# 1NR

## Derps

## Overview

#### Warming magnifies all impacts and makes global conflicts inevitable – and turns water shortages

Ginsborg et al. 12 – Mikkel Funder, Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Ida Peters Ginsborg - in collaboration with Nanna Callisen Bang, Denmark Institute for International Studies, 2012, "ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION EXPERIENCES FROM NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT" www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2012/RP2012-04-Addressing-climate-change\_web.jpg.pdf

2.2 Climate change as a conﬂict multiplier¶ Climate change is therefore best seen as a conﬂict multiplier, rather than as a major direct cause of conﬂict in itself. **Climate change may aggravate and extend the scope of existing conﬂicts, or trigger underlying and latent conﬂicts to break out into the open**. ¶ Previous studies have identiﬁed a number of areas in which **climate change may contribute to a worsening of conﬂicts** (Brown & Crawford 2009). These include:¶ • Land and water access. Access and use rights to land are a key feature in most situations where climate change has contributed to natural resource conﬂicts so far. Climate change can **intensify existing conﬂicts over land**, as land becomes less fertile or is ﬂooded, or if existing resource sharing arrangements between diﬀerent users and land use practices are disrupted. **In some parts of Africa, climate change may lead to a decline in available water resources of some 10–20% by the end of the century** (op cit.). This may **intensify existing competition** for access to water at intra-state and/or subnational levels. ¶ • Food security. Reduced rainfall and rising sea levels may lead to a decline in agricultural production and a substantial loss of arable land in some parts of Africa. Reduced yields for own consumption and increasing domestic food prices may in some cases lead to **civil unrest, and competition over access to land may intensify**.¶ • Migration and displacement. In some cases, increased scarcity of and competition over access to water and arable land may contribute to internal or regional migration, and disasters such as ﬂoods may lead to temporary or long-term local displacement. This may in turn **strengthen conﬂicts between host societies/communities and migrants** looking for access to new land and resources. ¶ • Increasing inequality and injustice. Through processes such as the above, some population groups may be particularly hard hit, leading to increased inequality and a sense of injustice. This may **intensify existing grievances and disputes** between natural resource users and/or between resource users and outside actors such as governments – thereby increasing the risk and intensity of conﬂict.

#### Even 1% risk justifies action - the consequences are too big

Podesta and Ogden 7 – \*President of the Center for American Progress and \*\* Senior National Security Analyst at the Center for American Progress (John and Peter, The Security Implications of Climate Change, The Washington Quarterly 31.1, Winter 2007)

Consequently, even though the IPCC projects that temperature increases at higher latitudes will be approximately twice the global average, it will be the developing nations in the earth's low latitudinal bands, as well as sub-Saharan African countries, that will be most adversely affected by climate change. In the developing world, even a relatively small climatic shift can trigger or exacerbate food shortages, water scarcity, destructive weather events, the spread of disease, human migration, and natural resource competition. These crises are all the more dangerous because they are interwoven and self-perpetuating: water shortages can lead to food shortages, which can lead to conflict over remaining resources, which can drive human migration, which can create new food shortages in new regions. Once underway, this chain reaction becomes increasingly difficult to stop. It is therefore critical that policymakers do all they can to prevent the domino of the first major climate change consequence, whether it be food scarcity or the outbreak of disease, from toppling. The most threatening first dominos, where they are situated, and their cascading geopolitical implications are identified in this essay.

#### Climate change collapses hegemony – ultimately causing extinction

Matthew, 2008 University of California, Irvine [Richard A., “Global Climate Change National Security Implications,” May,

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB862.pdf]

Against this background, climate change and security can be linked in a number of ways. Where climate changes abruptly, security problems will be immediate and extensive and perhaps even existential. We can easily envision threats on this scale in Bangladesh or other poor low-lying countries, but even here a significant number of Americans would be affected by a sudden barrage of massive flooding, Katrina-sized hurricanes, and tropical disease epidemics—perhaps enough to make climate change a national security issue. Another possible threat that we should take seriously is that of the gradual erosion of American power as endless demands are placed on it due to abrupt changes elsewhere. These are likely to arise as we face humanitarian disasters, as drought intensifies throughout Africa, and as South Asia collapses into conflict over things like fresh water. The greater our sense of interdependence, the greater our sense that national security depends on the welfare of things beyond our borders, and the more likely it is that the climate change will be a real security threat. This poses a big problem today. To what extent should we intervene to assist abroad? When should we use our resources and when should we show restraint? It is going to be difficult to make these decisions. We are playing with a lot of uncertainty. We do not know how other actors in the world will behave.

#### Warming causes nuclear indo-pak conflict and arctic resources wars.

Burke, Senior Fellow & Director – Energy Security Project at the Center for a New American Security, 2008

Sharon, Catastrophic Climate Change over the next hundred years, In Climatic Cataclysm p. 162-3

At the same time, the probability of conflict between nations will rise. Although global interstate resource wars are generally unlikely,13 simmering conflicts between nations, such as that between India and Pakistan, are likely to boil over, particularly if both nations are failing. Both India and Pakistan, of course, have nuclear weapons, and a nuclear exchange is possible, perhaps likely, either by failing central governments or by extremist and ethnic groups that seize control of nuclear weapons. There will also be competition for the Arctic region, where natural resources, including oil and arable land, will be increasingly accessible and borders are ill defined. It is possible that agreements over Arctic territories will be worked out among Russia, Canada, Norway, the United States, Iceland, and Denmark in the next two decades, before the truly catastrophic climate effects manifest themselves in those nations. If not, there is a strong probability of conflict over the Arctic, possibly even armed conflict. In general, though, nations will be preoccupied with maintaining internal stability and will have difficulty mustering the resources for war. Indeed, the greater danger is that states will fail to muster the resources for interstate cooperation.

