# States CP

## 1NC

#### ThusText: The fifty state governments of the United States should increase financial incentives for bimimetic solar power in the United States

## 2NC

#### Voting for the CP solves their framing arguments – it blends the counter-discourse of the aff with the dominant narrative of the DA, propelling its success through wider dissemination and acceptance. Only a risk this solves better that the aff’s isolated frame.

Felicitas Macgilchrist, Research Fellow and Lecturer at European-University Viadrina, 2007, Positive Discourse Analysis: Contesting Dominant Discourses by Reframing the Issues, Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines 1 (1): 74-94

The final strategy for contesting the dominant discourse is a more radical attempt to break into the consensus and entirely turn around the reporting of an issue. Radical reframing involves not only dialogue with other frames, as in the Euro-sceptic account, but also an inversion of the mainstream view of the issue. As indicated above (3.1), the mainstream media tend to ignore news stories which simply invert the conventional view with logical arguments. Blending an inversion with elements of other prevalent frames can, however, propel the counter-discourse into the publication. One fairly radical reframing is John Laughland’s (2004) article in The Guardian headlined The Chechens' American friends. Previous research has shown that The Guardian has a very strong position with regard to the Chechen-Russian conflict (cf. Macgilchrist in press). In their view, Russia’s brutal repression of the Chechen independence movement has forced Chechens to a politics of frustration, i.e. the Russian military is the root cause of the various sieges, hostage-takings and attacks carried out over the last few years. The merits and demerits of this frame are beyond the scope of this paper. Of interest here is how one article with an entirely different perspective comes to be printed in the newspaper.

The article was written just after the Beslan school siege in 2004 as a response to numerous media reports which gave Putin direct responsibility for creating the conditions that led to the hostage-taking. Laughland makes use of various discursive strategies to position himself towards these reports, including parody, nominalisation, extrematisation, etc. He inverts the western media stories which, for instance, argue that Russian television ‘played down’ the siege. To counter this, he describes the extensive coverage he saw on Russian television. The most noteworthy strategy for our purposes, however, is his dialogue with another very prominent frame in The Guardian: On closer inspection, it turns out that this so-called ‘mounting criticism’ [of Putin] is in fact being driven by a specific group in the Russian political spectrum - and by its American supporters. In addition to the distancing so-called and the scare quotes around mounting criticism, Laughland here introduces his prime move in contesting the criticism of Putin: he discredits the critics. He goes on to say that the specific groups driving the criticism are, firstly, Russian politicians ‘associated with the extreme neoliberal market reforms which so devastated the Russian economy’ in the 90s, and secondly, American neoconservatives. The Americans involved are members of the ACPC, the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya. Not only are they introduced as neoconservatives, they are described as supporters of the ‘war on terror’. That The Guardian opposes the war on terror can be seen not only by its articles on the topic, but also by the editorial suggestion that the employees join the Stop The War Coalition en masse. The journalists declined, preferring to retain the image of political neutrality.11 The article lists eight members of the ACPC, and gives each the exact opposite of what Jonathon Potter calls ‘category entitlement’ (Potter 1996): this is category disentitlement at work. In the list, each epithet is in direct contrast to The Guardian’s dominant discourse. The list of the self-styled ‘distinguished Americans’ who are its members is a rollcall of the most prominent neoconservatives who so enthusiastically support the ‘war on terror’. They include Richard Perle, the notorious Pentagon adviser; Elliott Abrams of Iran-Contra fame; Kenneth Adelman, the former US ambassador to the UN who egged on the invasion of Iraq by predicting it would be ‘a cakewalk’; Midge Decter, biographer of Donald Rumsfeld and a director of the rightwing Heritage Foundation; Frank Gaffney of the militarist Centre for Security Policy; Bruce Jackson, former US military intelligence officer and one-time vice-president of Lockheed Martin, now president of the US Committee on Nato; Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute, a former admirer of Italian fascism and now a leading proponent of regime change in Iran; and R. James Woolsey, the former CIA director who is one of the leading cheerleaders behind George Bush's plans to re-model the Muslim world along pro-US lines. Readers of The Guardian will recognise the frame being articulated here. The traditionally left-leaning newspaper is consistently critical of rightwing social reforms, and militarist approaches, regime change along pro-US lines, Lockheed Martin’s arms sales, etc. By aligning himself with a frame which is prevalent in the pages of The Guardian, Laughland is working at gaining credibility for the argument he will propose. If we think of words not as the linguistic expression of underlying ‘concepts’, but as ‘tools that cause listeners to activate certain parts of the knowledge base’ (Lee 2001: 11) then this inclusion of the neoconservatives activates a frame for readers who agree with The Guardian on global issues. In general, the ‘connotations’ (i.e. the shared frame knowledge) of neoconservative as used in The Guardian could prime the reader to question the legitimacy of, and motivation for, whichever entity / policy / group / suggestion the neoconservatives are supporting.12

In this case the neoconservatives support the mainstream media’s condemnation of Russia’s apparent causal role in the school siege; they support Chechnya and mitigate the attackers’ responsibility for the school siege. That Laughland highlights these Americans’ role in propelling a certain message through the media turns this condemnation on its head: he mitigates Russia’s responsibility and works up the Chechens’ culpability. In addition to this disentitlement of the ACPC, the text builds up the author’s entitlement to speak. The final caption at the end of the article defines the author for the readers: John Laughland is a trustee of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group. www.oscewatch.org This final sentence positions Laughland within the human rights field, with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe named in the internet link as validation. Given that The Guardian coverage of Chechnya tends to focus quite heavily on human rights issues, this final descriptor emphasises his ‘category entitlement’ as a commentator on these matters. Thus, Laughland utilizes two of The Guardian’s own priorities (frames) to undermine the dominant Guardian discourse: (1) his own position aligned with a human rights organisation, and (2) his critique of US ‘military-political’ institutions and neoconservative individuals. The article thereby radically reframes the Chechen-Russian conflict. It does not blame Vladimir Putin and Russian policies for creating the conditions leading to the Chechens’ hostage-taking attacks. Instead, it moves the coverage out of the simple Russia-represses-Chechnya frame, and into the frame of global geopolitical machinations, in which – it is implied – dubious neoconservative motives are central. Other articles on Russia engage in similar moves to radically reframe the issues, by appropriating the anti-war, anti-neocon discourses (Kraus 2004; Lieven 2004) or the discourses of, for example, technological progress (Gutterman 2004), and rule of law (Greeley 2005). Of interest here is that these radical reframings are successful: they are printed in fairly prominent positions in the mainstream media. If we shift the issues we feel strongly about (perhaps: education, health, language, representation, misrepresentation) closer to the space currently inhabited by dominant frames they are much more likely to be printed. This is not a matter of subsuming one’s own perspective and issues under the mainstream view, but of utilising the space offered by the dominant frames to achieve a wider dissemination of marginal views. Rather than the monologue of logical arguments, reframing enters into dialogue with other issues to grab media attention. This could be a very useful strategy for academics to break into the consensus of whichever issue they feel strongly about.

#### If we win that our CP solves the aff, it accesses their entire ethics framework. --- it’s irresponsible to refuse our CP if it solves the aff and we have a net-benefit.

John Finnis, Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy, 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 111-112

The sixth requirement has obvious connections with the fifth, but introduces a new range of problems for practical reason, problems which go to the heart of ‘morality’. For this is the requirement that one bring about good in the world (in one’s own life and the lives of others) by actions that are efficient for their (reasonable) purpose(s). One must not waste one’s opportunities by using inefficient methods. One’s actions should be judged by their effectiveness, by their fitness for their purpose, by their utility, their consequences… There is a wide range of contexts in which it is possible and only reasonable to calculate, measure, compare, weigh, and assess the consequences of alternative decisions. Where a choice must be made it is reasonable to prefer human good to the good of animals. Where a choice must be made it is reasonable to prefer basic human goods (such as life) to merely instru­mental goods (such as property). Where damage is inevitable, it is reasonable to prefer stunning to wounding, wounding to maiming, maiming to death: i.e. lesser rather than greater damage to one-and-the-same basic good in one-and-the-same instantiation. Where one way of participating in a human good includes both all the good aspects and effects of its alternative, and more, it is reasonable to prefer that way: a remedy that both relieves pain and heals is to be preferred to the one that merely relieves pain. Where a person or a society has created a personal or social hierarchy of practical norms and orienta­tions, through reasonable choice of commitments, one can in many cases reasonably measure the benefits and disadvantages of alternatives. (Consider a man who ha decided to become a scholar, or a society that has decided to go to war.) Where one is considering objects or activities in which there is reasonably a market, the market provides a common de­nominator (currency) and enables a comparison to be made of prices, costs, and profits. Where there are alternative techniques or facilities for achieving definite objectives, cost-benefit analysis will make possible a certain range of reasonable comparisons between techniques or facilities. Over a wide range of preferences and wants, it is reasonable for an individual or society to seek to maximize the satisfaction of those preferences or wants.

