## 1NC

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#### The affirmative’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential

#### First, a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---we do NOT force them back in the closet---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Limits and rules of engagement are not sameness but a self-reflexive and refining AGONISM---contestability requires minimal boundaries to prevent destabilization of political deliberation

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Contrary to his critics, Connolly does not promote a postmodern politics of permanent disruption and destabilization, or urge us to celebrate a politics inhabited by the free play of simulacra, devoid of any stable meaning or purpose. He states this explicitly saying, 'I do not think...that in a culture of robust pluralism everyone must accept the fundamental 'contingency' of things... the appreciation of contestability, not universal acceptance of contingency, sets a key condition of pluralism and pluralization.'101 Thus, Connolly's agonistic theory ultimately does not force us to reject the possibility of enduring meaning and points of stabilization as such, but only to hold on to the suspicion that our meaning, the way we make sense of the world, may be incomplete or subject to revision. Even in his earliest articulations of agonistic pluralism, Connolly acknowledged that the most expansive articulations still must retain boundaries and exclusions which, while remaining willing to accept 'fundamentalisms that insist what they are is true, intrinsic, and self-sufficient', would not allow them 'to impose themselves too actively upon other segments of the order'.102 In more recent work, Connolly has argued such imposition at some point requires a 'militant assemblage of pluralists' which 'coalesces' to resist an anti-pluralist onslaught.103 Thus, Connolly retains the notion of frontiers, limits, and boundaries to our democratic discourse, even within a theory which recognizes the need to continuously interrogate these restrictions.

#### Abolishing constraints does not improve creativity---in the context of debate starting from defined constraints like the topic is better for overall creativity because innovative thinking comes from problem-solving like figuring out how to read what you want to read while still being topical

Intrator 10 – David, President of The Creative Organization, October 21, 2010, “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” ¶ As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” ¶ The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. ¶ In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. ¶ But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic.¶ It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box.¶ One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities.¶ What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution.¶ This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally.¶ Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary.¶ More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like.¶ Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered.¶ But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works.¶ That’s the hard part.¶ It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated.¶ It also can be emotionally difficult.¶ You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

#### Second, discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development---we control uniqueness: university students already have preconceived ideological notions---government policy discussion facilitates engagement with and resolution of competing perspectives to improve social outcomes---it does NOT blame the individual for violence, but instead emphasizes individual AGENCY---it breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Third, switch-side is key---Effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)

What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."

Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.

It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.

Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.

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Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).

Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,

Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)

Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.

Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).

Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies.

Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).

By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:

Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)

There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.

Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).

Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).

The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

Arendt's Polemical Agonism

As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).

Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.

Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:

You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)

Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).

In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.

This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.

Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).

Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).

Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).

Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism.

Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.

In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Effective decision-making outweighs---

#### Key to social improvements in every and all facets of life

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

If we assume it to be possible without recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14

I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13

Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained.

Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually.

When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided:

A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision…

The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision…

It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16

John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors.

We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### Only portable skill---means our framework turns case

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Specifically, academic debate over energy policy in the face of environmental destruction is critical to shape the direction of change and create a public consciousness shift

Crist 4 (Eileen, Professor at Virginia Tech in the Department of Science and Technology, “Against the social construction of nature and wilderness”, Environmental Ethics 26;1, p 13-6, http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/againstsocialconstruction.pdf)

Yet, constructivist analyses of "nature" favor remaining in the comfort zone of zestless agnosticism and noncommittal meta-discourse. As David Kidner suggests, this intellectual stance may function as a mechanism against facing the devastation of the biosphere—an undertaking long underway but gathering momentum with the imminent bottlenecking of a triumphant global consumerism and unprecedented population levels. Human-driven extinction—in the ballpark of Wilson's estimated 27,000 species per year—is so unthinkable a fact that choosing to ignore it may well be the psychologically risk-free option.

Nevertheless, this is the opportune historical moment for intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences to join forces with conservation scientists in order to help create the consciousness shift and policy changes to stop this irreversible destruction. Given this outlook, how students in the human sciences are trained to regard scientific knowledge, and what kind of messages percolate to the public from the academy about the nature of scientific findings, matter immensely. The "agnostic stance" of constructivism toward "scientific claims" about the environment—a stance supposedly mandatory for discerning how scientific knowledge is "socially assembled"[32]—is, to borrow a legendary one-liner, striving to interpret the world at an hour that is pressingly calling us to change it.

### 1NC

#### The National Debate Tournament should hold an all-inclusive forum tonight to discuss exclusion of individuals who identify as LGBTQ or who prefer not to identify within the debate community in which all individuals are allowed to freely voice their opinion.

### Solvency

#### This debate doesn’t change anything about the practices they kritik --- skill development through debate is a prerequisite to transformative politics [inside AND outside of the community]

Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 33-6)

