# Framework

## 1NC

#### Should refers to a future action

Remo Foresi v. The Hudson Coal Co, SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 106 Pa. Super. 307; 161 A. 910; 1932 Pa. Super. LEXIS 239 July 14, 1932

As regards the mandatory character of the rule, the word 'should' is not only an auxiliary verb, it is also the preterite of the verb, 'shall' and has for one of its meanings as defined in the Century Dictionary: "Obliged or compelled (to); would have (to); must; ought (to); used with an infinitive (without to) to express obligation, necessity or duty **in connection with some act yet to be carried out."** We think it clear that it is in that sense that the word 'should' is used in this rule, not merely advisory. When the judge in charging the jury tells them that, unless they find from all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, they should acquit, the word 'should' is not used in an advisory sense but has the force or meaning of 'must', or 'ought to' and carries [\*\*\*8] with it the sense of [\*313] obligation and duty equivalent to compulsion. A natural sense of sympathy for a few unfortunate claimants who have been injured while doing something in direct violation of law must not be so indulged as to fritter away, or nullify, provisions which have been enacted to safeguard and protect the welfare of thousands who are engaged in the hazardous occupation of mining.

#### Prefer the precision of this interpretation

AHD 2k --- American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language in ‘00

(4th Edition, p. 1612)

Usage Note Like the rules governing the use of shall and will on which they are based, the **traditional rules** governing the use of should and would are largely ignored in modern American practice. Either should or would can now be used in the first person to express conditional futurity: If I had known that, I would (or somewhat more formally, should) have answered differently. But in the second and third persons only would is used: If he had known that, he would (not should) have answered differently. Would cannot always be substituted for should, however. Should is used in all three persons in a conditional clause: if I (or you or he) should decide to go. Should is also used in all three persons to express duty or obligation (the equivalent of ought to): I (or you or he) should go. On the other hand, would is used to express volition or promise: I agreed that I would do it. Either would or should is possible as an auxiliary with like, be inclined, be glad, prefer, and related verbs: I would (or should) like to call your attention to an oversight. Here would was acceptable on all levels to a large majority of the Usage Panel in an earlier survey and is more common in American usage than should. Should have is sometimes incorrectly written should of by writers who have mistaken the source of the spoken contraction should’ve.

#### “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact---T debates also solve any possible turn

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Education: Historical analysis divorced from present policy choices is bankrupt --- connecting the two in an academic environment is essential for meaningfully advancing progressive politics and averting extinction

Susan Graseck 8, director of the Choices for the 21st Century Education Program at Brown University and a Senior Fellow at Brown’s Watson Institute for International Studies, “Explore the Past to Understand the Present and Shape the Future,” Social Education 72(7), pp 367–370

In Robert Heilbroner’s prophetic book, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, published in 1974, he examined three threats to the survival of humanity that he believed world leaders would have to address in order to avert disaster—nuclear annihilation, overpopulation, and environmental catastrophe. 1 In recent years, the emerging possibilities of nuclear terrorism, the struggle of the community of nations to contend with massive starvation and major disasters, and frequent revelations on the impact of climate change have become more deeply etched into our consciousness and underscore the prescience of Heilbroner’s forecast.¶ These are **worldwide problems**, inextricably connecting national interests to global solutions. Will the rising generation be equipped to deal with the world they are inheriting? And what is our responsibility as social studies educators?¶ We all know that **our students** need more than the facts. They **need** a basic **understanding of our history**—where we came from or how civilizations have evolved and interacted. **But they also need to understand why this knowledge is important and how it relates to their present.** They need to appreciate how this knowledge is useful as we create the next chapter, the one they will “co-author.” And they need to believe it—that it is their chapter.¶ History doesn’t just happen; it is made—made by real people who faced real challenges, who had uncertainty about the future, just as we do today. Author David McCullough has said, ... history is not about the past. If you think about it, no one ever lived in the past.... They lived in the present. The difference is it was their present, not ours. They were caught up in the living moment exactly as we are, and with no more certainty of how things would turn out than we have.2¶ Astute social studies teachers move with ease between past and present; it is their stock-in-trade. We want students to understand what it was like to live at critical moments in history, to feel the moment as those living it did. We also want them to understand that history can be an important instrument that informs our approach to critical issues today.¶ Just as McCullough reminds us that history is made in the present, it is also important to remember that when history is made it becomes a piece of our world, a factor in our future decisions. In September 2002, media coverage had increased public awareness of brewing policy regarding U.S. plans in Iraq. By early 2003, the country and the wider world were in turmoil over what approach to take concerning Saddam Hussein. As Washington debated a plan of action, students in more than 4,000 classrooms, guided by their teachers, wrestled with a set of alternative policy options articulated in an online curriculum resource.¶ If we try to put ourselves back in that moment, it is difficult now to remember that the United States was wrestling with the question of what to do about Saddam Hussein and his alleged weapons of mass destruction and which nations would join with us. Should the United States (1) act alone to remove Saddam Hussein from power and eliminate his weapons of mass destruction; (2) work with the international community to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction; (3) reject war—at least now—and continue to contain and deter Saddam Hussein; or (4) reject the use of military force and reduce our foreign policy profile? All were tough choices with real consequences. When the nation went to war with Iraq in March 2003, Washington had made its choice; and with it, a new chapter in history began to take shape.¶ As the current war in Iraq deepened, the Choices Program developed a substantive resource to engage students in exploration of the history of Iraq, from its early years to the present. Working with this resource, students acquire a contextualized understanding of Iraqi history and the history of U.S. policy in the region and, in turn, a more complete understanding of the political, social, and cultural forces at play today. Armed with this historical knowledge, students are prepared to deliberate on current policy using a framework of divergent policy alternatives that we as Americans are facing. These “options” are framed in stark terms, complete with competing policy proposals, risks, and trade-offs.3 These could also be understood as “futures”— alternative images of a moment in the future arrived at through competing approaches to the current challenge.¶ Evaluating the significance of theoretical choices is precarious, but necessary, if students are to learn how to conceptualize the future and participate in decisions in the present. **If our students are to become** competent analysts **of world affairs and** problem solvers **tomorrow**, we **must engage them in informed deliberation on the uncertainties of history** and the challenges of the present—**analysis typically conducted by scholars and policy elites.** A Jeffersonian outlook on the responsibility of **an informed citizenry** would suggest that the public **has a key role to play, to set the broad parameters within which policy is made.**¶If our students are going to be prepared to participate as active citizens shaping the world of tomorrow, they must understand that history didn’t just happen, it was made, and that they have a place in making the choices that will become the history of tomorrow. If they are to appreciate fully the dynamic nature of this continuum from past to future, they will need to acquire a variety of intellectual skills. They must be able to: • Understand multiple perspectives and competing interpretations; • Grasp the concept of multiple causation; • Contextualize the past; • Make connections across time and place; • Differentiate among fact, opinion, and interpretation; • Weigh the importance and reliability of evidence and explain its significance; • Comprehend and use primary sources; and • Formulate rational conclusions.¶ The theme of this year’s National Council for the Social Studies conference is “Embrace the Future.” If we want our students to embrace the future that we are, in fact, constructing together, we must help them understand that **we do not study history because it’s good for us,** we study it because it is also about our future. They will only understand this if they can see the continuum from past to future and view the content we teach within the context of that continuum. When we at the Choices Program say, “Explore the past—shape the future,” it is this very continuum that we have in mind.

