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#### Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced---nuclear’s not prohibited

Anell 89 Lars is the Chairman of the WTO panel adopted at the Forty-Fifth Session of Contracting Parties on December 5, 1989. Other panel members: Mr. Hugh Bartlett and Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda. “Canada – Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt,” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production**.** Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Vote negative:

#### Including regulations is a limits disaster---undermines preparedness for all debates

#### And precision---only direct prohibition is a restriction---key to predictability

# Courts

#### TEXT: The United States Supreme Court should rule restrictions on the creation and use of mixed oxide fuel produced utilizing plutonium-uranium extraction for electricity generation from commercial nuclear power in the United States unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the tenth amendment

#### Courts can effectively rule to invalidate restrictions on all forms of energy production

Simon 7 [Christopher A. Simon - Director, Master of Public Administration, Political Science Department, University of Utah, Professor, Political Science, “Alternative Energy: Political, Economic, and Social Feasibility”]

**THE COURTS**

The institutional power of the federal courts regarding energy policy is not ex- plicit in Article III. The role of energy and the intra- and interstate transporta- tion of fuels and electricity in the United States is, for the most part, a late nine- teenth- and early twentieth-century phenomenon. Early energy policy-related cases were argued within the confines of the judiciary’s narrowly defined enu- merated powers. In the late nineteenth century, the court system remained timid in terms of taking energy and material related cases. Post-Loehner (1905). the judiciary showed itself more willing to enter into disputes between state government and citizens. Although the case had nothing to do with en- ergy policy**, the Supreme Court—**by taking the case—opened the doors to the expansion of one of its enumerated Article III powers in a way that more **di- rectly scrunitized policymaking** at the state and local levels and de facto ex- panded the notion that federal court decisions were linked to the national gov- ernment’s supremacy. The 1937 case West Coast Hotel u Parrish confirmed the judiciary’s interest in scrutinizing public policy at all levels of government. Constitutionally, legal theory was now open to an enlarged analysis of the in- terchange between national regulatory powers and policymaking authority and state and local powers. In essence, the Court more fully disclosed acceptance of judicial positivism in method and decision making rather than a strict con- structionist approach.

Over the years, **the courts have had a significant role in energy policy.** The Court has been particularly interested in regulation of safety with regard to energy policy, as safety issues are central to the public good aspect of energy. While not directly related to energy policy. New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. Merchants' Bank of Boston 47 U.S. 344 (1848) does illustrate the Court's particular and early interest in issues related to energy safety. The case involved the destruction by fire of a steam-operated commercial boat. In the end, the Court sided with the plaintiffs and the decision of a lower court to award damages. The case ultimately turned on the issue of fuel safety as the boat was fitted for wood-burning energy production, but was burning a much hotter “modem” fuel for boats of the time—anthracite coal. Although other deficiencies had been noted in terms of safety equipment that ultimately tied to the issue of the federal court's “admirality jurisdiction,” the case provides early evidence that the Court saw a role for itself in re- viewing aspects of energy safety, particularly in terms of transportation safety—albeit tangentially and quite possibly with little emphasis beyond the nature of the case.

The Court, however, tightened its level of scrutiny in term of energy- related safety issues in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma et al. 286 U.S. 210 (1932). In this case, one of the earliest cases involving the regulation of safety issues **related to petroleum refinement**, the Court dismissed broadly defined environmental restrictions on the extraction and refining of petroleum. In essence, the Court demonstrated that an early state-level effort to protect the environment from the impact of oil drilling and processing could only occur if statutes were written narrowly and were essentially based on scientific principles related to environmental safety. One could argue that by taking the case and deciding it, the Court opened further the door to national regulation of environmental policy as is most di- rectly **related to the issue of energy resource development, processing, and distribution.**

The 1970s, a decade in which the petroleum-based energy paradigm expe- rienced a major shock, saw the Court dealing with two prominent cases re- lated to energy safety issues. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat- ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et alia 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court dealt with questions related to “the proper scope of judicial review of the Atomic Energy Commission’s procedures with regards to the licensing of nu- clear power plants.” In lower court decisions, **the commission's rule-making procedures related to nuclear energy fuel management and safety issues were overturned through court decision**. In essence, this would have **opened the door to further court scrutiny of the nuclear energy process** in terms of safety. In a unanimous decision, the late William Rehnquist wrote that the Court of Appeals has improperly developed its own conception of safe reactor process and remanded the case to a lower court to scrutinize the commission’s regu- latory clarity. The case is significant because it effectively maintained nuclear energy policy as viable as long as rule making and regulatory processes gov- erning this form of alternative energy were rationally constructed and com- plete. The Court looked to administrative solutions to any lack of clarity or completeness first but was fairly definitive in removing the judicial system from the process or filling in areas of vagueness or rewriting significant por- tions of regulation and process-related nuclear energy policy.

In the same year, **the Court decided the so-called trans-Alaska pipeline** rate **case**s. The Court sought to clarify rate change **policies related to the shipment of crudc oil and natural gas**. In essence, the Court solidified the authority of Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in its efforts to manage the pipeline. The commission’s ability to adjust rates for rational economic reasons and to require pipeline operators to refund excess rate charges to customers was rec- ognized by the Court. The pipeline cases were critical to the legitimacy of the commission’s authority over the transportation of petroleum from Alaska**. In a broader sense, the Court established precedence** of the ICC **to regulate** petroleum **transportation.** Appellate court decision has further solidified its po- sition on pipeline rates in BP West Coast Products, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 376 F. 3d 1223 (2004). The Court was careful to bal- ance this decision in relation to the states’ power to regulate intrastate energy policy issues.

In Exxon Corp. et alia v. Governor of Maryland et alia 437 U.S. 117 (1978), the Court recognized the power of state government to regulate gaso- line markets within its borders. The Court found that neither the interstate commerce clause nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by Maryland's regulations on petroleum producers’ ability to establish gas stations and policy efforts to ensure equity within the gasoline market across various corporate concerns operating fueling station in-state. In essence, the Court established a balance between the interests of the national government in regulating energy transportation and use and the interests of the state in advancing goals not inconsistent with national constitutional in- terpretation and national policy priorities.

#### It’s competitive --- doesn’t reduce restrictions, just rules them unenforceable

Treanor & Sperling 93 William - Prof Law at Fordham. Gene - Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy. “PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND THE REVIVAL OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATUTES,” Columbia Law Review, Dec 93, lexis

Unlike the Supreme Court, several state courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is overturned. n42 With one exception, they have concluded that such **statutes are immediately enforceable.**

The most noted instance in which **the revival issue was resolved** by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pronounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer [\*1913] Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded,

The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid from the date it became effective. n43

Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action. n44

When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jawish v. Morlet n45 held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that **a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable,** but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished; that so long as the decision stands the statute is dormant but not dead; and that **if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date**. n46

The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in accord with the principle "that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law.' " n47 Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, " "Just about everybody was fooled.' " n48 Nonetheless, the court's view was that since **the** minimum wage **law had always been valid,** although for a period judicially unenforceable, **there was no need to reenact it. n49**

Almost **all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have reached the same result** as the Jawish court, using a similar formalistic [\*1914] analysis. n50 The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, n51 a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child support and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the applicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated:

Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to constitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court - an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by the Constitution. n52

The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival therefore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage [\*1915] of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making.

**Jefferson has little analytic appeal**. Its view of the separation of powers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jefferson rationale, a "revived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is, instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. n53 In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.

# PGS CP

## 1NC

#### TEXT: The United States federal government should develop and acquire, as rapidly as possible, a conventional prompt global strike capability, space-based quantum gradiometry capabilities, and synthetic aperture radar with Ground Movement Target Indicator and Surface Moving Target Indicator capabilities.

#### Conventional PGS solves prolif

Brito and Intriligator 10 Dagobert L, Political Econ Prof @ Rice and Michael D, Econ Prof @ UCLA, 3-1, “Conventional Trident Modification Program,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dagobert-l-brito/conventional-trident-modi\_b\_480660.html

Global Zero has the support of the Obama Administration and was the subject of President Obama's April 5, 2009 speech in Prague following a joint statement of Presidents Obama and Medvedev committing their two countries to achieving a nuclear free world." On the surface this idea is appealing. It is hard to imagine what could be wrong with a policy to eliminate nuclear warheads whose only purpose is either to kill tens of thousands of people or to destroy an opponent's nuclear warheads. Paradoxically, however, a world without nuclear weapons could be one that is very dangerous and unstable. It is our belief that one way to make Global Zero possible is for the United States to invest in developing a non-nuclear response to a nation that acquires a small number of nuclear weapons and uses the existence of these weapons to extort economic or political concessions, such as in the current world situation North Korea and potentially Iran. One possible way to do this is to deploy a weapon such as the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) Program. As we will argue, Trident missiles carrying non-nuclear kinetic warheads could deter a country from clandestinely attempting to acquire, deploy and then use a small number of nuclear weapons for political purposes. There is a very technical literature that was primarily motivated by the Cold War, and some of the results of this body of work are applicable to the current global situation. One of the more important results is that the probability of war is high in a conflict situation where the parties have very few nuclear weapons, or even worse, where only one of the parties has even a few such weapons, which was the only situation in which such weapons were used, by the U.S. against Japan in 1945. During the Cold War, this observation led to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction or "MAD". As a result, both sides invested in a large number ICBM, bomber and missile-carrying submarines so as to have a survivable second- strike capability. It may be possible to negotiate a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, however it is impossible to eliminate the technology for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the knowledge of how to do this that is widespread and available on the Internet. Given current technology, a country with a stockpile of fissile material could be able to produce nuclear weapons in a matter of months. In a situation where no country has nuclear weapons, a rogue country could clandestinely produce a small number of weapons, given. Most of the technology needed to produce such weapons is dual-use, involving both civilian and potential military use. Thus the boundary between the capability needed to produce nuclear weapons and having such weapons has been blurred. There have been recent attempts to change the threshold from the actual acquisition of nuclear weapons that is banned by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to the acquisition of the capability to construct nuclear weapons. This is difficult, however, since the exact boundary that differentiates general knowledge from knowledge specific to producing nuclear weapons is not well defined and it becomes less defined as technology progresses. Furthermore, technical change will continue to progress. Computers will continue to become more powerful, and computer-controlled machine tools will become more common and less expensive. The only substantial barrier to building nuclear weapons may be access to fissile material. If climate change lead to an increased dependence in nuclear power then it may become more difficult to restrict access to fissile material. MAD worked during the Cold War. We will never know whether the doctrine was sound or we were just lucky. If the doctrine worked, it required a high degree of rationality and sophistication on the part of the nations involved. This may not be the case if among the processors of nuclear weapons is a politically unstable rogue state. This creates a dilemma: In a world where nuclear weapons are eliminated, a country may be tempted to clandestinely build a small stockpile of nuclear weapons for bargaining purposes. We believe, however, that there may be a way to avoid this dilemma. It may not be possible to prevent a nation state from having the capability to build nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that it is possible to develop non-nuclear weapons systems that are credible and powerful enough to serve as an effective deterrent to any nation contemplating building a small number of nuclear weapons to extort political or economic concessions. Such as system would initially serve as a deterrent to nuclear proliferation and may, in fact, make Global Zero stable. Credibility is crucial in this area. The very elements that may have made the MAD doctrine viable reduce its credibility vis-à-vis a rogue nuclear nation. It is no longer credible that the United States or any of the major powers would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against the infrastructure and population of a rogue nation that used or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have only been used at the end of WWII, by the U.S. against Japan. The decision to drop two atomic bombs in Japan is still a subject of considerable controversy. It was, however, in many ways, a logical extension of existing practices of the time. The atomic bomb was seen as a means to destroy the enemy's cities, industries, and, especially, its will to fight. The bomb did what was already being done using conventional weapons by both sides in the war. In fact, more people were killed in the firebomb raids on Tokyo than by both atomic bombs. The special horrors and the threat to the human gene pool and the environment associated with radiation were not known or well understood at the time. After the war, the scientific and military communities as well as moral and political philosophers pondered the implications of nuclear weapons. It became clear that nuclear weapons were not a very effective means for a nation to use in pursuit of its political and economic objectives. It became necessary to develop complicated and sophisticated strategic doctrines so as to rationalize the acquisition and deployment of these weapons. Ultimately, it was seen by Bernard Brodie, Carl Kaysen, and others that the role of nuclear weapons was primarily to deter their use by other nations. Although weapons designers eventually developed warheads that were "clean" and potentially useful on the battlefield as tactical nuclear weapons, the concept of a nuclear threshold that could not be crossed except at a high cost became ingrained in the strategic thinking of the mid-twentieth century. The nuclear threshold was so well defined and accepted that a small and poor country like North Vietnam was able to inflict a political defeat on the United States without fear of its use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons did not prove to be an effective instrument of war or policy, whether by the United States in Vietnam or by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan or currently by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. The existence of a large stockpile of United States nuclear weapons was not a credible deterrent to their political use by minor rogue nuclear powers. In 1985 we first proposed that the U.S. reconfigure submarine-launched ballistic missiles with conventional warheads that could provide a non-nuclear deterrent that was politically credible. In 2002, together with another coauthor, we wrote a paper published by the Baker Institute at Rice University that proposed that the United States reconfigure some of its Trident II missiles to deliver kinetic energy warheads. (Anyone interested in the details of the proposal can find it on the Baker Institute website.) That proposal was sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In 2006 the Department of Defense received funding to start to develop such a weapon in the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) Program. The proposal differed from ours in two very important ways. First, the warheads are smaller to extend the range and, second, only a few missiles in any ballistic missile submarine would be conventional. Thus the missiles submarines would be carrying would be including both conventional and nuclear warheads. Congress has objected to the deployment of the CTM is that it could be destabilizing, as it would be impossible to differentiate between the launch of a conventional weapon and nuclear weapon. This could, indeed, be a problem if the Navy deploys submarines with a mix of nuclear and conventionally-armed missiles and launches from a location normally associated with the patrol area of submarines carrying nuclear missiles in a deterrence role. This would also require that the warhead have the same weight as the nuclear payload because it would not be possible to reduce its range. Our proposal differs in that we argue that all the missiles on a submarine be converted to CTM missiles and thus the submarines could be deployed closer to the possible targets and use larger warheads. The trajectories of a missile launch from a CTM submarine would be different from that of a nuclear-armed missile boat on patrol. Few, if any of our potential adversaries have any significant anti-submarine capability, so it would be possible to move the submarines close to their coast prior to attacking, constituting an effective deterrent. If the submarines were only carrying non-nuclear warheads, then it would be in the interest of the United States could allow other major nuclear powers to verify that the submarine was carrying non-nuclear warheads. It would be in the interest of the United States to make public - within limits - the location of the submarine. It should be remembered that the role of a CTM missile submarine would be very different from the role of a missile submarine whose mission is to insure the survivability of the United States second-strike capability. Rather, as a show of force, a potential adversary should know that conventionally-armed submarines are on patrol in the immediate vicinity. Congress commissioned the National Academy of Science to do a study of the CTM and in that study, its 2008 report stated: Major Finding 1. There are credible scenarios in which the United States could gain meaningful political and strategic advantages by being able to strike with conventional weapons important targets that could not be attacked rapidly by currently deployed military assets. In light of the appropriately extreme reluctance to use nuclear weapons, conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) could be of particular value in some important scenarios in that it would eliminate the dilemma of having to choose between responding to a sudden threat either by using nuclear weapons or by not responding at all. We believe that if the Navy is willing to dedicate some of its nuclear submarines to a CTM role and eliminate the ambiguity that has troubled members of Congress, then we should fund the deployment of the CTM. This not only reduces the value of a few nuclear weapons to a rogue state, it also makes possible the stability of Global Zero in the future.

## 2NC

#### Taiwan

Koo 11—former Director of the Chinese Services Group of Deloitte & Touche LLP, PhD (Dr. George, 25 January 2011, “A Win-Win Situation for US-China Relations After Hu's Visit,” <http://newamericamedia.org/2011/01/a-win-win-situation-for-us-china-relations-after-hus-visit.php>)

How to deal with Taiwan represents by far the most challenging issue facing both sides. In Obama’s remarks at the press conference, he referred to the Taiwan Relations Act, but in the joint statement about the U.S. commitment to one China policy, there were no reference to TRA. Thus, China could claim to have made progress on this issue while the U.S. can claim that nothing has affected the status quo. In fact, until the United States renounces selling arms to Taiwan and stops referring to TRA as though it were an international treaty—in fact it was only a Congressional act—progress in the bilateral relations will be sluggish.