In some ways, this is understandable as utopian writing, with recognizable antecedents throughout the history of leftist thought. But what is distinctive in Butler’s writing is the way temporal rhetoric emerges precisely at the site of uneasy normative commitment. In the case of performative subversion, a futural rhetoric displaces the problems surrounding agency, symbolic constraint, and poststructuralist ethics. Since symbolic constraint is constitutive of who we can become and what we can enact,¶ 34¶ there is clearly no way to truly envision a reworked symbolic. And since embracing an alternative symbolic would necessarily involve the imposition of newly exclusionary and normalizing norms, to do more than gesture would mean lapsing into the very practices that need to be superseded. Indeed, despite Butler’s insistence in Feminist Contentions that we must always risk new foundations, she evinces a fastidious reluctance to do so herself.¶ The forward-looking articulation of performative politics increasingly gives way, in Bodies That Matter, to a more reflective, and now strangely belated, antiexclusionary politics. Less sanguine about the efficacy of outright subversion, Butler more soberly attends to ways we might respond to the politically and ontologically necessary error of identity categories. We cannot choose not to put such categories into play, but once they are in play, we can begin to interrogate them for the exclusions they harbor and generate. Butler here is closely following Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s position on essentialism, a position Butler earlier sought to sublate through the more exclusive emphasis on the unremitting subversion of identity.18 If performative subversion aimed to denaturalize identity and thus derail its pernicious effects, here, by contrast, one realizes the processes of identity formation will perforce proceed, and one simply attempts to register and redress those processes in a necessarily incomplete way. The production of exclusion, or a constitutive outside, is “the necessary and founding violence of any truth-regime,” but we should not simply accept that fact passively:¶ The task is to refigure this necessary “outside” as a future horizon, one in which the violence of exclusion is perpetually in the process of being overcome. But of equal importance is the preservation of the outside, the site where discourse meets its limits, where the opacity of what is not included in a given regime of truth acts as a disruptive site of linguistic impropriety and unrepresentability, illuminating the violent and contingent boundaries of that normative regime precisely through the inability of that regime to represent that which might pose a fundamental threat to its continuity. . . . If there is a violence necessary to the language of politics, then the risk of that violation might well be followed by another in which we begin, without ending, without mastering, to own—and yet never fully to own—the exclusions by which we proceed. (BTM, 53)¶ Because the exclusionary process is productive of who and what we are, even in our oppositional politics, our attempts to acknowledge and redress it are always post hoc. Here the future horizon is ever-receding¶ 35¶ precisely because our own belated making of amends will never, and should never, tame the contingency that also begets violence. But the question arises: does Butler ever propose that we might use the evaluative criteria governing that belated critical recognition to guard against such processes of exclusion in the first place? Well, in rare moments she does project the possibility of cultivating practices that would actually disarm exclusion (and I will be discussing one such moment presently). But she invariably returns to the bleak insistence on the impossibility of ever achieving this. This retreat is necessitated, fundamentally, by Butler’s failure to distinguish evaluative criteria from the power-laden mechanisms of normalization. Yet the distinction does reappear, unacknowledged, in the rhetoric of belatedness, which, like performative thresholdism, serves to underwrite her political purism. As belated, the incomplete acts of “owning” one’s exclusions are more seemingly reactive and can appear not to be themselves normatively implicated.¶ We can see a similar maneuver in Butler’s discussion of universalist traditions in Feminist Contentions. Here she insists that Benhabib’s universalism is perniciously grounded in a transcendental account of language (communicative reason), and is hence not able to examine its own exclusionary effects or situated quality (FC, 128–32). This is, to begin with, a mischaracterization. Benhabib’s account of communicative reason is historically situated (if somewhat loosely within the horizon of modernity) and aims to justify an ongoing and self-critical process of interactive universalism—not merely through the philosophical project of articulating a theory of universal pragmatics but more significantly through the identification and cultivation of practices that enable democratic will formation.19 Butler then introduces, in contrast to Benhabib, an exemplary practice of what she calls “misappropriating” universals (Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic is cited here). Now, it is hard not to see this as a species of dogmatism. Bad people reinscribe or reinforce universals, good people “misappropriate” them. Benhabib calls for the reconstruction of Enlightenment universals, but presumably even reconstruction is tainted. The key point, however, is that misappropriation is a specifically protected derivative process, one whose own belatedness and honorific disobedience are guaranteed to displace the violence of its predecessor discourse.¶ Let me pursue here for a moment why I find this approach unsatisfactory. Simply because the activity of acknowledging exclusion or misappropriating universals is belated or derivative does not mean that such¶ 36¶ an activity is not itself as powerfully normative as the “normative political philosophy” to which Butler refers with such disdain. There is a sleight of hand occurring here: Butler attempts to imply that because such activities exist at a temporal and critical remove from “founding regimes of truth,” they more successfully avoid the insidious ruse of critical theory. But who’s rusing who here? Because Butler finds it impossible to conceive of normativity outside of normalization, she evades the challenging task of directly confronting her own normative assumptions. Yet Butler in fact advocates ethical practices that are animated by the same evaluative principles as communicative ethics: the rigorous scrutiny of all oppositional discourse for its own newly generated exclusions, and the reconfiguration of debilitating identity terms such as “women” as sites “of permanent openness and resignifiability” (FC, 50). Both these central practices rely fundamentally on democratic principles of inclusion and open contestation. Communicative ethics does no more than to clarify where among our primary social practices we might locate the preconditions for such activities of critique and transformation. By justifying its own evaluative assumptions and resources it aims not to posit a realm free of power but rather to clarify our own ongoing critiques of power. This does not mean that such critiques will not themselves require rigorous scrutiny for harboring blindnesses and further exclusions, but neither does it mean that such critiques will necessarily be driven by exclusionary logic. And communicative ethics is by no means a “merely theoretical” or “philosophical” project inasmuch as it can identify particular social and institutional practices that foster democratic ends. By casting all attempts to characterize such practices as pernicious normalizing, Butler effectively disables her own project and leaves herself no recourse but to issue dogmatic condemnations and approvals.

#### Making debate SOLELY about personal narratives is self-destructive---making the judges choose between whose personal experiences are more meaningful is VIOLENT and denies the intensity of our individual experiences

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Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that the minority scholar **himself or herself** hurts **and hurts badly**.¶ An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. **What can an academic** trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 **possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"?** n73 **"No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"?** "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, **writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power**... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our **lives is... ultimately obliterating**." n74¶ "Precarious." "Obliterating." **These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others**. **"I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects**. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 **-** destructive and, above all, self-destructive articles**.** n76 **Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from** abstracting themselves **from their pain in order** to gain perspective **on their condition**. n77¶ [\*696] **Last, as we have seen,** it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. n78 [\*697] **It is because of this** conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" **that Farber and Sherry deplore their use.** "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.¶ If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicismin white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. **It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.**¶ In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications [\*698] for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

## 2NC Framework

### Overview

#### Debate accomplishes one thing -- to teach debaters a nuanced process for decision-making and advocacy skills about any issue – debate has the potential to inculcate very specific thinking skills when approaching any issue

#### This only works if it follows a minimal set of structured principles---the affirmative instrumentally defending topical action and the debate following a switch-side-format---the politics of the ballot are impotent if the process is flawed

#### Debate is only effective if it follows a model of limited democratic deliberation – there are three central features of debate that promote critical skill development

#### Limited topic – abstract and general discussions about any socially pertinent topic might be interesting and informative – but limiting that discussion to specific policy proposals is critical to actualize the argumentative space of debate and force in depth clash and analysis that helps develop critical thinking skills-- thats *Steinberg and Freely*

#### Government modeling – students have preconceived ideological notions about the government and international relations – only forcing active engagement through role playing and analyzing federal policy making can we challenge preconceived notions – that’s *Esberg and Sagan*

#### Switch side debate --- defending a position, especially if it goes gainst your own belief, requires you to question your ideas and beliefs and defend every angle – divorces people from broader ideological tropes– that’s *Roberts Miller*

#### 4 impacts which turn the case

#### Decision making is an essential component of daily life – it is the fundamental exportable skills and valuable regardless of whether or not we become government decision makers – learning to aggregate information and generate careful choices is key to living the best life possible– that’s Steinberg and Freely --- ability to carefully deliberate makes you a better advocate to change both screwed up structures in the debate and in life.

#### The alternative to SSD is totalitarian thought that causes atrocities---that’s Roberts-Miller---absence of agonistic interrogation causes people to become politically complacent blind to ideological tropes---the reason screwed up conservatives in Alabama etc.

#### Careful deliberation solves the root of every social and political problem -- environmental destruction to gay rights to Iraq it holds every argument to extremely rigorous standards of defense---that’s Lundberg

1. **Conceded environment DA --- no new answers in the 1AR --- Crist says students in acedamia combining science about the environment and energy policy proposals percolates up from the academy to the government that is critical to sustain the ecosystem --- otherwise pollution inevitably creates structural violence**

### 2NC---AT: Role of Ballot

#### Their role of the ballot is a false choice --- your decision isn’t between “debate” as we present it an an inclusive activity---our counterplan and case arguments prove there are alternate ways to increase participation that we can and should pursue. We agree there are problems XXX \*Their criticisms are all about people in debate and the community which our counterplan accesses better.

