# T

#### Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89 Lars is the Chairman of the WTO panel adopted at the Forty-Fifth Session of Contracting Parties on December 5, 1989. Other panel members: Mr. Hugh Bartlett and Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda. “Canada – Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt,” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production**.** Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Vote negative:

#### Including regulations is a limits disaster---undermines preparedness for all debates

Doub 76 William is a principal in the law firm of Doub and Muntzing. Previously he was a partner in LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby, and MacRae. He was a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (1971-1974). He served as a member of the Executive Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission (1968-1971) and was appointed by the President to the President’s Air Quality Advisory Board. He is a past chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Energy Conference. “Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy,” http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435

FERS began with the recognition that federal energy policy must result from concerted efforts in all areas dealing with energy, not the least of which was the manner in which energy is regulated by the federal government. Energy self sufficiency is improbable, if not impossible, without sensible regulatory processes, and effective regulation is necessary for public confidence. Thus, the President directed that "a comprehensive study be undertaken, in full consultation with Congress, to determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the government." An interagency task force was formed to study this question. With 19 different federal departments and agencies contributing, the task force spent seven months deciphering the present organizational makeup of the federal energy regulatory system, studying the need for organizational improvement, and evaluating alternatives. **More than 40 agencies were found to be involved** with making regulatory decisions on energy. Although only a few deal exclusively with energy, most of the 40 could **significantly affect** the **availability and/or cost of energy**. For example, in the field of gas transmission, there are five federal agencies that must act on siting and land-use issues, seven on emission and effluent issues, five on public safety issues, and one on worker health and safety issues-all before an onshore gas pipeline can be built. The complexity of energy regulation is also illustrated by the case of Standard Oil Company (Indiana), which reportedly must file about 1000 reports a year with 35 different federal agencies. Unfortunately, this example is the rule rather than the exception.

#### And precision---only direct prohibition is a restriction---key to predictability

Sinha 6 S.B. Sinha is a former judge of the Supreme Court of India. “Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries,” Nov 7, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus: "It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

#  Framework

## 1NC

#### The affirmative’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential

#### First, a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact---T debates also solve any possible turn

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Second, discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development---we control uniqueness: university students already have preconceived and ideological notions about how the world operates---government policy discussion is vital to force engagement with and resolution of competing perspectives to improve social outcomes, however those outcomes may be defined---and, it breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making

Esberg & Sagan 12 \*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Third, switch-side is key---Effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation

Patricia Roberts-Miller 3 is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred:Hannah Ar endt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all **imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)

What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that **it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical**. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."

Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who **abdicate their human capacities** and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, **both for other people and eventually for themselves**" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a **people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews**. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their **constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a **totalitarian system**, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; **there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies**. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.

It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the **playful and competitive space of agonism**; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the **assumption of competition,** and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are **not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments**, **of one's thought**. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.

Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to **articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that **one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it**. The situation is agonistic **not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because **conflict is a necessary consequence of difference**. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.

Continued…

Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to **engage in mass murder** **because he was able not to think about it,** especially **not from the perspective of the victims**, and he was able to **exempt himself from personal responsibility** by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).

Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,

Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the **central mystery of the holocaust**—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, **fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy**, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)

Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.

Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).

Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: **denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive**. To put it another way, **theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies**.

Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).

By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:

Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)

There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "**critical thinking**, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, **necessarily public discourse**: critical thinking is possible "**only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection**" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; **participants are interlocutors** and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must **be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.**

Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).

Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).

The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). **The paradoxical nature of agonism** (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

Arendt's Polemical Agonism

As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still **values conflict, disagreement, and equality** among interlocutors, but it **has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).

Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it **is how one tests the validity of one's thought**. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.

Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:

You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)

Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).

In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.

This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.

Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).

Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does **not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth**; **it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered.** Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).

Agonism demands that one **simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions**, **rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think.** The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).

Yet, there are **important positive political consequences of agonism.**

Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how **the system could be actively moral**. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the **evil of conformity**—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state **makes possible extraordinary evil** carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill **undermines the political force of conformity**, so it is **a force against the bureaucratizing of evil.** If people think for themselves, **they will resist dogma**; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, **they will resist totalitarianism**. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.

In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the **best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere**. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Effective decision-making outweighs---

#### Key to social improvements in every and all facets of life

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

If we assume it to be possible without recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14

I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13

Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained.

Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually.

When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided:

A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision…

The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision…

It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16

John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors.

We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### Only portable skill---means our framework turns case

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, **debate builds capacity for critical thinking**, analysis of public claims, **informed decision making**, and **better public judgment**. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a **puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate**. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change**, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it **builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed** about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of **problem-solving skills** demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology **for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities**. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a **crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life**. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of **meaningful political engagement** and **new articulations of democratic life.**

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to **produce revisions of democratic life** that are **necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive**. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; wholesale **environmental destruction** and the potential for **rapid climate change**; emerging **threats to international stability** in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing **challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an **informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the **existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Academic debate over energy policy in the face of environmental destruction is critical to shape the direction of change and create a public consciousness shift

Crist 4 (Eileen, Professor at Virginia Tech in the Department of Science and Technology, “Against the social construction of nature and wilderness”, Environmental Ethics 26;1, p 13-6, http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/againstsocialconstruction.pdf)

Yet, constructivist analyses of "nature" favor remaining in the comfort zone of zestless agnosticism and noncommittal meta-discourse. As David Kidner suggests, this intellectual stance may function as a mechanism against facing the devastation of the biosphere—an undertaking long underway but gathering momentum with the imminent bottlenecking of a triumphant global consumerism and unprecedented population levels. Human-driven extinction—in the ballpark of Wilson's estimated 27,000 species per year—is so unthinkable a fact that choosing to ignore it may well be the psychologically risk-free option.

Nevertheless, this is the opportune historical moment for intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences to join forces with conservation scientists in order to help create the consciousness shift and policy changes to stop this irreversible destruction. Given this outlook, how students in the human sciences are trained to regard scientific knowledge, and what kind of messages percolate to the public from the academy about the nature of scientific findings, matter immensely. The "agnostic stance" of constructivism toward "scientific claims" about the environment—a stance supposedly mandatory for discerning how scientific knowledge is "socially assembled"[32]—is, to borrow a legendary one-liner, striving to interpret the world at an hour that is pressingly calling us to change it.

## 2NC

#### speaking the language of experts--- solves cession of science and politics to ideological elites who dominate the argumentative frame

Hoppe 99 Robert Hoppe is Professor of Policy and knowledge in the Faculty of Management and Governance at Twente University, the Netherlands. "Argumentative Turn" Science and Public Policy, volume 26, number 3, June 1999, pages 201–210 works.bepress.com

ACCORDING TO LASSWELL (1971), policy science is about the production and application of knowledge of and in policy. Policy-makers who desire to tackle problems on the political agenda successfully, should be able to mobilise the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge in policy. Policy-makers and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really evolve. This demands precise knowledge of policy.

There is an obvious link between the two: the more and better the knowledge of policy, the easier it is to mobilise knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses this interdependence by defining the policy scientist's operational task as eliciting the maximum rational judgement of all those involved in policy-making.

For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst this implies the development of two skills. First, for the sake of mobilising the best available knowledge in policy, he/she should be able to mediate between different scientific disciplines. Second, to optimise the interdependence between science in and of policy, she/he should be able to mediate between science and politics. Hence Dunn's (1994, page 84) formal definition of policy analysis as an applied social science discipline that uses multiple research methods in a context of argumentation, public debate [and political struggle] to create, evaluate critically, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge.

Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalisation of policy science can be interpreted as the spread of the functions of knowledge organisation, storage, dissemination and application in the knowledge system (Dunn and Holzner, 1988; van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1989, page 29). Moreover, this scientification of hitherto 'unscientised' functions, by including science of policy explicitly, aimed to gear them to the political system. In that sense, Lerner and Lasswell's (1951) call for policy sciences anticipated, and probably helped bring about, the scientification of politics.

Peter Weingart (1999) sees the development of the science-policy nexus as a dialectical process of the scientification of politics/policy and the politicisation of science. Numerous studies of political controversies indeed show that science advisors behave like any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995). Yet science somehow managed to maintain its functional cognitive authority in politics. This may be because of its changing shape, which has been characterised as the emergence of a post-parliamentary and post-national network democracy (Andersen and Burns, 1996, pages 227-251).

National political developments are put in the background by ideas about uncontrollable, but apparently inevitable, international developments; in Europe, national state authority and power in public policy-making is leaking away to a new political and administrative elite, situated in the institutional ensemble of the European Union. National representation is in the hands of political parties which no longer control ideological debate. The authority and policy-making power of national governments is also leaking away towards increasingly powerful policy-issue networks, dominated by functional representation by interest groups and practical experts.

In this situation, public debate has become even more fragile than it was. It has become diluted by the predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and administrative argument, and under-articulated as a result of an explosion of new political schemata that crowd out the more conventional ideologies. The new schemata do feed on the ideologies; but in larger part they consist of a random and unarticulated 'mish-mash' of attitudes and images derived from ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social movement and personal political experiences.

The market-place of political ideas and arguments is thriving; but on the other hand, politicians and citizens are at a loss to judge its nature and quality.

Neither political parties, nor public officials, interest groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor even the public media show any inclination, let alone competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In such conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of order and articulation of concepts, arguments and ideas. Although frequently more in rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific 'validation' does provide politicians, public officials and citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideological universe in disarray.

For policy analysis to have any political impact under such conditions, it should be able somehow to continue 'speaking truth' to political elites who are ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the elites of administrators, managers, professionals and experts who vie for power in the jungle of organisations populating the functional policy domains of post-parliamentary democracy; and to a broader audience of an ideologically disoriented and politically disenchanted citizenry.

Policy simulation’s good---key to portable skills, breaking down expert monopoly on policy advice

Robert Farley 2-29, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, February 29, 2012, “Teaching Crisis Decision-Making Through Simulations,” World Politics Review, online: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11628/over-the-horizon-teaching-crisis-decision-making-through-simulations

What goes for war goes for policy other than war. Public and foreign policy programs have increasingly used simulations as training and teaching tools. Policy initiatives, whether foreign or domestic, generate strategic dynamics; players respond to how other players have changed the game environment. Consequently, playing games can help students develop expertise regarding how to manage strategic dynamics, as well as more specific skills such as crisis negotiation.

At the same time, foreign and public policy schools have become attractive to serious simulators because of the presence of a large number of relatively knowledgeable graduate and advanced undergraduate students with time on their hands. The Army War College -- which runs two negotiation simulations, one involving Nagorno-Karabakh and the other Cyprus -- has taken advantage of this by running its simulations at several major universities, adapting the structure of the game for different groups of players. Last summer, the strategic forecasting firm Wikistrat -- for which I am an analyst -- ran a grand strategy competition involving a large number of major foreign policy programs.

Accordingly, the universe of potential policy simulations and “war games” is virtually limitless. The Paxsims blog, co-edited by WPR contributor Rex Brynen, focuses on the serious use of international political and military simulations, listing dozens of different games played to inform public policy decisions. These simulations include modeling relief efforts following the Haiti earthquake, refining peacekeeping and civilian protection in hostile environments, “replaying” the 2007 Surge in Baghdad, rethinking the partition of India and Pakistan, and -- of course -- sketching out an Israeli bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities.

As in many other fields, the Internet has transformed the development process of policy-oriented simulations. Widely available information and modern information technology makes it possible to bring together subject matter experts with designers, and crowdsourcing helps demonstrate and correct problems and flaws with the simulation. Indeed, the Wikistrat model is built directly on the idea that smart crowdsourcing can produce better policy analysis than reliance on relatively isolated expert opinion.

Patterson School simulations focus on the teaching and training aspects of gaming rather than on verisimilitude. Previous Patterson School simulations have involved a revolution in Belarus, a pirate attack off Somalia, the aftermath of the death of Fidel Castro, an Israeli strike on Iran and a nuclear accident in North Korea. The purpose of these games is to force decision-making under difficult circumstances, hopefully modeling the conditions under which policy professionals produce recommendations and make decisions.