## 2NC

#### Produces hundreds of potential affs

Ondřej Sládek 7, researcher in the Narratology Section, Institute for Czech Literature, Czech Academy of Sciences, Between History and Fiction: On the Possibilities of Alternative History, 2007, http://www.flu.cas.cz/fictionality2/sladek.pdf

Almost every historian must have been tempted to ask the question: "What would have happened, if.?" What would have happened if there had been no French Revolution of 1789? What if Napoleon had won the battle of Waterloo? Or vice versa: What if he had lost the battle of Austerlitz? What would European have history looked like? What would have happened if there was no American Revolutionary War? What would have happened had the Munich Agreement never been signed? What would have happened if. **One may ask** dozens, or hundreds **of these and similar speculative questions**. They may serve us to generate answers - histories that have never happened, although they could have.

#### And independently turns their reform arguments --- constraints are critical to promote creative thinking

Mayer 6 – Marissa Ann Mayer, vice-president for search products and user experience at Google, February 13, 2006, “Creativity Loves Constraints,” online: http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06\_07/b3971144.htm?chan=gl

When people think about creativity, they think about artistic work -- unbridled, unguided effort that leads to beautiful effect. But if you look deeper, you'll find that some of the most inspiring art forms, such as haikus, sonatas, and religious paintings, are fraught with constraints. They are beautiful because creativity triumphed over the "rules." Constraints shape and focus problems and provide clear challenges to overcome. Creativity thrives best when constrained.

But constraints must be balanced with a healthy disregard for the impossible. Too many curbs can lead to pessimism and despair. Disregarding the bounds of what we know or accept gives rise to ideas that are non-obvious, unconventional, or unexplored. The creativity realized in this balance between constraint and disregard for the impossible is fueled by passion and leads to revolutionary change.

A few years ago, I met Paul Beckett, a talented designer who makes sculptural clocks. When I asked him why not do just sculptures, Paul said he liked the challenge of making something artistically beautiful that also had to perform as a clock. Framing the task in that way freed his creative force. Paul reflected that he also found it easier to paint on a canvas that had a mark on it rather than starting with one that was entirely clean and white. This resonated with me. It is often easier to direct your energy when you start with constrained challenges (a sculpture that must be a clock) or constrained possibilities (a canvas that is marked).

#### Predictability --- Counterfactual analysis is a niche approach for studying history that most scholars discount as fiction

Ondřej Sládek 7, researcher in the Narratology Section, Institute for Czech Literature, Czech Academy of Sciences, Between History and Fiction: On the Possibilities of Alternative History, 2007, http://www.flu.cas.cz/fictionality2/sladek.pdf

Although this kind of thinking about history, which has come to be termed "counterfactual" or "virtual" history, is applied relatively often, it can hardly be regarded as a widely accepted approach and method in terms of standard historiographic research. Many critics of counterfactual scenarios regard them as mere uncommitted and useless playthings, a "parlor-game" (Carr 2001; see Doležel 2004, 111-112) for which there is no place in serious historigraphic writing.2 They regard them fundamentally as fiction since they describe something which has not happened, which is based neither in history, nor in genuine scholarly work. On the other hand, advocates of alternative thinking about history view counterfactual scenarios as an extension of a certain method the historian uses in every stage of their work. Their advocates believe counterfactual scenarios and models of possible history have various uses; one of the most important among them has to do with the fact that they are thought experiments pointing to the significance of certain facts of history (events and situations) which did not have to happen as we have come to know them - in a single specific way.

#### Counterfactuals are futile and misleading exercises --- impossible to accurately predict how the world would have turned out

David Frum 00, “History As It Wasn't,” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 6, No. 11, Nov 27, 2000, http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Protected/Articles/000/000/011/664qtnky.asp?nopager=1

But though it's natural to speculate about the paths we personally did not choose, **historians have warned for decades** **that** it is futile and misleading to engage in such speculation about humanity as a whole. "Cleopatra's nose: Had it been shorter, the whole face of the world would have been changed," Blaise Pascal mused -- and ever since, the idea that something as contingent as one woman's beauty might be responsible for the rise and fall of kingdoms has been damned by the historical profession as the "fallacy of Cleopatra's nose."

Historians have objected to Pascal's proposition for two opposite reasons: some because they believe that the shortening of Cleopatra's nose would have changed too little to make a difference; others because they believe that it would have changed too much for the human mind to reckon with.

Those who disparage the effect of the nose-change think that historical developments are vast, virtually irresistible tides, channeled within bounds that no individual can alter. Suppose Cleopatra had been less seductive, and that as a result Mark Antony rather than Octavian had emerged the dictator of Rome. How could that make a difference? To succeed, Antony would have had to govern more or less as Octavian did; had he failed to do so, his regime would have swiftly collapsed, as the three military dictatorships before Octavian's collapsed. In other words, had Cleopatra's nose been shorter, the names on the busts in the Capitoline museum might well have been altered. But the face of the world? Hardly a jot. According to this deterministic objection, historical counterfactuals are useless because they fail to take account of how little difference any single human being can make.

The other theory, by contrast, complains that Cleopatra's nose counterfactuals are useless because they fail to reckon with **how much difference** a single human being can make. Ray Bradbury has a famous science-fiction story in which a character travels back in time to the age of the dinosaurs, accidentally steps on a single butterfly, and returns to the present -- only to discover the world entirely changed. It's ridiculous, goes this theory, to ask how Mark Antony's empire would have differed from Octavian's. Alter one fact of history and all of history is put up for grabs, in such a radical way that we here in North America could easily be pondering in Chinese what-if scenarios about our Han dynasty ancestors.

The Italian historian and philosopher Benedetto Croce delivered an especially eloquent expression of this point of view, which is disapprovingly quoted in Niall Ferguson's introduction to Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals, a recent collection of essays on the topic. The Cleopatra's nose problem, Croce complained, "arbitrarily divides the course of history into necessary facts and accidental facts." A supposedly accidental fact is then

mentally eliminated in order to espy how the first would have developed along its own lines if it had not been disturbed by the second. This is a game which all of us in moments of distraction or idleness indulge in, when we muse on the way our life might have turned out if we had not met a certain person, . . . cheerfully treating ourselves, in these meditations, as though we were the necessary and stable element, it simply not occurring to us . . . to provide for the transformation of this self of ours which is, at the moment of thinking, what it is, with all its experiences and regrets and fancies, just because we did meet that person.

And yet despite all these wise admonitions, people continue to engage in just the sort of speculation Croce and others condemn. They use it as a teaching device, to jolt people out of the complacent assumption that events had to happen as they did: The British historian Conrad Russell has a marvelous essay about how, if the wind had not abruptly shifted in 1688, the Glorious Revolution would have failed and a Catholic king would have been preserved on the English throne. At still other times it serves a moral purpose, prodding us to appreciate the importance of individuals in history: What if the car that struck Winston Churchill when he looked the wrong way before crossing Fifth Avenue in 1931 had killed him? Alexis de Tocqueville warned that because men in democratic societies feel themselves to be small and weak, they are dangerously tempted by explanations of historical events that stress inevitability. Alternative history at its best can encourage us to appreciate the daunting contingency of history -- and the supreme importance for good or ill of individual moral choice.

This point is effectively made by the best of the essays anthologized in Ferguson's book, Mark Almond's "1989 Without Gorbachev." With bitter irony, Almond argues that we do indeed owe the end of the Cold War to Mikhail Gorbachev. "After generations of dullard apparatchiks had safely guided the Soviet Union to super-power status, it was the bright-eyed Gorbachev who grabbed the steering wheel and headed straight for the rocks." Repression could still have worked in the mid-1980s, and would have found no lack of apologists in the West.

Gorbachev's perestroika, by contrast, wrecked the stagnating Soviet economy while his glasnost discredited his regime. "Gorbachev's belief that a relaxation in international tensions was in the Soviet Union's interest was profoundly misplaced. Only the 'two camps' division of the world provided the kind of global scenario in which such a strange animal as the Soviet economy could function." Had Gorbachev only held on a little longer, he would have discovered that ideological help was on its way.