**Nothing about our framework necessitates violence --- you don’t check your subjectivity at the door --- when I’m reading a politics or oil DA I’m still Evan McCarty. Whatever topical affirmative or DA’s, K’s, or counterplans you read are going to be effected immensely by who you are and where you come from. This also answers their self-trauma arguments.**

### 2NC---AT: Self Trauma

#### Freedom from self-trauma can never produce political liberation---framework is necessary to create mutual conditions for contestation that allow for the transformation of political structures that result in tangible suffering

Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 37-9)

There remains yet another reason why the theory of communicative ethics cannot answer Butler’s theoretical investments. Despite Butler’s obvious political commitment, and her intermittent attention to race, internationalism, and institutions, her theories dwell overwhelmingly at the level of individual, intrapsychic drama. Nancy Fraser, who herself criticizes Butler’s intrasubjective focus, suggests that perhaps Butler’s recent appeals to radical democracy, though at this point only gestural, are the beginnings of a more sustained working out of normative commitments and collective practices. Perhaps. But I read these more as compensatory moments in a theory whose real focus often lies elsewhere. In Gender Trouble, because the field of politics remains fully focused on questions of identity, performative subversions necessarily emphasize the self ’s relation to the law, or the self ’s relation to the self (or to the normative identity the self inhabits). Given the exclusionary effects of any assumption of identity, one might assume that denaturalizing that process of assumption will have positive intersubjective consequences, but we are not told how this works.¶ The problem reemerges in Bodies That Matter, most pronouncedly in the essay “Phantasmatic Identification and the Assumption of Sex.” Here Butler makes an impassioned plea for the ethicopolitical efficacy of incoherent identity: since the assumption of coherent identity always comes at a cost, and harbors exclusions, we need to cultivate incoherent identity, or forms of identity that remain open to multiple, and what now appear as contradictory, identifications. Only then can we begin the ongoing process of overcoming a situation in which “the specificity of identity is purchased through the loss and degradation of connection” (BTM, 114). Not only does this account fail to elaborate any basis for its normative commitments, but there is an unexamined assumption that intrapsychic maneuvers translate directly into political realities, which seems to me to be a highly questionable claim. This comes out more sharply in the following gesture toward more positive psychic practices: “If [the] subject produces its coherence at the cost of its own complexity, the crossings of identifications of which it is itself composed, then that subject forecloses the kinds of contestatory connections that might democratize the field of its own operation” (BTM, 115; my emphasis). As was the case with performative subversion, the primary drama here is one of self-constitution. Democracy can be achieved internally, via the self ’s own internal operations. Intersubjective effects simply follow naturally from the form of identification undergone. At best, this constitutes an argument by analogy.¶ 39¶ This is one of those rare passages where Butler admits the possibility, indirectly and negatively to be sure, that we might actually foster antiexclusionary practices that would not require belatedness as a constitutive feature. Characteristically, Butler draws back somewhat from this utopian moment, stressing in subsequent paragraphs that processes of exclusion can never be eradicated. In the light of that sobering truth, she then offers a variant version of future possibility: by avowing our exclusionary identifications, we will glimpse an expanded community. In her words, we should “[trace] the ways in which identification is implicated in what it excludes, and [follow] the lines of that implication for the map of future community it might yield” (BTM, 119). In other words, to recognize that one is what one repudiates will help to effect a possible avowal of connection with those now constituted as irredeemably other. This passage more readily acknowledges the gap between intrapsychic and collective transformation, yet it still installs the former as the template for the latter.¶ Butler’s work is not devoid of all references to public and collective political practices. Indeed, she clearly aligns herself with specific activist communities—the feminist and gay and lesbian, most prominently—and seeks to articulate collective moments, most notably in “Gender Is Burning” and “Critically Queer,” two of the essays in Bodies That Matter. But there is a distinctly unmapped connection between her intrapsychic model and her collective model, an attempt to imagine that intrapsychic transformation will automatically yield social transformation, just as the assumption of identity has automatically produced all the exclusions that structure our social and political world. I think there is a real problem with this emphasis on intrapsychic identity, which will continue to disable Butler’s attempts to project positive political norms or to explain why she regards certain activist communities or moments as more “democratic” than others. Butler’s theory needs an account of how intersubjective and collective associations might be forged and nurtured beyond the moment of “contestatory connections.” This would necessarily require the risk of a greater normative clarity about democratic procedure (might not she at least risk a contingent proceduralism?).

### 2NC---AT: USFG = Closeting

#### Their argument that roleplaying the USFG means you are closeting people is completely illogical nothing about trying to learn about policy requires closeting people.

Policy simulation’s good---key to portable skills, breaking down expert monopoly on policy advice---which allows you to challengethe bad practices of the USFG

Robert Farley 12, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, February 29, 2012, “Teaching Crisis Decision-Making Through Simulations,” World Politics Review, online: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11628/over-the-horizon-teaching-crisis-decision-making-through-simulations

What goes for war goes for policy other than war. Public and foreign policy programs have increasingly used simulations as training and teaching tools. Policy initiatives, whether foreign or domestic, generate strategic dynamics; players respond to how other players have changed the game environment. Consequently, playing games can help students develop expertise regarding how to manage strategic dynamics, as well as more specific skills such as crisis negotiation.

At the same time, foreign and public policy schools have become attractive to serious simulators because of the presence of a large number of relatively knowledgeable graduate and advanced undergraduate students with time on their hands. The Army War College -- which runs two negotiation simulations, one involving Nagorno-Karabakh and the other Cyprus -- has taken advantage of this by running its simulations at several major universities, adapting the structure of the game for different groups of players. Last summer, the strategic forecasting firm Wikistrat -- for which I am an analyst -- ran a grand strategy competition involving a large number of major foreign policy programs.

Accordingly, the universe of potential policy simulations and “war games” is virtually limitless. The Paxsims blog, co-edited by WPR contributor Rex Brynen, focuses on the serious use of international political and military simulations, listing dozens of different games played to inform public policy decisions. These simulations include modeling relief efforts following the Haiti earthquake, refining peacekeeping and civilian protection in hostile environments, “replaying” the 2007 Surge in Baghdad, rethinking the partition of India and Pakistan, and -- of course -- sketching out an Israeli bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities.

As in many other fields, the Internet has transformed the development process of policy-oriented simulations. Widely available information and modern information technology makes it possible to bring together subject matter experts with designers, and crowdsourcing helps demonstrate and correct problems and flaws with the simulation. Indeed, the Wikistrat model is built directly on the idea that smart crowdsourcing can produce better policy analysis than reliance on relatively isolated expert opinion.

Patterson School simulations focus on the teaching and training aspects of gaming rather than on verisimilitude. Previous Patterson School simulations have involved a revolution in Belarus, a pirate attack off Somalia, the aftermath of the death of Fidel Castro, an Israeli strike on Iran and a nuclear accident in North Korea. The purpose of these games is to force decision-making under difficult circumstances, hopefully modeling the conditions under which policy professionals produce recommendations and make decisions.

This is not to say that nothing can be learned from the course of the game. In the 2012 simulation, members of the Sinaloa drug cartel launched simultaneous large-scale attacks on the Bellagio in Las Vegas as well as on several targets in Acapulco. All the attacks involved car bombings followed up by teams of heavily armed gunmen employing automatic weapons and hand grenades. The Patterson student cohort was divided into teams representing the Mexican and American national security bureaucracies, regional governments and cartels, with the exercise simulating the government response in the 24 hours immediately following the attack. The simulation ended in an abortive meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderon. Domestic political pressures played a role on both sides, with Texas Gov. Rick Perry launching a blistering series of attacks against Obama’s handling of the crisis, and the Mexican police consistently undercutting the efforts of the Mexican army.