#### Relations high – Hu meeting

Yang 11—Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China (Jiechi, 6 January 2011, A Conversation with Yang Jiechi, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/23777/conversation_with_yang_jiechi.html>)

We have good reason to believe that with the efforts of both sides, President Hu's state visit this time will **forcefully move forward the positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship** in the new era. It will take our practical cooperation to a new high and enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples. And it will demonstrate the will of China and the United States to act together for world peace, stability and development. Ladies and gentlemen, President Hu's upcoming visit to the United States will take place when the Obama administration concludes its second year in office. We commend the good progress the China-U.S. relations have made over the past two years. The China-U.S. relationship is an extremely important bilateral relationship in today's world. We believe that though China-U.S. relationship has seen some difficulties in the past two years, it has made important overall progress, particularly in the following areas. First, the exchanges and communication between the two countries at the high level and various other levels **have never been closer**. China-U.S. relations achieved a smooth transition shortly after President Obama took office. In the past 24 months, the two presidents have had seven successful meetings. I had the good fortune to be present at all the seven meetings. And I always came away with a deep impression of the sincerity of the leaders in their discussion about how to move forward the relationship, how to face the challenges and how to work for the common good of our two peoples and the people of the world. President Obama paid a state visit to China, and now President Hu will come to the United States for a state visit. Officials of the two countries at various levels have had frequent contacts in diverse forms. The two sides have established the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues and the high-level consultation on people-to-people exchange. This time in Washington, we discussed when to have the third round of SED, Strategic and Economic Dialogues. I think it will happen sometime in mid-2011. Setting up unique and effective -- I mean, these exchanges are setting up unique and effective platforms **to enhance mutual trust and cooperation** between China and the United States. Second, the desire and resolve of the two countries to strengthen their cooperation have never been stronger. In April 2009, President Hu and President Obama reached an important agreement when they met in London that the two sides should work together to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century. This has charted the course for the growth of China-U.S. relations in the new era. President Hu emphasizes on many occasions that a sound China-U.S. relationship is in the fundamental interests of the two countries and serves peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. He stressed that the Chinese government places high importance on its relations with the United States it and will work to promote cooperation with the United States. Likewise, President Obama attaches a great deal of importance to China-U.S. relations. The U.S. government has stressed its commitment to stronger cooperation between the two countries. Third, the Chinese and American interests have converged as never before. Today, we have tackled the international financial crisis, pushed forward the reform of global economic governance and played an important role in spurring world economic recovery. The China-U.S. business ties have been taken to a new level. Two-way trade is expected to top $380 billion U.S. dollars in 2010. China has been the fastest-growing major export market of the United States for nine consecutive years. Investment by Chinese enterprises in the United States has rapidly increased. By the end of November 2010, Chinese businesses had made over 4.4 billion U.S. dollars of non-financial direct investment in the United States. All this has contributed to the economic recovery and the protection of jobs in the United States. Our bilateral exchanges and cooperation in a wide range of areas, including energy and the environment, have been growing in breadth and depth. Fourth, the two peoples have never been engaged in China-U.S. relations in such a broad and in-depth manner. Today, around 120,000 Chinese students are studying in the United States and more than 20,000 American students are studying in China. According to Chinese statistics, over 3 million tourists visit each others' countries every year and 110 plus passenger flights fly between the two countries every week. China and the United States have forged 36 pairs of friendship, province-state and 161 sister-city relationships. Such close interactions have built countless bridges of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Fifth, the communication and coordination between China and the United States on major regional and international issues have never been better. The two countries have maintained effective coordination on regional hotspot issues, such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Iranian nuclear issue and South Asia. And now during this visit of mine, we discussed these issues. We also discussed the situation in Sudan, which figures prominently in the coming weeks. Also, on global issues, including climate change, G-20, the U.N. reform and fighting transnational crimes, working together the two countries have played an important and positive role in upholding world peace and security and promoting global sustainable development. The China-U.S. cooperation has become more strategic in terms of substance and more important in terms of global impact. What is it that has brought China and the United States closer to each other in the course of cooperation in the past two years? I believe that it is our growing common interests. It is the growing sense of any important reality that China-U.S. relations in the 21st century should be anchored in joint efforts to seize common opportunities and address common challenges for the welfare of our two peoples and the people of the world. **With regard to issues in China-U.S. relations, whatever the differences, there is a basic consensus between China and the U**nited **S**tates: **namely, the China-U.S. relationship is far too important**. The two countries have far more common interests than disagreements and cooperation is always the defining feature of this relationship.

#### Alliance resilient --- Japan is scared of China and North Korea

Harlan 11(1/13/10, John Pomfret and Chico Harlan, Staff Writers , The Washington Post, “Japanese military seeks greater cooperation with U.S.,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/13/AR2011011302297.html?sid=ST2011011302805>)

TOKYO - Worried about North Korean belligerence and an increasingly aggressive China, Japan's military wants to cooperate in unprecedented ways with the United States and is even considering putting its military in the line of fire in areas outside Japan, Japanese defense officials said Thursday. In an interview, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said Japan was studying ways to provide U.S. forces with logistical support in case of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Japan is also interested, he said, in determining how it can launch missions to evacuate civilians from the peninsula as part of efforts to support a U.S. mission. In subsequent briefings Thursday, Japanese defense officials acknowledged that such maneuvers could put Japanese troops in harm's way. If attacked, they said, Japanese forces would fight back, which would necessitate more and deeper training with the United States and perhaps South Korea to ensure against casualties from friendly fire. "The basic principle of Japan is to pursue peace," Kitazawa said, referring to Japan's constitution, which limits its military to the defense of Japan. "But we also need to have measures to avoid being left behind." Kitazawa's statements, made during a visit by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to Japan, underscore a significant improvement in relations between the United States and Japan since the last time Gates visited this country - in October 2009. They also highlight a significant risk that Japan is taking, moving to bolster its military profile in a region with strong memories of World War II. In October 2009, Gates was gruff with his hosts, telling them to it was "time to move on" with a controversial plan to build a new facility on Okinawa in exchange for the Marine Corps vacating the Futenma air base located in the middle of a city of 80,000. But Thursday, Gates described ties with Tokyo as "very healthy and on a positive track," and he went so far as to acknowledge that the multibillion-dollar base relocation scheme is "politically a complex matter" as he pledged to "follow the lead of the Japanese government" in solving the problem. Gates came to Japan from China, where he had an eventful three-day visit punctuated by the first test flight of China's stealth fighter. Chinese officials told Gates that the test was not meant to reflect insensitivity toward his visit, which was aimed at restoring high-level military ties with Beijing. But the test flight was seen as an unprecedented statement nonetheless. Starting in August 2009, U.S. relations with Japan faced an enormous challenge with the election of an opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan. It ousted the Liberal Democratic Party, which had run Japan almost without interruption since the 1950s. The DPJ came into office with new ideas about moving closer to China and wanting to be a more equal partner with the United States. First on the DPJ's agenda with Washington was the Futenma air base program - a multibillion-dollar scheme that involved relocating the Marine Corps air station to a more isolated spot on the island of Okinawa while simultaneously moving thousands of Marines to Guam. The prime minister at the time, Yukio Hatoyama, had run on a platform of opposing the base deal, which U.S. and Japanese negotiators had been working on since 1996. Hatoyama demanded an investigation. But Hatoyama, after intense U.S. pressure, pledged on May 28 to carry out the Futenma deal, although he provided no timetable. Soon after, he quit and was replaced as prime minister by the generally more pro-American Naoto Kan. At the same time, thanks to increasingly aggressive moves by China and continued provocations by North Korea, the DPJ's strategic thinking shifted back toward Washington. In the space of several months, China dispatched a naval convoy through Japanese waters and buzzed two Japanese warships with its helicopters. A Chinese fishing vessel rammed Japanese coast guard cutters off the shores of a disputed island chain. When Japan arrested the Chinese fishing captain, China erupted in a paroxysm of anger that essentially forced Japan to release him. Significantly at the time, U.S. officials put China on notice that the United States viewed the Chinese-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku or Diaoyu island chain as covered by the Article 5 military assistance clause of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. North Korea, meanwhile, was widely believed to have been responsible for sinking a South Korean warship in March, killing 46 sailors. North Korea also shelled a South Korean island in November, killing two civilians and two soldiers, in one of the most serious attacks on the South since the end of the Korean War in 1953. "Concerns about China and North Korea have made us realize that this relationship with the U.S. cannot go ragged," said Koichiro Katsumata, a rising star in the DPJ and a member of Japan's House of Representatives. In his five months as foreign minister, Seiji Maehara, an advocate for closer ties with Washington, has met four times with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Meanwhile, responding to U.S. pressure, Japan has also moved to improve military relations with South Korea. During a visit to Japan and South Korea in December, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pushed the two countries to accelerate security cooperation. He urged them not to be "hung up on what's happened in the past," a reference to the 100th anniversary of Japan's annexation of Korea. On Monday, Kitazawa and his South Korean counterpart, Kim Kwan-jin, met in Seoul and agreed to work toward two accords - to pool intelligence and to support each other's operations with logistical help. Kitazawa also said he expected more changes in Japan as well. Given China's recent test flight of what appears to be a fifth-generation stealth fighter, Japan, too, is interested in obtaining such technology, he said, either by purchasing it from the United States or by helping to produce it. He also intimated that the government would drop its regulations banning the export of weapons or weapons-related hardware. If Japan worked with the United States on developing a new system, it would have to be prepared to sell it around the world. Still, Kitazawa added, Japan was not interested in "becoming a country that exports lots of military equipment, thereby becoming a merchant of death." Kitazawa said Japan's government is already studying a plan to allow for the export of SM-3 [Standard Missile-3] Block IIA missiles to Europe as part of the Obama administration's plans to deploy a missile defense shield there. And Japan, press reports here said, is also considering becoming the first non-NATO nation to build a separate military facility in the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti as part of its efforts in the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden. "With the help from China and [North Korea], the DPJ has stopped daydreaming, and its security policy seems to be getting more realistic," said Kuni Miyake, a former Japanese diplomat and now the research director for the Canon Institute for Global Studies.

#### Japan’s economy is resilient --- will recover

Olivia Ward 11, Foreign Affairs Reporter, “Japan’s economic recovery has international ramifications,” 3-14-11, http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/953979--japan-s-economic-recovery-has-international-ramifications

“Coming out of this tragedy they have the opportunity to rebuild, modernize and encourage growth of new economic activity,” says Marcus Noland, a Washington-based Asia expert at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

“In 1995, Kobe was devastated by an earthquake. They rebuilt the city with an amazing offshore port, modernized the housing stock, and made a tremendous qualitative change. Now they have the chance to do the same for Sendai.”

Many believe that Japan’s economy is resilient and protected enough to rebound from its worst catastrophe since World War II.

More than 90 per cent of its wealth is generated in an industrial band running south from Tokyo, at least 300 kilometres from the devastated northeast. And although Japan is handicapped by a debt that is the world’s heaviest, most of the debt is home-owned and not exposed to international speculation.

#### No Sino/Japanese war – interdependence solves

O’Neil 7—Snr lecturer, IR, Flinders U, Australia (Andrew, Nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia: the quest for security, 99-101, AMiles)

The assumption underlying pessimistic views about the likely implications of a nuclear-armed Japan—that it will increase the likelihood of conflict between China and Japan—also bears some scrutiny. On the surface at least, the introduction of nuclear weapons into any bilateral relationship is a recipe for increased strategic tensions. A decision by a state to arm itself with the most powerful weapon in the history of humankind is bound to have some sort of impact on surrounding states, particularly those with which it has adversarial relations. While a decision by Japan to go nuclear would have an unfavorable short-term effect on relations between Tokyo and Beijing, it would not necessarily be enduring. Both countries would be able to adapt to the altered strategic circumstances of a dyadic nuclear relationship, because there is little China could realistically do to prevent a nuclear-armed Japan, and there remain powerful incentives for both sides to avoid conflict. In short, a range of important factors would serve to mitigate the risks of conflict between China and Japan in the event that the latter decided to acquire nuclear weapons. Mutual mistrust and wariness about the longer-term intentions of the other, coupled with persistent societal antipathies, will probably prevent any meaningful diplomatic breakthrough in the bilateral relationship between Beijing and Tokyo to a point where both sides cease to regard the other as a strategic rival in Northeast Asia. However, this does not necessarily mean that bilateral confrontation is inevitable. On the contrary, in spite of the bilateral tensions in the relationship, Japan and China share one of the most interdependent relationships of any two states in the international system. In particular, both countries remain acutely reliant on continued bilateral trade and investment for their overall economic well-being. As Sutter points out, “China depends heavily on Japan for economic assistance, for technology and investment, and as a market for Chinese goods. Japan is increasingly dependent on China as a market, a source of imports, and an offshore manufacturing base.”91 In 2004, China overtook the United States as Japan’s single most important export and overseas investment destination, and Japan remains China’s second largest trading partner.92 Just as significant is that the interdependent nature of the economic relationship between China and Japan is relatively balanced, with both sides having a relatively equivalent stake in continuing their prosperous economic relationship. Unlike China’s lopsided trading relationship with the United States—where China enjoys annual surpluses almost ten times greater than that which it has with Japan—Sino-Japanese two-way trade is more balanced and characterized by a high degree of complementarity. Consequently, there is much less scope for bilateral tensions arising from trade imbalances and associated disputes over market access. The second level of interdependence in the bilateral relationship is shared reliance on a small number of critical sea lanes for reliable energy supplies. For some time, Japan’s energy lifeline of oil imports from the Middle East has passed through the South China Sea, sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for Japan that remain vulnerable as strategic chokepoints. Indeed, this has been one of the key factors driving the SDF’s acquisition of enhanced maritime force projection capabilities, which some Japanese analysts have in the past seen as necessary to dissuade (and, if necessary, prevent) China from enforcing its claims to key island territories in the South China Sea. However, since it became a net importer of oil in 1994, China has had a much greater incentive to promote stability in the waters surrounding the same SLOCs that Japan depends on for its oil supplies. Beijing and Tokyo, for reasons of economic growth and prosperity, have an overlapping incentive to ensure regional stability in Asia as a whole, including in their own immediate region of Northeast Asia.93 Of course, neither of these levels of Sino-Japanese interdependence will necessarily prevent tensions, or even armed conflict, from occurring. History shows that economic interdependence is no guarantee that states with diverging strategic outlooks will not descend into war. With the best intentions in the world, governing elites are not always able to avoid discord and conflict with other countries, especially when deep-seated historical issues are involved; one only has to look at the Indo-Pakistan relationship to appreciate this fact. But the volume and breadth of the bilateral trade and investment between Beijing and Tokyo is historically unprecedented, and all indicators point to the reinforcement of that relationship in the years ahead. Moreover, the shared aim of preserving stability across regional SLOCs provides Beijing and Tokyo with an increasingly urgent common strategic focus in Asia. In sum, both countries will continue to have compelling strategic and economic reasons to carefully manage their bilateral relationship in the event that Japan acquires nuclear weapons. Critics of the argument put forward above may feel justified in pointing out the risk that China could decide to exercise the option of undertaking military action to neutralize an incipient Japanese nuclear force before it has the chance to evolve into a second-strike capability. Having already passed through the various critical stages of technological development, this is the stage in the proliferation cycle where Japan would be most vulnerable to preventive strikes from China. But, apart from the international opprobrium such action would attract, two additional factors would temper any offensive intentions by Chinese planners. The first is that the United States would probably feel compelled to respond militarily, irrespective of whether its alliance with Japan was still formally in place. In 1969, the Nixon administration clearly signaled to the USSR that it would not remain inactive in the event that Moscow followed through on its thinly veiled threats to strike China’s nuclear facilities at Lop Nor.94 It is highly unlikely that Washington would permit Chinese strikes against Japanese nuclear targets to go unpunished. This is something that Beijing would need to factor into its contingency planning and would, in all likelihood, contribute to deterring China from carrying out military strikes in the first place. The second key factor that would dampen any appetite for preventive strikes in Beijing is the possibility that ballistic missile defense systems will be effective in protecting Japanese nuclear assets from a successful Chinese strike. Having invited international condemnation, and risked a forceful American military reprisal, Chinese planners would also be exposing China to strategic humiliation in the event that they were not able to completely neutralize Japan’s embryonic arsenal. The fact remains that, given Japan’s massive military-industrial base, and its long-standing expertise in nuclear technology, it would not take long for it to recover from any Chinese strike that merely degraded its existing capability. From China’s perspective, Japan’s rapidly improving and highly sophisticated missile defense capability must add an additional layer of uncertainty about its capacity to prevent a nuclear-armed Japan from emerging. Indeed, in future, missile defense could provide some important coverage for Japan’s key nuclear-related sites during the (comparatively short) time it would take for it to build up a second-strike capability. Would China be deterred by a Japanese nuclear weapons force? There tends to be an assumption by those who point to Japan’s lack of strategic depth as a reason for it not to go nuclear that China would be largely immune from Japanese nuclear threats precisely because of its strategic depth. But this overlooks just how vulnerable China remains to serious economic dislocation. Even if one subscribes to the somewhat fanciful view that current and future Chinese leaders remain as equally callous as the Mao era leadership in their willingness to “sacrifice” key Chinese population centers in any nuclear conflict, China would nevertheless be quite vulnerable to massive and irreparable economic dislocation in the event that Japan targeted a city like Shanghai with a nuclear strike. The reality is that it would take only one successful nuclear strike on an economic center in China’s southeast coastal provinces for its national economic development to be set back years. It beggars belief that any regime in Beijing would regard any goal as more important than preserving national unity and economic development, which have been the overriding twin priorities for successive regimes since 1949. Like any dyadic deterrence relationship, a nuclear deterrence relationship between China and Japan would not be easy or straightforward. It would be characterized by some short-term instability while Japan made the transition to acquiring a secure (and thus credible) second-strike capability. In the longer term, however, both countries would have little choice but to adapt their overall strategic relationship to the unavoidable reality of mutual assured destruction.