The long march through the institutions of post-1960s pacifism and fellow traveling combined with nuclear panic was just about to reach its goal. It was only the surprising and total collapse of Communism . . . which brought much of the Western intelligentsia to admit that the Right had been correct. . . . Had the Wall stayed up, much of the Western elite would have remained oblivious to Communism's failings, moral as much as material, for at least another generation.

But alternative history is seldom at its best. More often it turns into heavy-handed academic drollery -- like the 1932 collection If It Had Happened Otherwise, in which (among other heavy-handed drolleries) Benjamin Disraeli becomes grand vizier to a rejuvenated Muslim kingdom in Spain. Or else into ponderously detailed constructions of imaginary societies -- science-fiction without the robots and deathrays -- as in Robert Sobel's For Want of a Nail, a prolonged counter-history of a world in which American independence was snuffed out at the battle of Saratoga in 1777.

And of course, sometimes it back-fires altogether. Reading through many counterfactual histories, one tends to find reinforced one's Tocquevillian feelings of inevitability. In Robert Cowley's What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been, another recent anthology of hypothetical history, Alistair Horne considers how history might have been altered had Napoleon halted his career of conquest after the Peace of Tilsit in 1807. But to suppose that Napoleon could have somehow quit the roulette table while he still held all his winnings is to endow him with a personality entirely different from the one he actually had -- and such an unnapoleonic Napoleon would never have adventured the first profitable spin. And even if Napoleon could have gotten a grip on his egotism and refrained from starting further wars himself, his empire was so ruthless, exploitative, and menacing that sooner or later the Russians, Austrians, and British would have resumed the war against him.

As for the old chestnut about Napoleon winning at Waterloo, not even Horne can bring himself to believe it. "There were vast fresh forces of Russians, Austrians, and Germans already moving toward France. A second battle, or perhaps several battles, would probably have followed." And behind these battles would have been the strangulating power of the Royal Navy and the superior financial resources of a Britain already embarked upon its industrial revolution.

It could be said that alternative history performs as great a service when it shows that a result was inescapable as when it shows that things might have turned out otherwise. One of the most sensible essays gathered in these anthologies is Theodore F. Cook's in What If?, which convincingly argues that the likeliest result of a Japanese victory at the battle of Midway would have been not an Axis victory, but a prolongation of the war and the devastation of the Japanese Home Islands by atomic bombs. Another is Alvin Jackson's in Virtual History, which concludes that Anglo-Irish relations would have followed the same tragic course in the twentieth century whether or not the British Liberals had been able to push through the plan for Home Rule for Ireland. "Ireland under Home Rule might well have proved to be not so much Britain's settled, democratic partner as her Yugoslavia."

But what is no service to anyone is the kind of wish-fantasy that predominates in both books. Eminent historian that he is, Stephen Sears is kidding himself to imagine in What If? that a Union victory at First Bull Run would have knocked the Confederacy out of the war before it began. In Virtual History, Niall Ferguson repeats the assertion (made in greater scope in his 1999 book The Pity of War) that British neutrality in 1914 would have brought us something very like the European Union eight decades ahead of schedule while preserving England as a great power -- a hypothesis that more closely resembles the daydreams of Civil War reenactors than the realities of the early twentieth century.

As they so often do, in fact, these fantasies **reveal more about the fantasizer** than they do about the thing fantasized about. Ross Hassig contends in What If? that an independent Native American state could have survived in Mexico had Hernando Cortez been captured and sacrificed by the Aztecs (as he very nearly was) in the climactic battle for Tenochtitlan in 1521 -- a contention that tells us more about the historical profession's born-again enthusiasm for Indian culture than about the real-life prospects for a stone-tool kingdom whose people lacked immunity to European diseases. Alternative history is the last redoubt of the historical traditionalist -- the sort of historian who still cares about high politics, wars, and battles -- but dreamy multiculturalists are forcing their way into even this cloistered subgenre. Makes you shudder to think what the rest of the profession must be like.

#### Counterfactuals are unrealistic policy simulations

James D. Fearon 91, Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2. (Jan., 1991), pp. 169-195, <http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/mia/users/Imene_Ajala/public/jamesfearon-couterfactuals.pdf>

Not only do counterfactual and actual case strategies both attempt to solve the same statistical problem, but both also run important methodological risks. Less obvious is that in each of the strategies, the principal risks are closely connected to the role played by counterfactuals.¶ The main risk in the first strategy is obvious and serious-how can we know what would have happened with any degree of confidence.: Historians, when confronted with the suggestion that the validity of their causal inferences necessarily depends on counterfactual argument, have often **dismissed out of hand or ignored the idea** in favor of the view that their job is to deal with reality.9 Political scientists and sociologists, too, with the exception of a neglected methodological piece by Max Weber and some recent work by Jon Elster, have also tended to avoid explicit discussion or open embrace of the counterfactual strategy, probably because it is felt that an empirical political science **must deal only with actual cases**. This belief would seem to be reflected in the title of a recent book of essays by political scientists working with counterfactual premises: What If?: Essays in Social Science Fiction. The play on "science fiction" is no accident here.10

# T Financial Incentives

## 1NC

#### Voting issue for limits and ground – they allow a litany of government actions that indirectly might encourage use of an energy – overstretches our research burden and undermines preparedness for all debates. Forcing the aff to spend money is the key internal link to every disad like politics, tradeoff, and spending.

**Webb, 93** – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online) – **italics in the original**

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.¶ By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public funds are either* disbursed or contingently committed, a **large number** of regulatory programs with incentive *effects* which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and *ad hoc* industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

## 1NR

#### Energy banks are quasi governmental organizations

Guith 11 Christopher, Free Enterprise, "Why We need a Clean Energy Bank", May 3, www.freeenterprise.com/2011/05/why-we-need-a-clean-energy-bank/

It is clear that the development and deployment of newer, more efficient and cleaner technologies will be needed to secure our energy future. U.S. private industry and our national laboratories and academic institutions have the brainpower to be global leaders in energy technology. However, the capital-intensive nature of energy technology development, its high financial and technological risks, and a lack of access to capital has created a wide chasm between technology development and commercialization.¶ That is why today I testified before the Senate Committee on Energy & Natural Resources in favor of a Clean Energy Deployment Administration (CEDA), a quasi-governmental agency dedicated to the financing and deployment of new and clean energy projects. An entity like CEDA can provide the flexible financial risk-management tools currently employed elsewhere i

n the government to advance other capital-intensive clean energy goals.¶ CEDA would function as an energy bank, modeled after the successful Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation. It would provide a full suite of financial services such as loans, loan guarantees, insurance, and other financing options to help inject capital into emerging clean energy projects. While several different versions of a CEDA have been proposed, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for 21st Century Energy supports the approach taken by Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) and Ranking Member Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), in which CEDA:¶ Would be revenue-neutral and could be required to repay initial capital infusions from the Treasury through successful operation.¶ Would be tailored to address the primary problem of commercializing new technologies.

# T 79

#### Must hold them accountable --- educators must promote reading comprehension skills --- vital to academic success and effective historical analysis

Rafael Heller 7 and Cynthia L. Greenleaf, Alliance for Excellent Education, “ Literacy Instruction in the Content Areas, June 2007, <http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/Content_Areas_report.pdf>

Given that content area reading materials are often quite difficult—in fact, many of the most popular middle and high school textbooks rival the complexity of college-level materials in their syntax, vocabulary, content, and presentation—it makes good sense to encourage all teachers to become familiar with these strategies. Students will need advanced literacy skills in order to do the sorts of intellectual work that the academic disciplines require, such as conducting and reporting scientific experiments, analyzing historical sources, or proving mathematical theorems. If **teachers** want their students to be able to handle such assignments. they **would do well to help them become more competent in reading difficult texts** in general.

