rather than the actual best controlled similar source.6 Id. (noting “use of the singular in the statutory language suggests” that EPA should consider the “unit with the best observed performance”). Yet, as Petitioners have demonstrated, EPA failed to demonstrate that even the multiple best controlled similar sources that it identified in setting the Utility MACT standards “will not violate” the standards that are based on the performance of those very units.¶ The need to identify a single source that has achieved the best control “in practice” is particularly important with respect to ensuring that the best controlled similar source “will not violate the standard” because controls installed to reduce one HAP may have antagonistic effects on other HAPs. EPA recognized this fact but ignored it in adopting its pollutant-by-pollutant approach to establishing MACT floors:¶ The EPA notes ... that if optimized performance for different HAP is not technologically possible due to mutually inconsistent control technologies (for example, if metals performance decreased if organics reduction is optimized), then this would have to be taken into account by the EPA in establishing a floor (or floors). The Senate Report indicates that if certain types of otherwise needed controls are mutually exclusive, the EPA is to optimize the part of the standard providing the most environmental protection. S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong. 1st sess. 168 (although, as noted, the bill accompanying this Report contained no floor provisions).¶ EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20126 at 433 (emphases added) (Ex. 6); see also id. at 447 (“The EPA is aware that the performance of one control technology can affect the performance of other in-stream control technologies.”).¶ It is unreasonable to interpret the CAA to allow for standards that purport to have been “achieved in practice,” but that will not be “achievable” by actual affected sources, much less the “best controlled similar source” used to set the standard. MACT floors are based on what has been “achieved in practice,” and “beyond-the-floor” standards are based on what is “achievable” considering cost and other factors. Compare 42 U.S.C. §7412(d)(2) and §7412(d)(3). The logic of the MACT floor is self-evident. The statute reasonably presumes new sources can replicate any emission level that has already been achieved by an existing source. Section 112 “thus embodies an assumption that standards based on achievability will be more stringent than ones based merely on past achievement.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (Williams, J., concurring).¶ EPA’s current pollutant-by-pollutant methodology for establishing MACT floors for new sources results in floors that themselves are not achievable (i.e., the MACT floors are more stringent than “beyond-the-floor” standards could be). Hence, EPA has adopted an interpretation that is “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” Id. at 885. Judge Williams recognized that EPA must avoid such a result and “keep[] the relation between ‘achieved’ and ‘achievable’ in accord with common sense and the reasonable meaning of the statute.” Id. In adopting its current pollutant-by-pollutant approach to setting floors, EPA failed to adhere to this directive.

#### Exon-Florio reviews are explicitly REGULATIONS not RESTRICTIONS intended to merely MONITOR and SUPERVISE high profile transactions involving the ownership of companies – production related energy activities are excluded

CJ Voss (Attorney at Stoel Rives LLP) September 24, 2012 "Energy Law Alert: CFIUS Intervenes in Chinese-Owned Wind Project" http://www.stoel.com/showalert.aspx?Show=9813

President Ford created CFIUS by Executive Order 11858 in 1975, in response to an influx of investment from the Middle East, to monitor the impact of and coordinate U.S. policy on foreign investment in the United States. In 1988, in response to concerns over the acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., by Fujitsu Limited, Congress passed the Exon-Florio Amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950 ("Exon-Florio") granting the President the express authority to block proposed mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers that threaten national security. Exon-Florio was subsequently amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 ("FINSA").

Scope of Review Under Exon-Florio

Exon-Florio applies to "covered transactions", which include mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers involving "foreign persons" that could result in foreign control of U.S. businesses, transfers of ownership of a U.S. business from one foreign owner to another, and transactions that result in foreign ownership of a part of an entity or of assets constituting a U.S. business (such as a division).

The regulations implementing FINSA identify certain types of transactions, including leases, start-up or "greenfield" investments, and lending transactions that are not considered covered transactions. However, the regulations provide that long-term leases and lending transactions may be considered covered transactions if the foreign lessee or lender makes significant business decisions, characteristic of an owner. In addition, start-up or "greenfield", investment is narrowly construed to mean investment involving such activities as "separately arranging for the financing of and the construction of a plant to make a new product, buying supplies and inputs, hiring personnel, and purchasing the necessary technology.