This is not to say that nothing can be learned from the course of the game. In the 2012 simulation, members of the Sinaloa drug cartel launched simultaneous large-scale attacks on the Bellagio in Las Vegas as well as on several targets in Acapulco. All the attacks involved car bombings followed up by teams of heavily armed gunmen employing automatic weapons and hand grenades. The Patterson student cohort was divided into teams representing the Mexican and American national security bureaucracies, regional governments and cartels, with the exercise simulating the government response in the 24 hours immediately following the attack. The simulation ended in an abortive meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderon. Domestic political pressures played a role on both sides, with Texas Gov. Rick Perry launching a blistering series of attacks against Obama’s handling of the crisis, and the Mexican police consistently undercutting the efforts of the Mexican army.

Our simulation highlighted the problems of bureaucratic competition, indistinct boundaries of responsibility, and mistrust between agencies and governments. The game also gave students an appreciation of the difficulties of dealing with an active and independent media, which remained largely outside their control. Most importantly, it gave students a taste of the difficulty in arriving at coherent, cohesive action even when policy objectives remained broadly in agreement. While students may never face this precise crisis in their subsequent professional careers, they undoubtedly will face situations where policymakers demand options, sleep be damned.

Increasingly realistic simulations involving larger and larger numbers of interested, well-informed players will help structure public policy decision-making for the foreseeable future. Someday, strong performance in such simulations, as well as the ability to craft useful games, may even prove a pathway to success in a public policy career.

#### true in the context of wind

John Barry 12, Reader in the School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy and Associate Director, Institute for a Sustainable World at Queen's University Belfast, and Geraint Ellis, Senior Lecturer, School of Planning, Architecture and Civil Engineering, Queen’s University, 2012, “Beyond Consensus? Agonism, Republicanism, and a Low-Carbon Future,” in Renewable Energy and the Public: From NIMBY to Participation, ed. Patrick Devine-Wright

We would therefore argue that neither of these approaches are well-suited to the broader challenges of shifting to a low carbon economy and more specifically, to the wider deployment of wind power. Based on our previous work (Ellis et al, 2007. Barry et al 2008), combined with further reflection with political and planning theory, we suggest alternative ways of how conflicts over wind farms should be conceptualised and related to the broader objectives of securing more sustainable energy systems. This involves more active engagement between those representing the spectrum of views on specific wind farm proposals, not based on the principle of 'consensus-seeking', but other forms of settlement. This does not necessarily mean we agree with the anti-wind lobby, but we do respect their civic entitlement to use formal and informal political process to argue their case. Following Hillier, we therefore explore here the potential of agonism in planning as a way of "domesticating'" antagonism to provide a more constructive contribution to democratic decision-making (Hillier 2002, p. 122). We seek to integrate this agonistic perspective with a broader 'republican' approach to decision-making around energy to offer an alternative way of conceptualising conflict over wind farm proposals.

[a]Republicanism, agonism and energy planning

Chantal Mouffe, one of the most prominent theorists of political agonism has defined it thus:

'I use the concept of agonistic pluralism to present a new way to think about democracy, which is different from the traditional liberal conception of democracy as a negotiation among interests and is also different from the model which is currently being developed by people like Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls. ...while we desire an end to conflict, if we want people to be free we must always allow for the possibility that conflict may appear and to provide an arena where differences can be confronted. The democratic process should supply that arena." (Mouffe, 1998)

In this way agonism can be sharply distinguished from both consensus and antagonism. The latter denotes a situation of conflict with little prospect of any agreement in which the only two outcomes for the protagonists are either "winning' or 'losing'. An antagonistic encounter is founded on a simplistic and radical 'self-other' relation, which focuses on the differences rather than commonalities between agents. In contrast, "... agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents. They are 'adversaries' not 'enemies' ( Mouffe 2005: 20: emphasis added).

In this way agonism lies between 'consensus' and 'antagonism', and one could define it as being concerned (like 'consensus' approaches) in seeking agreement (or at least settlement), but doing this by using rather than suppressing antagonism. An agonistic theory insists upon preserving democratic struggle as something both inevitable and indeed intrinsically good for the health of democracy and democratic citizenship. Of the two broad approaches outlined above - consensus-seeking and streamlining planning reform - it is clear that an agonistic approach, while disapproving of both approaches, is more critical of the latter in its attempt to depoliticise and undermine democratic decision-making processes. Equally important to emphasise is the provisionality inherent in agonistic politics, which is in stark contrast to the current dominant discourse of renewable energy, which is portrayed as a ;once and for all solution', as if the wide-spread deployment of renewable energy or increase in nuclear power settles and definitively 'solves' the energy crisis. An agonistic perspective does not take such a definitive attitude - all settlements can be re-examined afresh, re-argued and renegotiated in the light of new circumstances, scientific evidence or normative claims.

An agonistic approach can be further developed in the case of local energy governance by a distinctively republican conception of democratic politics, which potentially make it a better political frame for planning for renewable energy. Republicanism accepts pluralism (in values, lifestyles, perspectives) as a positive feature of a democratic polity and emphasises the importance of active citizens, participating and defending the collective way of life of their free community. It is important to note that a republican politics does not require that there be one commonly held view of the good life, long as they do not threaten or undermine the freedoms of the community. Furthermore republicanism regards contestation as more important to democratic politics than consensus and agreement (Pettit, 1997), thus sharing much with the outline of agonism above. Part of the reasons for this is that robust debate can help social learning and can provide imaginative solutions to problems. That is, in keeping with the deliberative approach a republican view accepts the potential of debate and argument to result in unexpected and unforeseen collectively-created solutions, which administrative, non-democratic decision-making cannot. It is also important to note that republicanism has a different conception of liberty than liberalism. For mainstream liberalism, freedom is understood as 'noninterference', while republicanism, liberty sees it as ;non-domination', which enables people to "live in the presence of people but at the mercy of none" (Pettit, 1997; 80). It also opens up the possibility of the state 'interfering' in the business of individuals or private actors (such as corporations) in the name of minimising the exercise of arbitrary power and domination of some citizens.

Here there is a need to distinguish a republican from a deliberative-democratic approach, though there is some overlap. A republican approach is not seeking consensus but rather the non-violent and solidarity-enhancing solution of encouraging people to honestly air their differences and seek settlement (even if this is agreement to disagree), and is also pragmatic in being willing to use majoritarian decision-making rules. It may also be that a republican approach taps into some of the findings from research into wind farm disputes, in that what people want is that their concerns to be respected and not dismissed disrespectfully. This encourages the identification of common ground, but the process is not contingent on it. Therefore, even if people remain in disagreement as to the particular decision made about the siting (or not) of a renewable energy proposal, both sides are aware of the background context of their respective positions, some of which may be shared by protagonists with very different views. That is, a republican approach is marked by seeking to create a deliberative mechanism in which 'citizens of good faith can disagree and disagree robustly and honestly'. Such processes may at least affirm reaffirm the fact that all involved are citizens (which unites them) and this should not be lost in the public articulation of their different views on the renewable energy decision (which divides them).

A civic republican approach to energy planning would involve the open and meaningful engagement of concerned citizens (through public enquires, citizen juries, planning appeals) with relevant public bodies to seek what is the best for the public interest. Thus rather than fearing open debate on wind energy proposals, it should be welcomed as an opportunity for negotiated agreement to elicit public spiritedness and engaged citizenship. Enhancing meaningful engagement would of course represent a radical departure from current planning practice4 and means that of the two positions outlined above -deliberation and streamlining - our position is closer to the former than to the latter.

#### Constraints are key to creativity---challenging ourselves to innovate within the confines of rules creates far more creative responses than starting with a blank slate

Mayer 6 – Marissa Ann Mayer, vice-president for search products and user experience at Google, February 13, 2006, “Creativity Loves Constraints,” online: http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06\_07/b3971144.htm?chan=gl

When people think about creativity, they think about artistic work -- unbridled, unguided effort that leads to beautiful effect. But if you look deeper, you'll find that some of the most inspiring art forms, such as haikus, sonatas, and religious paintings, are fraught with constraints. They are beautiful because creativity triumphed over the "rules." Constraints shape and focus problems and provide clear challenges to overcome. Creativity thrives best when constrained.

But constraints must be balanced with a healthy disregard for the impossible. Too many curbs can lead to pessimism and despair. Disregarding the bounds of what we know or accept gives rise to ideas that are non-obvious, unconventional, or unexplored. The creativity realized in this balance between constraint and disregard for the impossible is fueled by passion and leads to revolutionary change.

A few years ago, I met Paul Beckett, a talented designer who makes sculptural clocks. When I asked him why not do just sculptures, Paul said he liked the challenge of making something artistically beautiful that also had to perform as a clock. Framing the task in that way freed his creative force. Paul reflected that he also found it easier to paint on a canvas that had a mark on it rather than starting with one that was entirely clean and white. This resonated with me. It is often easier to direct your energy when you start with constrained challenges (a sculpture that must be a clock) or constrained possibilities (a canvas that is marked).

#### Abolishing constraints does not improve creativity---starting from defined constraints like the topic is better for overall creativity because innovative thinking comes from problem-solving like figuring out how to read what you want to read while still being topical

Intrator 10 – David, President of The Creative Organization, October 21, 2010, “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.”

As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.”

The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not.

In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired.

But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic.

It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box.

One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities.

What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution.

This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally.

Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary.

More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like.

Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered.

But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works.

That’s the hard part.

It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated.

It also can be emotionally difficult.

You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

# Case

## 1NC --- Only Blue

### Birds

#### Plan kills birds which are keystone species

Victoria Sutton and Nicole Tomich, 2005, Victoria Sutton is Visiting Lecturer (Fall 2004) Yale University, Professor of Law, Texas Tech University, Ph.D. in Environmental Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas and Nicole Tomich has a JD from Texas Tech University School of Law, “Harnessing Wind is Not (by Nature) Environmentally Friendly”, Pace Environmental Law Review, 92.

2.0 THE IMPACT OF WIND FARMS ON THE ENVIRONMENT **Any artificial structure, such as a wind turbine, is likely to have a significant negative impact on the surrounding natural en- vironment.**19 This reality increases in magnitude when the surrounding environment encompasses threatened or endangered species.20 Studies in Europe have revealed that the public’s perception of bird impacts can be a major factor in deciding whether a wind farm will gain acceptance and receive the proper permitting for a particular location.21 Furthermore, the minimal amount of existing scientific research on the environmental impacts of wind- generated power is considered by some to be developer-driven, and therefore incomplete, biased, and flawed.22 Whether “flawed” or not, there is existing literature on the negative impacts of wind power on the environment, and these impacts are discussed infra. 2.1 Impact of Wind Power on Birds Evidence of negative impacts on birds from interaction with wind generation first arose in the late 1980s.23 Since then, turbine blades have been proven to injure and kill birds-particularly birds of prey, known as raptors, some of which are threatened or endangered.24 These birds, such as the Bald Eagle,25 become victims of the wind turbines, primarily because of the height at which they fly. An early study of just one wind farm site in Al- tamont Pass, California, reported hundreds of raptors being killed yearly.26 Studies from the site, which hosts 6,500 wind turbines on 190 kilometers of property reveal: (1) turbines within 500 feet of canyons, which are typically prey areas, are associated with higher mortality rates; (2) mortality at end turbines is higher, but is just as high within strings of turbines where there are gaps of 35 meters or more between turbines; and (3) the lower the turbine density, the higher the mortality rates.27 The Altamont study was validated in the 1990s when migrating endangered Griffon Vul- tures were dying near Tarifa, Spain from collisions with wind tur- bine rotor blades.28 Bird collisions with wind generators can occur in a number of different ways: (1) a bird may strike the non-moving part of a tur- bine, such as the tower or motor box; (2) a bird may hit the spin- ning rotor blades; or (3) a bird may become caught in the strong pressure wave, or “wake” of a rotor blade.29 Wake collisions can cause a bird to become disoriented, lose control, and collide with the turbine, or be thrown down • onto the ground or into the ocean.30 The speed of revolving rotor blades can also contribute to “motion smear,” which is the degradation of the visibility of rap- idly moving objects, causing birds not to see them and fly straight into them.31 One study estimates that approximately 10,000 to 40,000 birds are killed each year by wind turbines in the United States.32 In comparison, approximately 60 million to 80 million yearly bird deaths result from vehicles, with an additional 40 million to 50 million deaths attributed to communication tower impacts.33 While the second set of figures seem to dwarf the importance of 10,000 to 40,000 birds killed annually by wind turbines, comparison studies are often flawed because they tend to focus on “cumulative impact” data rather than focusing on losses suffered by a particular species.34 Such studies compare the total mortalities from various sources, instead of the risk emanating from each separate source.35 Using the figures above, and factoring in approximately 230 million registered motor vehicles in the United States in the year 2000, the result is a low average of 0.3 bird deaths per vehicle per year.36 Furthermore vehicle deaths are much less likely to affect endangered or threatened raptors. Collisions are not the only threat posed to birds by wind power development. Wind farms can also become a barrier to movement, causing a migrating species to fly around rather than through a particular production site.37 A wind farm may also block daily home-range movements of a particular species, for instance, birds flying to and from preferred feeding and roosting sites.38 A wind farm that intersects a major migration path can cause a species to reroute adding stress and forcing the species to exert extra energy.39 The lighting of turbines may also pose a large threat to birds. Aviation lights that blink or rotate, have long been associated with bird mortality.40 Lighting dangers become amplified during bad weather such as fog, or heavy rain, increasing reflection and refraction, thus increasing mortality.41 Installed wind energy generating capacity increased by an average of 32% annually from 1998-2002;42 this ever-increasing growth rate combined with the various threats discussed supra, creates a unique and rapidly growing threat to bird populations and habitats.

