# Framework

## 1NC

#### The affirmative’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential

#### First, a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact---T debates also solve any possible turn

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Second, discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development---we control uniqueness: university students already have preconceived and ideological notions about how the world operates---government policy discussion is vital to force engagement with and resolution of competing perspectives to improve social outcomes, however those outcomes may be defined---and, it breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Third, switch-side is key---Effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all **imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)

What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that **it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical**. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."

Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who **abdicate their human capacities** and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, **both for other people and eventually for themselves**" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a **people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews**. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their **constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a **totalitarian system**, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; **there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies**. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.

It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the **playful and competitive space of agonism**; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the **assumption of competition,** and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are **not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments**, **of one's thought**. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.

Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to **articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that **one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it**. The situation is agonistic **not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because **conflict is a necessary consequence of difference**. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.

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Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to **engage in mass murder** **because he was able not to think about it,** especially **not from the perspective of the victims**, and he was able to **exempt himself from personal responsibility** by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).

Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,

Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the **central mystery of the holocaust**—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, **fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy**, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)

Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.

Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).

Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: **denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive**. To put it another way, **theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies**.

Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).

By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:

Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)

There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "**critical thinking**, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, **necessarily public discourse**: critical thinking is possible "**only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection**" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; **participants are interlocutors** and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must **be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.**

Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).

Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).

The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). **The paradoxical nature of agonism** (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

Arendt's Polemical Agonism

As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still **values conflict, disagreement, and equality** among interlocutors, but it **has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).

Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it **is how one tests the validity of one's thought**. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.

Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:

You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)

Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).

In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.

This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.

Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).

Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does **not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth**; **it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered.** Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).

Agonism demands that one **simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions**, **rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think.** The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).

Yet, there are **important positive political consequences of agonism.**

Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how **the system could be actively moral**. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the **evil of conformity**—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state **makes possible extraordinary evil** carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill **undermines the political force of conformity**, so it is **a force against the bureaucratizing of evil.** If people think for themselves, **they will resist dogma**; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, **they will resist totalitarianism**. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.

In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the **best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere**. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Effective decision-making outweighs---

#### Key to social improvements in every and all facets of life

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

If we assume it to be possible without recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14

I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13

Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained.

Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually.

When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided:

A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision…

The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision…

It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16

John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors.

We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### Only portable skill---means our framework turns case

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, **debate builds capacity for critical thinking**, analysis of public claims, **informed decision making**, and **better public judgment**. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a **puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate**. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change**, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it **builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed** about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of **problem-solving skills** demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology **for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities**. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a **crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life**. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of **meaningful political engagement** and **new articulations of democratic life.**

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to **produce revisions of democratic life** that are **necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive**. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; wholesale **environmental destruction** and the potential for **rapid climate change**; emerging **threats to international stability** in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing **challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an **informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the **existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### And independently a voting issue for limits and ground---our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates

#### Academic debate over energy policy in the face of environmental destruction is critical to shape the direction of change and create a public consciousness shift

Crist 4 (Eileen, Professor at Virginia Tech in the Department of Science and Technology, “Against the social construction of nature and wilderness”, Environmental Ethics 26;1, p 13-6, http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/againstsocialconstruction.pdf)

Yet, constructivist analyses of "nature" favor remaining in the comfort zone of zestless agnosticism and noncommittal meta-discourse. As David Kidner suggests, this intellectual stance may function as a mechanism against facing the devastation of the biosphere—an undertaking long underway but gathering momentum with the imminent bottlenecking of a triumphant global consumerism and unprecedented population levels. Human-driven extinction—in the ballpark of Wilson's estimated 27,000 species per year—is so unthinkable a fact that choosing to ignore it may well be the psychologically risk-free option.

Nevertheless, this is the opportune historical moment for intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences to join forces with conservation scientists in order to help create the consciousness shift and policy changes to stop this irreversible destruction. Given this outlook, how students in the human sciences are trained to regard scientific knowledge, and what kind of messages percolate to the public from the academy about the nature of scientific findings, matter immensely. The "agnostic stance" of constructivism toward "scientific claims" about the environment—a stance supposedly mandatory for discerning how scientific knowledge is "socially assembled"[32]—is, to borrow a legendary one-liner, striving to interpret the world at an hour that is pressingly calling us to change it.

## 2NC

### Framework --- AT: It’s All Text

#### Reducing social reality to discourse and text undermines emancipatory politics --- leaves the Left incapable of responding to environmental crises

Alan D. Sokal 96, Professor of Physics at New York University, “A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies,” Lingua Franca, May, 1996, http://www.physics.nyu.edu/sokal/lingua\_franca\_v4/lingua\_franca\_v4.html

Why did I do it? While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: **one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance**. At its best, a journal like Social Textraises important questions that no scientist should ignore -- questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters.

In short, my concern over the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). **There is a real world; its properties are not merely social constructions**; **facts and evidence do matter**. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths -- the utter absurdity of it all being **concealed through obscure** and **pretentious** language.

Social Text's acceptance of my article exemplifies the intellectual arrogance of Theory -- meaning postmodernist literarytheory -- carried to its logical extreme. No wonder they didn't bother to consult a physicist. If all is discourse and ``text,'' then knowledge of the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes just another branch of Cultural Studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and ``language games,'' then **internal logical consistency is superfluous** too: a patina of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. **Incomprehensibility becomes a virtue**; allusions, metaphors and puns substitute for evidence and logic. My own article is, if anything, an extremely modest example of this well-established genre.

Politically, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystifications promoted by the powerful -- not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. The recent turn of many ``progressive'' or ``leftist'' academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about ``the social construction of reality'' **won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for** preventing global warming**. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics and politics** if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.

### Framework --- AT: Politics = Violent/Decaying

#### The argument that politics is in a state of terminal decay is not only false but it essentializes politics as inherently dangerous --- this creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and results in massive state-based violence

Duarte 4 - André Duarte, Professor of Philosophy at the Federal University of Brazil, November 7, 2004, “Biopolitics and the dissemination of violence: the Arendtian critique of the present,” online: [http://web.archive.org/web/20041107231353/http://hannaharendt.net/research/biopolitics.html](http://web.archive.org/web/20041107231353/http:/hannaharendt.net/research/biopolitics.html)

It would be hard to find another thesis in Political Theory that is more assertive and unquestionable than the traditional identification of violence and politics; this is true to such an extent that the possibility of a non-violent politics or of tracing a conceptual distinction between power and violence becomes a chimera. No one doubts that violence is crucially inherent to political processes, and if it is true that not all violent phenomena are political phenomena, we feel more than certain that there would be no politics without violence or beyond it. Have we not been sufficiently warned - by political thinkers as different as Marx, Weber or Schmitt - that violence pertains to the core of the political? But, on the other hand, does the mere repetition of so-called truisms help us in any way to elucidate the most important political phenomena of our present?

As we know, Hannah Arendt is among those very few thinkers in contemporary political theory who dared to refuse the strict identification of politics and violence, arguing that violence is not necessarily inherent to the political, or that violence and power are not the same. In works such as The Human Condition and On Violence, among others, Arendt tried to demonstrate that while power is spontaneously generated by collective and concerted actions of a plurality of citizens, violence is mute and intended to disperse, silence and isolate them, disrupting the civic bounds that tie them together in acts and speeches. While power is an end in itself, since it is the very amalgam that unifies political agents in the public space, violence is purely instrumental, since it is a means to achieve a definite end through coercion. In short, while power may generate the establishment of a transitory consensus, which does not eliminate the possibility of dissent and conflicts, pure violence is merely destructive, being incapable of creating anything new, and so on.

In the present text, however, I do not intend to follow up and discuss the Arendtian analysis on the philosophical origins of the traditional equation of politics and violence, nor will I explore the extremely important consequences of her distinction between power and violence regarding the possibility of a radically democratic politics. What concerns me here is to explore Arendt’s diagnosis of the present, in which politics has been transformed into a wide variety of different violent phenomena. **Only if we do not consent in repeating the old and traditional identification of politics and violence will we be able to reconsider and rethink the meaning of our present experience of the political ‘as’ violence**. After all, Arendt’s thesis that power and violence are not the same - since the fundamental political phenomenon is not domination, but the collective generation of novelty in deeds and speeches – does not contradict her view that, throughout Western history and up to the present – or perhaps even more so nowadays –, politics has been experienced as violence. In fact, preventive wars have been declared and promoted by countries that represent themselves as absolute good fighting absolute evil in order to save humanity and to prevent future possible evil deeds. To achieve these goals, such countries may disregard previous international juridical agreements thus imposing their political and economic hegemony in an increasingly more violent and insecure world. Suicidal fundamentalists, secret organizations or even the regular armed forces of a State continuously launch terrorist attacks aiming at no less than the complete annihilation of its opponents. It is also well known that the twentieth century actually began with the **utilization of chemical and bacteriological mass destructive weapons whose manufacture rapidly became more and more lethal, culminating with nuclear weapons able to destroy all life on the planet**.

With considerable frequency States do impose preventive and repressive policies against immigrants and refugees, as well as against political movements that organize the unemployed, non-conformists of all sorts, displaced and homeless people, among many other ‘undesirable’ social groups. Last but not least, consider the so called ‘human waste’ that cannot be integrated in the capitalist system of globalized production and consumption, a whole mass of human beings that has to be seductively domesticated or put under strictly repressive vigilance so that new superfluous human beings can be constantly produced and reproduced. By considering these different contemporary experiences of politics ‘as’ violence, one should inquire: is there any link or bond between them? Has Arendt anything to say in order to render them more understandable?