# Px

## 1NC

#### Immigration will pass---sustained momentum’s key

Cohen 2/8 Micah is a writer for NYT’s 538 blog. “Signs of a Shift on Immigration Among G.O.P. Rank-and-File,” 2013, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/signs-of-a-shift-on-immigration-among-g-o-p-rank-and-file/

With notable speed after the Nov. 6 presidential election, a number of Republican politicians and opinions makers — from House Speaker John A. Boehner to the talk show host Sean Hannity — altered their positions on immigration and expressed a new openness to comprehensive reform.¶ Since then, the push to overhaul the nation’s immigration system appears to have sustained momentum. A new ABC News/Washington Post poll found a jump in public approval of President Obama’s handling of immigration, and most recent polls have found a majority of Americans support providing immigrants who have come here illegally a pathway to United States citizenship.¶ So, has the shift on immigration among some — but not all — Republican legislators, strategists and media personalities filtered down to rank-and-file Republicans?¶ The polling evidence — with a few significant caveats — says “possibly, yes.” There are signs of an uptick in Republican support for a pathway to citizenship, or at least a conditional pathway to citizenship.¶ First, the caveats. Tracking opinions on immigration policy over time is tricky because each pollster asks different questions with different options, making for apples-to-oranges comparisons. In addition, when narrowing the focus to self-identified Republicans and Republican leaners, small sample sizes and large margin of sampling errors become a problem. A typical national survey includes about 1,000 respondents, making the subsample of Republicans pretty small, usually around 200 to 300.¶ But keeping those disclaimers in mind, the most recent polls on immigration suggest an increase in the percentage of Republicans who favor immigration reform that includes a route to United States citizenship.¶ On average, the share of Republicans who favor providing undocumented immigrants with a path to citizenship is 48 percent among the six national polls released so far in 2013 and included in the PollingReport.com database. (The release of a CNN poll conducted Jan. 14-15 did not provide a breakdown by political party and is not included in the average).¶ Among the six previous polls that asked about a pathway to citizenship and released results by party identification, an average of only 38 percent of Republicans favored providing a path to citizenship.¶ Question wording has an effect here. Two of the polls that found the highest level of Republican support emphasized the requirements illegal immigrants might have to meet to become citizens. Conservative voters might be more likely to support a path to citizenship if it involves certain qualifications.¶ For instance, a Fox News poll conducted Jan. 15-17 among registered voters found that 56 percent of Republicans said the government should “allow illegal immigrants to remain in the country and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, but only if they meet certain requirements like paying back taxes, learning English, and passing a background check.”¶ And a Gallup poll released this week found that 59 percent of Republicans would vote for “a law that would allow undocumented immigrants living in the United States the chance to become legal residents or citizens if they meet certain requirements.”¶ On the other hand, a CBS News poll of adults conducted Jan. 24-27 found that only 35 percent of Republicans said illegal immigrants currently working in the country “should be allowed to stay in their jobs and to eventually apply for U.S. citizenship.” (CBS found that 25 percent of Republicans said illegal immigrants should be able to stay as guest workers and 36 percent said they should be required to leave the United States).¶ The apples-to-apples comparisons we have are more mixed: Republican support in the mid-January AP/GfK poll jumped to 53 percent from 31 percent in 2010. The latest ABC News/Washington Post poll moved to 42 percent Republican support for a path to citizenship from 37 percent in November 2012 (that’s inside the margin of sampling error). The CBS News poll did not move at all, finding 35 percent Republican support in both its December 2012 and late January 2013 surveys. And Quinnipiac polls, released on Thursday and in early December 2012, both found roughly 40 percent of registered Republicans support a path to citizenship and just more than 10 percent support legal status without citizenship.¶ An uptick in Republican support for a pathway to citizenship could be statistical noise. And even if it is real, it could reverse itself. Some political science research suggests that anti-immigrant attitudes increase when immigration is in the news.¶ But there are reasons to think that immigration, over all, has become less of a hot-button issue. A Pew study found that the number of illegal immigrants living in the United States has dropped since the 2007 push for change. Another Pew survey found that only 44 percent of Republicans see dealing with immigration as a top priority. That’s down from previous peaks of 69 percent in 2007 and 61 percent in 2011.¶ Further polling is needed before a more concrete picture of Republican attitudes emerges. But if Republican voters have warmed to providing a conditional path to citizenship, it could increase the likelihood of an overhaul becoming law by freeing House Republicans, in particular, to back some kind of reform.

#### Renewable incentives are a political firestorm---tied into Solyndra no matter what

Belogolova 11 Olga is a writer for the National Journal. “Solyndra Casts Shadow on Renewable-Energy Grants,” Dec 7, http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/solyndra-casts-shadow-on-renewable-energy-grants-20111206

The political firestorm that erupted when solar-panel maker Solyndra defaulted on its federal loan is sure to affect clean-energy tax credits that are set to expire at the end of the year, an overwhelming majority of National Journal’s Energy and Environment Insiders say.¶ Several clean-energy incentives will end on Dec. 31 if Congress does not renew them for at least another year. These include the Treasury Department’s 1603 grant program for renewable energy and tax credits for the ethanol industry. Last year, Congress passed a tax package in the 11th hour that included both.¶ This time around, however, Insiders think that such programs may become collateral damage of the Solyndra scandal. Nearly 85 percent of Insiders say that the politics surrounding Solyndra will hurt the chances of extending the 1603 program.¶ “The House has gone after the White House like an angry pit bull on Solyndra. There is no way they are gonna let the 1603 program through,” said one Insider.¶ Though the 1603 program is entirely separate from the Energy Department’s loan-guarantee program that assisted the now-bankrupt solar company, it holds the same political value for its opponents. The program, which allows renewable developers to take advantage of a 30 percent grant in lieu of future tax credits, was created through the stimulus bill—just like the loan-guarantee program.¶ “Republicans have pushed the anti-Solyndra, anti-clean-energy narrative so aggressively that they are willing to throw the baby out with the bathwater and the basin it was in as well,” said one Insider.¶ Some Insiders argued that opponents of the incentive were going to let it expire anyway—with or without the Solyndra controversy. One Insider said that the 1603 grant program is “too expensive to survive in this fiscal environment,” and another said that Solyndra is just a “convenient excuse” for the GOP to do what it was going to do regardless.¶ “I think it’s much less about Solyndra, and more about the fact we’re in a deficit situation,” explained one Insider.¶ The deficit situation and the general fiscal environment in Congress won't just affect the 1603 program, but it will also affect the tax credits for the ethanol industry. Seventy-five percent of Insiders said that Congress will not pass any tax-extenders package before the end of the year.¶ "The age of big spending on marginal sources is over for now," said one Insider.

#### PC’s key

Foley 1/15 Elise is a writer @ Huff Post Politics. “Obama Gears Up For Immigration Reform Push In Second Term,” 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/obama-immigration-reform\_n\_2463388.html

Obama has repeatedly said he will push hard for immigration reform in his second term, and administration officials have said that other contentious legislative initiatives -- including gun control and the debt ceiling -- won't be allowed to get in the way. At least at first glance, he seems to have politics on his side. GOP lawmakers are entering -- or, in some cases, re-entering -- the immigration debate in the wake of disastrous results for their party's presidential nominee with Latino voters, who support reform by large measures. Based on those new political realities, "it would be a suicidal impulse for Republicans in Congress to continue to block [reform]," David Axelrod, a longtime adviser to the president, told The Huffington Post.¶ Now there's the question of how Obama gets there. While confrontation might work with Republicans on other issues -- the debt ceiling, for example -- the consensus is that the GOP is serious enough about reform that the president can, and must, play the role of broker and statesman to get a deal.¶ It starts with a lesson from his first term. Republicans have demanded that the border be secured first, before other elements of immigration reform. Yet the administration has been by many measures the strictest ever on immigration enforcement, and devotes massive sums to policing the borders. The White House has met many of the desired metrics for border security, although there is always more to be done, but Republicans are still calling for more before they will consider reform. Enforcing the border, but not sufficiently touting its record of doing so, the White House has learned, won't be enough to win over Republicans.¶ In a briefing with The Huffington Post, a senior administration official said the White House believes it has met enforcement goals and must now move to a comprehensive solution. The administration is highly skeptical of claims from Republicans that immigration reform can or should be done in a piecemeal fashion. Going down that road, the White House worries, could result in passage of the less politically complicated pieces, such as an enforcement mechanism and high-skilled worker visas, while leaving out more contentious items such as a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.¶ "Enforcement is certainly part of the picture," the official said. "But if you go back and look at the 2006 and 2007 bills, if you go back and look at John McCain's 10-point 'This is what I've got to get done before I'm prepared to talk about immigration,' and then you look at what we're actually doing, it's like 'check, check, check.' We're there. The border is as secure as it's been in a generation or two, so it's really time."¶ One key in the second term, advocates say, will be convincing skeptics such as Republican Sen. John Cornyn of Texas that the Obama administration held up its end of the bargain by proving a commitment to enforcement. The White House also needs to convince GOP lawmakers that there's support from their constituents for immigration reform, which could be aided by conservative evangelical leaders and members of the business community who are pushing for a bill.¶ Immigrant advocates want more targeted deportations that focus on criminals, while opponents of comprehensive immigration reform say there's too little enforcement and not enough assurances that reform wouldn't be followed by another wave of unauthorized immigration. The Obama administration has made some progress on both fronts, but some advocates worry that the president hasn't done enough to emphasize it. The latest deportation figures were released in the ultimate Friday news dump: mid-afternoon Friday on Dec. 21, a prime travel time four days before Christmas.¶ Last week, the enforcement-is-working argument was bolstered by a report from the nonpartisan Migration Policy Institute, which found that the government is pouring more money into its immigration agencies than the other federal law-enforcement efforts combined. There are some clear metrics to point to on the border in particular, and Doris Meissner, an author of the report and a former commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, said she hopes putting out more information can add to the immigration debate.¶ "I've been surprised, frankly, that the administration hasn't done more to lay out its record," she said, adding the administration has kept many of its metrics under wraps.¶ There are already lawmakers working on a broad agreement. Eight senators, coined the gang of eight, are working on a bipartisan immigration bill. It's still in its early stages, but nonmembers of the "gang," such as Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) are also talking about reform.¶ It's still unclear what exact role the president will play, but sources say he does plan to lead on the issue. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), the top Democrat on the House immigration subcommittee, said the White House seems sensitive to the fact that Republicans and Democrats need to work out the issue in Congress -- no one is expecting a fiscal cliff-style arrangement jammed by leadership -- while keeping the president heavily involved.