Our simulation highlighted the problems of bureaucratic competition, indistinct boundaries of responsibility, and mistrust between agencies and governments. The game also gave students an appreciation of the difficulties of dealing with an active and independent media, which remained largely outside their control. Most importantly, it gave students a taste of the difficulty in arriving at coherent, cohesive action even when policy objectives remained broadly in agreement. While students may never face this precise crisis in their subsequent professional careers, they undoubtedly will face situations where policymakers demand options, sleep be damned.

Increasingly realistic simulations involving larger and larger numbers of interested, well-informed players will help structure public policy decision-making for the foreseeable future. Someday, strong performance in such simulations, as well as the ability to craft useful games, may even prove a pathway to success in a public policy career.

### 2NC---Limits K2 Creativity

#### Our framework strikes the “goldilocks” balance of creativity---we agree that a debate where the aff has to say the exact same thing every time would be bad---what makes debate with a resolution awesome is that the aff can take a variety of creative perspectives toward defending a topical plan without leaving the negative in the dark --- they go too far and allow the aff to talk about anything which eliminates the value of debate because it becomes 2 ships passing in the night.

#### Finding a way to be topical increases creativity and problem-solving ability---finding a way to be creative within the resolution is more real world whenever you face a problem in life there will be certain constraints that you have to operate within.

#### The benefits of debate can only be achieved by focusing on a stable resolution---debate’s unique from a conversation among friends where tangential relevance to the topic at hand has no implication---given the multiplicity of perspectives about the resolution, formal rules are crucial

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No doubt, in the course of discussion, someone may feel that it would be wiser for the assembly to discuss a somewhat different proposition than the one specified, perhaps worded in a subtly or substantially different way. But if they want to press the point, the parliamentary rule is that they must move an amendment, changing the wording of the motion under discussion, once again in a specifically formulated way. Proceedings are then devoted to a discussion of the virtues of the amendment, qua amendment, and a vote is taken on that, before the substantive discussion is resumed. And again, we see the virtue of this way of doing things in a diverse assembly. In conversation among friends, the topic may shift in an open-ended way, and people familiar with one another have both the willingness and the ability to keep track. But in an assembly consisting of people who are largely strangers to one another, deliberation would be hopeless if there was a sense that the topic might or might not have shifted slightly after every contribution. So, although amendment processes exist, their formulaic character and the rules governing their proposal and adoption provide a way of keeping track of where the discussion is, a way of keeping track which does not depend upon implicit understandings that some of the members may not share.¶ When discussion is exhausted, a vote may be called for, and-if my experience of law faculty meetings is any indication-someone will immediately leap to their feet and say: "I'm confused. What exactly are we voting on?" In a well-run assembly, the clerk or secretary will be in a position at that stage to read out the proposition (as amended) which now is the focus of the final vote. Once again, the determinacy of that proposition, as formulated and as amended, is important to establish a sense that we are all orienting our actions in voting to the same object. It is important for me to know, for example, that what I take myself to be voting against is exactly what my opponent takes himself to be voting in favor of. Otherwise, the idea that our votes, on a given occasion, are to be aggregated and weighed against one another becomes a nonsense.¶ What I have just described is rudimentary by comparison with the processes employed in actual legislative assemblies such as the Congress of the United States. Bills are longer and more complex than the sort of motions one hears at faculty meetings. They have usually been drafted-more or less competently-in advance, and there are many stages of deliberation (including committee stages, whose proceedings may be much less formal) that bills must go through before they are adopted. And, this is to say nothing of the vicissitudes of bicamerality, conference committees, and the rest.¶ For the most part, however, these complications enhance the need for a determinate text to focus and coordinate the various stages of the legislative process. Without a text to consider, to mark up, to amend, to confer about, and to vote upon, the process of law-making in a large and unwieldy assembly would have even a greater air of babel-like futility than that which is currently associated with Congress.¶ Thus, whether we are talking about a small-scale meeting or a large-scale legislative process, the positing of a formulated text as the resolution under discussion provides a focus for the ordering of deliberation at every stage. The existence of a verbalized bill, motion, or resolution is key to norms of relevance, and key to the sense, which procedural rules are supposed to provide, that participants' contributions are relevant to one another and that they are not talking at cross purposes. Maybe, a one-person deliberative body can do without this-though even there, many of us are familiar with the mnemonic virtues of a formulated proposition in our own solitary decision-making. And maybe, decision-making in a small group of oligarchs or in a junta of familiars can do without this as well, if they can move toward consensus on the basis of conversational informality. But the sense of a determinate focus for discussion-something whose existence is distinct from the will or tacit understandings of particular members'- seems absolutely indispensable for a large and diverse assembly of people whose knowledge and trust of one another is limited.¶ VIII If there is anything to this hypothesis, then we might want to start thinking about the textual canonicity of legislation in a slightly different way. I said in Part I that one of the values most commonly associated in the modern world with legislation is democratic legitimacy: We should defer to statutes because they have been enacted by a democratically elected entity. Just as the idea of democracy is insufficient to explain why we prefer a large elected legislature to a single elected legislator, so the democratic principle is insufficient to explain the particular way in which authority is accorded to legislation in the mod- ern world, viz., by taking seriously the exact words that were used in the formulations that emerged from the legislative chamber. If I am right, we now have an explanation for the importance of the ipsissima verba which is oriented primarily to the legislators' dealings among themselves, rather than directly to the issue of their collective authority vis-a-vis the people.¶ The final step, then, in pursuit of this hypothesis would be to show how this account of the importance of a text to the legislators is connected with the authority of the text for its intended audience. Here there are a couple of lines to pursue. First, as we have seen, the existence of orderly discussion is necessary to secure whatever Aristotelian advantages accrue from deliberation in a large and diverse group. Unless the diverse experiences and knowledge of the various legislators can connect and be synthesized, it is unlikely that their interaction will produce standards that are superior to those that any individual citizen could work out for herself. The conditions for orderly discussion, then, are indirectly conditions for the legislature's authority, in the Razian sense.8 9 In other words, authority requires superior expertise; superior expertise comes from deliberation among those who are different from one another; deliberation among those who are different from one another is possible only on the basis of formal rules of order; and crucial to rules of order is the postulation of an agreed text as the focus of discussion.¶ Second, respect for statute law is partly a matter of respect for the legislature as a forum whose representativeness is an aspect of the fairness 90 of the way a community makes its decisions. To the extent that representativeness requires diversity in the assembly, respect for that fairness is a matter of respecting the conditions under which diverse representatives can deliberate coherently. Thus, fairness-based respect for the legislature as a body may require not only that we respect the standards which it posits, but also that we respect these more formal aspects of the way in which its posited standards are arrived at- and thus that we respect the standards in question under the auspices of text-based formality.9 '

### 2NC---AT: Not an Even Playing Field

#### Yes there will always be disparities---nothing can make debate perfectly equitable---but everyone entering a debate has the ability to win under our framework---if you work hard and craft the best arguments a tiny school can beat the largest.

#### They delimit to the point where debate becomes an insurmountable unlevel playing field---aff can talk about whatever they want to.