No text deleted I believe that she does have many important things to say about those phenomena and to start trying to answer the above mentioned questions I would like to propose a rather unusual hypothesis for Arendt’s readers: the notion of biopolitics, which is not an Arendtian one, would be the missing link that fully articulates Arendt’s reflections concerning the tragic contemporary shifts of the political, in The Human Condition, with her close analysis of totalitarian regimes, in The Origins of Totalitarianism. In other words, the notion of biopolitics would permit us to highlight the Arendtian diagnosis of the present in terms of the dissemination of violence and of the growing meaninglessness of the political in our bureaucratized, mass- and market-oriented representative democracies, that is, our actually existent democracies. This hypothesis is unconventional not only because the notion of biopolitics is absent in Arendt’s thought, but also because it opens the path to some conclusions that she did not expressly or fully develop. However, as I will argue, if those conclusions stray from the exact meaning of Arendt’s texts, they certainly do not contradict the spirit of Arendt’s work on politics. This interpretive approach is inspired by Giorgio Agamben’s work, Homo sacer: sovereign power and bare life, in which he argues that both Arendt and Foucault were the first contemporary thinkers to understand the radical changes suffered by the political in modern times. According to Agamben, these changes culminate in the Nazi and Stalinist extermination camps with the transformation of citizens in the “bare life” (nuda vita) of the homo sacer, the prototype of a man whose murder is no crime. According to Agamben’s researches, the homo sacer was an old and rather obscure juridical figure of the Roman law that designated a man who had been excluded from both divine and human legislation. In other words, the paradox that the homo sacer – the sacrificial man – embodied in himself was that the only way in which he still belonged to the code of the Roman law was by means of his total exclusion from it. In other words, the homo sacer was deprived of any legal protection against anyone who attempted to murder him, providing that this murder was not supported by legal procedures or religious rites. This is not the place for extensive commentaries on Agamben’s work, nor will I attempt to compare thinkers as different as Arendt and Foucault. Rather, I would like to stress the aspects in which Arendt’s, Foucault’s and Agamben’s reflections converge, tracing a biopolitical diagnosis of the present. In short, I believe that the introduction of the notion of biopolitics in Arendt’s thinking, which is not at all arbitrary, as I will try to demonstrate, would permit us to better understand the correlation between the most important manifestations of contemporary political violence: the extraordinary violence of totalitarian disaster, and the ordinary violence of our mass- and market-democracies, corroded by the loss of any radical political alternative to capitalism. Although assuming the risks of reading Arendt beyond Arendt, I believe that I remain faithful to the core of her own thinking: at last, was it not she herself that emphasized interweaving political thought and the crucial political experiences of the present? In order to justify introducing the notion of biopolitics where it does not originally appear, it is necessary to understand in what sense biopolitical violence has become the common denominator of contemporary politics, reducing the distance between modern mass representative democracies and totalitarian regimes. This idea has to be carefully developed since, as it is well known, Arendt considered totalitarianism to be a disruptive and unprecedented regime, one that broke with all past forms of political domination and violence, such as dictatorships, tyrannies and despotisms. In her detailed analysis of Nazi and Stalinist totalitarianism, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt developed a careful evaluation of the structural characteristics they shared and distinguished them from all other political regimes. It is not my objective to counter her argument on the crucial structural differences that make all the difference between our actually existing democracies and totalitarian regimes, but to stress that biopolitical violence has become the common material underlying our contemporary political experiences. It is not a matter of merely blurring all differences and thus of simplistically identifying totalitarianism and representative democracies, although one should also be attentive to the political blackmail implied by the obstinate repetition of a simplistic opposition of totalitarianism and mass democracies. Slavoj Zizek has aptly described the ideological use of the concept of totalitarianism as a helpful admonition that actually uses the specter of a possible resurgence of totalitarian regimes to undermine any radical political alternative. This political blackmail works like this: it is better to accept the inequalities and absurdities of capitalism with its liberal economic and political foundations than to abolish it through totalitarian and genocidal regimes. However, I believe that Zizek goes too far when he detects this ideological misuse of the notion of totalitarianism in Arendt’s reflections since her own critical analysis of totalitarianism was never meant as a blind embrace of liberal democracies, an aspect that was perceived as an unacceptable betrayal by critics such as Sheldon Wolin, among others. To talk about totalitarianism today does not necessarily imply that one is threatening the critics of liberal democracy with the risks of the reappearance of the Goulag or of Auschwitz, since the critical detection of some rather dangerous continuities regarding the historical background in which both totalitarianism and liberal democracies have appeared is a crucial aspect of Arendt’s and Agamben’s analyses, as I will try to show. In other words, the analysis of totalitarianism remains a fundamental way of realizing and understanding the totalitarian dangers that surround our actually existing democracies. What really matters now is to understand the rather perverse biopolitical mechanisms through which human beings have been both included and excluded from the political and economical spheres in mass- and market oriented democracies and in totalitarian regimes. Moreover, to consider totalitarianism as a disruptive event in Western history does not mean to refuse understanding it as a historical phenomenon, that is, as the crystallization of different historical elements that have become constitutive of the political in late modern times and, therefore, also have something to do with liberal democracies. In other words, although totalitarian regimes should not be considered as the necessary pitfall of Modernity, they should never be viewed as a mere accident in Modernity’s path. To recall Zygmunt Bauman’s Arendtian inspired analysis, totalitarianism has to be understood in the historic context rendered possible by the conjunction of modern science and technology, bureaucratic administration and mass murder, all of which are suddenly brought together by the desire of purifying and embellishing the so- called “garden of politics” . One should not forget that if such a desire is less present in liberal democracies than in totalitarian regimes, both of them share a substantially common historical background. In fact, many of those modern historical elements that crystallized in totalitarian regimes still remain vastly present in our times, such as racism, xenophobia, political apathy and indifference, economic and territorial imperialism, the use of lies and violence in mass proportions as a means to dominate whole populations, the multiplication of homelessness, of refugees, of those with no country, as well as the growing superfluousness of a huge mass of human beings deprived of citizenship and economic dignity. Under these conditions we should be attentive not only to the possible appearance of new totalitarian regimes, but also to the quasi-totalitarian elements that stand right in the core of our representative mass democracies. At the end of her analysis of totalitarianism, Arendt herself warned us that as long as huge masses of superfluous human beings still abound in the present world it would always remain very tempting to any regime to resort to totalitarian measures in order to ‘solve’ contemporary political dilemmas: The danger of the corpse factories and holes of oblivion is that today, with populations and homelessness everywhere on the increase, masses of people are continuously rendered superfluous if we continue to think of our world in utilitarian terms. Political, social, and economic events everywhere are in a silent conspiracy with totalitarian instruments devised for making men superfluous. (…) The Nazis and the Bolsheviks can be sure that their factories of annihilation which demonstrate the swiftest solution to the problem of overpopulation, of economically superfluous and socially rootless human masses, are much of an attraction as a warning. Totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a manner worth of man. Towards the notion of biopolitics in Arendt’s thought What does it mean to characterize the present equation of politics and violence in terms of the paradigm of biopolitics? And how can this non-Arendtian notion make any sense in Arendt’s work? Let us begin with the first question. My contention is that the peculiar trait of the political since the turn of the nineteen century up to the contemporary world is the paradox of the simultaneous elevation of life to the status of supreme good and the multiplication of instances in which life is degraded to the utmost. I think that the constitutive element of the political in the present is the reduction of citizenship to the lower level of “bare life”, as Agamben understands it, an operation that implies a certain politicization of life through which human life is simultaneously divided into the categories of life included and protected by the political and economical community and life excluded and unprotected, left to degradation and annihilation. The answer to the second question, that is, how the notion of biopolitics fit into Arendt’s work, is contained in a nutshell in Arendt’s thesis regarding the “unnatural growth of the natural”, a rather peculiar formula with which she intended to define the main historical transformations suffered by the political in the late modern age. The Arendtian formula presented in The Human Condition comprises different historical phenomena originating from the outcome of the Industrial Revolution, such as the generalization of the capitalist form of production of wealth in abundance; the widening of the realm of human necessities, such as laboring and consuming, up to the point in which life itself, that is, the eternal life process of the human species, became the supreme good and the most important political subject-matter; the elevation of laboring activity to the level of the most important human activity; the reduction of men to the status of the animal laborans, the prototype of man conceived as a living being whose main necessities are tied down to the continuous cycle of laboring and consuming; the requirement of the continuous production and reproduction of goods in abundance, so that nature was reduced to no more than a stock of natural resources abused to the point of almost disappearing from the surface of the planet; finally, the transformation of politics into the administrative office responsible for the promotion of human happiness by securing the private vital interests of the animal laborans. In order to guarantee them it was necessary that the public sphere be transformed into a social one, i.e., into the market of private and economic exchanges devoted to the production and reproduction of abundant goods destined to almost immediate consumption. These goods have to be continuously produced and reproduced through ever- increasing laboring activity in order to be massively consumed, thus generating an unbreakable cycle. Arendt’s thesis is that from the nineteenth century onwards the political and its constitutive elements have become increasingly over-determined by private social and economic interests –governed today by financial globalization and free-market ideological discourses – to the extent that it has been transformed into the activity of managing the production and reproduction of the animal laborans’ life and happiness. To put it in Antonio Negri’s and Michael Hardt’s terms, the industrial and financial powers of the present produce not only commodities, but also subjectivities, needs, social relations, bodies and minds, since they actually produce the producers. The most evident consequence of this historical process is that we do not even know if there is still any space left for the establishment of new radical political alternatives, since all State policies, most specially in underdeveloped countries, are always predetermined by the rather unstable flows of international financial investments and stock-exchange fluctuations. The results of these historical changes promoted by the advance of capitalism imply many losses, according to Arendt: the loss of the political as the constituting space opened up and sustained by new political relations in the world, with the consequent surrendering of the spaces of freedom to that of necessity; the loss of free and spontaneous action to repetitive and predictable behavior; the invasion and destruction of the public and shared common space by private lobbies and other hidden pressure groups which easily escape the mechanisms of public vigilance; the substitution of blind and mute violence for the possibility of persuasively exchanging opinions; the submission of the plurality of political ideas to the so-called unique thinking governed by the inexorable laws of the economic market; the weakening of the citizen’s ability to consent and dissent and the increase of their tendency to blindly obey; in short, the obfuscation of people’s ability to bring about political novelties through common creativity by the tedious reduction of the exercise of freedom to the solitary instant of depositing a vote; and the reduction of the political arena to the disputes among the highly enclosed and bureaucratized party machines, not to mention repressive State actions and the media campaigns of demoralization mobilized against all those political agents that do not accept the so called rules of the game – in the media’s general discourse they will be called anarchistic rioters, anti-system terrorists and the like. The contemporary social production of wealth in abundance as connected to mass consumerism has transformed human beings into laboring animals and the political citizen into a consumering agent in the democratic-supermarket: s/he has a certain variety of opinions to choose among, provided that s/he does not question the limited political options offered by the whole system. And how could one question a political system in which all political parties declare that their aim is to protect citizens’ life interests and life quality? As Agamben has stated, to question the intrinsic limitations of our political system has become more and more difficult since political debates today have taken on the task of caring, controlling and enjoying the benefits of bare life: traditional political distinctions (such as right and left, liberalism and totalitarianism, private and public) have lost their clarity and intelligibility, entering into a zone of indetermination, ever since bare life became their fundamental determination. When “capitalism has become one with reality”, a historical situation that has been aptly characterized by Santiago Lopez Petit under the concept of “postmodern fascism”, there appears a time in which, according to Marina Garcés, “we are condemned to make choices in an elective space in which there are no options. Everything is possible, but we can do nothing”. In other words, our actual political experience is the experience of the vanishing of all creative political alternatives, since the practices and discourses of the so called anti-globalization movements – “another globalization is possible”, and the like – are to a large extent unable to create real alternatives to the economic roles that they are intent on confronting. These historic transformations have not only wrought more violence at the core of the political but have also redefined its character by giving rise to biopolitical violence. As we have stated, what characterizes biopolitics is the dynamic of both protecting and abandoning life through its inclusion and exclusion from the political and economic community. Thus, in Arendtian terms, the aspect that best describes biopolitical danger is the risk of converting the animal laborans into what Agamben has described as the homo sacer, the human being that can be put to death by anyone and whose death does not imply any crime whatsoever. In other terms, when politics is conceived of as biopolitics, in the sense of increasing life and happiness of the national animal laborans, the Nation-state becomes more and more violent and murderous. If we link Arendt’s thesis from The Human Condition to those defended in The Origins of Totalitarianism we understand that the Nazi and Stalinist extermination camps were the most refined laboratories designed for the annihilation of the “bare life” of the animal laborans, although they were not the only instances devoted to human slaughter. Hannah Arendt does not center her analysis only on the process of the extermination itself; she also discusses the historical process under which large-scale exterminations were rendered possible: the emergence of the animal laborans out of uprootedness and superfluousness of modern masses. She gives us a hint of this understanding when she affirms, in “Ideology and Terror: a new form of government”, a text written in 1953 and later added to the second edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism, in 1958, that Isolation is that impasse into which men are driven when the political sphere of their lives is destroyed. (…) Isolated man who lost his place in the political realm of action is deserted by the world of things as well, if he is no longer recognized as homo faber but treated as an animal laborans whose necessary ‘metabolism with nature’ is of concern of no one. Isolation then become loneliness. (…) Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian government, and for ideology or logicality, the preparation of its executioners and victims, is closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism at the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and social traditions in our own time. To be uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world at all. The historical process of converting the homo faber, the prototype of the human being as the creator of durable objects and institutions, into the animal laborans and, later on, into the homo sacer, can be retraced in Arendtian terms to the nineteenth century wave of imperialist colonization. In this process, European countries imposed well-planned administrative genocide in African territories as a means of domination and exploitation. As argued in the second volume of The Origins of Totalitarianism, European colonialist countries combined racism and bureaucracy and thus promoted the “most terrible massacres in recent history, the Boers’ extermination of the Hottentot tribes, the wild murdering by Carl Peters in German Southeast Africa, the decimation of the peaceful Congo population – from 20 to 40 million reduced to 8 million people; and finally, perhaps the worst of all, it resulted in the triumphant introduction of such means of pacification into ordinary, respectable foreign policies”. This vital equation between protecting and destroying life was also at the core of the two World Wars, as well as in many other local warlike conflicts, in the course of which whole populations have become stateless or deprived of a free political space. It is more than symptomatic that, in spite of all their structural political differences, the United States of Roosevelt, the Soviet Russia of Stalin, the Nazi Germany of Hitler and the Fascist Italy of Mussolini were all conceived of as States devoted to the production and reproduction of the needs of the national animal laborans. According to Agamben, since our contemporary politics does not recognizes no other value than life, Nazism and Fascism, that is, regimes which have taken bare life as its supreme political criterion, are bound to remain unfortunately timely. Finally, it is quite obvious that this same vital logic of enforcing and annihilating life still continues to be effective both in post-industrial and in underdeveloped countries, since economic growth depends on the increase of unemployment and on many forms of political exclusion. When politics is reduced to the tasks of enforcing, preserving and promoting life and happiness of the animal laborans it really does not matter if those objectives require increasingly violent acts, both in national and international milieus. Therefore, it should not be surprising if today the legality or illegality of the State’s violent acts have become a secondary aspect in political discussions, since what really matters is to protect and stimulate the life of the National (or, depending on the case, Western) animal laborans. In order to maintain the sacrosanct ideals of increased mass production and increased mass consumerism developed countries can ignore the finite character of natural reserves that can jeopardize the future of humanity and thus refuse to sign International Protocols regarding the conservation of natural resources and diminishing the emission of dangerous polluting gases. They can also launch preventive humanitarian attacks, interventions or wars, disregard basic civil rights everywhere, create detention camps that escape all legislation, like Guantánamo, enforce the Airport jails where suspects are kept incommunicable, or multiply refugee camps for those who no longer have a homeland or have been evacuated from zones of conflict. Some countries have even imprisoned whole populations in ghettos or built up concrete walls to physically isolate them from other communities and thus give rise to new forms of social, political and economical apartheid. In short, there are countries that can allow themselves to impose the highest level of violence possible against suspect individuals or political regimes – the so-called “rogue-countries”, les États voyous – which, in one way or another, supposedly interfere with the security, maintenance and growth of their own national life cycle. If, according to Arendt, the common world is the institutional in-between space that should survive the natural cycle of life and death of human generations, what happens in modern mass societies based on continuous laboring and consuming activities is the progressive abolition of the institutional artificial barriers that separate and protect the human world from the forces of nature. This is what explains the contemporary sensation of vertigo, instability and unhappiness, as well as the impossibility of combining stability and novelty in order to think and act in a politically creative way. However, what should not be missed in the Arendtian argument is that in the context of a “waste economy, in which things must be almost as quickly devoured and discarded as they have appeared in the world, if the process itself is not to come to a sudden catastrophic end”, it becomes not only possible, but also necessary, that people be taken as raw material ready to be consumed, discarded or annihilated. Therefore, when Arendt announces the “grave danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption and annihilation through consumption”, we should also remember that human annihilation, elevated to the status of a supreme and managed end in totalitarian regimes, still continues to occur, although in different degrees and by different methods, in the contemporary dark holes of the oblivion such as miserably poor Third World neighborhoods and Penitentiaries, underpaid and infra-human labor camps, not to mention slave labor camps, always in the name of protecting the vital interests of the animal laborans. To talk about the process of human consumption is not to employ a metaphoric language but to properly describe the matter in question. Heidegger had already realized it when in the notes written during the late thirties and later published under the title of Overcoming Metaphysics. In these notes he stated that the differences between war and peace had already been blurred in a society in which “metaphysical man, the animal rationale, gets fixed as the laboring animal”, so that “labor is now reaching the metaphysical rank of the unconditional objectification of everything present”. Heidegger had also already understood that once the world becomes fully determined by the cyclical “circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption” it is at the brink of becoming an “unworld” (Unwelt), since “man, who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into the process. Man is ‘the most important raw material’ because he remains the subject of all consumption”. After the Second World War and the dissemination of detailed information concerning the death factories Heidegger pushed his criticisms even further, since he then acknowledged that even the understanding of man in terms of both subject and object of the consumption process was inadequate to describe the whole process of planned mass annihilation. He then came to understand this process of human mass dehumanization in terms of the conversion of man into nothing more than an “item of the reserve fund for the fabrication of corpses” (Bestandestücke eines Bestandes der Fabrikation von Leichen), always ready to be manipulated, managed and destined to technological production and destruction. What happened in the “extermination camps” (Vernichtungslägern) was not that millions of people met death as their own most fundamental possibility; much to the contrary, their essential possibility of dying was definitely stolen from them and they merely “passed away” in the process of being “unconspicuously liquidated” (unauffälig liquidiert). Men as an animal laborans (Arendt), as homo sacer (Agamben), as an item of the reserve fund (Heidegger) are descriptions of the very same process of dehumanization by means of which humankind and human life are reduced to the lowest status of living and unqualified raw material. As argued by Agamben, when it becomes impossible to differentiate between biós and zóe, that is, when bare and unqualified life is transformed into a qualified “form of life”, we can then recognize the emergence of a biopolitical epoch in which States promote the animalization of man by policies that aim at both protecting and destroying human life. Such considerations favor Agamben’s thesis concerning the widespread presence of the homo sacer in the contemporary world: “if it is true that un-sacrificial life is the figure that our time proposes to us, although life has become eliminable in an unprecedented measure, then the bare life of the homo sacer concerns us in a particular way. (…) If today there is not a single predetermined figure of the sacrificial man, perhaps that is because all of us have virtually become homines sacri”. By discussing the changes in the way power was conceived of and exercised at the turn of the nineteen-century, Foucault had firstly realized that when life turned out to be a constitutive political element, one that had to be carefully managed, calculated, ruled and normalized by means of different ‘caring’ policies, giving rise to biopolitical measures, these policies soon became murderous ones. When the Sovereign’s actions became destined to promote and stimulate the growth of life beyond the task of merely imposing violent death, wars turned into more and more bloodshed and extermination became a regular procedure both within and outside of the Nation. After the constitution of the modern biopolitical paradigm, says Foucault, political conflicts aim at preserving and intensifying the life of the winners, so that enemies cease to be political opponents and come to be seen as biological entities: it is not enough to defeat them, they must be exterminated since they constitute risks to the health of the race, people or community. Foucault thus characterizes the historical consequences that the emergence and consolidation of the modern biopolitical paradigm implied at the turn to the nineteen-century: death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth-century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death … now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars have caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end of point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in case is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. Thus, under the biopolitical paradigm “the other’s death is not only merely my life, in the sense of my personal security; the other’s death, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or of the degenerated or abnormal), is what will render life in general saner; saner and more pure”. In On Violence, Arendt argued a similar thesis concerning the violent character of racist or naturalist conceptions of politics. According to Arendt, “nothing could be theoretically more dangerous than the tradition of organic thought in political matters”, in which power and violence are interpreted in terms of biological metaphors that can only induce and produce more violence, especially where racial matters are involved. Racism as an ideological system of thought is inherently violent and murderous because it attacks natural organic data that, as such, cannot be changed by any power or persuasion, so that all that can be done when conflicts become radicalized is to “exterminate” the other. Biopolitical violence, the specific character of different violent phenomena underlying both totalitarianism and the quasi-totalitarian elements of modern mass democracies, is the tragic inheritance sustained by all kinds of naturalized conceptions of the political. According to her views, all forms of naturalizing the political harm the egalitarian political artificiality without which no defense and “validation of human freedom and dignity” are possible. It was the analysis of the terrible experience of both political and economic refugees, of those interned in different kinds of concentration camps, of those left with no home and all those who have lost their own place in the world, that showed her that nature – and, of course, human nature – cannot ground and secure any right or any democratic politics. She herself suffered the consequences of being left with no homeland between 1933 and 1951. This denial of any rights whatsoever showed her the paradox that the naturalistic understanding and foundation of the Rights of Man implied, since once those rights ceased to be recognized and enforced by a political community, their “inalienable” character simply vanished, living unprotected exactly those very human beings that mostly needed them: “The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable … whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of a sovereign state”. The core of her argument is that the loss of the Rights of Man did not per se deprive a human being of his/her life, liberty, property, equality before the law, freedom of expression or the pursuit of happiness; the real “calamity” was that people in these circumstances “no longer belong to any community whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them”. In other words, nationalistic and racialized biopolitics has produced a huge mass of people that have no access to what Arendt has called as the “right to have rights” insofar as they have been stripped of their “right to belong to some kind of organized community”: “Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity”. The “abstract nakedness” of merely being a human being is not a trustful substitute for the artificial character of all the pacts freely consented to by active citizens. By analyzing the dynamic of the extermination camps, Arendt understood that ‘humanity’ goes far beyond the notion of the human being a mere natural living being with its minimum natural denominator: “human beings can be transformed into specimens of the human animal, and that man’s ‘nature’ is only ‘human’ insofar as it opens up to man the possibility of becoming something highly unnatural, that is, a man” . In other words, humanity, when it is politically understood, does not reside in the natural fact of being alive, since human beings depend on artificial legal and political institutions to protect them. The Arendtian rejection of understanding the human being as a living being in the singular, as well as her postulation of human plurality as the condition of all innovative politics depend on her thesis that politics has to do with the formation of a common world in the course of people’s acting and exchanging opinions. Politics depends on the human capacities to agree and disagree, so that everything that is mysteriously given to us by nature becomes politically irrelevant. For Arendt, equality is not a natural gift, but a political construction oriented by the “principle of justice”. In other words, political equality is the result of agreements through which people decide to grant themselves equal rights, since the political sphere is based on the assumption that equality can be forged by those who act and exchange opinions among themselves and thus change the world in which they live in. According to Arendt, there can be no democratic politics worthy of the name unless everyone, regardless of their nationality, is included in the political and economic community of a definite State intending to recognize and protect them as their citizens; otherwise, no human being can discover his/her own place in the world. Agamben’s thesis goes even further than Arendt’s in detecting the perplexities inherent to the traditional foundation of the Rights of Man. By following up and radicalizing Arendt’s reflections, he discovers in the text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man a fundamental piece of modern biopolitics since these rights constitute the very inscription of naked life into the political-juridical order. According to Agamben, in the Declarations of the Rights of Man of 1789 natural bare life is both the foundational source and the carrier of the rights of man, since the man’s bare life – or, more precisely, the very fact of being born in a certain territory – is the element that effects the transition from the Ancient regime’s principle of divine sovereignty to modern sovereignty concentrated in the Nation-State: It is not possible to understand the development as well as the national and biopolitical ‘vocation’ of the National-State in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, if one forgets that in its own basis we find out not man as the free and conscious subject but, mostly, man’s bare life, the mere fact of being born, which, in the transition from the ancient subject to the citizen, was invested as such as the principle of sovereignty.

