### 1NC

#### Debt ceiling compromise likely now but uniqueness doesn’t overwhelm the link---the impact is economic collapse

Klein 1/2 Ezra is a politics writer for the Washington Post. “The lessons of the fiscal cliff,” 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/the-lessons-of-the-fiscal-cliff/?wprss=rss_ezra-klein>

There is a narrative in American politics that goes something like this: The White House can’t negotiate. House Republicans can’t be reasoned with. And so the country is caught between pragmatists who can’t hold their ground and radicals who can’t compromise.¶ **The last few days complicate those narratives.** The White House didn’t hold firm on their promise to let the Bush tax cuts expire for all income over $250,000. They agreed to a $450,000 threshold instead. But at the same time, they pocketed more than $600 billion in revenue, $30 billion in extended unemployment benefits and five years of stimulus tax credits without giving up any real spending cuts. ¶ Speaker John Boehner, negotiating on behalf of House Republicans, rejected the White House’s offers for a bigger deal that included big spending cuts and watched his “plan B” die on the House floor. But, with the support of many of his members, he ended up shepherding the McConnell-Biden package towards final passage. Republicans realized they couldn’t be blamed for pushing the country over the cliff. ¶ The question of who “won” the fiscal cliff won’t be answered till we know what happens when Congress reaches the debt ceiling. The White House says that there’ll be no negotiations over the debt ceiling, and that if Republicans want further spending cuts, their only chance is to hand over more tax revenue. If they’re right and they do manage to enforce a 1:1 ratio of tax hikes to spending cuts in the next deal, they’re going to look like geniuses.¶ Republicans swear they are crazy enough to push the country into default, and they promise that the White House isn’t strong enough to stand by and let it happen. If they’re right, and the White House agrees to big spending cuts absent significant tax increases in order to avert default, then Republicans will have held taxes far lower than anyone thought possible.¶ But both Republicans and Democrats can’t be right. If we take the lessons of this negotiation, here’s what will happen: The White House will negotiate **over the debt ceiling**. They’ll say they’re not negotiating over the debt ceiling, and in the end, they may well refuse to be held hostage over the debt ceiling, but the debt ceiling will be part of the pressure Republicans use to force the next deal. The White House fears default, and in the end, they always negotiate.¶ That said, the Republicans aren’t quite as crazy as they’d like the Democrats to believe. They were scared to take the country over the fiscal cliff. They’re going to be terrified to force the country into default, as the economic consequences would be calamitous. They know they need to offer the White House a deal that the White House can actually take — or at least a deal that, if the White House doesn’t take it, doesn’t lead to Republicans shouldering the blame for crashing the global economy. That deal will have to include taxes, though the tax increases could come through reform rather than higher rates.¶ The Republicans also have a problem the White House doesn’t: The public broadly believes they’re less reasonable and willing to negotiate than the Democrats are. The White House has a reputation for, if anything, being too quick to fold. They have more room to avoid blame for a default than the Republicans do. In the end, **if the White House** holds its ground, **Republicans will likely compromise** — though only after the White House has done quite a bit of compromising, too. ¶ The final moments of the fiscal cliff offered evidence that both sides see how this is going to go. In his remarks tonight, President Obama signaled he would hold firm on the debt ceiling. “While I will negotiate over many things, I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills they’ve already racked up through the laws they have passed,” he said. And Boehner signaled that he knows tax reform will have to be part of the next deal. The post-deal press release his office sent out had the headline, “2013 Must Be About Cutting Spending and Reforming the Tax Code.” That said, the final days of the fiscal cliff, in which the deal almost broke apart a half-dozen times for a hal-dozen reasons, is a reminder that these tense, deadline negotiations can easily go awry. And so there’s a third possibility, too: That the White House is wrong about the Republicans will compromise, that the Republicans are wrong that the White House will fold, and so we really will breach the debt ceiling, unleashing economic havoc.

#### It’s top of the docket, PC is key, and it’s Obama’s sole focus

John Feehery 1-2, President of Communications and Director of Government Affairs for Quinn Gillespie and Associates, 1/2/13, “The Clock,” <http://www.thefeeherytheory.com/2013/01/02/the-clock/>

The small tax agreement passed by the House last night makes it harder for Obama to do other things with his time in the White House. ¶ That is the inevitable truth that seems lost on conservatives who opposed a deal to make permanent 98% of the Bush tax cuts. ¶ Mitch McConnell is a master at clock management, and as minority leader, his job is to make it as hard as possible for the President to enact his left-wing agenda. ¶ As I wrote yesterday, McConnell was the master strategist who decided that the Congress would deal first with taxes and then with spending. ¶ Conservative leaders (well, the ones most desperate to raise money attacking Republicans) are professionally apoplectic. They can’t believe that Republicans didn’t get any spending cuts included in this deal, after they torpedoed John Boehner’s plan which included massive spending cuts and popular tax provisions. ¶ But Plan C wasn’t designed to include spending cuts, you blithering idiots. That comes later, in the fight over the debt limit. ¶ The President has already declared that the debt limit is off the table, but of course, we all know that **he is posturing. Nothing is off the table**, and the fact of the matter is that Republicans need to come up with substantial spending cuts if they are to gain the respect of their political base. ¶ After the fight on the debt limit will come a fight on sequester. After the fight on the sequester will come a fight on the 2013 Appropriations bills. ¶ All of these fights will take the time and attention of the President himself. All of these fights will take political capital and energy and promises. By focusing on the budget issues, Republicans make it harder for the President to focus on other things, like immigration and gun control, and whatever crazy left-wing agenda items he might want to add to the list. ¶ Imagine if last night, the grand bargain came together, and Republicans and Democrats cleared up everything in one vote. The President wouldn’t have high-fived the Speaker and said, “my job is done here.” ¶ He would have moved on to gun control. He can’t do that now. Now he has to talk exclusively about the debt limit. He has to burn up political capital on an issue that dove-tails quite nicely with out-of-control spending. ¶ The clock is running out on the Obama White House, and the more time we talk about fiscal issues, the less time he has to get his left-wing agenda through the Congress.

#### Reprocessing is politically impossible---link turns the case

Berry and Tolley 10 R. Stephen Berry is a professor in the Dept. of Chemistry @ UChicago and George S. Tolley is a Professor Emeritus of Economics @ UChicago. “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: Future Prospects and Viability,” Nov 29, http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/institute/bigproblems/Team7-1210.pdf

In understanding the political context for nuclear technology in both the U.S. and France, it is possible to estimate how the lack of government incentive could inhibit nuclear reprocessing technology in the U.S. The U.S. government has not been able to give the same type of credible commitment that the French government has toward their nuclear industry. This lack of credible commitment can increase the risk associated with and cost of investing in this nuclear reprocessing technology. 73 Therefore it may be necessary to evaluate the limitations posed by the current institutional framework to incentivize the development and subsequent growth of the domestic nuclear reprocessing industry. This is an issue not only confronting nuclear reprocessing but the industry as a whole. Although nuclear reprocessing has not achieved viability domestically, the United States has signed an agreement with India that enables Indian reprocessing of U.S. originated nuclear material in accordance with the safety provisions outlined by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA). 74 This agreement will facilitate the participation of U.S. firms in India’s expanding civil/nuclear market. 75 Further, the U.S. also entered into agreements with Japan 76 and Italy in 2009 to reprocess its domestic nuclear fuel waste. 77 These agreements may imply that the U.S. industry and government realize that if the U.S. is to take part in nuclear reprocessing **it may not be able to accomplish it internally due to** domestic politics.