#### Extinction

Diner 94 [Major David, Judge Advocate General's Corps, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, Lexis]

Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 [HU]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

### Reform Key/AT: Intellectuals FW

#### Short-term market mechanisms are the only solution to environmental destruction---the aff is ideological blindness parading as moral purity which justifies the status quo

Bryant 12—professor of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, We’ll Never Do Better Than a Politician: Climate Change and Purity, 5/11/12, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/well-never-do-better-than-a-politician-climate-change-and-purity/)

Somewhere or other Latour makes the remark that we’ll never do better than a politician. Here it’s important to remember that for Latour– as for myself –every entity is a “politician”. Latour isn’t referring solely to those persons that we call “politicians”, but to all entities that exist. And if Latour claims that we’ll never do better than a politician, then this is because every entity must navigate a field of relations to other entities that play a role in **what is and is not possible** in that field. In the language of my ontology, this would be articulated as the thesis that the local manifestations of which an entity is capable are, in part, a function of the relations the entity entertains to other entities in a regime of attraction. The world about entities perpetually introduces **resistances and frictions** **that play a key role** in what comes to be actualized**.** It is this aphorism that occurred to me today after a disturbing discussion with a rather militant Marxist on Facebook. I had posted a very disturbing editorial on climate change by the world renowned climate scientist James Hansen. Not only did this person completely misread the editorial, denouncing Hansen for claiming that Canada is entirely responsible for climate change (clearly he had no familiarity with Hansen or his important work), but he derided Hansen for proposing market-based solutions to climate change on the grounds that “the market is the whole source of the problem!” It’s difficult to know how to respond in this situations. read on! It is quite true that it is the system of global capitalism or the market that has created our climate problems (though, as Jared Diamond shows in Collapse, **other systems of production have also produced devastating climate problems).** In its insistence on profit and expansion in each economic quarter, markets as currently structured provide no brakes for environmental destructive actions. The system is itself pathological. **However**, pointing this out and **deriding market based solutions doesn’t get us very far**. In fact, such a response to proposed market-based solutions is downright dangerous and irresponsible. The fact of the matter is that **1) we** currently **live in a market based world, 2) there is not**, in the foreseeable future **an alternative system on the horizon, and 3), above all,** we need to do something now**.** **We can’t afford to reject interventions simply** because they don’t meet our ideal conceptions of how things should be. **We have to work with the world that is here, not the one that we would like to be here**. And here it’s crucial to note that pointing this out does not entail that we shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to grapple with the world that is actually there before us. It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always seemed to ignore that words have power and that Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least **the power to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of policy and new priorities possible.** **The tragedy was that he didn’t use that power,** though he has gotten better. I do not wish to denounce others and dismiss their claims on these sorts of grounds. As a Marxist anarchists, I do believe that we should fight for the creation of an alternative hominid ecology or social world. I think that the call to commit and fight, to put alternatives on the table, has been one of the most powerful contributions of thinkers like Zizek and Badiou. If we don’t commit and fight for alternatives those alternatives will never appear in the world. **Nonetheless, we still have to grapple with the world we find ourselves in**. And it is here, in my encounters with some Militant Marxists, that I sometimes find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that they are unintentionally **aiding and abetting the very things they claim to be fighting**. **In their refusal to become impure, to work with situations or assemblages as we find them, to sully their hands, they end up** reproducing the very system they wish to topple and change**. Narcissistically they get to sit there, smug in their superiority and purity, while everything continues as it did before because they’ve refused to become politicians or engage in the difficult concrete work of assembling** human and nonhuman **actors to render another world possible.** As a consequence, they occupy the position of Hegel’s beautiful soul that denounces the horrors of the world, celebrate the beauty of their soul, **while depending on those horrors of the world to sustain their own position**. To engage in politics is to engage in networks or ecologies of relations between humans and nonhumans. To engage in ecologies is to descend into networks of causal relations and feedback loops that you cannot completely master and that will modify your own commitments and actions. But there’s no other way, there’s no way around this, and we do need to act now.

### Policy Key/Philosophy Fails

#### Pure critique is just fuel for the narcissism of academics---proposing tangible political alternatives is necessary

Bryant 12—professor of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, McKenzie Wark: How Do You Occupy an Abstraction?, larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/mckenzie-wark-how-do-you-occupy-an-abstraction/#more-6320)

In the language of my machine-oriented ontology or onticology, we would say that we only ever encounter local manifestations of hyperobjects, local events or appearances of hyperobjects, and never the hyperobject as such. Hyperobjects as such are purely virtual or withdrawn. They can’t be directly touched. And what’s worse, contrary to Locke’s principle of individuation whereby an individual is individuated by virtue of its location in a particular place and at a particular time, hyperobjects are without a site or place. They are, as Morton says, non-local. This, then, is a central problem, for how do you combat something that is everywhere and nowhere? How do you engage something that is non-local? If an army is over there I can readily target it. If a particular munitions factor is over here, then I can readily target it. But how do we target something that is non-local and that is incorporeal? This is the problem with occupying an abstraction.¶ Second, contemporary capitalism is massively redundant. This, I think, is what Wark is getting at when he speaks of contemporary power as “vectoral”. Under what Wark calls “vector power”, we have configurations of power where attacks at one site have very little impact insofar as flows can simply be re-channeled through another set of nodes in the network. Like a hydra, you cut off one head only to have another head appear in its place. The head can never be cut off once and for all because there is no single head.¶ The crisis of contemporary politics is thus the crisis of the erasure of site. In the age of hyperobjects, we come to dwell in a world where there is no clear site of political antagonism and therefore no real sense of how and where to engage.¶ Here I’m also inclined to say that we need to be clear about system references in our political theorizing and action. We think a lot about the content of our political theorizing and positions, **but** I **don’t** think we **think** a lot **about how our political theories are supposed to actually act in the world**. As a result, much contemporary leftist political theory ends up in a **performative contradiction**. It claims, following Marx, that it’s aim is not to represent the world but to change it, **yet it never escapes the burrows of academic** journals, **conferences,** and presses to actually do so. Like the Rat-Man’s obsessional neurosis where his actions in returning the glasses were actually designed to fail, **there seems to be a built in tendency in** these forms of **theorization to unconsciously organize their own failure**. And here I can’t resist suggesting that this comes as no surprise given that, in Lacanian terms, the left is the position of the hysteric and as such **has “a desire for an unsatisfied desire”.** In such circumstances **the worst thing consists in getting what you want**. We on the left need to traverse our fantasy so as to avoid this sterile and self-defeating repetition; and **this entails shifting from the position of political critique (hysterical protest), to political construction– actually envisioning and building alternatives.¶** So what’s the issue with system-reference? The great autopoietic sociological systems theorist, Niklas Luhmann, makes this point nicely. For Luhmann, there are intra-systemic references and inter-systemic references. Intra-systemic references refer to processes that are strictly for the sake of reproducing or maintaining the system in question. Take the example of a cell. A cell, for-itself, is not for anything beyond itself. The processes that take place within the cell are simply for continuing the existence of the cell across time. While the cell might certainly emit various chemicals and hormones as a result of these processes, from its own intra-systemic perspective, it is not for the sake of affecting these other cells with those hormones. They’re simply by-products. Capitalism or economy is similar. Capitalists talk a good game about benefiting the rest of the world through the technologies they produce, the medicines they create (though usually it’s government and universities that invent these medicines), the jobs they create, etc., but really the sole aim of any corporation is identical to that of a cell: to endure through time or reproduce itself through the production of capital. This production of capital is not for anything and does not refer to anything outside itself. These operations of capital production are intra-systemic. By contrast, inter-systemic operations would refer to something outside the system and its auto-reproduction. They would be for something else.¶ Luhmann argues that every autopoietic system has this sort of intra-systemic dimension. Autopoietic systems are, above all, organized around maintaining themselves or enduring. **This raises serious questions about academic political theory.** Academia is an autopoietic system. As an autopoietic system, it aims to endure, reproduce itself, etc. It must engage in operations or procedures from moment to moment to do so. These operations consist in the production of students that eventually become scholars or professors, the writing of articles, the giving of conferences, the production of books and classes, etc. All of these are operations through which the academic system maintains itself across time. **The horrifying consequence of this is that the reasons we might give for why we do what we do might** (and often) **have little to do with what’s actually taking place in system continuance**. We say that our articles are designed to demolish capital, inequality, sexism, homophobia, climate disaster, etc., but if we look at how this system actually functions we suspect that the references here are only intra-systemic, **that they are only addressing the choir or other academics, that they are only about maintaining that system, and that they never proliferate through the broader world**. Indeed, our very style is often a big fuck you to the rest of the world as it requires expert knowledge to be comprehended, thereby insuring that it can have no impact on broader collectives to produce change. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that **our talk about changing the world is a sort of alibi, a sort of rationalization, for a very different set of operations that are taking place**. Just as the capitalist says he’s trying to benefit the world, the academic tries to say he’s trying to change the world when all he’s really doing is maintaining a particular operationally closed autopoietic system. How to break this closure is a key question for any truly engaged political theory. And part of breaking that closure will entail eating some humble pie. Adam Kotsko wrote a wonderful and hilarious post on the absurdities of some political theorizing and its self-importance today. We’ve failed horribly with university politics and defending the humanities, yet in our holier-than-thou attitudes we call for a direct move to communism. **Perhaps we need to reflect a bit on ourselves** and our strategies and what political theory should be about.¶ Setting all this aside, I think there’s a danger in Wark’s claims about abstraction (though I think he’s asking the right sort of question). The danger in treating hyperobjects like capitalism as being everywhere and nowhere is that our ability to act becomes paralyzed. As a materialist, I’m committed to the thesis that everything is ultimately material and requires some sort of material embodiment. If that’s true, it follows that there are points of purchase on every object, even where that object is a hyperobject. This is why, given the current form that power takes or the age of hyperobjects, I believe that forms of theory such as new materialism, object-oriented ontology, and actor-network theory are more important than ever (clearly the Whiteheadians are out as they see everything as internally related, as an organism, and therefore have no way of theorizing change and political engagement; they’re quasi-Hegelian, justifying even the discord in the world as a part of “god’s” selection and harmonization of intensities).¶ The important thing to remember is that hyperobjects like capitalism are unable to function without a material base. They require highways, shipping routes, trains and railroads, fiber optic cables for communication, and a host of other things besides. Without what Shannon Mattern calls “infrastructure”, it’s impossible for this particular hyperobject exists. Every hyperobject requires its arteries. Information, markets, trade, require the paths along which they travel and capitalism as we know it today would not be possible without its paths. The problem with so much political theory today is that it focuses on the semiosphere in the form of ideologies, discourses, narratives, laws, etc., ignoring the arteries required for the semiosphere to exercise its power. For example, we get OWS standing in front of Wall Street protesting– engaging in a speech act –yet **one wonders if speech is an adequate way of addressing the sort of system we exist in.** Returning to system’s theory, is the system of capital based on individual decisions of bankers and CEO’s, or does the system itself have its own cognition, it’s own mode of action, that they’re ineluctably trapped in? Isn’t there a sort of humanist prejudice embodied in this form of political engagement? It has value in that it might create larger collectives of people to fight these intelligent aliens that live amongst us (markets, corporations, etc), but it doesn’t address these aliens themselves because it doesn’t even acknowledge their existence.¶ What we need is a politics adequate to hyperobjects, and that is above all a politics that targets arteries. OOO, new materialism, and actor-network theory are often criticized for being “apolitical” by people who are fascinated with political declarations, who are obsessed with showing that your papers are in order, that you’ve chosen the right team, and that see critique and protest as the real mode of political engagement. **But it is not clear what difference these theorists are making and how they are escaping intra-systemic self-reference and auto-reproduction**. But the message of these orientations is “to the things themselves!”, “to the assemblages themselves!” “Quit your macho blather about where you stand, and actually map power and how it exercises itself!” And part of this re-orientation of politics, if it exists, consists in rendering deconstruction far more concrete. Deconstruction would no longer show merely the leaks in any system and its diacritical oppositions, it would go to the things themselves. What does that mean? It means that deconstruction would practice onto-cartography or identify the arteries by which capitalism perpetuates itself and find ways to block them. You want to topple the 1% and get their attention? Don’t stand in front of Wall Street and bitch at bankers and brokers, occupy a highway. Hack a satellite and shut down communications. Block a port. Erase data banks, etc. Block the arteries; block the paths that this hyperobject requires to sustain itself. This is the only way you will tilt the hands of power and create bargaining power with government organs of capital and corporations. You have to hit them where they live, in their arteries. Did anyone ever change their diet without being told that they would die? Your critique is an important and indispensable step, but **if you really wish to produce change you need to find ways to create heart attacks and aneurysms. Short of that, your activity is just masturbation.** But this requires coming to discern where the arteries are and doing a little less critique of cultural artifacts and ideologies. Yet choose your targets carefully. The problem with the Seattle protests was that they chose idiotic targets and simply acted on impotent rage. A window is not an artery. It doesn’t organize a flow of communication and capital. It’s the arteries that you need to locate. I guess this post will get Homeland Security after me.