To conclude this text, I would like to emphasize that Arendt’s main reflections concerning totalitarianism still remain relevant nowadays, especially when directed towards the feebleness of actually existing democracies. The core of Arendt’s diagnosis of the present is that whenever politics has mostly to do with the maintenance and increase of the vital metabolism of affluent Nation-states, it will be indispensable to reduce the animal laborans to the even more degrading status of the homo sacer, of bare and unprotected life that can be delivered to oblivion and to death. Our actual understanding of politics as the administrative promotion of abundance and the happiness of the human being as an animal laborans has as its correlates economic and political exclusion, prejudices, violence and genocides against the naked life of the homo sacer. I also believe that Arendt can shed light on our current dilemmas, providing us theoretical elements for a critical diagnosis of the present as well as for the opening of new possibilities for collective action in the world. Arendt was a master of chiaroscuro political thinking in the sense that she was never blind to the contrasts between the open possibilities of radically renovating the political and the strict chains of a logic that binds violence and political exclusion under a biopolitical paradigm. If we still want to remain with Arendt, then **we have to attentively think and consciously seek to participate in new spaces and new forms of life devoted to political association, action and discussion, wherever and whenever they seem to subvert the tediously multiplication of the same in its many different everyday manifestations**. Arendt did not want to propose any political utopia but nor was she convinced that our political dilemmas had no other possible outcome, as if history had come to a tragic end. Neither a pessimist nor an optimist, she only wanted to understand the world in which she lived in and to stimulate us to continue thinking and acting in the present. At least, if a radically new political alternative can still come to be in our world, the responsibility for it will always be ours. Therefore, if we wish to remain faithful to the spirit of Arendt’s political thinking, then we should think and act politically without constraining our thinking and acting to any previously defined understanding of what politics ‘is’ or ‘should’ be. In other words, the political challenge of the present is to multiply the forms, possibilities and spaces in which we can perform our political actions. These can be strategic actions destined to enforce political agendas favored by political parties concerned with social justice. They can also be discrete, subversive actions favored by small groups at the margins of the bureaucratized party machines that promote political intervention free of teleological or strategic intents, since their goal is to sustain an intense and radical politicization of existence. Finally, there are also actions in which ethical openness towards otherness becomes fully political: small and rather inconspicuous actions of acknowledging, welcoming, and extending hospitality and solidarity towards others.

### AT: Predictability Bad---2NC

#### Breaking down predictability is self-defeating and impossible---creativity inevitably depends upon constraints, the attempt to wish away the structure of predictability collapses the very structure their aff depends on---it’s better to retain predictability and be creative within it

Armstrong 2K – Paul B. Armstrong, Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Winter 2000, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 211-223

Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking. 8 Iser shares Lyotard's concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a world of heterogeneous language games is to limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotard's endorsement of the "sublime"--the pursuit of the "unpresentable" by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and smashing the limits of existing paradigms--is undermined by contradictions, however, which Iser's explication of play recognizes and addresses. The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Iser's sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new games, this crossing of boundaries depends on and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes. [End Page 220]

The radical presumption of the sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual reciprocity of Iserian play.

Iser's notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser's analysis of "regulatory" and "aleatory" rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, "permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own" (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and open-ended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity.

### Constraints Key to Creativity---2NC

#### Constraints are key to creativity---challenging ourselves to innovate within the confines of rules creates far more creative responses than starting with a blank slate

Mayer 6 – Marissa Ann Mayer, vice-president for search products and user experience at Google, February 13, 2006, “Creativity Loves Constraints,” online: http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06\_07/b3971144.htm?chan=gl

When people think about creativity, they think about artistic work -- unbridled, unguided effort that leads to beautiful effect. But if you look deeper, you'll find that some of the most inspiring art forms, such as haikus, sonatas, and religious paintings, are fraught with constraints. They are beautiful because creativity triumphed over the "rules." Constraints shape and focus problems and provide clear challenges to overcome. Creativity thrives best when constrained.

But constraints must be balanced with a healthy disregard for the impossible. Too many curbs can lead to pessimism and despair. Disregarding the bounds of what we know or accept gives rise to ideas that are non-obvious, unconventional, or unexplored. The creativity realized in this balance between constraint and disregard for the impossible is fueled by passion and leads to revolutionary change.

A few years ago, I met Paul Beckett, a talented designer who makes sculptural clocks. When I asked him why not do just sculptures, Paul said he liked the challenge of making something artistically beautiful that also had to perform as a clock. Fr

aming the task in that way freed his creative force. Paul reflected that he also found it easier to paint on a canvas that had a mark on it rather than starting with one that was entirely clean and white. This resonated with me. It is often easier to direct your energy when you start with constrained challenges (a sculpture that must be a clock) or constrained possibilities (a canvas that is marked).

### Framework --- AT: Calculative Decisionmaking Bad

#### 1 --- Political calculation is necessary and inevitable --- endorsing Derridian politics leaves us incapable of making these narrow decisions coherently

Jack Reynolds, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Tasmania, Australia, 2006, Theory & Event, Vol. 9, No. 3

To summarise these various different texts then, Derrida insists that incalculable ethical absolutes (eg. justice) need to be put to work in contingent political calculations that are irretrievably context bound (eg. law). What is needed is a mutual contamination of the political and the ethical that might be termed 'ultra-political'. I think that this analysis, and in fact the ultra-political emphasis of all of Derrida's work, is exactly right, but some important questions remain. **How does Derrida think that we should calculate**, accepting his suggestion that we must? **There is very little indication** of this in his work. Although he regularly insists that there is no pure ethics, no pure justice, **any hint as to what kinds of political calculations are better or worse than others is left opaque**. Except in the most general terms, Derrida does not engage with the key theories of distributive justice and of political calculations in the narrow sense. While he does discuss the different ways in which we might attempt to add up or calculate equality (eg. according to number, according to merit, etc.), there is little consideration of the relative merits of these different kinds of addition, some of which may be more apt in a contemporary context of globalisation (mondialisation) than others.¶ Furthermore, this acknowledged necessity of political calculation is also treated in a far more derogatory way than the ethical absolutes that undergird and orient his work. In Rogues, for example, Derrida endorses the Husserlian distinction between rigour and exactitude, the latter being more calculative and lesser (R 132). In this text, he also reaffirms that he is on the side of chance and the incalculable (R 5), what in Politics of Friendship he terms the 'perhaps' (PF 28), because he doesn't want to reduce democracy to a program or procedural system of calculations, as we will see Rawls might be accused of. In fact, Derrida also discusses why he generally eschews principles and axioms (or lexical orderings, such as Rawls' famous principles of justice as fairness), suggesting that such principles favour the calculative application of programmatic rules (R 142). It is **for this reason that he continues to insist on the 'to come', the open-ended and the incalculable**, and advocates 'postulations' instead of axioms (the former avoids a comparable and calculable scale of values and evaluations).¶ Moreover, while Derrida regularly uses political terms in his recent work, invoking democracy, the 'new International', justice, etc., arguably **these terms have become deprived of their content in such a way as to become ethical absolutes**. Consider, for example, the notion of a democracy 'to come'. Derrida's emphasis upon the democracy that is (and must be) yet to come, means that **his vision of democracy is divested of content, calculability, and at least some of its normative force.** It also needs to be noted that it is Derrida's general contention that it is precisely that which disrupts calculation and which renders the application of any kind of formula impossible, which is just. For him, justice can never arrive in the 'present', but is constitutively 'to come' and forever futural – this is another way of saying that justice is non-negotiable and undeconstructible. Such suggestions are part and parcel of his deconstructive practices, which, above all, affirm the new, the messianic, the wholly other, justice, the impossible, and the future, terms that play a closely related structural role in his work. According to Derrida's own definitions of politics and ethics in both Rogues and 'Ethics and Politics Today', however, **these kinds of affirmations constitute an ethical injunction more than a political one**, as they are primarily about the non-negotiable and the absolute, notwithstanding that the point of his work is to allow this ethical affirmation to be at work within the political.¶ Interestingly, in an essay titled 'The Deconstruction of Actuality', Derrida also acknowledges that his own recent focus upon unconditional hospitality in texts like Of Hospitality, and absolute forgiveness in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, is apolitical in a certain sense (N 101). His point behind drawing attention to these kind of unconditional ethical horizons that are at work in the concepts of hospitality and forgiveness, is that a politics of hospitality that is purely about calculation and negotiation is a politics that loses all reference to justice. It is merely a machinic system and his point is that we need to ensure that these ideas of absolute hospitality and the like must infect the gritty realities of conditional hospitality, which is eminently susceptible of political calculation and manipulation. At the same time, it is not enough just to shout, for example, that John Howard's border protection policy in Australia's territorial waters is wrong and that a non-negotiable ethics demands that everyone be let in to the country. That is literally impossible on Derrida's view, but what is needed is a softening of the political calculations and a recognition of the importance of this demand of absolute hospitality that sustains and augments any actual occurrences of hospitality, rather than the covering over of that demand. As politically insightful as such a position is, **Derrida is reluctant to go** any **further and specify the kinds of political negotiation of these absolute demands which might be better or worse than other kinds of negotiation**10. Certain ethico-political stances are ruled out by him (a pure politics of calculation and a pure ethics of the incalculable are both ruled out), **but what is left is a wide expanse in the middle within which we must calculate and with which he won't help us much**11. In that respect, we need to supplement Derrida's valuable but somewhat moralistic insistence that justice is incalculable, for example, **with a more detailed examination of the merits and problems of myriad different kinds of political calculations (politics in the narrower sense) that Derrida himself acknowledges are** necessary and inevitable. This is where the **calculative ambitions of much analytic political philosophy becomes important,** whether it be utilitarianism or the liberalism of Rawls that we will now examine (at the same time, Rawls' work also shows us the risks associated with any such turn to calculability – most obviously the threat of engendering a normative moralism and becoming what Derrida would reproach as a 'knight of good conscience').

### Framework --- AT: Aff Decisionmaking Model = Good/AT: We Think Through Aporias

#### Derridian politics does not – and cannot – offer a useful prescription for thinking through aporias or promoting meaningful social change --- embracing the aff undermines the emancipatory potential of the public sphere

Richard Terdiman 7, Professor of Literature and History of Consciousness at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Determining the Undetermined: Derrida's "University Without Condition" Eighteenth-Century Studies 40.3 (2007) 425-441

As I've been suggesting, Derrida's term "condition" in "The University Without Condition" is code for a cardinal Enlightenment concept, determination. This is the part of the philosophes' understanding of the world to which Derrida refuses to subscribe. The whole liberatory orientation of his essay depends upon blanking such a mechanism. Consequently, throughout the essay, the term "condition" appears only in the privative mode: "without condition" (202), "un-limited" (202), "un-conditional" (203), "without conditions" (204; all with emphasis [End Page 431] added), and so on. This rigorous, unqualified insistence **leaves Derrida's analysis one concept short** of a means for understanding how the conditions from which he wants to free the university—and beyond it, thinking itself—impose themselves upon it. Derrida's analysis seems to conflate the concept of "conditions" and "determinations" with the consequence of their operation—as if one might catch coercion by analyzing its mechanism. How else to explain the determined absolutism of his stance excluding and repudiating determination in any form? But this absolutism is brittle.¶ The theory of determination that I believe is Derrida's ghostly antagonist here is primarily to be found in Hegel. There is some semantic blurring between the Hegelian terms Bedingung (normally translated as "condition") and Bestimmung (usually rendered as "determination").19 But Derrida conflates them, for example in his dialogue with Giovanna Borradori. There he utilizes bedingt as the equivalent of "determinate" and Bedingung to render "determination" (see Philosophy in a Time of Terror, 129–30). His usage is similar in Rogues.20 But in "The University Without Condition" Derrida is working in a mode of absolute negation of condition, of the radically unbedingt. The concept of determination is consequently unavailable to him for understanding how in the case of the university, the unrealized character of its unconditionality might be made real.21¶ So Derrida's insistence upon unconditionality—non-determination, absolute sovereignty—blocks conceiving the functioning of determination that the Enlightenment located at the heart of its understanding of human beings and doings. But without a capable theory of determination, it is hard to make sense of how any institution—the university in particular—could be freed from "conditions," from outside determination, to begin with. The strange position of two recurrent themes in Derrida's essay—on the one hand work (209ff.), on the other constraint or servitude (224)—can rightly be understood, I think, only against this background. These materialities are the shadowy other part of a dialectic that propels the argument for freedom of thought and expression, without the interrelation ever being made explicit. The argument for empowering the university must depend at its foundation on a conception of power to begin with—of state and other actors whose ability to do work and enforce constraints upon the political and intellectual registers of existence must logically and practically precede any liberation from power, and hence any achievement of unconditionality. But such processes are never seriously analyzed in Derrida's essay.¶ If the university's claim to unconditionality has never been "effective," as Derrida claims (206), the question then becomes, how does one get the claim honored? About that, Derrida does not have anything practical to say. The philosophes' reformist view relied upon detecting the irrationalities of state and church power that inhibited the rational exercise of human understanding, identifying their agents and their mechanism, and marshaling public opinion to limit or abrogate these irrationalities. But this materialist, realist conception of how power works and how it could be countered or interrupted diverges from Derrida's exhortation to institute a state of affairs—the university's liberation, the realization of its unconditionality—that he claims has never yet been achieved. [End Page 432]¶ \* \* \*¶ The blind spot in Derrida's account of how this transformation might be realized lies in his reliance, here as frequently in the work of his middle and later period, upon the messianic notion of the "à-venir" and its complement, the unconditioned "event." **Though they call out for change and hope for it, these modalities have no means of conceptualizing transformation,** still less of producing it. To make certain my argument here is clear, I should say that I have no doubt whatever that Derrida believed that social existence changes, or that specific changes (with which many of us would agree) would be most salutary. The critique I want to make of his view of the "event" does not question his motivation, it questions his model, particularly asking whether the conceptualization he projects in the coupled notions of the "event" and the "à-venir" does a capable job of comprehending the transformations he urges. My claim is that it does not.¶ This is because Derrida has no way to explain how a current pernicious state of affairs could be altered. Indeed he declines on principle to proffer an account of how this might happen. The mechanism and the temporality of what Derrida calls for and hopes to call forth are those of a—presumably agentless—miracle (I use the word in a technical, not an evaluative sense). That is, a process that cannot be accounted for by natural or social mechanism,