#### CIT’s key to Latin American relations

Shifter 12 Michael is the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf

Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation. The inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other country in the Americas. Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue. Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.

#### Relations are key to solve a laundry list of existential threats---the brink is now

Shifter 12 Michael is the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf

There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to pursue more robust ties. Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources. Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market and source of capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin America, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance. For its part, Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future. The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human rights.With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin America remain disappointing . If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart . The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention—both from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean.

## 1NR

#### This vastly outweighs the case---preserving existence by definition has to come before any other value---worsening environmental crisis turns all of their impacts, but embracing eco-authoritarianism unites humanity and solves all war

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 85-86

Our position differs from Wolff and other anarchists also insofar as we reject the principle of autonomy, the foundation belief of liberalism. It is the argument of this work that liberalism has essentially overdosed on freedom and liberty. It is true that freedom and liberty are important values, but such values are by no means fundamental or ultimate values. These values are far down the list of what we believe to be core values based upon an ecological philosophy of humanity: survival and the integrity of ecological systems. Without such values, values such as freedom and autonomy make no sense at all. If one is not living, one cannot be free. Indeed liberal freedom essentially presupposes the idea of a sustainable life for otherwise the only freedom that the liberal social world would have would be to perish in a polluted environment.

The issue of values calls into question the Western view of the world or perhaps more specifically the viewpoint that originates from Anglo Saxon development. It is significant that the “clash of civilizations” thinking espoused by Samuel Huntington, a precursor of the neoconservatives, has generated much debate and support. Huntington’s analysis involves potential conflict between “Western universalism, Muslim militancy and Chinese assertion.”18 The divisions are based on cultural inheritance. It is a world in which enemies are essential for peoples seeking identity and where the most severe conflicts lie at the points where the major civilizations of the world clash. Hopefully this viewpoint will be superseded, for humanity no longer has time for the indulgence of irrational hates. The important clash will not be of civilizations but of values. The fault line cuts across all civilizations. It is a clash of values between the conservatives and the consumers. The latter are well described in this book. They rule the world economically, and their thinking excludes true care for the future of the world. The conservatives at present are a powerless polyglot of scientists, environmentalists, farming and subsistence communities, and peoples of various religious faiths, including a minority of right-wing creationists who think that God wishes the world to be cared for. They recognize the environmental perils and place their banishment as the preeminent task of humanity. The fight for minds, not liberal democracy, will determine the future of the world’s population. If conservative thought prevails it may unite humanity in common cause and heal the cultural fault lines.

#### Delaying the transition to authoritarianism in the hopes that people just start to “get it” on their own independently causes extinction

Charles Daniel 12, University of Leeds, Summer 2012, “To what extent is democracy detrimental to the current and future aims of environmental policy and technologies?,” POLIS Journal, Vol. 7, <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/charles-daniel.pdf>

Is it therefore possible to conclude that democracy is indeed detrimental to the current and future aims of environmental policy and technologies? The resounding answer is ‘no’ as the alternative options proposed in the paper do not offer viable and comprehensive methods of being able to direct policy in ways that democracy is unable. What can be acknowledged though is that as our planet becomes more over-crowded, over-developed and over-dependent on financial instruments, so too does the window of opportunity to secure a sustainable planet for future generations. Tim Flannery is right in asserting that ‘our fate is in our own hands’ and whilst the need to be optimistic and to put faith in the ability of our future as stewards of the Earth is important, one cannot ignore our inclination as a species to behave in a selfish manner. Not only is it a political and cultural reality, it is also a biological one (Flannery 2010). Our instinct to survive will not go away. Unfortunately, that survival has become so contingent on the systematic exploitation of our natural world. It has, I believe, reached a point where something needs to be done. Progressive politics through raising awareness and encouraging good practices is vital for the survival of our planet. We cannot, however, wait for people to slowly adjust their lifestyles and hope that environmental consciousness ‘just happens’. I believe some level of intervention is required, a higher one that is currently present in our domestic and global politics. We need to accept, at some point, that limitations on our economic and social freedoms may be necessary in order to ensure that ‘Gaia’s’ future is secured. As I have suggested in Chapter 3, this has to be a two-tiered process. Firstly individuals have to accept limitations on their freedom. This has to be acknowledged by national governments that, in turn, would make the same sacrifice and relinquish certain aspects of their authoritative freedoms to supranational institutions. This process would require high levels of trust in global governance models that have, as such, been fairly ineffective in influencing the actions of powerful nations. However, we must not lose faith in these processes and retreat to policies of economic isolation and suspicion. James Lovelock is correct in affirming that our planet is old and frail. It is up to those in power to ensure that it does not wither away.

#### Even if they completely abolished consumption, the ontological impulse still makes ecological collapse inevitable

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 4

There is also another important point that will recur in our argument, but which requires emphasis now to avoid unnecessary confusion. In a book about democracy it is prima facie reasonable to expect a definition of “democracy”: “democracy is X.” Defenders of democracy have a problem in saying what “X” actually is. There are a multitude of definitions of democracy and to attempt to taxonomize now would be distracting from this overview. Further, we contend that democracy is conceptually incoherent, in some of its versions at least. Thus one of the problems of democracy is that there is no universally accepted definition that can be worked into an introductory chapter without immediately raising philosophical issues of contention. As we wish to develop an ecological critique of democracy in all its forms and a philosophical rejection of democracy per se, we are not disturbed by not being able to offer the reader an initial, simple definition. There are in our opinion no such satisfactory definitions, for all such definitions (e.g., government of the people, by the people, for the people) are even vaguer and less informative than the concept of democracy, as we show in chapter 5. For the moment we invite the reader to operate with her or his own intuitive understanding of democracy, and in chapter 5 we will criticize the standard accounts. In chapter 7 we will also reject liberalism as a philosophical position.

For the purposes of developing an ecological critique of democracy it is first necessary to understand the basis of the environmental crisis facing humanity. Almost all environmental writers blame the crisis on liberal capitalism. We argue that even if liberal capitalism ceased to exist there would still be the potential for an environmental crisis because of the destructive tendencies within the heart of democracy itself.

#### No offense---remember the town halls over health care reform in summer 2009 that were dominated by Fox News-watching idiots screaming about death panels? The only people who show up to the aff’s movement/deliberation/whatever will be crazy conservatives who are more deeply motivated, or people who can afford to take time off work---ensures it fails to accurately represent the aff’s constituency

Tina Nabatchi 7, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs and a Faculty Research Associate at the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration at Syracuse University, 2007, Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy, p. 65-66

Additional transaction costs to government officials and decision makers concern their ability to broker policy compromises (e.g., Huntington, 1975). "Because citizen participants are not paid for their time, committees may be dominated by strongly partisan participants whose livelihood or values are strongly affected by the decisions being made, or by those who live comfortably enough to allow them to participate regularly" (Irvin and Siansbury, 2004: 59). Thus, given the potential limits of representation among citizen participants, there is little to guarantee that participants will be adequate proxies for the community. This is especially true in larger, more heterogeneous communities (Ostrom, 1990). Even if there is diversity among participants, this diversity can make it more difficult for political elites to make policy decisions that satisfy citizen demands (Huntington, 1975; Sunstein, 2003). As more citizens participate, more views and positions are brought to the table. Policy makers must not only sort through these views, but also take into account the preferences and demands of larger and more diverse groups of citizens (for practical and recent examples of this situation, see Margerurn and Whitehall, 2004; Throop and Purdom, 2006; USFS, 2002).

#### Environmental decline makes the transition to authoritarianism inevitable---the only question is whether it can be effective

Mark Beeson 10, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918

The conclusions that emerge from the following discussion are necessarily impressionistic, speculative and rather dispiriting. The empirical evidence upon which such inferences depend is, by contrast, more and more compelling and unequivocal. There is little doubt that the natural environment everywhere is under profound, perhaps irredeemable stress. Parts of Southeast Asia and China are distinctive only in having already gone further than the most of the West in the extent of the degradation that has already occurred (see Jasparro and Taylor 2008). The only issue that remains in doubt is the nature of the response to this unfolding crisis. The extent of the problem, the seemingly implacable nature of the drivers of environmental decline, the limited capacity for action at the national level and the region's unimpressive record of cooperation and environmental management do not inspire confidence. Consequently, the prospects for an authoritarian response become more likely as the material base of existence becomes less capable of sustaining life, let alone the ‘good life’ upon which the legitimacy of democratic regimes hinges.

#### The environmental crisis will collapse democracy---embracing deliberation now causes delayed response that ensures extinction

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 153-156

As we have said, it is not too difficult to see how this present regime of global capitalism and liberal democracy will end: It will end through ecological necessity. Nature will take humanity by the throat and confront it with the biospherical damage that it has done. It is most unlikely in our opinion that some form of spontaneous, unorganized democratic groundswell will awaken the masses to their fates before it is too late. Rather any such resistance to the system must come from an organized vanguard, unafraid to ultimately rule in the name of the common good. These new philosopher kings feature what we call the “authoritarian alternative” discussed earlier.