#### Global economic crisis causes another nuclear war

Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for **peace and democracy** similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the **unlimited exercise of national sovereignty,** exclusive **self-interest** and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, **empty**ing, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of **multilateralism**, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as **unbridled nationalism.**

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#### US won’t cave on South Korea ENR now

Lee Byong Chul, senior fellow @ Inst. For Peace and Coop., 10-8-2012, “South Korea eschews enrichment of uranium,” Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20121008a4.html

South Korean officials have recently realized that the United States is likely to try to forbid them from enriching uranium and expanding their country's missile range, rather than leave these issues on the diplomatic back burner. Indeed, recent discreet talks, in which the U.S. has disregarded South Korean efforts to supplement the controversial U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which expires in March 2014, suggest that there are reasons to be deeply worried about the alliance's future. American negotiators — the reluctant midwives of South Korea's increasing responsibility in the field of atomic energy — remain steadfast in their opposition to South Korea's drive for improved defensive capabilities and a more advanced energy policy, despite the potential strategic benefits. U.S. nonproliferation experts do not anticipate progress on South Korea's efforts to win support for its preferred policies until the U.S. gains more leverage. Such a stalemate is not new. Nuclear talks between the two countries have often been characterized by poor communication and a lack of understanding. While South Korean officials rarely say in public what they really think, it is widely believed that U.S. policymakers have little motivation to reconcile with South Korea's government right now — they would prefer to stifle South Korea's increasingly loud demands. In the U.S.-South Korea relationship's heyday, American politicians considered the country an "extended arm of America." Such condescension may have been defensible when South Korea's military dictatorship needed America's political protection and security guarantee, but now the country is a beacon of democracy in East Asia. So, while South Koreans understand the need for compromise and cooperation, they believe that the time is right for a more balanced partnership. This belief does not imply South Korean cynicism about nonproliferation. Rather, it reflects concern about a nuclear North Korea, compounded by anxiety over the recent U.S.-Japan missile-defense accord. Given that the U.S. and South Korea have the same assessment of the intelligence regarding North Korea's nuclear progress, not to mention South Korea's vulnerability, their failure to reach a practical agreement is troubling. Former Deputy Foreign Minister Chun Yung Woo warned an American official in 2010 that revising the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement could soon become a "defining issue" in South Korea-U.S. relations, and that it was already attracting "significant amounts of negative press attention." Given South Korea's status as one of the world's top five nuclear-power producers, Chun argued, the South Korean public would not tolerate the perception that Japan was receiving preferential treatment. Indeed, rightwing leaders like Rep. Chung Mong Joon of the governing Saenuri Party have been vocal in expressing their doubts about South Korea's current denuclearization policy, suggesting that a nuclear weapons program could prevent a second war on the peninsula. The conservatives seem to believe that American nuclear protection for South Korea is a thing of the past. Despite their hawkish approach to North Korea's nuclear threats, South Korean officials know that uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing remains only a distant possibility. As a result, they are approaching negotiations skeptically, rather than emphasizing the sense of mutual obligation that should characterize the alliance. Their pessimism is hardly groundless, given that the United Arab Emirates has already signed a similar agreement with the U.S. declaring that it would not produce nuclear fuel. Indeed, South Korean negotiators appear convinced that they will not be able to make any headway with the U.S. on the issue. (To be sure, this failure may not matter much, given South Korean scientists' past declaration that they will not contribute to any nuclear program that could be used for military purposes.)

#### Failure to maintain a hardline on domestic reprocessing shatters the norm against ENR and makes credible US diplomatic pressure impossible – ensures South Korean ENR

Scott Sagan, poly sci prof @ Stanford, co-chair Global Nuclear Future Initiative, 4-18-2011, “The International Security Implications of U.S. Domestic Nuclear Power Decisions,” http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120621005012/http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/sagan\_brc\_paper\_final.pdf

A similar phenomenon occurs when policy makers and scholars underestimate the international effect of the U.S. decision to abandon plutonium reprocessing in the 1970s. Skeptics claim that the fact that France and Japan, especially, went forward with their ambitious plutonium reprocessing efforts somehow demonstrates that U.S. efforts to constrain the global growth were a failure. But a more appropriate standard (but again more difficult to measure) for assessing our influence would estimate the number of states that would have developed plutonium reprocessing capabilities if the U.S. had not actively discouraged such fuel cycle activities after Jimmy Carter’s April 1997 order to cancel construction of commercial breeder reactors that employed a closed fuel cycle with plutonium reprocessing. The primary motivation behind the decision to postpone the development of this technology was a concern for the proliferation implications of the U.S. use of a closed fuel cycle. 17 The Carter administration reasoned that the decision to end reprocessing in the U.S. would have two effects: first, the U.S. could no longer act as an exporter of related technologies, limiting their availability; and second, it would create a normative change that would redefine the behavior of a responsible nuclear power state. Because we are estimating a counterfactual condition, it is not possible to measure definitively the effects of the Carter policy on the actual spread of reprocessing facilities around the world. Of the twenty-one countries that at some point in their history pursued plutonium reprocessing, ten have finished large-scale facilities and use them today: U.S., China, Israel, France, UK, India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and North Korea. 18 Algeria and the Czech Republic have a pilot-scale reprocessing plants, but have not moved towards further industrial development. 19 Nine countries abandoned their reprocessing programs: South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. 20 The causes of these reversal decisions were complex, but in many of the cases U.S. diplomatic pressure was an important factor and that pressure was made more credible and acceptable because the U.S had given up its own civilian plutonium reprocessing programs. This “credibility” factor continues to be important today. South Korea is lobbying to renegotiate its agreements with the U.S. to be able to develop “pyro-processing,” a form of spent fuel reprocessing that supporters claim poses fewer proliferation risks than standard PUREX acqueous reprocessing. While this appears a challenge to the claim that the U.S. policy has had a positive influence, the very fact that the South Koreans are actively arguing that pyro-processing – unlike the PUREX process – does not separate out plutonium shows their awareness of the power of the norm against developing such technologies. While the U.S. government initially cooperated with South Korea on pyroprocessing research, Richard Stratford (Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs in the Bureau of Nonproliferation, U. S. Department of State) recently stated that the technology “moved to the point that the product is dangerous from a proliferation point of view,” and that the DOE now “states frankly and positively that pyro-processing is reprocessing.” The U.S. government position against pyro-processing in South Korea today is made more credible by the fact that the U.S. does not reprocess spend fuel for commercial purposes. 21

#### South Korean ENR causes South Korean prolif and undermines US nonprolif efforts with Iran, North Korea, and Southeast Asia

Zachary Keck 12, Assistant Editor of The Diplomat, “Rough Waters? The State of the ROK-U.S. Alliance,” The Diplomat, 8-22-12, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/08/22/rough-waters-the-state-of-the-rok-u-s-alliance/

Washington’s concerns over South Korean’s nuclear ambitions have only been heightened by Seoul’s latest campaign to acquire indigenous enrichment and reprocessing facilities, which it is proscribed from doing under a nuclear pact it signed with Washington in 1974. In contrast, the U.S. has signed agreements recognizing Japan’s reprocessing and enrichment rights as well as India’s de facto reprocessing capability. Now, with the U.S. and South Korea renegotiating the 1974 nuclear pact that will expire in 2014, South Korea has demanded that Washington acquiesce to Seoul building enrichment and processing facilities. South Korea’s immediate interest in acquiring these capabilities is not nuclear weapons but rather further expanding its nuclear energy industry at home and abroad. Nonetheless, the U.S. has rejected South Korea’s request thus far, with President Obama’s top proliferation adviser, Garry Samore, telling South Korean reporters last month, “There is no danger that Korean industry will not be able to get access to low enriched uranium," Washington has a number of reasons to oppose South Korea’s request, many of which have nothing to do with Seoul. For instance, a key component of President Obama’s nuclear security agenda is the goal of securing all nuclear materials worldwide within four years. Allowing South Korea to begin producing its own fissile materials would run counter to this goal and undercut the administration’s important successes in reducing the number of countries that possess and produce these materials. Allowing South Korea to build these facilities would also undermine the current U.S.-led campaign to persuade Iran to abandon its own enrichment facilities. It would also adversely affect a number of U.S. objectives in the Asia-Pacific, including persuading Pyongyang to surrender its own nuclear program, according Japan a heightened status among U.S. allies, and keeping Southeast Asia’s budding nuclear energy programs on their current peaceful trajectories. Under the surface, however, Washington’s opposition is likely due in part to its uncertainty over South Korea’s long-term nuclear intentions. As noted above, South Korea already has a history of covertly seeking nuclear arms. That this took place before Seoul became a democracy is cold comfort to the U.S given that South Koreans have at times been overwhelming in favor of their country acquiring nuclear weapons. In other words, at a time when the region is undergoing sweeping changes, the U.S. is increasingly less confident that South Korea will continue to rely on Washington for its security indefinitely. Indeed, there are already a number of signs that Seoul is seeking greater autonomy. These come at a time when the U.S. will need South Korea more than ever in order to properly rebalance its forces in the region.