#### The K’s theoretical abstractions reduce everything to signifiers which stifles productive solutions to warming

Bryant 12—professor of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, Social Constructivism Again: What SR Means to Me, larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/social-constructivism-again-what-sr-means-to-me/)

Rather, what I discovered was that the Lacanian axiom I had advocated for so many years– that “the universe is the flower of rhetoric” (Seminar XX) –**was limited in its ability to respond to** the **problems** that were of importance to me. Marx was an adequate theoretical framework for thinking the dynamics of global capital. Thinkers like Zizek and Adorno were adequate for thinking ideology. Thinkers like Lacan and Deleuze and Guattari (though I think D&G are realists) were adequate for thinking desire. Thinkers like Foucault were adequate for thinking about how institutions and scientific discourses in the social sciences discursively and through power produce subjects. Thinkers like Baudrillard and Bourdieu were adequate for explaining why certain objects take on cultural value. Thinkers like Butler were adequate for thinking the social construction of gender. Etc.¶ **Yet none of these things were adequate for thinking problems like climate change, the impact of technologies on the world**, or the impact of geography on social formations. (Tim, if you’re listening this is my explanation of why I think realism, materiality, and networks are philosophically important. Perhaps we’re just asking very different questions?). If you’re going to think seriously about things like climate change, for example, discussions of lived experience or how “the universe is the flower of rhetoric” will not do. **You need to take seriously real properties of g**reen**h**ouse **g**ase**s**, the earth’s albedo, **methane gases** released from garbage dumps, cow farts, diets, the flight of people to the suburbs and what this entails as a result of **car travel**, fluctuations in the sun’s output, **ocean temperatures, etc**. Analyses of lived experience or the social construction of objects are thoroughly inadequate for responding to these things. **At some point you need to hang your hat on the peg and recognize that you’re not just talking about discourses or signifiers**. Yes, yes, you want to talk about discourses, texts, and signifiers too. Yes, yes, you want to talk about lived experience too. **But this is not enough**. You need to take into account the mind, language, and sign independence of these beings as well. There’s no way around this. At least, I don’t think there’s any way around this.¶ I want to have my social constructivism and have my realism too. In fact, I want to go so far in my realism that I even count social constructions as real. They are all too real for those who live with their negative effects and like an ecosystem they regulate the possibilities of lives, our ability to respond to pressing problems like climate change, and the lives of countless nonhuman beings. However, recognizing that a theoretical framework is limited and that more theoretical work needs to be done broaching different domains of analysis does not leave the original theory unchanged. In The Democracy of Objects (sorry to plug my latest book so much in this post), I claim that I’m able to integrate the findings of Zizek. In Tim’s post, a participant who describes me as a psychotic because I treat words like things, says that I can’t really integrate Zizek unless I embrace his Hegelianism. Apparently this reader forgets that 1) Freud describes the psychotic as revealing on the surface the truth of the unconscious, and 2) forgets that in his final teaching Lacan described himself as a psychotic and praised Joyce for finding a non-Oedipal solution in the case of his own psychosis. I’d say I’m in good company, especially for those who have understood the argument of Anti-Oedipus (which Lacan, incidentally, praised)! Finally, I would argue that this reader seems not to understand the difference between the letter and the signifier in Lacan. Based on over 15 years of engagement with Lacanian theory both in the clinic and in the letter of the text, working, in both the clinic and with the theory, with some of the most eminent Lacanian theorists alive today, I’d be more than happy to go toe to toe with him if he’d like a more detailed debate.¶ Setting that silliness aside, this respondent doesn’t seem to recognize that integration doesn’t entail sublation of all elements of a theoretical edifice. Theoretical changes, even where they don’t reject all elements of the previous theoretical edifice, do not leave that previous theoretical edifice unchanged. Things need to be reworked in light of the new additions. Other claims need to be abandoned. New elements need to be introduced into the previous theory. The previous theory, while not rejected, is not the same as it was before. And this is how it is with Zizek’s Hegelianism. I believe that I can integrate the framework of Lacanian theory of the subject, desire, and jouissance within a Luhmannian framework of sociological autopoietic theory, but this is a far cry from endorsing the claim that there is an identity of substance and subject. **No, the whole point of the realist move with respect to problems like climate change was that we can no longer claim that signifying articulations are the structuring agency of all being**. We can no longer say that “reality is a synthesis of the imaginary and the symbolic” (Lacan, Television). No, reality has to become something closer to the Lacanian real, and the Hegelian real is something that evades all dialectical sublation, even the fraught, contradictory, Goedelian, and open sublation that Zizek advocates. At best Zizek gives us a nuanced version of commodity fetishism. **But there’s more to** heaven and **earth than commodity fetishism**. In this framework, all sorts of things, following Guattari, would have to be included in the Lacanian framework that tend to be ignored: the literal architecture of the institution where the clinic is practiced, the relations between the people that are there, the sort of work that is done by “patients” and “analysts”, the media used, artistic practices, economics, the material sociological setting of the neighborhood, etc., etc., etc. In addition to the signifier, we would have to attend to the role these things play.

### Ontology Defense

#### Prior questions fail and paralyze politics

Owen 2 (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### The aff eliminates any commitment to social and economic justice. Their fear of calculatability and concern for ontology condemns all practical political engagement

Yar 2k – Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Lancaster (Majid, Arendt's Heideggerianism, Cultural Values 4.1)

Similarly, we must consider the consequences that this 'ontological substitution' for the essence of the political has for politics, in terms of what is practically excluded by this rethinking. If the presently available menu of political engagements and projects (be they market or social liberalism, social democracy, communitarianism, Marxism, etc.) are only so many moments of the techno-social completion of an underlying metaphysics, then the fear of 'metaphysical contamination' inhibits any return to recognisable political practices and sincere engagement with the political exigencies of the day. This is what Nancy Fraser has called the problem of 'dirty hands', the suspension of engagement with the existing content of political agendas because of their identification as being in thrall to the violence of metaphysics. Unable to engage in politics as it is, one either [a] sublimates the desire for politics by retreating to an interrogation of the political with respect to its essence (Fraser, 1984, p. 144), or [b] on this basis, seeks 'to breach the inscription of a wholly other politics'. The former suspends politics indefinitely, while the latter implies a new politics, which, on the basis of its reconceived understanding of the political, apparently excludes much of what recognizably belongs to politics today. This latter difficulty is well known from Arendt's case, whose barring of issues of social and economic justice and welfare from the political domain are well known. To offer two examples: [ 1] in her commentary on the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s, she argued that the politically salient factor which needed challenging was only racial legislation and the formal exclusion of African-Americans from the political sphere, not discrimination, social deprivation and disadvantage, etc.(Arendt, 1959, pp. 45-56); [ 2] Arendt's pronounceraent at a conference in 1972 (put under question by Albrecht Wellmer regarding her distinction of the 'political' and the 'social'), that housing and homelessness were not political issues, that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualisation of freedom as disclosure; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the oikos.[ 20] The point here is not that Arendt and others are in any sense unconcerned or indifferent about such sufferings, deprivations and inequalities. Rather, it is that such disputes and agendas are identified as belonging to the socio-technical sphere of administration, calculation, instrumentality, the logic of means and ends, subject-object manipulation by a will which turns the world to its purposes, the conceptual rendering of beings in terms of abstract and levelling categories and classes, and so on; they are thereby part and parcel of the metaphysical-technological understanding of Being, which effaces the unique and singular appearance and disclosure of beings, and thereby illegitimate candidates for consideration under the renewed, ontological-existential formulation of the political. To reconceive the political in terms of a departure from its former incarnation as metaphysical politics, means that the revised terms of a properly political discourse cannot accommodate the prosaic yet urgent questions we might typically identify under the rubric of 'policy'. Questions of social and economic justice are made homeless, exiled from the political sphere of disputation and demand in which they were formerly voiced. Indeed, it might be observed that the postmetaphysical formulation of the political is devoid of any content other than the freedom which defines it; it is freedom to appear, to disclose, but not the freedom to do something in particular, in that utilising freedom for achieving some end or other implies a collapse back into will, instrumentality, teleocracy, poeisis, etc. By defining freedom qua disclosedness as the essence of freedom and the sole end of the political, this position skirts dangerously close to advocating politique pour la politique, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process.

### Anthro Defense

#### Abandonment of humanist values leaves us unable to act to stop atrocities and threatens the survival of the universe.

Violet B Ketels 96 (Associate Professor of English at Temple University, “‘Havel to the Castle!’ The Power of the Word,” 548 Annals 45, November, Sage)

The political bestiality of our age is abetted by our willingness to tolerate the deconstructing of humanist values. The process begins with the cynical manipulation of language. It often ends in stupefying murderousness before which the world stands silent, frozen in impotent "attentism"—a wait-and-see stance as unsuited to the human plight as a pacifier is to stopping up the hunger of a starving child. We have let lapse our pledge to the 6 million Jewish victims of the Holocaust that their deaths might somehow be transfiguring for humankind. We allow "slaughterhouse men" tactical status at U.N. tables and "cast down our eyes when the depraved roar past."1 Peacemakers, delegated by us and circumscribed by our fears, temporize with thugs who have revived lebensraum claims more boldly than Hitler did. In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence. We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it—only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large.2 In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience. "Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills,"3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content,"\* monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge.5 Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the humanist soul,"6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts."7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue. Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now. The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face.8 Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying. Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety? Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [hasj Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvokc as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389!9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle—by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo.... Kosovo is the Serbian-ized history of the Flood—the Serbian New Testament."10 A cover of Siiddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited." We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, regimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and appa-rat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity."12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

#### Aff doesn’t solve—and if it does its worse for non-humans

Tibor Machan 4 (Tibor, Distinguished Fellow and Prof. @ Leatherby Center for Entrepreneurship & Business Ethics @ Chapman U., “Putting Humans First: Why We Are Nature’s Favorite”, p. 11-13)

Now, one can dispute Hospers, but only by averting one's gaze from the facts. If animals in fact did have rights as you and I understand the concept of rights—rights that entail and mandate a hands-off policy toward other rights possessors—most of the creatures now lurking in lawns and jungles, at the very least all the carnivores, would have to be brought up on murder charges. This is what all the animal rights champions fail to heed, including Ingrid Newkirk, radical leader of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), who holds that it is unacceptable for us to use animals in any way at all.13 This is why they allow themselves such vile thoughts as that "the world would be an infinitely better place without humans **in it at all**."'4 If the scenario is absurd, it's so not because the concept of animal rights has been unfairly reduced to absurdity but because there is nowhere else to go. The idea of animal rights is impracticable to begin with; any attempt to visualize the denizens of the animal world benefiting from and respecting rights must collapse into fantasy willy-nilly.