# STEM DA

#### There are enough nuclear scientists now, but it’s tight, reprocessing causes overstretch.

APS 8—Readiness of the U.S. Nuclear Workforce for 21st Century Challenges, A Report from the American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs Committee on Energy and Environment, June 2008, http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/upload/Nuclear-Readiness-Report-FINAL-2.pdf

4. The continuing, largely static, nuclear engineering workforce needs of U.S. firms have been met through a combination of hiring those trained in university nuclear engineering programs and retraining others whose original expertise was in some other field (usually mechanical engineering). Also, retirees from the nuclear Navy have played an important role. This somewhat ad hoc approach may be sufficient as long as the number of nuclear reactors remains relatively static or grows at a slow but steady pace. However, large increases in the number of reactors and/or instituting the reprocessing and recycling of spent reactor fuel are likely to make this modus operandi untenable. Dealing with that eventuality will clearly call for approaches in which government, industry, and academia each play a major role.

#### Reprocessing in the US requires a huge increase in nuclear chemists and radiochemists

APS 8—Readiness of the U.S. Nuclear Workforce for 21st Century Challenges, A Report from the American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs Committee on Energy and Environment, June 2008, http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/upload/Nuclear-Readiness-Report-FINAL-2.pdf

Scenario 3; Doubling the Number of Reactors and Reprocessing Spent Fuel¶ This scenario has all the workforce challenges of the second scenario, plus the need for¶ the highly trained nuclear chemists and radiochemists who are indispensable for¶ reprocessing.¶ France has been operating spent fuel reprocessing facilities for some time, so it is interesting to examine how that country satisfies its nuclear workforce needs for these disciplines (See Appendix K). Apparently France is able to maintain its competency in nuclear chemistry, radiochemistry. as well as nuclear engineering by charging its governmental agency that does the reprocessing and related research, namely its Commissariat a I'Energie Atomique (CEA). with educating the workforce according to the country's needs. In the U.S. there is no governmental cadre of nuclear chemists and radiochemists who are charged with education. Those wanting to pursue these fields, especially for research careers, usually are educated under faculty mentors at universities. The growing scarcity of such mentors has thus led to a crisis in the U.S. In the long haul the U.S. will lose ground in its R&D on many fronts, including devising more efficient and safer methods of handling and processing both fresh and spent fuels for all future nuclear energy scenarios. Nuclear chemists and radiochemists with Ph.D.s would be needed to train the large cadre of radiochemical technicians who would carry out most of this work, and they would be needed at universities and national laboratories to spearhead the research that leads to breakthrough radiochemical technologies for spent nuclear fuel separations and reprocessing. Thus, any venture into spent fuel reprocessing, and fulfilling nuclear chemists' and radiochemists' many other cross-cutting roles in such areas as homeland security and public health, will not be possible unless expertise is imported from abroad. This modality is made much more difficult by the requirement that many of these workers must be U.S. citizens. In the U.S.. market-driven forces will not be able to produce additional domestically trained nuclear chemists and radiochemists if the educational infrastructure continues to disappear.

#### Trades off with nuclear forensics and stockpile stewardship

APS 8—Readiness of the U.S. Nuclear Workforce for 21st Century Challenges, A Report from the American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs Committee on Energy and Environment, June 2008, http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/upload/Nuclear-Readiness-Report-FINAL-2.pdf

This is a crisis situation that must be addressed promptly. If nuclear chemistry and radiochemistry education programs are not reinvigorated. the U.S. will lack the expertise required to pursue promising advanced research and development (R&D) in a myriad of disciplines. In addition to processing both fresh and spent fuel for nuclear reactors, including basic research on spent fuel separations and transmutation technologies, nuclear chemistry and radiochemistry are also extremely important to the nation's security and health in the following cross-cutting roles: (1) nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, (2) nuclear forensics and surveillance of clandestine nuclear activities, (3) monitoring of radioactive elements in the environment, (4) production of radioisotopes, and (5) preparation of radiopharmaceuticals for therapeutic and diagnostic medical applications. (See Ref. 6 in Appendix F.)

#### Improvements in fallout forensics provide an effective, credible attribution capability

Kraska 7 – James Kraska, Commander, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy, 2007, “Torts and Terror: Rethinking Deterrence Models and Catastrophic Terrorist Attack,” American University International Law Review, 23 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 361

Fallout analysis, an obscure branch of nuclear forensic science, is poised to permit researchers to attribute a nuclear detonation to a specific country, and perhaps a specific reactor. n82 If future research confirms the feasibility of such attribution, it will dramatically strengthen strategic nuclear deterrence against nuclear terrorist attack. The goal of fallout analysis is to discover quickly the source of nuclear material that went into construction of a particular bomb. n83 The United States restarted the Cold War-era fallout analysis program in 1999 in order to help to rebuild deterrence against nuclear terrorism. n84 If terrorists, as well as their state sponsors, know that a bomb can be traced back to them, they are less likely to use one, even if they posses it. Although this assumption may be questioned, accurately identifying the source reactor of the highly enriched uranium certainly complicates proliferation and planning for states of proliferation concern, as well as attack planning for non-state groups inclined to employ a nuclear weapon. Much of the radiochemistry work from the Cold War has had to be resurrected; retired scientists were recalled and decades of old analysis was dusted off. The program now involves manned aircraft and ground [\*382] robots that can enter nuclear fallout environments in order to take critical measures of radiochemistry signatures and profiles. n85

#### Bolstering our attribution capability makes retaliatory threats credible---deters nuclear terror

Phillips 7 – Matthew Phillips, senior analyst for DeticaDFI, a national security consulting firm in Washington, D.C., 2007, “Uncertain Justice for Nuclear Terror: Deterrence of Anonymous Attacks Through Attribution,” Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 3, p. 429-446

The prospect of North Korea or Iran (after achieving sufficient nuclear capability) transferring nuclear material or a nuclear weapon to terrorists is a serious, if uncertain, threat. Although North Korea reached an apparent disarmament agreement earlier this year with the United States and the other participants in the six-party talks, Kim Jong II's record of deception tempers optimism about the ultimate success of that agreement. A U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism, North Korea has major economic problems that could lead it to sell its nuclear weapons, materials or technology to the highest bidder. As for Iran, its state ties to terrorist organizations are well-documented, and it continues to defy international pressure to end uranium enrichment. Only states have the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, so nuclear-capable states that share terrorists’ hostility to the United States pose a potentially devastating threat. If terrorists obtained a nuclear weapon or fissile material to assemble an improvised nuclear device, vulnerabilities in U.S. port and border security could allow them to transport such a weapon into the United States covertly. A resulting attack using a nuclear weapon could result in hundreds of thousands or even millions of deaths. With no “return address” tying the attack to the state that provided the nuclear materials to the terrorists, such a method of attack could be attractive to states eager to inflict catastrophic destruction on the United States while avoiding retaliation. Deterrence of such states could be uncertain at best.¶ Some analysts have suggested that deterrence of nuclear terrorism could be strengthened through a robust attribution capability.1 They argue that if the United States could identify the source of nuclear materials with a high degree of confidence after an attack, it could ensure the certainty of a devastating response against that source and thus deter states from providing nuclear materials to terrorists. This article will argue that the United States must develop the best possible nuclear attribution technology, at the very least to support response actions after an attack. If the unthinkable happened, such technology would be crucial for identifying the source of the material and preempting follow-on attacks. But the technology's prospects for deterrence are uncertain—at least based on current capabilities—and expectations must be tempered. Depending on advances in the technology and how policymakers make use of it, improved attribution capabilities might enhance deterrence, and deterrence certainly should remain a key component of U.S. national security strategy. But because of the many technological and policy uncertainties that could surround an attribution effort, policymakers should not rely entirely on this technology as a failsafe means to deter nuclear terrorism.

#### \*\*Capply their impact evidence

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## 1NC

#### Hagel will be confirmed but it’s a huge fight---requires all of Obama’s political capital

Wong and Raju 1-6 Scott and Manu, 2013, “Hagel takes fire from Hill,” http://www.nj.com/us-politics/index.ssf/2013/01/hagel\_takes\_fire\_from\_hill.html

Senate Democrats and Republicans are far from sold on President Barack Obama's expected nomination of Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense. In fact, Obama's decision to tap the Vietnam veteran and outspoken former Republican senator is likely to spark another nasty fight with Congress right on the heels of the fiscal cliff showdown and just before another likely battle royal over the debt ceiling. Republicans on Sunday unleashed a fresh barrage of attacks amid reports Obama would nominate Hagel on Monday for the top job at the Pentagon. The new Senate minority whip, Texas Republican John Cornyn, said he's firmly against Hagel's nomination. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), an Air Force reservist who serves on the Armed Services Committee that will consider the nod, said Hagel would hold the "most antagonistic" views toward Israel of any defense secretary in U.S. history. And despite heaping praise on Hagel when he retired from the Senate after the 2008 elections, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) on Sunday failed to extend an olive branch to the Nebraska Republican, instead suggesting there would be "tough questions" ahead. Even Senate Democrats are privately signaling they're not yet on board with the Hagel pick, and that the White House has a lot of work to do to get him across the finish line. The nomination comes at a tricky time for the administration -- just as the fights over raising the debt ceiling and government appropriations are set to begin. And it could put a number of at-risk or pro-Israel Democrats in tough political spots -- especially if the nomination fight grows even more contentious. Democrats are also scratching their heads over why Obama appears willing to go to the mat for Hagel, while abandoning his push for a close friend and member of his inner circle, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, to become secretary of state. Rice, an unabashed Democrat, abandoned her bid after withering GOP criticism over the deadly attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Libya. Though different in substance, the controversy over Rice's remarks is not unlike the current pushback over Hagel's past foreign policy positions and controversial remarks. But Hagel lacks a natural constituency in the Senate, given that he's grown alienated from the GOP, yet Democrats are suspicious of his record. "It is a strange signal for the White House to send that they are willing to fight for Hagel but not Rice," one Senate Democratic aide said Sunday. "Democrats are not currently unified behind Hagel, and it will take some real work by the administration to get them there, if it's even possible." Senior Republicans agreed, noting that after Hagel infuriated Republicans and Democrats alike over the years, there isn't a natural base for him. "I can't imagine why [Obama] would choose to burn his political capital on this nomination. For what? There is no constituency for Chuck Hagel," one senior GOP aide said. "Obama will expend every ounce of political capital he has to get him across the finish line. Dems will hate this." On Sunday, the 66-year-old Hagel did receive an endorsement from Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), a key Obama ally and No. 2 in Democratic Senate leadership. Durbin noted that Hagel is a Republican, recipient of two Purple Hearts from wounds he received in Vietnam, and did stints on the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence committees. "Yes, he is a serious candidate if the president chooses to name him," Durbin stated. Freshman Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D-N.D.) called Hagel "a patriot" and said she was keeping an open mind. "Let's hear what the senator has to say," she said. And Democrats predicted last month that Hagel -- who served in the Senate from 1997 to 2009 -- would be confirmed. "We all know him up here, he'll be fine," Senate Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said in mid-December.

#### Plan drains PC

Thomas Clements 9-17, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, 9/17/12, “Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Program at Savannah River Site Hit with Major Setback,” http://aikenleader.villagesoup.com/p/plutonium-fuel-mox-program-at-savannah-river-site-hit-with-major-setback/897688

Experimental MOX made from weapons-grade plutonium has never been tested or used in a boiling water reactor (BWR) like Browns Ferry. Testing of MOX will take at least six years in one of the Browns Ferry reactors, according to an August 8 presentation to the NRC by Global Nuclear Fuel, meaning that MOX could not be used before 2025 at the earliest, resulting in a host of scheduling problems at the MOX factory, along with soaring costs which will raise the ire of Congress.

#### Hagel’s key to foreign policy restraint that prevents unsustainable squandering of U.S. power---the alternative is Flournoy who would lock in a neocon foreign policy

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos 12-25, longtime political reporter for FoxNews.com and a contributing editor at The American Conservative, Washington correspondent for Homeland Security Today magazine, 12/25/12, “Give Us Chuck Hagel for Christmas,” <http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2012/12/24/give-us-hagel-for-christmas/>

Now a Democratic President is reportedly mulling him for defense secretary and the same Republican automatons and neoconservative harpies are pulling no punches to thwart it. They complain about his allegedly insufficient support of Israel (massaged, cajoled and translated for full-effect into charges of anti-Semitism), driven in part by his unwillingness to impose harsh economic sanctions or use of force against Iran. He also voted against designating Hezbollah a terrorist organization, and has encouraged open relations with Hamas in hopes of reanimating the corpse of the Middle East pace process.

Furthermore, Hagel’s flagrant disdain for the runaway MIC (military industrial complex), preemptive war, and senseless foreign occupation is such an aberration to the Washington establishment that when the bunker busters in Congress, American Israel supporters and rightwing 101st Keyboard Brigade heard he might be nominated, their attack was so immediate and vicious it’ll likely serve as a model for smear efficiency for years to come. If the U.S. Army had deployed these superlative tactics in say, Afghanistan, they might have actually won the so-called “war of perception” over the Taliban 10 years ago. Too bad most of Hagel’s critics prefer calling the shots from over here, rather than putting their rear-ends in harm’s way over there.

The War Against Hagel has hardly been decisive, however, at least as we near the end of the year, leaving some space for his supporters to mount a proper defense, which of this writing, is increasingly vigorous. There seems to be a common theme to every blog post and op-ed penned for his purpose: the man is a welcome independent thinker in the Era of the Borg — and he’s no phony, else he would have safely buzzed off with the rest of the political hive long ago. The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, usually quite scornful of Realist foreign policy arguments — especially concerning Iran — said Thursday he worries about rightwing developments in Israel even more than Hagel’s purportedly soft approach on Iran, and suggested quite baldy that Hagel’s independence would be a help not a hindrance where it counts:

What we need are American officials who will speak with disconcerting bluntness to Israel about the choices it is making…Maybe the time has come to redefine the term “pro-Israel” to include, in addition to providing support against Iran (a noble cause); help with the Iron Dome system (also a noble cause); and support to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (ditto), the straightest of straight talk about Israel’s self-destructive policies on the West Bank. Maybe Hagel, who is not bound to old models, could be useful in this regard.