### 2NC---AT: You Don’t Switch Sides

#### They misunderstand the switch-side arguments we are making---you obviously can’t switch sides multiple times within a round. You become a pretty odd advocate if in the same speech you say heg good and bad, warming good and bad. You need something to switch sides around which is what the resolution provides because it is a good thing so move around.

**Framework isn’t just a dogmatic argument---it is a criticism about how to make debate most effective.**

**We have lots of discussions outside of rounds about these arguments.**

### AT: Secomb 2k

#### None of Secomb’s indicts apply to our framework:

1. **She says women are excluded from conversation because they’re seen as irrational---that’s obviously not something we endorse--- queers and everyone else is capable of rational argumentation**
2. **She says we come from different backgrounds so we can’t understand one another. That equally applies to their framework---there will always be some misunderstandings. Their framework makes it worse because debate becomes two ships passing in the night---the resolution is the best chance we have because it at least creates common understanding of what we’re debating about**

**Secomb’s wrong---deliberation is possible among all types of people**

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2k, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 106

The argument for countering partisanship at the grass roots by supporting political deliberation there is pretty simple: If deliberation is a good thing in "deliberative bodies" like congress, isn't a good thing among average citizens, too? To suppose otherwise is to hold either that the average citizen is incapable of deliberation or that the average citizen is less capable of deliberation than the average representative. Both positions collapse upon even the most glancing scrutiny. To hold that the average citizen is incapable of deliberation is both patently antidemocratic and empirically questionable, to say the very least. To hold that the average citizen is less capable of deliberation than the average representatives is perhaps slightly less antidemocratic and empirically dubious, but achieves this very modest gain in credibility only at the cost of landing in the out-and-out contradiction of valorizing deliberation in one place while denigrating it in another. If deliberation contains moments of both confrontation and engagement, democratizing deliberation by making it the province of the citizenry rather than leaving it in the hands of representatives has the potential of greatly expanding the degree to which confrontation and engagement become society-wide traits, traits which work on an ongoing basis to blunt the worst effects of partisanship. At least as important, such a democratization of deliberation is likely to enhance the deliberativeness of the polity since it will encourage deliberation at one removed from the locus of decision making—precisely the place it is most likely to succeed.

### 2NC---AT: Delgado

#### Their critique of fairness devolves into radical anti-semetism---this is an independent reason to reject Delgado and vote negative

Daniel A. Farber 95, Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of Minnesota, AND Suzanna Sherry, Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty, University of Minnesota. “Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?” California Law Review May, 1995 83 Calif. L. Rev. 853, lexis

Several years ago, the Duke Law Journal published a remarkable exchange over the validity of societal standards of merit. Duncan Kennedy, one of the founders of Critical Legal Studies, opened the debate. In support of affirmative action in law school faculty hiring, Kennedy attacked existing standards of merit as socially constructed and impossible to apply in a colorblind fashion. n2 In response, Judge Richard Posner, a leading pragmatist and pioneer in Law and Economics, criticized Kennedy's affirmative action proposal and implicitly defended merit standards. n3 Posner, in turn, was labeled a racist by Jerome Culp, a prominent advocate of Critical Race Theory. Culp accused Posner of exercising the "majority voice, attempting to silence black voices." n4 Posner's fatal flaw was his failure to acknowledge that "facially objective and disinterested standards in fact serve the interests of the white majority**,**" n5 and therefore are not truly objective at all. As we will see, a similar position on merit is taken by other leading critical theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon. n6 This essay will suggest the existence of deeply troubling links between the logic of this position and historic forms of racial and religious discrimination.

More than the evaluation of the merit of legal scholarship is at stake in this debate. Although the debate about merit was sparked by a disagreement over the narrower question of law school hiring, the critique of merit is tied to fundamental philosophical issues. As critical scholar Gary Peller has pointed out, the critique of merit stems from philosophical attacks on the concepts of objectivity and knowledge currently employed in our society. n7 For example, Catharine MacKinnon disavows "standard scientific [\*855] norms" because the radical feminist critique of "the objective standpoint as male" is necessarily "a critique of science as a specifically male approach to knowledge." n8

Similar attacks have been mounted on traditional moral concepts such as fairness and justice. According to Richard Delgado, a leading critical race theorist, "normative orderings always reflect the views of the powerful" and therefore serve to stifle social change. n9 Consequently, the "game" of normative discussion is "rigged against" the oppressed, for "one cannot use categories like justice, equality, etc., to overturn the very system" that created those values. n10 Normative talk, Delgado suggests, merely masks the operation of the "Home Office," which "does not speak normativese at all, but a sharper, brusquer, unfamiliar language full of consonants and commands." n11 Thus, like "merit," existing concepts of truth and morality are seen as part and parcel of systems of oppression.

We will refer to this stance as "radical constructivism," since it views these fundamental concepts as socially constructed aspects of systems of power. This viewpoint should be contrasted with more moderate forms of social constructivism, such as the view that categories defining social groups (such as homosexuals) are socially constructed. These moderate views do not challenge our entire structure of thought and are not the subject of this discussion. n12 The position taken by Delgado, MacKinnon, and Culp (and to some extent by Kennedy) cuts considerably deeper to the bone of existing conceptual schemes. These broad philosophical implications [\*856] prompt us to write about a topic that, considered narrowly, might seem to involve only an intramural dispute over academic standards.

The views of radical constructivists have not gone unopposed. Pragmatists such as Posner argue that current conceptions of objectivity, knowledge, and merit may be flawed but are necessary starting points in analysis. As he puts it, "those who believe that "reality' is constructed rather than found are prone to forget that not every social construction is arbitrary." n13 Although anti-dogmatic and refusing to accept even the most entrenched beliefs as final truths, n14 pragmatism also has a common sense vein that keeps it from veering into radical constructivism and utopianism. n15 While open to uses of metaphor, rhetoric, and even imaginative but false ideas in advancing inquiry, pragmatists do not abandon conventional values of truth and merit:

But to acknowledge that mistakes, emotive utterances, and literal falsehoods (which may be imaginative or emotional "truths") can have social utility is not to deny that truth and falsity can and ordinarily must be distinguished. It is not to endorse sloppy or tendentious scholarship, an "anything goes" attitude toward claims and assertions, or, what is closely related, the belief that, like everything else, science and mathematics are "just rhetoric." n16

The pragmatist, then, "recognizes the importance of logic and clear thinking," and does not embrace "epistemological or moral skepticism, or scientific or moral relativism." n17

We join this debate in support of Posner's position, but we do so only indirectly, by arguing that the logical implications of radical constructivism are disturbingly anti-Semitic. n18 In a sense, our argument might itself be considered an exercise in Critical Race Theory, since it assesses a viewpoint (radical constructivism) from the perspective of a historically oppressed group.

In a nutshell, our argument is as follows. Radical constructivists contend that standards of merit are socially constructed to maintain the power of dominant groups**.** n19 In other words, "merit" has no meaning, except as a way for those in power to perpetuate the existing hierarchy. In explaining [\*857] why some minorities have been less successful than whites, these writers repudiate genuine merit as even a partial explanation of the current distribution of social goods. They are then left in a quandary, unable to explain the success of other minority groupsthat have actually surpassed the dominant majority. If the accomplishments of these "model minorities" - Jews, Japanese Americans, and Chinese Americans - cannot be justified as reflecting the merit of their endeavors, then some other explanation must be sought. Unfortunately, once merit is put aside, no explanation for competitive success can be anything but negative. These groups have obtained disproportionate shares of important social goods; if they have not earned their shares fairly on the merits, then they must have done so unjustly. Thus, the radical constructivist view of merit logically carries negative implications regarding groups that have surpassed the dominant majority - in particular, Jews, the group that is our primary focus.