#### New Asian prolif ensures widespread additional nuclear conflict --- asymmetries

Lyon 9 (December, Program Director, Strategy and International, with Australian Strategic Policy Institute, previously a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland, “A delicate issue, Asia’s nuclear future”)

Deterrence relationships in Asia won’t look like East–West deterrence. They won’t be relationships of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and there will be many asymmetries among them. Regional nuclear-weapon states will articulate a spectrum of strategies ranging from existential deterrence to minimum deterrence to assured retaliation; and sometimes doctrinal statements will outrun capabilities. The smaller arsenals of Asia and the absence of severe confrontations will help to keep doctrines at the level of generalised deterrence. Extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be important to US allies in East Asia, although it is hard to imagine other Asian nuclear weapon states ‘extending’ deterrence to their clients or allies. Alagappa’s propositions contain a ‘picture’ of what a more proliferated Asia might look like. It could well remain a region where deterrence dominates, and where arsenals are typically constrained: an Asia, in fact, that falls some way short of a ‘nuclear chaos’ model of unrestrained proliferation and mushrooming nuclear dangers. An order in flux? Notwithstanding Alagappa’s more reassuring view, we shouldn’t understate the extent of the looming change from a nuclear relationship based on bipolar symmetry to a set of relationships based on multiplayer asymmetries. As one observer has noted, when you add to that change the relatively constrained size of nuclear arsenals in Asia, the likelihood of further nuclear reductions by the US and Russia, and ballistic missile defences of uncertain effectiveness, the world is about to enter uncharted territory (Ford 2009:125). Some factors certainly act as stabilising influences on the current nuclear order, not least that nuclear weapons (here as elsewhere) typically induce caution, that the regional great powers tend to get along reasonably well with each other and that the region enters its era of nuclear pre-eminence inheriting a strong set of robust norms and regimes from the earlier nuclear era. But other factors imply a period of looming change: geopolitical dynamism is rearranging strategic relationships; the number of risk-tolerant adversaries seems to be increasing; most nuclear weapons states are modernising their arsenals; the American arsenal is ageing; and the US’s position of primacy is increasingly contested in Asia. Indeed, it may be that dynamism which could most seriously undermine the Solingen model of East Asian nonproliferation. Solingen, after all, has not attempted to produce a general theory about proliferation; she has attempted to explain only proliferation in the post-NPT age (see Solingen 2007:3), when the P-5 of the UN Security Council already had nuclear weapons. In essence, though, it’s exactly that broader geopolitical order that might be shifting. It isn’t yet clear how the Asian nuclear order will evolve. It’s one of those uncertainties that define Australia’s shifting strategic environment. It’s not too hard to imagine an order that’s more competitive than the one we see now. The ‘managed system of deterrence’ The second approach to thinking about the Asian nuclear order is to attempt to superimpose upon it William Walker’s two key mechanisms of the first nuclear age: the ‘managed system of deterrence’ and the ‘managed system of abstinence’. What might those ‘systems’ look like in Asia? In Walker’s model, the managed system of deterrence included: the deployment of military hardware under increasingly sophisticated command and control; the development of strategic doctrines to ensure mutual vulnerability and restraint; and the establishment of arms control processes through which policy elites engaged in dialogue and negotiated binding agreements. (Walker 2007:436) It isn’t obvious that those core aspects of the ‘managed’ system are all central features of Asian nuclear relationships. Perhaps most importantly, it isn’t obvious that the world even has a good model for how deterrence works in asymmetric relationships. Within the US, there’s been something of a revival of interest in matters nuclear as strategic analysts attempt to reconceptualise how nuclear relationships might work in the future. Recent work on the problems of exercising deterrence across asymmetrical strategic contests, for example, suggests a number of problems: ‘In asymmetric conflict situations, deterrence may not only be unable to prevent violence but may also help foment it’ (Adler 2009:103). Some of the problems arise precisely because weaker players seem increasingly likely to ‘test’ stronger players’ threats—as part of a pattern of conflict that has emerged over recent centuries, in which weaker players have often prevailed against stronger opponents.3 If we were to look at the case study of the India–Pakistan nuclear relationship—which is grounded in an enduring strategic rivalry, and therefore not ‘typical’ of the broader nuclear relationships in Asia—it’s a moot point whether Pakistani behaviour has been much altered by the ‘deterrence’ policies of India. Indeed, the case seems to show that Pakistan doesn’t even accept a long-term condition of strategic asymmetry with India, and that it intends to use its nuclear weapons as an ‘equaliser’ against India’s larger conventional forces by building a nuclear arsenal larger than the Indian arsenal arrayed against it. That would imply, more broadly, that increasing strategic rivalries across Asia could be accompanied by efforts to minimise asymmetrical disadvantages between a much wider range of players. In short, in a more competitive Asian strategic environment, nuclear asymmetries that are tolerable now might well become less tolerable. Furthermore, we need to think about how we might ‘codify’ deterrence in Asia. In the Cold War days, the MAD doctrine tended to be reflected in arms control accords that limited wasteful spending and corralled the competition. As Walker acknowledges, the agreements were important ‘stabilisers’ of the broader nuclear relationship, but to what extent can they be replicated in conditions of asymmetry? It might be possible to codify crisis management procedures, but designing (and verifying) limitations on weapons numbers would seem to be much more difficult when the arsenals are of uneven size, and when the weaker party (perhaps both parties) would probably be relying on secrecy about the numbers and locations of weapons to minimise the vulnerability of their arsenals.

#### Extinction

Hayes 10 Peter Hayes, \*Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND, Michael Hamel-Green, \*\* Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf

But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view:  That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

#### A nuclear Iran causes massive proliferation and another nuclear war

Kroenig 12 – Matthew Kroenig is Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. February 22nd, 2012, "What Will Iran Do If It Gets a Nuclear Bomb?" [www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/what-will-iran-do-if-it-gets-a-nuclear-bomb/253430/](http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/what-will-iran-do-if-it-gets-a-nuclear-bomb/253430/)

A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a grave threat to international peace and security. It would lead to further nuclear proliferation as other countries in the region sought nuclear weapons in response. As I discuss in Exporting the Bomb, a nuclear Iran would likely become a nuclear supplier and transfer uranium enrichment technology--the basis for dangerous nuclear programs--to U.S. enemies in regions around the world.¶ Iran currently restrains its foreign policy for fear of U.S. military retaliation, but with a nuclear counter-deterrent it would be emboldened to push harder, stepping up support for terrorist groups, brandishing nuclear weapons for coercive purposes, and adopting a more aggressive foreign policy. A nuclear Iran could constrain U.S. freedom of action in the Middle East by threatening nuclear war in response to major U.S. initiatives in the region.¶ A more aggressive Iran would lead to an even more crisis-prone region, and any crisis involving a nuclear-armed Iran could spiral out of control and result in a nuclear war against Israel or even, once Iran has developed the requisite delivery vehicles, the U.S. homeland.¶ In sum, a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a severe threat that Washington would have to live with as long as Iran exists as a state and has nuclear weapons, which could be decades or even longer.