#### Their K is wrong and has zero evidentiary basis --- economic predictions are accurate, not totalizing, reflexive, and there’s no alt

DOUGLAS W. HANDS 84 Department of Economics University of Puget Sound What Economics Is Not: An Economist's Response to Rosenberg Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 495-503 http://www.jstor.org/stable/187496

1. Economic Predictions. Much of Rosenberg's discussion is directed toward explaining the "predictive weakness" (p. 297) of modem economics and the discipline's inability (or lack of desire) to "improve its predictive content" (p. 301). This failure to generate successful predictions and to improve the few predictions which are made is taken as an empiricafl act about even the most applied economic theories. No evidence is provided, or even suggested, to support this empirical claim. Rosenberg certainly needs to provide evidence for the ubiquitous predictive failure of applied economic theory. Such criticism is by no means "well known" or "standard" in the literature on economic methodology. It is "standard” to argue that economic theories are insulated from direct falsification, that they are built on inadequate behavioral foundation s, and that in their most abstract form they fail to yield predictions or even to systematically connect up with applied theories which might yield predictions. But systematic predictive failure is not a standard methodological criticism of applied economic theory. The reason why such predictive failure i snot a standard criticism i squite simple: Rosenberg has exaggerated the extent of this failure. Predictive failure is simply not the ubiquitous fact of modem economic theory which Rosenberg assumes. While nowhere n ear the standards ofthe best natura ls cience, applied economic theories (both micro and macro) do generate an ocean of successful predictions, on everything from the impact of trucking deregulation to the demand for consumer credit. Rosenberg's claim that economic predictions have not "improved"(p . 301) with time is also exaggerated. W hile there is always room for more improvement, modern macroeconometric models provide extraordinary accuracy relative to pre-World W ar I1b usiness cycle models. Where substantiael errros ooccur, such as the inability to predict the inflationary im pacto fthe OPEC i nduceds upply-sides hock, the models are improved so that failures of the same type are less likely to reoccur.3 Rosenberg even goes so far as to argue that more predictively successful alternatives currently exist (at least in the micro domain) and are neglected, ostensibly because of an irrational professional attraction to intentional and extreme views of human behavior. He tells us that even if a more predictive theory were available: "it is not likely to actually deflect practicing economists from their intentional extreme research program . . . the reason is that they are not really much interested in questions of empirical applicability at all. Otherwise some of the attractive nonintentional and/or nonextremal approaches to economic behavior that are available would long ago have elicited more interest from economists than they have" (p. 308). An adequate defense of this position would of course require a demonstration of both the predictive failure of traditional microeconomics and the predictive success of the proposed alternatives. We have already questioned the validity of the former; Rosenberg merely asserts the latter. Contrary to Rosenberg's claim, predictive success is an important criterion of theory choice in economics. One of the reasons for this is that economic predictions are consumed by the business community. These business interests do not care whether the underlying economic theory is intentional or nonintentional. In fact, they do not even care whether the predictions are from scientific theories or not. They are only concerned with (and pay for) predictive accuracy. In addition to these business interests, labor unions, governments, and other organizations are also consumers of economic predictions. These groups approach economic theory with the same nomological nonchalance as the corporate consumers. Of course, the fact that organizational consumers of economic predictions often purchase infolmation based on traditional economic models does not imply that these models constitute "science" or that there is no room for nontraditional models. The argument is only that the survivability of the traditional approach in such applications indicates that (relative to the available alternatives), its predictive failings are not as great as Rosenberg would have us believe.

# Case

## 1NC

#### Ecological crunch coming---causing a transition to environmental authoritarianism

Mark Beeson 10, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918

The environment has become the defining public policy issue of the era. Not only will political responses to environmental challenges determine the health of the planet, but continuing environmental degradation may also affect political systems. This interaction is likely to be especially acute in parts of the world where environmental problems are most pressing and the state's ability to respond to such challenges is weakest. One possible consequence of environmental degradation is the development or consolidation of authoritarian rule as political elites come to privilege regime maintenance and internal stability over political liberalisation. Even efforts to mitigate the impact of, or respond to, environmental change may involve a decrease in individual liberty as governments seek to transform environmentally destructive behaviour. As a result, ‘environmental authoritarianism’ may become an increasingly common response to the destructive impacts of climate change in an age of diminished expectations.

#### The aff’s faith in bottom-up change delays the transition and only authoritarian coercion can solve fast enough---the 1AC is founded on an ontology of abundance

Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 20-21

If these changes are necessary - the downgrading, curtailment and reconceptualisation of democracy, liberties, and justice, as well as the raising to primacy of integrity and ecological virtue - how are the necessary changes to come about? Value change represents the best 'long-term' hope but the ecological crisis is not a 'long-term' problem. These changes have to be introduced quickly and before there has been time to inculcate value shifts in the population. The downgrading of rights and liberties has to be achieved through policy and institutional change, even while the question of a long-term change of values is also addressed. For both these tasks what is required is political leadership and the institution of the state.

The immediate problem lies in the collective action problem that arises in respect of the looming ecological constraints on economic activity and the potential collapse of the global commons. The end of the 'golden age' of material abundance, as we slide back down the other side of 'Hubbert's pimple’ will bring about intense competition for scarce resources. To understand politics under these circumstances, we have to turn back to Hobbes and Burke, the political philosophers who conceptualised life under conditions of scarcity, and also to Plato, commended for his healthy mistrust of democracy.

For Ophuls a crucial element of political philosophy is the definition of reality itself; political philosophy carries within it an ontologieal component which sets out the foundations of political possibility. The contemporary West he sees as defined by the 'philosophers of the great frontier' Locke, Smith, and Marx. These are the political philosophers of abundance. For Locke the proviso of always leaving 'as much and as good' for others in appropriation could always be met even when there was no unappropriated land left, as the productivity of the land put to useful work would always create better opportunities for those coming later. Smiths 'invisible hand' thesis was also dependent upon the assumption that the material goods would always be available for individual to accomplish their own economic plans. For Marx the 'higher phase' of communist society arrives 'after the productive forces have... increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly' (Marx, 1970: 19). For Ophuls these are all the political philosophies of abundance. Ecological crisis, however, returns us to the Hobbesian struggle of all against all (Heilbroner, 1974: 89). With ecological scarcity we return to the classical problems of political theory that 400 years of abnormal abundance has shielded us from (Ophuls, 1977: 164). Both liberalism and socialism represent the politics of this 'abnormal abundance' and with the demise of this period we return to the eternal problems of politics.

Hobbes, then, is seen as the political philosopher of ecological scarcity avant la lettre. 'Hardin's "logic of the commons" is simply a special version of the general political dynamic of Hobbes' "state of nature"' (Ophuls, 1977; 148). Competition over scarce resources leads to conflict, even when all those involved realise that they would be collectively better off if they could co-operate, 'to bring about the tragedy of the commons it is not necessary that men be bad, only that they not be actively good' (Ophuls, 1977: 149). It is this Hobbesian struggle that may impose 'intolerable strains on the representative political apparatus that has been historically associated with capitalist societies' (Heilbroner, 1974: 89). Coercion is seen as the solution (and it is hoped, although as we have seen not for terribly good reasons, that this coercion can be agreed democratically), and the appropriate agent of this solution is the state. The transition from abundance to scarcity will have to be centralised and expert-controlled, and it is unlikely that 'a steady state polity could be democratic' (Ophuls, 1977: 162). As we shall see in the following paragraphs, this faith in the ability of the state to institute centralised controls that would be obeyed by its citizens is one of the areas that has attracted fierce criticism from contemporary green political theorists.

#### Breaking down elite control of energy policy is suicidal---destroys the capacity of centralized government to respond to climate change and environmental degradation

Mark Beeson 10, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918

Yet, whatever we may think about Asia's authoritarian regimes, we need to recognise that they have frequently been associated with a (generally successful) historical pattern of development that has prioritised the economic over the political, and that this model may continue to have appeal and potential efficacy (Beeson 2007b). The possibility that the state will, for better or worse, remain at the centre of attempts at environmental management is recognised by some scholars (Meadowcroft 2005), but even some of the most sophisticated analyses of the state's role seem overwhelming Eurocentric, highly abstract and not terribly helpful in explaining current or likely future political and environmental outcomes in places like Southeast Asia. For example, Eckersley's (2004, p. 178) belief that there is ‘the potential for a vibrant public sphere and innovative discursive procedures to lift the horizons of not only democratic opinion formation but also democratic will-formation beyond the territorially bounded community of citizens’, has little obvious resonance with the history of much of Southeast Asia [emphasis in original]. The reality is that the Philippines, the country with arguably the most vibrant civil society in Southeast Asia, also has one of the most appalling environmental records (Fahn 2003, p. 117).

Even in ‘developed’ industrial democracies with long traditions of political pluralism and arguably more effective civil societies, it has long been recognised that the exercise of effective ‘green’ agency is highly problematic and faces fundamental problems of mobilisation, organisation and collective action. The – perhaps understandable – suspicion of traditional politics, hierarchy and political authority has often rendered green parties politically ineffective (Goodin 1992). Even if we recognise the changes that have taken place in the social structures and even consciousness of many Western societies (Carter 2007), the reality on the ground in much of Southeast Asia and China is very different. Quotidian reality becomes especially important when we consider the potential efficacy of deliberative democracy, which some see as a way of resolving political conflicts over the environment.

Although deliberative democracy has been described as ‘the currently hegemonic approach to democracy within environmental thinking’ (Arias-Maldonado 2007, p. 245), it has little obvious relevance to the situation in East Asia. While there is much that is admirable about the central precepts of deliberative democracy (see Bohman 1998), its underlying assumptions about the circumstances in which political activity actually occur are strikingly at odds with the lived reality outside North America and Western Europe. This merits emphasis because for some writers rational, informed discourse is central to sustainable environmental management and the resolution of the competing interests that inevitably surround it (Hamilton and Wills-Toker 2006). And yet, as the very limited number of studies that actually examine environmental politics under authoritarian rule demonstrate, the reality is very different and the prospects for the development of progressive politics are very limited (Doyle and Simpson 2006). Even if we assume that political circumstances do actually allow for a politically unconstrained and informed discussion of complex issues, as Arias-Maldonado (2007, p. 248) points out, ‘the belief that citizens in a deliberative context will spontaneously acquire ecological enlightenment, and will push for greener decisions, relies too much on an optimistic, naive view of human nature, so frequently found in utopian political movements’.