Many of us see Hagel’s impact in much broader terms than just the Israel question. We’ve had too many armchair generals and dutiful yes men at the levers of power, cleaving to an unsustainable post-9/11 orthodoxy that has militarized our foreign policy and politicized our military. The neoconservatism of the Bush years has bled literally into the so-called humanitarian interventionism of the Obama era, and for the first time, there is an opportunity to check that with the presence of a known Realist who, as Harvard’s Stephen Walt says, is “opposed to squandering U.S. power, prestige, and wealth on misbegotten crusades,” and is immune to the “threat inflation” both sides routinely engage in to justify lining the pockets of the defense industry. After nearly 12 years of constant war, Hagel’s references to Iraq and Afghanistan as a meat grinder to which we’ve wastefully sent too many of our own children, and his belief that he is the “the real conservative” because he actually calls for restraint, should be a refreshing prospect, and not feared by Americans conditioned to accept there is a military solution for every problem.

“In a town dominated by often-unexamined conventional wisdom, the appointment of Hagel to DoD would be a welcome relief,” wrote Michael Cohen for The Guardian last week. Reached on the phone, Cohen told me that Hagel would be a “transformational pick,” but acknowledged that the challenges loom large for a non-conformist now squared against not only members of his own party, but neoconservatives wielding their “long knives,” and the pro-war wing of the Democratic establishment, too. “Look, he is not one of them,” Cohen said, “he’s not a neoconservative nor a liberal hawk, he thinks there should be limits on American power.”

Although President Obama has, so far, not said a word about Hagel, the former senator who quietly spent the last four years chairing the moderate Atlantic Council, is enjoying an enthusiastic defense from myriad commentators across the mainstream, including Andrew Sullivan, Steve Clemons, Peter Beinart — even Jim Judis at The New Republic. Several ambassadors — including Bush-era Nick Burns and Ryan Crocker and three Israel representatives — signed on to a letter encouraging his nomination.

Meanwhile, The National Journal and The Washington Post have published biographical sketches emphasizing Hagel’s Vietnam War record and its impact on his post-war career and personal philosophy (this hardly makes up, however, for the Post’s incoherent broadside published by its editorial page on Dec. 19). And of course, The American Conservative’s Daniel Larison and Scott McConnell, not to mention our own Justin Raimondo, are astutely swatting away the haters at every turn of this increasingly torrid offensive.

Michele Flournoy

But while many of us here at Antiwar would like a Hagel nomination for Christmas, the biggest concern (aside from his Swift Boating) is that we might find Michele Flournoy under the tree instead. For those who never heard of her, she founded the Center for a New American Security in 2007 in anticipation of a new Democratic White House. The think tank was designed to promote a more muscular Democratic military policy, which meant its top people supported Hillary Clinton for president as well as the U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq, and then Afghanistan, known then as the Petraeus Doctrine. Once Obama won, it became the go-to policy shop for the White House and a revolving door to the Pentagon and State Department for its senior fellows. Flournoy went on to take Doug Feith’s position as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the No. 3 job at the Pentagon. What she actually did in the fabled “E-Ring” to advance policy or to help extricate the military from an increasingly disastrous war in Afghanistan, is anyone’s guess. But the “hot policy wonk” and top COINdinista apparently made all the right friends and greased all the right skids, and is now the favored pick by the neocons, who see a kindred soul where Hagel is just heartburn ready to happen.

So buttressed is Flournoy by the Washington elite that people like Paul Wolfowitz, who in all reality should be ignored completely for his role in one of the worst war blunders in American history, are rolling out to defend her (in Wolfowitz’s case, maybe he should have cooled his wheels at home). After admitting he’s “not deeply familiar with Michele Flournoy’s record at the Defense Department or with her overall qualifications to be Secretary of Defense,” he says the fact 3,500 Afghan security forces have died this year (compared to 307 Americans) is proof enough she knows what she is doing. I say it’s proof enough that nothing has really changed since the Bush administration, except there are more troops in Afghanistan now (about 68,000) and the U.S. casualty count was much lower then —- 117 in 2007 to be exact.

When liberal flak Eleanor Clift wrote about the prospects of the “first female defense secretary” back in November, all she could muster in her favor was Flournoy’s Oxford pedigree, a stint in the lackluster Clinton Pentagon policy shop and quotes like these from former colleagues: “she has spent a great deal of time thinking how to deploy our military instruments economically and effectively.” Glad she was thinking about it before she left her post in February. Not much came out of if, however, if today’s accounts of continuing bloat, waste and mission creep are any indication.

Frankly, one hears a lot about Flournoy the “team player” but very little about her vision, ideas or actual accomplishments. The fact is, “the team” has been on a losing streak in Afghanistan since Obama took office, while her think tank, of which she continues to serve on the board of directors, has reaped all the benefits and influence as a conduit between the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom, the White House and greedy defense industry. “She’s a safe pick, she will carry the water — if you pick Hagel it would be saying ‘I want to push the envelope a little bit on foreign policy,’” said Cohen, “pushing it in a more realist direction than we have in the past.”

Perhaps that is why so many of us here are excited about the prospect. There are some areas where Hagel and the readers on this page might diverge, particularly on domestic issues. He’s a solid pro-life social conservative. He voted for the Patriot Act (he later fought for broader constitutional safeguards, saying he took an oath to protect the constitution, not “an oath of office to my party or my president”). We don’t know yet where he would stand on the controversial detention provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). We have no idea whether he would stanch the flow of U.S. personnel and weapons into Africa or how he would deal with a newly inherited drone war. As for the Pentagon labyrinth itself, as University of Texas professor (and expert COIN critic) Celeste Ward Gventer tells me, “the problems are systemic and largely exceed the decision or personality of one man, even if he is at the apex.”

Still, if a Flournoy pick would signal an endorsement of the status quo, a Hagel nod would serve to challenge it. This inclination to question policy is quite attractive to observers like us who are tired of living in a fake candy cane marshmallow bubble world when it comes to foreign policy and national security. As a senator, Hagel often addressed these issues realistically, with no regard to how it might hurt his chances for a presidential nomination, which turned out to be short-lived as a result (quite sad, considering the parade of ham-n-egger Republicans who ended up running, and losing, in the last two elections).

#### Foreign policy restraint’s key to the legitimacy of U.S. power and global liberal norms---avoids great power war and builds coalitions to ensure China rises peacefully

Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11>

With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, the United States should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of “enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations.

Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5

Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization.

The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately leads to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order.

A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism. The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon.

The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts.11

Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate.

Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the precepts of the previous administration: “preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy.

Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order.

Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional powers (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “swing civilizations,” in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.18

Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.20

Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion.

Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.

#### Unchecked Chinese rise risks global nuclear war

C. Dale Walton 7, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very **active American intervention** in Eastern Eurasia and **creating the** underlying **conditions for a massive**, and probably **nuclear, great power war**. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

## 1NR

#### Restraint’s key to prevent war with Russia and China---defuses Georgia, Taiwan and the South China Seas

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, November/December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6

Curbing the United States' commitments would reduce risks, but it cannot eliminate them. Adversaries may fill regional power vacuums, and allies will never behave exactly as Washington would prefer. Yet those costs would be outweighed by the concrete benefits of pulling back. A focus on the United States' core interests in western Europe would limit the risk of catastrophic clashes with Russia over ethnic enclaves in Georgia or Moldova by allowing the United States to avoid commitments it would be unwise to honor. By narrowing its commitments in Asia, the United States could lessen the likelihood of conflict over issues such as the status of Taiwan or competing maritime claims in the South China Sea. Just as the United Kingdom tempered its commitments and accommodated U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere at the turn of the last century, the United States should now temper its commitments and cultivate a lasting compromise with China over Taiwan.

#### Hagel will get confirmed now, but capital is key – he’s key to build bipartisan support for quick Afghanistan withdrawal

Mark Thompson, 1-7-2013, “President Obama To Tap Ex-GOP Senator Chuck Hagel to Run Pentagon,” Time, <http://nation.time.com/2013/01/07/president-obama-to-tap-ex-gop-senator-chuck-hagel-to-run-pentagon/>

For the third time in 15 years, a Democratic president will turn to a member of the Republican Party to run his Pentagon. Monday afternoon, President Obama is expected to nominate former Republican senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska to serve as secretary of defense. Senate approval – where Hagel served for 12 years before retiring in 2008 – is likely, but not guaranteed, given his pedigree. He follows in the footsteps of Bill Cohen, Clinton, 1997-2001 and Robert Gates, Obama, 2009-2011. Cohen, a one-time GOP senator from Maine, embraces the idea of a Republican defense secretary in a Democratic president’s cabinet, especially when military spending cuts are looming. “You’re picking the best person to handle the job who can build a consensus on Capitol Hill, basically,” he says of the key challenge Hagel faces. “Having a Republican when you’re downsizing sends the message that we’re going to do this on a non-partisan basis, with this man who has a military background, a war hero, Purple Hearts, et cetera.” Yet unlike Cohen and Gates – who could fairly be described as centrists — Hagel is decidedly more contrarian. He’ll bring his own baggage to the Pentagon on everything ranging from the U.S. role in the world, the size and purpose of the U.S. military, and striking the proper relationship with Israel. The nomination comes a month after Administration officials floated Hagel’s name, only to see it batted around like a piñata by those opposed to the pick. It’s apparent that the White House, already smarting over the pre-emptive derailment of UN Ambassador Susan Rice for secretary of state, wasn’t about to let that happen a second time. Ash Carter, the deputy defense secretary, and Michèle Flournoy – who stepped down as the Pentagon’s No. 3 civilian last year and would be the first woman to hold the post – were also-rans. Hagel has already run into a buzzsaw of opposition, even from the members of his own party. “I like Chuck Hagel,” Senator Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., told CNN on Sunday. “He served with distinguish in Vietnam as an enlisted man, two Purple Hearts, but, quite frankly, Chuck Hagel is out of the mainstream of thinking I believe on most issues regarding foreign policy.” If confirmed, Hagel “would be the most antagonistic secretary of defense towards the state of Israel in our nation’s history,” Graham said. Foreign-policy heavyweights are lining up on both sides of the nomination. Supporting Hagel are heavyweights including Bush 41 national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, Reagan defense secretary Frank Carlucci, and Ryan Crocker, the highly-regarded former U.S. ambassador to both Afghanistan and Iraq. Opponents include at least three GOP senators – Dan Coats of Indiana, Tom Coburn of Oklahoma and John Cornyn of Texas – as well as vocal critics including Josh Block, who heads the Israel Project, a Washington-based, pro-Israel group, and William Kristol, editor of The Weekly Standard, a conservative opinion magazine. “The next secretary of defense should be a well-respected mainstream national security leader,” Kristol wrote last week, “not an out-of-the-mainstream mediocrity.” On the deployment side of the ledger, Hagel is likely to push back against U.S. military commanders who want to pull the remaining 66,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan out as slowly as possible before all U.S. combat forces are due home by 2015. There’s one Hagel quote already ricocheting around the Pentagon, concerning President George W. Bush’s plan to dispatch 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Iraq in 2007 to try to quell a nascent civil war there. Hagel called it The most dangerous foreign-policy blunder in this country since Vietnam, if it’s carried out. Well, it was carried out, and by most accounts the so-called “surge” calmed things down in Iraq. “I’ll have a hard time voting for anybody to be secretary of defense who believes that the surge was a foreign-policy blunder,” Graham said Sunday. How much such comments will dent Hagel’s time as an decorated infantryman in Vietnam remains an open question. But more important than his service in Vietnam more than 40 years ago is the time he and Obama shared in the Senate from 2004 to 2008, when they served together on the foreign relations committee and traveled to overseas hotspots. Hagel would be the first defense secretary since the late Caspar Weinberger, defense chief in the Reagan Administration, to have worn a U.S. military uniform in combat – and the first enlisted man. That’ll instantly give him credibility. Hagel “led an infantry squad in Vietnam during the bloody fighting following the Tet Offensive,” Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said of his likely successor at a Memorial Day service last May. “Like millions of our generation, he demonstrated bravery, patriotism, and heroism on the battlefield.” With his Hagel pick following Panetta’s Democratic interregnum, Obama gets Republican cover to try to retool the Pentagon. That will include its missions as well as its business dealings. If he wants to, with Hagel in charge of the Defense Department, Obama will be able to press for more substantial changes than he could with a Democrat sitting in that huge E-ring office (Atlantic contributing editor Yochi Dreazen recently wrote about this strange state of affairs.) But Hagel has never seemed to harbor a sense that is the mission of America – nor its military – to spread democracy around the world. “Militaries are built to fight and win wars, not bind together failing nations,” he wrote in 2006. “We are once again learning a very hard lesson in foreign affairs: America cannot impose a democracy on any nation — regardless of our noble purpose.” That echoes Obama’s own thinking on the topic. Former Maine GOP senator William Cohen applauds Obama’s pick, and dismisses concerns that he’ll make bad policy. “You want a secretary of defense to be strong-minded,” Cohen says. “But he has to understand that this is not about Chuck Hagel because he is not going to determine policy in the Middle East or with Iran – that’s the call of the President.” Cohen says that while the Democratic Party is unfairly portrayed as being weak on defense, the Hagel nomination gives Obama some political cover. “Having a Republican there when you’re downsizing really takes away the issue of `There go the Democrats again,’” he says. The nod could generate some opposition from Jewish groups, who don’t see him as fervent enough when it comes to supporting Israel. Hagel has criticized loose U.S. talk about military strikes against Iran for its nuclear program. Iran, for its part, has been paying close attention to Hagel and his new assignment. Hagel’s lack of traditional GOP ideology might give him an edge when it comes to weaning the U.S. military off the hundreds of billions of dollars in added funding Congress gave it following 9/11. The libertarian Cato Institute suggests he would preside over a slimmed-down, stay-at-home military.

#### Political signal of commitment to fast withdrawal’s key to successful Taliban negotiations---builds in U.S. leverage---and no offense, maintaining presence inevitably fails

Daniel Serwer 12, professorial lecturer and senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a scholar at the Middle East Institute, 3/13/12, “Time to Go,” http://www.peacefare.net/?p=7801

Is there anyone still out there who thinks we can achieve our goals in Afghanistan? Yes is the short answer. Michael O’Hanlon for example. So I’ll try to reiterate why I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that we need to get out as quickly as possible, without however destabilizing the situation.

Far be it from me to suggest that the homicidal behavior of a single American staff sergeant should determine what we do, or don’t do, in Afghanistan. The fact however is that incidents like the one Sunday, in which 16 Afghans appear to have been murdered by a single American, really do have a broader significance. It is just no longer possible for many–perhaps most–Afghans to support the effort we have undertaken supposedly for their benefit. The Afghan parliament has said plainly that patience is running out. Wait until they realize how long it will take before the alleged perpetrator is tried and punished!

Of course we left Afghanistan to its own devices once before, after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. That did not work out well, for us or for them. The risks are great that the scenario will be repeated. I’m not sure President Karzai will last as long the Soviet-installed President Najibullah, who managed three years. But I trust Karzai will not stay on in Kabul if the Taliban appear at its gates, as Najibullah did. The Taliban castrated him and dragged him to death with a truck, then hung his body on a lamp post.

I doubt the Taliban, who would certainly gain control of at least parts of Afghanistan upon American withdrawal, would again make the mistake of inviting in al Qaeda. There isn’t much in it for them: al Qaeda is a pan-national movement with pretensions to uniting all Muslims in a revived caliphate.

As Rory Stewart notes, we are not going to be able to get the support we need from Pakistan or create the kind of government in Afghanistan that can gain the confidence of the Afghans. The only thing we’ve got going for us is that the Afghans hate the Taliban more than they hate us, but that is cold comfort.

It may also be in some doubt: the Taliban are having at least some success in governing areas they control. Their courts dispense justice, private and even state schools use their curriculum, and some nongovernmental organizations are allowed to operate. The Taliban district and provincial governors operate with increasing visibility and some degree of legitimacy.

To combat this kind of capillary presence of the Taliban, we would need to continue to distribute Americans widely in the countryside. It just isn’t going to be possible. With U.S. troops already withdrawing, the risk to Americans embedded in Afghan villages and ministries is going to rise sharply. Last month’s attacks on advisors embedded in the Interior Ministry, and the rising frequency of Afghan security force attacks on Americans, make that clear.

Like many Iraqis, at least some Afghans will come to regret U.S. withdrawal. The Pushtuns will not like dealing with the Northern Alliance, which defeated the Taliban in 2001 with help from the U.S., better than dealing with us, and many in the Northern Alliance would already prefer that we stay. Women–still not treated equally with men–stand to lose some of the enormous gains that they have made since the Taliban’s fall.