#### Global warming will engulf the Middle East in conflict

Duchene 2008 research assistant at Penn State [Lisa, “Probing Question: Are water wars in our future?” http://www.physorg.com/news131901803.html]

With rapid population growth, wasteful practices, and impending climate change, the situation is likely to get worse. Water resources in semi-arid regions are expected to be especially hard-hit, warned the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its 2007 summary report. By some estimates, two-thirds of the world's population will be water-stressed by 2025. During a year when many states across the U.S. are suffering some of the worst droughts ever, water is a topic on people's minds. Will the prospect of a diminishing water supply result in serious geopolitical conflict? "Freshwater resources are unevenly distributed around the globe," says Robert B. Packer, lecturer in political science at Penn State, who studies international political economy and the causes of war. "While freshwater is relatively abundant in Europe and much of North America, other regions of the globe, such as the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of West and Eastern Africa, face increasingly severe shortages." According to the BBC, the number of 'water-scarce' countries in the Middle East grew from three in 1955 to eight in 1990, with another seven expected to be added within 20 years. "Of particular concern," said Packer, "are certain riparian basins that could explode into conflict as sources of freshwater diminish. Conflict is more likely to occur where water can be seized and controlled in addition to being scarce." Among Middle East countries, where every major river crosses at least one international border, up to 50 percent of water needs of any specific state finds its source in another state, Packer noted. "Hydro-politics already play a central role among states in riparian basins, such as the Tigris-Euphrates, the Nile, the Jordan, as well as those sharing the underground aquifers of the West Bank." Conflicts are likely to emerge as competition intensifies to control river waters for hydroelectricity, agricultural use, and human consumption, he added. "Farms and cities downstream are vulnerable to the actions and decisions of upstream countries that they have little control over. This is exemplified in the tensions over the Tigris-Euphrates, where Turkey commenced construction of a system of hydroelectric dams. Iraq and Syria have protested, citing the project would reduce the rivers' flow downstream. Turkey's response to the Arab states has been 'we don't control their oil, they don't control our water.'" To the west, the Nile has been the lifeline for Egyptian civilization dating back to antiquity. Nearly all of Egypt's 80 million people live on the three percent of Egyptian territory that is the river's valley and delta. "For Egypt the Nile is life, and its government has voiced to upstream countries that any reduction of Nile waters would be taken as national security threat that could trigger a military response," says Packer. "Nearly all freshwater in the Israeli-occupied West Bank comes from underground aquifers," he added. "Water access has become a major issue between Israelis and Palestinians." "Perhaps the greatest of all modern Middle East conflicts, the Six Day War of 1967, began as a dispute over water access," Packer noted. Israel built a National Water Carrier to transport freshwater from the Jordan and the Sea of Galilee to the country's farming and urban centers. (The Carrier now supplies half the drinking water in Israel.) In 1965, Israeli forces attacked a Syrian water diversion project that would have cut the Carrier's supply, and prolonged violence led to war. "For Israelis, control of the Golan Heights is important strategically in terms of controlling the headwaters of the Jordan River," Packer noted. The effects of global warming and desertification also have impacted hydro-politics around the world. In West Africa, rainfall has declined 30 percent over the last four decades and the Sahara is advancing more than one mile per year. Senegal and Mauritania engaged in militarized conflict in 1989 across the Senegal River that divides them, in part over changing access to arable land.

## AT: Regs

#### Voyles evidence – politician obviously biased – making a predictive claim – doesn’t say regs have passed

#### Coal jobs are up---if Obama’s fighting a war on coal he sucks at it

Daniel J. Weiss 12, Senior Fellow and Director of Climate Strategy at the Center for American Progress, May 25, 2012, “The ‘War On Coal’ Is A Myth,” online: <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/05/25/490444/war-on-coal-myth/>

Big polluters and their Congressional allies have created a new straw man to knock down with the invention of the so-called “War on Coal.” It is a multi-million dollar disinformation campaign funded by Big Coal polluters to protect their profits and distract Americans from the deadly effects of air pollution on public health.

However, with the number of coal jobs in key coal states actually on the rise since 2009, it’s more like peacetime prosperity than war in coal country. The War on Coal is nothing more than a new shiny object, designed by big polluters to distract Americans from the real war – the polluters’ attacks on their health – and the truth.

//

Coal companies and dirty utilities claim that long overdue requirements to reduce mercury, arsenic, smog, acid rain, and carbon pollution from power plants will kill jobs. In West Virginia, however, coal mining employment was higher in 2011 than at any time over the last 17 years. Federal jobs statistics also show modest coal mining job growth in coal states like Virginia and Pennsylvania.

In West Virginia, a recent report from the non-partisan West Virginia Center for Budget and Policy showed coal mining jobs are actually rising, with 1,500 new coal jobs added since 2009. In Pennsylvania, Energy Information Administration (EIA) data shows a 2.3% increase in coal related jobs. And in Virginia, EIA data shows a 6.7% increase in coal mining employment from 2009 to 2010.

#### EPA mercury and carbon regs are net-positive for jobs---no adverse net impact on the industry

Daniel J. Weiss 12, Senior Fellow and Director of Climate Strategy at the Center for American Progress, May 25, 2012, “The ‘War On Coal’ Is A Myth,” online: <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/05/25/490444/war-on-coal-myth/>

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has promulgated or proposed new clean air standards for smog, acid rain, mercury, air toxics, and carbon pollution that will save lives, create jobs and protect public health. For example, the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard alone could prevent up to 11,000 premature deaths, 130,000 asthma incidents, and 540,000 lost work days every year. This would provide at least $59 billion in economic benefits.