In much of East Asia, the population may not have the luxury or capacity even to engage in these sorts of discursive practices, while the absence of effective democracy in much of the region stands as a continuing obstacle to achieving anything approximating deliberative democracy. Even more problematically in the long-run, there is no compelling evidence that democracy of any sort will necessarily promote good environmental outcomes (Neumayer 2002), or that rising living standards will inevitably deliver a sustainable environment (Dinda 2004). On the contrary, there is evidence to suggest that in the initial phases at least, ‘democratisation could indirectly promote environmental degradation through its effect on national income’ (Li and Reuveny 2006, p. 953). In other words, even the best of all outcomes – rising living standards and an outbreak of democracy – may have unsustainable environmental consequences that may prove to be their undoing in the longer-term. In such circumstances, ideas about possible ways of reorganising societies to lessen their impact on the natural environment may not find sufficient support to make them realisable or effective. As Lieberman (2002, p. 709) points out, ‘an idea's time arrives not simply because the idea is compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political circumstances favor it’. In much of Southeast Asia and China the forces supporting environmental protection are comparatively weak and unable to overcome powerful vested interests intent on the continuing exploitation of natural resources.

In short, predominantly Western concerns with ‘thick cosmopolitanism’ and the hope that a ‘metabolistic [sic] relationship with the natural environment’ might bind us to strangers (Dobson 2006, p. 177), seem bizarrely at odds with lived experience where climate change is already profoundly undermining sociability within national frameworks, let alone between them (Raleigh and Urdal 2007). The sobering reality would seem to be that ‘… as the human population grows and environmental damage progresses, policymakers will have less and less capacity to intervene to keep damage from producing serious social disruption, including conflict’ (Homer-Dixon 1991, p. 79).

#### Only top-down, centralized imposition of constraints on freedom can guarantee sustainability---their ethic will inevitably fail to improve ecological outcomes---an accelerating crisis makes authoritarianism inevitable, and the worse the environment gets, the worse the constraints on freedom will be

Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 14-15

In terms of the first of these points, that our democratic choices reflect a narrow understanding of our immediate interests and not an enlightened view of our long-term welfare, the case is made by Ophuls. He claims that we are now 'so committed to most of the things that cause or support the evils' with which he is concerned that 'we are almost paralysed; nearly all the constructive actions that could be taken at present... are so painful to so many people in so many ways that they are indeed totally unrealistic, and neither politicians nor citizens would tolerate them' (Ophuls, 1977: 224).4 Environmentally friendly policies can be justifiably imposed upon a population that 'would do something quite different if it was merely left to its own immediate desires and devices' (Ophuls, 1977: 227): currently left to these devices, the American people 'have so far evinced little willingness to make even minor sacrifices... for the sake of environmental goals' (Ophuls, 1977: 197). Laura Westra makes a similar argument in relation to the collapse of Canadian cod fisheries, which is taken to illustrate a wider point that we cannot hope to 'manage' nature when powerful economic and political interests are supported by 'uneducated democratic preferences and values' (Westra, 1998: 95). More generally reducing our 'ecological footprint' means 'individual and aggregate restraints the like of which have not been seen in most of the northwestern world. For this reason, it is doubtful that persons will freely embrace the choices that would severely curtail their usual freedoms and rights... even in the interests of long-term health and self-preservation.” (Westra, 1998: 198). Thus we will require a 'top-down' regulatory regime to take on 'the role of the "wise man" of Aristotelian doctrine as well as 'bottom-up' shifts in values (Westra, 1998: 199). Ophuls also believes that in certain circumstances (of which ecological crisis is an example) 'democracy must give way to elite rule' (1977: 159) as critical decisions have to be made by competent people.

The classic statement of the collective action problem in relation to environmental phenomena was that of Hardin (1968). The 'tragedy' here refers to the "remorseless working of things' towards an 'inevitable destiny' (Hardin, 1968: 1244, quoting A. N. Whitehead). Thus even if we are aware of where our long-term, enlightened interests do lie, the preferred outcome is beyond our ability to reach in an uncoerced manner. This is the n-person prisoners' dilemma, a well established analytical tool in the social analysis of collectively suboptimal outcomes. A brief example could be given in terms of an unregulated fishery. The owner of trawler can be fully aware that there is collective over-extraction from the fishing grounds he uses, and so the question arises of whether he should self-regulate his own catch. If he fishes to his maximum capacity, his gain is a catch fractionally depleted from what it would be if the fisheries were fully stocked. If the 'full catch' is 1, then this catch is 1 - £, where £ is the difference between the full stock catch and the depleted stock catch divided by the number of fishing vessels. If the trawlerman regulates his own catch, then he loses the entire amount that he feels each boat needs to surrender, and furthermore he has no reason to suppose that other fishermen would behave in a similar fashion, in fact he will expect them to benefit by catching the fish that he abjures. In the language of game theory he would be a 'sucker', and the rational course of action is to continue taking the maximum catch, despite the predictable conclusion that this course of action, when taken by all fishermen making the same rational calculation, will lead to the collapse of the fishery. Individual rationality leads to severely suboptimal outcomes. Under these circumstances an appeal to conscience is useless, as it merely places the recipient of the appeal in a 'double-bind'. The open appeal is 'behave as a responsible citizen, or you will be condemned. But there is also a covert appeal in the opposite direction; 'If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons' (Hardin, 1968: 246). Thus the appeal creates the imperative both to behave responsibly and to avoid being a sucker.

In terms of democracy, what this entails is that, in general, we have to be prepared to accept coercion in order to overcome the collective action problem.5 The Leviathan of the state is the institution that has the political power required to solve this conundrum. 'Mutual coercion, mutually agreed on" is Hardin's famous solution to the tragedy of the commons. Revisiting the 'tragedy' argument in 1998, Hardin held that '[i]ts message is, I think, still true today. Individualism is cherished because it produces freedom, but the gift is conditional: The more population exceeds the carrying capacity of the environment, the more freedoms must be given up' (Hardin, 1998: 682). On this view coercion is an integral part of politics: the state coerces when it taxes, or when it prevents us from robbing banks. Coercion has, however, become 'a dirty word for most liberals now' (Hardin, 1968: 1246) but this does not have to be the case as long as this coercion comes about as a result of the democratic will. This however, requires overcoming the problems raised by the likes of Ophuls and Westra, that is, it is dependent upon the assumption that people can agree to coerce each other in order to realise their long-term, 'enlightened' self-interest. If they cannot, and both the myopic and collective action problem ecological objections to democracy arc valid, then this coercion may not be 'mutually agreed upon' but rather imposed by Ophuls' ecological 'elite' or Westra's Aristotelian 'wise man'. Under these circumstances there seems to be no hope at all for a reconciliation of ecological imperatives and democratic decision-making: we are faced with a stark choice, democracy or ecological survival.

#### Sustainability inevitable---creativity and positive trends

John H. Matthews 12, and Frederick Boltz, Center for Conservation and Government, Conservation International, June 2012, “The Shifting Boundaries of Sustainability Science: Are We Doomed Yet?,” PLOS Biology, [http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001344](http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001344)

Humans have long caused irreparable harm to ecosystems, driven species to extinction, and have in turn endured major shifts in biogeochemical cycling. We agree that such incidents are avoidable and unacceptable and that the magnitude of current trends must not be dismissed. Humans have also developed ingenious and novel ways of making resource use far more efficient or exploiting new types of resources. Obvious developments here include the invention of agriculture and the domestication of wild plant and animal species, of course, but humans have also been innovative in energy development (wood, wind, coal, petroleum, hydropower, biofuels, geothermal, biogen, nuclear, solar, and wave power), the development of synthetic chemical fertilizers in the 19th century, and the discovery of modern antibiotics in the 20th century. Other innovations have been organizational, such as the development of cities in the Levant and east and south Asia, the birth of modern experimental science, and the transition from family-tribal-moeity structures to multiple scales of governance (including corporate, national, international, and global government structures and institutions). ¶ Some responses to economic and environmental change defy the longstanding predictions of overpopulation concerns, such as the widespread trend towards declining birthrates as living standards increase [32], though the relationship between per capita energy consumption and population growth is complex [33]. While Burger and colleagues point to increasing energy consumption over the past few centuries, they disregard important shifts in the sources of energy in progressive economies [1]; the expansion of low-carbon energy sources in China, Brazil, the European Union, and other regions in recent decades marks a critical transition, and a shift from coal-fired sources of power to hydropower or wind mark very significant transformations, with important implications for ecological footprints. For example, over 98% of Norway's electricity is derived from hydropower [34], about 20% of Brazil's transport fuels consumption is derived from renewable biofuels [35], while China has installed to date about 61 GW of windpower, or roughly three times the generation potential of the Three Gorges Dam [36]. The development of a global environmental movement is also notable in this context, as signified by both the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (attended by over 100 heads of state and 172 governments) as well as its planned 2012 successor conference, the Rio+20 Summit, in addition to important milestones achieved under the UN biodiversity and climate conventions (i.e., the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity [UNCBD] and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC]). ¶ While these and other innovations in organization, efficiency, and technology have had unintended side effects, they also resulted in major transitions in human survivorship, resource extraction efficiency, and social and cultural organization. They were also largely unanticipated or very difficult to predict for most observers prior to their invention. Taken together, humans have demonstrated great creativity in how we use technological, social, and cultural “tools” to solve resource limitations.¶ Not Doomed (Yet) Top¶ Our “adjustments” to the view of sustainability science presented by Brown and colleagues [1] are not meant to obscure or downplay absolute declines in resources such as economically valuable metals and agriculturally productive land, our heedless approach to anticipated tipping points in greenhouse gas accumulation, and ecosystem transformation and species extinction. The availability of natural resources is less of a problem than absolute limits in the Earth's ability to absorb the different outputs of economic activities, while maintaining conditions necessary for human productivity, much less the survival of humans and other species. Anthropogenic climate change is perhaps the most prominent example of these new scarcities and emerging “limits to growth.” Indeed, we attribute great merit to these cautionary appeals and to the evidence of Earth system thresholds. We argue for positive responses in behavior, technological progress, and economic realignments commensurate with the challenge of fulfilling human needs while maintaining an Earth system suitable for the long-term survival of humans and other species. ¶ The authors ask, Can the Earth support even current levels of human resource use and waste production, let alone provide for projected population growth and economic development? They answer their question with little doubt: “There is increasing evidence that modern humans have already exceeded global limits on population and socioeconomic development, because essential resources are being consumed at unsustainable rates” [1]. We agree that our present consumptive trajectory risks surpassing perceived planetary boundaries in the safe operating space for humanity (c.f. [11]). We argue that these risks merit a paradigm shift, a global transformation—and that this paradigm shift is underway. We believe that the transition from relatively static approaches to sustainability to flexible green economies embedded in dynamic, variable ecosystems will prove to be a critical intellectual shift for humans this century. ¶ There are reasons for cautious optimism. It is no accident that the modern synthesis of payments for ecosystem services crystallized in the developing world in Costa Rica when the scarcity of ecosystem goods and services from forest conversion was recognized as a social and economic threat [37]. Revolutionary approaches to water management such as dynamic environmental flows have evolved to address both climate variability and absolute shifts in Tanzania's precipitation regime (http://www.iucn.org/about/union/secretar​iat/offices/esaro/what\_we\_do/water\_and\_w​etlands/prbmp\_esaro/). A global policy and economic transformation attributing value to standing forest has emerged with the development of “REDD+” incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation, particularly in tropical forests (c.f. [38]). Many developing countries understand that Western models of development are inappropriate if not impossible to achieve. We believe that these and other positive trends are both accelerating and permeating local, national, and global economies quickly and permanently.

