# K

#### The aff enframes the world to limit out any ontological questioning and ensures a violent monopoly on truth that results in endless warfare

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This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper **bedrock of modern reason** that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but **the apparently solid ground of the real itself**. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly **they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale**. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: **ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained** as it is.

I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use **of armed force**, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form.

I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: **a drive for ideational** hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, **that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being**, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here **we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state)**. When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to **quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation** either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context **violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion**, at limited cost and with limited impact -- **it permeates being.**

This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which **humans are merely utilitarian instruments** for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather **turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction**. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21

#### The alt is to engage in meditative reflection and ask the question of Being

Swazo 2 Norman is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alaska. “Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections,” p. 12-14

In line with the above thought, I have noted that world order scholars are genuinely concerned about the manifold dimensions of planetary crisis­: war, both conventional war and the post-Cold War threat of thermonuclear war; social and economic injustice, especially between the industrialized North and the developing South of the globe; conditions of extreme poverty, especially in Africa, the subcontinent of Asia, and Latin America; and esca­lating ecological decay across the face of the planet. I submit that this "prag­matic" concern is really a manifestation of an existential anxiety in the face of a prospect of death through global catastrophe issuing from one or a combi­nation of these global problems. Such anxiety in the face of death is fully con­sonant with Heidegger's concern for the human way to be during the global reign of technology, that way in which modernity in its extreme configura­tion determines human life for better and for worse. With this in mind, it is not sufficient merely to contrapose the logic of world order to the logic of statecraft in the manner of straightforward nor­mative disputation. It is necessary, rather, that this existential anxiety be experienced in an essential way; i.e., such that all ethical and political logic and thinking come into question, and such that we come to see that even the logic of world order can have hidden prejudices that must be put into ques­tion. This "putting into question" is not a nihilistic move, such that we would come away from this questioning justifying anything or nothing at all. Rather, the fragility of our inherited and then transmitted justifications within the Western valuation comes into clear relief against the background of the human way to be that Heidegger seeks to clarify. We must remember, after all, as Charles Scott observes, that ... anything has been justified in our history by appeal to universal values and meanings, including the most severe repressions, torture, violent cru­elty, war, and the morbid enslaving and destructive segregation of vast groups of people. The proliferation of `universal' norms whereby we justify certain values and contend against other values mirrors our fear of what the world would be like if we lacked an adequate basis for justifying our values and realizing the best possibilities of ourselves.... The tension in Heidegger's thought ... puts in question the combina­tion of axioms, authorizing disclosure and judgment, as well as the belief that with a proper normative basis for our values we can hope to overcome the destructive proliferation of violently opposing ways of life."

# ASPEC

#### Agency discussions are essential to education about energy policy

Valentine 10 Scott Victor Valentine - Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore, “Canada’s constitutional separation of (wind) power” Energy Policy, Volume 38, Issue 4, April 2010,

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009227

Should policymakers facilitate renewable energy capacity development through distributive policies (i.e. subsidies), regulatory policies (i.e. CO2 emission caps), redistributive policies (i.e. carbon taxes) or constituent policies (i.e. green energy campaigns) (Lowi, 1972)? A preponderance of research has gone into addressing this question from various conceptual perspectives, which include popular themes such as comparing the efficacy of various policy instruments (cf. Blakeway and White, 2005; EWEA, 2005; Menza and Vachona, 2006; cf. Lipp, 2007), championing the efficacy of one specific instrument (cf. Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; cf. Mathews, 2008), assessing the impact that socio-economic dynamics have on the selection or design of policy instruments (cf. Maruyama et al., 2007; cf. Huang and Wu, 2009), investigating policy instrument selection in stakeholder networks (cf. Rowlands, 2007; cf. Mander, 2008), investigating hurdles to effective policy instruments implementation (cf. Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2002), and examining challenges associated with evaluating policy instrument efficacy (cf. Mallon, 2006; cf. Vine, 2008).

Despite the proliferation of studies on policy instruments in the renewable energy policy field, there are no prominent examples of studies which investigate the impact that the federal form of government has on strategic selection of policy instruments. Federal government systems are characterized by power-sharing between the central authority and the regions comprising the federation. For federal policymakers, the manner in which power is divided can pose significant policy-making problems (Thorlakson, 2003). Specifically, federal attempts to apply coercive policy instruments in policy areas of regional or concurrent (shared) authority can generate political, legal or operational resistance by regional authorities. Even when developing policy for areas under federal jurisdiction, regional authorities have to avail their various “thrust and riposte” tactics to undermine the efficacy of disagreeable federal policies (Braun et al., 2002). Given that there are 24 nations with a federal government structure (including the major economies of the United States, Germany, Canada, Australia, Russia, India, Spain, Brazil and Mexico), a formal enquiry into the impact that federal structure has on renewable energy policy instrument development is merited.

#### VI for limits and ground---hundreds of relevant actors, from the DoE to DOD, courts, executive all conduct different energy programs and have different restrictions ---overstretches our research burden and wrecks 1NC strategy.

# Px

#### CIR with path to citizenship will pass---sustained momentum’s key

Cohen 2/8 Micah is a writer for NYT’s 538 blog. “Signs of a Shift on Immigration Among G.O.P. Rank-and-File,” 2013, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/signs-of-a-shift-on-immigration-among-g-o-p-rank-and-file/

With notable speed after the Nov. 6 presidential election, a number of Republican politicians and opinions makers — from House Speaker John A. Boehner to the talk show host Sean Hannity — altered their positions on immigration and expressed a new openness to comprehensive reform.¶ Since then, the push to overhaul the nation’s immigration system appears to have sustained momentum. A new ABC News/Washington Post poll found a jump in public approval of President Obama’s handling of immigration, and most recent polls have found a majority of Americans support providing immigrants who have come here illegally a pathway to United States citizenship.¶ So, has the shift on immigration among some — but not all — Republican legislators, strategists and media personalities filtered down to rank-and-file Republicans?¶ The polling evidence — with a few significant caveats — says “possibly, yes.” There are signs of an uptick in Republican support for a pathway to citizenship, or at least a conditional pathway to citizenship.¶ First, the caveats. Tracking opinions on immigration policy over time is tricky because each pollster asks different questions with different options, making for apples-to-oranges comparisons. In addition, when narrowing the focus to self-identified Republicans and Republican leaners, small sample sizes and large margin of sampling errors become a problem. A typical national survey includes about 1,000 respondents, making the subsample of Republicans pretty small, usually around 200 to 300.¶ But keeping those disclaimers in mind, the most recent polls on immigration suggest an increase in the percentage of Republicans who favor immigration reform that includes a route to United States citizenship.¶ On average, the share of Republicans who favor providing undocumented immigrants with a path to citizenship is 48 percent among the six national polls released so far in 2013 and included in the PollingReport.com database. (The release of a CNN poll conducted Jan. 14-15 did not provide a breakdown by political party and is not included in the average).¶ Among the six previous polls that asked about a pathway to citizenship and released results by party identification, an average of only 38 percent of Republicans favored providing a path to citizenship.¶ Question wording has an effect here. Two of the polls that found the highest level of Republican support emphasized the requirements illegal immigrants might have to meet to become citizens. Conservative voters might be more likely to support a path to citizenship if it involves certain qualifications.¶ For instance, a Fox News poll conducted Jan. 15-17 among registered voters found that 56 percent of Republicans said the government should “allow illegal immigrants to remain in the country and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, but only if they meet certain requirements like paying back taxes, learning English, and passing a background check.”¶ And a Gallup poll released this week found that 59 percent of Republicans would vote for “a law that would allow undocumented immigrants living in the United States the chance to become legal residents or citizens if they meet certain requirements.”¶ On the other hand, a CBS News poll of adults conducted Jan. 24-27 found that only 35 percent of Republicans said illegal immigrants currently working in the country “should be allowed to stay in their jobs and to eventually apply for U.S. citizenship.” (CBS found that 25 percent of Republicans said illegal immigrants should be able to stay as guest workers and 36 percent said they should be required to leave the United States).¶ The apples-to-apples comparisons we have are more mixed: Republican support in the mid-January AP/GfK poll jumped to 53 percent from 31 percent in 2010. The latest ABC News/Washington Post poll moved to 42 percent Republican support for a path to citizenship from 37 percent in November 2012 (that’s inside the margin of sampling error). The CBS News poll did not move at all, finding 35 percent Republican support in both its December 2012 and late January 2013 surveys. And Quinnipiac polls, released on Thursday and in early December 2012, both found roughly 40 percent of registered Republicans support a path to citizenship and just more than 10 percent support legal status without citizenship.¶ An uptick in Republican support for a pathway to citizenship could be statistical noise. And even if it is real, it could reverse itself. Some political science research suggests that anti-immigrant attitudes increase when immigration is in the news.¶ But there are reasons to think that immigration, over all, has become less of a hot-button issue. A Pew study found that the number of illegal immigrants living in the United States has dropped since the 2007 push for change. Another Pew survey found that only 44 percent of Republicans see dealing with immigration as a top priority. That’s down from previous peaks of 69 percent in 2007 and 61 percent in 2011.¶ Further polling is needed before a more concrete picture of Republican attitudes emerges. But if Republican voters have warmed to providing a conditional path to citizenship, it could increase the likelihood of an overhaul becoming law by freeing House Republicans, in particular, to back some kind of reform.

#### Plan drains capital

Miller 12 RL is an attorney and climate writer featured often on the Daily Kos and Climate Hawks. “The Rage Of A Dying Dinosaur: Coal’s Decline In The U.S.,” Think Progress, June 23, <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/06/23/504331/the-rage-of-a-dying-dinosaur-coals-decline-in-the-us/>

A dinosaur backed into a corner by a pack of smaller dinosaurs may be mortally wounded, but it’s big and angry enough to do some serious damage in its death throes. The coal industry, long accustomed to being the Tyrannosaurus Rex of American politics, is on the ropes, battered by forces outside its control, but angry enough to damage people while it searches for an escape route.¶ Long term use of coal in the US is declining: “The share of U.S. electricity that comes from coal is forecast to fall below 40% for the year, its lowest level since World War II. Four years ago, it was 50%. By the end of this decade, it is likely to be near 30%.”¶ Coal’s decline is widely attributed to three reasons, which I’ve cleverly named EPA — Environmental Protection Agency, Price, Activists. One is far less important than the other two.¶ Congressional Republicans blame the EPA, but every time I’ve looked at “EPA regulations force this coal plant shutdown” cries, I’ve found a decrepit old plant shut down most months because maintenance costs are too high. EPA regulations are a relatively minor factor in coal plant shutdowns.¶ Most business analysts attribute coal’s fall to price. Coal’s price in the United States has stayed fairly stable, but prices of alternatives have plummeted. Natgas is at $2.50/MBTU – it was $9-10 during Bush years. Utilities are actively planning to replace older coal fired plants to natural gas. Things are so bad for Old King Coal that it’s fighting with two of its usual strong allies.¶ The electric utilities, formerly joined at the hip with coal, are now bailing on coal:¶ many now recognize that expending the political capital to fight for plants built in the middle of last century is not worth it — especially when they can construct combined cycle natural gas facilities with relative regulatory ease while releasing roughly half of the emissions in the meantime.¶ A perfect storm is pulling the coal sector under:¶ For example, “American Electric Power, meanwhile, has been one of the most vocal critics of EPA regs. But at the same time, it has admitted — according to Tierney’s paper — that its coal plants are running much less than intended because it is cheaper to operate the natural gas facilities.”

#### PC’s key

Foley 1/15 Elise is a writer @ Huff Post Politics. “Obama Gears Up For Immigration Reform Push In Second Term,” 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/obama-immigration-reform\_n\_2463388.html

Obama has repeatedly said he will push hard for immigration reform in his second term, and administration officials have said that other contentious legislative initiatives -- including gun control and the debt ceiling -- won't be allowed to get in the way. At least at first glance, he seems to have politics on his side. GOP lawmakers are entering -- or, in some cases, re-entering -- the immigration debate in the wake of disastrous results for their party's presidential nominee with Latino voters, who support reform by large measures. Based on those new political realities, "it would be a suicidal impulse for Republicans in Congress to continue to block [reform]," David Axelrod, a longtime adviser to the president, told The Huffington Post.¶ Now there's the question of how Obama gets there. While confrontation might work with Republicans on other issues -- the debt ceiling, for example -- the consensus is that the GOP is serious enough about reform that the president can, and must, play the role of broker and statesman to get a deal.¶ It starts with a lesson from his first term. Republicans have demanded that the border be secured first, before other elements of immigration reform. Yet the administration has been by many measures the strictest ever on immigration enforcement, and devotes massive sums to policing the borders. The White House has met many of the desired metrics for border security, although there is always more to be done, but Republicans are still calling for more before they will consider reform. Enforcing the border, but not sufficiently touting its record of doing so, the White House has learned, won't be enough to win over Republicans.¶ In a briefing with The Huffington Post, a senior administration official said the White House believes it has met enforcement goals and must now move to a comprehensive solution. The administration is highly skeptical of claims from Republicans that immigration reform can or should be done in a piecemeal fashion. Going down that road, the White House worries, could result in passage of the less politically complicated pieces, such as an enforcement mechanism and high-skilled worker visas, while leaving out more contentious items such as a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.¶ "Enforcement is certainly part of the picture," the official said. "But if you go back and look at the 2006 and 2007 bills, if you go back and look at John McCain's 10-point 'This is what I've got to get done before I'm prepared to talk about immigration,' and then you look at what we're actually doing, it's like 'check, check, check.' We're there. The border is as secure as it's been in a generation or two, so it's really time."¶ One key in the second term, advocates say, will be convincing skeptics such as Republican Sen. John Cornyn of Texas that the Obama administration held up its end of the bargain by proving a commitment to enforcement. The White House also needs to convince GOP lawmakers that there's support from their constituents for immigration reform, which could be aided by conservative evangelical leaders and members of the business community who are pushing for a bill.¶ Immigrant advocates want more targeted deportations that focus on criminals, while opponents of comprehensive immigration reform say there's too little enforcement and not enough assurances that reform wouldn't be followed by another wave of unauthorized immigration. The Obama administration has made some progress on both fronts, but some advocates worry that the president hasn't done enough to emphasize it. The latest deportation figures were released in the ultimate Friday news dump: mid-afternoon Friday on Dec. 21, a prime travel time four days before Christmas.¶ Last week, the enforcement-is-working argument was bolstered by a report from the nonpartisan Migration Policy Institute, which found that the government is pouring more money into its immigration agencies than the other federal law-enforcement efforts combined. There are some clear metrics to point to on the border in particular, and Doris Meissner, an author of the report and a former commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, said she hopes putting out more information can add to the immigration debate.¶ "I've been surprised, frankly, that the administration hasn't done more to lay out its record," she said, adding the administration has kept many of its metrics under wraps.¶ There are already lawmakers working on a broad agreement. Eight senators, coined the gang of eight, are working on a bipartisan immigration bill. It's still in its early stages, but nonmembers of the "gang," such as Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) are also talking about reform.¶ It's still unclear what exact role the president will play, but sources say he does plan to lead on the issue. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), the top Democrat on the House immigration subcommittee, said the White House seems sensitive to the fact that Republicans and Democrats need to work out the issue in Congress -- no one is expecting a fiscal cliff-style arrangement jammed by leadership -- while keeping the president heavily involved.

#### Ag industry’s collapsing now---immigration’s key

Alfonso Serrano 12, Bitter Harvest: U.S. Farmers Blame Billion-Dollar Losses on Immigration Laws, Time, 9-21-12, http://business.time.com/2012/09/21/bitter-harvest-u-s-farmers-blame-billion-dollar-losses-on-immigration-laws/

The Broetjes and an increasing number of farmers across the country say that a complex web of local and state anti-immigration laws account for acute labor shortages. With the harvest season in full bloom, stringent immigration laws have forced waves of undocumented immigrants to flee certain states for more-hospitable areas. In their wake, thousands of acres of crops have been left to rot in the fields, as farmers have struggled to compensate for labor shortages with domestic help.¶ “The enforcement of immigration policy has devastated the skilled-labor source that we’ve depended on for 20 or 30 years,” said Ralph Broetje during a recent teleconference organized by the National Immigration Forum, adding that last year Washington farmers — part of an $8 billion agriculture industry — were forced to leave 10% of their crops rotting on vines and trees. “It’s getting worse each year,” says Broetje, “and it’s going to end up putting some growers out of business if Congress doesn’t step up and do immigration reform.”¶ (MORE: Why Undocumented Workers Are Good for the Economy)¶ Roughly 70% of the 1.2 million people employed by the agriculture industry are undocumented. No U.S. industry is more dependent on undocumented immigrants. But acute labor shortages brought on by anti-immigration measures threaten to heap record losses on an industry emerging from years of stiff foreign competition. Nationwide, labor shortages will result in losses of up to $9 billion, according to the American Farm Bureau Federation.

#### Key to small farms

Gual 10, 10/17/2010 (Frank, Farm job, anyone?, Associated Content, p. http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/5877166/farm\_job\_anyone.html)

Those calling for tougher immigration laws and the UFW claim that farmers have become accustomed to hiring undocumented workers who are willing to work for little, and now make up half the farm labor force. Legal immigrants make up a quarter of the farm labor. Those Americans who do get hired to do farm work often disappear quickly.¶ Farm work is often offered in remote locations which city dwellers find difficult to get to, and one solution would be to provide transportation from central cities with high unemployment to outlying farms. Another possibility would be to use prisoners incarcerated for minor offenses.¶ A shortage of farm labor will cause food prices to rise at a time when many people are out of work and may be receiving government assistance. It will also increase our dependence on imported food, which may not be up to FDA standards and could cause health problems, as has already happened.¶ Another effect of the farm labor shortage will be the continued disappearance of small family farms, which will either be abandoned or bought by large conglomerates whose management is far removed from the local community.