# Case

## 1NC

#### Turn --- the aff is nothing more than historical fiction --- the unrealistic nature of the idea that Reagan would do the aff deprives counterfactual history of any meaningful ability to contribute to scholarship

Ondřej Sládek 7, researcher in the Narratology Section, Institute for Czech Literature, Czech Academy of Sciences, Between History and Fiction: On the Possibilities of Alternative History, 2007, http://www.flu.cas.cz/fictionality2/sladek.pdf

To prevent counterfactual history from **becoming a mere plaything of intellectuals** and a result of **uncontrolled imagination** on the part of the historian, some basic methodological guidelines had to be specified. This task was undertaken by Niall Ferguson himself, who, apart from the emphasis on credibility and convincingness of individual alternative histories, stresses especially their **feasibility**. He writes in his introduction to Virtual History: "We should consider as plausible or probable **only those alternatives which we can show on the basis of contemporary evidence that contemporaries actually considered"** (Ferguson 1999, 86). The likelihood of the counterfactual thus depends significantly on and is constituted by context - the context of a specific actual and historical event. In other words: "the historian must place himself in the position of the contemporaries to whom the various possible alternatives were still available, for whom the selection was not closed by the actualization of one of them" (Doležel 2004, 117).¶ A historian and a counterfactual historian treat facts and events in the same way, or rather: their inputs are the same while the outputs differ. The key concept contrasting the two interpretations is the one of event. What we have in mind here is a real (actual) event which is at the root of differing courses of development and diverse interpretations. Niall Ferguson says: "A number of points emerge when we consider these [alternatives]. Firstly, what actually happened was often not the outcome which the majority of informed contemporaries saw as the most likely: the counterfactual scenario was in that sense more 'real' to decisionmakers at the critical moment than the actual subsequent events. Secondly, we begin to see where determinist theories really do play a role in history: when people believe in them and believe themselves to be in their grip" (Ferguson 1999, 88).¶ Counterfactual histories and counterfactual historical fiction¶ But let us return now to Ferguson's methodological guidelines specifying how a historian should proceed when constructing counterfactual history. His method is based on three steps: (a) the convincingness and feasibility of a counterfactual history is a necessary condition; (b) the historian must possess a thorough knowledge of the context of the period or historical event in question; (c) **only those alternatives that were regarded as feasible** by people living in the given period should be considered. **This very last requirement turns counterfactual analysis into a significant tool for the extraction of scholarly knowledge.** Background material and historical documents are objectively researchable and each counterfactual history constructed may thus be checked and verified by other scholars. "Fergusonian counterfactual history is therefore primarily a study of decision-making by historical agents, based on documents such as government records, planning papers, diplomatic exchanges etc." (Doležel 2004, 118). They are thus exclusively worlds Wt, worlds of intentional action, from the point of view of the above-mentioned typolo-gy of worlds. Only these worlds are (historically) authentic and feasible.¶ What if the historian fails to revise his/her research in the light of individual documents and pieces of evidence and starts to speculate as to whether a certain coincidence had occurred or natural forces had intervened in a different way? That is, if the historian develops the two remaining types of worlds W2 and W3 - worlds in which non-intentional action prevails? Are they still counterfactual history, or (according to Ferguson's selection criteria) ratherfiction no historian should indulge in under any circumstances?¶ Statement 6: Counterfactual history can do without uncontrolled imagination; if it fails to do so, it becomes counterfactual historical fiction.¶ If a world constructed by a historical narrative is populated with characters and objects **which cannot be regarded as historical under any circumstances, it is not a historical, but a fictional world**. The same can be said of counterfactual history. If the counterfactual historian's primary considerations are informed by speculations about the possible intervention of natural forces (W2) or unpredictable situations (W3), which are, however, beyond historical evidence, what s/he produces is counterfactual historical fiction. One of the most typical features of counterfactual historical fiction is merging imaginary characters with factual/historical events and objects. This type of literary fiction, represented by authors such as R. Harris (Fatherland, 1992), K. Amis (The Alternation, 1976) etc., has shaped an independent and extremely popular genre. It would certainly be of interest to compare the worlds of these individual novels with a view to describing the structure of fictional worlds constituted by this genre. The limited time assigned to my talk however does not permit me to attempt this task.

#### Carter lost support due to his zealotism over energy policy in the same way the aff will—the public didn’t listen to radicalism and never will

Somers 10 (Brian, Renewable World Energy, “A Road Not Taken: Solar Panels, Jimmy Carter, and Missed Opportunities for Change”, 6/23, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/blog/post/2010/06/a-road-not-taken-solar-panels-jimmy-carter-and-missed-opportunities-for-change)

Having already been energy-conscious in those years, I personally remembered the installation of the solar collectors and also their removal. However, I knew nothing about the surrounding events, and I did not remember that Jimmy Carter did considerably more to free the U.S. from energy imports than only install a bunch of solar collectors on the roof of the White House to heat the water for the staff eating area. Hearing and seeing a replay of some of his speeches of those days from the Oval Office was thus a revelation to me. I didn't know that Carter had managed to reduce the oil imports to the U.S. by one third during his presidency. He did so by reducing the speed limit on U.S. freeways, by new regulations concerning required efficiency standards for electric appliances, and by a number of other measures.¶ Carter had gotten it wrong. He fully believed that the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 were indeed early indicators of the beginning of a world-wide fossil fuel shortage. He knew about Hubbert and Forrester and Meadows, and he truly believed that Peak Oil had come and gone right there and then, as indeed it had, at least as far as U.S. oil production was concerned.¶ He was a visionary and a zealot, and he expressed his convictions in no uncertain terms on each and every occasion, and the American public hated him for it with a passion. After all, these were the United States of America, the land of unlimited possibilities, so they had been told since their first breaths. How dared this new President tell them otherwise. How dared he express the view that the resources of this planet were finite, that there were limits to growth?¶ Shapiro, one of Carter's speechwriters expressed it well in the movie. Americans are deeply religious. They know that Moses didn't bring Ten Commandments down from Mount Sinai but eleven. **The eleventh commandment, recited rarely, is that Americans shall always have cheap energy.** It is their birthright. They live in the land of the free. They are free to fill'er up, any time and as often as they wish, and at an affordable price.¶ Jimmy Carter told them about false freedom. He told them that true freedom is the freedom of the others. True freedom is not to indulge in selfishness and grab everything for oneself because one can. This type of freedom would invariably lead to conflict and ultimately collapse. However, there exists another type of freedom, the freedom to work together for the benefit of all. Each of us should sacrifice a little so that, in the end, we could all lead better lives. This would free us of fossil fuel dependence. It would lead to a happier and cleaner world. It would lead to stability, to sustainability.¶ **He told them that they had a choice.** They could make the choice between false and true freedom, and the American people listened, because choose they did. **They elected Ronald Reagan who promised them continued exponential growth forever.**¶However, let me return to the movie. What happened to those solar panels?

#### Reagan wasn’t the cause of the death of solar but an illustration of how the public hates everything the aff stands for

Strickland 10 (Eliza, freelance writer focusing on science and the environment, Discover Magazine, “Jimmy Carter’s Infamous Solar Panels Won’t Return to the White House Roof”, 10/10, http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/discoblog/2010/09/10/jimmy-carters-infamous-solar-panels-wont-return-to-the-white-house-roof/)

Funny how a couple of slabs of silicon can become a national symbol.¶ In 1979, in the midst of an oil crisis, then-president Jimmy Carter tried to lead the nation to a brighter future powered by alternative energy via a symbolic gesture: installing solar panels on the roof of the White House. But instead of being inspired, the American people were freaked by Carter’s proposed program of conservation, carpooling, and cardigans, and promptly kicked him out the of Oval Office. Ronald Reagan shelved most of Carter’s ambitious energy plans, and in 1986 removed the solar panels from the roof.