#### No impact to biodiversity

Sagoff 97  Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

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Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on **the brink of** an episode of **massive extinction, it may not follow** from this grim fact **that human** being**s will suffer** as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain **why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth**. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority **of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans** one iota."n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "**The human species could survive just as well** if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain **even if** **every threatened organism becomes extinct**. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, **one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes**. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, **biodiversity matters only up to a point**; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make **little difference**." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

#### Plan weans America off oil

Biello 10 (David, Scientific American, “Where Did the Carter White House's Solar Panels Go?”, August 6, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=carter-white-house-solar-panel-array)

There was a lot of thought given to installing the 32 solar panels in the first place, not least because the system could not alter the look or profile of the White House in any way. In fact, Morse, who first got involved with solar during the Nixon administration by being asked to assess its potential, spent years determining what could be installed. Ultimately, he had to make parts of the panels white, rather than a darker (more sunlight-absorbent) color. On June 30, 1979, the panels were unveiled, although they remained invisible from the ground.¶ "It was the oil shock that pretty much caused the government to take a very serious look at its domestic solar resource," recalls Abengoa's Morse, who has spent decades aiding and abetting the still fledgling solar thermal industry both in government and out. "The motivation was energy independence," a motive that remains recognizable in political rhetoric today because, as Carter himself put it, the sun cannot be embargoed, referring to the 1973–74 Arab oil embargo. "We have this big solar resource, we should use it," Morse explains.¶ Carter was the first president to take that idea seriously, warming the reviewing stand for his inauguration on January 20, 1977 with the sun's heat harvested by roughly 1,000 square meters of solar thermal panels, according to Morse. "President Carter saw [solar] as a really valid energy resource, and he understood it. I mean, it is a domestic resource and it is huge," Morse recalls, although he admits the inaugural solar system left some chilly. "It was the symbolism of the president wanting to bring solar energy immediately into his administration."¶ That symbolism became more concrete in the form of a vastly increased budget for energy technology research and development (pdf)—levels still unmatched by succeeding administrations—and tax credits for installing wind turbines or solar power that caused a first boom in renewable energy installation. In a sense alternative energy was finally getting the same government support used to develop and maintain other energy technologies, such as oil drilling or nuclear power. "It did not take long for the U.S. government to realize that energy was a great national interest and subsidize it," Morse notes.

#### New tech that reduces oil demand quickly collapses prices---that destroys producer states

Gregory D. Miller 10, assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, April 2010, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 107-119

Despite numerous calls to decrease U.S. dependence on Middle East oil, doing so could have dramatic negative consequences for regional and international security, and these issues are largely overlooked in the current debate over how to cut U.S. consumption. The United States is often faulted for failing to account for the interests of others, and on this issue, a narrow focus on oil independence runs risks detrimental to long-term U.S. and global interests.¶ The United States should not maintain its dependence on oil simply to prevent economic instability in Russia, regional conflict in the Middle East, or the growth of the drug trade in Venezuela, but the United States must be cautious regarding how it goes about reducing its consumption. Some states are even more dependent on oil revenues than the West is on oil imports, and the United States must be careful about rushing toward energy independence without first considering the unintended consequences.¶ The United States only gets about 15 percent of its oil from the Middle East. Nearly 22 percent of all OPEC oil, however, is sold to the United States. 26 The United States is the world’s largest consumer of oil (more than 25 percent), and a reduction in U.S. demand will have a dramatic effect on the price of oil and on the world’s oil-exporting states. The real effects of a drop in U.S. consumption are difficult to predict and may depend on how the United States reduces its demand. If it does so simply through conservation, then the gradual decline in demand will likely have minimal effects on oil exporters. On the other hand, a drastic drop in demand, such as that associated with the development of a new technology, will have significant economic repercussions for a number of countries, even those that do not sell much oil to the United States. ¶ Initially, the loss of the United States as a major consumer would not cripple the economies of oil suppliers because there will be enough demand from countries such as India and China to provide continued revenue. In fact, U.S. reductions in consumption would even benefit many other potential consumers that do not have the money to purchase enough oil at current prices. To balance this drop in price, however, the likely response from oil producers will be to boost production and sell more oil. This will diminish the world’s oil reserves even more rapidly, possibly creating more interstate conflicts over remaining oil supplies, and ultimately run the security risks outlined here. As a result, the long-term consequences of even just the United States cutting its consumption of oil will be striking. These effects will be multiplied if global consumption also declines.

#### Global wars result

Hulbert 12 Matthew Hulbert is an analyst at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations "The political perils of low oil prices" July 9 2012 www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.php?id=3796&id\_mailing=295&toegang=49182f81e6a13cf5eaa496d51fea6406

As unedifying as all that might be, the bigger problem producer states have is that internal repression has no guarantee of success these days. It didn't work for Gadhafi in Libya, and it's unlikely to work for Assad in Syria in the long term. As fierce as the rear-guard battles have been, they’ve not been militarily conclusive or conducive to on-going hydrocarbon production.

Follow that argument through and it is clear that if the bulk of producer regimes were struggling to hang on in a $125/b world, they stand little chance of pulling through in an $80/b (or less) environment. So we reach the third step, and logical conclusion of our argument. The lower prices go, the more likely political unrest creates serious supply disruptions affecting physical supplies, with concomitant effects on paper markets. That obviously puts a radically new spin on what 'cyclical' means as far as price and political instability is concerned, but when we look across producer states, it’s hard to find any major players not sitting on a powder keg of political risk these days.

More likely than not, it will be some of the smaller players that get caught in the cross fire first. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is already deeply concerned about Bahrain relative to its Eastern Province. State implosion in Yemen is seen as an internal issue of the al-Saud to deal with, while serious deterioration in Iraq is becoming increasingly problematic in the North. Libya could see any post-war oil gains rapidly wiped out, Sudanese production has already fallen prey to intractable internal disputes, Kazakhstan remains entirely 'dispensable' in Central Asia given a lack of external clout in the region, while Nigeria has new civil strife problems to confront with Boko Haram. That’s before we consider intractable problems in Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. Any one of these jurisdictions could end up with a scorched earth policy if financing gaps aren’t closed.

Go further up the producer state 'food chain', and some of the world's largest players all have the same structural political problems, be it in the Middle East, Eurasia or Latin America. Any sign that a bigger petro-beast is losing control, and prices would rapidly lift. That might be welcome news for producer states lucky enough to ride the price wave and remain intact, but it's a very dangerous game to play.

And that's the whole problem here - the gap between geological costs of production and the geopolitical cost of survival is simply too wide for producers to cover without falling back on draconian measures. If this 'self-correcting' mechanism between price and political unrest starts supporting an informal price floor then so be it, but we shouldn't be fooled that this is serving anyone's interests - on either side of the consumer-producer ledger. Yes, it will help firm prices when certain producers struggle to adapt to rapidly shifting economic conditions, but assuming that more and more producer states hit political problems as prices slip, we're merely cementing the 'too big to fail' status of the very largest oil producers. Seeing petro-states dropping like political flies as prices correct isn't a proper 'solution' for a floor, not only because prices will rebound with a vengeance when markets tighten, but because it will make us even more dependent on a handful of key suppliers. As we all know from previous problems in Iraq (2.9 mb/d), Iran (3 mb/d), Libya (1.48 m/bd), Nigeria (2.4 mb/d) and even Venezuela (2.7 mb/d), once things go politically wrong, it takes a very long time, if ever, to get back to optimal production levels. It's the antithesis of where consumers want to be in terms of sourcing plentiful and fungible supplies.