It would be a mistake to await the outcome of the negotiations with the Taliban, which could drag on for a long time. Better to go into these negotiations stating a willingness to withdraw–by the end of this year if feasible, or shortly thereafter–provided a satisfactory political solution can be agreed. That could actually accelerate the diplomacy rather than hinder it. And in any event the Taliban will know full well that public and political support for the war is fading in the United States.

#### Effective negotiations key to Afghan stability

Stefan Wolff 11, Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham, England, UK, 6/19/11, “Negotiating with the Taliban: A Promising Exit Strategy?,” http://www.stefanwolff.com/notebook/negotiating-with-the-taliban

In this sense, the strategy of negotiating with the Taliban is right. It is also correct in insisting on conditions as to who can participate in negotiations without closing the door to those who may not (yet) meet them—this is the precise meaning of the ‘listing’ and ‘delisting’ in UN Security Council Resolution 1989(2011). As with the Northern Ireland peace process where participation in the negotiations that led to the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement were conditional upon acceptance of the Mitchell Principles of Non-violence, demanding that those Taliban who want be part of a future peaceful Afghanistan renounce violence is only logical. Similarly, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq was brought to an end, in part, because those supporting and participating in it were simultaneously pressured and incentivised to turn away from, and on, al-Qaeda and encouraged to participate in a political process. While a comparison between Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan with Sunni insurgents in Iraq, let alone Republicans (and Loyalists) in Northern Ireland, is not straightforward, and perhaps not even sensible, the particular strategy of dealing with the problem that they pose(d) makes sense: the demands of these groups are to a significant degree negotiable (which fundamentally distinguishes them from al-Qaeda and its affiliates).

Clearly, not all among the Taliban will easily and quickly warm to the compromises and concessions that will be necessary for a settlement to be possible, nor will all in the current Afghan political establishment necessarily do so either. The more negotiations progress, the more spoilers will come to the fore—groups and individuals who will benefit more from a continuation of the conflict than from its end. That is why ISAF must stay the course and continue fighting its counter-insurgency campaign against those unwilling to participate in a genuine search for a political settlement and demonstrate to them the futility of pursuing the illusion a military victory over the Afghan government and its international supporters. International support must also continue to build a local Afghan security capacity that can eventually lead this campaign as necessary. Yet in the same way in which there can be no unconditional negotiations with the Taliban, there cannot be unconditional support of an Afghan government which presides over unbelievable levels of corruption and whose president lacks democratic legitimacy.

A political settlement will only be possible with international support for its negotiation and implementation. It will only be sustainable if both sides, the Afghan government and the Taliban alike, commit to it credibly and if institutions are put in place that offer transparent, participatory, and accountable mechanisms for dealing with the multitude of challenges that will undoubtedly face Afghanistan on the way to and after the negotiations have succeeded. Such success may seem rather far-fetched at present, but not to give good-faith negotiations a fair chance now would block any kind of exit for the foreseeable future.

#### Afghan success prevents global nuclear war

Carafano 10 – James Jay is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe,” Jan 2 http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/

We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and **nuclear-arms spending spree**. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to **kill the world several times over**. State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially **triggering a nuclear war** between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be **far more dangerous than the Cold War’s** two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances **snowballed into a very big, tragic war**. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.

#### PC’s key---zero margin for error

Chuck Todd et al 1-8, MSNBC anchor, 1/8/13, “First Thoughts: No margin for error in Hagel nomination,” http://firstread.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/01/08/16412788-first-thoughts-no-margin-for-error-in-hagel-nomination?lite

\*\*\* No margin for error in Hagel nomination: Yesterday’s official rollout of Chuck Hagel for defense secretary went about as well as it could have for the Obama White House. Statements of praise for Hagel by folks like Colin Powell and Robert Gates? Check. A statement of past praise from John McCain (who said in 2006 Hagel would make a “great secretary of state”), even though McCain is now taking a skeptical look at the nominee? Check. And getting Chuck Schumer, perhaps the Democratic senator with the most reservations about Hagel, to issue a non-committal statement? Check. So the White House feels pretty good about where things stand, although this won’t be an easy fight. Yet what Team Obama can’t afford is any new negative information, any other shoe to drop. Bottom line: There is no margin for error from this point onward. Hagel’s support, at best, in the Senate is an inch deep and that “inch” would get him the votes he needs. But it wouldn’t take much for the bottom to, well, fall out. This is going to be a precarious few weeks. Very few senators are in D.C. right now, so the interest groups will be front and center. Hagel needs his confirmation hearing sooner, rather than later, but right now, it’s unclear when those hearings will be scheduled. Hagel also needs FACE time with senators, and he won’t have that opportunity for a good week or so. ¶ \*\*\* Obama’s confidence -- 2009 vs. 2013: As we wrote yesterday, Obama is clearly projecting a level of confidence at the start of this second term than he did four years ago, in particular, on foreign policy. Just look at the initial comfort level with his picks for his second-term national security team (Hagel, John Kerry, John Brennan) vs. the first-term team (Hillary Clinton, Bob Gates, Leon Panetta, Jim Jones). At the start of his first term, the president was no less confident about his foreign policy judgment but he made the calculation that he needed to placate the Washington establishment so he stuck with the Republican Gates at Defense, brought in Hillary to State, brought in a former general, Jim Jones, as his National Security Adviser. Gates and Clinton worked out, but Jones didn’t. ¶ \*\*\* Amplifying his views, using political capital: Now? The president is using his national security choices to amplify his views in a way that was missing four years ago. Kerry, Hagel, Brennan and keeping Tom Donilon as NSA (even potentially elevating Deputy NSA Denis McDonough to White House chief of staff) indicates the president is not just interested in running foreign policy out of the White House, but he wants to leave an Obama imprint on Defense, CIA, State etc. But it may be more than that -- Obama is displaying a confidence that he didn’t necessarily show after 2008. Much of this is what you get with a second-term president who got more than 51% of the popular vote (for the second-straight time). He may NOT be saying it the same way Bush did in 2004-05 after winning a second term, but he’s, so far, displaying the following notion: Obama believes he’s earned political capital, and he’s going to use it.

#### PC is key, Obama is pushing, it’s top of the docket

Maggie Haberman, 1-7-2013, “GOP sees political payback in Hagel pick,” Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/gop-sees-political-payback-in-hagel-pick-85867.html?hp=t1\_3

For Democrats, there’s a peril of crossing a re-elected president – but also the risk of backing someone who their pro-Israel and gay supporters, along with some donors, aren’t entirely comfortable with. At minimum, senators will be under pressure to extract as much from Hagel as they can before saying they’ll support him. For the White House, the choice of Hagel gives the president a post-Susan Rice opportunity to show he’ll stick by his principles as well as offering proof that White House aides have learned the lesson of leaving appointees undefined in the current political climate. But it also embroils the president, who had capital to spend after a lopsided electoral win in November, in a potentially ugly and, some Senate Democratic aides say privately, unnecessary fight given other elements of his agenda. And across Washington, while the conventional wisdom seems to slightly favor Hagel being confirmed, many in both parties are hedging their bets to see how the next few weeks play out. “It’s going to be a classic Beltway fight where the opponents on both sides are waging a classic [publicity] war against him,” said one Republican operative. There are few other recent examples of a former senator – and member of an exclusive club – facing stiff opposition in confirmation hearings. One exception to the rule: John Ashcroft, who was appointed Attorney General by George W. Bush in 2000 after losing his Missouri Senate race. “The president’s determined to have the nominee he wants in the position he wants and not…get caught up in trivial politics that don’t amount to a hill of beans,” said Democratic strategist Jonathan Prince. But the hill of beans facing Hagel could be unusually steep. Given Hagel’s status as a former senator with no natural constituency in either party, each senator has parochial concerns related to their own races to consider as they weigh a confirmation vote. Many of them didn’t like Hagel personally, not just politically, two Republican operatives pointed out. The White House knows “this is an in-your-face pick,” said Republicans strategist Curt Anderson. “To Republicans, he’s not just a moderate Republican…it’s that he’s an apostate Republican.” One Republican operative put it more bluntly: “Republicans are looking for a fight…It’s a rare gift.” Another said, “It’s bound to help people in 2014 if they’re seen as being aggressive.”

#### Obama won’t engage in debt ceiling debates

NYT 1/3 (MICHAEL D. SHEAR and JACKIE CALMES Lawmakers Gird for Next Fiscal Clash, on the Debt Ceiling, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/us/politics/for-obama-no-clear-path-to-avoid-a-debt-ceiling-fight.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0)

With the resolution of the year-end fiscal crisis just hours old, the next political confrontation is already taking shape as this city braces for a fight in February over raising the nation’s borrowing limit. But it is a debate President Obama says he will have nothing more to do with.¶ Even as Republicans vow to leverage a needed increase in the federal debt limit to make headway on their demands for deep spending cuts, Mr. Obama — who reluctantly negotiated a deal like that 18 months ago — says he has no intention of ever getting pulled into another round of charged talks on the issue with Republicans on Capitol Hill.¶ “I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they’ve already racked up through the laws that they passed,” the president said Tuesday night after he successfully pushed Republicans to allow tax increases on wealthy Americans. On Wednesday, he signed the legislation.¶ The president’s position is sure to appeal to his liberal allies, who fear another round of compromises by Mr. Obama. But it once again sets the stage for a nail-biting standoff that economists warn could lead to a damaging financial default and doubt from investors about the ability of the country to pay its obligations.¶ Moody’s, the rating agency, warned on Wednesday that the looming political battles over the nation’s debt could lower the group’s rating of American debt.¶ “We’re in for another round of brinkmanship and uncertainty,” said Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, who predicted weeks of “angst, discussion and hand-wringing” in Washington. “I don’t think the economy can really find its footing and jump to a higher level of growth until we get to the other side of this.”¶ Joel Prakken, senior managing director of Macroeconomic Advisers, an economics forecasting firm, said bluntly, “This is kind of a mess.”¶ The financial imperative for an increase in the debt limit comes at a time of increasingly sour relations between the president and his Republican adversaries in the House. To secure a deal to avert automatic tax increases and spending cuts on Jan. 1, Mr. Obama was forced into last-minute talks with Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Republican leader, after weeks of negotiations with Speaker John A. Boehner in the House collapsed amid acrimony and internal Republican dissension.¶ Now, the president and Mr. Boehner are signaling a fresh round of take-it-or-leave it stands that are in sharp opposition: The president says increasing the borrowing limit is nonnegotiable, while Republicans say the House is all but certain to pass a bill that raises the debt limit only in exchange for significant cuts — a challenge to Mr. Obama and the Democratic-controlled Senate.¶ Smarting from the president’s victory on taxes over the New Year’s holiday, Republicans in Congress are betting that their refusal to raise the $16.4 trillion debt ceiling will force Mr. Obama to the bargaining table on spending cuts and issues like changes in Medicare and Social Security.¶ But doing so would inevitably reprise the bitter debate over the debt ceiling that took place in the summer of 2011, when the government came close to defaulting on its debt before lawmakers and the president agreed to a 10-year package of spending cuts in exchange for Republican agreement to raise the debt ceiling by about the same amount.¶ And that is exactly what Republicans want — again.¶ “If they want to get the debt limit raised, they are going to have to engage and accept that reality,” said Brendan Buck, a spokesman for Mr. Boehner. “The president knows that.”¶ Senator Patrick J. Toomey, Republican of Pennsylvania, said flatly that his party should risk the possibility of default — including interruptions in federal benefit checks and paychecks for government workers — if it was the only way to compel the president to support deep spending cuts that will reduce the deficit.¶ “That’s disruptive, but it’s a hell of a lot better than the path that we’re on,” Mr. Toomey said Wednesday on MSNBC. “We absolutely have to have this fight over the debt limit.”¶ The Republican Party’s caucus in the House will discuss a debt ceiling strategy at a private retreat in Williamsburg, Va., this month, according to a top Republican aide, who said they were determined to insist again on spending cuts that equal the amount of increase in how much the country can borrow.¶ “The speaker told the president to his face that everything you want in life comes with a price,” the aide said. “That doesn’t change here. I don’t think he has any choice.”¶ White House officials say Mr. Obama is equally determined to avoid letting the debt ceiling become a regular Republican tool for extracting concessions on spending on programs popular with Democratic constituents.¶ “It means that he won’t negotiate on it,” a senior administration official said Wednesday about the president’s comments. ”He’s not entertaining offers about it. We’re not having meetings about it.”

#### Political scientists and experts agree

Beckman 10 Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 50

However, many **close observers** of the presidential–congressional relationship have **long cited prevoting bargaining** across Pennsylvania Avenue **as being substantively important**. For example, discussing President Eisenhower’s legislative record in 1953, CQ staffers issued a caveat they have often repeated in the years since:¶ The **President’s leadership** often was tested beyond the glare spotlighting roll calls. . . . Negotiations off the floor and action in committee sometimes are **as important as the recorded votes**. (CQ Almanac 1953, 77)¶ **Many a political scientist has agreed**. Charles Jones (1994), for one, wrote, “However they are interpreted, roll call votes cannot be more than they are: one form of floor action on legislation. If analysts insist on scoring the president, concentrating on this stage of lawmaking can provide no more than a partial tally” (195). And Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher (1990) note that even if they ultimately are reflected in roll-call votes, “many important decisions in Congress are made in places other than floor votes and recorded by means other than roll calls . . . ” (68).

#### Obama’s Velcro---only blame sticks to him---means winners lose---healthcare proves

Nicholas & Hook 10 Peter and Janet, Staff Writers---LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack **Obama is made of Velcro**.¶ Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become **ensnared in blame**.¶ Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public.¶ But Obama remains **the colossus of his administration** — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.¶ The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape.¶ **What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting.¶** Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll.¶ "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated

#### Can’t win on energy

Eisler 12 Matthew is a Researcher @ the Chemical Heritage Foundation. “Science, Silver Buckshot, and ‘All of The Above’” April 2, http://scienceprogress.org/2012/04/science-silver-buckshot-and-%E2%80%9Call-of-the-above%E2%80%9D/

Conservatives take President Obama’s rhetoric at face value. Progressives see the president as disingenuous. No doubt White House planners regard delaying the trans-border section of the Keystone XL pipeline and approving the Gulf of Mexico portion as a stroke of savvy realpolitik, but one has to wonder whether Democratic-leaning voters really are as gullible as this scheme implies. And as for the president’s claims that gasoline prices are determined by forces beyond the government’s control (speculation and unrest in the Middle East), it is probably not beyond the capacity of even the mildly educated to understand that the administration has shown little appetite to reregulate Wall Street and has done its part to inflate the fear premium through confrontational policies in the Persian Gulf. Committed both to alternative energy (but not in a rational, comprehensive way) and cheap fossil fuels (but not in ways benefiting American motorists in an election year), President **Obama has accrued** no political capital **from his energy policy from either the left or the right** by the end of his first term.¶ The president long ago lost the legislative capacity for bold action in practically every field, including energy, but because the GOP’s slate of presidential candidates is so extraordinarily weak in 2012, he may not need it to get re-elected. At least, that is the conventional wisdom in Democratic circles. Should President Obama win a second term, Congress is likely to be **even more hostile** than in his first term, as in the Clinton years. And as in the Clinton years, that will probably mean four more years of inaction and increased resort to cant.

#### Government support for reprocessing’s politically impossible---tech costs, environmental and prolif drawbacks

Damon Kenul 10, Research Assistant at NYU Langone Medical Center, et al., 11/29/10, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Future Prospects and Viability,” <http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/institute/bigproblems/Team7-1210.pdf>

Of these options, we believe that the fifth has the most promise. Nuclear reprocessing is too environmentally hazardous and expensive given current technological constraints and uranium prices, although this could change in the near future with scientific improvements. Increasing government support of advancements in reprocessing in the U.S. would encourage growth and investment in this technology. Therefore, continued government commitment to researching pyroprocessing and other advanced fuel cycle technologies is vital to the nuclear industry, especially if we envision this technology maturing internationally. As unsustainable as our current nuclear waste disposal strategies are, we believe in the current political climate, commercial reprocessing in the United States are not a viable option due to high environmental and technological costs, as well as having significant nuclear proliferation threats. However, in order for the U.S. to employ pyroprocessing in the future, the government must begin now to incentivize the technology for firms and investors. As uranium prices are expected to increase in the future, as well as an increasing concern regarding the management of nuclear waste worldwide, reprocessing may become a promising solution provided investments are made to address current challenges in the field.