#### Reagan wasn’t dogmatically opposed to solar—his administration acted to choose the best way to solve the economy

Washington Post 10 (Juliet Eilperin and Scott Higham, “How the Minerals Management Service's partnership with industry led to failure”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082406754.html?sid=ST2010082404823>)

Cites Ronald Reagan’s first interior secretary

"The Reagan administration was for everything," Watt says. "We wanted nuclear, we wanted solar, we wanted conservation, we wanted wind, we wanted coal. We were just doing everything we could to re-arm America, dig us out of a huge financial mess. That required energy at every level."

#### Their counterfactual is wrong—Carter wasn’t a visionary—he installed panels as a publicity stunt—Reagan was just not crazy like Carter was

Shirley 10 (Craig, president of Shirley & Banister Public Affairs and has written two books on Ronald Reagan, including his newest, "Rendezvous With Destiny", 10/8, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/10/08/craig-shirley-jimmy-carter-white-house-energy-crisis-solar-panels-ronald-reagan/#ixzz2AesOTcCm

“A new solar hot water heating system being installed at the White House costs thousands of dollars more that the original estimate and it probably won’t pay for itself in energy savings, officials said.”¶ So went the lede of a story in the Associated Press and reprinted in the Washington Post on April 6th, 1979 about President Jimmy Carter’s newest public relations stunt in the midst of the energy crisis. This was on the heels of lowering the thermostats in the White House, and later in the year, turning off the White House Christmas lights to show his concern over energy usage while also claiming he did so to show support for the hostages being held in Tehran by the Ayatollah Khomeini. In Carterland, this was seen as a public relations “twofer.”¶ Voltaire once said, “History is a pack of lies, agreed upon.” Truer words were never spoken, especially over the current handwringing by environmentalists and liberal revisionists as to why Ronald Reagan had the useless solar panels and endless pipes removed when he became president.¶ **Revisionist history is current attempting to portray Carter as a forward looking environmentalist and Reagan as some cold hearted capitalist but** as a matter of fact, in another public relations initiative, the 39th president also proposed tax credits for wood burning stoves. One can imagine a denuded American continent, bereft of any trees because Americans had cut down all the forests. Environmentalists tend to be silly people and a favored bumper sticker at the time proudly proclaimed, “Split Wood, Not Atoms.”¶ The Associated Press story elaborated, as unnamed White House officials called the solar panels an “economic dog.” Carter’s cousin, Hugh Carter, was in charge of the parsimous Georgian’s White House, but with Jimmy Carter, public relations often seemed to trump good policy, even spending policy. ¶ Several of Carter’s energy initiatives included closing off exploration for oil and gas in Alaska and western states, proposing time and again a new federal tax of 50 cents per gallon on gasoline, and the creation of the Department of Energy, one of the great government boondoggles of all time, whose goal was to solve the energy crisis. Americans have only been waiting for a little over thirty years to figure out the real mission of the DOE.¶ During his time of office, he ordered the oil companies to stop refining gasoline and instead refine home heating oil for a coming winter. The order resulted in gasoline lines that snaked around gas stations across the country. In many places including Northern Virginia, fist fights broke out among furious drivers. Rationing policies were initiated by many states, some based on Social Security numbers, others based on “odd” or “even” license plates, but these were obviously easy to beat. And often were.¶ Americans became especially furious when they learned the Congress had it very own gas station, which was selling the then precious liquid for much less than the taxpayers were shelling out. At his inaugural, Carter had arranged for “solar reflectors” to keep those in the reviewing stand warm, but according to The Economist, “electric heaters will be ready in case the sun fails to shine.”¶ At one point, Carter issued an Executive Order directing the private sector not to lower their air conditioning below 78 degrees in the summer nor raise their heat above 66 degrees in the winter. Across the country, the order was ignored. However, he did propose “inducements” to force industrial America to switch from oil and natural gas to coal. Conservationists now routinely denounce coal. ¶ He also proposed at one point that mortgages not be granted to home buyers until the federal government has certified the home was sufficiently insulated. Americans who did voluntarily cut their electricity usage found to their horror that their bills actually had gone up, a cruel reminder of how economics works.¶ Carter also proclaimed May 3 as “National Sun Day” and pressed for the creation of a Administration official to boost solar poer whose job title only lacked the title “Czar.” In Los Angeles, a race between solar cars took place, but it was never reported if any of them actually finished the contest.¶ The solar panels were originally “supposed to cost” the taxpayers “$24,000 to install and would cut utility bills by $1,000 a year to start.” Imagine that. Carter’s plan was for the panels to pay for themselves in 24 years! Even that platy went awry however, as Cousin Hugh could not find anyone to install them for less than $28,000 and, to accommodate the ugly White Elephant, another $7,000 would have to be spent tearing up the White House roof!¶ In spite of all the arguments against the useless panels, Carter had the contraption installed anyway, a monument to the **fecklessness of his so-called conservation policies**. Washingtonians laughed, “There he goes again.”¶ **Government officials---including Carter---actually discussed regulations to control access to the sun.**¶Early in his term, Carter sat before a roaring fire dressed in a sweater, calling on the American people to sacrifice and conserve energy. He called his campaign the “Moral Equivalent Of War,” but Americans felled to laugher when they realized the acronym of Carter’s plan. After the sweater incident, he picked up the nickname, “Jimmy Cardigan.” Anyone who knows about fireplaces will tell you that an open fire in a hearth sucks all the heat out of a building leaving it colder that it would have without the fire in the first place. But that night, it did make a pretty television shot for the president.¶ There was no energy crisis. There was a crisis of harebrained government regulators, interfering with the free market, who created the problems in the first place. In the 1840’s, Charles Dickens visited Washington. Unimpressed with the city and the government, he sniffed, “Few people would live in Washington, I take it, who were not obliged to live there.”

#### Using economics and foreign policy as the problem frames for solar power are the only way to overcome deeply entrenched perspectives about its efficacy

Laird—1AC Author—1 (Frank—prof in the school of intl studies at University of Denver, PhD in Political Science from MIT, MA in Physics from University of Edinburgh, “Solar Energy, Technology Policy, and Institutional Values”, Cambridge University Press, Print.)