Final scene: corpses all over the stage

By way of reminder, as much as petro-states currently face a systemic crisis trying to set a price floor, it was only in March that we saw how badly placed OPEC is to moderate the market at the top. Seeing petro-states in a pickle might warm the hearts of many right now, but markets can turn, and turn fast. When they do, the oil weapon will shift target as well. It will no longer be pointed at petro players heads, but directly at consumer states. That's the consequence of a dysfunctional energy system - not just with a $50-$150/b outlook eminently possible, but swings well beyond that 'price band' all too likely.

Splitting this price directly in two and sticking close to $100/b might not be that bad an idea after all: Mopping up the mess from producer state implosion would require an effort far beyond the international systems capabilities and reach. Carefully agreed truces are always better than outright wars, particularly for those squeamish about collateral damage. Corpses would litter the entire energy stage.

## 1NR

#### Fearing death doesn’t preclude recognizing life’s finitude and its inevitability---we can still create provisional value in life---individuals should have the option to live

Cara Kalnow 9 A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil at the University of St. Andrews “WHY DEATH CAN BE BAD AND IMMORTALITY IS WORSE” https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/724/3/Cara%20Kalnow%20MPhil%20thesis.PDF

(PA) also provided us with good reason to reject the Epicurean claim that the finitude of life cannot be bad for us. With (PA), we saw that our lives could accumulate value through the satisfaction of our desires beyond the boundaries of the natural termination of life. But Chapter Four determined that the finitude of life is a necessary condition for the value of life as such and that many of our human values rely on the finite temporal structure of life. I therefore argued that an indefinite life cannot present a desirable alternative to our finite life, because life as such would not be recognized as valuable. In this chapter, I have argued that the finitude of life is instrumentally good as it provides the recognition that life itself is valuable. Although I ultimately agree with the Epicureans that the finitude of life cannot be an evil, this conclusion was not reached from the Epicurean arguments against the badness of death, and I maintain that (HA) and (EA) are insufficient to justify changing our attitudes towards our future deaths and the finitude of life. Nonetheless, the instrumental good of the finitude of life that we arrived at through the consideration of immortality should make us realize that the finitude of life cannot be an evil; it is a necessary condition for the recognition that life as such is valuable.

Although my arguments pertaining to the nature of death and its moral implications have yielded several of the Epicurean conclusions, my position still negotiates a middle ground between the Epicureans and Williams, as (PA) accounts for the intuition that it is rational to fear death and regard it as an evil to be avoided. I have therefore reached three of the Epicurean conclusions pertaining to the moral worth of the nature of death: (1) that the state of being dead is nothing to us, (2) death simpliciter is nothing to us, and (3) the finitude of life is a matter for contentment. But against the Epicureans, I have argued that we can rationally fear our future deaths, as categorical desires provide a disutility by which the prospect of death is rationally held as an evil to be avoided. Finally, I also claimed against the Epicureans, that the prospect of death can rationally be regarded as morally good for one if one no longer desires to continue living.

5.3 Conclusion

I began this thesis with the suggestion that in part, the Epicureans were right: death—when it occurs—is nothing to us. I went on to defend the Epicurean position against the objections raised by the deprivation theorists and Williams. I argued that the state of being dead, and death simpliciter, cannot be an evil of deprivation or prevention for the person who dies because (once dead), the person—and the grounds for any misfortune—cease to exist. I accounted for the anti-Epicurean intuition 115 that it is rational to fear death and to regard death as an evil to be avoided, not because deathsimpliciter is bad, but rather because the prospect of our deaths may be presented to us as bad for us if our deaths would prevent the satisfaction of our categorical desires. Though we have good reasons to rationally regard the prospect of our own death as an evil for us, the fact that life is finite cannot be an evil and is in fact instrumentally good, because it takes the threat of losing life to recognize that life as such is valuable. In this chapter, I concluded that even though death cannot be of any moral worth for us once it occurs, we can attach two distinct values to death while we are alive: we can attach a value of disutility (or utility) to the prospect of our own individual deaths, and we must attach an instrumentally good value to the fact of death as such. How to decide on the balance of those values is a matter for psychological judgment.

#### Our form of scenario planning is good---creates the best risk analysis and contingency planning

Han 10 Dong-ho is a PhD candidate in Political Science at U Nebraska Lincoln. “Scenario Construction and Implications for IR Research: Connecting Theory to a Real World of Policy Making,” All Academic Research

How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? If the problem of uncertainty in future world politics is increasing and future international relations are hard to predict, then it is necessary to devise a useful tool to effectively deal with upcoming events so that policy makers can reduce the risks of future uncertainties. In this paper, I argue that the scenario methodology is one of the most effective methods to connect theory to practice, thereby leading to a better understanding of future world events. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the scenario methodology to the field of IR in a more acceptable fashion and to explore its implications for a real policy world. To achieve this goal, I will explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future world events. More specifically, I will clarify what the scenario method is and what its core components are and explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in IR by analyzing existing IR literature with an emphasis on security studies that primarily provide the prospect of future security issues. 1. Introduction How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? Given various theoretical ideas for predicting and analyzing future events in the field of international relations (IR), to understand these events properly it is important both to cast out all plausible outcomes and to think through a relevant theory, or a combination of each major theory, in connection with those outcomes. This paper aims to explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future world events. After clarifying the scenario methodology, its core components, and its processes and purposes, I will explore other field’s use of this methodology. Then I will explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in the field of IR. I will conclude with summarizing the advantage of the scenario method in a real world of policy making. 2. What is the Scenario Methodology? This section begins with one major question – what is the scenario methodology? To answer this, some history regarding the development of this method should be mentioned.1 Herman Kahn, a pioneer of the scenario method, in his famous 1962 book Thinking about the Unthinkable, argued that the decision makers in the United States should think of and prepare for all possible sequences of events with regard to nuclear war with the Soviet Union.2 Using scenarios and connecting them with various war games, Kahn showed the importance of thinking ahead in time and using the scenario method based upon imagination for the future.3 According to Kahn and his colleagues, scenarios are “attempts to describe in some detail a hypothetical sequence of events that could lead plausibly to the situation envisaged.”4 Similarly, Peter Schwartz defines scenarios as “stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow, stories that can help us recognize and adapt to changing aspects of our present environment.”5 Given a variety of definitions of scenarios,6 for the purpose of this research, I refer to the scenario-building methodology as a means by which people can articulate different futures with trends, uncertainties, and rules over a certain amount of time. Showing all plausible future stories and clarifying important trends, scenario thinking enables decision makers to make an important decision at the present time. Key Terms in the Scenario Methodology The core of the scenario method lies in enabling policy makers to reach a critical decision at the present time based on thinking about all plausible future possibilities. Key concepts in the scenario method include: driving forces, predetermined elements, critical uncertainties, wild cards and scenario plot lines.7 Driving forces are defined as “the causal elements that surround a problem, event or decision,” which could be many factors, including those “that can be the basis, in different combinations, for diverse chains of connections and outcomes.”8 Schwartz defines driving forces as “the elements that move the plot of a scenario, that determine the story’s outcome.”9 In a word, driving forces constitute the basic structure of each scenario plot line in the scenario-making process. Predetermined elements refer to “events that have already occurred or that almost certainly will occur but whose consequences have not yet unfolded.”10 Predetermined elements are “givens” which could be safely assumed and understood in the scenario-building process. Although predetermined elements impact outcomes, they do not have a direct causal impact on a given outcome. Critical uncertainties “describe important determinants of events whose character, magnitude or consequences are unknown.”11 Exploring critical uncertainties lies at the heart of scenario construction in the sense that the most important task of scenario anaysts is to discover the elements that are most uncertain and most important to a specific decision or event.12 Wild cards are “conceivable, if low probability, events or actions that might undermine or modify radically the chains of logic or narrative plot lines.”13 In John Peterson’s terms, wild cards are “not simple trends, nor are they byproducts of anything else. They are events on their own. They are characterized by their scope, and a speed of change that challenges the outermost capabilities of today’s human capabilities.”14 Wild cards might be extremely important in that in the process of scenario planning their emergence could change the entire direction of each scenario plot line. A scenario plot line is “a compelling story about how things happen” and it describes “how driving forces might plausibly behave as they interact with predetermined elements and different combinations of critical uncertainties.”15 Narratives and/or stories are an essential part of the scenario method due to the identical structure of analytical narratives and scenarios: “both are sequential descriptions of a situation with the passage of time and explain the process of events from the base situation into the situation questioned.”16 Process and Purpose of Scenario Analysis Scenario analysis begins with the exploration of driving forces including some uncertainties. However, scenario building is more than just organizing future uncertainties; rather, it is a thorough understanding of uncertainties, thereby distinguishing between something clear and unclear in the process of decision making.17 As Pierre Wack has pointed out, “By carefully studying some uncertainties, we gained a deeper understanding of their interplay, which, paradoxically, led us to learn what was certain and inevitable and what was not.” In other words, a careful investigation of raw uncertainties helps people figure out more “critical uncertainties” by showing that “what may appear in some cases to be uncertain might actually be predetermined – that many outcomes were simply not possible.”18 Exploring future uncertainties thoroughly is one of the most important factors in scenario analysis. Kees van der Heijden argues that in the process of separating “knowns” from “unknowns” analysts could clarify driving forces because the process of separation between “predetermineds” and uncertainties demands a fair amount of knowledge of causal relationships surrounding the issue at stake.19 Thus, in scenario analysis a thorough understanding of critical uncertainties leads to a well-established knowledge of driving forces and causal relations.20 Robert Lempert succinctly summarized the scenario-construction process as follows: “scenario practice begins with the challenge facing the decisionmakers, ranks the most significant driving forces according to their level of uncertainty and their impact on trends seemingly relevant to that decision, and then creates a handful of scenarios that explore different manifestations of those driving forces.”21

#### Hirsh’s point is that PC’s not key because some GOP Senators want immigration after losing the Latino vote

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Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all.