that intervenes in the flow of temporality but can never be organized or organized for. In "The University Without Condition," Derrida's term for these miraculous transformations is the "impossible possible" (234). Surely we can hope for such a wondrous transformation, and we cannot say the university will never benefit from one. **But the wait for this unaccountable realization could be frustrating**. We need to better understand the modality of Derrida's "à-venir" and "event," and the motivation behind his concepts, if we are to assess what he is arguing in "The University Without Condition."22¶ In his middle and later work, the "event" is one of Derrida's most insistent themes. The notion is knotty—if one can even call it a notion, given that ex hypothesi it must exist as a form without any possibility of specifiable content. The event is what is "to come" (à-venir) in the sense of being what is absolutely not here now. **If it is performable**, deducible, predictable, **if it is determined, entailed—"conditioned"—in any way by any present fact or tendency, it does not count as an "event" in Derrida's understanding of the term.** For him, an "event" is a "leap" (230) **beyond any proposition**, **postulate, or project.** It thus prosecutes an absoluteness that by this very quality converges with the notion of an institution "without condition" with which Derrida begins his essay.¶ In Specters of Marx, in "Force of Law" (particularly in "First Name of Benjamin") and ubiquitously elsewhere in his later work, Derrida weaves a complex reflection around the notion of the "event," which he conceives as the un-anticipatable, the in-conceivable, the "impossible." "The University Without Condition" essentially concludes with this idea (233–34). This seemingly **absolute epistemological indetermination** is the irreducible element in the "à-venir." As Derrida puts it in Philosophy in a Time of Terror, "The event is what comes and, in coming, comes to surprise me, to surprise and suspend comprehension: the event is first of all that which I do not first of all comprehend. Better, the event is first of all that I do not comprehend. It consists in that, that I do not comprehend: that which I do not comprehend and first of all that I do not comprehend, the fact that I do not comprehend: my incomprehension" (90). [End Page 433]¶ This Derridean ideologeme refers to a familiar problematic, and we can see the motivation behind it. Derrida is seeking to deal with a constitutive asymmetry between past and future—between the empirically knowable "what was" and the subjunctive and invisible "what is to come." We have no memory of the future. So if we don't want to be condemned to thinking of the future as no more than the mechanical and predetermined prolongation of what already is, it would seem there would have to be some concept of a "break" or "leap" (230) in the continuist flow of time that would allow the future to "become itself" in its difference from the present. Otherwise it could only remain indentured—bedingt—to the "now," and could not produce anything authentically "new."23 This Derridean conceptualization contests the continuous, deterministic—and supposedly teleological—vision of history that derives (or is said to derive) from Hegel, as Derrida implies in Philosophy in a Time of Terror (120). Nietzsche is the progenitor of this view, and Heidegger one of its most powerful theorists.24¶ However, Derrida's thought of the "event" pays a cost for freeing the future through such a conceptualization of it. In relation to what I claimed earlier was the most pertinent intertext for Derrida's argument here—Kant's "What is Enlightenment?"—**Derrida's formulation seems irreconcilable with Kant's projection of discourse in the public space as a fundamental means of fostering transformations in the given state of things**. This is not because in Derrida's conception the public space is closed to discourse—of course the contrary is true—but because under his construction of the event **there is** no cognizable path **that could lead from discourse in this space to the coming of,** say, **the university without condition**. But such a connection was Kant's whole point in arguing for reason's **liberation**. While taking on board Kant's resonant theses about the liberation of thought, Derrida depoliticizes them by excising precisely the portion of Kant's—and the Enlightenment's—analysis that conceived how such an objective might be made real.

### Framework --- AT: Humanism Bad

#### --- Humanistic education promotes empathy and democratic peace --- atrocities result from a lack of this type of education --- only our framework promotes this

Professor Nimrod Aloni 11, Ph.D., a UNESCO Chair in Humanistic Education at Kibbutzim College in Israel, “HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE,” Education and

Humanism: Linking Autonomy and Humanity, 2011,

<https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/299-education-and-humanism.pdf>

The main reason for fostering cosmopolitan humanism lies in the realization that **it would be** **irresponsibly naïve to expect humanist and democratic virtues to develop naturally**. On the one hand, the motivation is to assist everyone in realizing their potential and leading a sovereign life of meaning and quality; on the other hand, we are well aware that both as individuals and as collectives, human beings tend to perceive themselves as better, more just or deserving privileged access to resources denied to other groups. Since such selﬁsh, ethnocentric, or even **racist attitudes** usually mean offending the humanity or **denying the human rights of other groups**, humanism seeks the **universal application** of basic norms of human dignity and equality. The Biblical ethics is a prime example for such norms. **It opposes egoistic and ethnocentric tendencies** with the such teachings as: ‘Steer away from falsehood and slay not one who is righteous and just… and take no bribe… and oppress no stranger’; ‘thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour. … love thy neighbour as thyself’ (Leviticus, 19:15,18); ‘But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt’ (ibid., 34); ‘Do not unto your neighbour that which you hate’; ‘May your neighbour’s honour be as precious to ¶ you as your own’.¶ Though it may certainly be objected that even those humanistic checks and balances entail some coercion over the individual, such coercion is far more limited than any alternative imposition of religious, ideological or political contents – limited to such aspects and boundaries allowing everyone to actualise their mental potential and enjoy equal opportunities to inﬂuence the character and practices of their social community. Naturally, **those educating for universal humanism are usually disparaged by nationalist leaders or religious fanatics** as betraying their unique heritage, since they want their ﬂock reduced to submissive devotees of the single truth that they cherish and represent. We are fortunate, nevertheless, in that after millennia of religious wars, ideological violence and brutal racism, the family of nations has ﬁnally, on December 10 th 1948, determined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth of other status… Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.’¶ The value of humanistic principles has recently received support, of all sources, ¶ from empirical studies on the quality of life in various countries. As opposed to the authoritarian bias of many that there is something unrewarding, ‘weakly’ or artiﬁ cial about the virtues of reﬂ ective thinking and social justice, empirical data provided by the UN’s Human Development Index as well as by the OECD’s PISA international achievement tests indicate **clearly that it is those countries which uphold humanism’s idealistic virtues are also those who offer their citizens the highest quality of life**. The Scandinavian countries, for example, have been in the lead for many years, both in standards of public welfare, health, and education services, and in standards of individual liberties, social equity, gender equality, and political integrity. An examination of the fundamental values of these societies shows that they practice the **fundamental humanistic elements: comprehensive education in the spirit of science, critical reasoning and the liberal arts**, **open and pluralistic democracies**, and supportive and caring welfare societies that ensure no one loses his or her human dignity upon becoming impoverished.¶ In sum, based on the humanistic philosophy of human dignity as well as on empirical ﬁndings regarding the prerequisites of quality of life, we are called to shape an educational policy having the following arch-objectives: (1) An intellectual approach based on open-mindedness and broad education, autonomous and **critical thinking, logical reasoning and factual evidence**; (2) A moral standpoint characterized by **attributing equal human worth to others**, striving for social justice and peaceful neighbourliness and showing respect, fairness and consideration for others; (3) Active democratic citizenship evidenced by **social responsibility and political involvement**, as well as by the dispositions of pluralism, tolerance and self-restraint; (4) Cultural richness supported by active curiosity, broad intellectual horizons, experiential depth, commitment to excellence and cultural diversity; (5) Being a ‘world citizen’, consisting in being informed and concerned not only about one’s local community and culture, but also about other cultures and about ethical and ecological issues that are of global and international concern.

### Framework --- AT: Myth/AT: Aff = Prior to Politics

#### 2 --- The response to myth should be scientifically and economically informed energy policymaking, which only our framework encourages

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In a democracy, a well-informed public can play an important role in helping elected officials make wise policy decisions. But **many Americans believe in energy myths** that shape their views and influence public-policy debates. Consider some of the most widely accepted ideas and how energy-policy decisions may reflect these beliefs.¶ The belief that nuclear energy is unsafe has resulted in an unwritten moratorium on new nuclear power plants. Since the partial meltdown of a nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island in 1979, not a single nuclear reactor has been built in the United States. Moreover, in 1977 President Jimmy Carter outlawed the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, even though almost all the material in a nuclear rod can be safely reused following the first nuclear cycle. Though no one has ever died from the production of nuclear power in the U.S., though we have safely generated nuclear power and stored nuclear waste for decades, and though other countries are increasingly turning to nuclear power to help meet their energy needs—notably France, which generates 80 percent of its electricity from nuclear power—fear has held nuclear energy advancement hostage for thirty years. These unfounded fears have caused us to miss out on three decades’ worth of safe, reliable power that produces virtually zero carbon emissions. And we’ve lost all that time, too, which we could have spent training a workforce to wield and manage nuclear power technology.¶ Additionally, the notion that offshore drilling is environmentally dangerous has kept off-limits abundant domestic sources of oil and natural gas, making the U.S. the only country with significant known reserves of oil and natural gas that refuses to tap them. Since the 1969 oil spill off Santa Barbara’s coast, much of the public has viewed oil drilling as overly harmful to our ocean waters; but the track record of offshore drilling reveals a history of safety and of minimal environmental impact. Since 1975, offshore drilling in the Exclusive Economic Zone (within 200 miles of the U.S. coast) has a safety record of 99.999 percent, meaning that only 0.0001 percent of the oil produced has been spilled.[146] In spite of oil’s safety record, however, large portions of our oil- and natural gas–rich coastal waters remain off-limits to exploration and development. The result: U.S. dependence on foreign sources of energy has grown over time, as we have neglected to reap the benefits—economically and geopolitically—of our abundant natural resources.¶ Just as misguided fears may stymie the responsible development and use of certain resources, unrealistic hopes may accelerate the rollout of others—more appealing philosophically but less efficient economically. The deeply held view that renewable fuels hold immediate promise arguably played a part in the nation’s aggressive move toward corn ethanol. Hoping that corn ethanol can play a large role in powering our nation’s vehicles, the U.S. Congress increased the amount of ethanol that must be blended into our transportation-fuel mix from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 10.5 billion gallons in 2009 and 15 billion gallons in 2015. As it turns out, such a decision was premature. Just months after Congress upped the mandate, the tide of public opinion turned against corn ethanol, as the burning of large portions of our nation’s corn crop helped raise food prices worldwide, and as new research revealed that the massive land clearing required for the corn-ethanol business potentially increases, rather than decreases, the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. In spite of billions of taxpayer-subsidized dollars and protective tariffs, the domestic ethanol industry fell into disarray, with dozens of ethanol refiners going bankrupt because of falling ethanol prices and resulting excess refining capacity. The corn-ethanol debacle is a prime example of the law of unintended consequences and of the potential of myth-based thinking to lead to premature—and, ultimately, unsuccessful—energy policies that harm the economy and, often, even the environment.¶ Similarly, we may be acting too quickly to limit carbon-dioxide emissions, despite indications that the Earth’s climate is not warming as quickly as many believe. According to computer models and media accounts, the Earth’s temperature is on a breakaway upward trajectory. However, though the Earth’s average temperature increased about one degree Fahrenheit during the twentieth century, its climb was not constant. Rather, two distinct warming periods were separated by a period of global cooling. Additionally, satellite data indicate that the second warming period of the twentieth century has recently halted and, perhaps, is in reverse. Computer models did not project such a shift. We simply cannot be sure we understand the myriad intricacies of global climate dynamics, at least not sufficiently to justify sweeping attempts to regulate carbon dioxide, the supposed chief culprit of climate change. Particularly since such regulations would come at enormous economic cost—potentially hitting every industry, business, and consumer—the risks of rushing to judgment are substantial. Unless we proceed cautiously, aggressive climate measures could raise energy and electricity prices, curtail economic output, and reduce overall employment.¶ Along with unconfirmed fears of humans’ impact on climate, the mistaken belief that U.S. cities are becoming more polluted has sparked opposition to building new coal-fired power plants. Though the idea that carbon dioxide is a pollutant is recent (and unproven) and though air quality in our cities has steadily improved for decades, many oppose new coal plants. If carried to its logical extreme, misplaced fears about climate and pollution could bar not only new coal plants but could also shut down existing coal plants, effectively closing off the source of half of our nation’s electricity supply.¶ Finally, due to the inefficiencies of renewable energies and alternative fuels, the possibility of U.S. energy independence anytime in the near future is a myth. However, the U.S. is well positioned to meet our future energy needs, for instead of focusing all our resources on a single energy source or energy supplier, we have a diversified portfolio of energy resources and numerous supplies that act as an effective hedge against supply disruptions. For example, contrary to popular opinion, the U.S. imports oil from dozens of nations and is not overly reliant on any single country or region. Only 16 percent of our 2007 oil imports came from the Persian Gulf, for example, while over 61 percent of the petroleum consumed in the U.S. in 2007 was either produced here or imported from Canada and Mexico, our immediate neighbors. In spite of such balance, misplaced fears that we are overly dependent on dangerous regimes for our oil supply could hasten government mandates and subsidies for unproven technologies that divert resources from more efficient uses—and raise the overall cost of energy for consumers.¶ Misguided energy policies ultimately tend to produce economic harm, both to producers and consumers. Though its economic impact is often overlooked, energy policy affects everyone’s pocketbook. Higher energy prices inevitably lead to higher prices and job losses throughout the economy. Additionally, since the poorest households spend the largest share of their incomes on energy, policies that raise the price of energy **disproportionately hurt the poor.** Politicians would do well to remember this as they consider President Obama’s plan to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions approximately 83 percent by 2050.[147]According to the Congressional Budget Office, just a 15 percent reduction in emissions from 1998 levels would impose an additional $680 (measured in constant 2006 dollars) in costs on the poorest 20 percent of our population, the largest percentage increase (3.3 percent) of the five economic quintiles.[148]¶ As our survey shows, many Americans hold inaccurate ideas about key energy issues. **From classrooms to press rooms to legislative halls, energy myths abound.** The pervasiveness of such misunderstandings about energy often **leads to energy policies driven by emotion,** rather than by facts; to premature, rather than prudent, legislation and regulations; and to constrictive, rather than growth-oriented, economic outcomes.¶ Instead of rushing to judgment based on political expediency, unproven theories, or fear, policymakers **should focus on realistic energy policies** that meet our needs today without creating liabilities for us tomorrow. **Scientific, technological, and economic realities**, **rather than myths**, **must guide energy-policy decisions.** Separating myths from realities is essential if Americans are to continue to depend on reliable and affordable sources of energy.