The concept of rights emerged with the rise of human civilization precisely because it is needed by and applicable to human beings, given the specifically moral nature of human beings and their ambition to live with each other in mutual harmony and to mutual benefit. Rights have nothing to do with the lives of wolves and turtles because of what animal rights champions themselves admit, namely, the amoral nature of at least the bulk of the animal world.15 Advocates of animal rights in at least one way do admit the vast gulf between animals and humans and that humans alone are equipped to deal with moral issues. When they address us alone about these matters—when they accept all the carnage that is perpetrated by other living things, including what would be infanticide and worse if human beings were to engage in it—they clearly imply that human beings are indeed special. They imply, first and foremost, that people are indeed the only living beings capable of understanding a moral appeal. Only human beings can be implored to do right rather than wrong. Other animals just don't have the capacity for this. And so the environmentalists don't confront them with any moral arguments no matter how politically incorrect the animals may be toward one another.

## 2NC

#### Rare Earth Mineral Demand is low – Downstream enterprises hesitant to enter into new projects

WantChinaTimes, 8/14/12, “Decreased demand hits China's rare earth producers”, <http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1102&MainCatID=11&id=20120814000043>

A wave of business closures is sweeping the rare earth industry in China, especially in regions such as Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia and Guangdong. One reason is high prices for the minerals, which have prompted the United States and other countries to resume their own rare earth production and downstream enterprises to seek substitute materials or switch their orders to other nations.

In addition, **due to fluctuations in rare earth prices, downstream enterprises** and mining companies **are adopting a wait-and-see attitude and will not formulate production plans until prices stabilize.** "With domestic and overseas demand in decline, the wait-and-see attitude in the industry will last for a while," says Meng Qingjiang, deputy secretary general of the Jiangxi Rare Earth Association.

Statistics from China Rare Earth Industry Association show that in the first half of the year, rare earth exports from China reached only 5,000 tons and the volume of shipments for the whole year will be much lower than last year's 16,000 tons.

A boss of a rare earth enterprise in Ganzhou in Jiangxi province reports that his company suspended operations in early July due to a lack of overseas orders. He expects his company will resume production in September, when orders will return following the end of the summer vacation season in July and August in Europe.

An executive from a magnetic material enterprise in Inner Mongolia is more pessimistic. "Our factory has also suspended production. Moreover, my peers are not optimistic about the market outlook in the second half," he said.

An industry insider hopes that the government can stimulate domestic demand to offset the weak demand for rare earth minerals from overseas markets.

#### Plan causes disproportionate demand for Nd and Dy – they are key elements in the construction of wind turbines

Elisa Alonso et. Al, 2/3/12, postdoctoral research associate in the Materials Systems Laboratory at MIT, “Evaluating Rare Earth Element Availability: A Case with Revolutionary Demand from Clean Technologies”, Environmental Science and Technology,

ABSTRACT: The future availability of rare earth elements (REEs) is of concern due to monopolistic supply conditions, environmentally unsustainable mining practices, and rapid demand growth. We present an evaluation of potential future demand scenarios for REEs with a focus on the issue of comining. Many assumptions were made to simplify the analysis, but the scenarios identify some key variables that could affect future rare earth markets and market behavior. Increased use of wind energy and electric vehicles **are key elements** of a more sustainable future. However, since present technologies for electric vehicles and wind turbines rely heavily on dysprosium (Dy) and neodymium (Nd), in rare-earth magnets, future adoption of these technologies may result in **large and disproportionate increases in the demand for these two elements.** For this study, upper and lower bound usage projections for REE in these applications were developed to evaluate the state of future REE supply availability. In the absence of efficient reuse and recycling or the development of technologies which use lower amounts of Dy and Nd, following a path consistent with stabilization of atmospheric CO2 at 450 ppm may lead to an increase of more than 700% and 2600% for Nd and Dy, respectively, over the next 25 years if the present REE needs in automotive and wind applications are representative of future needs.

#### China would respond to sharp demand spike by restricting exports and promoting domestic industry – causes downstream firm relocation from the US to China

Timothy J. Brennan and Joel Darmstadter et. Al.,2012, Senior fellows at Resources for the Future, “THE SUPPLY CHAIN AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF RARE EARTH MATERIALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. WIND ENERGY SECTOR”, <http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-Rpt-Shih%20etal%20RareEarthsUSWind.pdf>

So far, it appears that, although China may have market power over REs, it has a limited ability to affect the supply chain. Moreover, concerns that the industry is characterized by widespread vertical integration are not well founded. Such integration appears more likely to be motivated by a host of actions to promote efficient production and reduce costs and prices than the reverse. Nevertheless, China has continued to set quotas on RE exports. To the extent that a country has market power, its quotas and tariffs could be viewed as a way to raise prices and national income by restricting output. Were profit maximization the goal, however, the country would charge its own domestic RE users the same high price foreign users have to pay as a result of the export quotas. Using REs as an example, if a foreign buyer could turn REs into alloys, magnets, or wind turbines at lower cost than competitors within China, it would be willing to pay more for the REs; China would lose money by favoring domestic suppliers.

This story is predicated on market power, and our analysis so far indicates that conditions in the wind generation sector, particularly in the United States, mitigate any adverse domestic effects of market power. Quotas, however, could have a strategic effect in this context worth future investigation and analysis. Some press reports suggest that companies farther along the supply chain that relocate to China can obtain REs on more favorable terms than foreign suppliers (Bradsher 2011). These advantages could take the form of lower prices or the ability to obtain explicit or implicit long-term supply guarantees without being exposed to high price volatility. If—and this may change—China does not impose quotas or tariffs on products that include REs, producers who relocate to China obtain a competitive cost advantage over those who do not. This creates an **additional incentive to relocate operations to China**, over and above other advantages of producing in China, such as lower labor costs (Lifton 2009). Moreover, if these downstream products are available at competitive prices because REs are available in China as a result of competition among the three leading suppliers, then the RE quota is of even less consequence to buyers along the supply chain.

The combination of lower costs and better access to REs in China, along with an absence of similar quotas and export controls on magnets or turbines produced in China, indicate that **the purpose of the RE quotas is not so much to exploit market power over REs but to encourage domestic production in China.** The question is why. For answers, we can only speculate because of the uncertainties regarding the operation of firms in China that we discussed in relation to market power and vertical integration. In principle, multiple firms moving to China would still be independent actors, with no anticompetitive consequences—even if the lion’s share of downstream manufacturing relocated to China.23 The story changes, however, if these firms are not independently competing profit maximizers, but are instead managed collectively by the Chinese government. Relocation of a dominant share of manufacturing to China may have an effect if those firms were managed or owned collectively. One possibility is that operating in China would give the Chinese access to knowledge of production processes and potential routes to innovation. If all those firms operate in China, and if the knowledge from each were to be exploited through a single entity within China, this knowledge could then perhaps be combined to give that entity an advantage in innovating and result in the future monopolization of PMs, wind turbines, or other products.24

In short, **China could use its monopoly over REs to induce downstream firms to relocate to China.** China could then obtain access to manufacturing knowledge from firms that relocate to China.

#### Easy access to the Rare Earth metals are key to heg – comprise a number of essential military applications

Adam Stone, 6/12/12, Staff Writer for Defense News, “CNAS: U.S. Reliance on Rare Earths Carries Risks”, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120612/DEFREG02/306120003/CNAS-U-S-Reliance-Rare-Earths-Carries-Risks>

Thinking about national security risks, one’s mind does not often turn to such esoteric materials as neodymium, samarium and dysprosium. Yet researchers say **U.S. military dependence on these “rare earth” minerals may put the nation in peril.**

Analysts at The Center for a New American Security, a nonpartisan national security and defense policy think tank, say China’s dominance as a supplier of rare earth minerals to the U.S. represents a **strategic vulnerability.**

These materials form core components in jet engines, precision-guided missiles, lasers and catalytic converters for hybrid-electric engines, said Will Rogers, a CNAS research associate. Their high heat capacity and powerful magnetic properties make them ideal for such high-endurance uses.

Ninety percent of these materials come from China today, and that **nation has shown a willingness to use rare earth minerals to gain political advantage.** In a 2010 territorial dispute with Japan, China held up exports of these minerals, a move aimed directly at Japanese electronics production.

“It was the first real sign that China might be willing to use its leverage with rare earths,” Rogers said. That could have significant ramifications. “The challenge with rare earths is that **there are very few if any substitutes for their applications**, so you would really be giving up **critical functions** among military uses if supply ran short.”

#### U.S. preponderance of power deters conflict in every global hotspot from going nuclear---offshore strategies fail

Steven Metz 12, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, January 30, 2012, “To Maintain U.S. Primacy, Standoff Power is not Enough,” World Politics Review, online: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11312/to-maintain-u-s-primacy-standoff-power-is-not-enough

Though the objective itself is admirable, the strategy behind it can prove to be counterproductive and even dangerous if pushed to extremes. Standoff methods are extraordinarily effective in some situations and against some types of opponents. Unfortunately, a global power that seeks to shape the security environment,

prevent the emergence of conflict and shape the outcome of conflicts that do occur confronts situations and opponents far from its home territory. In these cases, the capability to project force with little risk to one’s forces is essential. But preferring standoff methods is one thing; having only standoff capabilities is something entirely different. All U.S. presidents have found that the promotion of American national interests requires balanced military capabilities, with more-direct methods, particularly land power, in the mix.

Following the 1991 Gulf War, some military and political leaders came to believe that modern technology had made

standoff methods so effective that there was less need for direct military action. The value of land power, according to this group, was in decline. The Sept. 11 attacks and the ensuing struggle with extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world showed otherwise. For a while, the inclination to place all bets on standoff methods faded. Now this debate has re-emerged.

The idea that standoff military methods now outweigh a balanced capability in strategic importance grows from a misreading of recent history. It is based on the belief that Libya rather than Iraq or Afghanistan should be the model for future U.S. military operations. Americans certainly prefer a Libya-style use of force with few or no American casualties. But if that is the limit of the nation’s capabilities, it will have no ability to deter or defeat opponents more clever and capable than Moammar Gadhafi's security services; to shape regional security systems; to stabilize countries or regions; and to influence the outcome of conflicts that do not look like Libya.

Global trends point toward an enduring need for land power. States will fragment, with accompanying conflict. There is a possibility of renewed proxy wars between regional and global powers. In the absence of effective American land power, aggressors would simply avoid large-scale conventional military operations and devolve to the use of proxies, whether insurgents, terrorists or militias. The United States would be ill-prepared to help its friends resist this form of aggression, thus making it more likely. Fragile states, including those emerging from a conflict or from democratic revolutions, would have trouble finding the assistance they needed to establish stability. The United States would be hard-pressed to lead international efforts to stop humanitarian disasters or genocide, particularly in the wake of a devastating conflict such as a nuclear exchange.

Without a balanced military capability, America would lose its ability to shape the world in pursuit of its national interests. While budget and force cuts are necessary, they should be structured so that the U.S. military retains both its dominance at defeating enemy armed forces through standoff strikes and its ability to deter other types of opponents and shape strategic outcomes through the application of land power.

There is no doubt that the United States will exercise global leadership more selectively in coming years. It may decide to avoid large-scale counterinsurgency operations along the lines of Iraq and Afghanistan or direct involvement in major wars. But while making such a decision based on expected benefits, costs and risks is wise, to be forced into it by a lack of effective land power would be very dangerous.

If the United States only needs to defeat conventional enemy armed forces, standoff military methods are enough. But if the national interest requires facing other types of opponents, deterring conflict and shaping conflicts that cannot be deterred, America needs a balance of standoff and direct capabilities. If the United States intends to remain an effective global power, it must have potent land power.