U.S. energy policy makers held remarkably consistent normative and technical ideas (sometimes called values and beliefs) about energy technologies for over three decades. Both types of ideas shaped the problem frame that officials used in thinking about energy policy. Policy elites who thought about the future and about new energy sources conceptualized their problems in terms of economic benefits and national security. Notions of economic benefits changed over time, from the idea that energy should be cheap to promote maximum economic growth to more refined notions that energy markets ought to be efficient to get optimal economic performance. Nonetheless, both notions point to getting energy at the lowest possible price. Discussions of national security emphasized importing oil from sources that would not be interrupted by political acts.¶ Precisely how policy makers expressed their values and beliefs depended on the contingent circumstances in which they found themselves, but both sets of dominant ideas made for a problem definition that greatly disadvantaged solar advocates. Because of its high market prices, solar was hardpressed to compete with fossil fuels, and because of its diffuse nature, it did not fit into the existing energy production system the way nuclear power promised to do. Although policy makers began to include an assortment of environmental protection values into their frames, that did little to alter the situation.¶ In addition, normative and technical ideas interacted in complex ways, and the boundary between them was ambiguous and contested.' For example, consider the apparently empirical notion held by a White House aide about the infeasibility of solar energy as a major energy source. As cited in the previous chapter, this aide took from a discussion with Congressman Mike McCormack what the aide called a "Solar fact" that getting one percent of the country's total energy from solar would require converting ten percent of all houses to solar, and would cost $70-lOS billion.2 The aide called this a "fact," the most solidly empirical of appellations. And yet, contained within this alleged fact were a number of normative and questionable empirical assumptions. It assumed empirically that the price of solar systems would not go down much. It also assumed normatively that the United States should remain a very high-consumption society, which in itself contains assumptions about the technological possibilities for energy efficiency and the normative desirability of ever-increasing material consumption. Changes in any of these underlying ideas would change this apparently simple "fact." ¶ At a more aggregate level of policy discussions, the normative and empirical ideas became just as enmeshed. As I showed in Chapter 5, Nixon administration officials regarded high levels of energy consumption as normatively desirable, as indicators of a good and progressive society.; The empirical fact of high energy consumption became a normative standard. Thus the official energy policy frame made sustaining and enlarging that consumption more than just preserving the empirical status quo; growing energy consumption was a valued social goal, not just an empirical fact. This problem frame stacked the odds against solar energy in normative as well as empirical terms. By this normative standard, the sorts of technological changes that would most enhance solar energy's prospects, particularly large improvements in energy efficiency, look normatively undesirable, whatever their technical feasibility. Conventional energy policy analysts held these intertwined empirical and normative goals deeply, as shown by their bitter attacks on Amory Lovins when he challenged that problem frame, as detailed in Chapter 6. ¶ For thirty-five years solar advocates presented their technologies that used a variety of renewable energy sources as a way to exploit a vast, inexhaustible, but diffuse, resource. Most of them for most of the period did not think that creating a solar society entailed significant social or political change. Hoyt Hottel, Maria Telkes, Farrington Daniels, and the other early solar pioneers of the I 940s and 1950s all sought to make solar affordable, largely with the assumption that it would plug into the existing energy systems, replacing fossil fuels, and enabling society and polity to continue functioning as before, with greater security and, perhaps, less pollution. Most of them saw no contradiction in promoting research and development in both solar and nuclear power, or solar and synthetic fuels, and their only complaint was that nuclear got an unfairly large portion of federal subsidies. A few of them, such as Daniels and Eugene Ayers, sometimes hinted that a substantial change in such a major technological system would affect more than how one heated a room or lit a lamp. But for most of these advocates, solar energy technology offered just another way of securing the status quo against the end of fossil fuels. They sought a new technological system to prevent the social changes that would accompany scarcity.¶ By the 1970s a new type of solar advocate emerged. These activists came to the technology from a part of the environmental movement that believed that the fundamental structures of society and politics - those concerned with industrial and agricultural production, housing, settlement patterns, and transportation - were, in some deep sense, flawed.' These ecological advocates did not simply want any and all solar technologies. They sought technologies that would reinforce and be more compatible with a qualitatively different society and politics, one in which ecological sustainability and local community self-reliance would displace increasing ecological damage, bureaucratic centralization, and anomie. For them, making a drastic change in the energy technology system would be akin to making a legislative change for all of society.' Whether the technologies they sought would have given them the society that they desired is not the point here. Rather, the point is that their social goals and ideas about technology as a social force led them to a very different framing of the energy problem and solar's role in it. Within their problem frame, solar was not only a feasible solution to the energy problem, it was the only desirable solution, the only energy technology ensemble that would encourage and strengthen the sort of society that they desired. In their frame, issues such as high initial costs and an immature industry were problems to be solved, not barriers to policy. This shared meaning of solar energy technologies bound together ecological advocates as a social group and drove their choices, leading them to champion smaller, more decentralized solar technologies and to reject schemes like the solar-powered satellites.' The problem frame that came out of this meaning led them to regard problems like costs as secondary considerations, just the opposite of conventional frames. ¶ Top-level policy makers never shared that framing of the problem or the normative values that went with it. Their public pronouncements and written internal debates show no hint that they ever even considered this alternative problem frame and set of values. The presidents and their top aides - in every administration - talked about energy almost exclusively in economic and national security terms, with occasional references to narrowly construed environmental values. Even in the Carter administration, no one outside of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) gave any sign that they even thought about some of the more radical alternatives, and they never committed them to paper, suggesting that such ideas were not welcome in policy deliberations. ¶ These facts suggest a new interpretation of solar energy policy, particularly its rapid rise and fall in the 1970s. The conventional explanations for energy policy and solar's failure to establish itself within it do not explain all of the events recounted here. It was not enough that solar was expensive and its future costs were uncertain. That could be said of all future energy technologies, including nuclear energy. And it was not enough that the Reagan administration was ideologically hostile to solar energy. Solar advocates began losing their battles for support while President Carter was still in office, and the ideological explanation begs the question of why Reagan and his people evinced such hostility to solar energy. The association of solar energy with the ecological wing of the solar movement was a phenomenon of the 1970s, not what one might have predicted in the 1950s or 1960s. Perhaps most importantly, the events analyzed here require us to reexamine the pluralist account of solar energy policy. Pluralism must, to explain events adequately, incorporate the influence of ideas, normative and empirical, being institutionalized into official problem frames.

## 1NR

#### Their indicts don’t deny the indisputable fact that violence is on the decline

Boyd 12 Neil, Professor and Associate Director, School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University The Empirical Evidence for Declining Violence, <http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/neil-boyd/steven-pinker-violence-_b_1184510.html>