Although radical constructivists are surely as appalled by anti-Semitism as by racism, we contend that negative stereotypes about Jews and some Asian Americans are a logical concomitant of the rejection of the concept of merit. Anti-Semitic propositions are a nearly inescapable implication of the radical constructivist critique of merit. Rejecting merit could inadvertently leave these writers closer to the rhetoric and politics of Louis Farrakhan than to those of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Before expanding on our argument, we present a few important caveats. First and most emphatically, we do not suggest that the scholars we discuss harbor anti-Semitic feelings, even unconsciously. n20 We seek to alert them to logical implications they will surely find unacceptable, in order to prompt them to rethink their current attachment to radical constructivism. In short, we accuse the theory, not the theorists, of anti-Semitism. n21

#### Their model of social hierarchy causes the essentialism of dominance---all evidence to the contrary requires scapegoating and conspiracy theories---devolves into totalitarian anti-semetism and turns the case

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Since merit can be difficult to identify or even to define - especially in a field as fluid as law n85 - radical constructivists appear to have hit on an almost invulnerable strategy for explaining the relative lack of success of some minority groups and for demanding radical remedial steps. There are, however, two problems with their theory: Jews and native-born Asian Americans. By almost every measure of success, both groups succeed at far higher rates than white Gentile Americans. In 1970, Jewish family income was 172% of the average American income, Japanese-American family income was 132% of the average, and Chinese-American family income was 112% of the average. n86 By 1980, native-born Chinese Americans were [\*870] earning 150% of the non-Hispanic white average, with Japanese- and Korean-American families not far behind the Chinese Americans. n87 As of that year, unemployment rates for Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Americans were approximately half that of the general population. n88 Poverty rates are also significantly lower for some Asian American groups. n89 More recent data similarly reveal that Jewish family income remains well above the average income for Gentile families. n90

Educational attainment has accompanied this economic success. Jews and Asian Americans are disproportionately represented in higher education: In 1982, Jews obtained undergraduate degrees at nearly twice the rate of the general American population; n91 in 1990, the percentage of Jews with some college education was almost twice that of the general population. n92 Asian Americans also completed college at twice the rate of the general population. n93 Americans of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean ancestry comprise approximately one-fifth of the student body at some prestigious universities, even though they are less than two percent of the national population. n94 Although many universities implemented quotas to limit Jewish students and faculty from the early 1920s through at least the early 1960s, n95 by 1975 Jews "constituted 10 percent of all faculty members but [\*871] 20 percent of those teaching at elite universities." n96 If there is no such thing as merit, what explains the success of these two groups, both of whom, like blacks, have been victims of discrimination by white Gentile America? n97

Focusing on Jews in particular, we can identify only a few conceivable explanations unconnected with merit, all of them unacceptable both to us and to critical theorists. If merit is wholly irrelevant, the four possible explanations for Jewish success are: (1) that a Jewish conspiracy exists; (2) that Jews are parasitic on American culture; (3) that American culture is essentially Jewish; or (4) that there is no such thing as a distinct Jewish culture or identity. We will deal with each explanation in detail. n98 Without attempting to discredit or evaluate the validity of any of the explanations, we will merely note their anti-Semitic overtones. Unless there is yet another explanation besides merit for Jewish success in a Gentile world, denying the role of merit has clear anti-Semitic implications. n99 We have no doubt that radical constructivists will find each of these theories as unacceptable as we do. We hope, accordingly, that they will be led to reexamine their critique of merit.

The first theory is that Jews succeed as a consequence of a powerful and pervasive Jewish conspiracy. Some Americans believe that there is a Jewish or Zionist conspiracy, which has been posited as an explanation for everything from violence on television to the spread of AIDS. n101 [\*872]

The existence of a powerful Jewish conspiracy would certainly explain why Jews as a group are successful even if success has nothing to do with merit. It is also, of course, one of the most ancient anti-Semitic myths. With roots dating back at least to medieval Christianity, the Jewish conspiracy theory persisted through the Reformation and into modernity. n102 Martin Luther, for example, viewed Jews as a menace to Christianity and as (in the words of one Reformation historian) the "storm troops of the devil's forces." n103 Luther had little doubt about the appropriate remedy:

First, [I advise you] to set fire to their synagogues or schools and to bury and cover with dirt whatever will not burn, so that no man will ever again see a stone or cinder of them... .

Second, I advise that their houses also be razed and destroyed... Instead they might be lodged under a roof or in a barn, like the gypsies...

Third, I advise that all their prayerbooks and Talmudic writings, in which such idolatry, lies, cursing, and blasphemy are taught, be taken from them.

Fourth, I advise that their rabbis be forbidden to teach henceforth on pain of loss of life and limb. n104

The Jewish conspiracy theory both feeds on and fosters anti-Semitism, portraying Jews as using devious or evil means to gain power over innocent non-Jews. It has spawned various myths, including the belief that Jews used the blood of Christian babies in the Passover seder n105 and that Jews caused the Black Death by poisoning wells. n106 It takes its most powerful [\*873] modern form in the fraudulent Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which purports to document a Jewish conspiracy to destroy the Christian world. n107 Although the Protocols have been thoroughly discredited, n108 and were admitted to be a forgery by their American publisher, Henry Ford, in 1927, n109 some Americans still believe in them.

Similar myths of an Asian conspiracy also abound. Fears of a "yellow peril," an Asian conspiracy to obliterate white civilization, were rampant in the first decades of this century. n110 During World War II, Japanese were depicted as single-mindedly conspiring toward world conquest. n111 Even today, Japanese economic success is sometimes attributed to deviousness or a desire to dominate the world. n112 The Protocols of the Elders of Zion finds its anti-Asian counterpart in the Tanaka Memorial. The Tanaka Memorial was a document purportedly presented by Prime Minister Tanaka to Emperor Hirohito in 1927, outlining Japanese plans for world domination. n113 Like the Protocols, it was widely accepted as genuine, although it was almost certainly fraudulent. n114

Conspiracy theories are a powerful tool for those who wish to portray themselves as innocent victims of the successful or feared Other. Such theories have been used to justify everything from university quotas on both Jews and Asian Americans n115 to the Holocaust n116 and the forced relocation and internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. n117 Conspiracy theories were also used, with tragic success, to justify increasingly harsh [\*874] treatment of black slaves in order to prevent slave revolts. n118 Radical constructivists surely abhor such conspiracy theories and agree that they have no place in academic thought.

A second conceivable explanation for disproportionately high rates of success among Jews is that they are chameleons who, with no culture of their own, take on the cultural coloration of the society around them. Indeed, they are so successful at imitating cultural norms that they outperform "authentic" members of the society. The negative aspect of this stereotype is not the purported adaptability, which could be considered a positive trait. Rather, it is the specific form of that adaptation, which is described as purely imitative with no creative component.