# Case

## 1NC

### Extremism Turn --- 1NC

#### Advancing Derridian philosophy risks causing extremism and genocide --- the aff must be held accountable, even if the results are unintended

Arthur J. Dyck 5, Professor of Population Ethics in the School of Public Health and Member of the Faculty of Divinity at Harvard University, “Taking Responsibility for Our Common Morality,” The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 391-417

Scholars in all fields **should hold themselves morally responsible** for what they **publish and teach**. One would think that everyone would take this for granted, but Hilary Putnam, for one, has earnestly warned that we dare not. As he writes, “To-day, as we face the twenty-first century, our task is not to repeat the mistakes of the twentieth century.” **He sounded this warning at the conclusion of his analysis of** Jacques **Derrida’s philosophical works**. Putnam regrets that philosophers reside among the all too numerous scholars whose publications and instruction aided and abetted the development of the “political tragedy” exemplified by the regimes of **Hitler and Stalin**. **Derrida** the philosopher **counts among current scholars whose thinking** raises the specter of repeating those mistakes of the twentieth century and their horrendous aftermath. Taking the renewal of philosophy as the theme for his Gifford Lectures of 1990, Putnam characterized the writings of Derrida as not only philosophically unsound, but also as **dangerous and irresponsible**.2¶ Why does Putnam sound the alarm at the thinking of Derrida? For one thing, as Putnam observes, “[T]he thrust of Derrida’s work is so negative, so lacking in any sense of what and how we should construct, politically or otherwise, that it is difficult to exonerate him completely from the effect of his teaching.”3 When Derrida. for example, treats the notions of “justification,” “good reason,” and warrant as “primarily repressive gestures,” Putnam regards that as dangerous because, “**it provides** aid and comfort for extremists **(especially extremists of a romantic bent) of all kinds,** both left and right.”4 Derrida’s left-wing followers include those who call for freeing ourselves from the very concepts of rightness and truth.¶ Putnam knows that others hold Derrida responsible for the diverse and unfortunate ways in which people receive his scholarship. Derrida has spoken of his desire to write as “the desire to perfect a program on a matrix having the greatest potential variability, plunvocality, et cetera, so that each time something returns it will be as different as possible.” and that, as Richard Bernstein writes, makes him responsible for the “divergent and incompatible ways in which [hisi texts are read and heard.” Thus some view Derrida as a nihilist; others see him as one who respects the irreducibly other. According to Putnam. such a ‘double reading” results, not because Derrida wants to appear “irresponsible.” but because he “problematizes” the notions of reason and truth by claiming that they remain indispensable while, at the same time, speaking of them as “collapsed” in a manner that leads to the interpretation that he has dispensed with them.¶ Putnam does not regard Derrida as a political extremist but rather as **one whose philosophical writings lend support to political extremists.** While viewing Derrida’s own political pronouncements as “generally admirable,” Putnam’s fear of Derrida’s philosophical influence on political thought remains **unabated**. As he says:¶ The philosophical irresponsibility of one decade can become the real-world political tragedy of a few decades later**.** And deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility.6 ¶ Putnam does not in the least exaggerate his concerns. That some scholars cast doubt on our commitments to truth and rightness, that others lay aside the quest to augment our knowledge of them, while still others deny that scholars can even attain such knowledge, **must surely cause alarm**. As I shall illustrate in this essay, this philosophical trend threatens the purpose of higher education.

### Rationality Good

#### Commodification arguments are wrong---policy solutions are the only way to prevent extinction

Wagner 11 Gernot, economist at EDF, where he works in the office of economic policy and analysis, “But Will the Planet Notice? How Smart Economics Can Save the World.” Hill and Wang Press, p. 11-12

The fundamental forces guiding the behavior of billions are much larger than any one of us. It's about changing our system, creating a new business as usual. And to do that we need to think about what makes our system run. In the end, it comes down to markets, and the rules of the game that govern what we chase and how we chase it. Scientists can tell us how bad it will get. Activists can make us pay attention to the ensuing instabilities and make politicians take note. When the task comes to formulating policy, only economists can help guide us out of this morass and save the planet. In an earlier time with simpler problems, environmentalists took direct action against the market's brutal forces by erecting roadblocks or chaining themselves to trees. That works if the opposing force is a lumberjack with a chain saw. It might even work for an entire industry when the task is to ban a particular chemical or scrub a pollutant out of smokestacks. But that model breaks down when the opposing force is ourselves: each and every one of us demanding that the globalized market provide us with cheaper and better food, clothes, and vacations. There is no blocking the full, collective desires of the billions who are now part of the market economy and the billions more who want to—and ought to—be part of it. The only solution is to guide all-powerful market forces in the right direction and create incentives for each of us to make choices that work for all of us. The guideposts we have today for market forces evolved helter- skelter from a historical process that gave almost no weight to the survival of the planet, largely because the survival of the planet was not at stake. Now it is. Since we can't live without market forces, we need to guide them to help us keep the human adventure going in workable ways, rather than continue on the present path right off the edge of a cliff.

#### Rational argumentation key to problem-solving --- it’s the foundation for ameliorating all social and political crises

Robert C. Rowland 95 is a Professor of Communication at the University of Kansas, “In Defense of Rational Argument: A Pragmatic Justification of Argumentation Theory and Response to the Postmodern Critique” Philosophy & Rhetoric Vol. 28, No. 4Oct 1, 1995, EBSCO

Conclusion—argument and empowerment

Discursive reason and argument as a means of attaining rationality are under strong attack. When viewed from a pragmatic perspective, however, rational argument is easily defended. All aspects of a theory of argument can be tied to a rational problem-solving purpose. Field-invariant and field-dependent standards for evaluation, particular field practices, and the very defining characteristics of argument itself all are shaped by purpose. Defined in this manner, rational argument is the most useful general problem-solving tool available to humans.

Modernism was based on optimistic assumptions about what it means to be human. These assumptions related to the perfectibility of knowledge and the possibility of progress toward a truly free and just society. Today, the modernist agenda stands in tatters. We no longer believe that perfect knowledge is possible or that human civilization necessarily will progress toward greater freedom and justice. A pragmatic theory of argument cannot be used to rebuild modernism, but the tools provided by that theory can be used by each of us to further the aims of modernism. If full knowledge is unattainable, a focus on pragmatically justifiable problem-solving tools can help us to find the most effective solutions for any given problem. If no perfect society can be created, then we may use argument to ameliorate societal problems. And if social structures sometimes oppress the individual, then each of us may use argument as a tool for personal empowerment.

### Growth Sustainable---Must-Read

#### Growth’s sustainable---tech innovation continually changes the game and outpaces their predictions---global shift towards sustainability’s happening now, it’s effective and permanent

John H. Matthews 12, and Frederick Boltz, Center for Conservation and Government, Conservation International, June 2012, “The Shifting Boundaries of Sustainability Science: Are We Doomed Yet?,” PLOS Biology, <http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001344>

Humans have long caused irreparable harm to ecosystems, driven species to extinction, and have in turn endured major shifts in biogeochemical cycling. We agree that such incidents are avoidable and unacceptable and that the magnitude of current trends must not be dismissed. Humans have also developed ingenious and novel ways of making resource use far more efficient or exploiting new types of resources. Obvious developments here include the invention of agriculture and the domestication of wild plant and animal species, of course, but humans have also been innovative in energy development (wood, wind, coal, petroleum, hydropower, biofuels, geothermal, biogen, nuclear, solar, and wave power), the development of synthetic chemical fertilizers in the 19th century, and the discovery of modern antibiotics in the 20th century. Other innovations have been organizational, such as the development of cities in the Levant and east and south Asia, the birth of modern experimental science, and the transition from family-tribal-moeity structures to multiple scales of governance (including corporate, national, international, and global government structures and institutions).

Some responses to economic and environmental change defy the longstanding predictions of overpopulation concerns, such as the widespread trend towards declining birthrates as living standards increase [32], though the relationship between per capita energy consumption and population growth is complex [33]. While Burger and colleagues point to increasing energy consumption over the past few centuries, they disregard important shifts in the sources of energy in progressive economies [1]; the expansion of low-carbon energy sources in China, Brazil, the European Union, and other regions in recent decades marks a critical transition, and a shift from coal-fired sources of power to hydropower or wind mark very significant transformations, with important implications for ecological footprints. For example, over 98% of Norway's electricity is derived from hydropower [34], about 20% of Brazil's transport fuels consumption is derived from renewable biofuels [35], while China has installed to date about 61 GW of windpower, or roughly three times the generation potential of the Three Gorges Dam [36]. The development of a global environmental movement is also notable in this context, as signified by both the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (attended by over 100 heads of state and 172 governments) as well as its planned 2012 successor conference, the Rio+20 Summit, in addition to important milestones achieved under the UN biodiversity and climate conventions (i.e., the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity [UNCBD] and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC]).

While these and other innovations in organization, efficiency, and technology have had unintended side effects, they also resulted in major transitions in human survivorship, resource extraction efficiency, and social and cultural organization. They were also largely unanticipated or very difficult to predict for most observers prior to their invention. Taken together, humans have demonstrated great creativity in how we use technological, social, and cultural “tools” to solve resource limitations.

Not Doomed (Yet) Top

Our “adjustments” to the view of sustainability science presented by Brown and colleagues [1] are not meant to obscure or downplay absolute declines in resources such as economically valuable metals and agriculturally productive land, our heedless approach to anticipated tipping points in greenhouse gas accumulation, and ecosystem transformation and species extinction. The availability of natural resources is less of a problem than absolute limits in the Earth's ability to absorb the different outputs of economic activities, while maintaining conditions necessary for human productivity, much less the survival of humans and other species. Anthropogenic climate change is perhaps the most prominent example of these new scarcities and emerging “limits to growth.” Indeed, we attribute great merit to these cautionary appeals and to the evidence of Earth system thresholds. We argue for positive responses in behavior, technological progress, and economic realignments commensurate with the challenge of fulfilling human needs while maintaining an Earth system suitable for the long-term survival of humans and other species.

The authors ask, Can the Earth support even current levels of human resource use and waste production, let alone provide for projected population growth and economic development? They answer their question with little doubt: “There is increasing evidence that modern humans have already exceeded global limits on population and socioeconomic development, because essential resources are being consumed at unsustainable rates” [1]. We agree that our present consumptive trajectory risks surpassing perceived planetary boundaries in the safe operating space for humanity (c.f. [11]). We argue that these risks merit a paradigm shift, a global transformation—and that this paradigm shift is underway. We believe that the transition from relatively static approaches to sustainability to flexible green economies embedded in dynamic, variable ecosystems will prove to be a critical intellectual shift for humans this century.

There are reasons for cautious optimism. It is no accident that the modern synthesis of payments for ecosystem services crystallized in the developing world in Costa Rica when the scarcity of ecosystem goods and services from forest conversion was recognized as a social and economic threat [37]. Revolutionary approaches to water management such as dynamic environmental flows have evolved to address both climate variability and absolute shifts in Tanzania's precipitation regime (http://www.iucn.org/about/union/secretar​iat/offices/esaro/what\_we\_do/water\_and\_w​etlands/prbmp\_esaro/). A global policy and economic transformation attributing value to standing forest has emerged with the development of “REDD+” incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation, particularly in tropical forests (c.f. [38]). Many developing countries understand that Western models of development are inappropriate if not impossible to achieve. We believe that these and other positive trends are both accelerating and permeating local, national, and global economies quickly and permanently.

### Tech Good

#### Techno-optimism and skepticism can coexist – rejecting optimism dooms the developing world to poverty and starvation

Schafer 9 [Arthur Schafer, Director of the Centre for Professional and Applied Ethics, University of Manitoba, Jan 1 2009, Review of *The End of Ethics In A Technological Society,* http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/departments/philosophy/ethics/media/End\_of\_Ethics\_In\_A\_Technological\_Society.pdf]

These rival tropes – white-coated saviour vs. white-coated villain - might be classified, respectively, as technophiliac and technophobiac. The technophiles berate the technophobes for being mired in the stagnant past; the technophobes accuse the technophiles of putting at risk everything we hold dear.¶ It would be misleading, however, to think of these warring camps as comprising two entirely distinct groups of people. It would be misleading because the battle of competing images is often internal rather than external. Each of us feels hopeful and optimistic some of the time, attracted by the vision of a better world through better technology. At other times, we feel fearful that efforts to achieve mastery over both Nature and human nature will produce a catastrophic result that no one could desire. In our anxious moments we remember the ancient Greek warning that Hubris is inevitably followed by Nemesis. When we are feeling hopeful, however, we imagine a world in which the ancient scourges of poverty and disease have been banished by modern technology or at least a world in which fewer of our fellow human beings suffer unremittingly.¶ Ours is a society marked by general affluence, in a world marked by general poverty. Despite the shameful existence of a sizeable minority of our own citizens which continues to live in abject poverty, we are proud of the fact that per capita income (adjusted for inflation) has been doubling roughly every generation over a period of almost two centuries. In other parts of the world, notably China and India, hundreds of millions of people have recently made the great leap from starvation to poverty and they have done so by following a technology-dependent path similar to ours. Many hope that their next leap will be from poverty to comfort and then onwards and upwards to Western-style luxury. Our exhortations - that they seek a more modest path to development, so as to spare the global environment from further (possibly fatal) damage - strike many in the developing world as hypocritical. Billions of Chinese and Indians, after all, remain mired in poverty, as do billions of others in Africa and South America.¶ Scientific discovery and technological innovation are indisputably making an important contribution to growing prosperity, thereby providing evidence for the claim that life goes better in a technological society. As Francis Bacon famously remarked, “knowledge is power”. Bacon was writing at the end of the 16th century, but his aphorism presciently captures the spirit of the 18 th century European Enlightenment. A century later, faith in the liberating power of scientific knowledge was echoed and amplified by such otherwise disparate 19th century thinkers as the liberal John Stuart Mill and the socialist Karl Marx. Mill and Marx share a striking confidence that civilizations progress through the advancement of scientific knowledge. Both believe in Progress (with a capital “P) and both insist that modern science is critically important if humankind is to ameliorate such evils as disease and starvation. Equally important, Mill and Marx share the conviction that scientific thinking will, more or less rapidly, transform modern men and women into well-educated, reasonable, and tolerant citizens. Ignorance, irrationality, superstition and intolerance (all associated with traditional religious faith) may never be totally abolished but they will surely yield, over time, to the Enlightenment forces of science and reason.