The response to Steven Pinker's new book, The Better Angels of our Nature has been remarkable. While there are a few mixed reviews (James Q. Wilson in the [Wall Street Journal](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=0CE4QFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424053111904332804576537813826824914.html&ei=vjkLT5O-EKrr0gHw5tzfCA&usg=AFQjCNHswRvsFx9EJnkHojHaLMn93Nodzg) comes to mind), virtually everyone else either raves about the book or expresses something close to ad hominem contempt and loathing. ¶ At the heart of the disagreement are competing conceptions of research and scholarship. How are we to study violence and to assess whether it has been increasing or decreasing? What analytic tools do we bring to the table? ¶ Pinker, sensibly enough (in my view), chooses to look at the rate of violent death over time, in pre-state societies, in medieval Europe, in the modern era, and always in a global context; he writes about inter-state conflicts, the two world wars, intra-state conflicts, civil wars, and homicides.¶ In doing so, he takes a critical barometer of violence to be the rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 citizens; the global gold standard for homicide can currently be found in states where the figure in question hovers at an annual rate of about [one per 100,000](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&sqi=2&ved=0CEIQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com%2Fdoi%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-229X.2011.00518.x%2Fpdf&ei=AkkLT-2hH6nu0gGa7PCKAg&usg=AFQjCNHkOa3T8YQk3UsMEE3dNvXL6OH-Tw) culpable homicides within a population -- a status currently achieved by the Baltic States of Finland, Denmark, and Norway, Newfoundland, and with many Western European states, and Canada itself, in close pursuit. ¶ Pinker's aim is to explain the variables that have contributed to the global decline in violence that we have witnessed, particularly during the past 30 years, but also, perhaps more fundamentally, during the past 500 years. He points to the emergence of literacy and the enlightenment, to competent democratic governments, peaceful commerce, and more recently, the overwhelming support for racial equality, women's rights, gay rights, children's rights, and animal rights.¶ He does not pretend that the world is now safe from significant violence in the future; he is not so foolish as to make such a confident prediction about a necessarily complex future (see Dan Gardner's book, Future Babble). Pinker is simply assessing, rather, what the evidence is telling us about the extent of violence in the world today. ¶ For example, we learn that the risk of being a victim of a homicide has always been much higher in often romanticized tribal or non-state societies than it is today in a modern liberal state. And even during the 1970s and early 1980s, the homicide rates in Canada and the United States were more than twice as high as they are today.¶ It is not surprising that Pinker has his critics, generally individuals who are reluctant to acknowledge quantitative data as relevant, and who cling to the notion that human beings have never been more violent than in this century. Elizabeth Kolbert, [writing](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.newyorker.com%2Farts%2Fcritics%2Fbooks%2F2011%2F10%2F03%2F111003crbo_books_kolbert&ei=rToLT-GxCMrX0QGKnLDzCw&usg=AFQjCNHL4-lAOyx0KQe3MKka3EqwxBmqrA) in the New Yorker, laments, contrary to fact, that there is no discussion of "colonialism" in Pinker's book and concludes, "Name a force, a trend, or a 'better angel' that has tended to reduce the threat, and someone else can name a force, a trend, or an 'inner demon' pushing back the other way."¶ The response to this is simple: yes, one can do this, but **there will be no credible evidence in support of such a claim**. Kolbert and her dance of the dialectic **cannot disguise the reality that the rate of violence**, as measured by culpable homicide, has markedly decreased over human history. ¶ Other critics (for example, [Robert Epstein](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.scientificamerican.com%2Farticle.cfm%3Fid%3Dbookreview-steven-pinker-the-better-angels-of-our-nature-why-violence-has-declined&ei=IjsLT_HSN8na0QHvypzpCA&usg=AFQjCNFhvT4yaEclbyupHANwljt91wuv9g) in Scientific American), oddly enough, take issue with canvassing the rate of culpable homicide, preferring to focus on the absolute numbers of deaths as a more critical variable of relevance. ¶ And still others, John Gray in [Prospect](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.prospectmagazine.co.uk%2F2011%2F09%2Fjohn-gray-steven-pinker-violence-review%2F&ei=gjsLT8q-B-Ti0QHx8sS4Ag&usg=AFQjCNEEt2pHkAI7QrQGsC04s7V6PdsiKw) and Joe Carter in [First Thoughts](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.firstthings.com%2Fblogs%2Ffirstthoughts%2F2011%2F12%2F20%2Fthe-precious-steven-pinker%2F&ei=0zwLT8veC-Tv0gGnyKWxAg&usg=AFQjCNGHs5q2MgbK5-6AnG4QmyFLaKm_9Q), take issue with Pinker's atheism: "the delusions of liberal humanism," as Carter puts it, and a "delusion of peace" claims John Gray. He writes, "Pinker's attempt to ground the hope of peace in science is profoundly instructive, for it testifies to our enduring need for faith."

#### Zero empirical correlation between ‘innate drives’ or ‘social institutions’ and conflict

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http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA493031&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

While classical liberals focused on political structures, socialists analyzed the socioeconomic system of states as the primary factor in determining the propensity of states to engage in war. Socialists such as Karl Marx attributed war to the class structure of society; Marx believed that war resulted from a clash of social forces created by a capitalist mode of production that develops two antagonistic classes, rather than being an instrument of state policy. Thus capitalist states would engage in war because of their growing needs for raw materials, markets, and cheap labor. Socialists believed replacing capitalism with socialism could prevent war, but world events have proven socialists wrong as well.32 ¶ These two schools of thought—war is caused by innate biological drives or social institutions—do not demonstrate any meaningful correlation with the occurrence or nonoccurrence of war. There are many variables not considered by these two schools: for example, the influence of national special interest groups such as the military or defense contractors that may seek glory through victory, greater resources, greater domestic political power, or justification for their existence. ¶ Legal scholar Quincy Wright has conducted one of the “most thorough studies of the nature of war”33 and concludes that there “is no single cause of war.”34 In A Study of War, he concludes that peace is an equilibrium of four complex factors: military and industrial technology, international law governing the resort to war, social and political organization at the domestic and international level, and the distribution of attitudes and opinions concerning basic values. War is likely when controls on any one level are disturbed or changed.35 Similarly, the 1997 US National Military Strategy identifies the root causes of conflict as political, economic, social, and legal conditions.36 ¶ Moore has compiled the following list of conventional explanations for war: specific disputes; absence of dispute settlement mechanisms; ideological disputes; ethnic and religious differences; communication failures; proliferation of weapons and arms races; social and economic injustice; imbalance of power; competition for resources; incidents, accidents, and miscalculation; violence in the nature of man; aggressive national leaders; and economic determination. He has concluded, however, that these causes or motives for war explain specific conflicts but fail to serve as a central paradigm for explaining the cause of war.37 ¶ In the final analysis, Wright is unequivocally correct—there is no single cause or explanation for war. However, there is one clear consistency in all wars: wars always begin through the calculated decisions of men or women, regardless of any cause, motive, or explanation. As the UNESCO constitution asserts, “wars begin in the minds of men.”38 People—national leaders— are always at the core of any decision to wage war, and any strategy for preventing war must address these individuals.

#### Tech thought is inevitable

Kateb 97 George, Professor of politics at Princeton, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_/ai\_19952031

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity--and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives--would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence. As for our generation and the indefinite future, many of us are prepared to say that there are many things we wish that modern science did not know or is likely to find out and many things we wish that modern technology did not know how to do. When referring in 1955 to the new sciences of life, Heidegger says We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us (1966, p. 52). The implication is that it is less bad for the human status or stature and for the human relation to reality that there be nuclear destruction than that (what we today call) genetic engineering should go from success to success. To such lengths can a mind push itself when it marvels first at the passions, drives, and motives that are implicated in modern technology, and then marvels at the feats of technological prowess. The sense of wonder is entangled with a feeling of horror. We are past even the sublime, as conceptualized under the influence of Milton's imagination of Satan and Hell. It is plain that so much of the spirit of the West is invested in modern technology. We have referred to anger, alienation, resentment. But that cannot be the whole story. Other considerations we can mention include the following: a taste for virtuosity, skill for its own sake, an enlarged fascination with technique in itself, and, along with these, an aesthetic craving to make matter or nature beautiful or more beautiful; and then, too, sheer exhilaration, a questing, adventurous spirit that is reckless, heedless of danger, finding in obstacles opportunities for self-overcoming, for daring, for the very sort of daring that Heidegger praises so eloquently when in 1935 he discusses the Greek world in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1961, esp. pp. 123-39). All these considerations move away from anger, anxiety, resentment, and so on. The truth of the matter, I think, is that the project of modern technology, just like that of modern science, must attract a turbulence of response. The very passions and drives and motives that look almost villainous or hypermasculine simultaneously look like marks of the highest human aspiration, or, at the least, are not to be cut loose from the highest human aspiration.

#### Technological thought has been internalized---aff can’t change it

Leach 3 Neil, Professor at the University of Southern California, “Forget Heidegger”, August 15 is last date modified, <http://www.china-designer.com/magazine/leach/txt1.htm>