This negative portrayal of Jews as parasitic, unimaginative imitators who succeed on the backs of the truly deserving is typical of anti-Semitism. Historically, Jews have been portrayed as soulless parasites on the surrounding culture. In the mid-nineteenth century, French scholar Ernest Renan claimed that Jews had "no mythology, no epic, no science, no philosophy, no fiction, no plastic arts, no civic life; there is no complexity, nor nuance; an exclusive sense of uniformity." n119 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, an early French socialist, characterized "the Jew" as "unproductive," and "an intermediary, always fraudulent and parasitical, who operates in business as in philosophy, by forging, counterfeiting, sharp practices." n120 The composer Richard Wagner similarly portrayed Jews - especially assimilated Jews - as "the most heartless of all human beings," lacking passion, soul, music, or poetry. n121 In the early twentieth century, an American anti-Semite belittled Jewish academic success as "simply another manifestation of the acquisitiveness of the race," describing Jews as "clever, acute, and industrious rather than able in the highest sense." n122 In publications that have now become notorious, the deconstructionist Paul de Man took a similar position during World War II about the contribution of Jews to Western literature. n123

Jews are not the only group whose success has been linked to this character defect. Asians, especially the Japanese, have similarly been [\*875] described as imitative and without a culture of their own. In 1944, an American missionary with extensive experience in Japan wrote: "The Japanese have lost much irreparably by not having a great art, a great poetry, a great drama, to introduce to the Western world." n124 A U.S. Navy publication of the same era described even premodern Japan as a "third-hand culture," adding that the Japanese response to modernity had been "borrowing this and copying that, never inventing, but always adapting western machines, western arms, and western techniques to their own uses." n125 Portrayals of the Japanese as primarily good mimics continued after World War II, n126 and are still occasionally found today. n127 The prevalent modern American stereotype of Asian Americans as technically skilled but without leadership abilities n128 might be at least partly derived from the longstanding belief that many Asians lack cultural or creative abilities. This supposed deficiency explains the ability of both Jews and Asian Americans to abandon any independent cultural identity and assume the character of the dominant culture. n129

A third possible explanation for Jewish success, and the converse of the parasitic explanation, is that mainstream American culture and standards are in their essence not white (or Gentile) but Jewish. Jews succeed, according to this explanation, because American culture has taken on Jewish characteristics. If this theory is correct, it is little surprise that societal standards of merit are structured to "like" the participation of Jews. n130

The strong version of this theory is that Jews have somehow infiltrated American culture. Given the views of American society held by radical constructivists, this theory has strikingly anti-Semitic implications. These writers routinely portray mainstream American culture as overwhelmingly unappealing: narrow, unimaginative, intolerant, ignorant, and at least occasionally evil. n131 If American culture is really Jewish culture, then Jews are [\*876] the cause of these deficiencies in our culture and are themselves deficient and unappealing.

Like the anti-Semitic beliefs discussed above, blaming Jews for the evils of mainstream culture has a long historical pedigree. The rise of both capitalism and communism have been blamed on Jews. n132 Marx portrayed capitalism as essentially Jewish n133 and predicted that Jews would disappear under socialism, which would "abolish the preconditions and thus the very possibility of huckstering" and would thereby "make the Jew impossible." n134 In the early twentieth century, Germans and Austrians - in countries where anti-Semitism had always flourished and would soon explode - lamented the "Judaisation" of German and Austrian culture. n135 Not surprisingly, given the role of Jews in important cultural institutions such as the academy and the movie industry, the same charges have been made about American culture. n136

Attributing societal problems to despised minorities is a common technique. In the nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants were sometimes accused of threatening to destroy the American working class and its culture. n137 Blacks have been blamed for causing cultural decay by introducing Americans to everything from crime and drugs to family breakdown. n138 Like the first two explanations of Jewish success, then, this theory portrays Jews negatively and rests on an analysis common to racist arguments used against other minorities.

Suggesting that the fundamental "Jewishness" of American culture explains Jewish success also creates more questions than it answers. Considering that Jews are less than three percent of the population, how did Jewish culture become so dominant? Either Jewish culture happened to have features that were more meritorious than the majority culture or Jews insidiously remade that culture in their own image. The former explanation [\*877] conflicts with the radical constructivists' denial of independent standards of merit generally and with their embrace of multiculturalism. The latter explanation collapses back into the conspiracy theory of Jewish success.

A milder version of the "Judaisation" argument is that Jewish (and Asian) culture simply happens to emphasize many of the values that are needed in modern society, such as education, initiative, enterprise, and so on. These groups are thus more likely than some other minorities to play the game successfully by the white (or Gentile) rules, and are more comfortable doing so. n139 Such a proposition does not appear to be necessarily anti-Semitic, and could conceivably explain the relative success of Jews and Asian Americans (who presumably also share the same "white" values) as compared to African Americans, whose cultural values might be more distinctive. n140 This benign explanation is unavailable to radical constructivists, however. To suggest that Jews, like white Gentiles, have a different and non-oppressive set of values or standards than people of color is already to concede that standards are not just a way of perpetuating existing hierarchies. The benign explanation suggests that standards and values are developed by cultures for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that they appear to be adaptive to the culture's environment. This anthropological truism is a far cry from the radical constructivist view that standards primarily serve to perpetuate a particular group's power over other groups. Stripped of its benign interpretation, the Judaisation argument retains only anti-Semitic components: to the extent that Jews share the (oppressive and racist) values of powerful white Gentiles, their "hyper-acceptance" of these values only makes them even "worse" than other whites.

The final conceivable explanation for Jewish success - that such success is nothing more than a statistical anomaly - is in many ways the most damaging, because it amounts to a denial that Jews exist as a distinct or identifiable group. Under this theory, it is no more than random chance that any three percent of the white American population will disproportionately exhibit any particular characteristics, from financial success to alcoholism. If being Jewish is an essentially insignificant trait, then any characteristics Jews exhibit are the result of random differences among the white population. It is thus misleading to point to "Jewish" success as a phenomenon in need of explanation.

Like the other theories, besides being implausible, n141 this purported explanation is analogous to historical forms of anti-Semitism. As early as [\*878] the French Revolution, anti-Semitic Enlightenment thinkers urged the removal of the pervasive restrictions on Jews with the hope that Judaism would be eliminated, because Jews' only common identity derived from their oppressed status: "The Jews were not to be emancipated as a community but as individual human beings, the assumption being that, once oppression was removed, their distinctive group identity would disappear." n142 To deny that Jews are a culturally distinct group is to ignore over 5,000 years of history, during which Jews kept their identity alive in the face of persecution, dispersal, and genocide.