#### Political backlash against reprocessing turns the entire case---destroys certainty necessary for private sector involvement and kills the credibility of the plan

Damon Kenul 10, Research Assistant at NYU Langone Medical Center, et al., 11/29/10, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Future Prospects and Viability,” <http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/institute/bigproblems/Team7-1210.pdf>

The differentiation in the U.S. and French nuclear industries was largely based on the government’s level of commitment over time. In the U.S., the government’s commitment to the industry was initially strong, but abated over time, while France’s government maintained a strong commitment over time. 55 The level of a government’s credible commitment to the nuclear energy industry and specifically nuclear reprocessing will play an important role in shaping the flow of capital into the technology. 56 As the industry is currently constructed, utilities are sensitive to licensing and construction costs, which may be difficult to predict based on a government’s ability to commit to the industry. Utilities must obtain construction licenses from regulatory bodies to build nuclear facilities. These investment decisions necessitate large sunk costs which must be incurred a number of years prior to operating the plant. The decision making process of the utility is ultimately influenced by uncertainty surrounding the regulatory process that can ease or complicate the process. This uncertainty increases the risk associated with these types of investments and disincentivizes investment in the technology. Therefore an “analysis of the differences in institutional environment attributes can further understanding of government’s credible commitment to the industry.” 57 In understanding the existing differentiation in the institutional environment for both the U.S. and France, it is possible to elucidate how these unique situations have created varying transaction costs for their respective industries.

The U.S. efforts to exploit nuclear power commercially originated as a result of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and specifically the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 58 . In 1957, the Price-Anderson Act limited utilities’ liabilities regarding nuclear accidents and helped promulgate interest in the commercial use of nuclear energy. 59 This act served an important role in relaying the government’s credible commitment to the nuclear industry. Initially, the U.S. nuclear industry was subject to the interaction of three groups; the nuclear/electric industry, the AEC, and the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). 60 In this respect, polices regarding the nuclear industry were centralized and left to the discretion of the regulators and the regulated industries themselves. This political environment fostered the expansion of the nuclear industry and investment in the technology. However, control over commercial nuclear policy became highly fragmented: By the time the JCAE was officially disbanded in early 1977, more than a dozen committees in the House and Senate had gained some oversight over nuclear energy policy. Once the decentralization of authority had occurred, proposals to create a single House energy committee with concentrated authority were defeated. This proliferation of oversight is far more typical of the American political system than the centralized JCAE had been. 61

Further, during this period there was a significant rise in the number of anti-nuclear activists namely the Union of Concerned Scientist and the National Resource Defense Council. 62 These groups were able to utilize this fragmented political environment to undermine government commitment to the industry. The revived arrangement for nuclear industry oversight can be characterized by a subcommittee structure “open to competing interests, as well as vulnerable to changes in the composition of interest groups”. 63 Moreover, the nuclear industry was subject to an increased volume of rules and regulations as the anti-nuclear activist groups employed the independent judiciary branch for their interests. The change in the political structure confronting the nuclear industry undermined the feasibility of credible commitment of government toward the industry. Subsequently, this helped lead to the decline of the commercial nuclear industry in the U.S in addition to the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. This situation contrasts the environment of the French nuclear industry.

The American combination of fragmented power, little reliance on bureaucratic expertise, an independent judiciary, and opposing interest groups greatly undermines the ability of the U.S. government to credibly commit to the nuclear power industry. In France, despite substantial anti-nuclear interest groups, the impermeability of the institutional setup—no division of power, weak judiciary, and reliance on bureaucratic expertise— effectively prevents activists from influencing policy outcomes.64

## 2NR

#### Obama won’t spend PC on gun control

Turner 12/14 Dan has been an editorial editor or writer with the LA Times since 2004. “Not another gun control diatribe,” 2012, <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-guns-connecticut-20121214,0,404849.story>

The latter argument is a little hard to make with a straight face in the case of Friday's shootings at an elementary school in Newtown, Conn.; I doubt even National Rifle Assn. chief Wayne LaPierre would claim that arming 6-year-olds or their teachers is a good idea. Regardless, the liberal blogosphere will scream for action, politicians will promise to take it, and then **they'll misplace that gun control bill** on the way to cut the ribbon for a new community center in their districts.¶ President Obama is a master at this kind of bait-and-switch tactic, regularly calling for a national conversation on gun violence in the wake of mass killings, or touting his support for a ban on assault rifles, **without doing anything whatsoever** to advance these causes. In a tearful news conference Friday, he promised to take "meaningful action to prevent more tragedies like this, regardless of the politics." And what action would that be? Obama knows that gun control is a political nonstarter. Advocates might be hoping he'll be more courageous now that he has won a second term, but if history is a guide, he will save his political capital for fights he can win, such as immigration reform, and dump issues that fire up conservative opposition, such as climate controls and, yes, gun control. Smart politician. Disappointing leader.

#### Klein’s wrong

Sprung 12 Andrew Sprung is a political commentator & media consultant. He is the CEO of Sprung PR and hold a PhD from the University of Rochestor. “Ezra Klein's unconvincing theory that Obama misunderstands (or misrepresents) "change," 9/21, http://xpostfactoid.blogspot.com/2012/09/ezra-kleins-unconvincing-theory-that.html

In my view, Klein is viewing this question too narrowly. Obama is well aware of the limitations of the bully pulpit, and he's got to know better than any person on the planet that presidential advocacy polarizes, entrenching the opposing party in implacable opposition to whatever the president proposes. Yet, in presenting a revamped theory of how the presidency works, he's not just feeding us a line of BS. And if Obama wins reelection, I believe that we will look back five or ten or twenty years from now and recognize that yes, Obama did change the way Washington works. Or at the very least, he kept the US on a sane policy course in a time of extreme polarization and thus gave (will have given...) the system space to self-correct, as it has in the past.¶ Let's start with Klein's objection to Obama's characterization of how healthcare reform got done:¶ The health-care process, which I reported on extensively, was a firmly “inside game” strategy. There were backroom deals with most every major interest group and every swing legislator....¶ By the time the law passed, many more Americans viewed it unfavorably than viewed it favorably — exactly the opposite of what you’d expect if health care had passed through an “outside game” strategy in which, as Obama put it, “the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.”¶ And yet, health care passed. **The inside game worked.**¶ All true, laddie. And yet, in claiming that the impetus for healthcare reform came from the outside, I don't think Obama is attempting to whitewash this long and messy process -- or is even referring to it. He is alluding to the marshaling or channeling of popular will that got him elected. ¶ The essence of Obama's primary election argument against Hillary Clinton was that he was better equipped to marshal the popular will for fundamental change -- with healthcare reform as the centerpiece -- than she was. I well remember the moment when that argument first impressed itself on me. It was in a debate in the immediate aftermath of the Iowa caucuses, on Jan. 5, 2008:¶ Look, I think it's easier to be cynical and just say, "You know what, it can't be done because Washington's designed to resist change." But in fact there have been periods of time in our history where a president inspired the American people to do better, and I think we're in one of those moments right now. I think the American people are hungry for something different and can be mobilized around big changes -- not incremental changes, not small changes.¶ I actually give Bill Clinton enormous credit for having balanced those budgets during those years. It did take political courage for him to do that. But we never built the majority and coalesced the American people around being able to get the other stuff done.¶ And, you know, so the truth is actually words do inspire. Words do help people get involved. Words do help members of Congress get into power so that they can be part of a coalition to deliver health care reform, to deliver a bold energy policy. Don't discount that power, because when the American people are determined that something is going to happen, then it happens. And if they are disaffected and cynical and fearful and told that it can't be done, then it doesn't. I'm running for president because I want to tell them, yes, we can. And that's why I think they're responding in such large numbers.¶ Cue the political science eye-roll. The American people were not "determined" that healthcare reform per se had to occur. You can't read the results of the 2008 wave election as a "mandate" for a specific policy. In the aftermath, the electoral tide went back out with a vengeance.¶ But it's also true that in two years of campaigning Obama's words did inspire people, that the American people were hungry for change after Bush, that Obama made a broad and conceptually coherent case for moving the center of American politics back to the left with a renewed commitment to shared prosperity and investment in the common good, and that healthcare reform was at the center of that case. True too that the results of that election gave him enough of a majority to persist, even when relentless Republican misinformation and bad-faith negotiation and delay eroded public support.¶ **Obama** also **used the bully pulpit at crucial points,** if not to rally public opinion, at least to re-commit wavering Democrats -- and also to convince the public, as he enduringly has, that he was more of a good faith negotiator, more willing to compromise, than the Republicans. Those pressure points were the September 2009 speech he gave to a joint session of Congress, and the remarkable eight-hour symposium he staged with the leadership of both parties in late February 2010 to showcase the extent to which the ACA incorporated past Republican proposals and met goals allegedly shared by both parties, as well as his own bend-over-backwards willingness to incorporate any Republican ideas that could reasonably be cast as advancing those goals.¶ In a series of posts about Ronald Reagan, Brendhan Nyhan has demonstrated that presidential rhetoric generally does not sway public opinion. **Savvy politicians channel public opinion**; transformative ones seize an opportunity when their basic narrative of where the country needs to go aligns with a shift in public opinion, usually in response to recent setbacks or turmoil. Obama, like Reagan, effected major change in his first two years because he caught such a wave -- he amassed the political capital, and he spent it, and we **got what he paid for**. The force from outside -- a wave election -- empowered Obama to work change from inside in a system that reached a new peak of dysfunctionality. ¶ Klein's also objects to Obama's pitch for how to effect change going forward. In 2011, he notes, Obama highlighted the substantial change won from the messy inside game of legislating, touting the long list of legislative accomplishments of the 111th Congress. In election season, he has reverted to a keynote of his 2008 campaign: change comes from you, the electorate; it happens when ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Klein regards this as election season hooey:¶ But while this theory of change might play better, it’s the precise theory of change that the last few years have shattered.¶ Whatever you want to say about the inside game, it worked. Legislation passed. But after the midterm elections, it stopped working. And so the White House moved towards an outside game strategy, where ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Perhaps the most public example was Obama’s July 2011 speech, in which he said:¶ I’m asking you all to make your voice heard. If you want a balanced approach to reducing the deficit, let your member of Congress know. If you believe we can solve this problem through compromise, send that message.¶ So many Americans responded that Congress’s Web site crashed. But Obama didn’t get his “balanced approach,” which meant a deal including taxes.¶ Klein goes on to recount that throughout the past year of confrontation with the GOP, pushing a jobs package that had broad popular support, Obama won only one minor victory, extension of the payroll tax cut. He then reverts to two political science tenets: presidential advocacy entrenches the opposition, and it can't move popular opinion. But I think he misreads Obama's pitch, strategy and record on several counts.¶ First, he understates Obama's (and the Democrats') successes in the year of confrontation that has followed the debt ceiling debacle. He writes off the payroll tax cut and unemployment benefit extension as small beer. **But this was actually a near-total victory in two stages against entrenched opposition**, and it won Obama some vital back-door stimulus for the second year running in the wake of the GOP House takeover. It was followed by a similar GOP cave-in on maintaining low student loan interest rates -- and then again, by the collapse of the House GOP effort to renege on the Budget Control Act and impose still more spending cuts. Presidential rhetoric may not change the public mind. But when it's in sync with voter's propensities, it can deploy public opinion to bring pressure to bear on the opposition.¶ Second, it's true that under threat of GOP debt ceiling extortion, Obama successfully marshaled public opinion in favor of his "balanced"approach to deficit reduction but wasn't able to use that pressure to move the GOP off their no-new-taxes intransigence. But that battle ain't over yet, and popular support for Obama's position is political capital that's still in the bank. In the upcoming fiscal cliff negotiations, Obama, if he wins reelection, will have the whip hand, given the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and Republican teeth-gnashing over the defense cuts in the sequester. Speaking of which, Obama's refusal to intervene in the supercommittee negotiations as Republicans stonewalled once again over any tax hikes banked him further capital in this upcoming fight. Republicans are screaming much louder than Democrats about the sequester, disastrous though the cuts may be on the domestic side.

#### **Even if the media exaggerates its effectiveness, PC still causes vote shifting**

Beckman 10 Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 17

**Even though** Washington correspondents surely overestimate a sitting president's potential sway in Congress, **more than a kernel of truth remains**. Modern presidents do enjoy tremendous persuasive assets: unmatched public visibility; unequaled professional staff, unrivaled historical prestige, unparalleled fundraising capacity. And buttressing these persuasive power sources are others, including a president’s considerable discretion over federal appointments, bureaucratic rules, legislative vetoes, and presidential trinkets.9 **So even with their limitations duly noted**, presidents clearly still enjoy an impressive bounty in the grist of political persuasion - one they can (and do) draw on to help build winning coalitions on Capitol Hill.

# Solvency

## 1NC

#### Empirically, lifting restrictions on reprocessing does nothing because it’s not economically viable

Frank N. von Hippel 8, nuclear physicist, professor of public and international affairs in Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security, May 2008, “Rethinking Nuclear Fuel Recycling,” Scientific American, Vol. 298, No. 5

Having been awakened by India to the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation through reprocessing, the Ford administration (and later the Carter administration) reexamined the AEC's position and concluded that reprocessing was both unnecessary and uneconomic. The U.S. government therefore abandoned its plans to reprocess the spent fuel from civilian reactors and urged France and Germany to cancel contracts under which they were exporting reprocessing technology to Pakistan, South Korea and Brazil.

The Reagan administration later reversed the Ford-Carter position on domestic reprocessing, but the U.S. nuclear industry was no longer interested. It, too, had concluded that reprocessing to make use of the recovered plutonium would not be economically competitive with the existing "once-through" fueling system. Reprocessing, at least in the U.S., had reached a dead end, or so it seemed.

#### Fuel costs for reprocessing are ten times higher than the once-through fuel cycle

David Biello 10, Associate Editor for Scientific American, 4/15/10, “Is Reprocessing the Answer to Eliminating Fissile Materials from Bombs and Nuclear Waste?,” <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-reprocessing-the-answer-to-eliminating-fissile-materials>

Reprocessing is also expensive. The French spend roughly an extra 800 million euros ($1.1 billion) per year for reprocessed fuel compared to conventional uranium fuel rods and the National Research Council estimated in 1996 that reprocessing existing U.S. spent nuclear fuel would cost at least $100 billion. "The power produced from MOX fuel costs 2 cents more than that produced from uranium fuel," Makhijani says. "It is tenfold higher than the underlying resource cost."

Hanson disagrees. "There's plenty of money for recycling…. A light water [nuclear] reactor is a machine that turns foreign uranium into domestic plutonium."

The mixed oxide fuel rods that result from reprocessing have a mixed track record for performance. Although not a single such MOX fuel rod has failed, according to Hanson, they have not lasted as long as fuel rods from fresh uranium. "It was supposed to go around for three refueling cycles," or roughly 4.5 years, von Hippel notes of U.S. excess weapons plutonium turned into MOX fuel. "They had to pull it out after two [refueling cycles of 18 months each] because the fuel had expanded so much. It isn't fully equivalent to low-enriched uranium fuel."

#### Nuclear profit margins are thin---economics of reprocessing determines whether it can be commercialized

Matthew Bunn 3, Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 7/30/3, “THE ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING VS. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/repro-report.pdf

The relative cost of reprocessing vs. direct-disposal is an important element of these debates. Economics, of course, is not the only or even the principal factor affecting decisions concerning reprocessing today—the inertia of fuel-cycle plans and contracts initiated long ago, hopes that plutonium recycling will contribute to energy security, lack of adequate storage space for spent fuel, environmental concerns, and other factors also play critical roles. 1 But economics is not unimportant, particularly in a nuclear industry facing an increasingly competitive environment, where the difference between producing electricity at slightly higher or lower cost than competitors is the difference between bankruptcy and profit, and where fuel-cycle costs are among the few costs reactor operators can readily control. At a minimum, if reprocessing is being done to achieve objectives other than economic ones, it is worthwhile to know how much one is paying to achieve those other objectives.

There is general agreement in recent studies that with today’s low uranium and enrichment prices, reprocessing and recycling is more expensive than direct disposal of spent fuel. 2 The only argument is over the magnitude of the difference and how long it is likely to persist. Advocates of reprocessing often argue that the extra cost of reprocessing is small today, and will soon disappear as uranium supplies become scarce and their price rises. 3 The data and analyses presented in this report, by contrast, demonstrate that the margin between the cost of reprocessing and recycling and that of direct disposal is wide, and is likely to persist for many decades to come.