" Further, a start-up investment "may involve the acquisition of shares in a newly incorporated subsidiary." Accordingly, in most cases, these exceptions are unlikely to benefit foreign investors in U.S. renewable energy projects.

Under Exon-Florio, the President is authorized to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction if there is credible evidence that the foreign person exercising control might take action that threatens to impair U.S. national security.

The term "national security" is not defined in the statute or implementing regulations and is construed broadly by CFIUS to include all facts and circumstances that have potential national security implications. Factors that will heighten CFIUS's interest in a transaction include whether the acquisition target:

has contracts with the U.S. government, particularly sole- or single-source defense contracts, classified contracts or contracts with U.S. government agencies that have national security responsibilities (e.g., homeland security, intelligence);

possesses sensitive or classified technologies, particularly with defense or law enforcement applications, or produces goods, services, or technologies subject to export controls;

controls "critical infrastructure," including major energy assets; or

is engaged in operations that involve nuclear energy.

In addition, the prospective purchaser's nationality and whether it is controlled or owned (in whole or in part) by a foreign government are important factors in determining whether a CFIUS review may be appropriate.

In light of these factors, national security concerns may arise in a number of ways when a foreign entity acquires a U.S. renewable energy business:

If the U.S. business holds sensitive, classified, or export controlled information or technology, or provides power or energy-related products directly to a U.S. government agency, CFIUS approval should be sought.

Transactions involving foreign control over "major energy assets" are subject to heightened scrutiny. A transaction involving "major energy assets" is subject to a mandatory 45-day investigation unless CFIUS concludes during its initial review that the acquisition will not impair national security. To the extent that a renewable energy project is integrated into traditional energy transmission and distribution networks, the possibility that a foreign owner of the project could materially disrupt an energy supply chain likely would raise national security concerns.

The nationality of the acquirer likely influences the CFIUS process. Transactions involving acquirers based in China, Russia, certain countries in the Middle East, and other countries perceived as "non-cooperative" with respect to national security-related matters likely will be subject to greater scrutiny than transactions involving acquirers based in the E.U. or other G20 nations.

#### OCS meets --- that means oil and natural gas affs

NRC 11 Natural Resources Committee, “Obama Administration Imposes Five-Year Drilling Ban on Majority of Offshore Areas” November 8, 2011, http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=267985

WASHINGTON, D.C., November 8, 2011 - After imposing a nearly three-year moratorium on new offshore drilling by discarding the 2010-2015 lease plan that allowed for new development on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), the Obama Administration announced a draft plan today that closes the majority of the OCS to new energy production through 2017. The Administration’s draft five-year plan prohibits new offshore drilling and only allows lease sales to occur in areas that are already open. The draft plan includes lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico and the Arctic – leaving portions of Alaska and the entire Atlantic and Pacific Coasts off-limits to new energy production and job creation.

#### Coal Affs meet

DOI No Date U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIORBUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/coal\_and\_non-energy.print.html

Public lands are available for coal leasing only after the lands have been evaluated through the BLM's multiple-use planning process. Leasing federal coal resources is prohibited on public lands such as military reservations, National Parks, or National Wildlife Refuges. In areas where development of coal resources may conflict with the protection and management of other resources or public land uses, the BLM may identify mitigating measures which may appear on leases as either stipulations to uses or restrictions on operations.

#### Wind Affs meet

BBNEP No Date “Buzzards Bay National Estuary Program” http://buzzardsbay.org/windfarms.htm

The first state approval for the project came in May 2005 when approval was given for the laying of two transmission lines in state waters. From a summer 2005 CZMail: The Secretary of EOEA "issued a Certificate for the Cape Wind Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) stating that the DEIR adequately and properly complies with the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). However, the Secretary is requiring that the project proponent provide additional characterizations of project alternatives, including other locations and configurations; oceanographic modeling data of Nantucket Sound's sediment transport pathways and how they could be affected by the project; data on the use of the Sound by birds and aquatic organisms; and an additional analysis of the visual impacts of the project. The Certificate also noted that due to a recent change to the state boundary in Nantucket Sound, some of the proposed wind turbines are planned for state waters, which would be prohibited under the Ocean Sanctuaries Act." The Final Certificate on Cape Wind can be viewed at the MEPA website, Certificate 12643 FEIR.

#### It’s arbitrary and undermines research

Resnick 1 Evan- assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.