#### Prevents extinction

Altieri 8 - Professor of agroecology @ University of California, Berkeley. [Miguel Altieri (President, Sociedad Cientifica LatinoAmericana de Agroecologia (SOCLA), “Small farms as a planetary ecological asset: Five key reasons why we should support the revitalization of small farms in the Global South,” Food First, Posted May 9th, 2008, pg. http://www.foodfirst.org/en/node/2115]

The Via Campesina has long argued that farmers need land to produce food for their own communities and for their country and for this reason has advocated for genuine agrarian reforms to access and control land, water, agrobiodiversity, etc, which are of central importance for communities to be able to meet growing food demands. The Via Campesina believes that in order to protect livelihoods, jobs, people's food security and health, as well as the environment, food production has to remain in the hands of small- scale sustainable farmers and cannot be left under the control of large agribusiness companies or supermarket chains. Only by changing the export-led, free-trade based, industrial agriculture model of large farms can the downward spiral of poverty, low wages, rural-urban migration, hunger and environmental degradation be halted. Social rural movements embrace the concept of food sovereignty as an alternative to the neo-liberal approach that puts its faith in inequitable international trade to solve the world’s food problem. Instead, food sovereignty focuses on local autonomy, local markets, local production-consumption cycles, energy and technological sovereignty and farmer to farmer networks.¶ This global movement, the Via Campesina, has recently brought their message to the North, partly to gain the support of foundations and consumers, as political pressure from a wealthier public that increasingly depends on unique food products from the South marketed via organic, fair trade, or slow food channels could marshal the sufficient political will to curb the expansion of biofuels, transgenic crops and agro-exports, and put an end to subsidies to industrial farming and dumping practices that hurt small farmers in the South. But can these arguments really captivate the attention and support of northern consumers and philanthropists? Or is there a need for a different argument—one that emphasizes that the very quality of life and food security of the populations in the North depends not only on the food products, but in the ecological services provided by small farms of the South. In fact, it is herein argued that the functions performed by small farming systems still prevalent in Africa, Asia and Latin America—in the post-peak oil era that humanity is entering—comprise an ecological asset for humankind and planetary survival. In fact, in an era of escalating fuel and food costs, climate change, environmental degradation, GMO pollution and corporate- dominated food systems, small, biodiverse, agroecologically managed farms in the Global South are the only viable form of agriculture that will feed the world under the new ecological and economic scenario.¶ There are at last five reasons why it is in the interest of Northern consumers to support the cause and struggle of small farmers in the South:¶ 1. Small farmers are key for the world’s food security¶ While 91% of the planet’s 1.5 billion hectares of agricultural land are increasingly being devoted to agro-export crops, biofuels and transgenic soybean to feed cars and cattle, millions of small farmers in the Global South still produce the majority of staple crops needed to feed the planet’s rural and urban populations. In Latin America, about 17 million peasant production units occupying close to 60.5 million hectares, or 34.5% of the total cultivated land with average farm sizes of about 1.8 hectares, produce 51% of the maize, 77% of the beans, and 61% of the potatoes for domestic consumption. Africa has approximately 33 million small farms, representing 80 percent of all farms in the region. Despite the fact that Africa now imports huge amounts of cereals, the majority of African farmers (many of them women) who are smallholders with farms below 2 hectares, produce a significant amount of basic food crops with virtually no or little use of fertilizers and improved seed. In Asia, the majority of more than 200 million rice farmers, few farm more than 2 hectares of rice make up the bulk of the rice produced by Asian small farmers. Small increases in yields on these small farms that produce most of the world´s staple crops will have far more impact on food availability at the local and regional levels, than the doubtful increases predicted for distant and corporate-controlled large monocultures managed with such high tech solutions as genetically modified seeds.¶ 2.Small farms are more productive and resource conserving than large-scale monocultures¶ Although the conventional wisdom is that small family farms are backward and unproductive, research shows that small farms are much more productive than large farms if total output is considered rather than yield from a single crop. Integrated farming systems in which the small-scale farmer produces grains, fruits, vegetables, fodder, and animal products out-produce yield per unit of single crops such as corn (monocultures) on large-scale farms. A large farm may produce more corn per hectare than a small farm in which the corn is grown as part of a polyculture that also includes beans, squash, potato, and fodder. In polycultures developed by smallholders, productivity, in terms of harvestable products, per unit area is higher than under sole cropping with the same level of management. Yield advantages range from 20 percent to 60 percent, because polycultures reduce losses due to weeds, insects and diseases, and make more efficient use of the available resources of water, light and nutrients. In overall output, the diversified farm produces much more food, even if measured in dollars. In the USA, data shows that the smallest two hectare farms produced $15,104 per hectare and netted about $2,902 per acre. The largest farms, averaging 15,581 hectares, yielded $249 per hectare and netted about $52 per hectare. Not only do small to medium sized farms exhibit higher yields than conventional farms, but do so with much lower negative impact on the environment. Small farms are ‘multi-functional’– more productive, more efficient, and contribute more to economic development than do large farms. Communities surrounded by many small farms have healthier economies than do communities surrounded by depopulated, large mechanized farms. Small farmers also take better care of natural resources, including reducing soil erosion and conserving biodiversity.¶ The inverse relationship between farm size and output can be attributed to the more efficient use of land, water, biodiversity and other agricultural resources by small farmers. So in terms of converting inputs into outputs, society would be better off with small-scale farmers. Building strong rural economies in the Global South based on productive small-scale farming will allow the people of the South to remain with their families and will help to stem the tide of migration. And as population continues to grow and the amount of farmland and water available to each person continues to shrink, a small farm structure may become central to feeding the planet, especially when large- scale agriculture devotes itself to feeding car tanks.¶ 3. Small traditional and biodiverse farms are models of sustainability¶ Despite the onslaught of industrial farming, the persistence of thousands of hectares under traditional agricultural management documents a successful indigenous agricultural strategy of adaptability and resiliency. These microcosms of traditional agriculture that have stood the test of time, and that can still be found almost untouched since 4 thousand years in the Andes, MesoAmerica, Southeast Asia and parts of Africa, offer promising models of sustainability as they promote biodiversity, thrive without agrochemicals, and sustain year-round yields even under marginal environmental conditions. The local knowledge accumulated during millennia and the forms of agriculture and agrobiodiversity that this wisdom has nurtured, comprise a Neolithic legacy embedded with ecological and cultural resources of fundamental value for the future of humankind.¶ Recent research suggests that many small farmers cope and even prepare for climate change, minimizing crop failure through increased use of drought tolerant local varieties, water harvesting, mixed cropping, opportunistic weeding, agroforestry and a series of other traditional techniques. Surveys conducted in hillsides after Hurricane Mitch in Central America showed that farmers using sustainable practices such as “mucuna” cover crops, intercropping, and agroforestry suffered less “damage” than their conventional neighbors. The study spanning 360 communities and 24 departments in Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala showed that diversified plots had 20% to 40% more topsoil, greater soil moisture, less erosion, and experienced lower economic losses than their conventional neighbors.¶ This demonstrates that a re-evaluation of indigenous technology can serve as a key source of information on adaptive capacity and resilient capabilities exhibited by small farms—features of strategic importance for world farmers to cope with climatic change. In addition, indigenous technologies often reflect a worldview and an understanding of our relationship to the natural world that is more realistic and more sustainable that those of our Western European heritage.¶ 4. Small farms represent a sanctuary of GMO-free agrobiodiversity¶ In general, traditional small scale farmers grow a wide variety of cultivars . Many of these plants are landraces grown from seed passed down from generation to generation, more genetically heterogeneous than modern cultivars, and thus offering greater defenses against vulnerability and enhancing harvest security in the midst of diseases, pests, droughts and other stresses. In a worldwide survey of crop varietal diversity on farms involving 27 crops, scientists found that considerable crop genetic diversity continues to be maintained on farms in the form of traditional crop varieties, especially of major staple crops. In most cases, farmers maintain diversity as an insurance to meet future environmental change or social and economic needs. Many researchers have concluded that this varietal richness enhances productivity and reduces yield variability. For example, studies by plant pathologists provide evidence that mixing of crop species and or varieties can delay the onset of diseases by reducing the spread of disease carrying spores, and by modifying environmental conditions so that they are less favorable to the spread of certain pathogens. Recent research in China, where four different mixtures of rice varieties grown by farmers from fifteen different townships over 3000 hectares, suffered 44% less blast incidence and exhibited 89% greater yield than homogeneous fields without the need to use chemicals.¶ It is possible that traits important to indigenous farmers (resistance to drought, competitive ability, performance on intercrops, storage quality, etc) could be traded for transgenic qualities which may not be important to farmers (Jordan, 2001). Under this scenario, risk could increase and farmers would lose their ability to adapt to changing biophysical environments and increase their success with relatively stable yields with a minimum of external inputs while supporting their communities’ food security.¶ Although there is a high probability that the introduction of transgenic crops will enter centers of genetic diversity, it is crucial to protect areas of peasant agriculture free of contamination from GMO crops, as traits important to indigenous farmers (resistance to drought, food or fodder quality, maturity, competitive ability, performance on intercrops, storage quality, taste or cooking properties, compatibility with household labor conditions, etc) could be traded for transgenic qualities (i.e. herbicide resistance) which are of no importance to farmers who don’t use agrochemicals . Under this scenario risk will increase and farmers will lose their ability to produce relatively stable yields with a minimum of external inputs under changing biophysical environments. The social impacts of local crop shortfalls, resulting from changes in the genetic integrity of local varieties due to genetic pollution, can be considerable in the margins of the Global South.¶ Maintaining pools of genetic diversity, geographically isolated from any possibility of cross fertilization or genetic pollution from uniform transgenic crops will create “islands” of intact germplasm which will act as extant safeguards against potential ecological failure derived from the second green revolution increasingly being imposed with programs such as the Gates-Rockefeller AGRA in Africa. These genetic sanctuary islands will serve as the only source of GMO-free seeds that will be needed to repopulate the organic farms in the North inevitably contaminated by the advance of transgenic agriculture. The small farmers and indigenous communities of the Global South, with the help of scientists and NGOs, can continue to create and guard biological and genetic diversity that has enriched the food culture of the whole planet.¶ 5. Small farms cool the climate¶ While industrial agriculture contributes directly to climate change through no less than one third of total emissions of the major greenhouse gases — Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), small, biodiverse organic farms have the opposite effect by sequestering more carbon in soils**.** Small farmers usually treat their soils with organic compost materials that absorb and sequester carbon better than soils that are farmed with conventional fertilizers. Researchers have suggested that the conversion of 10,000 small- to medium-sized farms to organic production would store carbon in the soil equivalent to taking 1,174,400 cars off the road.¶ Further climate amelioration contributions by small farms accrue from the fact that most use significantly less fossil fuel in comparison to conventional agriculture mainly due to a reduction of chemical fertilizer and pesticide use, relying instead on organic manures, legume-based rotations, and diversity schemes to enhance beneficial insects. Farmers who live in rural communities near cities and towns and are linked to local markets, avoid the energy wasted and the gas emissions associated with transporting food hundreds and even thousands of miles.¶ Conclusions¶ The great advantage of small farming systems is their high levels of agrobidoversity arranged in the form of variety mixtures, polycultures, crop-livestock combinations and/or agroforestry patterns. Modeling new agroecosystems using such diversified designs are extremely valuable to farmers whose systems are collapsing due to debt, pesticide use, transgenic treadmills, or climate change. Such diverse systems buffer against natural or human-induced variations in production conditions. There is much to learn from indigenous modes of production, as these systems have a strong ecological basis, maintain valuable genetic diversity, and lead to regeneration and preservation of biodiversity and natural resources. Traditional methods are particularly instructive because they provide a long-term perspective on successful agricultural management under conditions of climatic variability.¶ Organized social rural movements in the Global South oppose industrial agriculture in all its manifestations, and increasingly their territories constitute isolated areas rich in unique agrobiodiversity, including genetically diverse material, therefore acting as extant safeguards against the potential ecological failure derived from inappropriate agricultural modernization schemes. It is precisely the ability to generate and maintain diverse crop genetic resources that offer “unique” niche possibilities to small farmers that cannot be replicated by farmers in the North who are condemned to uniform cultivars and to co-exist with GMOs. The “ cibo pulito, justo e buono” that Slow Food promotes, the Fair Trade coffee, bananas, and the organic products so much in demand by northern consumers can only be produced in the agroecological islands of the South. This “difference” inherent to traditional systems, can be strategically utilized to revitalize small farming communities by exploiting opportunities that exist for linking traditional agrobiodiversity with local/national/international markets, as long as these activities are justly compensated by the North and all the segments of the market remain under grassroots control.¶ Consumers of the North can play a major role by supporting these more equitable markets which do not perpetuate the colonial model of “agriculture of the poor for the rich,” but rather a model that promotes small biodiverse farms as the basis for strong rural economies in the Global South. Such economies will not only provide sustainable production of healthy, agroecologically-produced, accessible food for all, but will allow indigenous peoples and small farmers to continue their millennial work of building and conserving the agricultural and natural biodiversity on which we all depend now and even more so in the future.

# Coal DA

## 1NC

#### Regulations that undermine the coal industry are key to a clean tech transition---current support for renewables isn’t enough

Adam James 12, Special Assistant for Energy Policy at the Center for American Progress; and Jorge Madrid, Research Associate at the Center for American Progress, June 7, 2012, “Carbon Limits Will Help Fix a Broken Energy Market and Spur Economic Growth,” online: <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/06/07/11678/carbon-limits-will-help-fix-a-broken-energy-market-and-spur-economic-growth/>

Increasing public- and private-sector investment in clean energy will lead to economic prosperity and create jobs. Back in 2009 the federal government invested $44.3 billion in the clean-tech market through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. With the global clean-tech market now worth $263 billion, this investment is helping kick-start U.S. economic growth and increasing our competitiveness internationally.

To illustrate: The Recovery Act investment in clean energy—which will amount to $150 billion by 2014—will leverage anywhere from $327 billion to $622 billion in public- and private-sector investment. This is a public-private investment ratio ranging from 2-to-1 to 4-to-1.

And the potential impact on jobs rates is promising: Every $1 million spent on clean energy investments creates 16.7 jobs, compared to those same dollars creating only 5.3 jobs in the fossil-fuel sector. Even during the height of the recession between 2007 and 2010, employment in clean-tech sectors grew by 12 percent. Further, the Recovery Act leveraged public and private investment such that by the middle of 2010 it had created or saved up to 3.4 million full-time equivalent jobs, boosted U.S. GDP by up to $520 billion, and reduced the U.S. unemployment rate by up to 1.8 percentage points, according to analysis by the Blue Green Alliance.

These jobs are distributed throughout the workforce. The table below shows that the employment created through clean energy investments beats out fossil fuel investment at every level of employment.¶ But this isn’t just about jobs. Part of bringing prosperity to America’s doorstep is doing the work in our backyard. For instance, there are more than 400 wind-related manufacturing facilities in the United States, and turbines located here currently boast 60 percent domestic content in the manufacturing and installation process. When investment dollars get poured into those businesses, they stay within our borders, keeping innovative industries and good jobs domestic. Additionally, there is the simple fact that new infrastructure, in the form of renewable generation facilities, will require American workers to build, operate, and maintain the facilities.¶ One-time investments in clean energy such as the Recovery Act, however, will not be enough to keep pace with the rest of the world. Already, other industrialized nations are pouring billions of dollars into renewable energy to gain a foothold in emerging markets and become exporters of clean technologies. They know the game: Whoever fails to invest and innovate will be left holding the bag of coal and will pay the asking price for clean energy down the line, forfeiting intellectual property rights and manufacturing dominance in the process.¶ If we don’t seize this opportunity, our competitors will. In 2011 China alone invested more than $45 billion in clean energy. The European Union was right behind, with Germany investing $30 billion, Italy investing $28 billion, and the United Kingdom investing $9.4 billion. India put $10.2 billion on the table as well.¶ Last but not least, requiring new power plants to reduce their carbon pollution creates opportunities for entrepreneurship. There will be entirely new sectors of employment that will be created to address the challenges that will pop up along the way. The brightest minds will be put to the tasks of innovating to solve new problems, of overcoming new barriers, and of creating new avenues for exploration.¶ We should not shy away from this grand challenge of reimagining and re-engineering a future in which new competitive and groundbreaking technology replaces old, inefficient, and antiquated modes of production. This is where Americans have historically shown their true spirit of innovation and problem-solving.¶ Conclusion¶ Our failure to accurately price the energy we consume has been a longstanding issue in the market, and it has led to the continued supremacy of fossil fuels even though practical alternatives exist. The carbon pollution rule will limit the amount of carbon that new coal-fired plants can emit, making new construction of these plants largely uneconomical. When the pending rules are final, the Obama administration should implement carbon-pollution reductions for existing power plants to help level the energy playing field even more and reduce the health and environmental costs associated with coal.¶ These important rules will help ramp up investment in clean energy and energy efficiency, which will create jobs, foster competition, and encourage domestic manufacturing.