It is troubling, but not unprecedented, that one of the pivotal propositions of this branch of critical theory - that merit is constructed to serve the powerful - has anti-Semitic implications. Critics of the existing order have often ended up targeting Jews, whether intentionally or not. n143 Anti-Semitism has served as "a convenient way of attacking the existing order without demanding its total overthrow and without having to offer a comprehensive alternative." n144 Sadly, like some of its radical predecessors through the ages, n145 radical constructivism is not altogether lacking the potential to fall into the grips of this, "the longest hatred." n146 [\*879]

This unsettling possible alignment of radical constructivism with the worst totalitarian regime of this century should also - upon reflection - seem less than shocking. n147 The core of the radical constructivist paradigm is a rejection of the Enlightenment and its emphasis on rationality and scientific explanation. n148 Instead, radical constructivists seek to explain the world solely as the result - deliberate or unconscious - of ideology and the pursuit of dominance. But that standard leaves little room for shared concepts of merit, morality, or anything else. n149 As other scholars have noted, radical constructivism "leaves no ground whatsoever for distinguishing reliable knowledge from superstition." n150 As a feminist philosopher who sympathizes with what we have called radical constructivism has warned, it can readily slide into moral relativism n151 - only one step away from relying on raw power to determine truth. For if ideas are mere reflections of the exercise of power, it becomes difficult to find a basis for criticizing social arrangements. And if raw power is the test of truth, totalitarians are merely the most unabashed constructors of reality. Much as radical constructivists may dislike this conclusion, its potential is present in their conceptual apparatus.

## 1nr Counterplan

#### Debate is self-reflexive and self-correcting --- it allows the very terms and shortfalls of debate itself to be scrutinized --- your debate bad arguments prove why debate is good

STANNARD**,** PF COMMUNICATION AND JOURNALISM, 6

[MATT, “DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY AND DEBATE”, legalcommunication.blogspot.com/2006/08/deliberation-debate-and-democracy-in.html

Sometimes this means conducting deliberative polls or favoring the referendum process. Other times it means making the political process more transparent, such as favoring open-door meetings and the like. Now, many people make pretty good arguments as to the imperfections of these policies. The referendum process can be co-opted, bought out; sometimes even openness is antithetical to transparency, since cynical politicians can take advantage of openness for their own publicity, and sometimes people need to deliberate in private.¶ But the great thing about deliberation as a commitment is that these criticisms can become part of the overall process of deliberative democracy. In a world where interested parties have the opportunity to speak and **debate in good faith**, we can criticize the referendum process, or explain why we can’t always have open meetings. We can **debate the rules themselves**, in other words, **debate the process itself.** ¶All of this suggests that, if deliberative ethics are an antidote to both authoritarianism and self-centeredness, we need more: More debate teams, more public discussion, more patient deliberation, more argument, more discourse, and more nurturing and promotion of the material entities that sustain them.¶ Some of the most articulate criticisms of competitive, switch-side academic debate come from the **debate community itself.** These criticisms have lately centered on things like the specialized and esoteric practices of debate, the under-representation of minorities in the activity, and the way in which debate practices feed, rather than fight, structures of domination. In other words, internal criticism of academic debate is very much like internal criticisms of the Academy in general: We’re too specialized, we’re too white, and we’re exploited by hegemonic institutions. All of these criticisms are true, and **yet, paradoxically, it is our experience in debate,** along with our experience in the critical thinking of university education, that teaches us how to articulate these arguments. The deliberative process is self-reflective **and at least has the** potential to be self-correcting**.**

#### Social science framework’s key to productive debate --- emphasis on evidence and arguments is a prerequisite to evaluating different methodologies

John Gerring 1, Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston University, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, 2001, pg. 29

Whatever agreement is possible in social science will be provided by a foundation that we can all (more or less) agree on. Such a **framework** is present already in our everyday judgments about good **work,** strong **arguments**, and solid **evidence.** By contrast, consensus is *not* likely to arise through our conversion to a single paradigm (inaugurating that heavenly state known as “normal science”). We are not likely to wake up one Monday morning to find ourselves all doing game theory, or hermeneutics. Fortunately, agreement on theories, models, and methods is **not necessary**. Indeed, it would be foolhardy and unproductive for social scientists to pursue the same questions in the same ways. Triangulation is useful.

Such knowledge will cumulate only if we are able to put diverse **evidence and argumentation** together into a **common framework.** Progress *is* a realistic goal, so long as we understand that lasting progress is **more likely** to occur in small steps than in **revolutionary “paradigmatic” leaps**. If the criteria framework will not resolve all our strife, it will at least point the way to a **more productive style of debate**: where arguments meet each other on **common ground**, where the **advantages and disadvantages of different approaches** to a problem can be specified and evaluated, and where cumulation can reasonably be assessed.

## 1nr Case

### AT: Subjectivity

#### It’s impossible to debate about competing moral or personal claims because neither should be judged more important or rational than the other--- framework is a prerequisite to effective discussions

Edwin Bryan Portis, Professor Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 2

Moral commitment, on the other hand, is not always so readily compromised. Even bargaining with like-minded counterparts of good faith can be difficult, but bargaining with the morally corrupt, disso­lute, or obtuse is sordid business. And irrespective of the sincerity with which proponents of divergent moral views attempt to find some way to live together in peace, they ultimately must be committed to changing one another's minds about what is proper and necessary. That is to say, they must be so committed if politics is to be based on fixed moral commitment to human needs. It is certainly possible for groups with divergent moral commitments, or even religious beliefs, to be unconcerned with one another's priorities and practices, and this mutual indifference undoubtedly facilitates bargaining and accommo­dation. But this is simply another form of interest (or pseudo) politics, one in which the interests of each self interested group are determined by a common creed or identity rather than personal advantage. e Moral or ideological dispute can be deliberative only if the contes­tants are convinced they might prevail through public discussion and argument, that minds might be changed. This conviction makes sense if the contestants agree on fundamentals and see themselves divided primarily by matters of interpretation and implementation. We sus­pect that to some degree this is usually the case. Even the word par­tisanship, while denoting divisiveness, implies a whole of which the partisan is part, and this implication may be the source of the negative connotations the word "partisanship" carries with it. To the extent that this is so, the fact that contestants share a larger consensus compels them to consider the costs to the "whole" of unrestrained struggle, as well as consider the political costs to themselves of appearing too partisan. More important in the present context, disputants who see themselves as differing primarily in matters of interpretation are more likely to think that they can convince one another's supporters of the error of their ways and that they themselves might be mistaken. Moreover, they are likely to be justified in these assessments because a common framework provides criteria by which coherence might be assessed and alternative positions evaluated. In the absence of agreement on fundamentals, however, ideo­logical partisanship can be displaced by deliberation only if theoreti­cal differences are in principle resolvable through rational discussion. Otherwise, each internally consistent theoretical system would rest upon its own supposedly self-evident conceptual axioms, impervi­ous to criticism based on rival doctrines. Of course, if there were a set of truly self-evident conceptual premises, this situation would rarely arise, for there would be consensus on fundamentals. Yet it is the rare political theorist who believes that the basic concepts of political thought are self-evident, and not many defend the possibil­ity that rational discussion could establish a rational consensus on fundamental concepts. Indeed, an influential thesis concerning the nature of interpretation in political theory holds that disputes over the meaning of fundamental concepts are theoretically irresolvable: Such concepts are not simply controversial; they are "essentially contested." As this postulate was first articulated by W. B. Gallie (1962), it is the normative nature of complex concepts such as "freedom" or "democracy" that inevitably renders their meaning irredeemingly controversial. As normative con­cepts, their application is by definition appraisive, and real world in­stances are valued achievements. As complex concepts, however, they contain a number of elements that contribute to these valued achieve­ments, and the relative weight of each element's contribution, and there­fore its importance in the definition of the concept, cannot be conclusively established by rational means. As a result, their meaning will always be contested, and the contest must be to some extent political because one position is not necessarily more rational than another.2 <r