### Science Good

#### Scientific knowledge is best because it subjects itself to constant refinement based on empirical evidence

Hutcheon 93—former prof of sociology of education at U Regina and U British Columbia. Former research advisor to the Health Promotion Branch of the Canadian Department of Health and Welfare and as a director of the Vanier Institute of the Family. Phd in sociology, began at Yale and finished at U Queensland. (Pat, A Critique of "Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA", http://www.humanists.net/pdhutcheon/humanist%20articles/lewontn.htm)

The introductory lecture in this series articulated the increasingly popular "postmodernist" claim that all science is ideology. Lewontin then proceeded to justify this by stating the obvious: that scientists are human like the rest of us and subject to the same biases and socio-cultural imperatives. Although he did not actually say it, his comments seemed to imply that the enterprise of scientific research and knowledge building could therefore be no different and no more reliable as a guide to action than any other set of opinions. The trouble is that, in order to reach such an conclusion, one would have to ignore all those aspects of the scientific endeavor that do in fact distinguish it from other types and sources of belief formation.¶ Indeed, if the integrity of the scientific endeavor depended only on the wisdom and objectivity of the individuals engaged in it we would be in trouble. North American agriculture would today be in the state of that in Russia today. In fact it would be much worse, for the Soviets threw out Lysenko's ideology-masquerading-as-science decades ago. Precisely because an alternative scientific model was available (thanks to the disparaged Darwinian theory) the former Eastern bloc countries have been partially successful in overcoming the destructive chain of consequences which blind faith in ideology had set in motion. This is what Lewontin's old Russian dissident professor meant when he said that the truth must be spoken, even at great personal cost. How sad that Lewontin has apparently failed to understand the fact that while scientific knowledge -- with the power it gives us -- can and does allow humanity to change the world, ideological beliefs have consequences too. By rendering their proponents politically powerful but rationally and instrumentally impotent, they throw up insurmountable barriers to reasoned and value-guided social change.¶ What are the crucial differences between ideology and science that Lewonton has ignored? Both Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have spelled these out with great care -- the former throughout a long lifetime of scholarship devoted to that precise objective. Stephen Jay Gould has also done a sound job in this area. How strange that someone with the status of Lewontin, in a series of lectures supposedly covering the same subject, would not at least have dealt with their arguments!¶ Science has to do with the search for regularities in what humans experience of their physical and social environments, beginning with the most simple units discernible, and gradually moving towards the more complex. It has to do with expressing these regularities in the clearest and most precise language possible, so that cause-and-effect relations among the parts of the system under study can be publicly and rigorously tested. And it has to do with devising explanations of those empirical regularities which have survived all attempts to falsify them. These explanations, once phrased in the form of testable hypotheses, become predictors of future events. In other words, they lead to further conjectures of additional relationships which, in their turn, must survive repeated public attempts to prove them wanting -- if the set of related explanations (or theory) is to continue to operate as a fruitful guide for subsequent research.¶ This means that science, unlike mythology and ideology, has a self-correcting mechanism at its very heart. A conjecture, to be classed as scientific, must be amenable to empirical test. It must, above all, be open to refutation by experience. There is a rigorous set of rules according to which hypotheses are formulated and research findings are arrived at, reported and replicated. It is this process -- not the lack of prejudice of the particular scientist, or his negotiating ability, or even his political power within the relevant university department -- that ensures the reliability of scientific knowledge. The conditions established by the community of science is one of precisely defined and regulated "intersubjectivity". Under these conditions the theory that wins out, and subsequently prevails, does so not because of its agreement with conventional wisdom or because of the political power of its proponents, as is often the case with ideology. The survival of a scientific theory such as Darwin's is due, instead, to its power to explain and predict observable regularities in human experience, while withstanding worldwide attempts to refute it -- and proving itself open to elaboration and expansion in the process. In this sense only is scientific knowledge objective and universal. All this has little relationship to the claim of an absolute universality of objective "truth" apart from human strivings that Lewontin has attributed to scientists.¶ Because ideologies, on the other hand, do claim to represent truth, they are incapable of generating a means by which they can be corrected as circumstances change. Legitimate science makes no such claims. Scientific tests are not tests of verisimilitude. Science does not aim for "true" theories purporting to reflect an accurate picture of the "essence" of reality. It leaves such claims of infallibility to ideology. The tests of science, therefore, are in terms of workability and falsifiability, and its propositions are accordingly tentative in nature. A successful scientific theory is one which, while guiding the research in a particular problem area, is continuously elaborated, revised and refined, until it is eventually superseded by that very hypothesis-making and testing process that it helped to define and sharpen. An ideology, on the other hand, would be considered to have failed under those conditions, for the "truth" must be for all time. More than anything, it is this difference that confuses those ideological thinkers who are compelled to attack Darwin's theory of evolution precisely because of its success as a scientific theory. For them, and the world of desired and imagined certainty in which they live, that very success in contributing to a continuously evolving body of increasingly reliable -- albeit inevitably tentative -- knowledge can only mean failure, in that the theory itself has altered in the process.

### Oil Turn

#### Plan causes a shift away from consumerism --- collapses oil consumption --- that’s the McQuillan and Berry evidence

#### Collapses prices--The link is immediate---expectations of price decline

Feldstein 8 Martin Feldstein, 7/1/2008. Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan, is a professor at Harvard and a member of The Wall Street Journal's board of contributors. “We Can Lower Oil Prices Now,” The Wall Street Journal, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121486800837317581.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries>

Unlike perishable agricultural products, oil can be stored in the ground. So when will an owner of oil reduce production or increase inventories instead of selling his oil and converting the proceeds into investible cash? A simplified answer is that he will keep the oil in the ground if its price is expected to rise faster than the interest rate that could be earned on the money obtained from selling the oil. The actual price of oil may rise faster or slower than is expected, but the decision to sell (or hold) the oil depends on the expected price rise. There are of course considerations of risk, and of the impact of price changes on long-term consumer behavior, that complicate the oil owner's decision – and therefore the behavior of prices. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (the OPEC cartel), with its strong pricing power, still plays a role. But the fundamental insight is that owners of oil will adjust their production and inventories until the price of oil is expected to rise at the rate of interest, appropriately adjusted for risk. If the price of oil is expected to rise faster, they'll keep the oil in the ground. In contrast, if the price of oil is not expected to rise as fast as the rate of interest, the owners will extract more and invest the proceeds. The relationship between future and current oil prices implies that **an expected change in the future price of oil will have an immediate impact on the current price of oil**. Thus, when oil producers concluded that the demand for oil in China and some other countries will grow more rapidly in future years than they had previously expected, they inferred that the future price of oil would be higher than they had previously believed. They responded by reducing supply and raising the spot price enough to bring the expected price rise back to its initial rate. Hence, with no change in the current demand for oil, the expectation of a greater future demand and a higher future price caused the current price to rise. Similarly, credible reports about the future decline of oil production in Russia and in Mexico implied a higher future global price of oil – and that also required an increase in the current oil price to maintain the initial expected rate of increase in the price of oil. Once this relation is understood, it is easy to see how news stories, rumors and industry reports can cause substantial fluctuations in current prices – all without anything happening to current demand or supply. Of course, a rise in the spot price of oil triggered by a change in expectations about future prices will cause a decline in the current quantity of oil that consumers demand. If current supply and demand were initially in balance, the OPEC countries and other oil producers would respond by reducing sales to bring supply into line with the temporary reduction in demand. A rise in the expected future demand for oil thus causes a current decline in the amount of oil being supplied. This is what happened as the Saudis and others cut supply in 2007. Now here is the good news. Any policy that causes the expected future oil price to fall can cause the current price to fall, or to rise less than it would otherwise do. In other words, it is possible to bring down today's price of oil with policies that will have their physical impact on oil demand or supply only in the future. For example, increases in government subsidies to develop technology that will make future cars more efficient, or tighter standards that gradually improve the gas mileage of the stock of cars, would lower the future demand for oil and therefore the price of oil today. Similarly, increasing the expected future supply of oil would also reduce today's price. That fall in the current price would induce an immediate rise in oil consumption that would be matched by an increase in supply from the OPEC producers and others with some current excess capacity or available inventories. Any steps that can be taken now to increase the future supply of oil, or reduce the future demand for oil in the U.S. or elsewhere, can therefore lead **both to lower prices and increased consumption today**.

#### Prolonged dip in prices collapses all producer states, causes political repression and state collapse, and unleashes wars across the world

Hulbert 12 Matthew Hulbert is an analyst at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations "The political perils of low oil prices" July 9 2012 www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.php?id=3796&id\_mailing=295&toegang=49182f81e6a13cf5eaa496d51fea6406

As unedifying as all that might be, the bigger problem producer states have is that internal repression has no guarantee of success these days. It didn't work for Gadhafi in Libya, and it's unlikely to work for Assad in Syria in the long term. As fierce as the rear-guard battles have been, they’ve not been militarily conclusive or conducive to on-going hydrocarbon production.

Follow that argument through and it is clear that if the bulk of producer regimes were struggling to hang on in a $125/b world, they stand little chance of pulling through in an $80/b (or less) environment. So we reach the third step, and logical conclusion of our argument. The lower prices go, the more likely political unrest creates serious supply disruptions affecting physical supplies, with concomitant effects on paper markets. That obviously puts a radically new spin on what 'cyclical' means as far as price and political instability is concerned, but when we look across producer states, it’s hard to find any major players not sitting on a powder keg of political risk these days.

More likely than not, it will be some of the smaller players that get caught in the cross fire first. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is already deeply concerned about Bahrain relative to its Eastern Province. State implosion in Yemen is seen as an internal issue of the al-Saud to deal with, while serious deterioration in Iraq is becoming increasingly problematic in the North. Libya could see any post-war oil gains rapidly wiped out, Sudanese production has already fallen prey to intractable internal disputes, Kazakhstan remains entirely 'dispensable' in Central Asia given a lack of external clout in the region, while Nigeria has new civil strife problems to confront with Boko Haram. That’s before we consider intractable problems in Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. Any one of these jurisdictions could end up with a scorched earth policy if financing gaps aren’t closed.

Go further up the producer state 'food chain', and some of the world's largest players all have the same structural political problems, be it in the Middle East, Eurasia or Latin America. Any sign that a bigger petro-beast is losing control, and prices would rapidly lift. That might be welcome news for producer states lucky enough to ride the price wave and remain intact, but it's a very dangerous game to play.

And that's the whole problem here - the gap between geological costs of production and the geopolitical cost of survival is simply too wide for producers to cover without falling back on draconian measures. If this 'self-correcting' mechanism between price and political unrest starts supporting an informal price floor then so be it, but we shouldn't be fooled that this is serving anyone's interests - on either side of the consumer-producer ledger. Yes, it will help firm prices when certain producers struggle to adapt to rapidly shifting economic conditions, but assuming that more and more producer states hit political problems as prices slip, we're merely cementing the 'too big to fail' status of the very largest oil producers. Seeing petro-states dropping like political flies as prices correct isn't a proper 'solution' for a floor, not only because prices will rebound with a vengeance when markets tighten, but because it will make us even more dependent on a handful of key suppliers. As we all know from previous problems in Iraq (2.9 mb/d), Iran (3 mb/d), Libya (1.48 m/bd), Nigeria (2.4 mb/d) and even Venezuela (2.7 mb/d), once things go politically wrong, it takes a very long time, if ever, to get back to optimal production levels. It's the antithesis of where consumers want to be in terms of sourcing plentiful and fungible supplies.

Final scene: corpses all over the stage

By way of reminder, as much as petro-states currently face a systemic crisis trying to set a price floor, it was only in March that we saw how badly placed OPEC is to moderate the market at the top. Seeing petro-states in a pickle might warm the hearts of many right now, but markets can turn, and turn fast. When they do, the oil weapon will shift target as well. It will no longer be pointed at petro players heads, but directly at consumer states. That's the consequence of a dysfunctional energy system - not just with a $50-$150/b outlook eminently possible, but swings well beyond that 'price band' all too likely.

Splitting this price directly in two and sticking close to $100/b might not be that bad an idea after all: Mopping up the mess from producer state implosion would require an effort far beyond the international systems capabilities and reach. Carefully agreed truces are always better than outright wars, particularly for those squeamish about collateral damage. Corpses would litter the entire energy stage.

### Nihilism Turn --- 1NC

#### Breaking with prior forms of politics and metaphysics results in nihilistic deconstruction

J.M. Balkin 94, Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1131, March, 1994, Lexis

We can also apply the distinction between the infinite and the indefinite to the meanings of texts. People often as-sociate deconstruction with the claim that the meaning of texts is indeterminate. Yet there are two ways to claim that meaning is indeterminate: One can say that a text's meaning is infinite - that is, that it means everything - or one can say that its meaning is indefinite. **If the meaning of every text is infinite, then all texts mean the same thing**, because all texts have every meaning. But if one says that the meaning of every text is indefinite, we mean that the contexts in which the text will take its meaning cannot be specified in advance, and therefore the text will always have an excess of meaning over that which we expect (or intend) it to have when it is let loose upon the world. The first view of texts is consistent with a nihilistic account of deconstruction; **the second is consistent with the type of deconstruction I advocate.**

The choice between these two approaches also corresponds to two different explanations of how one deconstructs a conceptual opposition. **The strategy of the nihilistic view is one of total effacement - all conceptual distinctions are imaginary because the meanings of each side of the opposition are infinite**. Therefore both sides mean the same thing. The strategy of transcendental deconstruction is one of nested opposition. A nested opposition is an opposition in which the two sides "contain" each other - that is, they possess a ground of commonality as well as difference. n55 In this case, the deconstruction argues that the two sides are alike in some contexts and different in others; the logocentric mistake has been to assert categorically that they were simply identical or simply different. Because the two sides form a nested opposition, their similarity and their difference rely on context, but because context cannot be fully determined in advance, the scope of their similarity and difference is indefinite. In this way the transcendental conception of deconstruction preserves the possibility of [\*1153] conceptual distinctions, while the nihilistic version does not. n56

The distinction between transcendental deconstruction and its unworkable alternative rests upon the distinction between the indefinite and the infinite. However, since one can deconstruct any distinction, one should also be able to deconstruct the distinction between the indefinite and the infinite. Even here, however, we need to ask what conception of deconstruction we should use to critique the theory - the transcendental or the nihilistic. If we use a nihilistic concep-tion, we would be effacing this distinction. We would say that there is no difference between the indefinite and the infi-nite in any circumstance or situation. So, for example, we would be saying that everything with indefinite boundaries is infinite in extension. It would follow that each day is infinite in length because the boundary between day and night is indefinite. Thus, the use of nihilistic deconstruction leads to an untenable position, just as it leads to the destruction of many other useful distinctions. But this is a reason to think that **the nihilistic conception of deconstruction is seriously flawed.**

## 1NR

### XT --- Extremism Turn

#### The affirmative politics produces dangerous, extremist politics --- an intellectual endorsement of Derrida’s politics sets the stage for future genocide as the indeterminate language games are coopted – that’s Dyck

#### 1 --- Their view of textuality and meaning encourages Holocaust denial and a distorted view of history makes mass atrocities inevitable

Irving Hexham, in Mission and the State, 1999 ed. Ulrich van der Hayden

http://www.ucalgary.ca/~hexham/courses/Courses-2006/Rels-339/IRVING/Ulrich-revised.htm

Deborah Lipstadt warns historians about the dangers of adopting fashionable theories like deconstruction without solidly grounding their work in an accurate representation of source materials [1994]. She makes a passionate plea for historical accuracy while demonstrating the real dangers that occur when people distort the facts. The techniques used by Holocaust deniers, who use history to propagate their views, are not isolated to rogue historians. The basic arguments used by the deniers are not as absurd as most decent people, who instinctively reject such claims, think. In fact, they are increasingly common in popular scholarship. As Lipstadt points out "It is important to understand that the deniers do not work in a vacuum." [Lipstadt 1984:17]. Rather, holocaust "denial can be traced to an intellectual climate that has made its mark in the scholarly world during the past two decades. The deniers are plying their trade at a time when history seems to be up for grabs and attacks on the Western rationalist tradition have become commonplace." [Lipstadt 1994:17]. She continues: "This tendency can be traced, at least in part, to intellectual currents that began in the late 1960's. Various scholars began to assert that texts had no fixed meaning. The reader's interpretation, not the author's intention, determined meaning." [Lipstadt 1984:18] The danger here is not that established scholars are likely to become converts to holocaust denial, although in places like France this is a clear possibility, rather it is the effect such techniques have on students. As Lipstadt observes: "The scholars who supported this deconstructionist approach were neither deniers themselves nor sympathetic to the deniers' attitudes; most had no trouble identifying Holocaust denial as disingenuous." But, "when students had to confront the issue. Far too many of them found it impossible to recognize Holocaust denial as a movement with no scholarly, intellectual, or rational validity" [Lipstadt 1984:18]. At the end of her work she warns again that some "historians are not crypto-deniers, but the results of their work are the same: the blurring of boundaries between fact and fiction and between persecuted and persecutor [Lipstadt 1994:215]. Further Lipstadt correctly observes that "If Holocaust denial has demonstrated anything, it is the fragility of memory, truth, reason, and history." She is right. As scholars it is our duty to defend history based upon the accurate and the objectivity of scholarship. No doubt some people will bristle at the suggestion that we ought to strive for objectivity. Such critics regard the discovery of bias as something totally new without realizing that the hermeneutics of suspicion existed long before Foucault or Deridda [Spencer 1874] History and the deconstruction of Afrikaner Ideology With Lipstad's warning in mind let us turn to the study of South Africa history. During the 1980's various writers used history to deconstruct the claims of Afrikaner Nationalism [Hexham 1981; du Toit and Giliomee 1983; du Toit 1983; Elphick and Giliomee 1988]. These works made an impact among Afrikaners because they exposed the inconsistencies of the historical claims used to legitimate the ideology of apartheid. This delegitimation was possible because these studies were based on the same historical sources as those used by Afrikaner Nationalists used to justify apartheid. By demonstrating that the sources themselves did not support Nationalist claims these authors struck a body blow at the intellectual edifice that maintained the self-confidence of Afrikaner Nationalist intellectuals. At the same time other authors, such as Charles Villa-Vicencio and James Cochran, joined the fray. But, these latter writers were not trained historians. Rather they were theologians who used history as a tool in the "as a basis for ecclesial renewal" and to "understand the character of the church in South Africa and identify its social function" [Villa-Vicenciio 1988:1]. Worthy as these goals were these theologians appropriated historical evidence rather like fundamentalist Christians use proof texts from the Bible to support their arguments. Thus the historical record was forced into preconceived neo-Marxist ideological frameworks for the purpose of undermining support for apartheid. The problem with this approach was that it often distorted and misrepresented the source documents [Cf. Hexham 1989; 1993]. At this point, it is necessary to add that whenever one talks about the "distortion" or “misrepresentation” of sources it is important to recognize that everyone makes the occasional mistake. It is also true that in many cases legitimate questions of interpretation may arise when various scholars see the significance of the same piece of evidence differently. Therefore, what I am objecting to is not the occasional mistake, questionable usage, or issues of genuine interpretation. Rather, it is the systematic use or misuse of source texts to support a grand theory without regard to the context and clear intent of the original sources. Such practices ignore historical methods for the purpose of promoting an ideology [Himmelfarb 1987; Elton 1967 and 1991] The problem, of course, is that once these techniques are generally accepted the choice of ideology can change. Today they are used to promote democracy and tolerance. Tomorrow they may be used to promote totalitarianism and racism.