#### Collapsing coal prevents extinction from runaway warming---now’s key

Lester R. Brown 11, Founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute, June 28, 2011, “The Good News About Coal,” online: http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2011/06/28/op-ed-the-good-news-about-coal/

During the years when governments and the media were focused on preparations for the 2009 Copenhagen climate negotiations, a powerful climate movement was emerging in the United States: the movement opposing the construction of new coal-fired power plants.¶ Environmental groups, both national and local, are opposing coal plants because they are the primary driver of climate change. Emissions from coal plants are also responsible for 13,200 U.S. deaths annually – a number that dwarfs the U.S. lives lost in Iraq and Afghanistan combined.¶ What began as a few local ripples of resistance quickly evolved into a national tidal wave of grassroots opposition from environmental, health, farm, and community organisations. Despite a heavily funded industry campaign to promote "clean coal", the American public is turning against coal.¶ In a national poll that asked which electricity source people would prefer, only three percent chose coal. The Sierra Club, which has kept a tally of proposed coal-fired power plants and their fates since 2000, reports that 152 plants in the United States have been defeated or abandoned.¶ An early turning point in the coal war came in June 2007, when Florida’s Public Service Commission refused to license a huge 5.7- billion-dollar, 1,960-megawatt coal plant because the utility proposing it could not prove that building the plant would be cheaper than investing in conservation, efficiency, or renewable energy.¶ This point, frequently made by lawyers from Earthjustice, a nonprofit environmental legal group, combined with widely expressed public opposition to any more coal-fired power plants in Florida, led to the quiet withdrawal of four other coal plant proposals in the state.¶ Coal’s future also suffered as Wall Street, pressured by the Rainforest Action Network, turned its back on the industry. In February 2008, investment banks Morgan Stanley, Citi, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Bank of America announced that any future lending for coal- fired power would be contingent on the utilities demonstrating that the plants would be economically viable with the higher costs associated with future federal restrictions on carbon emissions.¶ One of the unresolved questions haunting the coal sector is what to do with the coal ash – the remnant of burning coal – that is accumulating in 194 landfills and 161 holding ponds in 47 states. This ash is not an easy material to dispose of since it is laced with arsenic, lead, mercury, and other toxic materials.¶ A coal ash spill in Tennessee in December 2008 released a billion gallons of toxic brew and is costing the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 1.2 billion dollars to clean up.¶ An August 2010 joint study by the Environmental Integrity Project, Earthjustice, and the Sierra Club reported that 39 coal ash dump sites in 21 states have contaminated local drinking water or surface water with arsenic, lead, and other heavy metals at levels that exceed federal safe drinking water standards. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had already identified 98 other water- polluting sites.¶ In response to these and other threats, new regulations are in the making to require better management of coal ash storage facilities to avoid contaminating local groundwater supplies. In addition, EPA is issuing more stringent regulations on coal plant emissions to reduce chronic respiratory illnesses and deaths caused by coal-fired power plant emissions.¶ The coal industry practice of blasting off mountaintops to get at coal seams is also under fire. In August 2010, the Rainforest Action Network announced that several leading U.S. investment banks, including Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, Citi, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo, had ceased lending to companies involved in mountaintop removal coal mining.¶ Massey Energy, a large coal mining company notorious for its violations of environmental and safety regulations and the owner of the West Virginia mine where 29 miners died in 2010, lost all funding from three of the banks.¶ Now that the United States has, in effect, a near de facto moratorium on the licensing of new coal-fired power plants, several environmental groups, including the Sierra Club and Greenpeace, are starting to focus on closing existing coal plants.¶ Utilities are beginning to recognise that coal is not a viable long- term option. TVA announced in August 2010 that it was planning to close nine of its 59 coal-generating units. Duke Energy, another major southeastern utility, followed with an announcement that it was considering the closure of seven coal-fired units in North and South Carolina alone.¶ Progress Energy, also in the Carolinas, is planning to close 11 units at four sites. In Pennsylvania, Exelon Power is preparing to close four coal units at two sites. Xcel Energy, the dominant utility in Colorado, announced it was closing seven coal units. And in April 2011, TVA agreed to close another nine units as part of a legal settlement with EPA.¶ In an analysis of the future of coal, Wood Mackenzie, a leading energy consulting and research firm, describes these closings as a harbinger of things to come for the coal industry.¶ The chairman of the powerful U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Jon Wellinghoff, observed in early 2009 that the United States may no longer need any additional coal plants. Regulators, investment banks, and political leaders are now beginning to see what has been obvious for some time to climate scientists such as James Hansen: that it makes no sense to build coal-fired power plants only to have to bulldoze them in a few years.¶ Closing coal plants in the United States may be much easier than it appears. If the efficiency level of the other 49 states were raised to that of New York, the most energy-efficient state, the energy saved would be sufficient to close 80 percent of the country’s coal-fired power plants. The remaining plants could be shut down by turning to wind, solar, and geothermal energy.¶ The U.S. transition from coal to renewables is under way. Between 2007 and 2010, U.S. coal use dropped eight percent. During the same period, and despite the recession, 300 new wind farms came online, adding some 23,000 megawatts of wind-generating capacity.¶ With the likelihood that few, if any, new coal-fired power plants will be approved in the United States, this moratorium sends a message to the world. Denmark and New Zealand have already banned new coal-fired power plants. As of late 2010, Hungary was on the verge of closing its one remaining coal plant.¶ Ontario Province, where 39 percent of Canadians live, plans to phase out coal entirely by 2014. Scotland announced in September 2010 that it plans to get 100 percent of its electricity from renewables by 2025, backing out coal entirely. In May 2011, that target date was pushed up to 2020.¶ Even China is surging ahead with renewable energy and now leads the world in new wind farm installations. These and other developments suggest that the Plan B goal of cutting carbon emissions 80 percent by 2020 may be much more attainable than many would have thought a few years ago.¶ The restructuring of the energy economy will not only dramatically drop carbon emissions, helping to stabilise climate, it will also eliminate much of the air pollution that we know today. The idea of a pollution-free environment is difficult for us even to imagine, simply because none of us has ever known an energy economy that was not highly polluting.¶ Working in coal mines will be history. Black lung disease will eventually disappear. So too will ‘code red’ alerts warning us to avoid strenuous exercise because of dangerous levels of air pollution.¶ And, finally, in contrast to investments in oil fields and coal mines, where depletion and abandonment are inevitable, the new energy sources are inexhaustible. While wind turbines, solar cells, and solar thermal systems will all need repair and occasional replacement, investing in these new energy sources means investing in energy systems that can last forever.¶ Although some of the prospects look good for moving away from coal, timing is key. Can we close coal-fired power plants fast enough to save the Greenland ice sheet? If not, sea level will rise 23 feet. Hundreds of coastal cities will be abandoned. The rice-growing river deltas of Asia will be underwater. And there will be hundreds of millions of rising-sea refugees.¶ If we cannot mobilise to save the Greenland ice sheet, we probably cannot save civilisation as we know it.

## 2NC

#### Growth leads to runaway climate change—extinction—adaptation is impossible

Roberts 12/8/2011 David Roberts is a staff writer for Grist "The brutal logic of climate change mitigation" www.grist.org/climate-policy/2011-12-08-the-brutal-logic-of-climate-change-mitigation

In my last post, I discussed a new peer-reviewed paper by climate scientists Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows. It paints a grim picture: The commonly accepted threshold of climate "safety," 2 degrees C [3.6 degrees F] temperature rise over pre-industrial levels, is now properly considered extremely dangerous; even 2 degrees C is drifting out of reach, absent efforts of a scale and speed beyond anything currently proposed; our current trajectory is leading us toward 4 or 6 (or 8 or 10) degrees C, which we now know to be a potentially civilization-threatening disaster. Like I said, go ahead and pour yourself a stiff drink. So, what does this grim situation say about our current climate policy efforts? The paper also contains some important insights on that front. Here is how Anderson and Bows frame it: Over the past five years a wealth of analyses have described very different responses to what, at first sight, appears to be the same question: What emission-reduction profiles are compatible with avoiding "dangerous" climate change? However, on closer investigation, the difference in responses is related less to different interpretations of the science underpinning climate change and much more to differing assumptions related to five fundamental and contextual issues. (1) What delineates dangerous from acceptable climate change? (2) What risk of entering dangerous climate change is acceptable? (3) When is it reasonable to assume global emissions will peak? (4) What reduction rates in post-peak emissions is it reasonable to consider? (5) Can the primacy of economic growth be questioned in attempts to avoid dangerous climate change? Keep question (5) in mind. It is almost never raised explicitly in these discussions, but it turns out to be central to how we answer the other questions. Long story short, Anderson and Bows argue that we are systematically blowing smoke up our own asses. (Though, ahem, that's probably not how they would put it.) The thing is, we have ostensibly answered question (1). The Copenhagen Accord has been signed by 141 countries representing over 87 percent of global emissions, including the U.S. and the E.U. It explicitly recognizes "the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius." Climate communiques the world over are full of categorical language: we "must" avoid 2 degrees C! (Despite the fact that new science reveals 2 degrees C to be well within extremely dangerous territory.) We pretend that 2 degrees C is our threshold. Yet the climate scenarios and plans presented to policymakers do not actually reflect that threshold. As Anderson and Bows say, "most policy advice is to accept a high probability of extremely dangerous climate change rather than propose radical and immediate emission reductions."Note, also, that most popular climate scenarios include an implausibly early peak in global emissions -- 2010 in many cases, 2015-16 in the case of the Stern Report, the ADAM project, and the U.K.'s Committee on Climate Change. Why do climate analysts do this? Why do they present plans that contain wildly optimistic assumptions about the peak in global emissions and yet a high probability of overshooting the 2 degrees C target? The answer is fairly simple, and it has to do with the answer to question (4), regarding what level of emissions reductions is reasonable to expect. According to the Stern Review and others, emissions reductions of 3 to 4 percent a year are the maximum compatible with continued economic growth. And so that's the level they use in their scenarios. Yet reductions at that pace offer very little practical hope of hitting 2 degrees C. In other words, climate analysts construct their scenarios not to avoid dangerous climate change but to avoid threatening economic growth. That would make sense if being richer would help us prosper in a 4 degrees C [7.2 degrees F] world. But ... no such luck. Says Anderson in his slideshow presentation: There is a widespread view that a 4 degrees C future is incompatible with an organised global community, is likely to be beyond "adaptation," is devastating to the majority of ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable (i.e., 4 degrees C would be an interim temperature on the way to a much higher equilibrium level). To be sure, there is plenty of uncertainty about the impacts of particular levels of temperature rise. (See: recent controversy over climate sensitivity.) Predictions are hard, especially about the future. But if the "widespread view" Anderson identifies is correct -- or even half correct! -- it completely scrambles conventional approaches to the problem. It implies that 4 degrees C must be avoided at literally any cost.

#### The ONLY way to solve warming is by decreasing emissions through slow economic growth—under no circumstance will tech solve—we’ll cross the threshold in 10 years—it’s try or die and multiple, empirical models prove this

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I want to point out that a massive discrepancy exists between the official pronouncements emerging from Copenhagen on carbon emissions and recent government actions to spur economic growth. Before and during Copenhagen (and after, too, we can be sure), politicians and central bankers across the globe have worked tirelessly to return the global economy to a path of growth. We need more jobs, we are told; we need economic growth, we need more people consuming more things. Growth is the ever-constant word on politicians' lips. Official actions amounting to tens of trillions of dollars speak to the fact that this is, in fact, our number-one global priority. But the consensus coming out of Copenhagen is that carbon emissions have to be reduced by a vast amount over the next few decades. These two ideas are mutually exclusive. You can't have both. Economic growth requires energy, and most of our energy comes from hydrocarbons - coal, oil, and natural gas. Burning those fuel sources releases carbon. Therefore, increasing economic activity will release more carbon. It is a very simple concept. Nobody has yet articulated how it is that we will reconcile both economic growth and reduced use of hydrocarbon energy. And so the proposed actions coming out of Copenhagen are not grounded in reality, and they are set dead against trillions of dollars of spending. There is only one thing that we know about which has curbed, and even reversed, the flow of carbon into the atmosphere, and that is the recent economic contraction. This is hard proof of the connection between the economy and energy. It should serve as proof that any desire to grow the economy is also an explicit call to increase the amount of carbon being expelled into the atmosphere. The idea of salvation via the electric plug-in car or other renewable energy is a fantasy. The reality is that any new technology takes decades to reach full market penetration, and we haven't even really begun to introduce any yet. Time, scale, and cost must be weighed when considering any new technology's potential to have a significant impact on our energy-use patterns. For example, a recent study concluded that another 20 years would be required for electric vehicles to have a significant impact on US gasoline consumption. Meaningful Numbers of Plug-In Hybrids Are Decades Away The mass-introduction of the plug-in hybrid electric car is still a few decades away, according to new analysis by the National Research Council. The study, released on Monday, also found that the next generation of plug-in hybrids could require hundreds of billions of dollars in government subsidies to take off. Even then, plug-in hybrids would not have a significant impact on the nation’s oil consumption or carbon emissions before 2030. Savings in oil imports would also be modest, according to the report, which was financed with the help of the Energy Department. Twenty to thirty years is the normal length of time for any new technology to scale up and fully penetrate a large market. But this study, as good as it was in calculating the time, scale, and cost parameters of technology innovation and penetration, still left out the issue of resource scarcity. Is there enough lithium in the world to build all these cars? Neodymium? This is a fourth issue that deserves careful consideration, given the scale of the overall issue. But even if we did manage to build hundreds of millions of plug-in vehicles, where would the electricity come from? Many people mistakenly think that we are well on our way to substantially providing our electricity needs using renewable sources such as wind and solar. We are not. Renewable timetable is a long shot Al Gore's well-intentioned challenge that we produce "100 percent of our electricity from renewable energy and truly clean carbon-free sources within 10 years" represents a widely held delusion that we can't afford to harbor. The delusion is shared by the Minnesota Legislature, which is requiring the state's largest utility, Xcel Energy, to get at least 24 percent of its energy from wind by 2020. One of the most frequently ignored energy issues is the time required to bring forth a major new fuel to the world's energy supply. Until the mid-19th century, burning wood powered the world. Then coal gradually surpassed wood into the first part of the 20th century. Oil was discovered in the 1860s, but it was a century before it surpassed coal as our largest energy fuel. Trillions of dollars are now invested in the world's infrastructure to mine, process and deliver coal, oil and natural gas. As distinguished professor Vaclav Smil of the University of Manitoba recently put it, "It is delusional to think that the United States can install in a decade wind and solar generating capacity equivalent to that of thermal power plants that took nearly 60 years to construct." Texas has three times the name plate wind capacity of any other state — 8,000-plus megawatts. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas manages the Texas electric grids. ERCOT reports that its unpredictable wind farms actually supply just a little more than 700 MW during summer power demand, and provide just 1 percent of Texas' power needs of about 72,000 MW. ERCOT's 2015 forecast still has wind at just more than 1 percent despite plans for many more turbines. For the United States, the Energy Information Administration is forecasting wind and solar together will supply less than 3 percent of our electric energy in 2020. Again it turns out that supplanting even a fraction of our current electricity production with renewables will also take us decades. And even that presumes that we have a functioning economy in which to mine, construct, transport and erect these fancy new technologies. Time, scale, and cost all factor in as challenges to significant penetration of new energy technologies as well. So where will all the new energy for economic growth come from? The answer, unsurprisingly, is from the already-installed carbon-chomping coal, oil, and natural gas infrastructure. That is the implicit assumption that lies behind the calls for renewed economic growth. It's The Money, Stupid As noted here routinely in my writings and in the Crash Course, we have an exponential monetary system. One mandatory feature of our current exponential monetary system is the need for perpetual growth. Not just any kind of growth; exponential growth. That's the price for paying interest on money loaned into existence. Without that growth, our monetary system shudders to a halt and shifts into reverse, operating especially poorly and threatening to melt down the entire economic edifice. This is so well understood, explicitly or implicitly, throughout all the layers of society and in our various institutions, that you will only ever hear politicians and bankers talking about the "need" for growth. In fact, they are correct; our system does need growth. All debt-based money systems require growth. That is the resulting feature of loaning one's money into existence. That's the long and the short of the entire story. The growth may seem modest, perhaps a few percent per year ('That's all, honest!'), but therein lies the rub. Any continuous percentage growth is still exponential growth. Exponential growth means not just a little bit more each year, but a constantly growing amount each year. It is a story of more. Every year needs slightly more than the prior year - that's the requirement. The Gap Nobody has yet reconciled the vast intellectual and practical gap that exists between our addiction to exponential growth and the carbon reduction rhetoric coming out of Copenhagen. I've yet to see any credible plan that illustrates how we can grow our economy without using more energy. Is it somehow possible to grow an economy without using more energy? Let's explore that concept for a bit. What does it mean to "grow an economy?" Essentially, it means more jobs for more people producing and consuming more things. That's it. An economy, as we measure it, consists of delivering the needs and wants of people in ever-larger quantities. It's those last three words - ever-larger quantities - that defines the whole problem. For example, suppose our economy consisted only of building houses. If the same number of houses were produced each year, we'd say that the economy was not growing. It wouldn't matter whether the number was four hundred thousand or four million; if the same number of new homes were produced each year, year after year, this would be considered a very bad thing, because it would mean our economy was not growing. The same is true for cars, hair brushes, big-screen TVs, grape juice, and everything else you can think of that makes up our current economy. Each year, more needs to be sold than the year before, or the magic economic-stimulus wands will come out to ward off the Evil Spirits of No Growth. If our economy were to grow at the same rate as the population, it would grow by around 1% per year. This is still exponential growth, but it is far short of the 3%-4% that policymakers consider both desirable and necessary. Why the gap? Why do we work so hard to ensure that 1% more people consume 3% more stuff each year? Out of Service It's not that 3% is the right number for the land or the people who live upon it. The target of 3% is driven by our monetary system, which needs a certain rate of exponential growth each year in order to cover the interest expense due each year on the already outstanding loans. The needs of our monetary system are driving our economic decisions, not the needs of the people, let alone the needs of the planet. We are in service to our money system, not the other way around. Today we have a burning need for an economic model that can operate tolerably well without growth. But ours can't, and so we actually find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of pitting human needs against the money system and observing that the money system is winning the battle. The Federal Reserve exists solely to assure that the monetary system has what it needs to function. That is their focus, their role, and their primary concern. I assume that they assume that by taking care of the monetary system, everything else will take care of itself. I think their assumption is archaic and wrong. Regardless, our primary institutions and governing systems are in service to a monetary system that is dysfunctional. It was my having this outlook, this lens, more than any other, that allowed me to foresee what so many economists missed. Only by examining the system from a new, and very wide, angle can the enormous flaws in the system be seen. Economy & Energy Now let's get back to our main problem of economic growth and energy use (a.k.a. carbon production). There is simply no way to build houses, produce televisions, grow and transport grape juice, and market hair brushes without consuming energy in the process. That's just a cold, hard reality. We need liquid fuel to extract, transform, and transport products to market. More people living in more houses means we need more electricity. Sure, we can be more efficient in our use of energy, but unless our efficiency gains are exceeding the rate of economic growth, more energy will be used, not less. In the long run, if we were being 3% more efficient in our use of fuel and growing our economy at 3%, this would mean burning the same amount of fuel each year. Unfortunately, fuel-efficiency gains are well known to run slower than economic growth. For example, the average fuel efficiency of the US car fleet (as measured by the CAFE standards) has increased by 18% over the past 25 years, while the economy has grown by 331%. Naturally, our fuel consumption has grown, not fallen, over that time, despite the efficiency gains. So the bottom line is this: There is no possible way to both have economic growth (as we've known it in the past) and cut carbon emissions. At least not without doing things very differently.

#### De-growth solves better

Patrick Moriarty 10 Ph.D.1, Department of Design, Monash University and Damon Honnery Ph.D.2, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Monash University "Why Technical Fixes Won’t Mitigate Climate Change" Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 8, 1921-1927. journalofcosmology.com/ClimateChange107.html

4. Discussion

We have argued so far that none of the various conventional approaches for climate mitigation will be effective, and that the rising even in combination will prove to be ‘too little too late’ (Moriarty and Honnery 2010a). This conclusion is also reached by numbers of researchers supporting—perhaps reluctantly—geoengineering, who usually view it as the sole remaining option.

But it is not; technical fixes such as those discussed do not exhaust the possibilities. In previous work, we’ve argued that the policy of continued economic growth should be abandoned for two reasons. First, as argued by Kitzes et al. (2009), the demand for ecosystem services may have already exceeded the sustainable biocapacity of Earth—we are in unsustainable overshoot, as Randers (2008) has stressed. Second, as a number of researchers, including Jackson (2009), van den Bergh (2009) and the editors of Nature (Anon. 2010) have argued, GDP per capita is no longer a reliable indicator of welfare, at least in the high-income countries. Globally, the rise in GDP in recent decades has been tightly linked to rise in global primary energy use (Moriarty and Honnery 2010a). As it presently measured, we probably can’t increase global GDP for very much longer, and we shouldn’t even try, given its decreasing relevance to global welfare. If we remove the artificial constraint of ever-rising GDP, we can focus on the global satisfaction of human needs.