Adorno's further example of the car reveals how the technological has come to colonise our everyday lives not as standing reserve, but as something to which symbolic intention is always already being 'attached'. The point here is that we have to understand that our engagement with technology involves a moment of 'proprioception'. Technology may come to operate as a form of 'prosthesis' to the human body that is appropriated such that it becomes part of the motility of the body. In driving a car we come to navigate the road through that car. As such, the car as an item of technology is not divorced - alienated - from the body. Indeed it becomes a form of extension to that body. What I am arguing here is not some simplistic manifesto for cyborgs, claiming that human beings can become part human and part machine. Rather I am trying to tease out the logic of mimesis itself. For according to this logic, human beings have absorbed technology at an unconscious level, such that they have come to operate through technology, as though by way of some tele-kinesis.¶ Not only this, but technology may actually influence the way that human beings think. It may itself affect our consciousness. Let us take the example of the computer. For, if as Walter Benjamin once argued, the factory worker in the modernist age comes to absorb the jolting, jarring repetitive action of the machine, such that those movements are appropriated into the worker's own behaviour, so too people today have absorbed the thinking and fluid circuitry behind the computer screen. New conditions breed new ways of thinking. As Douglas Rushkoff observes, a new computer generation is emerging. The computer kids of today come to behave like their computers. They identify with them, play with them, and mimic their operations. Analogical reasoning is out. Non-linear, multiple-layered thinking is in - Deleuzian surfing. Fractals, rhizomes and clones, fluidity and flux - these are the buzz words of this new generation. In such a context, those who argue against the use of the computer in the contemporary design studio are failing to address the concrete ontological reality of life today, and are doing no service to the students, for whom knowledge of computer has become a 'given' within the contemporary office. It may be that the still prevalent antipathy towards digital technology is merely a form of 'denial'. As in the case of homophobics, who often deny their latent homosexuality, critics of technology may be repressing a secret fascination with technology. An individual 'in denial' may be fascinated by some personal psychic obsession, but, not wishing to acknowledge it, will project that obsession on to some external object, and then criticise it. But whether this antipathy towards digital technology is a form of repressed fascination or not, it is clearly out of place in what has become a highly digitalised world.¶ This is not to say that the computer should be accepted unproblematically within the studio. Indeed the lessons of those design schools that have accepted the computer wholesale would seem to indicate that the concerns expressed in The Anaesthetics of Architecture about the potential aestheticisation and hence anaesthetisation of social issues are borne out only too clearly in such contexts. Rather it is a call for a self-critical, theoretically informed engagement with such realms. Theory may be unable in itself to combat the potential problems of aestheticisation. Yet it may provide the first crucial step. Once a problem has been exposed, one is no longer trapped by that problem.¶ The consequences are all too obvious. Not only have we accepted technology as an essential part of our everyday life, such that the distinction once posed between techné and technology seems no longer valid, but our whole existence has become conditioned by technology. In this new digital age, as Sarah Chaplin argues, we have adopted a form of cybervisuality. An important factor, then, is our interface with that technology. For technology may take many forms. Here the question of design becomes crucial. The message of mimesis is not that human beings will adapt to anything, so that design is unimportant, but precisely the opposite. Design becomes an important mechanism for making people feel at one with their world. This relates not simply to whether a piece of technology is itself aesthetically pleasing - as is the case, say, with the iMac computer - , but in the context of digital technology it relates also to the user interface - to software programming and its compatibility with human modes of operation. Far from engendering alienation, well designed technology has the capacity to overcome alienation.¶ There was a time when Heideggerian thought made a substantial and noteworthy contribution to architectural culture in challenging the spirit of positivism that was once so pervasive. But now Heideggerian thinking must not itself go unchallenged, in that it threatens to install itself as a set of fixed values out of tune with the fluidity and flux of contemporary society. And while some would criticise postmodern thought for being relativistic in accommodating plurality and difference, and questioning the ground on which any particular statement is made, the true relativism lies surely in a tradition that forecloses even the possibility of even asking these questions, by doggedly adhering to an out of date set of values, and by failing to engage substantively with any critical discourse.¶ In an increasingly digital world, it is time, it would seem, to adopt a more flexible and tolerant attitude towards digital technology. It is time to break free from the shackles of the past. It is time, perhaps, to forget Heidegger.

#### Both past and future heg avert extinction

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It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force.

As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

#### Heg is key to decease excess American interventionalism – answers their militarism argument

**Kagan and Kristol, 2k** (Robert and William, “Present Dangers”, Kagan is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Kristol is the editor of The Weekly Standard, and a political analyst and commentator, page 13-14 )

http://www2.uhv.edu/fairlambh/asian/present\_dangers.htm

It is worth pointing out, though, that a foreign policy premised on American hegemony, and on the blending of principle with material interest, may in fact mean fewer, not more, overseas interventions than under the "vital interest" standard. (13). The question, then, is not whether the US should intervene everywhere or nowhere. The decision Americans need to make is whether the US should generally lean forward, as it were, or sit back. A strategy aimed at preserving American hegemony should embrace the former stance, being more rather than less inclined to weigh in when crises erupt, and preferably before they erupt. This is the standard of a global superpower that intends to shape the international environment to its own advantage. By contrast, the vital interest standard is that of a "normal" power that awaits a dramatic challenge before it rouses itself into action.

**Policymakers have an obligation to err in favor of prediction—it’s inevitable and using explicit predictions enhances decision-making**

**Fitzsimmons 7** (Michael, Washington DC defense analyst, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06-07, online)

In defence of prediction

Uncertainty is not a new phenomenon for strategists. Clausewitz knew that ‘many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain’. In coping with uncertainty, he believed that ‘what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability.’34 Granted, one can certainly allow for epistemological debates about the best ways of gaining ‘a standard of judgment’ from ‘knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense’. Scientific inquiry into the ‘laws of probability’ for any given strate- gic question may not always be possible or appropriate. Certainly, analysis cannot and should not be presumed to trump the intuition of decision-makers. Nevertheless, Clausewitz’s implication seems to be that the burden of proof in any debates about planning should belong to the decision-maker who rejects formal analysis, standards of evidence and probabilistic reasoning. Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision- makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be impor- tant or unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others’ presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not ‘what is your inferred causation, General?’ Above all, not, ‘what are your values, Mr. Secretary?’ ... If someone says ‘a fair chance’ ... ask, ‘if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?’ If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences ... Once differing odds have been quoted, the question ‘why?’ can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert’s basis for linking ‘if’ with ‘then’ gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.’35 There are at least three critical and related benefits of prediction in strate- gic planning. The first reflects Neustadt and May’s point – prediction enforces a certain level of discipline in making explicit the assumptions, key variables and implied causal relationships that constitute decision-makers’ beliefs and that might otherwise remain implicit. Imagine, for example, if Shinseki and Wolfowitz had been made to assign probabilities to their opposing expectations regarding post-war Iraq. Not only would they have had to work harder to justify their views, they might have seen more clearly the substantial chance that they were wrong and had to make greater efforts in their planning to prepare for that contingency. Secondly, the very process of making the relevant factors of a deci- sion explicit provides a firm, or at least transparent, basis for making choices. Alternative courses of action can be compared and assessed in like terms. Third, the transparency and discipline of the process of arriving at the initial strategy should heighten the decision-maker’s sensitivity toward changes in the envi- ronment that would suggest the need for adjustments to that strategy. In this way, prediction enhances rather than under-mines strategic flexibility. This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in plan- ning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the dis- tinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilis- tic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy. As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome – that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy. \* \* \* One of the most widely read books in recent years on the complicated relation- ship between strategy and uncertainty is Peter Schwartz’s work on scenario-based planning, The Art of the Long View. Schwartz warns against the hazards faced by leaders who have deterministic habits of mind, or who deny the difficult implications of uncertainty for strategic planning. To overcome such tenden- cies, he advocates the use of alternative future scenarios for the purposes of examining alternative strategies. His view of scenarios is that their goal is not to predict the future, but to sensitise leaders to the highly contingent nature of their decision-making.37 This philosophy has taken root in the strategic-planning processes in the Pentagon and other parts of the US government, and properly so. Examination of alternative futures and the potential effects of surprise on current plans is essential. Appreciation of uncertainty also has a number of organisational impli- cations, many of which the national-security establishment is trying to take to heart, such as encouraging multidisciplinary study and training, enhancing information sharing, rewarding innovation, and placing a premium on speed and versatility. The arguments advanced here seek to take nothing away from these imperatives of planning and operating in an uncertain environment. But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but assumptions must be made in the end. Clausewitz’s ‘standard of judgment’ for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambiguous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future.