#### Depends on picking the right issues --- links prove the plan is wrong

Hirsh 2/7 Michael Hirsh - chief correspondent for National Journal, previously senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital” February 7, 2013 http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

And then **there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong**. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either.¶ At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country.¶ Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. **The problem was** that **whatever credibility** or stature Bush thought **he had earned** as a newly reelected president **did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes**. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it.¶ The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But **there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform**. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… **Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill**. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.

# PIC out Plan

## 1NC

#### Text: We endorse the 1AC except for the plan that the federal government should increase financial incentives for bimimetic solar power in the United States

#### Its competitive – they make an explicit argument that the ENTIRE 1AC should be viewed as their plan text --- we are PICing out of part of that

#### Any permutation is severance

#### It’s net beneficial

#### Their Moten evidence says that “finding a steady place from which to launch a plan, hatch an escape signals a problem of essentialism” – destroys the affs revolutionary potential

#### And Links to their Peat evidence --- proves

# Framework

## 1NC

#### Topical affirmatives can only claim advantages based on the immediate hypothetical enactment of a topical plan by the USFG---in other words, simply winning that the USFG should \*not\* do the plan should always be a sufficient reason to vote negative

#### First, “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### Second, the agent of the resolution is the USFG---we’ll read ev later if they contest this obvious fact

#### Finally, “should” means “shall” or “must” – the affirmative is required to defend implementation

Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

#### Voting issue for limits and ground---our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative---they could say student support for their advantage causes culture shifting or say that the plan wouldn’t happen but that they have an impact on the debate space---these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates

#### And, extra topicality has to be a voting issue---it proves the resolution insufficient and means the aff has to read extratopical advantages to make their aff viable, which unlimits the topic---any extra ground isn’t predictable and counter-planning out of extra-T advantages means we have to screw up the rest of our strategy just to get back to square one.

#### Reading a plan doesn’t make you topical---it magnifies the abuse by allowing the affirmative to be vague and requires us to engage in theory and substance just to make our substance viable---letting them just say they meet our violation means we lose valuable CX and 1NC time which is the only starting point for neg offense

#### This is a reason it has to be a reason to reject the team---if at any point in this debate there’s even a hint of the aff not defending our framework it should be a sufficient reason to vote negative because of time skew and deterrence

## 2NC

#### United States’ excludes energy produced outside of US airspace

Rense 8 (citing US code under the 14th amendment) February, “McCain Not A US Citizen,

Can't Be President?” <http://rense.com/general81/cain.htm>

Excerpted from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86755.pdf 7 FAM 1116 KEY PHRASES USED IN THE 14th AMENDMENT AND IN LAWS DERIVED FROM IT 7 FAM 1116.1 "In The United States" 7 FAM 1116.1-1 States and Incorporated Territories (TL:CON-64; 11-30-95) a. The phrase "in the United States" as used in the 14th Amendment clearly includes States that have been admitted to the Union. Sections 304 and 305 of the INA provide a basis for citizenship of persons born in Alaska and Hawaii while they were territories of the United States. These sections reflect, to a large extent, prior statutes and judicial decisions which addressed the l4th Amendment citizenship implications of birth in these and other U.S. territories. Guidance on evidence on such births should be sought from CA/OCS. b. Sec. 101(a)(38) INA provides that, for the purposes of the INA, The term "United States",... when used in the geographical sense, means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.In addition, under Pub. L. 94-241, the "approving Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America", (Sec. 506(c)), which took effect on November 3, 1986, the Northern Mariana Islands are treated as part of the United States for the purposes of sections 301 and 308 of the INA. c. All of the aforenamed areas, except Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, came within the definition of "United States" given in the Nationality Act of 1940, which was effective from January 13, 1941 through December 23, 1952. d. Prior to January 13, 1941, there was no statutory definition of "the United States" for citizenship purposes. Thus there were varying interpretations. Guidance should be sought from the Department (CA/OCS) when such issues arise. Here are the exemptions... 7 FAM 1116.1-4 Not Included in the Meaning of "In the United States" (TL:CON-64; 11-30-95) a. A U.S.-registered or documented ship on the high seas or in the exclusive economic zone is not considered to be part of the United States. A child born on such a vessel does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of the place of birth (Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir., 1928)). b. A U.S.-registered aircraft outside U.S. airspace is not considered to be part of U.S. territory. A child born on such an aircraft outside U.S. airspace does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of the place of birth.

#### Federal Government

DOJ 01 (US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Justice Expenditures and Employment Extracts 2001)

Federal Government – the term Federal encompasses all activities of the United States Government other than employment of the Armed Forces. District of Columbia data are excluded from this category and included with data for municipalities.

# Coal DA

#### U.S. coal exports to China are low, but downward pressure on domestic demand expands them massively

Bryan Walsh 12, Senior Editor at TIME, May 31, 2012, “Drawing Battle Lines Over American Coal Exports to Asia,” online: http://science.time.com/2012/05/31/drawing-battle-lines-over-american-coal-exports-to-asia/

But across the Pacific Ocean, the demand for coal has never been hotter, with China burning 4.1 billion tons in 2010 alone, far more than any other country in the world. That insatiable demand forced China in 2009 to become a net coal importer for the first time, in part because congested rail infrastructure raised the cost of transporting coal from the mines of the country’s northwest to its booming southern cities. In April, Chinese coal imports nearly doubled from a year earlier. Right now Australia and Indonesia supply much of China’s foreign coal. U.S. coal from the Powder River Basin could be a perfect addition to the Chinese market. Montana and Wyoming are just short train trips to ports on the Pacific Northwest coast, and from there it’s a container ship away from Asian megacities where coal doesn’t have to compete with cheap natural gas and air-pollution regulations are far weaker than in the U.S. To a wounded Big Coal, China is a potential savior.¶ As I write in the new edition of TIME, there’s just one problem: right now, ports on the West Coast lack the infrastructure needed to transfer coal from railcars into container ships. (Just 7 million of the 107 million tons of U.S.-exported coal left the country via Pacific Ocean ports last year.) That’s why coal companies like Peabody and Ambre Energy are ready to spend millions to build coal-export facilities at a handful of ports in Washington and Oregon. If all those plans go forward, as much as 150 million tons of coal could be exported from the Northwest annually—-nearly all of it coming from the Powder -River -Basin and headed to Asia. Even if the U.S. kept burning less and less coal at home, it would have a reason to keep mining it.

#### U.S. exports lock in expanded Chinese coal capacity---causes warming over the tipping point---it’s unique because absent U.S. exports the rising cost of coal will cause a shift to renewables – turns case

Thomas M. Power 12, Research Professor and Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Montana; Principal, Power Consulting; February 2012, “The Greenhouse Gas Impact of Exporting Coal from the West Coast: An Economic Analysis,” <http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf>

The cumulative impact of these coal port proposals on coal consumption in Asia could be much larger than even that implied by the two pending proposals. If Arch, Peabody, and other western U.S. coal producers’ projections of the competitiveness of western coal in Asia are correct, facilitating the opening of the development of West Coast coal ports could have a very large impact on the supply of coal to China and the rest of Asia.

6.4 The Long-term Implications of Fueling Additional Coal-Fired Electric Generation

Although the economic life of coal-fired generators is often given as 30 or 35 years, a permitted, operating, electric generator is kept on line a lot longer than that, as long as 50 or more years through ongoing renovations and upgrades. Because of that long operating life, the impact of the lower Asian coal prices and costs triggered by PRB coal competing with other coal sources cannot be measured by the number of tons of coal exported each year. Those lower coal costs will lead to commitments to more coal being burned for a half-century going forward.

That time-frame is very important. During exactly this time frame, the next half-century, the nations of the world will have to get their greenhouse gas emission stabilized and then reduced or the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may pass a point that will make it very difficult to avoid massive, ongoing, negative climate impacts. Taking actions now that encourage fifty-years of more coal consumption around the world is not a minor matter. Put more positively, allowing coal prices to rise (and more closely approximate their full cost, including “external” costs) will encourage extensive investments in improving the efficiency with which coal is used and the shift to cleaner sources of energy. This will lead to long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will also last well into the next half-century. 57

# T Solar

#### Solar power is distinct from solar energy--- must be PV

Bradford 6 (Travis--Associate Professor of Practice in International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, “Solar Revolution: The Economic Transformation of the Global Energy Industry” MIT Press, Print.)

#### Typically, an informed discussion about solar energy is limited by various and confusing notions of what the term solar energy actually describes. Broadly speaking, solar energy could be used to describe any phenomenon that is created by solar sources and harnessed in the form of energy, directly or indirectly-from photosynthesis to photovoltaics. Many of today's environmentalists use the term solar energy in its most comprehensive sense to include certain new renewable-energy technologies such as wind power and biomass, arguing that these sources derive energy from the sun, however indirectly. More conservative uses of the term, such as the one that this book employs, discuss direct-only solar sources, whether active, passive, thermal, or electric-that is, sources of energy that can be directly attributed to the light of the sun or the heat that sunlight generates. ¶ This more restrictive classification is useful because a more general characterization of solar energy that includes wind and other technologies tends to obscure various isolated trends within the broader renewable-energy industry. Many renewable-energy technologies sometimes lumped under solar energy have very different economic characteristics, making it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about them. Since the economic drivers discussed in the second half of this hook do not apply to all technologies equally, it is helpful to be precise when analyzing specific industrial transformations and the markets in which they will occurVoting issue

#### A) limits---only a stable interpretation of solar avoids the infinite explosion of relationships with the sun or the way solar energy operates on life --- makes it impossible to be neg

#### B) Ground --- Core negative ground is based on the expansion of electricity production—basic grid disads, tradeoff arguments and resource args require the aff to defend a transition