All humans have a need for adequate provision of food, potable water, shelter, health and education services, as well as for sociality and so on. The UN has incorporated these human needs into its Millennnium Development Goals (Moriarty and Honnery 2010a). We propose that economies focus on these needs, attempting to satisfy them for all, with a minimum use of depletable resources and environmental damage. In a world with many resources yet to be exploited, the wealth of a minority would not be at the expense of the poor. But if resource use is already at or nearing unsustainable levels, our argument is that the only way the needs of an expanding population can be met is by abandoning global economic growth, and with it the high-energy lifestyles of the West. Rees (2008) argues that the West will need to cut ‘energy and material consumption by up to 80%’, with equity being an essential component of this challenge (Moriarty and Honnery 2010b). Social innovation, just as much as technical innovation in energy efficiency or renewable energy, is urgently needed for a just and sustainable future.

#### That fails

Patrick Moriarty 10 Ph.D.1, Department of Design, Monash University and Damon Honnery Ph.D.2, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Monash University "Why Technical Fixes Won’t Mitigate Climate Change" Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 8, 1921-1927. journalofcosmology.com/ClimateChange107.html

2.4 Carbon Sequestration

The world’s soils and forests have lost an estimated 200 billion tones of carbon (GtC) over the past two centuries (Lal 2004). Reforestation and increasing soil carbon would thus merely help restore the status quo ante. However, the world is still losing biomass carbon to the atmosphere, because of net deforestation. Given ongoing climate and land-use change and global population growth, we will be fortunate if we can prevent further net carbon loss.

Other methods of carbon sequestration are mechanical. CCS would capture CO2 from large fossil fuel plants, such as coal-burning power stations, compress it, then transport it to chosen sites for underground burial. According to the 2007 IPCC report (Solomon et al. 2007), CO2 accounts for about 77 % of all net climate forcing, and 74 % of CO2 comes from fossil fuel combustion and other industrial processes. If only 40 % of CO2 from fossil fuel use were technically suitable for capture, then at best we could sequester 23 % of all CO2-e emissions. For a long-lived gas such as CO2, it is cumulative emissions that are important for climate change. Since CCS can only capture current emissions, at best we will fall far short of 23 % capture. Clearly, CCS cannot be more than part of a mitigation strategy. At present, only about five Mt of CO2 are sequestered each year, compared with total CO2-e emissions of about 30 Gt. Even capturing 23 % would need some three orders of magnitude scale-up. Air capture could potentially capture all past and present CO2 emissions but its heavy energy costs would rule it out (Moriarty and Honnery 2010a,b).

#### Renewables can’t solve

Patrick Moriarty 10 Ph.D.1, Department of Design, Monash University and Damon Honnery Ph.D.2, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Monash University "Why Technical Fixes Won’t Mitigate Climate Change" Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 8, 1921-1927. journalofcosmology.com/ClimateChange107.html

2. The Failure of Conventional Mitigation Methods

Conventional mitigation methods aim at reducing or slowing GHG emissions to the atmosphere (NAS 2010a,b,c). They are thus inherently conservative, in that their intent is to either slow down the rate of movement along an existing emissions path, or even return to earlier emission levels. Possible conventional approaches include:

. replacing fossil fuel energy use by renewable energy (RE) sources

. replacing fossil fuel energy use by nuclear energy

. reducing energy use through energy efficiency improvements and conservation

. reducing CO2 emissions through biological carbon sequestration in soils and forests, carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), and air capture.

2.1 Renewable Energy

Modern forms of renewable energy presently provide about 17 EJ (EJ=exajoule=1018 joule) of primary energy, mostly hydro and liquid fuels from biomass. Much more is provided from traditional fuel wood, probably about 45 EJ. For comparison, present global primary energy use is around 500 EJ (Moriarty and Honnery 2009).

The renewable energy sources can be divided into two groups: those that can supply energy on a continuous basis (such as hydro, biomass and geothermal energy), and those that are only intermittently available (such as wind and the various forms of solar energy). Unfortunately, only the intermittent sources have sufficient technical potential to supply anything like our present global use (Moriarty and Honnery 2007). Using intermittent sources to supply continuous (baseload) power requires conversion of the energy to carriers such as hydrogen, which can reduce energy availability by a factor of roughly two and more if energy storage costs and reconversion back to electricity are included (Honnery and Moriarty 2010). For solar energy, low winter output would require much redundant capacity (Trainer 2010). Hydro presently supplies about 11 EJ of electricity, but the world total that can be economically developed may be at most 30 EJ. Although technical potentials as high as 1000 EJ have been claimed for biomass, others consider that only around 30 EJ can be sustainably produced without reducing global food production.

The share of renewable energy (RE) in electricity production has been falling for decades, and in recent years, also its share of global primary energy use. What are its future prospects? Official organisations like the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) have projected RE use out to 2030 under various scenarios. For the IEA (2009), RE improves its present share of 12.7 % of world energy in 2007 to 14.2 % in their reference scenario. Only in an optimistic 450 ppm CO2-equivalent (CO2-e) stabilisation scenario does RE share rise to 23.4 % in 2030. The EIA (2009) foresaw RE achieving about a 3 % growth rate in all scenarios.

On present trends, all we can hope to do is modestly reverse RE’s declining share of the global energy market. Fossil fuel power plants have lives of up to 50 years or more, and most new electricity plant will use fossil fuels. Even in the European Union, a region that has gone furthest in pledges to reduce GHG emissions, a 2009 survey of member countries found that only 8 % of new electricity capacity under construction would use renewable energy sources (Anon. 2009).

# Amendment CP

The United States Congress should propose an Amendment to the United States Constitution which <Insert Mandates of Aff Plan>. The Amendment should specify that it must be ratified immediately. The necessary states should ratify the Amendment. We’ll clarify.

#### Amending instead of judicial policy change solves the case without hurting the Supreme Court's image or risking rollback

Thomas E. Baker, Law Prof @ Texas Tech, 1995, “Exercising the Amendment Power,” 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 325

Indeed, the best use of this “republican veto” would be to set aside a Supreme Court decision that itself overrules a prior decision. This would have the immediate effect of reinstating the preferred earlier interpretation. For example, Congress and the state legislatures by vetoing either National League of Cities v. Usery86 or Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, could have settled the debate over the Tenth Amendment, at least for this generation. That would have avoided the constitutional consternation that resulted from the Court’s yo-yoing of its own precedents.88 This usage to set aside judicial overrulings has the potential to reclaim valuable constitutional precedent at only an incremental cost to the Court as an institution.89 The Supreme Court’s recent internal debate over stare decisis for constitutional questions is instructive and provides Congress with some helpful criteria to consider in deciding whether to veto a Supreme Court decision. Such criteria include the narrowness of the margin of the decision, the persuasiveness of the dissents, the lack of allegiance by present members of the Court, the difficulty of consistent application by the lower courts and subsequent Supreme Courts, the extent of reliance on the ruling within the legal community and in society at large, how related doctrines have affected the ruling, and whether the facts and assumptions relied on in the decision have been overcome by subsequent developments.90 The debate over the particular proposal ought to take place on this level of pragmatic argumentation, with full consideration afforded to all relevant and prudential factors,91 including the threshold assumption that there is a higher burden for constitutional change than for legislative matters. Constitutional politics ought to claim the best wisdom of our nation, expressed through the Congress and the state legislatures. How can the Supreme Court be expected to act in response to the exercise of the “republican veto” if the practice becomes routine? If an amendment is proposed by Congress and ratified by the states, then the Court is oath-bound 92 to respect the outcome of the political process.93 In fact, each time Article V has been relied on to overrule a Supreme Court decision, the Justices have adhered to their oaths.94 The Supreme Court, no less than the political branches, must adhere to the rule of law; indeed, the Court as an institution has the most to lose under the rule of man.95 The constitutional dialogue would be enhanced by regular repair to the “republican veto.”96 Under settled understandings of the principle of separation of powers, the decisions when and what to propose and ratify in a “republican veto” are wholly given over to the Article V procedures. The judicial task of interpreting any amendment, including a new amendment setting aside a specific Court decision, necessarily resides with the Supreme Court, as does the continuing obligation to interpret the scope of the underlying provision of the Constitution’ The implied veto of judicial review is subject to the explicit veto of Article V, but the awesome responsibility to interpret the Constitution will remain with the Supreme Court. Once ratified, a “republican veto” will become part and parcel of the same constitutional dynamic.98 Arguably, an amendment that is negative should be preferred over an amendment that attempts affirmatively to state a new constitutional rule for decision. What is needed is a different interpretation, not different language.99 In our constitutional theater, the Supreme Court always will perform center stage, but Article V makes Congress the director, and the people in the states the playwrights. A “republican veto” will oblige the Justices to reinterpret their part as they perform their ongoing role. This is a constitutionally creative collaboration which is textually preferred over the common law methodology within the exclusive domain of the Justices.’°°

# T Restrictions

## 1NC

#### Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89 Lars is the Chairman of the WTO panel adopted at the Forty-Fifth Session of Contracting Parties on December 5, 1989. Other panel members: Mr. Hugh Bartlett and Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda. “Canada – Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt,” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Vote negative:

#### Including regulations is a limits disaster---undermines preparedness for all debates

Doub 76 William is a principal in the law firm of Doub and Muntzing. Previously he was a partner in LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby, and MacRae. He was a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (1971-1974). He served as a member of the Executive Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission (1968-1971) and was appointed by the President to the President’s Air Quality Advisory Board. He is a past chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Energy Conference. “Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy,” http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435

FERS began with the recognition that federal energy policy must result from concerted efforts in all areas dealing with energy, not the least of which was the manner in which energy is regulated by the federal government. Energy self sufficiency is improbable, if not impossible, without sensible regulatory processes, and effective regulation is necessary for public confidence. Thus, the President directed that "a comprehensive study be undertaken, in full consultation with Congress, to determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the government." An interagency task force was formed to study this question. With 19 different federal departments and agencies contributing, the task force spent seven months deciphering the present organizational makeup of the federal energy regulatory system, studying the need for organizational improvement, and evaluating alternatives. More than 40 agencies were found to be involved with making regulatory decisions on energy. Although only a few deal exclusively with energy, most of the 40 could significantly affect the availability and/or cost of energy. For example, in the field of gas transmission, there are five federal agencies that must act on siting and land-use issues, seven on emission and effluent issues, five on public safety issues, and one on worker health and safety issues-all before an onshore gas pipeline can be built. The complexity of energy regulation is also illustrated by the case of Standard Oil Company (Indiana), which reportedly must file about 1000 reports a year with 35 different federal agencies. Unfortunately, this example is the rule rather than the exception.

#### And precision---only direct prohibition is a restriction---key to predictability

Sinha 6 S.B. Sinha is a former judge of the Supreme Court of India. “Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries,” Nov 7, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus: "It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

## 1NR

#### NSPS is just a regulation – need pollution standard of 1000 pounds per megawatt hour – just need CCS to comply – not a prohibition

Kennedy and Obeiter 12 Kevin and Michael, "EPA’s New Source Performance Standards: A Positive Step Toward Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions", June 26, insights.wri.org/news/2012/06/epas-new-source-performance-standards-positive-step-toward-reducing-greenhouse-gas-emis

On June 25, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) released the 2012 Annual Energy Outlook (2012 AEO) – the same day the public comment period closed on the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) proposed New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for new power plants. The NSPS proposal marks EPA’s first step toward controlling carbon pollution from stationary sources, and the agency received a record-breaking more than two million comments supporting the rule. EPA will take the comments it receives into consideration before finalizing the rule later this year. (Get more information on the proposed rule, including WRI’s official comment).¶ The NSPS effectively codifies a transition toward cleaner sources of energy that has been ongoing for several years. The reference case in the 2012 AEO, which does not include the NSPS, projects that the vast majority of new power plants through 2035 will run on natural gas or renewable energy. While the rule does not dramatically alter the trajectory of electricity generation in the U.S., it does ensure that we will not return to the most carbon-intensive fuel sources unless they are paired with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). With more than a quarter of the country’s fossil-fuel-fired plants more than 40 years old, this rule provides critical insurance that carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power plants will decline as aging and highly polluting power plants are retired. This is an important step by EPA to bring greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the power sector under control, though more remains to be done in reducing emissions from electricity generation and throughout the economy.¶ The NSPS establishes a pollution standard of 1,000 pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour of output. This means that utilities can continue to build the natural gas, wind, and solar power plants that have been the mainstay of new capacity additions in recent years, and hydropower and nuclear energy can also be part of the new generation mix.¶ New generation capacity from coal would require at least partial CCS to comply. The NSPS gives coal-fired power plants the option of using a 30-year average of CO2 emissions, providing a gentle push to the industry to research and demonstrate the CCS technology that will be vital if coal is to remain a major energy source in a carbon-constrained economy – even as market forces push utilities in the direction of cleaner sources of energy.1 And as we look ahead to the deep emission reductions needed to limit the effects of global warming, CCS will be important for natural gas to remain part of the fuel mix.¶ The rule does not apply to existing power plants, which represent the greatest source of GHGs in the United States – 34 percent in 2010. Addressing GHG emissions from existing power plants presents a much larger challenge that will need to be done right for the sake of the utilities, their customers, and the environment.¶ EPA has rules on the books that limit carbon pollution from vehicles, and the proposed NSPS brings us closer to carbon pollution limits for new power plants. These two sectors – transportation and electricity – represent roughly 60 percent of GHG emissions in the United States, so EPA’s progress on creating rules that will eventually reduce U.S. emissions is significant. Additional GHG co-benefits will come from other rules such as Boiler MACT (Maximum Achievable Control Technology), an air toxics standard for industrial boilers; and the NSPS for the oil and gas industry.

#### Contextual definitions bad – intent to define outweighs

Kupferbreg 87Eric University of Kentucky, Senior Assistant Dean, Academic & Faculty Affairs at Northeastern University, College of Professional Studies Associate Director, Trust Initiative at Harvard School of Public Health 1987 “Limits - The Essence of Topicality” http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Kupferberg1987LatAmer.htm

Often, field contextual definitions are too broad or too narrow for debate purposes. Definitions derived from the agricultural sector necessarily incorporated financial and bureaucratic factors which are less relevant in considering a 'should' proposition. Often subject experts' definitions reflected administrative or political motives to expand or limit the relevant jurisdiction of certain actors. Moreover, field context is an insufficient criteria for choosing between competing definitions. A particularly broad field might have several subsets that invite restrictive and even exclusive definitions. (e.g., What is considered 'long-term' for the swine farmer might be significantly different than for the grain farmer.) Why would debaters accept definitions that are inappropriate for debate? If we admit that debate is a unique context, then additional considerations enter into our definitional analysis.

#### Conditions aren’t restrictions---this distinction matters

Pashman 63 Morris is a justice on the New Jersey Supreme Court. “ISIDORE FELDMAN, PLAINTIFF AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, v. URBAN COMMERCIAL, INC., AND OTHERS, DEFENDANT,” 78 N.J. Super. 520; 189 A.2d 467; 1963 N.J. Super. Lexis

HN3A title insurance policy "is subject to the same rules of construction as are other insurance policies." Sandler v. N.J. Realty Title Ins. Co., supra, at [\*\*\*11] p. 479. It is within these rules of construction that this policy must be construed.¶ Defendant contends that plaintiff's loss was occasioned by restrictions excepted from coverage in Schedule B of the title policy. The question is whether the provision in the deed to Developers that redevelopment had to be completed [\*528] within 32 months is a "restriction." Judge HN4 Kilkenny held that this provision was a "condition" and "more than a mere covenant." 64 N.J. Super., at p. 378. The word "restriction" as used in the title policy cannot be said to be synonymous with a "condition." A "restriction" generally refers to "a limitation of the manner in which one may use his own lands, and may or may not involve a grant." Kutschinski v. Thompson, 101 N.J. Eq. 649, 656 (Ch. 1927). See also Bertrand v. Jones, 58 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 1959), certification denied 31 N.J. 553 (1960); Freedman v. Lieberman, 2 N.J. Super. 537 (Ch. Div. 1949); Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435 (Ch. 1948), affirmed per curiam, 1 N.J. 508 (1948). It would not be inappropriate to say that the word "restrictions," as used [\*\*\*12] by defendant insurers, is ambiguous. The rules of construction heretofore announced must guide us in an interpretation of this policy. I find that the word "restrictions" in Schedule B of defendant's title policy does not encompass the provision in the deed to Developers which refers to the completion [\*\*472] of redevelopment work within 32 months because (1) the word is used ambiguously and must be strictly construed against defendant insurer, and (2) the provision does not refer to the use to which the land may be put. As the court stated in Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, supra, at p. 440, "HN5equity will not aid one man to restrict another in the uses to which he may put his land unless the right to such aid is clear, and that restrictive provisions in a deed are to be construed most strictly against the person or persons seeking to enforce them." (Emphasis added).

#### Regulation is strictly distinct from restriction of production

Qureshi 46 Indian representative at the United National Social and Economic Council. Verbatim report of the sixth meeting of committee IV. Oct 31st, http://www.wto.org/gatt\_docs/English/SULPDF/90220091.pdf

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that in Article 47, Paragraph 1, the regulation of production should not mean restriction of production, otherwise the whole aim of raising the standard of living will be defeated; nor should it mean to discourage the production of certain commodities if certain countries find it necessary to do so and to expand their production in the interests of their country.

#### Restriction narrower than regulation

Johnson, District Court Judge 9 Judge Thomas E. Johnson, US District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, "Stover v. Fingerhut Direct Marketing, Inc. - Document 33," 8/26/2009 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/west-virginia/wvsdce/5:2009cv00152/61171/33

9 The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test refers to "regulation" of speech. 447 U.S. at 567. "Regulation" could be construed broadly as applying [\*\*29] a system of laws, including penalties, affecting a particular manner of commercial speech. However, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has employed the narrower word, "restriction," in place of "regulation." See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1989) ("[G]overnment restrictions upon commercial speech may be no more broad or no more expansive than 'necessary' to serve its substantial interests").