The Economic Policy Institute projects that the mercury standard will actually have a “positive net impact on overall employment – likely leading to the net creation of 84,500 jobs between now and 2015.” The jobs created by the standard, however, would not just be limited to certain industrial sectors. EPI’s study projects that “8,000 Jobs would be gained in the utility industry itself,” along with the over 80,500 jobs that would be created to build pollution control equipment. While dirty coal companies claim that the mercury standard will cause massive unemployment, EPI notes that “only 10,600 jobs would be displaced due to higher energy costs.” Richard Morgenstern, a former Reagan and Clinton EPA official, predicts that the new standard will have “no net impact” on employment.

EPA predicts that its proposed carbon pollution standard for new power plants will have no impact on employment or existing coal plants. In fact, the standard simply complements existing market factors, as the EPA points out:

Because this standard is in line with current industry investment patterns, this proposed standard is not expected to have notable costs and is not projected to impact electricity prices or reliability.

#### Independent studies conclude compliance costs are even less than EPA predicted

Alex Chamberlain 11, ERA Environmental Consulting, 2011, “EPA Utility MACT Regulations Face Similar Criticism as Boiler MACTs,” online: http://info.era-environmental.com/blog/bid/40758/EPA-Utility-MACT-Regulations-Face-Similar-Criticism-as-Boiler-MACTs

Industry groups are critical of the new Utility MACTs. Some have even projected that the costs to industry will actually amount to $110 billion - ten times the estimated price tag cited by EPA. Independent studies, however, have shown that the new EPA regulations for the energy sector will actually have less of an economic impact than the EPA itself had predicted. They also fear that the court-imposed short deadline imposed on EPA’s final publication will result in a repeat of the Boiler MACT situation. In March 21, 2011, EPA published its final Boiler MACT regulations in the federal register, only to immediately announce it was officially reconsidering many aspects of the final rule and indefinitely delaying the regulation enforcement date. The resulting uncertainty has created unrest and confusion across the manufacturing industry and the political sphere which the energy sector would rather avoid.

#### Natural gas not key – coal is recovering in the US

Reuters 12-7 – Reuters, December 7th, 2012, "Coal prices to rise on increased Chinese, U.S. demand -Deutsche" www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/07/energy-coal-prices-idUSL5E8N76W120121207

But Deutsche Bank said that higher gas demand in the U.S. would push American gas prices up, leading to a reduction of U.S. coal exports, while Chinese demand for coal imports would rise, further supporting coal prices.¶ "Therefore, while the outlook in the next month is ambiguous, the second half of 2013 provides clearer signals for an improvement in thermal coal fundamentals next year," the bank said.

#### *U.S. coal exports to China are low, but downward pressure on domestic demand expands them massively*

*Bryan Walsh 12, Senior Editor at TIME, May 31, 2012, “Drawing Battle Lines Over American Coal Exports to Asia,” online: http://science.time.com/2012/05/31/drawing-battle-lines-over-american-coal-exports-to-asia/*

*But across the Pacific Ocean, the demand for coal has never been hotter, with China burning 4.1 billion tons in 2010 alone, far more than any other country in the world. That insatiable demand forced China in 2009 to become a net coal importer for the first time, in part because congested rail infrastructure raised the cost of transporting coal from the mines of the country’s northwest to its booming southern cities. In April, Chinese coal imports nearly doubled from a year earlier. Right now Australia and Indonesia supply much of China’s foreign coal. U.S. coal from the Powder River Basin could be a perfect addition to the Chinese market. Montana and Wyoming are just short train trips to ports on the Pacific Northwest coast, and from there it’s a container ship away from Asian megacities where coal doesn’t have to compete with cheap natural gas and air-pollution regulations are far weaker than in the U.S. To a wounded Big Coal, China is a potential savior.¶ As I write in the new edition of TIME, there’s just one problem: right now, ports on the West Coast lack the infrastructure needed to transfer coal from railcars into container ships. (Just 7 million of the 107 million tons of U.S.-exported coal left the country via Pacific Ocean ports last year.) That’s why coal companies like Peabody and Ambre Energy are ready to spend millions to build coal-export facilities at a handful of ports in Washington and Oregon. If all those plans go forward, as much as 150 million tons of coal could be exported from the Northwest annually—-nearly all of it coming from the Powder -River -Basin and headed to Asia. Even if the U.S. kept burning less and less coal at home, it would have a reason to keep mining it.*

## Link

#### They’ve conceded the link – no new args

#### *SMRs cause coal plant retiring*

*Marcus King et al 11, Associate Director of Research, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, et al., March 2011, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf*

*SMRs have potential advantages over larger plants because they provide owners more flexibility in financing, siting, sizing, and end-use applications. SMRs can reduce an owner's initial capital outlay or investment because of the lower plant capital cost. Modular components and factory fabrication can reduce construction costs and schedule duration. Additional modules can be added incrementally as demand for power increases. SMRs can provide power for applications where large plants are not needed or may not have the necessary infrastructure to support a large unit such as smaller electrical markets, isolated areas, smaller grids, or restricted water or acreage sites. Several domestic utilities have expressed considerable interest in SMRs as potential replacements for aging fossil plants to increase their fraction of non-carbon-emitting generators. Approximately 80 percent of the 1174 total operating U.S. coal plants have power outputs of less than 500 MWe; 100 percent of coal plants that are more than 50 years old have capacities below 500 MWe [3]. SMRs would be a viable replacement option for these plants.*

## AT: China Not Switching

#### *U.S. exports lock in expanded Chinese coal capacity---causes warming over the tipping point---it’s unique because absent U.S. exports the rising cost of coal will cause a shift to renewables*

*Thomas M. Power 12, Research Professor and Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Montana; Principal, Power Consulting; February 2012, “The Greenhouse Gas Impact of Exporting Coal from the West Coast: An Economic Analysis,”* [*http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf*](http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf)