#### Their Duarte ev says economics slay the aff and restrictions aren’t key---it’s like they read the perfect 1AC anti-solvency card

Gary Duarte 11, U.S. Nuclear Energy Foundation, 10/12/11, “A little of our opinion about nuclear fuel reprocessing,” http://usnuclearenergy.org/REPROCESSING.htm

To begin with the massive upfront costs related to the nuclear energy industry and exhaustive regulation systems that are applied by U. S. agencies to nuclear power plants are responsible for making them the safest large volume 24/7 365 energy producers on the planet. At the same time, we have been trying for 30 years to make renewable sources cost effective and this challenge continues. We have not educated the public throughout the world that nuclear energy “economics” must be “projected” at 60 to 100 years of “operation” as these are what the plants are designed for. Now, these are not “estimates” we have thirty years of nuclear plant track records and zero public fatalities in the U. S. This is unprecedented in ANY other base load power generation method on the planet.

The long and short of the reprocessing assessment, since President Reagan “lifted” the U. S. ban on commercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels in 1981 has always been the economics (*some still believe it is banned, it’s not*). A commercial reprocessing facility with the capacity to complete between 800 and 1,000 metric tons annually may cost 10 billion dollars to build in China’s “economics” but 30 billion to build in the U. S. economics. For the past 30 years nearly all of the indecisiveness related to a U. S. reprocessing direction has been the difficulty in facing the economics. Also, over these years, technology has advanced several new and/or different methods for reprocessing, basically introducing yet another decision dilemma. This is why such intense projects have to be decided by the “science community” because the “political community” changes every four-eight years and the capacity to focus is lost. In essence, the DOE and NRC have failed to enlighten Congress and the American public to the scientific need and economic commitment to make reprocessing a “national initiative”; this is what needs to be done. Its costs can only be justified if the program is “painted” as a 100 year mission. Remember, many of us are convinced that America still needs another 150 new nuclear plants to serve our future energy growth and be “energy cost competitive” worldwide. And still, these added plants will also need 6% FINAL deep geologic storage.

Then there are those who say that Thorium fuels, pebble bed reactors, etc. will eliminate everything in today’s nuclear waste cycle. Some of our “reality” friends will say many of these are STILL laboratory projects and we will get there in time . . . but we need to START builds based on “TODAY’S functioning technology” over the next twenty years then see where the lab projects are at that time. These same “technology advances” will be occurring with solar and wind, biomass, etc. We must drive these technologies scientifically, but build today’s projects economically.

“If” we were to consider a full scale reprocessing facility; estimates are about 12,000 jobs, including 1,000 design jobs during the construction and about 2,500 permanent jobs for decades of operation. A project of this magnitude has the potential to evoke a substantial economic impact on any community and create up to 70,000 jobs overall. Based on the current costs of natural uranium fuel, the “potential value” of the current U. S. stockpile of 66,000 metric tons of commercial reactor spent nuclear fuel would be; $130,000 X 66,000 tons = 8,580,000,000 (8 billion 580 million dollars). We looked at the values of two different opinions, to determine an estimated value of 7 to 11 billion dollars with its reprocessed cost price competitive to natural uranium fuel costs after enrichment. And, as one can see, our current stockpile is only 1/3 the cost for the facility. Now, as we mentioned above, as we build 150 new plants those 6% waste additions will amortize our 30 billion dollar reprocessing facility over 60 – 100 years, fully amortize its cost and generate revenue. (Maybe even be foolish enough to offer “our reprocessing services” to other countries for income and American jobs).

With the “experience” of negative U. S. political interests in a strong nuclear build and reprocessing, NO private company or investors are going to risk building such a facility until they see the full “long term” support of the politics and public policy in America as a “national initiative”. This is the single largest deterrent to “commercial scale” reprocessing in the U. S. The science and engineering is accomplished, proven and functional. This entire dialogue that America has studied for 30 years is a fundamental reason that “We the People” must speak up and “separate science from politics” and allow technology to advance the sciences we need to benefit our lives and as a nation be “energy economically competitive”.

Science and engineering understand the U. S. need for expanding our nuclear fleet but the government does not, putting most of its attention on (still expensive) renewable energy with only a few waving the nuclear flag. No matter what administration is at the helm, government MUST re-affirm our need for nuclear expansion. Again here, it needs to be a “national initiative”. Nuclear should be re-classified as “green” and allotted government commitment. The nuclear industry has been wrongly battered by government and the environmental movements for years. It needs government to offer the industry 30 – 50% investment tax credits or working loan guarantees for all who build carbon free baseload power, or a tax holiday for the first ten years of operation of carbon free facilities. These incentives would be available to wind, solar and nuclear development. We must raise the success potential for such projects which have been unfairly brutalized in the past.

[Italics in original]

## 2NC

#### The Russian economy is strong and resilient

Actuarial Post 11 [“Russian recovery continues to gather momentum,” July 19 2011, <http://www.actuarialpost.co.uk/article/russian-recovery-continues-to-gather-momentum-623.htm>]

Baring Asset Management (Barings), the international investment management firm, believes Russia will become an increasingly attractive market to investors over the next 18 months as its economic recovery continues to gather pace on the back of higher public sector investment and consumer spending.

Matthias Siller, manager of the Baring Russia Fund also believes that over the next 18 months, Russia's political backdrop will have a positive influence on investment opportunities in the country. This year, Russia's Parliamentary elections will take place and in 2012, the Presidential election. Siller explains: "The elections will naturally result in an increase in social spending on infrastructure and on housing as the government tries to secure support. Aggressive fiscal loosening will also put more money in people's pockets and boost consumer confidence, supporting growth."

In terms of GDP growth Barings believes this will remain solid, although Russia's economic recovery has been slower to gain momentum compared to other emerging European nations. Siller says: "Russia's late cyclical recovery means that whilst consumer spending is only just starting to pick up, its monetary pressures are less strained than other European countries. Consumer spending, supported by a revival in retail loan growth since early 2010, points toward a strong, sustained recovery. Evidence of growth in consumption can be seen in rising new car sales which for example are well above Turkey's."

Barings believes the Russian economy has been relatively resilient to the financial crisis, and currently its budget deficit forecasts are significantly better than some other European emerging economies. While other European governments' support of growth via deficit spending comes to an end, Russia is an exception to the trend. A deficit spending increase in Russia will continue to underpin wage growth and consumption. Barings also expects privatisation efforts to increase and generate more growth for businesses.

# Russia Adv

## 1NC

#### Restrictions aren’t key---joint plutonium disposal’s already legally required---nothing more the plan can do

GSN 11 – Global Security Newswire, 7/14/11, “Russian-U.S. Plutonium Disposal Pact Enters Into Force,” http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russian-us-plutonium-disposal-pact-enters-into-force/

Russia and the United States on Wednesday brought an updated bilateral agreement on the disposal of weapon-grade plutonium into force through an exchange of diplomatic documents, the U.S. State Department announced (see GSN, June 7).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the exchange in Washington.

The U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement requires the nations starting in 2018 to each eliminate a minimum of 34 metric tons of processed plutonium -- enough fissile material to fuel roughly 17,000 nuclear warheads. The pact anticipates further reductions in stockpiled weapon-usable plutonium in the future, according to a State Department press release.

"Entry into force of the agreement also represents a significant milestone in U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear security measures, and it marks an essential step in the nuclear disarmament process by making these reductions in plutonium stocks irreversible," the release states.

Moscow and Washington are in discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency on methods for verifying the pact's mandates are being carried out (U.S. State Department release, July 13).

"This milestone marks important progress on U.S. and Russian commitments to eliminate nuclear weapons material," Laura Holgate, National Security Council senior director for WMD terrorism and threat reduction, said in provided comments. "Such eliminations are the ultimate in improving nuclear security, as they permanently remove the threat of theft or misuse of nuclear material, at the same time reducing the burden of securing materials."

The plutonium pact was initially inked in 2000 and subsequently updated in April 2010 with a new protocol that authorized Russian to employ fast reactors to irradiate the plutonium under rigorous security standards, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration said in a release.

Washington is to give Russia as much as $400 million for the project, with Moscow paying the remaining costs of the effort -- projected to be in excess of $3 billion. The Energy Department's semiautonomous nuclear agency and its Russian equivalent, Rosatom, are also to pursue foreign donations to defray the costs for Russia.

To carry out the disposal program in the United States, the Energy Department is supervising building of three plants at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, including the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility that would convert plutonium into nuclear reactor fuel (see GSN, June 17). Russia is also developing its own plutonium conversion technologies and is building the BN-800 fast reactor (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release, July 13).

#### Their advantage requires winning that the TVA would use MOX fuel---zero chance of that happening

Thomas Clements 9-17, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, 9/17/12, “Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Program at Savannah River Site Hit with Major Setback,” http://aikenleader.villagesoup.com/p/plutonium-fuel-mox-program-at-savannah-river-site-hit-with-major-setback/897688

In yet another series of significant set-backs for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) troubled plutonium fuel (MOX) program at the Savannah River Site (SRS), a key Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) official has backed away from considering MOX use in TVA’s aging reactors at this time.

The Decatur Daily, a newspaper located in Decatur, Alabama and just a few miles from TVA’s Browns Ferry reactors, quotes Preston Swofford, chief nuclear officer at TVA, as saying that he’s not at this point interested in MOX use and the agency is instead focused on a host of problems facing operation and management of TVA’s nuclear plants. The official was quoted as a DOE hearing on plutonium disposition, including necessity of testing of MOX in the problem-plagued Browns Ferry reactors, was conducted near Decatur on September 13.

The paper quotes Swofford’s negative comments about consideration of MOX: "It's just so low on my radar screen that I refuse to jump in the fray. I don't think I do service to the ratepayers of the Valley bringing on one more issue. Now three or four years from now, when the fleet's back to steady, we'll take a look at the product."

“Given TVA’s reluctance in pursuing MOX and the fact that DOE has no customers to use experimental MOX fuel is reason to put the brakes on the entire MOX program and halt construction of the $6-billion MOX plant to nowhere,” said Tom Clements, Nonproliferation Policy Director with the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability. “It appears that the MOX program continues to degrade into a big-government program with a singular mission: transfer of tax payer money into the pockets of the plutonium industry.”

#### Relations strong

Ria Novosti 5/10/12 [“Russian, U.S. Presidents to Continue ‘Reset’,” http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120510/173351119.html]

Russian and U.S. presidents Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama on Wednesday agreed in their telephone conversation to continue the “reset” in the relations between their countries, the White House said in a statement.

“The two Presidents reiterated their interest in the sustained high-level dialogue that has characterized the reset of relations, and the substantial progress of the last three years on issues like nuclear security and non-proliferation, Afghanistan, the WTO, and increased trade and commercial ties,” the White House said.

“President Obama and President Putin noted with satisfaction the concrete achievements of the last three years and expressed their commitment to enhance bilateral cooperation on the basis of mutual strategic interests,” the statement said.

The two leaders also “commemorated the occasion of Russia’s celebration of Victory in Europe day, noting the historic war-time alliance between our two countries and underscoring their mutual commitment to strengthening the U.S.-Russian partnership.”

On Wednesday, the Kremlin reported that Putin and Obama congratulated each other on Victory Day and discussed the prospects of Russian-U.S. relations.

The White House also said Putin told his U.S. counterpart Obama on the phone that he would not attend the G8 summit at Camp David.

“Noting his responsibilities to finalize Cabinet appointments in the new Russian government, President Putin expressed his regret that he would be unable to attend the G8 Summit at Camp David on May 18-19,” it said.

“President Obama expressed his understanding of President Putin’s decision and welcomed the participation of Russian Prime Minister [Dmitry] Medvedev at the G8 Summit,” the White House said.

“President Obama and President Putin agreed to hold a bilateral meeting on the margins of the June 18-19, G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico,” it said.

#### Zero risk of war

David E. Hoffman 10/22/12, contributing editor to Foreign Policy and the author of The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy, which won the 2010 Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction, "Hey, Big Spender," Foreign Policy, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/22/hey\_big\_spender?page=full

Despite tensions that flare up, the United States and Russia are no longer enemies; the chance of nuclear war or surprise attack is nearly zero. We trade in each other's equity markets. Russia has the largest audience of Facebook users in Europe, and is open to the world in a way the Soviet Union never was.

#### No conflict – arctic cooperation is increasing

Fries 12 [Tom Fries, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Arctic Institute, Apr 18 2012, “Perspective Correction: How We Misinterpret Arctic Conflict,” http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/perspective-correction-how-we.html]

War and conflict sell papers -- the prospect of war, current wars, remembrance of wars past. Accordingly, a growing cottage industry devotes itself to writing about the prospect of conflict among the Arctic nations and between those nations and non-Arctic states, which is mostly code for “China.” As a follower of Arctic news, I see this every day, all the time: eight articles last week, five more already this week from the Moscow Times, Scientific American or what-have-you. Sometimes this future conflict is portrayed as a political battle, sometimes military, but the portrayals of the states involved are cartoonish, Cold-War-ish...it’s all good guys and bad guys.

I’m convinced that this is nonsense, and I feel vindicated when I see the extent to which these countries' militaries collaborate in the high North. From last week's meeting of all eight Arctic nations' military top brass (excepting only the US; we were represented by General Charles Jacoby, head of NORAD and USNORTHCOM) to Russia-Norway collaboration on search & rescue; from US-Canada joint military exercises to US-Russia shared research in the Barents...no matter where you look, the arc of this relationship bends towards cooperation.

#### The worst case scenario happened – no extinction

Dove 12 [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶ There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶ Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶ That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶ Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶ The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated members, so this release over the world’s largest city really represented a worst-case scenario.¶ Nobody got sick or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

## 2NC

#### The Russian economy is strong and resilient

Actuarial Post 11 [“Russian recovery continues to gather momentum,” July 19 2011, <http://www.actuarialpost.co.uk/article/russian-recovery-continues-to-gather-momentum-623.htm>]

Baring Asset Management (Barings), the international investment management firm, believes Russia will become an increasingly attractive market to investors over the next 18 months as its economic recovery continues to gather pace on the back of higher public sector investment and consumer spending.

Matthias Siller, manager of the Baring Russia Fund also believes that over the next 18 months, Russia's political backdrop will have a positive influence on investment opportunities in the country. This year, Russia's Parliamentary elections will take place and in 2012, the Presidential election. Siller explains: "The elections will naturally result in an increase in social spending on infrastructure and on housing as the government tries to secure support. Aggressive fiscal loosening will also put more money in people's pockets and boost consumer confidence, supporting growth."

In terms of GDP growth Barings believes this will remain solid, although Russia's economic recovery has been slower to gain momentum compared to other emerging European nations. Siller says: "Russia's late cyclical recovery means that whilst consumer spending is only just starting to pick up, its monetary pressures are less strained than other European countries. Consumer spending, supported by a revival in retail loan growth since early 2010, points toward a strong, sustained recovery. Evidence of growth in consumption can be seen in rising new car sales which for example are well above Turkey's."

Barings believes the Russian economy has been relatively resilient to the financial crisis, and currently its budget deficit forecasts are significantly better than some other European emerging economies. While other European governments' support of growth via deficit spending comes to an end, Russia is an exception to the trend. A deficit spending increase in Russia will continue to underpin wage growth and consumption. Barings also expects privatisation efforts to increase and generate more growth for businesses.

#### TVA won’t choose to use MOX and there’s no way the plan can legally force them to

Thomas Clements 9-17, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, 9/17/12, “Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Program at Savannah River Site Hit with Major Setback,” http://aikenleader.villagesoup.com/p/plutonium-fuel-mox-program-at-savannah-river-site-hit-with-major-setback/897688

Swofford’s position and TVA’s reluctance to look seriously into MOX use will likely have a decisive impact on DOE’s legal ability to issue a final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Final SEIS) on plutonium disposition. While DOE’s “preferred alternative” is for MOX use in TVA reactors, the draft SEIS states (page S-iv) that “The TVA does not have a preferred alternative at this time regarding whether to pursue irradiation of MOX fuel in TVA reactors and which reactors might be used for this purpose.”

As TVA owns the reactors which might test and use MOX and is charged with complying with regulations of the NRC in operation of the reactors, DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has no legal jurisdictional authority to direct TVA to accept MOX for testing and use.