## 1NR

### Finishing Bryant

**a sort of rationalization, for a very different set of operations that are taking place**. Just as the capitalist says he’s trying to benefit the world, the academic tries to say he’s trying to change the world when all he’s really doing is maintaining a particular operationally closed autopoietic system. How to break this closure is a key question for any truly engaged political theory. And part of breaking that closure will entail eating some humble pie. Adam Kotsko wrote a wonderful and hilarious post on the absurdities of some political theorizing and its self-importance today. We’ve failed horribly with university politics and defending the humanities, yet in our holier-than-thou attitudes we call for a direct move to communism. **Perhaps we need to reflect a bit on ourselves** and our strategies and what political theory should be about.¶ Setting all this aside, I think there’s a danger in Wark’s claims about abstraction (though I think he’s asking the right sort of question). The danger in treating hyperobjects like capitalism as being everywhere and nowhere is that our ability to act becomes paralyzed. As a materialist, I’m committed to the thesis that everything is ultimately material and requires some sort of material embodiment. If that’s true, it follows that there are points of purchase on every object, even where that object is a hyperobject. This is why, given the current form that power takes or the age of hyperobjects, I believe that forms of theory such as new materialism, object-oriented ontology, and actor-network theory are more important than ever (clearly the Whiteheadians are out as they see everything as internally related, as an organism, and therefore have no way of theorizing change and political engagement; they’re quasi-Hegelian, justifying even the discord in the world as a part of “god’s” selection and harmonization of intensities).¶ The important thing to remember is that hyperobjects like capitalism are unable to function without a material base. They require highways, shipping routes, trains and railroads, fiber optic cables for communication, and a host of other things besides. Without what Shannon Mattern calls “infrastructure”, it’s impossible for this particular hyperobject exists. Every hyperobject requires its arteries. Information, markets, trade, require the paths along which they travel and capitalism as we know it today would not be possible without its paths. The problem with so much political theory today is that it focuses on the semiosphere in the form of ideologies, discourses, narratives, laws, etc., ignoring the arteries required for the semiosphere to exercise its power. For example, we get OWS standing in front of Wall Street protesting– engaging in a speech act –yet **one wonders if speech is an adequate way of addressing the sort of system we exist in.** Returning to system’s theory, is the system of capital based on individual decisions of bankers and CEO’s, or does the system itself have its own cognition, it’s own mode of action, that they’re ineluctably trapped in? Isn’t there a sort of humanist prejudice embodied in this form of political engagement? It has value in that it might create larger collectives of people to fight these intelligent aliens that live amongst us (markets, corporations, etc), but it doesn’t address these aliens themselves because it doesn’t even acknowledge their existence.¶ What we need is a politics adequate to hyperobjects, and that is above all a politics that targets arteries. OOO, new materialism, and actor-network theory are often criticized for being “apolitical” by people who are fascinated with political declarations, who are obsessed with showing that your papers are in order, that you’ve chosen the right team, and that see critique and protest as the real mode of political engagement. **But it is not clear what difference these theorists are making and how they are escaping intra-systemic self-reference and auto-reproduction**. But the message of these orientations is “to the things themselves!”, “to the assemblages themselves!” “Quit your macho blather about where you stand, and actually map power and how it exercises itself!” And part of this re-orientation of politics, if it exists, consists in rendering deconstruction far more concrete. Deconstruction would no longer show merely the leaks in any system and its diacritical oppositions, it would go to the things themselves. What does that mean? It means that deconstruction would practice onto-cartography or identify the arteries by which capitalism perpetuates itself and find ways to block them. You want to topple the 1% and get their attention? Don’t stand in front of Wall Street and bitch at bankers and brokers, occupy a highway. Hack a satellite and shut down communications. Block a port. Erase data banks, etc. Block the arteries; block the paths that this hyperobject requires to sustain itself. This is the only way you will tilt the hands of power and create bargaining power with government organs of capital and corporations. You have to hit them where they live, in their arteries. Did anyone ever change their diet without being told that they would die? Your critique is an important and indispensable step, but **if you really wish to produce change you need to find ways to create heart attacks and aneurysms. Short of that, your activity is just masturbation.** But this requires coming to discern where the arteries are and doing a little less critique of cultural artifacts and ideologies. Yet choose your targets carefully. The problem with the Seattle protests was that they chose idiotic targets and simply acted on impotent rage. A window is not an artery. It doesn’t organize a flow of communication and capital. It’s the arteries that you need to locate. I guess this post will get Homeland Security after me

### AT: Ontology First

#### Ontology focus irrelevant—doesn’t affect our ability to make claims about the world—and, it cripples the alt by devolving into reductionism

Hellmann 9 [Gunther Hellmann, Prof of Political Science, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at AICGS and a professor of political science at Goethe University, “Beliefs as Rules for Action: Pragmatism as a Theory of Thought and Action” International Studies Review, Volume 11, Issue 3, Pages 638-662]

While this is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the possible causes of the resurgent interest in pragmatism, a pointer at two connected factors may be allowed. The first relates to the disturbances in international politics in the aftermaths of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1989/1990 and the terrorist attacks on the twin towers in September 2001. The second has to do with an increasing appreciation in IR of an internal perspective on such real world developments—that is, a perspective which tries to understand how individual and collective actors make sense of such occurrences. Such a turn to an internal (or reconstructive) perspective—as opposed to an external (or explanatory) perspective has accompanied, among others, the rise of "constructivism" and "postmodernism" in general and the refinement of a diverse set of "discursive" approaches in particular. This confluence of real world developments and disciplinary shifts provided an extremely fertile soil for the rediscovery of the much older tradition of pragmatism. This is due to the fact that pragmatism promises to steer a clear course between the Scylla of eternal repetition without any sensorium for novelty (positivism) and the Charybdis of **aloof criticism** without a sufficiently strong grounding in everyday **real-life problems** (postmodernism). Pragmatism's attractiveness stems, at least in part, from its anti-"istic" disposition. In contrast to other "paradigms" or "research programs" in IR, it does not lend itself as easily to paradigmatist treatment (cf. Lapid 1989). Richard Bernstein suggested that pragmatism ought to be thought of as a tradition in the sense of a "narrative of an argument" which is "only recovered by an argumentative retelling of that narrative which will itself be in conflict with other argumentative retellings." In this view, the history of pragmatism has not only been a conflict of narratives "but a forteriori, a conflict of metanarratives" (Bernstein 1995:54). Thus, whereas many Realists, Liberals, or Constructivists are keen on building research programs, most pragmatists abstain from such endeavors (and the paradigmatic battles that necessarily accompany fights over the true core), not least because most of them sympathize with Richard Rorty's plea for "liberal irony." As "liberal ironists" accept the contingency of language, they are also accepting the impossibility of reaching any such things as a "final vocabulary" (Rorty 1989:73–95). As this forum shows, the very diverse recourse to different pragmatist themes that social philosophers such as Richard Bernstein, Jürgen Habermas (1999:7–64), Hilary Putnam (1987, 1995), Richard Rorty (1982, 1998), and Nicholas Rescher (1995) note with regard to philosophical debates, also shows up in the reception of pragmatism in IR.1 In the spirit of this diversity in recovering the pragmatist tradition, one way to claim a distinctive accent is to present pragmatism as a coherent theory of thought and action (Hellmann 2009). "Theory" is synonymous here with "doctrine" or "axiom"—a belief held to be true, or, more pragmatically still, a tool to think about thought and action which is held to enable us to cope better. The core of this theory is the primacy of practice—"perhaps the central" principle of the pragmatist tradition (Putnam 1995:52; emphasis in original). According to this principle, the inevitability of individual as well as collective action is to be thought of as the necessary starting point of any theorizing about thought and action. Most social action is habitualized. As William James put it, our beliefs live "on a credit system." They "'pass,' so long as nothing challenges them" (James [1907] 1995:80). Yet as we cannot flee from interacting with our environment and as the world keeps interfering with our beliefs, we have to readjust. In such "problematic situations," a (very practical) form of "inquiry" helps us to find appropriate new ways of coping with the respective problems at hand. Experience (that is, past thoughts and actions of ourselves as well as others), expectation (that is, intentions as to desired future states of the world we act in as well as predictions as to likely future states), and creative intelligence merge in producing a new belief (Dewey [1938] 1991:41–47, 105–122, 248–251; see also Jackson in this forum). The shorthand which many pragmatists have used to express this interplay is that beliefs are rules for action (Peirce [1878] 1997:33; James [1907] 1995:18) This very condensed version of the core of pragmatism has far-reaching consequences. The view that a belief is a habit of action implies, among other things, that all anyone can have (and needs to have) is his or her own point of view. As a matter of fact this "insistence on the agent point of view" is just another way of expressing the primacy of practice and the "epistemology" that follows from it: "If we find that we must take a certain point of view, use a certain 'conceptual system,' when we are engaged in practical activity, in the widest sense of 'practical activity,' then we must not simultaneously advance the claim that it is not really 'the way things are in themselves'" (Putnam 1987:70) From Dewey onwards, pragmatists have rejected the "spectator theory of knowledge" which Putnam alludes to here—that is, the view that our beliefs do (or can) somehow "correspond" to some reality "out there." No doubt: we have to cope with reality, but to do so successfully, our beliefs do not have to "correspond" to it. For pragmatists, beliefs are not to be thought of as "a kind of picture made out of mind-stuff" which represents reality. Rather they are "tools for handling reality" (Rorty 1991:118). Most importantly our beliefs are tools which depend in a fundamental way on language. Thus, Dewey properly called language "the tool of tools" (Dewey [1925] 1981:134) directly following on Charles Sanders Peirce, the very first exponent of what later became to be known as the "linguistic turn" (Rorty [1967] 1992). For pragmatists, Peirce's famous line about man being thought (my language is the sum total of myself; for a man is the thought; Peirce [1868] 2000:67) had in many ways foreshadowed an obvious solution to a philosophical debate which had dominated for centuries (and continues to do so in some quarters even now). Rather than positioning themselves on either side in the debate on "realism" versus "antirealism" pragmatists reject the very distinction as it relies misleadingly on an understanding of truth as accurate representation. Yet as Donald Davidson convincingly argued "beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing. It is good to be rid of representations, and with them the correspondence theory of truth, for it is thinking there are representations that engenders intimations of relativism" (Davidson [1998] 2002:46). The radical conclusion after having gotten rid (with Quine and Davdison) of all three "dogmas of empiricism," then, is that language is a tool for coping with the world rather than for representing reality or for finding truth. Moreover, as is the case with any kind of tool, languages are "made rather than found" (Rorty 1989:7). Just as the craftsperson may have to adapt his or her tools in dealing with new types of tasks so human beings in general are always dependent on coming up with new descriptions for new situations to cope adequately. Yet neither these descriptions nor the vocabularies on which they are based are "out there." Rather, descriptions are the result of the intelligent use of words and vocabularies which have been invented and adapted in a gradual process of collective habituation. As Markus Kornprobst argues in this forum, the use of analogies or metaphors is a particularly good illustration of this point. In this sense, methods provide the central tools for science (which Dewey defined as "the perfected outcome of learning"). Two points are worth emphasizing in this context. First, as Dewey put it, "never is method something outside of the material." Rather, good scholarship (as "methodized" inquiry) is characterized by making intelligent connections between subject matter and method. As there is always a danger of methods becoming "mechanized and rigid, mastering an agent instead of being powers at command for his own ends," the scholar has to strike a proper balance between proven techniques based on prior experience with similar problems on the one hand and innovation based on the novelty (or "problematicness") of the problem at hand on the other. "Cases are like, not identical." Therefore, existing methods, "however authorized they may be, have to be adapted to the exigencies of particular cases" (all quotes from Dewey [1916] 2008; see also Sil in this forum). Second, the central role attached to methods as tools for problem-solving also has implications with regard to two other key concepts usually addressed as a sort of trinity in elaborating one's position vis-à-vis science and scholarship, that is, **ontology** and **epistemology**. **Pragmatism**, in essence, **dispenses with both**. The "question of ontology"—that is, the question of "what exists" (Wendt 1999:22)—which scientific realists, among others, consider to be of central importance, does not arise for pragmatists simply because an "as if" assumption usually suffices to deal with those aspects of reality (for example, an "international system" or a "state"), which we cannot observe directly. Consequently, an "ontological grounding" of science is only worrisome if one had reason to worry about "the really real" (Rorty 1991:52). Pragmatists see none. The state is experienced as "real" when I pay taxes or refuse to go to war for it. Thus, establishing intersubjective understandings as to how to deal successfully with reality is all that is needed. This is another way of describing what pragmatists view as "knowledge": The quality of a certain description of reality (in terms of specific conceptual distinctions and choices of vocabularies) will show in its consequences when we act upon it. Knowledge in this sense is, as Wittgenstein has argued, "in the end based on acknowledgement" (Wittgenstein 1975:§378). The "question of epistemology" similarly dissolves as the answer to it is the same one which pragmatists give to the question of action: you settle for a belief (as a rule for action) through inquiry. Thinking and acting are two sides of the same coin. The question of how people think would become a problem only if there were a problem with the way people think. But, as Louis Menand has pointedly put it, "pragmatists don't believe there is a problem with the way people think. They believe there is a problem with the way people think they think"—that is, they believe that alternative "epistemologies" which separate thought and action are mistaken as they create **misleading conceptual puzzles**. In dissolving the question of epistemology in the context of a unified theory of thought and action pragmatism therefore "unhitches" human beings from "a **useless structure of bad abstractions about thought**" (Menand 1997:xi).