*The cumulative impact of these coal port proposals on coal consumption in Asia could be much larger than even that implied by the two pending proposals. If Arch, Peabody, and other western U.S. coal producers’ projections of the competitiveness of western coal in Asia are correct, facilitating the opening of the development of West Coast coal ports could have a very large impact on the supply of coal to China and the rest of Asia.*

*6.4 The Long-term Implications of Fueling Additional Coal-Fired Electric Generation*

*Although the economic life of coal-fired generators is often given as 30 or 35 years, a permitted, operating, electric generator is kept on line a lot longer than that, as long as 50 or more years through ongoing renovations and upgrades. Because of that long operating life, the impact of the lower Asian coal prices and costs triggered by PRB coal competing with other coal sources cannot be measured by the number of tons of coal exported each year. Those lower coal costs will lead to commitments to more coal being burned for a half-century going forward.*

*That time-frame is very important. During exactly this time frame, the next half-century, the nations of the world will have to get their greenhouse gas emission stabilized and then reduced or the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may pass a point that will make it very difficult to avoid massive, ongoing, negative climate impacts. Taking actions now that encourage fifty-years of more coal consumption around the world is not a minor matter. Put more positively, allowing coal prices to rise (and more closely approximate their full cost, including “external” costs) will encourage extensive investments in improving the efficiency with which coal is used and the shift to cleaner sources of energy. This will lead to long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will also last well into the next half-century. 57*

#### Their evidence is terrible – from a blogger

#### China’s transitioning to clean tech now---political commitment from CCP leadership

Luke Schoen 10-19, Associate in the Climate & Energy Program at WRI Insights, 10/19/12, “Policy Experts Provide Insights Into China’s Leadership Transition,” <http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/10/policy-experts-provide-insights-chinas-leadership-transition>

Deborah Seligsohn, a climate and energy advisor to WRI, rounded out the call by highlighting that China’s economic restructuring can be compatible with environmental protection, including around action to address climate change. China’s efforts to control emissions will be “good for climate change, the planet, and other environmental issues that they have to grapple with,” Seligsohn said.

She discussed the main drivers behind China’s energy and climate actions, including the country’s desire to: restructure its economy; increase innovation and development of new technologies; move toward greater environmental protections; and meet its targets in the 12th five-year plan.

Seligsohn concluded that “there is strong agreement [among Chinese officials] that part of development is being both cleaner and more technologically sophisticated and having a more diverse economy.”

China’s Energy Future

The discussions held during the call point to one key takeaway: Together, these underlying factors may indeed push China toward a lower-carbon energy future. These changes are unlikely to occur quickly, but we’ll all be watching closely to see if China’s new leadership is able to manage a transition to clean energy while ensuring the country stays on a solid growth pathway.

## AT: North Korea

#### Seriously, lols

#### Short-term coal price declines cause fast investment in new coal generation that will be locked in for 50 years

Thomas M. Power 12, Research Professor and Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Montana; Principal, Power Consulting; February 2012, “The Greenhouse Gas Impact of Exporting Coal from the West Coast: An Economic Analysis,” <http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf>

• Prices now determine energy use for decades.

Lower coal prices reduce the incentives to retire older, inefficient, coal-using production processes and discourage additional investments in the energy efficiency of new and existing coal-using enterprises. As those lower prices flow through to consumers, it also reduces the incentives to shift to more energy efficient appliances. Furthermore, lower coal costs will encourage investments in new coal-burning facilities in Asia—which in turn create a 30- to 50-year demand for coal.

• China responds to higher prices by improving efficiency.

Concerns over rising energy costs have led the Chinese government to develop tighter energy efficiency standards throughout the economy. The rise in world oil prices, for example, led the Chinese government to announce strict five-year energy conservation goals including limiting the growth of coal consumption to about 4 percent per year, far below the expected expansion of the economy.

• Potential for energy efficiency remains largely untapped.

Energy usage per unit of GDP across the Chinese economy is almost four times that in the United States and almost eight times that in Japan. The Chinese government and the large state-owned enterprises that produce, distribute, and use larger amounts of energy are well aware of the burden that high and rising energy cost can impose on the economy. The energy policies embodied in the last several five-year plans have focused heavily on improving overall energy efficiency in order to effectively control energy costs. Lowering coal costs to China would undermine these valuable energy efficiency efforts.

#### U.S. coal exports change the long-term risks that planners account for in energy investment decisions---locks new coal plants that’ll operate for 50 years

Thomas M. Power 12, Research Professor and Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Montana; Principal, Power Consulting; February 2012, “The Greenhouse Gas Impact of Exporting Coal from the West Coast: An Economic Analysis,” <http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf>

The conclusion I draw from this analysis is that the PRB coal exports facilitated by the proposed coal ports will reduce the price of coal to Asian markets, the cost of using coal there, and the long-term price and supply risks that planners take into account when making long-term energy infrastructure investment decisions. Coal export will encourage the continued, rapid expansion of coal-fired electric generation capacity. Consequently, as I discuss in Section 6 below, the impacts of coal export will be much larger than the annual capacity of the port facilities would suggest, because it will encourage investments in new coal-burning facilities in Asia and their associated 30-50 year combustion of coal

## AT: Impact D

#### From a founder of a energy company

#### 1nc ev – china independently causes extinction – nagle

#### Does’t assume a shift away – shift happening now – that’s above

#### 1nc flournoy – extinction

#### Prefer scientific consensus – warming skeptics are paid off by fuel companies and cherry-pick data

Monbiot 8 – visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning) and East London (environmental science). He has honorary doctorates from the University of St Andrews and the University of Essex and an Honorary Fellowship from Cardiff University [George, “Big oil's big lie,” June 23, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/23/climatechange.carbonemissions]