### 1NC

#### U.S. coal exports to China are low, but downward pressure on domestic demand expands them massively

Bryan Walsh 12, Senior Editor at TIME, May 31, 2012, “Drawing Battle Lines Over American Coal Exports to Asia,” online: http://science.time.com/2012/05/31/drawing-battle-lines-over-american-coal-exports-to-asia/

But across the Pacific Ocean, the demand for coal has never been hotter, with China burning 4.1 billion tons in 2010 alone, far more than any other country in the world. That insatiable demand forced China in 2009 to become a net coal importer for the first time, in part because congested rail infrastructure raised the cost of transporting coal from the mines of the country’s northwest to its booming southern cities. In April, Chinese coal imports nearly doubled from a year earlier. Right now Australia and Indonesia supply much of China’s foreign coal. U.S. coal from the Powder River Basin could be a perfect addition to the Chinese market. Montana and Wyoming are just short train trips to ports on the Pacific Northwest coast, and from there it’s a container ship away from Asian megacities where coal doesn’t have to compete with cheap natural gas and air-pollution regulations are far weaker than in the U.S. To a wounded Big Coal, China is a potential savior.¶ As I write in the new edition of TIME, there’s just one problem: right now, ports on the West Coast lack the infrastructure needed to transfer coal from railcars into container ships. (Just 7 million of the 107 million tons of U.S.-exported coal left the country via Pacific Ocean ports last year.) That’s why coal companies like Peabody and Ambre Energy are ready to spend millions to build coal-export facilities at a handful of ports in Washington and Oregon. If all those plans go forward, as much as 150 million tons of coal could be exported from the Northwest annually—-nearly all of it coming from the Powder -River -Basin and headed to Asia. Even if the U.S. kept burning less and less coal at home, it would have a reason to keep mining it.

#### Plan causes coal plant retiring

Marcus King et al 11, Associate Director of Research, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, et al., March 2011, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf

SMRs have potential advantages over larger plants because they provide owners more flexibility in financing, siting, sizing, and end-use applications. SMRs can reduce an owner's initial capital outlay or investment because of the lower plant capital cost. Modular components and factory fabrication can reduce construction costs and schedule duration. Additional modules can be added incrementally as demand for power increases. SMRs can provide power for applications where large plants are not needed or may not have the necessary infrastructure to support a large unit such as smaller electrical markets, isolated areas, smaller grids, or restricted water or acreage sites. Several domestic utilities have expressed considerable interest in SMRs as potential replacements for aging fossil plants to increase their fraction of non-carbon-emitting generators. Approximately 80 percent of the 1174 total operating U.S. coal plants have power outputs of less than 500 MWe; 100 percent of coal plants that are more than 50 years old have capacities below 500 MWe [3]. SMRs would be a viable replacement option for these plants.

#### U.S. exports lock in expanded Chinese coal capacity---causes warming over the tipping point---it’s unique because absent U.S. exports the rising cost of coal will cause a shift to renewables

Thomas M. Power 12, Research Professor and Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Montana; Principal, Power Consulting; February 2012, “The Greenhouse Gas Impact of Exporting Coal from the West Coast: An Economic Analysis,” <http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf>

The cumulative impact of these coal port proposals on coal consumption in Asia could be much larger than even that implied by the two pending proposals. If Arch, Peabody, and other western U.S. coal producers’ projections of the competitiveness of western coal in Asia are correct, facilitating the opening of the development of West Coast coal ports could have a very large impact on the supply of coal to China and the rest of Asia.

6.4 The Long-term Implications of Fueling Additional Coal-Fired Electric Generation

Although the economic life of coal-fired generators is often given as 30 or 35 years, a permitted, operating, electric generator is kept on line a lot longer than that, as long as 50 or more years through ongoing renovations and upgrades. Because of that long operating life, the impact of the lower Asian coal prices and costs triggered by PRB coal competing with other coal sources cannot be measured by the number of tons of coal exported each year. Those lower coal costs will lead to commitments to more coal being burned for a half-century going forward.

That time-frame is very important. During exactly this time frame, the next half-century, the nations of the world will have to get their greenhouse gas emission stabilized and then reduced or the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may pass a point that will make it very difficult to avoid massive, ongoing, negative climate impacts. Taking actions now that encourage fifty-years of more coal consumption around the world is not a minor matter. Put more positively, allowing coal prices to rise (and more closely approximate their full cost, including “external” costs) will encourage extensive investments in improving the efficiency with which coal is used and the shift to cleaner sources of energy. This will lead to long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will also last well into the next half-century. 57

#### Extinction

Flournoy 12 – Citing Feng Hsu, PhdD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center, Don FLournoy, PhD and MA from UT, former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University, former Associate Dean at SUNY and Case Institute of Technology, Former Manager for Unviersity/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications, Ohio University, “Solar Power Satellites,” January 2012, Springer Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 )

#### Chinese emissions are sufficient to cause extinction

John Copeland Nagle 11, the John N. Matthews Professor, Notre Dame Law School, Spring 2011, “How Much Should China Pollute?,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 12 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 591

Third, the rest of the world suffers because of the inability of China and the United States to agree on a method for reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. Even if the rest of the world were to reach such an agreement, the failure to include China and the United States would doom the project from the start. Together, China and the United States account for forty-one percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions. [FN19] Left unchecked, China's emissions alone could result in many of the harms associated with climate change. [FN20] That is why many observers believe that “[t]he decisions taken in Beijing, more than anywhere else, [will] determine whether humanity thrive[s] or perishe[s].”

### 1NC

#### The 50 states and relative territories should provide production tax credits and a 20% investment tax credit to GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy and all subsequent developers for production of a demonstration Power Reactor Innovative Small Module at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site and for all subsequent reactors following that design for energy production in the United States

#### State governments can use financial incentives to spur nuclear power

NEI 09 (Nuclear Energy Institute, “Policies That Support New Nuclear Power Plant Development”, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/factsheet/policiessupportnewplantdevelopment/?print=true)

State Policies Several states have passed legislation or implemented regulations, or both, to support construction of new nuclear power plants. These policies range from property tax incentives to pre-determination of rate-making principles for a project before construction begins. The policies that help most with financing new plants in regulated states are those that: Require the state public utility commission to determine if a proposed plant is prudent before construction begins and approve costs periodically during construction, thereby guaranteeing these capital costs will be added to the rate base when the plant comes online. Allow the carrying cost of construction work in progress (CWIP)—or the financing cost associated with¶ construction—to be passed on to ratepayers during construction. Allowing CWIP reduces the cost ratepayers will pay for power from the plant when it goes into commercial operation. Some unregulated states assist with financing for unregulated plants by allowing pre-negotiated, long-term power purchase agreements (PPA). PPAs guarantee the project will have a source of cash flow (and cost recovery) once it is operational. State-level policies send positive signals to the financial community, helping companies finance projects reasonably, and, thereby, keeping the cost of electricity for consumers lower.

### 1NC

#### TEXT: The United States Federal Government should establish and Nuclear Waste Policy Commission to direct a evolutionary solution to nuclear waste storage in the United States including opening repositories and pursuing new waste disposal technologies.