#### 2 --- Deconstruction applied broadly increases the risk of its abuse --- produces injustice

J.M. Balkin 94, Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1131, March, 1994, Lexis

Thus, Derrida argues, the opposition "subject of justice" versus "nonsubject of justice" is unstable. Because of its instability, it may continually be questioned, and the criteria that separate the subjects of justice from those nonsubjects - earlier identified by the distinction between "humans" and "animals" - must continually be revised. Hence, Derrida wants to insist, deconstruction is relevant to justice because we can deconstruct the boundaries of who is considered a [\*1144] "person" or, more generally, a proper subject of justice. By challenging these boundaries, we can move from a world in which the conception of a subject of justice is wrongfully limited to one in which it receives a just expansion. n38¶ In this way, Derrida insists, the use of deconstruction might not lead to nihilism or injustice. Instead deconstruc-tion would form part of a progressive project that sought increasingly to expand political rights to those other than white male European human beings by deconstructing the boundaries of who are and are not the proper subjects of justice. As he says, in a slightly different context, "nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal." n39¶ **These egalitarian sentiments are surely to be applauded. Yet Derrida has not shown a necessary connection be-tween deconstruction and justice**. He has merely pointed out that one might deconstruct certain oppositions in a way that produces increasingly egalitarian conclusions. He has not shown that these are the only oppositions one might deconstruct. Nor has he shown that one can only deconstruct these oppositions in a way that produces increasingly egalitarian results.¶ Derrida might have chosen to deconstruct or problematize the distinction between justice and injustice, between liberty and slavery, or between tolerance and bigotry. He does not do so. But nothing in deconstructive theory - if such a thing exists - directs him or forbids him from doing so. **Deconstructive argument does not cease to operate when the conclusions one might draw from it are inegalitarian**, although it is hardly surprising that Jacques Derrida sees egalitar-ian consequences flowing from his use of deconstruction. Indeed, this possibility is admitted by his very claim that de-construction "does not necessarily lead to injustice ... but may ... lead to a reinterpretation" that is more just. n40 Derrida, like every good deconstructor, picks his targets carefully.¶ Moreover, even given the targets of his deconstruction - the historically enforced oppositions between the subjects and nonsubjects of justice - Derrida has not shown that the only way in which these [\*1145] oppositions might be deconstructed leads to increasingly just results. If deconstruction calls into question the boundaries of subjects of jus-tice, it does not follow that the only way to question these boundaries is to advocate their expansion. They may well be unstable, as Derrida insists. Yet their instability might be evidence that they are about to implode, rather than expand. Furthermore, even if there must be an expansion, one can expand the boundary in two opposite directions - by expand-ing the scope of what is assigned to the "human," who is a subject of justice, or by expanding the scope of what is as-signed to the "nonhuman," which is not a proper subject of justice. In this way, **the instability of these boundaries might well be used**, as it has in the past, to show that blacks, or Asians, or women are not fully human beings, or that the dis-tinction between women and animals, for example, **is so unstable that it cannot fully be maintained.**¶ Indeed, **one can understand the history of bigotry as the continuous deconstruction of an imagined unity of hu-mankind**. It is the perpetual claim that the unity of humankind is a pious fiction, a papered-over discontinuity and het-erogeneity, and that the Other within this imagined unity must be located and understood in all of its difference and inferiority. The egalitarian claims to rediscover the true similarity of the subjects of justice by reclaiming those who were wrongly grouped with nonsubjects; the bigot claims to rediscover the true similarity of nonsubjects of justice by rejecting those who were wrongly grouped with the subjects of justice. **Both deconstruct boundaries and categories, and the act of deconstruction does not decide between them.**¶One might also use deconstruction to show that the boundaries of who may possess certain civil and political rights are unstable. Thus, early American feminists argued that the expansion of political rights to black males required the expansion of political rights to women. However, a similar criticism applies here. The claim that the current limita-tions of political rights - like the franchise or the right to life - are unstable and that the justifications for these bounda-ries are self-deconstructing may argue in favor of further restricting the scope of these rights rather than expanding them. If the extension of antidiscrimination laws to disabled persons cannot be squared with the denial of such rights to homosexuals, then perhaps this result counsels in the direction of shrinking the rights of the disabled rather than ex-panding the rights of homosexuals. The strongly egalitarian bias of the academy makes this an unthinkable position, but it is not made unthinkable by any feature of "deconstructive theory**." It is made unthinkable** [\*1146] **by the preexisting moral commitments of those who make the deconstructive argument.**¶If one begins with an egalitarian ideology, one can easily be misled into thinking that the "emancipatory ideal" that Derrida endorses is the same as deconstruction. But this assumption is based on an implicit opposition or conceptual homology - namely, that deconstruction is to logocentrism as emancipation is to slavery, or as expansion of the subjects of justice is to contraction of the subjects of justice. Of course, one of the most important deconstructive techniques is the demonstration that the homology "A is to B as C is to D" is reversible; one deconstructs ideologies by subverting the conceptual homologies upon which they rest. My point is that this technique can be performed as easily with the present set of conceptual oppositions as with the opposition between speech and writing in Of Grammatology.¶ Furthermore, even if one accepted that deconstruction necessarily led to an increased domain of subjects of justice, Derrida's argument rests on the additional assumption that increasing the number of subjects of justice increases justice. But it does not. The second half of the nineteenth century saw two great expansions of the domain of subjects of justice in the United States. The first was the emancipation of the slaves and the bestowal of civil and political rights upon them through the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. The second came twenty years later in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, n41 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that corporations were persons for purposes of the civil and political rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Derrida's terms, corporations too became subjects of justice, and indeed, through the same constitutional amendment that granted civil rights to blacks. The result of this decision was that corporations had contract and property rights against other individuals that the courts were constitutionally bound to enforce, and they did so with a vengeance during America's Gilded Age, with results that today make most economic egalitarians shudder. n42 The legacy of Santa Clara continues to this [\*1147] day: The Supreme Court has held that corporations as constitutional "persons" have First Amendment speech rights like those of private citizens. n43 This holding seems unexceptional but for the fact that corporations usually have considerably more money and therefore can exercise their speech rights more effectively than the average citizen, through donations to political campaigns, purchase of time and space on broadcast and print media, and so on. The recognition and protection of corporate civil and political rights has enabled corporations to convert huge concentrations of property rights into concentrations of political power and thereby exercise considerable control over the American political process. Not surprisingly, some scholars on the left find these results to be perverse and to represent a net loss of individual liberty. n44¶ In recent times, one of the most pressing questions before the American public has been the scope of the right to abortion. Antiabortion activists have been on the forefront of expanding the boundaries of personhood. One might almost believe that they were taking their cue from Derrida, for their arguments are nothing if not deconstructive: Effacing the distinction between fetus and child, they have argued that fetuses are "babies" and doctors who perform abortions are "baby killers." Insisting on the undecideability of any boundaries (such as viability) between the person and the nonperson, they have characterized the current law of the United States as the most violent act of mass murder since the Holocaust. If, as Derrida points out, justice and injustice have been reserved in Western culture to the possessors of language, and if this reservation is itself in need of destabilizing and deconstructing - in the case of animals, for example - the contemporary antiabortion advocate can hardly be faulted for seeing in this claim an argument for the protection of defenseless fetuses, who lack the power of speech and are routinely slaughtered by [\*1148] those who possess this power. Everything that Derrida says about the exclusion of animals from the domain of justice, they might argue, could be said on behalf of the human fetus: If a cat or a chimpanzee should be protected from torture or vivisection, how much more so should the human fetus who likewise lacks the power of speech, and who likewise is slaughtered for the benefit of those whom the state has already recognized as subjects of justice - women?¶ Needless to say, many women's groups and commentators on the left (including, one assumes - although one does not know this for certain - Derrida himself) would find such an argument abhorrent. But is the argument abhorrent be-cause it is not deconstructive or rather because it is deconstructive - because nothing in "deconstruction" prevents such an argument? Is the reason that a feminist who employs deconstruction would not make such an argument because deconstruction forbids it or because it conflicts with her deeply held moral and political commitments - her sense of the just and the unjust? In other words, isn't she really using deconstructive argument to make sense of her existing com-mitments, to articulate her values?¶ In the examples of corporate speech, or the pros and cons of abortion, we witness what I call "ideological drift" at work. n45 An argument or principle that appears on its face to have determinate political consequences turns out to bear a very different political valence when it is inserted into new and unexpected contexts. Yet because, as deconstruction itself reminds us, one cannot fully control the contexts into which an argument or a claim can be inserted, one cannot fully control its political valence in future situations. **The notion of ideological drift follows from the basic deconstructive point that iterability alters**. We have merely applied this point to the practice of deconstructive argument itself. If the practices of deconstruction by human beings are themselves subject to the insights of deconstruction, this alteration seems inevitably to follow. The practice of deconstruction by human beings must also be subject to ideological drift. So is Derrida then hoisted on his own petard? If what is called "deconstruction" is a rhetorical practice, a series of arguments, a set of approaches that can be taught, repeated, iterated, used again and again in different contexts, places, and times, all this would seem to follow. Deconstruction, or more correctly **deconstructive arguments made by human beings, must be iterable in ways that lead to both just and unjust results**. [\*1149]

#### Even if extremism exists now, you still shouldn’t endorse a dangerous politics that increases the risk of genocide and extremist action – it’s a linear DA

### AT: No Link to Turns

#### They can’t say no link --- the 1AC necessarily elevates mythos above logos because it advocates a shift from the current mode of thought centered upon logic

#### They misunderstand the link – yes Hitler pre-dated Derrida but our evidence goes one step further saying that their speech act has political implications and they must be held accountable for the dangerous ideas they introduce in spaces like debate

#### Their Berry evidence says they redesign the current system into western ‘mythologos’ – this sounds nice but there is a necessary tradeoff – we must start with logos in order to prevent extremism – that’s our Crist evidence on FW

#### Aff kills economics and the social sciences

Rosenau 92 Pauline Marie Rosenau is Professor of Political Science at the University of Quebec—Montreal, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES pp105

The post-modern call for an End of the Order of Representation poses both methodological and substantive problems for all the social sciences. Difficulties in both mapping social relations and doing comparative analysis result. Examples from sociology, anthropology, and political science are presented.

To the extent that social scientists attempt to "map" the social world in the sense of representing it, their efforts are questioned by the skeptical post-modernists, for whom any effort at constructing such maps will surely fail. Without the possibility of such representational mapping, the skeptics are, conspiciously, unable to either describe the social world or formulate theories about it because both processes assume representation. The affirmatives are willing to acknowledge that representation as mapping in the social sciences is likely to be imperfect (Jameson 1984a, 1988), but they still believe the effort to represent the social world is worthwhile. This position allows the affirmative post-modernists to continue doing social science, to engage in the representationally dependent activities of description, explanation, and theory construction even though in more modest forms.

Dismissing the possibility of representation undermines modern social science methods in general, but its questioning of comparative analysis is especially thoroughgoing. The very act of comparing, in an effort to uncover similarities and differences, is a meaningless activity because postmodern epistemology holds it impossible ever to define adequately the elements to be contrasted or likened. The skeptical post-modernists' reservations about the possibility of generalizing and their emphasis on difference, discussed above in Section 2, form the basis of rejecting the comparative method. If, as they conclude, everything is unique (Latour 1988: 179-81), then the comparative method is invalid in its attempts to search for and explain similarities and differences while holding certain dimensions constant (assuming a degree of sameness in other variables).15 The affirmative post-modernists, as well, question the linguistic representation upon which any comparative statements are necessarily based. They also argue that comparative analysis makes assumptions about presence or absence, and this too is a contentious matter.

The field of anthropology has been especially sensitive to the post-modern call for an end to the order or representation. Some anthropologists reduce the whole of the post-modern challenge to this crisis of representation. Thus, there is a broad questioning in the field of anthropology as to the "uncertainty about adequate means for describing social reality" (Marcus and Fischer 1986: 8). The problem is fundamental in such a field, where so much depends on accurate description, on some degree of correspondence between what the scholar finds and what is "really out there."

In anthropology this means there is doubt about whether it is even possible to describe (represent) other cultures and formulate theories about them (Rabinow 1986). But it also involves knowing what questions are appropriate for an ethnographer to ask about another culture.16 As a result of the internal turmoil provoked by post-modern anti-representational views in anthropology, changes are occurring in how anthropologists and ethnographers write about other societies. For example, some post-modernists in these fields avoid the word "represent" altogether; they contend their goal is merely to "evoke." Evoking is preferable to representing because it is assumed to free one of objects, facts, descriptions, generalizations, experiments, and truth (Tyler 1986: 129—30). This solution may not satisfy all anthropologists because it implies a clear relinquishing of professional authority (Marcus and Fischer 1986: 8).

Sociology too has experienced a period of post-modern floundering, an identity crisis over the problems of representation.17 "Totalizing vision is replaced by concerns with contextuality, exceptions, indeterminants," and meaning in general (Richardson 1988: 200). Some post-modern sociologists resolve the crisis of representation by abandoning the activity of the- ory construction altogether because it depends on the now dubious ability to re-present (Seidman 1989). Post-modern anti-representation leads others to reduce the claims they make for their scholarly research, transforming sociological activity into "storytelling" (constructing mini-narratives) rather than inquiry. It becomes "allegorical" or literary rather than scientific (Richardson 1988: 200-204). This strategy has certain advantages: One cannot be criticized by post-modernists if one simply refuses to make any knowledge claims, one cannot be denounced by one's modern colleagues for not being "scientific" if one erases the distinction between science and literature (Clifford and Marcus 1986: 4).

Another strategy suggested by some post-modern sociologists and anthropologists involves erasing the barrier between the representing subject and the represented object of inquiry. They propose to go "among the people" and simply let them "speak for themselves" (Pratt 1986: 32). This strategy is designed to end the "illusion of objectivity" and reduce the need to represent. This may not resolve the crisis of representation so much as shift the burden of representing from the researcher to "the people." Post-modern anti-representation orients the ideological content of political science inquiry as concerns democracy though not in a singular, unilateral direction.18 As formulated by the skeptics, post-modern anti-representationalism undermines confidence in democracy, erases any normative preference for representative democracy, questions the struggle for reforms concerning equality of representation, and discourages experimentation with new forms of democracy. It almost precludes any defense of modern Western forms of representational democracy as they are known today. The affirmatives who turn to public-sphere theory face equally serious problems. The requirements of critical debate and discussion in the public sphere are so obviously demanding that only a small portion of the population can meet them. Public-sphere theory gets around the shortcomings of representation, but it is vulnerable to the charge of elitism.