#### Economic inducements and conditions don’t count

Thompson et al 3 Thompson, Trott, and Tallman, Judges on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. “TOPA EQUITIES LTD v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES,” June 4, http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1371163.html

The terms “restrict or inhibit” which appear in § 4122(a) are not defined by the statute;  therefore, we construe them “in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural meaning.”  United States v. Velte, 331 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).   The Fourth Edition of Webster's New World College Dictionary (2002) defines “restrict” as to “put certain limitations on;” it defines “inhibit” as “to hold back or keep from some action” and “to prohibit;  forbid.” LARSO neither prohibits nor limits TOPA's ability to prepay its federally subsidized mortgage.   TOPA is free to prepay its subsidized mortgage and leave the federal program if it wishes.   If it does so, it becomes subject to the 1990 LARSO amendments the same as any other apartment owner with existing tenants.   If TOPA chooses to prepay its subsidized mortgage and replace it, the interest rate it will pay on its replacement mortgage will no doubt exceed the interest rate it was paying on its subsidized mortgage.   But this is an economic choice TOPA is free to make.

#### Making production tough, expensive, or unlikely isn’t a restriction

Caiaccio 94 [Kevin, “Howard v. Babcock, the Business of Law Versus the Ethics of Lawyers: Are Noncompetition Covenants among Law Partners against Public Policy,” 28 Ga. L. Rev. 825 (1993-1994), Hein Online]

While the Howard court acknowledged the enforceability of some law practice covenants under the Business Code, the key issue became whether the agreement, which called for the loss of 82.5% of net profits by the departing partners, was one that "restricted" [\*820] the practice of law. n95 The court essentially adopted the Haight court approach, stating that a reasonable cost imposed on a departing partner does not restrict the practice of law. n96 The court labeled the cost a mere "economic consequence" to an "unrestricted choice." n97 The majority in Howard reasoned that such a construction was consistent with Rule 1-500 and that this construction struck a balance between competing interests. n98 According to the court, this interpretation allowed a departing partner to practice law anywhere in the state and represent any of the former firm's clients who were willing to follow. n99 The departing partner would, however, have to compensate the firm for its loss of income. Therefore, the court remanded for a factual determination as to whether the loss of withdrawal benefits constituted liquidated damages or an unacceptable penalty. n100¶ The majority opinion justified this break with years of nationwide precedent by reasoning that "a revolution in the practice of law has occurred." n101 This "revolution" required the "economic interests of the law firm to be protected as they are in other business enterprises." n102 The court supported its recognition of a "revolution" by noting the increased propensity of law firms--even large, seemingly stable firms--to split up as partners grab clients on the way out. n103 As a result, noncompetition agreements have become common, despite the near universal recognition by courts and ethics committees that such agreements are unenforceable. n104 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the pervasiveness of lateral hiring, even among high-level partners, has undermined the assumption that firms are stable institutions. n105 The court concluded that,¶ [\*821] due to these "sweeping changes" in the profession, the per se rule banning noncompetition agreements among law partners should be abolished. n106¶ The court then addressed some of the arguments made by the dissent and by other courts upholding the ban. According to the majority of the court, two primary arguments exist in support of the ban: (1) an attorney should have the freedom to practice law where and for whom he or she pleases, n107 and (2) clients are not commodities and should have the freedom to choose representation. n108 The majority argued that these freedoms are merely "theoretical" because they are routinely circumscribed. n109 For example, attorneys, like other professionals, may be fired or forced out by their partners despite the wishes of the client. n110 Similarly, an attorney is not required to accept representation of every client that seeks services, and a lawyer may even be required to decline representation of a prospective client if a conflict of interest exists. n111 In fact, an attorney has many grounds to justify terminating a relationship with a client. n112 Finally, the majority noted that, in civil cases, clients have no "right" to an attorney at all. n113 Thus, these "freedoms," upon which the per se rule is justified, are in fact already limited. n114¶ The court proceeded a step further, arguing that permitting restrictive covenants may even serve the client. According to the court, the ban promoted a "culture of mistrust" and damaged the stability of law firms. n115 Partners may be reluctant to refer clients to or support the practice of their fellow partners if fear persists that a partner may leave with those clients at any time. n116 The court concluded that the changing nature of the business of law, the permissibility of such covenants in other [\*822] professions, and the undesirable promotion of the culture of mistrust required the abolition of the per se ban on lawyer restrictive covenants. n117 The court remanded the case to the trial court for analysis under the test of reasonableness applicable to all restrictive covenants. n118¶ Justice Kennard, the sole dissenting justice, made several arguments in support of the per se ban. First, Kennard offered a different interpretation of Rule 1-500 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, arguing that the rule was unambiguous: agreements that restrict competition are unethical. n119 She criticized the majority's argument as flawed because it interpreted "restrict" to mean "prohibit" and claimed that a reasonable cost was not a restriction. n120 According to the dissent, this interpretation does not give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. n121 In their ordinary meaning, restrict and prohibit are not synonymous; a price as high as 82.5% of net profits certainly constitutes a restriction. n122 Therefore, the partnership agreement violated the clear meaning of the rule.¶ In support of this interpretive argument, the dissent cited the "discussions" that accompany the Rules and "provide guidance for interpretation." n123 The discussions accompanying Rule 1-500, which the majority ignored, were unequivocal:¶ $ (Rule 1-500$ ) permits a restrictive covenant in a law corporation, partnership, or employment agreement. The law corporation shareholder, partner, or associate may agree not to have a separate practice during the existence of the relationship; however, upon termination of the relationship (whether voluntary or involuntary), the member is free to practice law without any contractual restriction . . . . n124¶ According to the dissent, the court should not have endorsed an interpretation completely inconsistent with this unambiguous commentary. n125¶ Second, the dissent argued that, despite the majority's perceived "revolution" in the practice of law, n126 the law is still primarily a profession, and lawyers should continue to strive for the highest ethical standards. n127 Although no one in the private sector could continue to practice law without a profit, an attorney has a very high fiduciary duty. This duty often requires an attorney to place the interest of a client above her own interest. Therefore, the client's right to choose representation is paramount to the interests of the attorney. n128 Enforcing covenants not to compete, on the other hand, would subordinate the client's rights to the monetary interests of established firms. n129¶ Next, the dissent attacked the argument that, since noncompetition agreements are enforceable in other professions, lawyers should not be treated differently. n130 According to the dissent, the ethics rules of other professions are not helpful because "the nature, ideals, and practices of the various professions are different." n131 Notwithstanding the rules with respect to other professions, lawyers should strive to obtain the highest ethical standards because "ethics is not a subject in which the objective is to achieve consensus at the level of the lowest common denominator." n132 [\*824] ¶ Finally, the dissent noted that the purpose of ethics regulations is to protect the public, not the monetary interests of law firms. n133 According to the dissent, the majority subordinated the rights of clients and lawyers to the business interests of firms and justified this erosion of ethics standards by concluding that these rights are merely "theoretical" because they are already circumscribed. n134 The dissent strenuously disagreed with the majority's conclusion, arguing that this analysis was irrelevant. The issue in this case was not whether a partner may be forced out of a law firm, nor whether a conflict of interest existed; n135 the issue was whether the defendant-law firm could "prevent a willing attorney from representing a willing client." n136 Therefore, the majority's analysis on this point was merely "rationalization, not reasoning." n137¶ The dissent concluded that the court should not promote the weakening of ethical standards and that the integrity of the legal profession demanded upholding the per se ban on covenants not to compete between law partners. n138¶ IV. Analysis and Recommendations¶ Although the Howard court set out persuasive policy reasons for abolishing the per se ban on lawyer restrictive covenants, the majority's reasoning contained several flaws. First, the court misconstrued the meaning of the ethics rule: under the majority's interpretation, the rule prohibits only outright bans on competition. In reaching this conclusion, the court violated several rules of statutory construction. Second, the court failed to recognize the need to articulate a new standard for law partners. Instead, the court held that agreements between law partners should be analyzed under the "rule of reason" test applicable to ordinary business partnerships. This Comment contends that the rules of ethics, as currently written, mandate a higher standard for attorneys than for other types of partners. In abrogating the per se ban, courts should interpret the rule in a manner that balances the changing nature of the practice of law with the competing ethical considerations.¶ a. proper construction of the rules of professional conduct¶ The Howard court began its analysis by examining the California Business and Professions Code, which expressly permits reasonable restrictive covenants among business partners. n139 The court noted that this provision had long applied to doctors and accountants and concluded that the general language of the statute provided no indication of an exception for lawyers. n140 After reaching this conclusion, however, the court noted that, since it had the authority to promulgate a higher standard for lawyers, the statute alone did not necessarily control, n141 and the court therefore proceeded to examine the California Rules of Professional Conduct. n142 The court avoided the apparent conflict between the business statute and the ethics rule by undertaking a strained reading of the rule. In essence, the court held that the word "restrict" referred only to outright prohibitions, and that a mere "economic consequence" does not equal a prohibition. n143

#### A condition that makes production harder is distinct

Priebe 99 (Director of Agricultural Economic Law, European Commission) Rhinehard, Production Rights in European Agriculture p.200

The milk quota system, to quote the prime example, is a levy imposed on production in¶ excess of reference quantities, or 'quotas' . The Community does not prohibit surplus production,¶ but it does make it subject to a very dissuasive tax. An 'overproduction tax' as high as¶ that under the milk quota system is tantamount, in economic terms at least, to a prohibition on¶ large-volume production above the limits laid down. The beet quota system, on the other¶ hand, is of a different legal nature. This is based on production limits that are governed in¶ practice by delivery contracts between growers and sugar companies.¶ In other industries, limits exist as conditions for the granting of direct aid. In such cases,¶ this is not a direct restriction on production, in a strictly legal sense. The farmer is free not to comply with these conditions if he chooses not to accept the aid offered. Economically, s/he often has no choice. Accordingly, in order to obtain Community aid, he has to comply with¶ the conditions that apply. For instance, under the support scheme for arable crop growers, aid¶ applications cannot be submitted in respect of land which was used for permanent pasture,¶ permanent crops, forest or non-agricultural uses4 as at 31 December 1991. Such a provision,¶ designed to avoid speculation in arable crops triggered purely by the introduction of the direct¶ aid system in 1992, divides agricultural land into two: land which is eligible for arable land¶ support and ineligible land. This is a permanent division. The set-aside obligation, signifYing¶ each producer's individual contribution to the disciplining of production under the same¶ system, is another example of this form of restriction.

#### Restrictions must be a formal prohibition, not an INDUCEMENT

Groves 97 Dr Peter J Groves, LLB, MA, PhD, MITMA, Solicitor. “Sourcebook on Intellectual Property Law,” Google Books

Then I come to the word 'restrict', A person though not prohibited is restricted from using something if he is permitted to use it to a certain extent or subject to certain conditions but otherwise obliged not to use it, but I do not think that a person is properly said to be restricted from using something by a condition the effect of which is to offer him some inducement not to use it, or in some other way to influence his choice. To my mind, the more natural meaning here is restriction of the licensee's right to use the article and I am fortified in that opinion by two considerations. If I am right in thinking that 'require' and 'prohibit' refer to legal obligations to buy or not to use, I see nothing to suggest that 'restrict' is used in quite a different sense which has nothing to do with legal obligation but which relates to financial disadvantage. And, second, to say that the effect will be to restrict seems to me much more appropriate if restriction refers to restriction of the licensee's right to use than it would be if restriction refers to an inducement not to use. The legality of the condition has to be determined at the time when the licence is granted and if the terms of the conditions are such as to restrict the licensee's right to use an article in certain circumstances then it can properly be said that its effect will be to restrict him from using it. But if, as in the present case, all that can be said is that the effect of the condition in some circumstances will be to offer a financial advantage, which may be considerable or may be small, if the licensee uses the licensor's goods, I do not see how it can be said that its effect will be to restrict the licensee from using other goods. The licensee may be influenced by this financial advantage or he may, perhaps for good reason, choose to disregard it; it is impossible to say in advance what the effect will be.

#### Attaching economic consequences to an action doesn’t restrict

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 93 Howard v. Babcock, No. S027061. , SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, 6 Cal. 4th 409; 863 P.2d 150; 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80; 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6006; 28 A.L.R.5th 811; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8975; 93 Daily Journal DAR 15372, December 6, 1993, Decided , Rehearing Denied February 3, 1994, Reported at: 1994 Cal. LEXIS 534.

[\*\*156] [\*\*\*86] Rule 1-500 provides: "(A) A member shall not be a party to or participate in offering or making an agreement, whether in connection with the settlement of a lawsuit or otherwise, if the agreement restricts the right of a [\*419] member to practice law, except that this rule shall not prohibit such an agreement which: [¶] (1) Is a part of an employment, shareholders', or partnership agreement among members provided the restrictive agreement does not survive the termination of the employment, shareholder, or partnership relationship; or [¶] (2) Requires payments to a member upon the member's retirement from the practice of law; or [¶] (3) Is authorized by Business and Professions Code sections 6092.5, subdivision (i) or 6093 [providing for authority of State Bar Court to impose conditions of probation on disciplined attorneys]. [¶] (B) A member shall not be a party to or participate in offering or making an agreement which precludes the reporting of a violation of these rules." 6

CA(4)(4) We are not persuaded that this rule was intended to or should prohibit the type of agreement that is at issue here. HN10 An agreement that assesses a reasonable cost against a partner who chooses to compete with his or her former partners does not restrict the practice of law. Rather, it attaches an economic consequence to a departing partner's unrestricted choice to pursue a particular kind of practice.

We agree with the Court of Appeal in Haight, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d 963, declaring HN11an agreement between law partners that a reasonable cost will be assessed for competition is consistent with rule 1-500. Rejecting an interpretation of rule 1-500 like that proffered by plaintiffs here, the court stated: "We do not construe rule 1-500 in such a narrow fashion. . . . The rule does not . . . prohibit a withdrawing partner from agreeing to compensate his former partners in the event he chooses to represent clients previously represented by the firm from which he has withdrawn. Such a construction represents a balance between competing interests. On the one hand, it enables a departing attorney to withdraw from a partnership and continue to practice law anywhere within the state, and to be able to accept employment should he choose to do so from any client who desires to retain him. On the other hand, the remaining partners remain able to preserve the stability of the law firm by making available the withdrawing partner's share of capital and accounts receivable to replace the loss of the stream of income from the [\*420] clients taken by the withdrawing partner to support the partnership's debts." (Haight, supra, at pp. 969-970.) Concluding that the agreement was not invalid on its face, the court held that the validity of the agreement depended on whether it "amounts to an agreement for liquidated damages or an agreement resulting in a forfeiture." (Id. at p. 972.)

#### Coal affs can meet if they are restrictions on public lands

DOI No Date U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIORBUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/coal\_and\_non-energy.print.html

Public lands are available for coal leasing only after the lands have been evaluated through the BLM's multiple-use planning process. Leasing federal coal resources is prohibited on public lands such as military reservations, National Parks, or National Wildlife Refuges. In areas where development of coal resources may conflict with the protection and management of other resources or public land uses, the BLM may identify mitigating measures which may appear on leases as either stipulations to uses or restrictions on operations.

#### =Wind Affs meet

BBNEP No Date “Buzzards Bay National Estuary Program” http://buzzardsbay.org/windfarms.htm

The first state approval for the project came in May 2005 when approval was given for the laying of two transmission lines in state waters. From a summer 2005 CZMail: The Secretary of EOEA "issued a Certificate for the Cape Wind Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) stating that the DEIR adequately and properly complies with the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). However, the Secretary is requiring that the project proponent provide additional characterizations of project alternatives, including other locations and configurations; oceanographic modeling data of Nantucket Sound's sediment transport pathways and how they could be affected by the project; data on the use of the Sound by birds and aquatic organisms; and an additional analysis of the visual impacts of the project. The Certificate also noted that due to a recent change to the state boundary in Nantucket Sound, some of the proposed wind turbines are planned for state waters, which would be prohibited under the Ocean Sanctuaries Act." The Final Certificate on Cape Wind can be viewed at the MEPA website, Certificate 12643 FEIR.

#### CTL Military Affs

Snider 12 Annie Snider 12, EandE reporter, “Pentagon still can't define 'energy security,' much less achieve it”, January 16, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/01/16/1

Indeed, a military energy issue that has become a symbol of the larger energy policy debate was one of the final points to be resolved in last month's congressional budget deal. Republicans mounted an effort to exempt the military from a 2007 ban on purchasing fuels like liquefied coal that have a higher greenhouse gas content than traditional petroleum, but in the end they acquiesced, leaving the ban intact.

#### Including energy regulations adds five million research hours

Tugwell 88 Franklin Tugwell joined The Asia Foundation's Board of Trustees in 2010. Dr. Tugwell has served as the President and CEO of Winrock International since 1999. Previously, Dr. Tugwell was the executive director of the Heinz Endowments of Pittsburgh, the founder and president of the Environment Enterprises Assistance Fund, and as a senior consultant for International Projects and Programs at PG&E Enterprises. He served as a deputy assistant administrator at USAID (1980-1981) and as a senior analyst for the energy program at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1979-1980). Dr. Tugwell was also a professor at Pomona College and an adjunct distinguished professor at the Heinz School of Carnegie Mellon University. Additionally, he serves on the Advisory Board and International Committee of the American Council on Renewable Energy and on the Joint Board of Councilors of the China-U.S. Center for Sustainable Development. He also serves on the Board of Eucord (European Cooperative for International Development). Dr. Tugwell received a PhD in political science from Columbia University. “The Energy Crisis and the American Political Economy,” ISBN 0-8047-1500-9

Finally, administering energy regulations proved a costly and cumbersome endeavor, exacting a price all citizens had to pay. As the energy specialist Paul MacAvoy has noted: "More than 300,000 firms were required to respond to controls, ranging from the three dozen major refining companies to a quarter of a million retailers of petroleum products. The respondents had to file more than half a million reports each year, which probably took more than five million man-hours to prepare, at an estimated cost alone of $80 mil- lion."64 To these expenditures must be added the additional costs to the government of collecting and processing these reports, monitor- ing compliance, and managing the complex process associated with setting forth new regulations and adjudicating disputes. All to- gether, it seems likely that the administrative costs, private and public, directly attributable to the regulatory process also exceeded $1 billion a year from 1974 to 1980.^

#### Including energy regs is too big---it’s torture for the neg

Edwards 80 Opinion in BAYOU BOUILLON CORP. v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit. May 5

Comprehending the applicability and complexity of federal energy regulation necessitates both a stroll down the tortuous legislative path and a review of legal challenges so numerous as to require the establishment of a Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.