#### Commission solves and avoids controversy

Richard B. Stewart 8, University Professor and John Edward Sexton Professor of Law; Chair and Faculty Director, Hauser Global Law School Program; Director, Frank J. Guarini Center for Environmental and Land Use Law; New York University School of Law, 2008, “Symposium: Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress and Administration: Panel VII: Managing Waste: U.S. Nuclear Waste Law and Policy: Fixing a Bankrupt System,” New York University Environmental Law Journal, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 783

The second step Congress and the President should take is to constitute a high level Nuclear Waste Policy Commission to engage in a total review and rethinking of the country's nuclear waste policy and chart a new course. The commission should include representatives of key federal agencies, including DOE, EPA, NRC, Defense, Interior, State, and Commerce; key members of Congress; and representatives of states with major nuclear facilities or sites, including Nevada, Washington, New Mexico, Idaho, and South Carolina as well as a cross-section of other states. Such an organization, which would have certain affinities to federal base closing commissions but would focus on general polices and institutional arrangements rather than specific decisions, would enlist the services of a strong staff as well as relevant existing expert advisory committees. Such an initiative is needed to kick start a thoroughgoing review of nuclear waste law and policy and give it prominence and potential buy-in to recommendations for change by key constituencies.

Neither the administration nor Congress has been able or willing on their own to institute such a review. Establishing such a commission to take the lead would be a politically attractive option [\*811] for a new President. To make comprehensive proposals for a new approach, this high-level expert body, similar to the Carter IRG, would take the lead in portage around the existing nuclear waste policy logjam. The approach taken should be ambitious and comprehensive, including not only current and future wastes but issues relating to the back-end of the fuel cycle in general, alternative technologies including reprocessing and new types of reactors, and broader considerations including climate change, energy security, and domestic and international security against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. A focus on wastes in isolation would ignore the several ways in which they are embedded in this larger complex of issues, and thereby risk adoption of short-sighted approaches that overlook cross-cutting opportunities.

#### Ensurese step-by-step, iterative solutions that solve waste.

Richard B. Stewart 8, University Professor and John Edward Sexton Professor of Law; Chair and Faculty Director, Hauser Global Law School Program; Director, Frank J. Guarini Center for Environmental and Land Use Law; New York University School of Law, 2008, “Symposium: Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress and Administration: Panel VII: Managing Waste: U.S. Nuclear Waste Law and Policy: Fixing a Bankrupt System,” New York University Environmental Law Journal, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 783

The default outcome is that the waste will remain where it currently is, at reactors and DOE sites. Treatment, container, and storage methods are available to store these wastes safely at their present locations. The precautionary principle might well counsel leaving wastes where they are for the indefinite future. The uncertainties involved with depositing waste in a repository are probably greater that those involved in storage, and disposing of them in a repository is, sooner or later, an irreversible step. Also, there may be long run environmental and nuclear security advantages in reprocessing wastes which would also counsel against immediate burial in a repository. Given the uncertainties, there are significant advantages in preserving options and postponing a decision on final disposition or reprocessing pending the development of more information, including that provided by technological and scientific progress. Finally, there are political obstacles to siting new consolidated waste storage facilities, and such facilities may not have compelling environmental, security, and economic advantages over the status quo.

In the larger political and societal framework, however, it is [\*821] important to move forward to open at least one repository and develop consolidated interim storage facilities. So long as these steps are not accomplished, there will be growing local resistance to continued storage on site and more general opposition to expansion of nuclear power or the development of reprocessing facilities. Given the environmental advantages of expanded use of nuclear power and the potential security and other contributions of reprocessing, steps to convince the public that progress is being made on addressing nuclear waste are necessary.

Unless unanticipated technical problems with the Yucca site emerge, a repository at Yucca should be built and opened, but only a small portion of the statutorily authorized quantity of wastes deposited. The remaining waste could be stored in dry casks on site. This would enable the repository to be tested at pilot scale. This would demonstrate to the public that a repository can be built and successfully operated for waste disposal while reserving the decision to fill and close the repository for the future. Meanwhile, the stored waste would be available for potential future reprocessing to produce fuel or for later disposal. These steps might alleviate somewhat the intensity of Nevadans' concerns with and opposition to the site. Studies at other nuclear sites indicate that local communities become habituated to them and, over time, come to regard the risks posed as less hazardous. Successful demonstration of the Yucca repository will also help persuade the public that the nuclear waste "problem" can be "solved." If Yucca is abandoned, it will be extraordinarily difficult to site a new repository, and the public perception of failure will be reinforced. Actually opening one repository and successfully testing it will help reduce opposition to a second. Storing wastes on site at Yucca will also set a precedent for interim consolidated storage. Further, it will enable the federal government to discharge its responsibility for managing SNF and liquidate the running conflict with utilities over the government's liability for failing to do so. The NWPA may not have to be modified to accommodate this result. It provides only that the federal government must begin sending SNF to Yucca in 1998, and arguably does not preclude pilot-scale disposal (to test the repository performance and the retrievability feature required by law), together with on-site storage of the remaining wastes.

## Util

#### Moral absolutism undermines political effectiveness and causes political paralysis

Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Spring 2002, Dissent, Vol. 49, No. 2

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Some rights violations are inevitable – cost-benefit analysis is the only way to justify action to solve concrete harms

Cummiskey Associate Professor of Philosophy – Bates 1999 Gewirth ed. Boylan p. 134

The PGC’s (Principle of Generic Consistency’s) goal of securing the generic rights of all may indeed require the infringement of the negative rights of some as a necessary means of securing the more weighty negative and positive rights of many others. Since the infringement of the rights of some would prevent the injustice of significant rights violations, the acts of coercion or harm would indeed function to prevent injustice as Gewirth requires. The duty to protect the more weighty rights of the many would thus require the infringements on the rights of the few. In truly tragic situations, someone’s rights are infringed no matter what choice is made. If we take seriously Gewirth’s compelling arguments for robust positive rights, then we cannot simply rely on the institutions of a common sense morality which is much more libertarian. We must instead treat the objective needs of those we would hurt by helping. The criterion of the degree of needfulness of action (which involves rights conflicts) simply provides no basis for a bias in favor of negative rights over positive rights. It thus leaves the limits of justified coercion to be determined by a cost-benefit analysis on the objective needs of generic agency. So once again we find no basis for limiting Gewirthian consequentialism.

#### Conflicting moral claims necessitate utilitarianism

Mulholland Professor of Philosophy – Newfoundland 1986 Journal of Philosophy v.83 i.6 p. 328

For many, the persuasiveness of utilitarianism as a moral theory lies in its power to provide a way out of difficulties arising from the conflict of moral principles. The contention that utilitarianism permits people to override rights in case of conflict of principles or in those cases where some recognized utility requires that a right be disregarded, is then not an internal objection to utilitarianism. Nor does it even indicate a plausible alternative to the convinced utilitarian. For him, utilitarianism has its force partly in the coherence and simplicity of the principle in explaining the morality of such cases.

#### No impact to our form of calculation --- the life of every person is treated as equal

Harsanyi Professor of Economics – UC Berkeley 1982 Utilitarianism and Beyond ed. Sen and Williams p. 26-27

Some further notes on this suggestion will be in place here. First, it is sometimes alleged that justice has to be at odds with utility. But if we ask how we are to be just between the competing interests of different people, it seems hard to give any other answer than it is by giving equal weight, impartially to the interests of everybody. And this is precisely what yields the utility principle. It does not necessarily yield equality in the resulting distribution. There are certainly very good utilitarian reasons for seeking equality in distribution too; but justice is something distinct. The utilitarian is sometimes said to be indifferent between equal and unequal distributions provided that total utility is equal. This is so; but it conceals two important utilitarian grounds for a fairly high degree of actual goods (tempered, of course, as in most systems including Rawls’s by various advantages that are secured by moderate inequalities). The second is that inequalities tend to produce, at any rate in educated societies, envy hatred and malice whose disutility needs no emphasizing. I am convinced that when these two factors are taken into account, utilitarians have no feed to fear the accusation that they could favour extreme inequalities of distribution in actual modern societies. Fantastic hypothetical cases can no doubt be invented in which they would have to favor them; but as, as we shall see, this is an illegitimate form of argument.