Post-modern anti-representationalism in political science raises the problem of relevance. Extreme skeptical post-modern political theorists call for the end of the "Order of Representation," and this includes representative democracy. Their cynicism with respect to democracy appears illtimed in light of recent world events. Many former socialist and communist countries have recently opted for representative democracy. Certainly modern Western democracy has its weaknesses and inadequacies, but to denounce it as thoroughly as do some skeptical post-modern political theorists appears a bit naive. Some affirmative post-modern political scientists call for direct democracy, but they are fuzzy on the details and means by which this can be successfully applied in large societies. Many post-modern political scientists, as a result of "real world events," face what might be called a crisis of credibility, yet to be resolved and in need of immediate attention.

### AT: Warming Impact

#### No warming impact---mitigation and adaptation will solve

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

### XT -- Rationality Good

#### Even if rationality isn’t perfect, faith in rationality is good because it produces PRACTICAL knowledge which is enough to act upon

“While there can be no purely "objective reason," field-invariant and field-dependent principles of argumentation can be justified pragmatically” --- it’s also self-correcting which is our 1NC Hutcheon evidence which proves rationality is the best approach

#### Our Rowland evidence says “truth should be understood not as factual statements that are certain, but as symbolic statements that function as useful problem-solving tools” and “Although the postmodern critique denies that humans can directly experience "the facts," it does not deny that a real-world exists” which proves our arg

#### Their approach leads to relativism since they make the perfect the enemy of the good

### Growth Sustainable

#### Growth’s sustainable---tech innovation continually changes the game and outpaces their predictions---global shift towards sustainability’s happening now, it’s effective and permanent – Matthews evidence answers his only 2AC card that is too old and doesn’t assume new innovation that resolves unsustainable consumption

#### Growth’s driving successful climate adaptation and reversal on a global scale now---solves their impact

John H. Matthews 12, and Frederick Boltz, Center for Conservation and Government, Conservation International, June 2012, “The Shifting Boundaries of Sustainability Science: Are We Doomed Yet?,” PLOS Biology, <http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001344>

Perhaps the most significant shifts in resource management consciousness have emerged through climate change adaptation and the recognition that institutions, infrastructure, and ecosystems have been managed on the basis of climate “stationarity,” which is the assumption that the past is an effective guide to the future [30],[39].

We suggest that ecosystems and economies should be managed flexibly for at least three non-stationary processes, including demographics, economics, and climate. A fourth non-stationarity should target research and investments that lead to increased efficiency and smaller resource footprints. Taken together, these non-stationarities fit social–ecological resilience theory quite closely. Complex and shifting human interactions with ecosystems and biogeochemical cycles can be translated into decision-making processes [40].

With increasing scientific knowledge and global awareness of emerging environmental risks, scarcities, and potential tipping points in social and ecological systems, measures are being taken to correct our flawed economic models—internalizing externalities in accounting and decision making, integrating planetary boundaries in policy discussions, and committing to reverse trends in environmental and social decline. We agree with our respected colleagues that this change is not happening at the scale or pace necessary to resolve the problem [1], and exceeding tipping points is a genuine risk. Such signal failures of resource management as the collapse of the Atlantic cod fishery in the 20th century [41] or the lack of a global carbon emissions agreement at the UNFCCC CoP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 highlight our difficulty in negotiating science, institutional change, and governance. However, we also highlight that the adaptive capacity of humanity to overcome seemingly insurmountable constraints on human development within a productive and resilient biosphere has been demonstrated at more modest scales and that this capacity for transformation exists in our interconnected global community at a scale previously unimaginable.

Science-based resource management has seen dramatic growth in sophistication in recent decades, as conservation and economic development have blended together and flexible, non-stationary management approaches have become increasingly mainstream in development banks, governments and aid agencies, and corporations. These shifts represent real advances in linking ecology to practical challenges in managing resources across multiple spatial and temporal scales.

#### Collapse is not inevitable---their authors underestimate societal resilience, flexibility, and innovation---the existential imperative will drive growth toward ecological sustainability

John H. Matthews 12, and Frederick Boltz, Center for Conservation and Government, Conservation International, June 2012, “The Shifting Boundaries of Sustainability Science: Are We Doomed Yet?,” PLOS Biology, <http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001344>

In this issue of PLoS Biology, Burger and colleagues make several important contributions to the discourse of sustainability science, recalling limits of human economic and population growth derived from macroecology and physical principles [1]. We agree with many of the points offered in their paper in this issue and with those in the paper by Brown and colleagues [2]. However, we also believe there is danger in a vision of sustainability that is overly deterministic and does not reflect the dynamic nature of the biosphere, its ecosystems, and economies. We are also concerned about the implications of framing sustainability in the language of physics rather than ecology.

Recent policy discussions in preparation for the Rio+20 Convention emphasize the concept of “green economies.” Perhaps most cogently described by microbiologist Lynn Margulis, the term refers to any theory of economics that views human economic activity as embedded within ecosystems. Green economics is often used with or in place of the more widely used term of “sustainability” or “sustainability science.” Both terms reflect a new, evolving, and diffuse discipline—or perhaps a goal approached through many disciplines, including ecology, economics, engineering, and sociology. Given the central role of ecosystems in current paradigms for sustainable development, the science of ecology is a seemingly natural home for sustainability science.

However, ecology may also present some operational limits to assessing or implementing sustainable strategies. Given how difficult it is to develop ecological experiments and test hypotheses, ecology has been described as having more in common with the earth sciences (such as geology) than other biological sciences (such as physiology or molecular biology), and much less with physical sciences such as chemistry and physics [3],[4]. Given the importance of observation and inference in ecology, making predictions about complex ecological interactions requires accepting their inherent uncertainty and thus a particular humility in drawing conclusions [5].

A reader of the Burger and colleagues paper [1], for instance, might assume that the logical endpoints for its arguments are either an imminent global economic collapse triggered by stringent natural resource scarcities or catastrophic human population decline in a forceful realignment with global carrying capacity. These are dire options, with no realistically actionable response, and a reader would be forced to either reject the initial assumptions or to despair, neither of which is a useful motivational force for positive change.

Moreover, while we believe that heightened concern is warranted and that these endpoints are possible, we also believe there is evidence that they can be avoided or mitigated. Predictions made on similar first principles have been put forward repeatedly in the past (e.g., [6]–[8]), and rigidly materialist approaches to social and economic change often underestimate the flexibility and resilience of human economies and societies [9]. To date, technological advances such as increases in agricultural productivity spurred by the prospect or reality of scarce primary inputs (land, water, nutrients, energy), shifts in economic valuation, and policy-based human behavioral change, such as the actions under the Montreal Protocol to reduce tropospheric concentrations of ozone-depleting gases, have avoided or delayed our transgression of perceived thresholds in the Earth system [10],[11]. While we cannot assume that there is an equivalent to Moore's Law of semiconductor capacity for natural resource management [12] or have faith that efficiency and innovation alone will save us, we can credibly assume that the existential imperative for human adjustment and adaptation will prompt us to correct our seemingly disastrous course.

As a result, we believe that sustainability itself must rest on a broader foundation, particularly if we posit that sustainability science encompasses socioeconomic development, which requires the mobilization of natural resources in new ways to sustain and improve human well-being. Here, we describe several potential gaps in sustainability science, as well as evidence for what we hope is useful optimism that emerging economic paradigms are becoming more ecologically sensitive.

### Tech Good

#### Tech thought and faith in it is inevitable

Kateb 97 George, Professor of politics at Princeton, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_/ai\_19952031

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity--and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives--would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence. As for our generation and the indefinite future, many of us are prepared to say that there are many things we wish that modern science did not know or is likely to find out and many things we wish that modern technology did not know how to do. When referring in 1955 to the new sciences of life, Heidegger says We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us (1966, p. 52). The implication is that it is less bad for the human status or stature and for the human relation to reality that there be nuclear destruction than that (what we today call) genetic engineering should go from success to success. To such lengths can a mind push itself when it marvels first at the passions, drives, and motives that are implicated in modern technology, and then marvels at the feats of technological prowess. The sense of wonder is entangled with a feeling of horror. We are past even the sublime, as conceptualized under the influence of Milton's imagination of Satan and Hell. It is plain that so much of the spirit of the West is invested in modern technology. We have referred to anger, alienation, resentment. But that cannot be the whole story. Other considerations we can mention include the following: a taste for virtuosity, skill for its own sake, an enlarged fascination with technique in itself, and, along with these, an aesthetic craving to make matter or nature beautiful or more beautiful; and then, too, sheer exhilaration, a questing, adventurous spirit that is reckless, heedless of danger, finding in obstacles opportunities for self-overcoming, for daring, for the very sort of daring that Heidegger praises so eloquently when in 1935 he discusses the Greek world in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1961, esp. pp. 123-39). All these considerations move away from anger, anxiety, resentment, and so on. The truth of the matter, I think, is that the project of modern technology, just like that of modern science, must attract a turbulence of response. The very passions and drives and motives that look almost villainous or hypermasculine simultaneously look like marks of the highest human aspiration, or, at the least, are not to be cut loose from the highest human aspiration.

### XT --- Nihilism Turn

#### Breaking with prior forms of politics and metaphysics results in nihilistic deconstruction – that’s Balkin

#### Turns the case --- purely negative resistance reinscribes that which it resists

Spitzer 11 (Anais N. Spitzer is a Visiting Instructor of Religious Studies at Prescott College, 2011, “Soliciting Philosophy’s Tears” in *Derrida, Myth and the Impossibility of Philosophy*)

Resistance is more complex than it may initially appear because it is not just the rejection of something. Extending this insight allows us to understand how, in resisting indecidable mythos, philosophy as logos affirms it. First we must recall how Hegel’s dialectic assimilates difference, uniting it with identity. From this point of view, resistance is ultimately pointless, since difference (resistance) is merely a passing stage that is eventually negated. When negation is negated, resistance becomes affirmation. However, from an alternative vantage point, the dialectic is a response to resistance. In order to mitigate uncertainty and otherness, it is designed to reconcile and domesticate these upsetting others in order to welcome them, not as contraventions, but as part of a whole. As we have seen, however, the dialectical movement is incomplete. Its efforts at reconciliation can never completely disarm these opposites in order to remedy the unsettling tears within itself. These others cannot be synthesized and attenuated in the name of logos or identity. As much as they do not ‘belong’ to the system, they are integral to it, and are therefore preserved by it. Yet, in remaining, they also threaten the system from within. This explains the need to constrain them, to keep them at bay, even while they defy such restriction. In a chapter aptly titled, ‘Not just resistance,’ Taylor explores this dilemma: From one point of view, the ‘No’ of resistance is a negation or an avoidance of affirmation two gestures that are not the same. But resistance is not merely negative; nor does it simply avoid affirmation. To resist is also to affirm even when it is not clear what is being affirmed. A certain affirmation . . . inhabits the negation of resistance as an anteriority that can never be escaped or erased . . . Resistance, after all, is secondary and, as such, is a response to that which it follows. . . . As the re of resistance implies, resistance reinscribes what it resists. Thus, resistance involves an unavoidable duplicity: it affirms what it seems to deny, and denies what it seems to affirm. Resistance needs, and, therefore, inevitably repeats, what it nonetheless cannot sanction. Though resistance remains exterior to what it resists, there is (impossibly) nothing outside resistance. (N, 73) If resistance were a ‘merely negative’ exteriority it would affirm that which it denies. It would not, therefore, truly resist.53 Derrida understands this, and marshals the internal contradictions of the Hegelian system as resistances that are already in place and not, therefore, simply external.54 More important, however, is Taylor’s observation that a ‘certain affirmation . . . inhabits the negation of resistance as an anteriority that can never be escaped or erased.’ In order to say ‘no’ to something, the something must first be acknowledged or affirmed. In other words, resistance unintentionally, but unavoidably, affirms that which it resists. Therefore, resistance is never primary, but always secondary and, as Taylor observes, re-inscribes that which it resists. In the current context, in order to resist mythos, philosophy as logos must unwittingly affirm and reinscribe it. This is precisely what Plato’s Phaedrus does. In marshalling his forces of resistance (by attempting to employ the pharmakon as remedy or poison, to the exclusion of its other meaning) in order to ‘cure’ his discourse and logos of mythos, Plato unavoidably affirms ambiguous mythos. In doing so he unintentionally, but inescapably, poisons the logocentric intentions of the discourse he aspires to protect. Logos’ resistance (to mythos) both affirms and denies mythos as that which it cannot, at all costs, confront, lest the resisted undermine the resister. This is, of course, exactly what happens. Harboured within logos’ resistance to mythos is an unintended affirmation a preservation of mythos.

#### The aff’s form of deconstruction produces inaction

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Yet I leave both books with a sense of unease. Is there anything else that critics of texts can do about the Bomb? Is the subject exhausted by analyzing stories and novels, even if one managed to hunt them all down, and all the relevant film scripts for good measure? Confining our interest to nuclear fiction, we run the risk of growing too comfortable with the Bomb. It is not just another usable theme for writers and their critics. The Bomb really exists. It stands ready and waiting to terminate civilization. It is the text to end all texts.¶ In the same years that Brians and Dowling were at work on their studies of nuclear war fiction, critics of a more theoretical turn of mind began looking at the Bomb in a broader setting. The Summer 1984 issue of Diacritics introduced us to the notion of "nuclear criticism," defined both as the interpretation of standard works of literature in the light of the Bomb and as the application of critical theory to the rhetoric of nuclear war, on the assumption that discourse is itself violence. As Tobin Siebers complains in The Ethics of Criticism, the two approaches contradict one another, since "nuclear war cannot be both intrinsic and extrinsic to literature at the same time" (227). So be it. But can nuclear criticism deconstruct nuclear discourse? Can literary critics make themselves useful to humanity by unraveling the words not only of novelists but also of presidents, defense ministers, commanders of nuclear forces, strategic planners, arms negotiators, weapons contractors, and all those who have, together, created what Jacques Derrida calls the "phantasm" of nuclear war? ¶ J. Fisher Solomon's agenda in Discourse and Reference in the Nuclear Age is to answer such questions in terms that will catch the attention of literary theorists and, at the same time, provoke their engagement in the struggle to prevent nuclear war. His starting points are the movement of American poststructuralist criticism in the early and middle 1980s toward a new historicism and a new political consciousness, as exhibited in the work of Fredric Jameson, Edward Said, and Michael Ryan, and in the ingenious challenge to their initiatives delivered by Derrida in his paper in Diacritics, "No Apocalypse, Not Now." Solomon gives the devil his due in a careful analysis of Derrida's paper, but he concludes-I think correctly-that the Derridean deconstruction of nuclear criticism leads potentially to its destruction as well. Derrida does not forbid us to interpret the world and even foresee possible futures, "but he does deconstruct the ground by which we might evaluate our interpretations, suspending our beliefs in a universal epoche" (30). If we deny the availability of external criteria by which to make rational choices between alternative judgments and actions, if we decide that nothing is decidable, then we have made a commitment in spite of ourselves: **a commitment to the status quo.** The way out of our dilemma, according to Solomon, is to adopt a conjectural, nondogmatic, and critical realism, along the lines of Karl Popper's revision of Aristotle, with a little help from the semiotics of C. S. Peirce. Such a philosophy weaves its way adroitly through the brambles of Heideggerian elitist irrationalism, Marxian dogmatics, and Derridean nihilism, to emerge at the other end of the obstacle course with a theory that girds us for hard thought and action in the everyday world of empirical reality. At one point Solomon admits, almost sheepishly, that believing in the **reality of an external world** and the **rational objectivity of scientific knowledge** may sound to an outsider like simple common sense. But for a critic in this decade to speak of "extratextual referents" (such as the Bomb) or to propose that science is not just another form of literature, takes courage. The drift of recent philosophy of science as well as poststructuralist criticism is all in the direction of a corrosive and radical subjectivity that would, if it could, **leave nothing standing**. For his courage, and for his determination to gain the ear of critics by mastering the arcane language of high theory, Solomon deserves much credit.