Of course, it's not a crime, and it's hard to see how, in a free society, it could or should become one. But the culpability of the energy firms the climate scientist James Hansen will indict in his testimony to Congress today is clear. If we fail to stop runaway climate change, it will be largely because of campaigning by oil, coal and electricity companies, and the network of lobbyists, fake experts and thinktanks they have sponsored. The operation sprang directly from Big Tobacco's war against science. It has used the same fake experts, the same public relations companies and the same tactics: as I showed in my book Heat, the campaign against action on climate change was partly launched by the tobacco company Philip Morris. But while the tobacco companies' professional liars were smoked out by a massive class action in the US, the sponsored climate change deniers still have massive influence over public perception. A survey published yesterday by the Observer shows that six out of ten people in Britain agreed that "many scientific experts still question if humans are contributing to climate change." This is an inaccurate perception, which results from Big Energy's lobbying. Almost without exception, the scientists who claim to doubt that manmade climate change is taking place fall into two categories: either they are not qualifiedin the branch of science they are discussing or they have received moneyfrom fossil fuel companies. Of all the self-professed climate "sceptics", I have been able to find only one – Dr John Christy of the University of Alabama – who has relevant qualifications and who does not appear to have received fees from lobby groups or thinktanks sponsored by the energy companies. But even he has had to admit that the figures on which he based his claims were the results of "errors in the … data". The others are the very opposite of sceptics. **Many of them are paid to start with a conclusion – that climate change isn't happening or isn't important – then to find data and arguments to support it**. In most cases, they cherrypick scientific findings; in a few cases, like the fake scientific paper attached to the celebrated Oregon petition, they make them up altogether. But **people who don't understand the difference between a peer-reviewed paper and a pamphlet are taken in**. The energy companies' propaganda campaign is amplified by scientific illiterates in the media, such as Melanie Phillips, Christopher Booker, Nigel Lawson, Alexander Cockburn and the television producer (who made Channel 4's documentary The Great Global Warming Swindle) Martin Durkin. I don't believe that the energy companies should be prosecuted for commissioning the truckload of trash their sponsored experts publish. But their campaign of disinformation must be exposed again and again. Like the tobacco lobbyists, they are not only delaying essential public action; they also create the impression that science is for sale to the highest bidder. The awful truth is that sometimes it is.

#### We haven’t reached the tipping point yet

Hansen et al 7 (James, Director @ NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Adjunct Prof. Earth and Env. Sci. @ Columbia U. Earth Institute), and others, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, “Dangerous human-made interference with climate: a GISS model study”, 7:2287-2312, http://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2007/2007\_Hansen\_etal\_1.pdf)

Have we already passed a “tipping point” such that it is now impossible to avoid “dangerous” climate change (Lovelock, 2006)? In our estimation, we must be close to such a point, but we may not have passed it yet. It is still feasible to achieve a scenario that keeps additional global warming under 1C, yielding a degree of climate change that is quantitatively and qualitatively different than under BAU scenarios. The “alternative” scenario, designed to keep warming less than 1C, has a significantly smaller forcing than any of the IPCC scenarios. In recent years net growth of all real world greenhouse gases has run just slightly ahead of the alternative scenario, with the excess due to continued growth of CO2 emissions at about 2%/year. CO2 emissions would need to level out soon and decline before mid-century to approximate the alternative scenario. Moderate changes of emissions growth rate have a marked effect after decades, as shown by comparison to BAU scenarios. Early decreases in emissions growth are the most effective.

#### Warming’s on track to be catastrophic---action now solves

Nuccitelli 9/1 Dana, environmental scientist at a private environmental consulting firm in Sacramento and has a Bachelor's Degree in astrophysics from the University of California at Berkeley, and a Master's Degree in physics from the University of California at Davis, 2012, “Realistically What Might The Future Climate Look Like?”, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/09/01/784931/realistically-what-might-the-future-climate-look-like/

This is Why Reducing Emissions is Critical¶ We’re not yet committed to surpassing 2°C global warming, but as Watson noted, we are quickly running out of time to realistically give ourselves a chance to stay below that ‘danger limit’. However, 2°C is not a do-or-die threshold. Every bit of CO2 emissions we can reduce means that much avoided future warming, which means that much avoided climate change impacts. As Lonnie Thompson noted, the more global warming we manage to mitigate, the less adaption and suffering we will be forced to cope with in the future.¶ Realistically, based on the current political climate (which we will explore in another post next week), limiting global warming to 2°C is probably the best we can do. However, there is a big difference between 2°C and 3°C, between 3°C and 4°C, and anything greater than 4°C can probably accurately be described as catastrophic, since various tipping points are expected to be triggered at this level. Right now, we are on track for the catastrophic consequences (widespread coral mortality, mass extinctions, hundreds of millions of people adversely impacted by droughts, floods, heat waves, etc.). But we’re not stuck on that track just yet, and we need to move ourselves as far off of it as possible by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions as soon and as much as possible.¶ There are of course many people who believe that the planet will not warm as much, or that the impacts of the associated climate change will be as bad as the body of scientific evidence suggests. That is certainly a possiblity, and we very much hope that their optimistic view is correct. However, what we have presented here is the best summary of scientific evidence available, and it paints a very bleak picture if we fail to rapidly reduce our greenhouse gas emissions.¶ If we continue forward on our current path, catastrophe is not just a possible outcome, it is the most probable outcome. And an intelligent risk management approach would involve taking steps to prevent a catastrophic scenario if it were a mere possibility, let alone the most probable outcome. This is especially true since the most important component of the solution – carbon pricing – can be implemented at a relatively low cost, and a far lower cost than trying to adapt to the climate change consequences we have discussed here (Figure 4).¶ Climate contrarians will often mock ‘CAGW’ (catastrophic anthropogenic global warming), but the sad reality is that CAGW is looking more and more likely every day. But it’s critical that we don’t give up, that we keep doing everything we can do to reduce our emissions as much as possible in order to avoid as many catastrophic consequences as possible, for the sake of future generations and all species on Earth. The future climate will probably be much more challenging for life on Earth than today’s, but we still can and must limit the damage.