#### Policymakers must act in a consequentialist fashion --- their moral theorizing ignores the constraints of real-world policymaking

Michael Ignatieff 7, member of the independent international commission on Kosovo, chaired by Judge Richard Goldstone of South Africa. Former fellow at King’s College, Cambridge; École des Hautes Études, Paris; and St. Antony’s College, Oxford; and Visiting Prof of Human Rights Practice at Harvard, August 5, 2007, The New York Times, online: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html?ei=5090&en=cb304d04accc6df8&ex=1343966400&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all, accessed August 10, 2007

The unfolding catastrophe in [Iraq](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iraq/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) has condemned the political judgment of a president. But it has also condemned the judgment of many others, myself included, who as commentators supported the invasion. Many of us believed, as an Iraqi exile friend told me the night the war started, that it was the only chance the members of his generation would have to live in freedom in their own country. How distant a dream that now seems.

Having left an academic post at Harvard in 2005 and returned home to Canada to enter political life, I keep revisiting the Iraq debacle, trying to understand exactly how the judgments I now have to make in the political arena need to improve on the ones I used to offer from the sidelines. I’ve learned that acquiring good judgment in politics starts with knowing when to admit your mistakes.

The philosopher Isaiah Berlin once said that the trouble with academics and commentators is that they care more about whether ideas are interesting than whether they are true. Politicians live by ideas just as much as professional thinkers do, but they can’t afford the luxury of entertaining ideas that are merely interesting. They have to work with the small number of ideas that happen to be true and the even smaller number that happen to be applicable to real life. In academic life, false ideas are merely false and useless ones can be fun to play with. In political life, false ideas can ruin the lives of millions and useless ones can waste precious resources. An intellectual’s responsibility for his ideas is to follow their consequences wherever they may lead. A politician’s responsibility is to master those consequences and prevent them from doing harm.

I’ve learned that good judgment in politics looks different from good judgment in intellectual life. Among intellectuals, judgment is about generalizing and interpreting particular facts as instances of some big idea. In politics, everything is what it is and not another thing. Specifics matter more than generalities. Theory gets in the way.

The attribute that underpins good judgment in politicians is a sense of reality. “What is called wisdom in statesmen,” Berlin wrote, referring to figures like Roosevelt and Churchill, “is understanding rather than knowledge — some kind of acquaintance with relevant facts of such a kind that it enables those who have it to tell what fits with what; what can be done in given circumstances and what cannot, what means will work in what situations and how far, without necessarily being able to explain how they know this or even what they know.” Politicians cannot afford to cocoon themselves in the inner world of their own imaginings. They must not confuse the world as it is with the world as they wish it to be. They must see Iraq — or anywhere else — as it is.

## Internal Link Turns

### Worse---Waste Management

#### Reprocessing undermines overall waste management---increases waste volumes by 20 times---diverts resources from geologic disposal

UCS 11 – Union of Concerned Scientists, 4/5/11, “Nuclear Reprocessing: Dangerous, Dirty, and Expensive,” <http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear_power_risk/nuclear_proliferation_and_terrorism/nuclear-reprocessing.html>

Reprocessing would hurt U.S. nuclear waste management efforts.

First, there is no spent fuel storage crisis that warrants such a drastic change in course. Hardened interim storage of spent fuel in dry casks is an economically viable and secure option for at least fifty years.

Second, reprocessing does not reduce the need for storage and disposal of radioactive waste, and a geologic repository would still be required. Plutonium constitutes only about one percent of the spent fuel from U.S. reactors. After reprocessing, the remaining material will be in several different waste forms, and the total volume of nuclear waste will have been increased by a factor of twenty or more, including low-level waste and plutonium-contaminated waste. The largest component of the remaining material is uranium, which is also a waste product because it is contaminated and undesirable for reuse in reactors. Even if the uranium is classified as low-level waste, new low-level nuclear waste facilities would have to be built to dispose of it. And to make a significant reduction in the amount of high-level nuclear waste that would require disposal, the used fuel would need to be reprocessed and reused many times with an extremely high degree of efficiency—an extremely difficult endeavor that would likely take centuries to accomplish.

Finally, reprocessing would divert focus and resources from a U.S. geologic disposal program and hurt—not help—the U.S. nuclear waste management effort. The licensing requirements for the reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and waste processing plants would dwarf those needed to license a repository, and provide additional targets for public opposition. What is most needed today is a renewed focus on secure interim storage of spent fuel and on gaining the scientific and technical consensus needed to site a geological repository.

### Worse---Overall Waste

#### Reprocessing massively increases the cumulative amount of waste to be stored

David Biello 10, Associate Editor for Scientific American, 4/15/10, “Is Reprocessing the Answer to Eliminating Fissile Materials from Bombs and Nuclear Waste?,” <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-reprocessing-the-answer-to-eliminating-fissile-materials>

Even without fast-neutron reactors, however, some, such as new Nuclear Regulatory Commission commissioner William Magwood, have argued that reprocessing makes sense to deal with nuclear waste in the absence of a geologic repository like the one proposed for Yucca Mountain in Nevada. All told, the U.S. fleet of 104 nuclear reactors produces roughly 2,000 metric tons of waste per year, according to the Department of Energy (DOE). That adds up to roughly 70,000 metric tons at various places throughout the country—and reprocessing could reduce the radioactive half-life of much of this waste.

Hanson also argues that reprocessing turns spent fuel rods—rods of lightly enriched uranium fuel clad in zirconium—into a form more suitable for long-term storage: glass logs of vitrified nuclear waste. "Used fuel is hotter than hell. And nobody designed it to be thrown away," he says. "Glass has durability."

But reprocessing can end up producing more waste. According to the DOE, reprocessing spent fuel ends up increasing the total cumulative volume of nuclear waste by more than six times—thanks to more materials being contaminated with plutonium—from a little less than 74,000 cubic meters destined for some form of repository to nearly 460,000 cubic meters. Reprocessing also results in radioactive liquid waste: the French reprocessing plant in La Hague discharges 100 million liters of liquid waste (pdf) into the English Channel each year. "They have polluted the ocean all the way to the Arctic," Makhijani says. "Eleven western European countries have asked them to stop reprocessing."

### Environment DA

#### Reprocessing increases requirements for a geologic repository and destroys the environment---massive ecosystem damage

Damon Kenul 10, Research Assistant at NYU Langone Medical Center, et al., 11/29/10, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Future Prospects and Viability,” <http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/institute/bigproblems/Team7-1210.pdf>

The United States classifies radioactive wastes by the process used to produce them, and not the actual radioactivity or half-life. Reprocessing waste is designated above class C. Nuclear waste classes A, B, and C can be disposed of by shallow burying. All Nuclear waste above Class C must be disposed of in deep geological repositories by U.S. law. Wastes greater than class C are extremely dangerous to all organic life. Their aftereffects can also be detected many years into the future. Highly radioactive waste has been shown to increase cancer rates. This is mostly due to extremely long half-lives and ease with which they permeate soils to find ground water.20

Reprocessing results in high-level radioactive waste and large volumes of Greater than Class C waste. A study done by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) determined that the reprocessing performed in France would actually significantly increase the amount of waste that would need to be disposed of in a geologic repository. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that France’s combined volume of nuclear waste on a life-cycle basis is about six times the amount than the no-reprocessing approach that is currently used by the United States. Low-level waste volume and waste transportation shipments are also estimated to increase many times over when reprocessing is used.21

From an environmental perspective, reprocessing is not a beneficial practice. Reprocessing would increase the amount of waste in storage and has long record of accidents which have the potential to permanently damage and alter ecosystems.22

#### Extinction

Diner 94 [Major David, Judge Advocate General's Corps, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, Lexis]

Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 [HU]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