#### Util outweighs ontology

Macauley 96—Associate prof of philosophy and environmental studies, Penn State (David, Minding Nature, p 74)

We may approach the issue of what Heidegger may teach today's radical environmentalists by examining an issue about which they and Heidegger would profoundly disagree. Heidegger claimed that there is a greater danger than the destruction of all life on earth by nuclear war.40 For radical environmentalists, it is hard to imagine anything more dangerous than the total destruction of the biosphere! Heidegger argued, however, that worse than such annihilation would be the totally technologized world in which material "happiness" for everyone is achieved, but in which humanity would be left with a radically constricted capacity for encountering the being of entities. This apparently exorbitant claim may be partially mitigated by the following con- sideration. If human existence lost all relationship to transcendent being, entities could no longer show themselves at all, and in this sense would no longer "be." Who needs nuclear war, Heidegger asked rhetorically, if entities have already ceased to be? For many environmentalists, such a question reveals the extent to which Heidegger remained part of the human-centered tradition that he wanted to overcome. By estimating so highly human Dasein's contribution to the manifesting of things, Heidegger may well have underesti- mated the contribution made by many other forms of life, for which the extinction of humankind's ontological awareness would be far preferable to their own extinction in nuclear war!

#### Their ontology arguments are tautological and non-falsifiable—adhering to them ensures authoritarian violence

Graham 99 [Philip, School of Communication Queensland University of Technology, Heidegger’s Hippies]

To state their positions more succinctly: ‘Heraclitus maintained that everything changes: Parmenides retorted that nothing changes’ (Russell 1946: 66). Between them, they delineated the dialectical extremes within which the “problem of the subject” has become manifest: in the extremes of questions about ontology, the nature of “Being”, or existence, or ‘Existenz’ (Adorno 1973: 110-25). Historically, such arguments tend towards **internalist hocus pocus**: The popular success of ontology feeds on an illusion: that the state of the intentio recta might simply be chosen by a consciousness full of nominalist and subjective sediments, a consciousness which self-reflection alone has made what it is. But Heidegger, of course, saw through this illusion … beyond subject and object, beyond concept and entity. Being is the supreme concept –for on the lips of him who says “Being” is the word, not Being itself –and yet it is said to be privileged above all conceptuality, by virtue of moments which the thinker thinks along with the word “Being” and which the abstractly obtained significative unity of the concept does not exhaust. (Adorno 1973: 69) Adorno’s (1973) thoroughgoing critique of Heidegger’s ontological metaphysics plays itself out back and forth through the Heideggerian concept of a universalised identity –an essentialist, universalised being and becoming of consciousness, elided from the constraints of the social world. Adorno’s argument can be summed up thus: there can be no universal theory of “being” in and of itself because what such a theory posits is, precisely, non-identity. It obscures the role of the social and promotes a specific kind of politics –identity politics (cf. also Kennedy 1998): Devoid of its otherness, of what it renders extraneous, an existence which thus proclaims itself the criterion of thought will validate its decrees in **authoritarian style**, as in political practice a dictator validates the ideology of the day. The reduction of thought to the thinkers halts the progress of thought; it brings to a standstill would thought would need to be thought, and what subjectivity would need to live in. As the solid ground of truth, subjectivity is reified … Thinking becomes what the thinker has been from the start. **It becomes tautology**, a regressive form of consciousness. (Adorno 1973: 128). Identity politics - the ontological imperative - is inherently authoritarian precisely because it promotes regression, internalism, subjectivism, and, most importantly, because it negates the role of society. It is simplistic because it focuses on the thingliness of people: race, gender, ethnicity. It tries to resolve the tension of the social-individual by smashing the problem into two irreconcilable parts. Identity politics’ current popularity in sociological thought, most well-evidenced by its use and popularity in “Third Way” politics, can be traced back to a cohort I have called Heidegger’s Hippies –the failed, half-hearted, would-be “revolutionaries” of the 60s, an incoherent collection of middle-class, neo-liberal malcontents who got caught up in their own hyperbole, and who are now the administrators of a ‘totally administered’ society in which hyperbole has become both lingua franca and world currency (Adorno 1964/1973 1973).

#### Instrumental rationality does not cause violence and is key to solve environmental destruction

Bronner 95—Professor of Political Science, Comparative Literature, and German Studies at Rutgers University (Stephen Eric, The Great Divide: The Enlightenment and its Critics, http://nova.wpunj.edu/newpolitics/issue19/bronne19.htm)