# 1NR

## 1

#### *Desalination can’t solve – too expensive to ship water to the places that need it most*

*Increasing Population, 1-22-2010, “Fresh Water,” http://increasingpopulation.blogspot.com/2010/01/fresh-water.html*

*Fresh water can be obtained from salt water by desalination. For example, Malta derives two thirds of its freshwater by desalination. A number of nuclear powered desalination plants exist, and physicists agree that there are billions of years of nuclear fuel available. But the high costs of desalination, especially for poor countries, make impractical the transport of large amounts of desalinated seawater to interiors of large countries. The cost of desalinization varies; Israel is now desalinating water for a cost of 53 cents per cubic meter, Singapore at 49 cents per cubic meter. In the United States, the cost is 81 cents per cubic meter ($3.06 for 1,000 gallons). According to a 2004 study by Zhoua and Tolb, "one needs to lift the water by 2000 m, or transport it over more than 1600 km to get transport costs equal to the desalination costs. Desalinated water is expensive in places that are both somewhat far from the sea and somewhat high, such as Riyadh and Harare. In other places, the dominant cost is desalination, not transport. This leads to somewhat lower costs in places like Beijing, Bangkok, Zaragoza, Phoenix, and, of course, coastal cities like Tripoli." Thus while the study is generally positive about the technology for affluent areas that are proximate to oceans, it concludes that "Desalinated water may be a solution for some water-stress regions, but not for places that are poor, deep in the interior of a continent, or at high elevation. Unfortunately, that includes some of the places with biggest water problems." Another potential problem with desalination is the byproduction of saline brine, which can be a major cause of marine pollution when dumped back into the oceans at high temperatures."*

#### *They can’t solve---no evidence we would choose to use SMR’s to give other countries water for free---obviously the military would use it for missions*

### No Solvency

#### Desalination inevitable – aff not key

Earth Talk, 2012, “Can Ocean Desalination Solve the World’s Water Shortage?” http://environment.about.com/od/biodiversityconservation/a/desalination.htm

Despite such arguments, the practice is becoming more common. Ted Levin of the Natural Resources Defense Council says that more than 12,000 desalination plants already supply fresh water in 120 nations, mostly in the Middle East and Caribbean. And analysts expect the worldwide market for desalinated water to grow significantly over the coming decades. Environmental advocates may just have to settle for pushing to "green" the practice as much as possible in lieu of eliminating it altogether.

#### Nuclear desalination inevitable globally – aff not key

Next Energy News, 9-17-2007, “Middle East goes Nuclear for Water Desalination Plants,” http://www.nextenergynews.com/news1/nextnews9.17a.html

Libya hopes to use the electricity generated by nuclear power for water desalination, a hope echoed in many countries in the region. Egypt has said it will pursue a similar scheme, as have Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council countries -- Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Japan and Kazakhstan already have working nuclear-powered desalination plants. The Middle East, like much of the rest of the world, is increasingly in need of fresh water. About 60 percent of the roughly 7,500 traditionally powered desalination plants can be found in the Middle East. In fact, Saudi Arabia holds about a quarter of the world's desalination capacity, according to the International Desalination Association, and it provides 70 percent of the country's drinking water.

#### Desal is net bad for water shortages – diverts from better solutions

Earth Talk, 2012, “Can Ocean Desalination Solve the World’s Water Shortage?” http://environment.about.com/od/biodiversityconservation/a/desalination.htm

Food & Water Watch advocates instead for better fresh water management practices. "Ocean desalination hides the growing water supply problem instead of focusing on water management and lowering water usage," the group reports, citing a recent study which found that California can meet its water needs for the next 30 years by implementing cost-effective urban water conservation. Desalination is "an expensive, speculative supply option that will drain resources away from more practical solutions," the group says

### No Water Wars

#### No water wars

Katz 11—Director of the Akirov Institute for Business and Environment at Tel Aviv University. PhD (David, Hydro-Political Hyperbole, Global Environmental Politics, 11; 1; Feb 2011)

A number critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empirical evidence behind the water wars hypothesis. One critique of the environmental security literature, of which much of the published material on water wars is guilty, is that warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evidence.28 Statements from the 1980s that the next war in the Middle East will be over water have already proven false. Research has shown, however, that even the more general predictions of imminent water wars that are based on comments by officials may be suspect. Leng, for instance, found no correlation between the frequency of threats of war and the onset of war.29 Examining conflict and cooperation over water resources, Yoffe and colleagues noted over 400 incidents of water-related verbal exchanges by political figures between 1948 and 1999 that were conflictual in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conflict of varying levels of intensity. Thirty of these were from the Middle East, none were [End Page 15] more recent than 1970, none were all-out wars, and in none was water the central cause of conflict.30

Proponents of water war scenarios often premise their dire conclusions on the fact that water is essential for life and non-substitutable.31 Yet water for basic needs represents a small share of total water use, even in arid countries.32 Economists and others point out that over 80 percent of world freshwater withdrawals are for the agricultural sector, a relatively low-value use and one in which large gains in efficiency could be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choice of crops. Thus, economic critiques of the water war hypothesis stress that the value of water that would be gained from military conflict is unlikely to outweigh the economic costs of military preparation and battle, much less the loss of life.33

Some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusion that freshwater is increasingly scarce, 34 an assumption on which the water war hypothesis relies. Such a “cornucopian” view claims that people adapt to scarcity through improvements in technology, pricing, and efficiency—rendering water less scarce, not more so.