## Solvency

#### Plan’s not sufficient---no nuclear absent gas prices doubling, carbon pricing and incentives

Maize 12 Kennedy, contributing editor to POWER and executive editor of the online magazine MANAGING POWER, "Fukushima Disaster Continues to Cloud Nuclear Outlook", July, Vol. 156, Issue 7, EBSCO

With new reactors finally under construction, this should be an optimistic time for nuclear power in the U.S. But cheap natural gas, rising construction costs, and the Fukushima accident's lingering pall have darkened the mood.¶ Although the events in Japan that destroyed much of Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station were more than a year in the past, their memory provided the backdrop for the nuclear track at the ELECTRIC POWER Conference in Baltimore in May. The events in Japan of March 2011 clearly changed the nature of the discussion of nuclear power and its future.¶ In the 14 months since the Fukushima accident, the rest of Japan's once-considerable nuclear fleet had gone offline. By the time of the Baltimore meeting, Japan was without any nuclear-generated electricity for the first time in 42 years. The country once had an ambitious nuclear program that provided a third of its electric generating capacity, and there were plans to build more reactors. (See "Japan Scrambles to Revamp Its Energy Sector" in POWER'S June 2012 issue, and the web supplement "Japan's Nuclear Infrastructure," at www.powermag.com for a detailed look at where the nation's energy policy was headed before last year and where it is being redirected.)¶ As the nuclear track was under way, British author Mark Lynas wrote in the UK's Guardian newspaper that "the long shadow cast by Fukushima has extended over a much wider area than any scientific assessment of radiological hazard would argue is necessary." Parents in a village 20 kilometers from the reactor reportedly refuse to let their children play outdoors and believe that dosimeter readings barely above background levels are incorrect.¶ Lynas contrasted Japan's widespread revulsion toward nuclear power with the response in South Korea, which today gets some 30% of its generation from nuclear plants and plans to increase that amount to 60%. South Korea -- like its neighbor Japan -- also faces limited domestic energy resources.¶ Despite the emergence of a small but vocal anti-nuclear movement, Korea's government has made clear it plans to stay the nuclear course. But Heung Gyu Park, a senior vice president of KEPCO E&C, the country's nuclear engineering and construction company, said in Baltimore that his country has made changes since the Japanese disaster.¶ Soon after the events in Japan, Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO, parent of KEPCO E&C) initiated a full-scale review of its 21 operating units and concluded that they were capable of withstanding events similar to those that devastated the Japanese units. As in Japan, all of South Korea's reactors are sited on the coast and cooled by seawater. The country is also located on the seismically active Pacific "ring of fire."¶ In addition to the KEPCO review, a South Korean government inquiry followed the Japanese event. That effort developed an action plan for steps KEPCO should take to improve its emergency preparedness and operational safety.¶ A key to the government's response, Park said, was creation of a new regulatory agency, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, launched last October and located in the office of the South Korean president. The new, higher-level agency replaces the South Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety as the primary regulatory body, separating nuclear power promotion from its regulation. The institute has become a technical advisor to the new board.¶ South Korea remains on track to build eight nuclear units, all of the advanced Korean-designed (in conjunction with Japan's Toshiba) 1,400-MW pressurized water reactor. KEPCO broke ground for two of these units the same week that Japan's final operating nuclear unit shut down and just prior to ELECTRIC POWER.¶ Muted Celebration¶ J. Frank Russell, senior vice president at Concentric Energy Advisors, described the ambiguous status of nuclear power today from a U.S. perspective. By many counts, he said, "this should be a year of celebration for 'new nuclear' in the U.S." because Southern Co. is building Vogtle Units 3 and 4, and Scana Corp. has a green light from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the two new units at its V.C. Summer station.¶ In contrast to what could be justified optimism, "the reality is different," Russell said. "The pipeline is empty, with other proposed units stalled or delayed by the sponsors." The promise of "up to a dozen" new units that was common in the industry a few years ago "has mostly gone away," and the industry has awakened to a less-friendly environment.¶ Many reasons account for faded nuclear dreams in the U.S., Russell said. The 2008 recession lowered demand for power and reduced financial markets' appetite for risk. The collapse of natural gas prices as a result of the shale gas revolution undercut the economics. So did the federal government's failure to put a price on carbon emissions. Fukushima also played a role. But the key factor dogging the U.S. nuclear sector has been the high and growing cost of nuclear power plants. "While many of these issues may be considered temporary," said Russell, "the sheer total cost of large-scale new nuclear units is just too large for many companies to bear."¶ Few companies have the capitalization and appetite for risk to take on a project that could cost $10 billion, the current estimate for a new nuclear unit in the U.S. For a merchant generator, finding the equity capital for such an undertaking is problematic. "Even with a loan guarantee," he said, "the equity may be impossible to raise."¶ What will it take for a real U.S. nuclear turnaround? Russell offered a list, with each item necessary to achieving rebirth but none sufficient in itself. He said that demand growth will have to return and that the current generating capacity surplus must decline. Natural gas prices will have to double to at least $4/million cubic feet. A carbon price also must be put in place. The Vogtle and Summer units must come in on schedule and must meet budget targets (an outcome already put in doubt by cost increases recently announced at Vogtle). And policy makers and the public must be positive and supportive.

#### Nuclear can’t attract private capital – shouldn’t give more subsidies

Peter Bradford 10, former NRC member, 10-11-2010, “Honey, I Shrunk the Reinaissance,” http://www.electricitypolicy.com/bradford.pdf

Surely it is time to abandon the demand of many in the industry and in Congress for taxpayer financing for an immediate full blown nuclear renaissance. The industry must first prove that it can deliver cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Its ability to lay a claim on the public purse rests entirely on the proposition that it has a significant role to play in combating climate change. That claim in turn rests on the proposition that new plants can be built at a cost that will enable nuclear power to compete well enough to attract private capital. There are excellent reasons to doubt these claims. Even within the industry, some innovators are pushing forward nextgeneration designs for small reactors, for travelling wave reactors, for thorium-based fuel cycles, for converter reactors running on nuclear waste. These proposals call into question the wisdom and feasibility of trying to base a revival on locking into an unwavering commitment to standardizing current designs. Those who assert that the problem of climate change is so urgent that ―we have to do everything‖ (or, another popular substitute for serious thought, ―seek silver birdshot, not silver bullets‖) overlook the fact that we can never afford to do everything. The urgency of world hunger doesn’t compel us to fight it with caviar, no matter how nourishing fish eggs might be. Spending large sums on elegant solutions (especially those with side effects) that provide little relief will diminish what we can spend on more promising approaches.

#### Nuclear can’t be cost competitive with NG – even subsidies aren’t enough

Holbert Janson 12, 2-21-2012, “Rethinking the Nuclear Energy Renaissance,” Energy Collective, <http://theenergycollective.com/node/77122>

Cost is a significant challenge for any alternative energy sources. However, the expense of nuclear is not likely to fall as fast as wind or solar as a result of technological advances. Nuclear power must be heavily subsidized in order to be anywhere near cost competitive with traditional power sources. ¶ ¶ In the U.S. nuclear power accounts for around 20% of electricity production. This is most likely the highest percentage it will ever be. New capacity is continually being built to meet energy demand and with the exception of the two approved reactors in Georgia none of that is coming from nuclear. Support for public subsidies for alternative energy sources is waning given the current economic climate. ¶ ¶ Perhaps unexpectedly, those who oppose nuclear power are finding their cause helped by the current state of the natural gas industry. The extremely low price of natural gas has helped in bringing cheap electricity to the public and making more expensive power generation methods like nuclear harder to justify financially. Government subsidies will only go so far. Private capital still has to come to the table at some point. The project in Georgia in addition to several billion dollars in government loan guarantees was also prefunded by assessing monthly fees on consumer’s electricity bill to raise the remainder of the $14billion+ price tag.