Horkheimer and Adorno identified "Enlightenment" with a debunking of what stands beyond the scientific domination over nature or what Kant called "pure reason." For this reason, however, they ultimately wound up engaging in the very form of dogmatic ahistorical philosophical inquiry that they initially wished to oppose. Their form of argumentation perverts history and obscures what is politically at stake.¶ Horkheimer and Adorno place the domination of nature at the center of emancipatory philosophical discourse. But they never take into account the actual movements with which the Enlightenment spirit and its critics were connected. They are unable to deal with its legacy for a progressive politics and, insofar as "the whole is false" (Adorno), their critique evidences a deeply indeterminate and abstract quality. Indeed, they never took to heart the insight from Nietzsche that: "to perceive resemblances everywhere, making everything alike, is a sign of weak eyesight."32¶ Their claim that fascism is a continuation of the "Enlightenment," according to either of their definitions, is empirically and normatively wrong. Neither from the standpoint of economic or political history, let alone class interests, does the interpretation offered by Horkheimer and Adorno make sense. Fascism was a self-conscious ideological response to the Revolution of 1848, whose democratic values derived from Lessing and the German Enlightenment,33 as well as the two great offspring of modernity. The mass base of the Nazis lay in precapitalist classes like the peasantry and the petty- bourgeoisie whose interests were directly threatened by the capitalist production process and its two dominant classes.34 Sections of the bourgeoisie and a great majority of the proletariat, for their part, identified respectively with an impotent set of parties embracing a continental form of liberalism and a social democratic party still formally embracing orthodox Marxism. These were the supporters of the Weimar Republic and the enemies of the Nazis who made war on them in word and deed.¶ Dialectic of Enlightenment casts real historical conflicts into an anthropological fog. The tale of Odysseus, wherein the destruction of subjectivity becomes the only way to preserve the subject, offers a case in point. Instrumental reason did not bring about fascism or even destroy the ability of individuals to make normative judgments. It was rather the product of a clash between real movements, whose members were quite capable of making diverse judgments concerning both their interests and their values, which resulted in the victory of the Nazis.¶ The attempt to unify qualitatively different phenomena under a single rubric can only produce pseudo-dialectical sophistry and political confusion.35 The decision to broaden the "Enlightenment" to include its greatest and most self-conscious critics -- Sade, Schopenhauer, Bergson and Nietzsche 36 -- offers a case in point. None of these thinkers had the least identification with Enlightenment political theory or the practice associated with it. They were anti-liberal, anti-socialist, anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian, anti- rationalist and anti-historical.¶ Adorno would later write that "not least among the tasks now confronting thought is that of placing all the reactionary arguments against Western culture in the service of progressive Enlightenment."37 As usual, however, this imperative was left hanging in the abstract. He never thought to consider the contradictions capable of arising from the attempt to merge right-wing ideology with left-wing practice.¶ The famous analysis of the culture industry suffers from the same exaggeration and lack of determinacy as their critique of instrumental rationality and modern forms of bureaucratic politics. Horkheimer and Adorno were content to highlight the repressive character of mass culture per se. They dismissed the idea that genuine works of art or important sources of information could appear in the mass media. They also ignored the manner in which even works of high culture have learned from the technology generated by attempts to produce popular culture. It was enough for Horkheimer to note that, if the culture industry comes to define the public realm, then the moment of emancipatory resistance will enter the tenuous domain of a private experience constantly threatened by the extension of instrumental rationality.38 Thus, interestingly enough, he was actually less sanguine about the emancipatory role of aesthetics than either Adorno or Marcuse in their later writings.¶ Talk about the "integration" of works, however, only begs the question of whether they were really rendered impotent or whether they actually helped change the "hegemonic" system and were only then turned into museum pieces. Questions of this sort, however, are never entertained in Dialectic of Enlightenment. The "whole" is what counts while attempts to transform it are never radical enough since either revolution or reform must, in some degree, make recourse to instrumental rationality.¶ But, for this very reason, the repressive conditions this form of critique claims to contest are left intact. Without making reference to institutions and movements, incapable of drawing qualitative distinctions between phenomena, the attempt to preserve subjectivity from the incursions of society turns into little more than an aesthetic exercise in what Thomas Mann initially called a "power-protected inwardness." Solidarity is treated either as an arbitrary sentiment or a demand for conformity while Enlightenment collapses into the "mass deception" of the culture industry. Critique has a different fate in store: it can now only talk itself into exhaustion.¶ The Enlightenment Spirit¶ 1968 marked the beginnings of a change in the prevalent understandings of the Enlightenment. Conservatives had previously condemned it for generating a revolutionary rejection of tradition while critical theorists and the ultra-left emphasized the impotence of its ethical ideals relative to the repressive power of its commitment to instrumental rationality. Especially following the death of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, however, the situation changed. The earlier critique of instrumental rationality was retained by significant intellectual elements of the New Left and most notably by the ecology movement. Nevertheless, it became fused with a belief in the fundamentally repressive character of the Enlightenment in terms of both its political worldview and its normative assumptions.¶ Vietnam had symbolized the connection of liberalism and imperialism and many were led to question the "Eurocentric" character of the Enlightenment. A new sensitivity about the twin cancers of racism and sexism created a new concern about the "white" and "male" prejudices of its representatives as well as the manner in which minorities, women, and outsiders were unrepresented. New social movements began the preoccupation with "identity politics" and the emphasis on local struggles, or what Michel Foucault originally termed "micro-politics," even as they sought to overcome the organizational legacy of bureaucracy and hierarchy on the left.¶ Postmodernism reflected all of this and -- relying for its theoretical inspiration on political reactionaries like Nietzsche, Bergson, and Heidegger -- sought to present its insights in a matter which "would be simultaneously post-Marxist and post- liberal."39 Its proponents condemned "essentialism" as little more than a dogmatic striving for absolute truth. They castigated rationalism in favor of relativism and the centrality of "experience." They rejected historical materialism for its "totalistic" -- or totalitarian -- ambitions and use of "grand narratives." They criticized the use of universal categories for veiling one or another -- western, male, or white -- "master discourse." They chastized liberalism for fostering illusions about "rights," the equality of citizens, the political centrality of the state, and even cosmopolitanism for undermining any sense of the particular or "lived" identity.¶ The New Left made genuine contributions and undertook its critique in the name of a populist commitment to democracy.40 Many of its earlier advocates like Paul Goodman and Erich Fromm and Christian Bay were influenced by Enlightenment values and even the best postmodern thinkers took the bourgeois heritage seriously. They sought to contest its limitations and empower repressed groups with very different experiences of reality.41 But the "owl of Minerva" did not really spread its wings in the aftermath of the 1968s. The new philosophical movement of postmodernism was born of defeat. Its popularity grew concurrently with the rising conservative tide of the late 1970s and, especially in the United States, carried over into the present.¶ Perhaps, for this very reason, a problem presents itself with respect to the relation between theory and practice. For, whether explicitly or implicitly, the advocates of particularism always made reference to the moral obligations of others to support their cause and, in spite of all the talk about the inherently alienating character of the state, sought legislation in order to make their concerns concrete. Postmodern theorists were unconcerned. Illuminating this relationship in keeping with the philosophical idealism of Kant and Hegel or the historical materialism of Marx, after all, would necessarily lead them to contest the unqualified "contingency" of all "significations" and obviously involve them in some form of "grand narrative."¶ The effects of this situation on practice are becoming increasingly evident. The ideological emphasis on identity and particularism, relativism and various forms of historical reductionism, have fostered fragmentation and political confusion. It is becoming ever more difficult to deny that, whatever the achievements of the last 25 years, the new social movements have lost the moral high ground the left held during the civil rights movement and the early struggles against the Vietnam War.¶ Some have sought to face such matters directly. Judith Butler accepted the need for a notion of "contingent epistemology" without ontological grounding, for example, while Gayitri Spivak introduced the idea of "strategic essentialism." Neither is sufficient, however, to deal with the real issues at hand. Epistemology never had an ontological foundation in the first place, which was precisely the problem Fichte and Schelling and Hegel had with the "subjective idealism" of Kant, but it offered a way of thinking about what categories are necessary for which particular forms of inquiry and action. The new notion of "contingent epistemology" gives no clue when it is necessary to privilege universalistic against particularistic claims, however, and it is the same with the concept of "strategic essentialism."¶ Neither thinker considers how the employment of epistemological or essentialist categories necessarily generates the need for "grand narratives" along with "impartial" criteria for discriminating between particular interests and institutions. Nor is either theorist willing to develop the implications of such philosophical compromises for postmodern analysis or its validity. The relativism and emphasis on particular "experience," which originally gave the tendency its philosophical power, are neither denied nor embraced. They are simply left in a strange form of limbo.¶ Even more important, however, the basic issue still remains unresolved. The commitment to those universalistic assumptions underpinning republicanism, socialism, and internationalism is -- as Mendelssohn realized -- always one of conviction. It is not a tactical or "strategic" matter especially when the advocates of liberal and socialist programs are engaged in challenging an authoritarian regime. The new importance attributed to epistemology and essentialism can also only confuse adherents of those new social movements inspired by various forms of identity politics and particularist ideologies.¶ The contradiction between theory and practice now exists for postmodernism as surely as it did for the socialist labor movement when Eduard Bernstein chastized its leaders for preaching a revolutionary Marxist theory while engaging in a purely reformist practice. And the response to this current situation must take the same form. It is time to end the equivocations. Let the postmodern critics of Enlightenment values either keep their radically subjectivist form of theory and, in the manner of Nietzsche and Heidegger, transform the notion of praxis to meet their theoretical beliefs or come to grips with reality, recognize the needs of existing forms of progressive political action, and draw the theoretical consequences.¶ Postmodernism, of course, is not the only popular theory critical of the Enlightenment legacy. There is even a certain overlap with certain left proponents of the quite popular philosophical tendency known as "communitarianism" and thinkers like Richard Rorty or Chantal Mouffe are actually open to identification with either tendency. Communitarianism also rejects the universalism, cosmopolitanism, and emphasis on individual rights associated with the Enlightenment. Its proponents often enjoy referring to Rousseau's Draft for a Constitution of Poland and the manner in which it cautions Catherine the Great against making dramatic moves, which might contradict the traditions out of which a people organically formed.¶ Communitarians generally condemn the explosion of claims associated with "rights" as against "duties" for their fragmenting impact upon the national community. Thinkers like Amitai Etzioni also seek to shift government activities to the type of voluntary associations enthusiastically described by Alexis de Tocqueville. If the first concern surely exaggerates the corroding influence of the new social movements on the polity, as against the egoism generated by the new unleashing of market forces, the second idea is even more problematical given the increased time spent on work, the classification of nearly one-third of all workers as members of the "working poor," the impact of markets on "voluntary associations," and -- finally -- the fact that the various and complex programs undertaken by the state cannot simply be transferred into the nebulous sphere of non-institutionalized forces supposedly defined neither by the market nor the state.¶ Communitarians oppose the rationalism and universalism, the preoccupation with the state and its bureaucratic institutions, which derive from the Enlightenment. They prefer instead to base their political theory on the belief that it is necessary to begin with the customs and traditions carried over from the past. But there is no sense of the terms by which one tradition gains privilege over another and how to judge between them. Also, from this philosophical perspective, it is difficult to justify the condemnation of repressive traditions in a culture other than one's own.¶ Is the United States a "liberal" nation or a racist one? There is surely no definitive answer. Michael Walzer would suggest that "moral sentiment" alone can inform a judgment. The weakness of relying on intuition, however, is obvious. Also, even if a major left communitarian thinker like Charles Taylor should maintain that commitment to liberal values is necessary since liberalism is part of "our" European tradition, it will logically lack relevance for those suffering under theocratic or authoritarian nations devoid of a liberal legacy. Thus, in the name of opposing the abstract rationalism and "Eurocentrism" deriving from the Enlightenment, even the best communitarians will find themselves in a situation where the benefits of liberalism or social democracy can exist only for those nations already in the possession of them.¶ Nelson Mandela, of course, knew better. The fact of the matter is that the most successful and emancipatory movements of the oppressed were all inspired by a commitment to either the language of rights or universalist principles. These movements championed the power of reasoned dialogue, cultural cosmopolitanism, and what Jurgen Habermas has appropriately termed "constitutional patriotism" or a vision of the state predicated on the rule of law (Rechtsstaat). It has traditionally been movements of the right which have employed arguments about the inherent uniqueness of their constituency, privileged "experience" over reasoned dialogue, and identified with the organic community (Volksstaat). A basic choice of worldview is still with us and seeking to combine left-wing politics with right-wing assumptions can only lead to moral disillusionment and unprincipled compromise.¶ Nothing is more false or self-defeating for a progressive than to reduce the Enlightenment to the interests of white, male, bourgeois Europeans. This view, which is embraced by so many on the left, rests on the assumption that the value of an idea is reducible to the particular attributes of its author or the complex of interests dominant when the given work was produced. Such a stance is nothing other than a crude version of the sociology of knowledge, which was never particularly radical in the first place.¶ ¶ The value of the Enlightenment spirit lies precisely in its ability to jut beyond its historical context. Its commitment to tolerance and equality, its skepticism of religion and established tradition, reflect more than the interests of a white, male bourgeoisie on the rise. It projects an invigorated notion of the individual -- or the expansion of what Goethe termed the "personality" -- and a new respect for work beyond any market incentives. "Labor," wrote Adam Smith, is the "original price of everything." Indeed, "work makes the person," could have been a slogan of the Enlightenment.¶ Candide is a case in point. An early "educational novel" (Bildungsroman), it expresses the excitement of travel and new experiences. It condemns religious intolerance no less than the unwarranted optimism about this being "the best of all possible worlds." Rather than exhibiting a simplistic form of resignation, furthermore, its famous closing actually poses a challenge for the future. Voltaire wrote this work, after all, while building his ideologically progressive and economically successful community, which would serve as a refuge for many victims of religious intolerance, in political exile at Ferney. Indeed, the decision of Candide to "tend his garden" is nothing other than a recognition that the time has come to give up on metaphysical speculation and begin to do some work.¶ Perhaps the most powerful critique of the Enlightenment, for all that, derives from its emphasis on the domination over nature. Instrumental rationality employed without respect for the intricacies of various eco-systems has created an environmental nightmare. Pollution of the air, withering of the forests, des- poilation of the oceans, have profoundly altered any previous optimism connected with technological progress. The ecological movement, for all its problems, has opened the eyes of the world. But still, identifying technology or instrumental rationality with the domination of nature is a mistake. Ecology is not rigidly opposed to Enlightenment notions of science and technology. Coming to terms with the technological degradation of the environment, in fact, can only occur from the standpoint of technology itself. A return to the premodern past is no option. It is a matter of setting new priorities for technological development in the future and invigorating liberal and socialist values with ecological concerns.¶ Ecology offers new possibilities for linking the efforts of reason with the creation of a safer, better, and more beautiful world. Such a vision is only betrayed by the introduction of half-baked spiritualism, uncritical reliance on intuition, and naive ideas about some "golden age" hidden in the mists of the past. Modernity has had a progressive impact on social interaction and, in this vein, Ulrich Beck is completely correct when he writes that "the needle of Enlightenment is found in the haystack of relationships, not under the searchlight of theory."42

### Anthro

#### REPRESENTING HUMAN IMPACTS IS NECESSARY PART OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND CONSISTENT WITH A REVISION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH NATURE

Plumwood 2 (Val, PF PHILOSOPHY - UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, Environmental Culture: The ecological crisis of reason, PG. 138-40]

Recognition, prudence and survival But by providing reasons for considering nature based on human prudence, are we not perpetuating the verv human-centredness and instrumentalism we should seek to combat, considering nature only in relation to our own needs and as means to meet those needs? This issue reveals another major area of difference between the cosmic model implying elimination of human bearings and the liberation model of human-cent redness of the sort I have given. Only in the confused account of anthropocentrismas cosmic anthropocentrism is it essential to avoid anything which smacks of human bearings and preferences in the interests of pursuing superhuman detachment. On the liberation account of human-centred ness, there is no problem or inconsistency in introducing some prudential considerations to motivate change, or to show why, for example, human-centredness is not benign and must lead to damaging consequences for humankind. To gain a better understanding of the role of prudence in the kinds of changes that might be required, let us return to the marital example of Bruce and Ann. Let us suppose that instead of leaving right away, Ann persuades Bruce to try a visit to a marriage counsellor to see if Bruce can change enough to save their relationship. (We will have to assume that Bruce has some redeeming features I have not described here to explain why Ann considers it worthwhile going to all this trouble). After listening to their stories, the counsellor diagnoses Bruce as a textbook case of egocentrism, an individual version of the centredness structure set out above. Bruce seems to view his interests as somehow radically separate from Ann's, so that he is prepared to act on her request for more consideration only if she can show he will get more pleasure if he does so, that is, for instrumental reasons which appeal to a self-contained conception of his interests. He seems to see Ann in instrumental terms not as an independent person but as someone defined in tenus of his own needs, and claims it is her problem if she is dissatistied or miserable. Bruce sees Ann as there to service his needs, lacks sensitivity to her needs and does not respect her independence or agency. 24 Bruce, let us suppose, also devalues the importance of the relationship, denies his real dependency on Ann, backgrounds her services and contribution to his lite, and seems to be completely unaware of the extent to which he might suffer when the relationship he is abusing breaks down. Bruce, despite Ann's warnings, does not imagine that it will, and is sure that it will all blow over: after a few tears and tantrums Ann will come to her senses, as she has always done before, according to Bruce. Now the counsellor, June, takes on the task of pointing out to Bruce that his continued self-centredness and instrumental treatment of Ann is likely to lead in short order to the breakdown and loss of his relationship. The counsellor tries to show Bruce that he has underestimated both Ann's determination to leave unless there is change, as well as the sustaining character of the relationship. June points out that he may, like many similar people the counsellor has seen, sutler much more severe emotional stress than he realises when Ann leaves, as she surely will unless Bruce changes. Notice that June's initial appeal to Bruce is a prudential one; June tries to point out to Bruce that he has misconceived the relationship and to make him understand where his real interests lie. There is no inconsistency here; the counsellor can point out these damaging consequences of instrumental relationship for Bruce without in any way using, endorsing or encouraging instrumental relationships. In the same way, the critic of human-centredness can say with perfect consistency, to a society trapped in the centric logic ofthe One and the Other in relation to nature, that unless it is willing to give enough consideration to nature's needs, it too could lose a relationship whose importance it has failed to understand, has systematically devalued and denied - with, perhaps, more serious consequences for survival than in Bruce's case. The account of human-centredness I have given, then, unlike the cosmic account demanding self-transcendence and self-detachment, does not prohibit the use of certain forms of prudential ecological argument, although it does suggest certain contexts and qualifications for their use. In the case of Ann and Bruce, June the counsellor might particularly advance these prudential reasons as the main reasons for treating Ann with more care and respect at the initial stages of the task of convincing Bruce of the need for change. Prudential arguments need not just concern the danger of losing the relationship. June may also try to show Bruce how the structure of egocentrism distorts and limits his character and cuts him off from the main benefits of a caring relationship, such as the sense of the limitations ofth~ self and its perspectives obtained by an intimate encounter with someone else's needs and reality. Prddential arguments of all kinds for respect are the kinds of arguments that are especially useful in an initial context of denial, while there is still no realisation of that there is a serious problem, and resistance to the idea of undertaking work for change. In the same way, the appeal to prudential considerations of ecological damage to humans is especially appropriate in the initial context of ecological denial. where there is still no systematic acknowledgement of human attitudes as a problem, and resistance to the idea of undertaking substantial social change. Although reasons of advantage or disadvantage to the self cannot be the only kinds of considerations in a framework which exhibits genuine respect for the other, the needs of the self do not have to be excluded at any stage from this process, as the fallacious view of prudence as always instrumental and egocentric suggests.