Perhaps the strongest case against the likelihood of water wars is the lack of empirical evidence of precedents. Wolf found only one documented case of war explicitly over water, and this took place over 4500 years ago.35 Moreover, he could document only seven cases of acute conflict over water. Yoffe and colleagues also find that armed conflict over water resources has been uncommon.36 They found that cooperation was much more common than conflict, both globally and in all world regions except the Middle East/North Africa. This pattern may explain why only a limited number of case studies of water conflict are presented in the water wars literature.

Analysts have criticized environmental security arguments that are based on case studies because such works tend to have no variation in the dependent variable.37 Many large sample statistical studies have attempted to address such shortcomings, however, in several cases these studies too have come under fire. For instance, a number of large-sample statistical studies find correlations between water-related variables and conflict, however, few, if any, provide convincing support for causal relationships. Moreover, several studies found that water availability had no impact on the likelihood of either domestic or international conflict, 38 including at least one study that attempted to replicate earlier studies [End Page 16] that claimed to have found such correlations.39 Moreover, the results of several studies that do find correlations between water and conflict are either not robust or are contrasted by other findings. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal find that the statistical significance of water scarcity variables is highly dependent on one or two observations, leading them to conclude that actual effects of water scarcity “are weak, negligible or insignificant.”40 Jensen and Gleditsch find that the results of Miguel and colleagues are less robust when using a recoding of the original dataset.41 Gleditsch and colleagues found that shared basins do predict an increased propensity for conflict, but found no correlation between conflict and drought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream, leading them to state that “support for a scarcity theory of water conflict is somewhat ambiguous.”42

#### No risk of water wars---historical evidence all concludes neg---cooperation is way more likely and solves

Jeremy Allouche 11 is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food PolicyVolume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8 Accessed via: Science Direct Sciverse

Water/food resources, war and conflict

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological changeand greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture**.** More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an **instrumental purpose**; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none **of these declarations have been followed up by military action**.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None **of the** various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, **more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale** (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however **no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict**. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity **does not make much sense in the light of the recent** historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, **the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin** ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

### No Asia War

#### Multiple factors make Asia war unlikely

Vannarith 10—Executive Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace. PhD in Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific U (Chheang, Asia Pacific Security Issues: Challenges and Adaptive Mechanism, <http://www.cicp.org.kh/download/CICP%20Policy%20brief/CICP%20Policy%20brief%20No%203.pdf>)

Some people look to China for economic and strategic interests while others still stick to the US. Since, as a human nature, change is not widely acceptable due to the high level of uncertainty. It is therefore logical to say that most of the regional leaders prefer to see the status quo of security architecture in the Asia Pacific Region in which US is the hub of security provision. But it is impossible to preserve the status quo since China needs to strategically outreach to the wider region in order to get necessary resources especially energy and raw materials to maintain her economic growth in the home country. It is understandable that China needs to have stable high economic growth of about 8 percent GDP growth per year for her own economic and political survival. Widening development gap and employment are the two main issues facing China. Without China, the world will not enjoy peace, stability, and development. China is the locomotive of global and regional economic development and contributes to global and regional peace and stability. It is understandable that China is struggling to break the so-called containment strategy imposed by the US since the post Cold War. Whether this tendency can lead to the greater strategic division is still unknown. Nevertheless, many observers agree that whatever changes may take place, a multi-polar world and multilateralism prevail. The reasons or logics supporting multilateralism are mainly based on the fact that no one country can really address the security issues embedded with international dimension, no one country has the capacity to adapt and adopt to new changes alone, and it needs cooperation and coordination among the nation states and relevant stakeholders including the private sector and civil societies. Large scale interstate war or armed conflict is **unthinkable** in the region due to the high level of interdependency and democratization. It is believed that economic interdependency can reduce conflicts and prevent war. Democracy can lead to more transparency, accountability, and participation that can reduce collective fears and create more confidence and trust among the people in the region. In addition, globalism and regionalism are taking the center stage of national and foreign policy of many governments in the region except North Korea. The combination of those elements of peace is necessary for peace and stability in the region and those elements are **present and being improved in this region.**

#### No conceivable scenario

Singh 8 [Daljit, visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2008 – 2009, lexis]

However, looking ahead just the next few years, the positive trends of the recent past can be expected to continue. First, the U.S. military presence and certain key alliances that underpin East/Southeast Asian security will remain in place. The strengthening of America's alliances with Japan and Australia in recent years and the growing trilateral cooperation among them suggest that the main maritime powers led by the United States will work more closely to balance a rising China, even as they, and others, engage and cooperate with China. Also noteworthy is the deepening strategic cooperation between India and the United States, but its future depends significantly on whether the U.S.-India nuclear deal gets through.¶ Second, bilateral relations between the United States and Japan on one side and China on the other can be expected to remain generally stable. China will be preoccupied with its internal development and the United States with the Middle East and Afghanistan, while being dependent on Chinese cooperation on a number of regional and international issues. The trend of improvement in Sino-Japanese relations set in motion by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is likely to be continued by Premier Fukuda. Sino-Indian relations have seen expanded dialogue and economic links but their future will depend in part upon how far U.S.-India strategic and defence cooperation advances.¶ Third, two of the most dangerous potential flashpoints, the Korean nuclear crisis and the India-Pakistan confrontation, seem to have been defused, even if not permanently settled. Territorial disputes between China and Japan and between China and some Southeast Asian countries are unlikely to erupt into conflict in the near future because of improved political relations between the parties concerned. Some uncertainty remains over Taiwan but, more likely than not, the United States will be able to restrain President Chen Shui-bian if he is tempted to challenge the red lines that China has drawn.