Likewise, under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), DOE has no authority to dictate a “preferred option” to TVA. TVA is officially a “cooperating agency” in preparation of the draft environmental document and under regulations of NEPA, TVA does not have to adopt DOE’s “preferred alternative.” At this point, in addition to Swofford’s statements, lacking a TVA-conducted EIS specific to the reactors, absent TVA management and board decisions, absent any applications to the NRC to test and use MOX in TVA reactors, and lacking formal public involvement process in TVA decision-making on this controversial matter, it appears that TVA simply can’t even consider a leap to a “preferred alternative” in support of MOX testing and use without a much more lengthy and rigorous public process.

#### Past trends prove – cooperation is more likely

Fries 12 [Tom Fries, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Arctic Institute, Apr 18 2012, “Perspective Correction: How We Misinterpret Arctic Conflict,” http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/perspective-correction-how-we.html]

It’s not only the handcuffs of many colors worn by the Arctic states that will keep them from getting aggressive, it is also the good precedents that exist for cooperation here. Russia and Norway recently resolved a forty year-old dispute over territory in the Barents. There are regular examples of military cooperation among the four littoral NATO states and between Norway and Russia. Even the US and Russia are finding opportunities to work together. Meanwhile, the need to develop search-and-rescue capabilities is making cross-border cooperation a necessity for all Arctic actors. There are numerous international research and private-sector ventures, even in areas other than hydrocarbons. These will only grow in importance with time. In fact, it would seem that for many of these countries, the Arctic is a welcome relief - a site where international collaboration is comparatively amicable.

# Prolif Adv

## 1NC

#### U.S. reprocessing opens the floodgates for global prolif

UCS 11 – Union of Concerned Scientists, 4/5/11, “Nuclear Reprocessing: Dangerous, Dirty, and Expensive,” <http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear_power_risk/nuclear_proliferation_and_terrorism/nuclear-reprocessing.html>

Reprocessing would increase the ease of nuclear proliferation.

U.S. reprocessing would undermine the U.S. goal of halting the spread of fuel cycle technologies that are permitted under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but can be used to make nuclear weapons materials. The United States cannot credibly persuade other countries to forgo a technology it has newly embraced for its own use. Although some reprocessing advocates claim that new reprocessing technologies under development will be "proliferation resistant," they would actually be more difficult for international inspectors to safeguard because it would be harder to make precise measurements of the weapon-usable materials during and after processing. Moreover, all reprocessing technologies are far more proliferation-prone than direct disposal.

#### Limiting reprocessing is the vital internal link to stopping global prolif---the plan destroys leverage over Iran and North Korea

Bunn & Malin 9 – Matthew Bunn is an Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government; Martin B. Malin is Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Fall 2009, “Enabling a Nuclear Revival—And Managing Its Risks,” Innovations, Vol. 4, No. 4, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Enabling-a%20Nuclear-Revival-and-Managing-Its-Risks.pdf

Many steps will have to be taken to limit proliferation risks. Iran and North Korea present the first and most urgent challenges. The outcome of today’s efforts to walk North Korea back from the nuclear brink and to persuade Iran to accept restraints on its fuel-cycle activities will have a major effect on whether nuclear energy will spread peacefully or will become a hedge behind which nuclear newcomers develop the necessary infrastructure to eventually build weapons. The United States and the other partners in relevant talks must engage directly with North Korea and Iran, with packages of promised benefits and punishments large enough and credible enough to convince these states that it is in their interest to give up their nuclear weapon ambitions.

Beyond those two cases, some of the most important means of limiting the risk of proliferation include phasing out the civilian use of HEU and minimizing civil plutonium reprocessing; forging new approaches to the fuel cycle that limit the spread of nationally controlled uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities; building new approaches to police, intelligence, and export control cooperation to stop blackmarket transactions in nuclear technology; strengthening international safeguards; and strengthening enforcement when states violate their nonproliferation obligations.

#### Committing to reprocessing now, with decades-old tech, would make the U.S. look like jackasses, not leaders

Matthew Bunn 7, Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 11/14/7, “Risks of GNEP’s Focus on Near-Term Reprocessing,” <http://www.environment.harvard.edu/docs/faculty_pubs/bunn_risks.pdf>

Fortunately, there is no pressing need to move forward with construction of a reprocessing plant in the United States in the near term. Dry casks offer a safe and proven technology that makes it possible to store spent fuel for decades at low cost. As a result, there is no need to rush to make these decisions – we can make these decisions more responsibly in the decades to come, when technology has developed further and economic, security, and political circumstances have clarified. What is needed now is patient R&D and in-depth systems analysis, rather than a rush to build commercial-scale facilities. As Richard Garwin has put it, by picking winners prematurely, the proposed GNEP approach “would launch us into a costly program that would surely cost more to do the job less well than would a program at a more measured pace guided by a more open process.”20

It would certainly not be a sign of U.S. leadership to decide now to build a reprocessing plant little different from what France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Japan have already built – to build, as one GNEP participant put it to me, a 1975 Cadillac. Rather, it would lock the United States in to spending many billions of dollars on decades-old technologies whose high costs and proliferation risks are already well known, and which are already failing to win contracts in the commercial marketplace. The idea of sending spent fuel from decommissioned U.S. reactors to France to be reprocessed, as DOE is reportedly considering, 21 has even less merit, and should be soundly rejected. The reprocessing would cost well over a billion dollars, far more than continuing to store this fuel where it is, and would simply add to the multi-billion dollar problem of excess plutonium the United States already has. DOE has correctly identified large global stockpiles of separated plutonium as a dangerous problem; dealing with that problem by reprocessing more plutonium is like using gasoline to put out a fire.

The recent National Academy of Sciences review has provided an excellent discussion of just how premature it would be to build commercial-scale facilities now, unanimously recommending against proceeding with a GNEP program focused on nearterm large-scale construction. As they concluded: “There is no economic justification to go forward with this program at anything approaching commercial scale. Continued research and development are the appropriate level of activity, given the current state of knowledge.” I urge the Committee to hear from the National Academy panel, to get the insights gained from their in-depth examination of the GNEP program in the context of other nuclear R&D.

#### U.S. reprocessing is irrelevant to our ability to influence other states’ tech choices on reprocessing---but the plan does give prestige to reprocessing which causes it to spread widely---means our prolif offense is unique

Matthew Bunn 7, Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 11/14/7, “Risks of GNEP’s Focus on Near-Term Reprocessing,” <http://www.environment.harvard.edu/docs/faculty_pubs/bunn_risks.pdf>

Department of Energy (DOE) officials respond by arguing that under GNEP, the United States will provide assured fuel services that will reduce countries’ incentives to build their own enrichment and reprocessing plants. That is a worthwhile objective, and as I will discuss later, programs to take away countries’ spent nuclear fuel could be a dramatic new incentive for them to rely on the international nuclear fuel market rather than building their own facilities. But U.S. reprocessing is irrelevant to providing assured fresh fuel supply – the principal focus so far – and if the United States or other countries are going to take back limited quantities of spent fuel from new countries developing nuclear energy, there is no requirement that this fuel be reprocessed.

It is important to pursue these objectives carefully, so as to follow the dictum “first, do no harm.” Ironically, the period since President Bush’s 2004 speech in which he laid down the objective of preventing the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to countries that did not already operate such plants has seen the greatest explosion of interest in uranium enrichment in the nuclear age, with states such as South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Ukraine, and Belarus suddenly expressing renewed interest. If states perceive that a new line is to be drawn between technology “haves” and “have nots” – a perception that early GNEP presentations on dividing the world into “supplier states” and “recipient states” contributed to – they will rush to try to ensure that they are on the “have” side of the line.

#### Their ev says downsizing the nuclear arsenal was the reason for declining U.S. cred---and the U.S. wouldn’t do PUREX even after the plan

NNSA 8 – National Nuclear Security Administration, December 2008, “Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Alternatives,” http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/GNEP\_NPIA.pdf

In the U.S. defense nuclear complex, the PUREX process was used in large-scale production operations at Hanford and Savannah River. The goal of these PUREX operations was to produce weapons usable material, rather than minimize waste. The PUREX process is not under consideration among the GNEP alternatives for civil nuclear power because its use entails the separation of pure plutonium. With the presidential decision to refrain from commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing a few decades ago, U.S. activities related to these technologies decreased. The downsizing of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex over the last decade or so has further decreased the U.S. knowledge and experience base. This loss of experience and R&D can diminish U.S. credibility as a role model and its ability to influence the decisions of others.

#### Their fuel cycle leadership arguments completely depend on winning that they cause the U.S. to accept other countries’ spent fuel for reprocessing

NNSA 8 – National Nuclear Security Administration, December 2008, “Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Alternatives,” http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/GNEP\_NPIA.pdf

6.3.1 Nonproliferation Impacts

The nonproliferation impacts of the full actinide recycle alternatives are very similar to one another and a mirror image to those for the once-through alternatives. That is, the strengths of the once-through are the weaknesses of the full actinide recycle alternatives and vice versa. In general they have advantages that they can provide a more attractive technical basis for discouraging the spread of enrichment and reprocessing by offering comprehensive front- and back-end fuel services that include acceptance and recycling of spent fuel. This approach could also help reduce global separated plutonium stocks. The full recycle alternatives also extract the fissile components of spent fuel into forms that are easier to misuse for nuclear explosives and that pose greater challenges for safeguards than spent fuel. The following sections discuss these issues in more detail, followed by a discussion of the importance of long-term sustainability for these fuel cycles.

#### Absolutely zero chance of that happening

James M. Acton 9, associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2009, “Nuclear Power, Disarmament and Technological Restraint,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 4, p. 101-126

The key area of dispute is whether reprocessing in the advanced nuclear states makes it easier for them to take back spent fuel. In December 2008, for instance, the US Department of Energy argued that, by simplifying the task of long-term waste storage, reprocessing ‘would reduce technical barriers – and so could also reduce political barriers – to offering back-end fuel services’.68 This comment referred specifically to a novel reprocessing technology that would separate out the highly radioactive components of nuclear waste that complicate its management, but similar arguments are made in favour of traditional reprocessing.

Even if the greater ease of storing reprocessed waste is taken as fact – and many opponents of reprocessing would not concede this point69 – the problem with the Department of Energy's argument is that the barriers to long-term waste management are primarily political, as the statement essentially acknowledges. Just one illustration of these political barriers can be seen in the legislation that capped the capacity of the planned US geological storage repository at Yucca Mountain, a project now essentially abandoned, at between a quarter and a ninth of the quantity of waste that technical analyses demonstrated could be safely stored there.70

There are various objections to the take back of spent fuel. Among these is a visceral objection to turning any state into the ‘world's nuclear dumping ground’.71 It seems extremely unlikely that reprocessing in order to reduce the long-term waste-management challenges would convince those that have this objection of the merits of spent-fuel take back. Another, more subtle objection is that a state should not take back spent fuel from abroad until it has a satisfactory long-term plan for managing its own waste. Reprocessing advocates argue that by simplifying storage, reprocessing can help build a consensus around the geological-repository option. In practice, however, the controversy surrounding geological storage plans is likely to be increased by linking them to an even more controversial technology like reprocessing.72

#### No impact to prolif---every actor has an incentive to overstate the impact

Robert Farley 11, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, 11/16/11, “Over the Horizon: Iran and the Nuclear Paradox,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10679/over-the-horizon-iran-and-the-nuclear-paradox

But states and policymakers habitually overestimate the impact of nuclear weapons. This happens among both proliferators and anti-proliferators. Would-be proliferators seem to expect that possessing a nuclear weapon will confer “a seat at the table” as well as solve a host of minor and major foreign policy problems. Existing nuclear powers fear that new entrants will act unpredictably, destabilize regions and throw existing diplomatic arrangements into flux. These predictions almost invariably turn out wrong; nuclear weapons consistently fail to undo the existing power relationships of the international system.

The North Korean example is instructive. In spite of the dire warnings about the dangers of a North Korean nuclear weapon, the region has weathered Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation in altogether sound fashion. Though some might argue that nukes have “enabled” North Korea to engage in a variety of bad behaviors, that was already the case prior to its nuclear test. The crucial deterrent to U.S. or South Korean action continues to be North Korea’s conventional capabilities, as well as the incalculable costs of governing North Korea after a war. Moreover, despite the usual dire predictions of nonproliferation professionals, the North Korean nuclear program has yet to inspire Tokyo or Seoul to follow suit. The DPRK’s program represents a tremendous waste of resources and human capital for a poor state, and it may prove a problem if North Korea endures a messy collapse. Thus far, however, the effects of the arsenal have been minimal.

Israel represents another case in which the benefits of nuclear weapons remain unclear. Although Israel adopted a policy of ambiguity about its nuclear program, most in the region understood that Israel possessed nuclear weapons by the late-1960s. These weapons did not deter Syria or Egypt from launching a large-scale conventional assault in 1973, however. Nor did they help the Israeli Defense Force compel acquiescence in Lebanon in 1982 or 2006. Nuclear weapons have not resolved the Palestinian question, and when it came to removing the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, Israel relied not on its nuclear arsenal but on the United States to do so -- through conventional means -- in 2003. Israeli nukes have thus far failed to intimidate the Iranians into freezing their nuclear program. Moreover, Israel has pursued a defense policy designed around the goal of maintaining superiority at every level of military escalation, from asymmetrical anti-terror efforts to high-intensity conventional combat. Thus, it is unclear whether the nuclear program has even saved Israel any money.

The problem with nukes is that there are strong material and normative pressures against their use, not least because states that use nukes risk incurring nuclear retaliation. Part of the appeal of nuclear weapons is their bluntness, but for foreign policy objectives requiring a scalpel rather than a sledgehammer, they are useless. As a result, states with nuclear neighbors quickly find that they can engage in all manner of harassment and escalation without risking nuclear retaliation. The weapons themselves are often more expensive than the foreign policy objectives that they would be used to attain. Moreover, normative pressures do matter. Even “outlaw” nations recognize that the world views the use of nuclear -- not to mention chemical or biological -- weapons differently than other expressions of force. And almost without exception, even outlaw nations require the goodwill of at least some segments of the international community.

Given all this, it is not at all surprising that many countries eschew nuclear programs, even when they could easily attain nuclear status. Setting aside the legal problems, nuclear programs tend to be expensive, and they provide relatively little in terms of foreign policy return on investment. Brazil, for example, does not need nuclear weapons to exercise influence in Latin America or deter its rivals. Turkey, like Germany, Japan and South Korea, decided a long time ago that the nuclear “problem” could be solved most efficiently through alignment with an existing nuclear power.

Why do policymakers, analysts and journalists so consistently overrate the importance of nuclear weapons? The answer is that everyone has a strong incentive to lie about their importance. The Iranians will lie to the world about the extent of their program and to their people about the fruits of going nuclear. The various U.S. client states in the region will lie to Washington about how terrified they are of a nuclear Iran, warning of the need for “strategic re-evaluation,” while also using the Iranian menace as an excuse for brutality against their own populations. Nonproliferation advocates will lie about the terrors of unrestrained proliferation because they do not want anyone to shift focus to the manageability of a post-nuclear Iran. The United States will lie to everyone in order to reassure its clients and maintain the cohesion of the anti-Iran block.

None of these lies are particularly dishonorable; they represent the normal course of diplomacy. But they are lies nevertheless, and serious analysts of foreign policy and international relations need to be wary of them.

Nonproliferation is a good idea, if only because states should not waste tremendous resources on weapons of limited utility. Nuclear weapons also represent a genuine risk of accidents, especially for states that have not yet developed appropriately robust security precautions. Instability and collapse in nuclear states has been harrowing in the past and will undoubtedly be harrowing in the future. All of these threats should be taken seriously by policymakers. Unfortunately, as long as deception remains the rule in the practice of nuclear diplomacy, exaggerated alarmism will substitute for a realistic appraisal of the policy landscape.

#### Prolif will be slow

Tepperman 9 Deputy Editor at Newsweek. Frmr Deputy Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs. LLM, i-law, NYU. MA, jurisprudence, Oxford. (Jonathan, Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb, http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome\_files/nukes\_Final.pdf)

The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors—Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say—might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

## 2NC

#### No impact to biodiversity

Sagoff 97  Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on **the brink of** an episode of **massive extinction, it may not follow** from this grim fact **that human** being**s will suffer** as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain **why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth**. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority **of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans** one iota."n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "**The human species could survive just as well** if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain **even if** **every threatened organism becomes extinct**. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, **one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes**. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, **biodiversity matters only up to a point**; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make **little difference**." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.