#### Fuel costs for reprocessing are ten times higher than the once-through fuel cycle

David Biello 10, Associate Editor for Scientific American, 4/15/10, “Is Reprocessing the Answer to Eliminating Fissile Materials from Bombs and Nuclear Waste?,” <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-reprocessing-the-answer-to-eliminating-fissile-materials>

Reprocessing is also expensive. The French spend roughly an extra 800 million euros ($1.1 billion) per year for reprocessed fuel compared to conventional uranium fuel rods and the National Research Council estimated in 1996 that reprocessing existing U.S. spent nuclear fuel would cost at least $100 billion. "The power produced from MOX fuel costs 2 cents more than that produced from uranium fuel," Makhijani says. "It is tenfold higher than the underlying resource cost."

Hanson disagrees. "There's plenty of money for recycling…. A light water [nuclear] reactor is a machine that turns foreign uranium into domestic plutonium."

The mixed oxide fuel rods that result from reprocessing have a mixed track record for performance. Although not a single such MOX fuel rod has failed, according to Hanson, they have not lasted as long as fuel rods from fresh uranium. "It was supposed to go around for three refueling cycles," or roughly 4.5 years, von Hippel notes of U.S. excess weapons plutonium turned into MOX fuel. "They had to pull it out after two [refueling cycles of 18 months each] because the fuel had expanded so much. It isn't fully equivalent to low-enriched uranium fuel."

#### Nuclear profit margins are thin---economics of reprocessing determines whether it can be commercialized

Matthew Bunn 3, Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 7/30/3, “THE ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING VS. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/repro-report.pdf

The relative cost of reprocessing vs. direct-disposal is an important element of these debates. Economics, of course, is not the only or even the principal factor affecting decisions concerning reprocessing today—the inertia of fuel-cycle plans and contracts initiated long ago, hopes that plutonium recycling will contribute to energy security, lack of adequate storage space for spent fuel, environmental concerns, and other factors also play critical roles. 1 But economics is not unimportant, particularly in a nuclear industry facing an increasingly competitive environment, where the difference between producing electricity at slightly higher or lower cost than competitors is the difference between bankruptcy and profit, and where fuel-cycle costs are among the few costs reactor operators can readily control. At a minimum, if reprocessing is being done to achieve objectives other than economic ones, it is worthwhile to know how much one is paying to achieve those other objectives.

There is general agreement in recent studies that with today’s low uranium and enrichment prices, reprocessing and recycling is more expensive than direct disposal of spent fuel. 2 The only argument is over the magnitude of the difference and how long it is likely to persist. Advocates of reprocessing often argue that the extra cost of reprocessing is small today, and will soon disappear as uranium supplies become scarce and their price rises. 3 The data and analyses presented in this report, by contrast, demonstrate that the margin between the cost of reprocessing and recycling and that of direct disposal is wide, and is likely to persist for many decades to come.

#### Err neg---independent academic studies confirm reprocessing’s not economical

Charles de Saillan 10, attorney with the New Mexico Environment Department, 2010, “ARTICLE: DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: A PERSISTENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM,” The Harvard Environmental Law Review, 34 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 461, p. lexis

Fourth, reprocessing has proven to be economically infeasible. One premise underlying the interest in reprocessing in the 1960s and 1970s was that naturally occurring uranium was a relatively scarce resource. Since then, large uranium deposits have been discovered in Canada and Australia. n194 Moreover, a recent study concluded that the costs of using reprocessed MOX fuel are roughly four times greater than the costs of using enriched uranium oxide fuel from mined uranium ore. n195 Although EDF uses MOX fuel in several of its nuclear power reactors, it is required to do so by French law. n196 BNFL in the United Kingdom does not use the MOX fuel it produces in its reactors. n197

Because of these problems, most countries with nuclear power programs have elected not to reprocess spent nuclear fuel. Recently, several independent academic studies in the United States have affirmed that reprocessing is not a practical solution to the problem of spent nuclear fuel disposal. n198

#### Short-term reprocessing tech can’t compete because of costs---advanced reprocessing is even worse

Matthew Bunn 7, Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 11/14/7, “Risks of GNEP’s Focus on Near-Term Reprocessing,” <http://www.environment.harvard.edu/docs/faculty_pubs/bunn_risks.pdf>

Reprocessing using technologies available now or in the near term is likely to be substantially more expensive than direct disposal of spent fuel. 16 The UREX+ technology now being pursued adds a number of complex separation steps to the traditional PUREX process, and would likely be even more expensive. The capital cost of fast-neutron reactors such as those proposed for GNEP has traditionally been significantly higher than that of light-water reactors. A National Academy of Sciences review of separations and transmutation technologies such as those proposed for GNEP concluded that the additional cost of recycling compared to once through for 62,000 tons of commercial spent fuel “is likely to be no less than $50 billion and easily could be over $100 billion.” 17 While spent fuel management is only a small part of the cost of nuclear energy, the proposed GNEP approach would also require construction of a large fleet of fast reactors whose capital costs – the key driver of nuclear energy costs – have always been higher than those of light-water reactors. If the capital costs of fast reactors remained significantly higher in the future, processing all U.S. spent fuel in this way would cost tens or hundreds of billions of dollars more than a once-through approach. Who will pay these costs? Are we talking about many decades of government subsidies, or onerous regulations requiring private industry to pay for uneconomic activities?

#### IFR’s are a complete failure – empirics are conclusively on our side

Amory B. Lovins, chief scientist @ RMI, 3-21-2009, ““New” nuclear reactors, same old story,” Rocky Mountain Institute, http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2009-07\_NuclearSameOldStory

IFRs might in principle offer some safety advantages over today’s light-water reactors, but create different safety concerns, including the sodium coolant’s chemical reactivity and radioactivity. Over the past half-century, the world’s leading nuclear technologists have built about three dozen sodium-cooled fast reactors, 11 of them Naval. Of the 22 whose histories are mostly reported, over half had sodium leaks, four suffered fuel damage (including two partial meltdowns), several others had serious accidents, most were prematurely closed, and only six succeeded. Admiral Rickover canceled sodium-cooled propulsion for USS Seawolf in 1956 as “expensive to build, complex to operate, susceptible to prolonged shutdown as a result of even minor malfunctions, and difficult and time-consuming to repair.” Little has changed. As Dr. Tom Cochran of NRDC notes, fast reactor programs were tried in the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the USSR, and the US and Soviet Navies. **All failed**. After a half-century and tens of billions of dollars, the world has one operational commercial-sized fast reactor (Russia’s BN600) out of 438 commercial power reactors, and it’s not fueled with plutonium.

#### IFR will be expensive and uncompetitive – true of every single new reactor type in history

Amory B. Lovins, chief scientist @ RMI, 3-21-2009, ““New” nuclear reactors, same old story,” Rocky Mountain Institute, http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2009-07\_NuclearSameOldStory

No new kind of reactor is likely to be much, if at all, cheaper than today’s LWRs, which remain grossly uncompetitive and are getting more so despite five decades of maturation. “New reactors” are precisely the “paper reactors” Admiral Rickover described in 1953: An academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic characteristics: (1) It is simple. (2) It is small. (3) It is cheap. (4) It is light. (5) It can be built very quickly. (6) It is very flexible in purpose. (7) Very little development will be required. It will use off-the-shelf components. (8) The reactor is in the study phase. It is not being built now. On the other hand a practical reactor can be distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) It is being built now. (2) It is behind schedule. (3) It requires an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. (4) It is very expensive. (5) It takes a long time to build because of its engineering development problems. (6) It is large. (7) It is heavy. (8) It is complicated. Every new type of reactor in history has been costlier, slower, and harder than projected. IFRs’ low pres¬sure, different safety profile, high temperature, and potentially higher thermal efficiency (if its helium turbines didn’t misbehave as they have in all previous reactor projects) come with countervailing disadvantages and costs that advocates assume away, **contrary to all experience.**