#### That destroys education---too much to comprehend

Stafford 83 G. William is an Associate at Ross, Marsh and Foster. Review of “Federal Regulation of Energy” by William F. Fox, Jr, http://felj.org/elj/Energy%20Journals/Vol6\_No2\_1985\_Book\_Review2.pdf

It may safely be said that any effort to catalogue "the entire spectrum of federal regulation of energy"' in a single volume certainly requires an enterprising effort on the part of the author. In this regard, Mr. Willam F. Fox, Jr., an Associate Professor of Law at Catholic University of America, has undertaken an examination of a vital aspect of United States policy in Federal Regulation of Energy, published in 1983 with an annual pocket supplement available. Despite the complex nature of the subject of his work, Mr. Fox has prepared a text that provides a significant description of many aspects of federal energy regulatory policy. Initially, the book's title may prove somewhat misleading in that it approaches the subject from an historical perspective focused more on substantive than procedural issues. Although a reader gets the impression that the author at time has tried to do too much -at least from the standpoint of the energy practitioner- the historical and technical insights it offers the student of federal energy relation are valuable. Moreover; its detailed explanations of the methods used to tneet federal energy goals are useful for those in the position of initiating energy policy. This strength notwithstanding, it appears unlikely that an energy law practitioner would benefit significantly from its use, other than from its historical point of view. A general impression is that the author may have been overly ambitious in his effort to undertake the monumental task of evaluating laws, regulations, and significant judicial decisions in a single work.

#### The best lexicography proves restriction and regulation are distinct by definition

Schackleford 17 J. is a justice of the Supreme Court of Florida. “Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, a corporation, et al., Plaintiff in Error, v. The State of Florida, Defendant in Error,” 73 Fla. 609; 74 So. 595; 1917 Fla., Lexis

There would seem to be no occasion to discuss whether or not the Railroad Commissioners had the power and authority to make the order, requiring the three specified railroads running into the City of Tampa to erect a union passenger station in such city, which is set out in the declaration in the instant case and which we have copied above. [\*\*\*29] It is sufficient to say that under the reasoning and the authorities cited in State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 67 Fla. 441, 458, 63 South. Rep. 729, 65 South. Rep. 654, and State v. Jacksonville Terminal [\*631] Co., supra, it would seem that HN14the Commissioners had power and authority. The point which we are required to determine is whether or not the Commissioners were given the authority to impose the fine or penalty upon the three railroads for the recovery of which this action is brought. In order to decide this question we must examine Section 2908 of the General Statutes of 1906, which we have copied above, in the light of the authorities which we have cited and from some of which we have quoted. It will be observed that the declaration alleges that the penalty imposed upon the three railroads was for the violation of what is designated as "Order No. 282," which is set out and which required such railroads to erect and complete a union depot at Tampa within a certain specified time. If the Commissioners had the authority to make such order, it necessarily follows that they could enforce a compliance with the same by appropriate proceedings in the courts, but [\*\*\*30] it does not necessarily follow that they had the power and authority to penalize the roads for a failure to comply therewith. That is a different matter. HN15Section 2908 of the General Statutes of 1906, which originally formed Section 12 of Chapter 4700 of the Laws of Florida, (Acts of 1899, p. 86), expressly authorizes the imposition of a penalty by the Commissioners upon "any railroad, railroad company or other common carrier doing business in this State," for "a violation or disregard of any rate, schedule, rule or regulation, provided or prescribed by said commission," or for failure "to make any report required to be made under the provisions of this Chapter," or for the violation of "any provision of this Chapter." It will be observed that the word "Order" is not mentioned in such section. Are the other words used therein sufficiently comprehensive to embrace an order made by the Commissioners, such as the one now under consideration? [\*632] It could not successfully be contended, nor is such contention attempted, that this order is covered by or embraced within the words "rate," "schedule" or "any report,' therefore we may dismiss these terms from our consideration and [\*\*\*31] direct our attention to the words "rule or regulation." As is frankly stated in the brief filed by the defendant in error: "It is admitted that an order for the erection of a depot is not a 'rate' or 'schedule' and if it is not a 'rule' or 'regulation' then there is no power in the Commissioners to enforce it by the imposition of a penalty." It is earnestly insisted that the words "rule or regulation" are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace such an order and to authorize the penalty imposed, and in support of this contention the following authorities are cited: Black's Law Dictionary, defining regulation and order; Rapalje & Lawrence's Law Dictionary, defining rule; Abbott's Law Dictionary, defining rule; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, defining order and rule [\*\*602] of court; Webster's New International Dictionary, defining regulation; Curry v. Marvin, 2 Fla. 411, text 515; In re Leasing of State Lands, 18 Colo. 359, 32 Pac. Rep. 986; Betts v. Commissioners of the Land Office, 27 Okl. 64, 110 Pac. Rep. 766; Carter V. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co., 124 Mo. App. 530, 102 S.W. Rep. 6, text 9; 34 Cyc. 1031. We have examined all of these authorities, as well as those cited by the [\*\*\*32] plaintiffs in error and a number of others, but shall not undertake an analysis and discussion of all of them. While it is undoubtedly true that the words, rule, regulation and order are frequently used as synonyms, as the dictionaries, both English and law, and the dictionaries of synonyms, such as Soule's show, it does not follow that these words always mean the same thing or are interchangeable at will. It is well known that the same word used in different contexts may mean a different thing by virtue of the coloring which the word [\*633] takes on both from what precedes it in the context and what follows after. Thus in discussing the proper constructions to be placed upon the words "restrictions and regulations" as used in the Constitution of this State, then in force, Chap. 4, Sec. 2, No. 1, of Thompson's Digest, page 50, this court in Curry v. Marvin, 2 Fla. 411, text 415, which case is cited to us and relied upon by both the parties litigant, makes the following statement: "The word restriction is defined by the best lexicographers to mean limitation, confinement within bounds, and would seem, as used in the constitution, to apply to the amount and to the time [\*\*\*33] within which an appeal might to be taken, or a writ of error sued out. The word regulation has a different signification -- it means method, and is defined by Webster in his Dictionary, folio 31, page 929, to be 'a rule or order prescribed by a superior for the management of some business, or for the government of a company or society.' This more properly perhaps applies to the mode and form of proceeding in taking and prosecuting appeals and writs of error. By the use of both of those terms, we think that something more was intended than merely regulating the mode and form of proceedings in such cases." Thus, in Carter v. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co., 124 Mo. App. 530, text 538, 102 S.W. Rep. 6, text 9, it is said, "The definition of a rule or order, which are synonymous terms, include commands to lower courts or court officials to do ministerial acts." In support of this proposition is cited 24 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law 1016, which is evidently an erroneous citation, whether the first or second edition is meant. See the definition of regulate and rule, 24 amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2nd Ed.) pages 243 to 246 and 1010, and it will be seen that the two words are not always [\*\*\*34] synonymous, much necessarily depending upon the context and the sense in which the words are used. Also see the discussion [\*634] of the word regulation in 34 Cyc. 1031. We would call especial attention to Morris v. Board of Pilot Commissioners, 7 Del. chan. 136, 30 Atl. Rep. 667, text 669, wherein the following statement is made by the court: "These words 'rule' and the 'order,' when used in a statute, have a definite signification. They are different in their nature and extent. A rule, to be valid, must be general in its scope, and undiscriminating in its application; an order is specific and not limited in its application. The function of an order relates more particularly to the execution or enforcement of a rule previously made." Also see 7 Words & Phrases 6271 and 6272, and 4 Words & Phrases (2nd Ser.) 419, 420. As we held in City of Los Angeles v. Gager, 10 Cal. App. 378, 102 Pac. Rep. 17, "The meaning of the word 'rules' is of wide and varied significance, depending upon the context; in a legal sense it is synonymous with 'laws.'" If Section 2908 had contained the word order, or had authorized the Commissioners to impose a penalty for the violation of any order [\*\*\*35] made by them, there would be no room for construction. The Georgia statute, Acts of 1905, p. 120, generally known as the "Steed Bill," entitled "An act to further extend the powers of the Railroad Commission of this State, and to confer upon the commission the power to regulate the time and manner within which the several railroads in this State shall receive, receipt for, forward and deliver to its destination all freight of every character, which may be tendered or received by them for transportation; to provide a penalty for non-compliance with any and all reasonable rules, regulations and orders prescribed by the said commission in the execution of these powers, and for other purposes," expressly authorized the Railroad Commissioners "to provide a penalty for non-compliance with any and all reasonable rules, regulations and orders prescribed by the said Commision." [\*635] See Pennington v. Douglas, A. & G. Ry. Co., 3 Ga. App. 665, 60 S.E. Rep. 485, which we cited with approval in State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 fla. 617, text 651, 47 South. Rep. 969, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 639. Under the reasoning in the cited authorities, especially State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., [\*\*\*36] supra, and Morris v. Board of Pilot Commissioners, we are constrained to hold that the fourth and eighth grounds of the demurrer are well founded and that HN16the Railroad Commissioners were not empowered or authorized to impose a penalty upon the three railroads for failure to comply with the order for the erection of a union depot.

#### It’s arbitrary and undermines research

Resnick 1 Evan- assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

# 2NC CP

#### Counterplan: the United States federal government should not allow the EPA to conduct ghg regulations including on the semiconductor industry or broader regions of state authority for regulations

# Adv 1 – Coal

## 1NC

#### The aff doesn’t set a precedent -- the court will limit the plan to maintain the status quo, even if they can’t overrule it. Nothing the aff does changes the mindset of the justices.

Stephen F. Smith, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, April 2002, Texas Law Review, Activism As Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1057

The end result after decades of case-by-case refinement (and frequently revisionism) was a considerable change in Miranda doctrine, but not a complete evisceration of Miranda. Neither Warren nor Rehnquist got to have his first-best preference. What they did get was a second-best approach in which the suspect must be given basic information as to his rights and has the power, by making (and sticking to) an unequivocal request for counsel, to stop all questioning. Of course, the police have ample latitude to use persuasion or clever, noncoercive means to cause suspects not to exercise that power and, ultimately, to make incriminating statements that can be used against them at trial. n213 After Dickerson, it would appear that Miranda law is finally at an equilibrium that almost all of the Justices - including supporters and critics of Miranda - can accept, as shown by the fact that seven of the nine Justices signed onto without comment an opinion reaffirming both Miranda and all of the limitations and exceptions adopted over the ensuing three decades. n214 This is the advantage of reactivism - it provides an efficacious means by which a Court that fundamentally disagrees with earlier precedents, but is unwilling or unable to overrule them explicitly, can move the law (and, with it, actual case outcomes) back in what it believes to be the right direction. The legal system and the public thereby gain, to varying degrees, the benefits of the overruling. At the same time, reactivism allows risk-averse Justices and the Court as an institution to avoid the unpleasant consequences of overruling that have historically made Justices so reluctant [\*1112] to overrule even the most indefensible decisions. n215 Thus, the law gets "fixed" in a way that avoids sharp doctrinal shifts.

\*\*\*FYI – “reactivism” includes “limiting or distinguishing prior precedent in ways that undermine the precedent, as well as adopting compensating rules, such as decision rules in criminal procedure, that do not undermine the precedential value of the earlier decision but nevertheless, in practical terms, reduce the real-world impact of the decision.”\*\*\*

#### Grids resilient – backup solves

Wood, Business Roundtable senior communications advisor, 2012

(Carter, “The grid: After India, America? No, but still…”, 8-2, <http://businessroundtable.org/blog/the-grid-after-india-america-no-but-still/>, DOA: 10-12-12, ldg)

A blackout of such scale could not happen in the United States. For one thing, we don't have 600 million people. And America's electrical grid is certainly much more resilient than the one in India, a still-developing country with ineffective governments. Still, as The Washington Post reports today, "Aging power grid on overload as U.S. demands more electricity." At CNBC, Jim Cramer asked Thomas F. Farrell II, Chairman, President & CEO of Dominion Resources, about India. Could the same thing happen in the United States? Farrell responded: Our system has a lot more rigor to it and partly because we have reserve margins, meaning we have more power stations than we need to run at any particular moment in time, so that if a power station goes out, there's a back-up to help keep the grid stable. They don't have that much excess power in India, and when they get to the root cause, they'll probably find that was somewhere in there.

#### No impact

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Gas market fundamentals swamp the impact of EPA regs

Daniel J. Weiss 12, Senior Fellow and Director of Climate Strategy at the Center for American Progress, May 25, 2012, “The ‘War On Coal’ Is A Myth,” online: <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/05/25/490444/war-on-coal-myth/>

So what is happening to King Coal? The real culprit is the low price for natural gas. A February, 2012 analysis of coal plant retirements by the Analysis Group found that coal plant declines resulted from basic changes in market forces:

The sharp decline in natural gas prices, the rising cost of coal, and reduced demand for electricity are all contributing factors in the decisions to retire some … coal-fired generating units. These trends started well before EPA issued its new air pollution standards.

Coal industry executives themselves say that low natural gas prices, a warm winter, and a sluggish economy are the primary reasons for coal mining worker layoffs. The Bipartisan Policy Center noted that industry-commissioned doomsday projections of economic losses from EPA standards are vastly exaggerated by including unrelated regulations and worst-case scenarios. BPC found that “Several investment analysts were conducted prior to EPA’s [rule] proposal and made worst case estimates about what EPA was likely to require.”

#### Natural disasters are weakening and there are many checks

Kaiser Foundation 11 citing a UN report. " Chances Of Dying In Natural Disaster Decreasing, Economic Costs Increasing Worldwide, U.N. Report Says," 5/10, http://globalhealth.kff.org/Daily-Reports/2011/May/10/GH051011-UN-Disasters.aspx

The risk of dying in a natural disaster is decreasing worldwide, but the economic toll weather-related catastrophes inflict is rising "often due to a lack of investment," according to a new U.N. report released in Geneva on Tuesday, Reuters reports. According to the Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, "[d]amage to infrastructure – schools, health centers, roads, bridges – is soaring in many low- and middle-income countries despite improvements in many early warning systems," the news agency writes (Nebehay, 5/10). The report, released in conjunction with a four-day biennial U.N. conference on disaster risk, "estimated that the amount of global GDP exposed to harm by disasters had nearly tripled from $525.7 billion 40 years ago to $1.58 trillion," according to Agence France-Presse. "The report also reiterated warnings about growing pattern of extreme weather events that has been linked to climate change," AFP adds. Though nations have made improvements in early warning systems and disaster response, many governments said in the survey they were having difficulties implementing disaster reduction measures, including land planning, safe building codes, or slope stabilization, the news agency reports (5/10). "One of the reasons why countries aren't investing enough in disaster risk management is probably, to put it in simple terms, human nature. All of us as individuals and governments in particular do tend to heavily discount very low probability future events," Andrew Maskrey, coordinator of the report, said, adding, "It is very clear from the economic evidence that prevention is better than cure," according to Reuters (5/10).

#### Current tech can identify areas prone to any natural disaster and increase preparedness

Dr. Robert Hamilton 97, Chairman, IDNDR Scientific and Technical Committee, 1997, online: http://www.unisdr.org/unisdr/docs/early/geo/geo.htm

Using currently available methodology, the areas that are prone to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and tsunamis can be identified and the degree of the hazard can be assessed. Such hazard assessments provide an adequate basis for promulgating land-use practices to avoid these geological hazards and building practices to withstand their effects. All nations that are threatened by geological hazards should conduct national, regional, and, where appropriate, local hazard assessments. It should be noted that this is one of the three targets of the IDNDR.

## 2NC

#### No conflicts resulted from the recession – disproves the impact

Barnett 9**—**senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide **recession has had** virtually **no impact** whatsoever **on** the **international security** landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly **unrelated to** global **economic trends**. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: •No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); •The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); •Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); •No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); •A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and •No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

#### History proves

Ferguson 6— Laurence A. Tisch prof of History at Harvard. William Ziegler of Business Administration at Harvard. MA and D.Phil from Glasgow and Oxford (Niall, “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/the\_next\_war\_of\_the\_world.html)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

#### Robust studies prove

Miller 2k – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm)

Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.

#### Structural economic decline now causes a transition to a post-growth equilibrium economy

Heinberg 10 – Richard Heinberg, Senior Fellow at The Post-Carbon Institute, Professor at the New College of California, March 4, 2010, “What if the economy doesn't recover?,” online: http://www.countercurrents.org/heinberg040310.htm

In 2008 the U.S. economy tripped down a steep, rocky slope. Employment levels plummeted; so did purchases of autos and other consumer goods. Property values crashed; foreclosure and bankruptcy rates bled. For states, counties, cities, and towns; for manufacturers, retailers, and middle- and low-income families, the consequences were—and continue to be—catastrophic. Other nations were soon caught up in the undertow.

In late 2009 and early 2010, the economy showed some signs of renewed vigor. Understandably, everyone wants it to get "back to normal." But here's a disturbing thought: **What if that is not possible?** What if the goalposts have been moved, the rules rewritten, the game changed? What if the decades-long era of economic growth based on ever-increasing rates of resource extraction, manufacturing, and consumption is over, finished, and done? What if the economic conditions that all of us grew up expecting to continue practically forever were merely a blip on history's timeline?

It's an uncomfortable idea, but one that cannot be ignored: The "normal" late-20th century economy of seemingly endless growth actually emerged from an aberrant set of conditions **that cannot be perpetuated**.

That "normal" is gone. One way or another, a "new normal" will emerge to replace it. Can we build a different, more sustainable economy to replace the one now in tatters?

Let's be clear: I believe we are in for some very hard times. The transitional period on our way toward a **post-growth, equilibrium economy** will prove to be the most challenging time any of us has ever lived through. Nevertheless, I am convinced that **we can survive** this collective journey, and that if we make sound choices as families and communities, **life can actually be better** for us in the decades ahead than it was during the heady days of seemingly endless economic expansion.

In this essay, I would like to share my conclusions on this subject and the process by which I arrived at them. It's a bit of a long story, so please bear with me. First, the conclusions.

Four Propositions

The following summary statements are fundamental both to grasping our current situation and managing our way toward a desirable future:

1. We have reached the end of economic growth as we have known it. The "growth" we are talking about consists of the expansion of the overall size of the economy (with more people being served and more money changing hands) and of the quantities of energy and material goods flowing through it. The economic crisis that began in 2008 was both foreseeable and inevitable, and that it marks a permanent, fundamental break from past decades—a period in which economists adopted the unrealistic view that perpetual economic growth is necessary and also possible to achieve. As we will see, there are fundamental constraints to ongoing economic expansion, and the world is beginning to encounter those constraints. **This is not to say the U.S. or the world will never see another quarter or year of growth** relative to the previous year. Rather, the point is that when the bumps are averaged out, the general trend-line of the economy (measured in terms of production and consumption of real goods) will be level or downward rather than upward from now on.

#### Economic collapse forces a cultural change away from growth, which solves---prefer our ev that cites polling

Speth 8 – James Gustave Speth, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, founder of the World Resources Institute, Professor at Vermont Law School, Former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of the President, Co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council, 2008, The Bridge at the Edge of the World, p. 211-213

Unfortunately, the surest path to **widespread cultural change** is a cataclysmic event that profoundly affects shared values and delegitimizes the status quo and existing leadership. The Great Depression is a classic example. I believe that both 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina could have led to real cultural change in the United States, both for the better, but America lacked the inspired leadership needed.