### No Indo-Pak War

#### No Indo-Pak war

Turkish Weekly 11 (28 July 2011, India and Pakistan Pledge 'New Spirit of Cooperation', http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/120330/india-and-pakistan-pledge-39-new-spirit-of-cooperation-39-.html)

The foreign ministers of India and Pakistan have called for a new spirit of cooperation between their countries.

SM Krishna and Hina Rabbani Khar are holding talks in Delhi, the first such meeting between the two nuclear rivals in a year.

The meeting comes five months after the South Asian neighbors resumed bilateral discussions.

Talks were suspended after the 2008 Mumbai (Bombay) attacks which India blamed on Pakistan-based militants.

But earlier this year, leaders vowed to resume their dialogue.

Correspondents say the talks are unlikely to throw up any major policy statements, but they will be another step in improving relations between the neighbors.

Indian Foreign Minister SM Krishna said before the meeting that his country wanted to see ""a stable, smooth and prosperous Pakistan"".

Khar, Pakistan's newly appointed and first ever female foreign minister, said ties between the two countries ""should not be held hostage to the past.""

But soon after her arrival in India on Tuesday, she met with Kashmiri separatist leaders, a move that would not have gone down well with her hosts, says the BBC's Sanjoy Majumder in Delhi.

The two sides are expected to discuss the contentious issue of disputed Kashmir.

The Himalayan region is claimed by both India and Pakistan in its entirety, but has been divided since 1948. It has been the cause of three wars between the countries.

India will also press Pakistan to take action against militant groups based on its soil, especially those perceived to be behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Since February, Indian and Pakistani officials have met to discuss a range of issues in an attempt to find ways to build trust and promote peace.

Last month, the foreign secretaries of the two countries held two days of talks where they agreed to discuss new nuclear confidence-building measures.

#### War won’t go nuclear

Enders 2 (Jan 30, David, Michigan Daily, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely)

**\* Ashutosh Varshney – Professor of Political Science and South Asia expert at the University of Michigan**

**\* Paul Huth – Professor of International Conflict and Security Affairs at the University of Maryland**

**\* Kenneth Lieberthal – Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council**

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan.¶ "Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."¶ The worlds two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous.¶ "The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said.¶ "Watching the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said.¶ Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war.¶ "India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."¶ Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal.¶ "American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands."

### Middle East War

#### ME war won’t escalate---empirics prove

Cook 7**—**CFR senior fellow for Mid East Studies. BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA and PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania(Steven, Ray Takeyh, CFR fellow, and Suzanne Maloney, Brookings fellow, 6 /28, Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6383265, AG)

Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, **the region has** also **developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.**

### Warming DA

#### Global expansion of enrichment capability is the only way nuclear power can solve climate change---the plan reverses that

Sharon Squassoni 9, Director and Senior Fellow of the Proliferation Prevention Program at CSIS, 3/25/9, “Nuclear Power: How Much More?,” http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=176&rid=2

The amount of nuclear capacity required to make a signification contribution to global climate change mitigation is so large that it would inevitably be widely distributed across the globe. Such a distribution would have particular implications for nuclear proliferation. However, projected distributions of nuclear energy out to 2050 are extremely speculative. The industry itself does not engage in such projections, and countries that set nuclear energy production goals have a history of widely missing long-range targets, such as China and India. The discussion below considers a hypothetical distribution of nuclear energy for 2050, based on the 2003 MIT Study. [12]

Scenario III, shown in Figure 7, uses the “High 2050” scenario in Appendix 2 (“Global Electricity Demand and the Nuclear Power Growth Scenario”) of the 2003 MIT study, The Future of Nuclear Power. Although this is not a distribution designed to achieve optimal CO2 reductions, it is expansion at a level significant enough (1500 GWe) to have an effect on CO2 emissions. This would mean a fourfold increase from current reactor capacity.

The MIT study used an underlying assumption that the developed countries would continue with a modest annual increase in per capita electricity use and the developing countries would move to the 4000 kWh per person per year benchmark if at all feasible (the 4000 kWh benchmark being the dividing line between developed and advanced countries). Electricity demand was then pegged to estimated population growth. Finally, it was assumed that nuclear energy would retain or increase its current share of electricity generation. The least-off developing countries were assumed in the MIT study not to have the wherewithal for nuclear energy. It should be noted that MIT’s 2050 projection was “an attempt to understand what the distribution of nuclear power deployment would be if robust growth were realized, perhaps driven by a broad commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and a concurrent resolution of the various challenges confronting nuclear power’s acceptance in various countries.” A few countries that the MIT High 2050 case included but are not included here are countries that currently have laws restricting nuclear energy, such as Austria.

Implications for Uranium Enrichment

A fourfold expansion of nuclear energy would entail significant new production requirements for uranium enrichment as shown in Figure 8 and possibly, reprocessing. The MIT study anticipated that 54 states would have reactor capacities that could possibly justify indigenous uranium enrichment. If a capability of 10 GWe is considered the threshold at which indigenous enrichment becomes cost-effective, more than 15 additional states could find it advantageous to engage in uranium enrichment.

Figure 9 depicts what the geographic distribution of enrichment capacity might look like, based on the development of 10 GWe or more of reactor capacity. Of course, some states – such as Australia or Kazakhstan – might opt to enrich uranium regardless of domestic nuclear energy capacity, choosing to add value to their own uranium exports. In addition, states may choose to take the path of the UAE, which has formally renounced domestic enrichment and reprocessing in its domestic law, despite aspiring to reach 10 GWe of capacity. Ultimately, these decisions lie very much in the political realm, and can be reversed.

#### Cross-apply the impact to the DA.