The most thorough look at this issue from the perspective here is Thomas Homer-Dixon’s The Upside of Down. He argues “that our circumstances today are surprisingly like Rome’s in key ways. Our societies are also becoming steadily more complex and often more rigid. This is happening partly because we’re trying to manage—often with limited success—stresses building inside our societies, including stresses arising from our gargantuan appetite for energy. . . . Eventually, as occurred in Rome, the stresses may become too extreme, and our societies too inflexible to respond, and some kind of **economic** or political **breakdown will occur**. . . .

“People often use the words ‘breakdown’ and ‘collapse’ synonymously. But in my view, although both breakdown and collapse produce a radical simplification of a system, they differ in their long-term consequences. Breakdown may be serious, but it’s not catastrophic. Something can be salvaged after breakdown occurs and perhaps rebuilt better than before. Collapse, on the other hand, is far more harmful. . . .

“In coming years, I believe, foreshocks are likely to become larger and more frequent. Some could take the form of threshold events—like climate flips, large jumps in energy prices, boundary-crossing outbreaks of new infectious disease, or international financial crises.”23

Homer-Dixon argues that foreshocks and breakdowns can lead to positive change if the ground is prepared. “We need to prepare to turn breakdown to our advantage when it happens—because it will,” he says.24 Homer-Dixon’s point is critically important. Breakdowns, of course, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes; authoritarian ones and Fortress World are also possibilities. Turning a breakdown to advantage will require both inspired leadership and a new story that articulates a positive vision grounded in what is best in the society’s values and history.

A congressman is said to have told a citizens’ group, “If you will lead, your leaders will follow.” But it doesn’t have to be that way. Harvard’s Howard Gardner stresses this potential of true leadership in his book Changing Minds: “Whether they are heads of a nation or senior officials of the United Nations, leaders of large, disparate populations have enormous potential to change minds . . . and in the process they can change the course of history.

“I have suggested one way to capture the attention of a disparate population: by creating a compelling story, embodying that story in one’s own life, and presenting the story in many different formats so that it can eventually topple the counterstories in one’s culture. . . . [T]he story must be simple, easy to identify with, emotionally resonant, and evocative of positive experiences.”25

There is evidence that **Americans are ready for another story**. As noted, **large majorities of Americans**, **when polled,** express disenchantment with today’s lifestyles and offer **support** for **values similar to those discussed here**.26 But these values are held along with other strongly felt and often conflicting values, and we are all pinned down by old habits, fears, insecurities, social pressures, and in other ways. A new story that helps people find their way out of this confusion and dissonance could help lead to real change.

#### Transition now is sustainable --- this is offense for us ---future collapse won’t be

Heinberg 10**—**journalist, teaches at the Core Faculty of New College of California, on the Board of Advisors of the Solar Living Institute and the Post Carbon Institute (Richard Life After Growth, 04 March 2010, http://www.countercurrents.org/heinberg040310.htm)

By saying this, I am not suggesting that we should all simply give up and accept an inevitable, awful fate. Even though the collapse of the world's financial and industrial systems has started, effort now at minimizing further dire consequences is essential. Collapse does not mean extinction. A new way of life will almost certainly emerge from the wreckage of the fossil-fueled growth era. It is up to those of us who have some understanding of what is happening, and why, to help design that new way of life so that it will be sustainable, equitable, and fulfilling for all concerned. We all need practical strategies and tools to weather the collapse and to build the foundation of whatever is to come after. Journey to a New Economy The propositions described above, and my personal journey, are the starting points for a search that can be summarized in a single question: What are the guideposts toward a livable, inviting post-growth society? This search has in many instances entailed a literal, geographic journey. During the past few years, as I traveled the lecture circuit, I met thousands of people who had already concluded on their own that the global stage was being set for an economic crash of epic proportions. They had passed through the psychological stages of grief—denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. They were thinking creatively, building new lives, and experimenting with a wide range of strategies for meeting basic human needs while using much less of just about everything. Some of these folks, like me, had been thinking along these lines for a long time—since the 1970s. Many were much younger, though, had learned about Peak Oil or climate change just within the past few years, and had recently decided to devote their lives to building a post-hydrocarbon world. Some were clearly members of what was known in the 1970s as the "counterculture." Others were mainstream citizens—investment bankers, real estate sellers, high school teachers, small business owners, corporate middle managers—who had chanced upon information that awakened them forcibly from their routines. Many of these folks lived in large cities, but others in small towns or on farms; some were rich, some poor (a few by choice); some were devout, others agnostic or atheist; some were working alone on survivalist projects, while others were building community organizations; some saw the transition as a business opportunity while others were working through non-profit organizations. Here are just three examples that stand out. In 2005, while on a lecture tour in Ireland, I met a young college teacher named Rob Hopkins who believed that life could be better without fossil fuels. He had led his students in developing an "Energy Descent Action Plan" for their town, and believed he had the seed for something larger and more significant. He soon moved back to his native England to earn his Ph.D., and designed his thesis project around helping the village of Totnes begin a cooperative, phased process of transitioning away from its dependence on fossil fuels. This project in turn led to the start of a series of Transition Initiatives in villages, towns, and neighborhoods throughout the U.K. In 2007, a version of Rob's written Ph.D. thesis was published as a book (The Transition Handbook) that quickly began inspiring others to take up this strategy. Today there are hundreds of Transition Initiatives at various stages of development in a dozen countries (including over 50 in the U.S.). While in Montana for a speaking engagement at the University of Montana in Helena in spring 2009, some local Peak Oil activists drove me to the town of Ronan and introduced me to Billie Lee, who had helped start Mission Mountain Food Enterprise Center. The Center is housed in a fairly small, non-descript building and features medium-scale food processing equipment that local small food producers can rent at reasonable rates. This enables small farmers to produce value-added products (everything from canned soups to herbal tea bags) that are profitable and are price-competitive with those made by industrial food companies located hundreds or thousands of miles from Ronan. Local food has become an obsession for the sustainability-minded during the past few years, and local food systems will be a necessary pillar of post-growth economies. Yet aspiring small-scale farmers often have a hard time getting started because they cannot afford the equipment to enable them to produce profitable value-added products. Here in the tiny hamlet of Ronan was an ingenious solution to the problem, and one that deserves to be replicated in every agricultural county in the nation. On a trip to New England in 2007, I met Lynn Benander, a community energy activist and entrepreneur who had started a project called Co-op Power to bring renewable energy to low-income and multi-ethnic communities throughout the Northeast. Typically, renewable energy projects cost more to get going than conventional coal or gas power projects, and so they tend to be found in wealthier communities and regions. Conversely, the most polluting energy projects tend to be sited in or near poor neighborhoods or regions. Co-op Power aims to change that imbalance of power—in a way that any community can copy. A typical project: You help four people put up a solar hot water system and everyone comes to help you put up yours; you save 40 to 50 percent off your total system price, get to know your neighbors, and learn how your system works. Co-op Power had also pioneered a cooperative financing method that cuts through the usual roadblocks to renewable energy projects in poorer neighborhoods by leveraging member equity. Individually, these initiatives and projects may seem to be on too small a scale to make much of a difference. But multiplied by thousands, with examples in nearly every community, they represent a quiet yet powerful movement. Few of these efforts have gained national media attention. Most media commentators who address economic issues are focused on the prospects—positive or negative—of the existing growth-based economy. These projects don't seem all that important within that framework of thinking. But in the new context of the no-growth economy, they may mean the difference between ruinous poverty and happy sufficiency. The trends are already in evidence: as the financial crisis worsens, more people are planting gardens, and seed companies are working hard to keep up with the demand. More young people are taking up farming now than in any recent decade. In 2008, more bicycles were sold in the U.S. than automobiles (not good news for the struggling car companies, but great news for the climate). And since the crisis started, Americans have been spending much less on non-essentials—repairing and re-using rather than replacing and adding. Many economists assume these trends are short-term and that Americans will return to consumerism as economic crisis shifts into recovery. But if there is no "recovery" in the usual sense, then these trends will only grow. This is what the early adopters are assuming. They believe that the nation and the world have turned a corner. They understand something the media either ignore or deny. They're betting on a future of local food systems, not global agribusiness; of community credit co-ops rather than too-big-to-fail Wall Street megabanks; of small-scale renewable energy projects, not a world-spanning system of fossil-fuel extraction, trade, and consumption. A future in which we do for ourselves, share, and cooperate. They're embarking on a life after growth.

#### It wouldn’t cause extinction

Heinberg 4 – journalist, teaches at the Core Faculty of New College of California, on the Board of Advisors of the Solar Living Institute and the Post Carbon Institute (Richard, Power Down, 149-150)

These are the lessons of the past. However, we should also keep in mind the ways in which present circumstances differ from previous ones. Today’s industrial society is the first global civilization in history. It is characterized by interlocking systems of trade such that hardly a single country today is entirely self-sufficient in food, energy, or other basic necessities. Its environmental impacts are global in extent, so that the survivors will not be able simply to move elsewhere in order to escape. Moreover, today’s industrial civilization has developed weapons capable of extinguishing all higher life on the planet. In the worst imaginable case, the collapse of our current civilization will be absolute and permanent: no one will survive. However, it is more likely that collapse will be survivable, at least for some. More significantly, because industrial civilization is drawing down important resources far more quickly than they can be replenished, its fall will almost certainly have the characteristics of a depletion-led collapse. According to Greer, if depletion is limited by decreased drawdown of resources as a consequence of diminished production, the crisis may play out much like a maintenance crisis. However, “a society in which depletion is advanced…may not be able to escape catabolic collapse even if such steps are taken. Cultural and political factors may also make efforts to avoid catabolic collapse difficult to accomplish, or indeed to contemplate. A possible scenario for the collapse of our own civilization might go something like this: Energy shortages commence in the second decade of the century, leading to economic turmoil, frequent and lengthening power blackouts, and general chaos. Over the course of several years, food production plummets, resulting in widespread famine, even if formerly wealthy countries. Wars – including civil wars – rage intermittently. Meanwhile ecological crisis also tears at the social fabric, with water shortages, rising sea levels, and severe storms wreaking further havoc. While previous episodic disasters could have been dealt with by disaster management and rescue efforts, by now societies are too disorganized to mount such efforts. One after another, central governments collapse. Societies attempt to shed complexity in stages, thus buying time. Empires devolve into nations; nations into smaller regional or tribal states. But each lower stage – while initially appearing to offer a new beginning and a platform of stability – reaches its own moment of unsustainability and further collapse ensues. Between 2020 and 2100, the global population declines steeply, perhaps to fewer than one billion. By the start of the next century, the survivors’ grandchildren are entertained by stories of a great civilization of the recent past in which people flew in metal birds and got everything they wanted by pressing buttons.

#### Complexity means quick collapse is net-better for human welfare even if they win their offense---delay magnifies environmental and human impacts

Vail 5 – Jeff Vail, attorney at Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP in Denver, Colorado specializing in litigation and energy issues, former intelligence officer with the US Air Force and energy infrastructure counterterrorism specialist with the US Department of the Interior, April 28, 2005, “The Logic of Collapse,” online: http://www.jeffvail.net/2005/04/logic-of-collapse.html

But despite the declining marginal returns, society is not capable of reducing expenditure, or even reducing the growth in expenditure. I discuss this at length in A Theory of Power, but the basic fact is that society is—at its very root—an evolutionary development that uses a continual increase in complexity to address social needs—and to ensure its own survival. So, as societies continue to invest more and more in social complexity at lower and lower marginal rates of return, they become more and more inefficient until eventually they are no longer capable of withstanding even commonplace stresses. They collapse.

This may seem too deterministic—after all, it suggests that **all societies will eventually collapse**. While that may cause our inherent sense of hubris to perk up for a moment, we should remember that this equation fits our data quite well—every civilization that has ever existed has, in fact, collapsed. Our present global civilization is, or course, the sole exception. A look back at the contemporary chroniclers of history shows that every “great” civilization thinks that they are somehow different, that history will not repeat with them—and their hubris is shared with gusto by members of the present global civilization.

Of course, as discrete empires and societies grow ever more cumbersome they do not always collapse in the spectacular fashion of the Western Roman Empire. If they exist in a “peer-polity” situation—that is, they are surrounded by competitors of similar levels of complexity—then they will tend to be conquered and absorbed. It is only in the case of a power vacuum—like the Chacoans or Western Romans—that we witness such a spectacular loss of complexity. In the “modern” world, we have not witnessed such a collapse as we exist in a global peer-polity continuum. When the Spanish empire grew too cumbersome the British were there to take over, and the mantel has since passed on to America, with the EU, China and others waiting eagerly in the wings. In the modern world there can no longer be an isolated collapse—our next experience with this will be global.

In fact, the modern civilization continuum has existed for so long without a global collapse because we have managed to tap new energy sources—coal, then oil—each with a higher energy surplus than the last. This has buoyed the marginal return curve temporarily with each discovery, but has not changed the fundamental dynamics of collapse.

Perhaps we should take a step back and look at collapse in general. Our psychological investment in the “goodness” of “high-civilization” leads to the commonly held conclusion that collapse is bad—and that to advocate it would be irrational. But from a purely economic point of view, **collapse actually increases the overall benefit that social complexity provides to society for their level of investment**. It makes economic sense. In the graph above, C3-B1 and C1-B1 provide the same benefit to society—but for dramatically different support burdens required to maintain their respective levels of complexity. C1-B1 is a much more desirable location for a society than C3-B1, so collapse from C3-B1 to C1-B1 is actually a good thing. With the growing burden of today’s global society, **the global inequality and injustice** that seems to grow daily, **collapse is beginning to make economic sense**. In fact, an entire philosophical movement, Primitivism, has sprung up dedicated to convincing the world that a “C1-B1”, hamlet society is in fact a far better place.

Despite the growing logic of collapse, in today’s peer-polity world that option does not exist except on a global scale. Today **we have 3 options:**

1. Continue business as usual, accepting declining marginal returns on investments in complexity (and very soon declining overall returns) until an eventual**, inevitable collapse occurs globally**. Continuation of present patterns will continue the **escalating environmental damage**, and will continue to grow the human population, with population levels in increasing excess of the support capacity of a post-collapse Earth (**i.e. more people will die in the collapse**).

2. Locate a new, more efficient energy source to subsidize marginal returns on our investments in complexity. This does not mean discover more oil or invent better clean coal technology—these, along with solar or wind power still provide lower marginal returns than oil in the heyday of cheap Saudi oil. Only the development of super-efficient fusion power seems to provide the ability to delay the decline of marginal returns any appreciable amount, and this will still serve to **only delay and exacerbate the eventual return to option #1.**

3. **Precipitate a global collapse now** in order to reap the economic benefits of this action while **minimizing the costs of the collapse** that will continue to increase with the complexity and population of our global civilization. When combined with a strategy to replace hierarchy with rhizome, as outlined in A Theory of Power, Chapter 9, this may even represent a long-term sustainable strategy.

Whoa. Am I seriously suggesting the triggering of a global collapse? For the moment I’m just suggesting that we explore the idea. If, after deliberation, we accept the totality of the three options as outlined above, then **triggering collapse stands as the only responsible choice**. It is—admittedly—a choice that is so far outside the realm of consideration of most people (who are strongly invested in the Myth of the West) that they will never take it seriously. But critically, it does not necessarily require their consent…

These may seem like the ramblings of a madman. But in the late Western Roman Empire, there is a fact that is simply not taught today because it is too far outside our tolerance for things that run counter to the Myth of the West: The citizens of Rome wanted to end the Empire, to dissolve its cumbersome structure, but could not reverse its pre-programmed course. Many—perhaps most—welcomed the invading barbarians with open arms.

So **should collapse be triggered now, or should we wait as long as possible?** If we accept the inevitability of collapse, **then it should be triggered as soon as possible**, as the cost of implementing a collapse strategy is continually growing…

Throughout history, when collapse has occurred, **it has been a blessing**. The mainstream continues to cling to the beliefs that collapse will be a terrible loss, and that it is not inevitable. **Even with all of our cultural brain-washing**, do we really have so much hubris as to hold on to the tired mantra that “this time, in our civilization, things will be different”?

#### Only collapse now ensures there’s enough natural resources and ecosystem resilience left to create sustainable societies---delay means extinction

Barry 8 – Glen Barry, Ph.D. in Land Resources from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, MS in Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development from Madison, Founder and President of Ecological Internet, January 14, 2008, “Economic Collapse and Global Ecology,” online: http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm

Humanity and the Earth are faced with an enormous conundrum -- sufficient climate policies enjoy political support only in times of rapid economic growth. Yet this growth is the primary factor driving greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental ills. The growth machine has pushed the planet well beyond its ecological carrying capacity, and unless constrained**, can only lead to human extinction** and an end to complex life.

With every economic downturn, like the one now looming in the United States, it becomes more difficult and less likely that policy sufficient to ensure global ecological sustainability will be embraced. This essay explores the possibility that from a biocentric viewpoint of needs for long-term global ecological, economic and social sustainability; it would be better for the economic collapse to come **now rather than later**.

Economic growth is a deadly disease upon the Earth, with capitalism as its most virulent strain. Throw-away consumption and explosive population growth are made possible by using up fossil fuels and destroying ecosystems. Holiday shopping numbers are covered by media in the same breath as Arctic ice melt, ignoring their deep connection. Exponential economic growth destroys ecosystems and pushes the biosphere closer to failure.

Humanity has proven itself unwilling and unable to address climate change and other environmental threats with necessary haste and ambition. Action on coal, forests, population, renewable energy and emission reductions could be taken now at net benefit to the economy. Yet, the losers -- primarily fossil fuel industries and their bought oligarchy -- successfully resist futures not dependent upon their deadly products.

Perpetual economic growth, and necessary climate and other ecological policies, are **fundamentally incompatible.** Global ecological sustainability depends critically upon establishing a steady state economy, whereby production is right-sized to not diminish natural capital. Whole industries like coal and natural forest logging will be eliminated even as new opportunities emerge in solar energy and environmental restoration.

This critical transition to both economic and ecological sustainability is simply not happening on any scale. The challenge is how to carry out necessary environmental policies even as economic growth ends and consumption plunges. The natural response is going to be liquidation of even more life-giving ecosystems, and jettisoning of climate policies, to vainly try to maintain high growth and personal consumption.

We know that humanity must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% over coming decades. How will this and other necessary climate mitigation strategies be maintained during years of economic downturns, resource wars, reasonable demands for equitable consumption, and frankly, the weather being more pleasant in some places? If efforts to reduce emissions and move to a steady state economy fail; the collapse of ecological, economic and social systems is assured.

Bright greens take the continued existence of a habitable Earth with viable, sustainable populations of all species including humans as the ultimate truth and the meaning of life. Whether this is possible in a time of economic collapse is **crucially dependent upon whether enough ecosystems and resources remain post collapse** to allow humanity to recover and reconstitute sustainable, relocalized societies.

It may **be better for the Earth and humanity's future that economic collapse comes sooner rather than later**, while more ecosystems and opportunities to return to nature's fold exist. Economic collapse will be deeply wrenching -- part Great Depression, part African famine. There will be starvation and civil strife, and a long period of suffering and turmoil.

Many will be killed as balance returns to the Earth. Most people have forgotten how to grow food and that their identity is more than what they own. Yet there is some justice, in that those who have lived most lightly upon the land will have an easier time of it, even as those super-consumers living in massive cities finally learn where their food comes from and that ecology is the meaning of life. Economic collapse now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again.

Human suffering -- already the norm for many, but hitting the currently materially affluent -- is inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We are a couple decades at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the Earth's biosphere fails. Humanity can take the bitter medicine now, and recover while emerging better for it; or **our total collapse can be a final**, fatal **death swoon**.

#### Risk of environmental collapse is real and will cascade---we haven’t crossed the tipping point yet but we’re really close---and, anthropogenic destructions destroys resilience and causes extinction

Johan Rockström et al 9 is a Environmental Professor in natural resource management at Stockholm University, and the Executive Director of the Stockholm Environment Institute and the Stockholm Resilience Centre, along with 27 other members of the SEI and SRC, A safe operating space for humanity, Nature 461, 472-475 (24 September 2009), www.nature.com/nature/journal/v461/n7263/full/461472a.html

Crossing certain biophysical thresholds could have disastrous consequences for humanity

Three of nine interlinked planetary boundaries have already been overstepped

Although Earth has undergone many periods of significant environmental change, the planet's environment has been unusually stable for the past 10,000 years 1, 2, 3. This period of stability — known to geologists as the Holocene — has seen human civilizations arise, develop and thrive. Such stability may now be under threat. Since the Industrial Revolution, a new era has arisen, the Anthropocene4, in which human actions have become the main driver of global environmental change5. This could see human activities push the Earth system outside the stable environmental state of the Holocene, with consequences that are detrimental or even catastrophic for large parts of the world.

During the Holocene, environmental change occurred naturally and Earth's regulatory capacity maintained the conditions that enabled human development. Regular temperatures, freshwater availability and biogeochemical flows all stayed within a relatively narrow range. Now, largely because of a rapidly growing reliance on fossil fuels and industrialized forms of agriculture, human activities have reached a level that could damage the systems that keep Earth in the desirable Holocene state. The result could be irreversible and, in some cases, abrupt environmental change, leading to a state less conducive to human development6. Without pressure from humans, the Holocene is expected to continue for at least several thousands of years7.

To meet the challenge of maintaining the Holocene state, we propose a framework based on 'planetary boundaries'. These boundaries define the safe operating space for humanity with respect to the Earth system and are associated with the planet's biophysical subsystems or processes. Although Earth's complex systems sometimes respond smoothly to changing pressures, it seems that this will prove to be the exception rather than the rule**.** Many subsystems of Earth react in a nonlinear, often abrupt, way, and are particularly sensitive around threshold levels of certain key variables. If these thresholds are crossed, then important subsystems, such as a monsoon system, could shift into a new state, often with deleterious or potentially even disastrous consequences for humans8, 9.

Most of these thresholds can be defined by a critical value for one or more control variables, such as carbon dioxide concentration. Not all processes or subsystems on Earth have well-defined thresholds, although human actions that undermine the resilience of such processes or subsystems — for example, land and water degradation — can increase the risk that thresholds will also be crossed in other processes, such as the climate system.

We have tried to identify the Earth-system processes and associated thresholds which, if crossed, could generate unacceptable environmental change. We have found nine such processes for which we believe it is necessary to define planetary boundaries: climate change; rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine); interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean acidification; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading (see Fig. 1 andTable).

The inner green shading represents the proposed safe operating space for nine planetary systems. The red wedges represent an estimate of the current position for each variable. The boundaries in three systems (rate of biodiversity loss, climate change and human interference with the nitrogen cycle), have already been exceeded.

In general, planetary boundaries are values for control variables that are either at a 'safe' distance from thresholds — for processes with evidence of threshold behaviour — or at dangerous levels — for processes without evidence of thresholds. Determining a safe distance involves normative judgements of how societies choose to deal with risk and uncertainty. We have taken a conservative, risk-averse approach to quantifying our planetary boundaries, taking into account the large uncertainties that surround the true position of many thresholds. (A detailed description of the boundaries — and the analyses behind them — is given in ref. 10.)

Humanity may soon be approaching the boundaries for global freshwater use, change in land use, ocean acidification and interference with the global phosphorous cycle (see Fig. 1). Our analysis suggests that three of the Earth-system processes — climate change, rate of biodiversity loss and interference with the nitrogen cycle — have already transgressed their boundaries. For the latter two of these, the control variables are the rate of species loss and the rate at which N2 is removed from the atmosphere and converted to reactive nitrogen for human use, respectively. These are rates of change that cannot continue without significantly eroding the resilience of major components of Earth-system functioning**.** Here we describe these three processes.

#### Growth causes war

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If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we, the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected. First, the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example, as ‘development’ under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel’s invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world’s leading exporters of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US is at war in Central Asia over ‘terrorism’. Few would doubt that a ‘collateral’ outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, US Army retired argued ‘... US military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World’. Taylor referred to ‘… fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States’ and ‘… growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent counterparts’.62 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets’.63 ‘That more than half of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict.’64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. ‘President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war.’ It would ‘… be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States’.65 ‘The US is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Brown, said yesterday.’66 Klare’s recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of international conflict. ‘Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate. … the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow. … The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods. … resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment.’67 Much of the rich world’s participation in the conflicts taking place throughout the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, ‘The rich prize that is Shaba’, Breeze begins, ‘Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco– Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire. … These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship …’68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. ‘The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials.’69 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets …’70 Growth, competition, expansion … and war Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. … world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion. ’71 ‘War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! ‘Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.’75 Security The point being made can be put in terms of security. One way to seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure of money, resources and effort on military preparedness. However there is a much better strategy; i.e. to live in ways that do not oblige you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut! This is not possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth that are totally impossible for all to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to defend their unjust privileges. In other words, if we want affluence we must prepare for war. If we insist on continuing to take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes, without which we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice, and that is not possible unless rich countries move to ‘The Simpler Way’.

#### Extinction

Chase-Dunn 96 Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of (Christopher, Conflict Among Core States: World-System Cycles and Trends, 23 January 1996, http://wsarch.ucr.edu/archive/papers/c-d&hall/warprop.htm)

Note-figure omitted

Late in the K-wave upswing (i.e. in the 2020s), the world-system schema predicts a window of vulnerability to another round of world war. This is when world wars have occurred in the past. Intensified rivalry and competition for raw materials and markets will coincide with a multipolar distribution of military power among core states. The world-system model does not predict who the next hegemon will be. Rather it designates that there will be structural forces in motion that will favor the construction of a new hierarchy. Historical particularities and the unique features of the era will shape the outcome and select the winners and losers. If it were possible for the current system to survive the holocaust of another war among core states, the outcome of the war would be the main arbiter of hegemonic succession. While the hegemonic sequence has been a messy method of selecting global "leadership" in the past, the settlement of hegemonic rivalry by force in the future will be a disaster that our species may not survive. It is my concern about this possible disaster that motivates this effort to understand how the hegemonic sequence has occurred in the past and the factors affecting hegemonic rivalry in the next decades. What are the cyclical processes and secular trends that may affect the probability of future world wars? The world-system model is presented in Figure 1. This model depicts the variables that I contend will be the main influences on the probability of war among core states. The four variables that raise the probability of core war are the Kondratieff cycle, hegemonic decline, population pressure (and resource scarcity) and global inequality. The four variables that reduce the probability of core war are the destructiveness of weaponry, international economic interdependency, international political integration and disarmament. The probability of war may be high without a war occurring, of course. Joshua Goldstein's (1988) study of war severity (battle deaths per year) in wars among the "great powers" demonstrated the existence of a fifty-year cycle of core wars. Goldstein's study shows how this "war wave" tracks rather closely with the Kondratieff long economic cycle over the past 500 years of world-system history. It is the future of this war cycle that I am trying to predict. Factors that Increase the Likelihood of War Among Core States The proposed model divides variables into those that are alleged to increase the probability of war among core states and those that decrease that probability. There are four of each. Kondratieff waves The first variable that has a positive effect on the probability of war among core powers is the Kondratieff wave -- a forty to sixty year cycle of economic growth and stagnation. Goldstein (1988) provides evidence that the most destructive core wars tend to occur late in a Kondratieff A-phase (upswing). Earlier research by Thompson and Zuk (1982) also supports the conclusion that core wars are more likely to begin near the end of an upswing. Boswell and Sweat's (1991) analysis also supports the Goldstein thesis. But several other world-system theorists have argued that core wars occur primarily during K-wave B-phases. This disagreement over timing is related to a disagreement over causation. According to Goldstein states are war machines that always have a desire to utilize military force, but wars are costly and so statesmen tend to refrain from going to war when state revenues are low. On the other hand, statesmen are more likely to engage in warfare when state revenues are high (because the states can then afford the high costs of war). Boswell and Sweat call this the "resource theory of war."

#### Growth causes terrorism

Cronin 3Senior Associate at the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War (Audrey Kurth, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism”, Project MUSE)

The objectives of international terrorism have also changed as a result of globalization. Foreign intrusions and growing awareness of shrinking global space have created incentives to use the ideal asymmetrical weapon, terrorism, for more ambitious purposes. The political incentives to attack major targets such as the United States with powerful weapons have greatly increased. The perceived corruption of indigenous customs, religions, languages, economies, and so on are blamed on an international system often unconsciously molded by American behavior. The accompanying distortions in local communities as a result of exposure to the global marketplace of goods and ideas are increasingly blamed on U.S.- sponsored modernization and those who support it. The advancement of technology, however, is not the driving force behind the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies, despite what some have assumed. Instead, at the heart of this threat are frustrated populations and international movements that are increasingly inclined to lash out against U.S.-led globalization. As Christopher Coker observes, globalization is reducing tendencies toward instrumental violence (i.e., violence between states and even between communities), but it is enhancing incentives for expressive violence (or violence that is ritualistic, symbolic, and communicative). The new international terrorism is [End Page 51] increasingly engendered by a need to assert identity or meaning against forces of homogeneity, especially on the part of cultures that are threatened by, or left behind by, the secular future that Western-led globalization brings. According to a report recently published by the United Nations Development Programme, the region of greatest deficit in measures of human development—the Arab world—is also the heart of the most threatening religiously inspired terrorism. Much more work needs to be done on the significance of this correlation, but increasingly sources of political discontent are arising from disenfranchised areas in the Arab world that feel left behind by the promise of globalization and its assurances of broader freedom, prosperity, and access to knowledge. The results are dashed expectations, heightened resentment of the perceived U.S.-led hegemonic system, and a shift of focus away from more proximate targets within the region. Of course, the motivations behind this threat should not be oversimplified: Anti-American terrorism is spurred in part by a desire to change U.S. policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions as well as by growing antipathy in the developing world vis-à-vis the forces of globalization. It is also crucial to distinguish between the motivations of leaders such as Osama bin Laden and their followers. The former seem to be more driven by calculated strategic decisions to shift the locus of attack away from repressive indigenous governments to the more attractive and media-rich target of the United States. The latter appear to be more driven by religious concepts cleverly distorted to arouse anger and passion in societies full of pent-up frustration. To some degree, terrorism is directed against the United States because of its engagement and policies in various regions. Anti-Americanism is closely related to antiglobalization, because (intentionally or not) the primary driver of the powerful forces resulting in globalization is the United States. Analyzing terrorism as something separate from globalization is misleading and potentially dangerous. Indeed globalization and terrorism are intricately intertwined forces characterizing international security in the twenty-first century. The main question is whether terrorism will succeed in disrupting the [End Page 52] promise of improved livelihoods for millions of people on Earth. Globalization is not an inevitable, linear development, and it can be disrupted by such unconventional means as international terrorism. Conversely, modern international terrorism is especially dangerous because of the power that it potentially derives from globalization—whether through access to CBNR weapons, global media outreach, or a diverse network of financial and information resources.

#### Nuclear war

Hellman 8—professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University. PhD from Stanford. (Martin, The Odds for Nuclear Armageddon, Spring 2008, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce whichever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan).

#### Growth causes diseases mutations --- escalates to spread rampantly

Hamburg 8**—**FDA Commissioner.Senior Scientist Nuclear Threat Initiative. MD (Margaret, Germs Go Global: Why Emerging Infectious Diseases Are a Threat to America, http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/GermsGoGlobal.pdf)

Globalization, the worldwide movement toward economic, financial, trade, and communications integration, has impacted public health significantly. Technology and economic interdependence allow diseases to spread globally at rapid speeds. Experts believe that the increase in international travel and commerce, including the increasingly global nature of food handling, processing, and sales contribute to the spread of emerging infectious diseases.47 Increased global trade has also brought more and more people into contact with zoonosis -- diseases that originated in animals before jumping to humans. For example, in 2003, the monkeypox virus entered the U.S. through imported Gambian giant rats sold in the nation’s under-regulated exotic pet trade. The rats infected pet prairie dogs, which passed the virus along to humans.48 International smuggling of birds, brought into the U.S. without undergoing inspection and/or quarantine, is of particular concern to public health experts who worry that it may be a pathway for the H5N1 “bird flu” virus to enter the country. Lower cost and efficient means of international transportation allow people to travel to more remote places and potential exposure to more infectious diseases. And the close proximity of passengers on passenger planes, trains, and cruise ships over the course of many hours puts people at risk for higher levels of exposure. If a person contracts a disease abroad, their symptoms may not emerge until they return home, having exposed others to the infection during their travels. In addition, planes and ships can themselves become breeding grounds for infectious diseases. The 2002-2003 SARS outbreak spread quickly around the globe due to international travel. SARS is caused by a new strain of coronavirus, the same family of viruses that frequently cause the common cold. This contagious and sometimes fatal respiratory illness first appeared in China in November 2002. Within 6 weeks, SARS had spread worldwide, transmitted around the globe by unsuspecting travelers. According to CDC, 8,098 people were infected and 774 died of the disease.49 SARS represented the first severe, newly emergent infectious disease of the 21st century. 50 It illustrated just how quickly infection can spread in a highly mobile and interconnected world. SARS was contained and controlled because public health authorities in the communities most affected mounted a rapid and effective response. SARS also demonstrated the economic consequences of an emerging infectious disease in closely interdependent and highly mobile world. Apart from the direct costs of intensive medical care and disease control interventions, SARS caused widespread social disruption and economic losses. Schools, hospitals, and some borders were closed and thousands of people were placed in quarantine. International travel to affected areas fell sharply by 50 - 70 percent. Hotel occupancy dropped by more than 60 percent. Businesses, particularly in tourism-related areas, failed. According to a study by Morgan Stanley, the Asia-Pacific region’s economy lost nearly $40 billion due to SARS.51 The World Bank found that the East Asian region’s GDP fell by 2 percent in the second quarter of 2003.52 Toronto experienced a 13.4 percent drop in tourism in 2003.53

# Adv 2 – Precedent

## 1NC

#### Economic power not key to hegemony

Kapila 10 [Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst and the Consultant for Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group and a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College with a Masters in Defence Science and a PhD in Strategic Studies., “21st Century: Strategically A Second American Century With Caveats,” June 26, http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006263919/21st-century-strategically-a-second-american-century-with-caveats.html]

Strategically, the 20th Century was decidedly an American Century. United States strategic, military, political and economic predominance was global and undisputed. In the bi-polar global power structure comprising the United States and the Former Soviet Union it was the United States which globally prevailed. The 20th Century's dawn was marked by the First World War which marked the decline of the old European colonial powers, noticeably Great Britain. The Second World War marked the total eclipse of Great Britain and other colonial powers. The United States replaced Great Britain as the new global superpower. The 20th Century's end witnessed the end of the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Former Soviet Union as the United States strategic challenger and counter-vailing power. On the verge of the new millennium the United States strode the globe like a colossus as the sole global super power. With a decade of the 21st Century having gone past, many strategic and political analysts the world over have toyed with projections that United States global predominance is on the decline, and that the 21st Century will not be a second American Century. Having toyed, with such projections, these analysts however shy away from predicting whose century the 21st Century will strategically be? The trouble with such projections is that they are based predominantly on analyses of economic trends and financial strengths and less on detailed analyses of strategic and military strengths, and more significantly strategic cultures. Presumably, it is easier for such analysts to base trends on much quoted statistical data. Strategic analysis of global predominance trends is a more complex task in the opinion of the Author, as it cannot be based on statistical data analysis. Global predominance trends need unravelling of strategic cultures of contending powers, the reading of national intentions and resolve and the inherent national strengths and willpower demonstrated over a considerable time span of half-centuries and centuries. Crisply put, one needs to remember that in the 1980's, Japan and Germany as "economic superpowers" could not emerge as global superpowers. Hence global predominance calls for more than economic strengths. The United States getting strategically bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan in the first decade of the 21st Century has not led to any noticeable decline in American global predominance. Despite Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States reigns supreme globally even in East Asia where China could have logically challenged it. More significantly, and normally forgotten, is the fact that the off-quoted shift of global and economic power from the West to East was facilitated by United States massive financial direct investments in China, Japan, South Korea and India. China quoted as the next superpower to rival the United States would be economically prostate, should the United States surgically disconnect China's economic and financial linkages to the United States. More significantly, while examining the prospects of the 21st Century as a "Second American Century" it must be remembered that besides other factors, that out of the six multipolar contenders for global power, none except China have shown any indications to whittle down US global predominance. Even China seems to be comfortable with US power as long as it keeps Japan in check. This Paper makes bold to assert that the 21st Century would be a Second American Century despite China's challenge and the strategic distractions arising from the global Islamic flash-points.

#### No impact

O’Neill 4O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

## 1NR

### 2NC Bioterror

#### The worst case scenario happened – no extinction

Dove 12 [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶ There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶ Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶ That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶ Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, § Marked 17:13 § and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶ The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated members, so this release over the world’s largest city really represented a worst-case scenario.¶ Nobody got sick or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.