# Framework

## 1NC

#### 1) A limited topic of discussion that provides for ground for discussion is key to productive decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable--- T debates also solve any possible turn

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### 2) Discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development--- forces students to engage in concrete issues of government policy formulation

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### 3) Switch-side is key---Effective deliberation is only possible in a switch-side debate – forces critical thinking and better advocacy of one’s positions

Keller, et. al, 01 – Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago (Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

SOCIAL WORKERS HAVE a professional responsibility to shape social policy and legislation (National Association of Social Workers, 1996). In recent decades, the concept of policy practice has encouraged social workers to consider the ways in which their work can be advanced through active participation in the policy arena (Jansson, 1984, 1994; Wyers, 1991). The emergence of the policy practice framework has focused greater attention on the competencies required for social workers to influence social policy and placed greater emphasis on preparing social work students for policy intervention (Dear & Patti, 1981; Jansson, 1984, 1994; Mahaffey & Hanks, 1982; McInnis-Dittrich, 1994). The curriculum standards of the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) require the teaching of knowledge and skills in the political process (CSWE, 1994). With this formal expectation of policy education in schools of social work, the best instructional methods must be employed to ensure students acquire the requisite policy practice skills and perspectives. The authors believe that structured student debates have great potential for promoting competence in policy practice and in-depth knowledge of substantive topics relevant to social policy. Like other interactive assignments designed to more closely resemble "real-world" activities, issue-oriented debates actively engage students in course content. Debates also allow students to develop and exercise skills that may translate to political activities, such as testifying before legislative committees. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, debates may help to **stimulate critical thinking** by shaking students free from **established opinions** and helping them to **appreciate the complexities involved in policy dilemmas.** Relationships between Policy Practice Skills, Critical Thinking, and Learning Policy practice encompasses social workers' "efforts to influence the development, enactment, implementation, or assessment of social policies" (Jansson, 1994, p. 8). Effective policy practice involves analytic activities, such as defining issues, gathering data, conducting research, identifying and prioritizing policy options, and creating policy proposals (Jansson, 1994). It also involves persuasive activities intended to influence opinions and outcomes, such as discussing and debating issues, organizing coalitions and task forces, and providing testimony. According to Jansson (1984,pp. 57-58), social workers rely upon five fundamental skills when pursuing policy practice activities: value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing the underlying values inherent in policy positions; conceptual skills for identifying and evaluating the relative merits of different policy options; interactional skills for interpreting the values and positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in a convincing manner; political skills for developing coalitions and developing effective strategies; and position-taking skills for recommending, advocating, and defending a particular policy. These policy practice skills reflect the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookfield, 1987; Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of critical thinking are identifying and challenging underlying assumptions, exploring alternative ways of thinking and acting, and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis, and reflection (Brookfield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policy-making process--identifying the values underlying policy choices, recognizing and evaluating multiple alternatives, and taking a position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy practice skills seems to share much in common with developing capacities for critical thinking. R.W. Paul (as cited in Gambrill, 1997) states that critical thinkers acknowledge the imperative to argue from opposing points of view and to seek to identify weakness and limitations in one's own position. Critical thinkers are aware that there are many legitimate points of view, each of which (when thought through) may yield some level of insight. (p. 126) John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying **one's own policy position.** In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### And independently a voting issue for limits and ground---our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates

#### And Effective decision-making outweighs---

#### Key to improvement in every and all facets of life

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors.

We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### It’s the only portable skill

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After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

## 2NC

### AT: Only Textual

#### Reality exists independent of discourse --- focusing only on text fails to change reality

Thomas 6 (Director of Programs @ the Objectivist Center, “What is the Objectivist View of Reality (Metaphysics)? 8-13, <http://www.theobjectivistcenter.org/cth-32-450-FAQ> Objectivist View Reality Metaphysics.aspx)

But reality is not a function of our ideas. It exists, and it is what it is, regardless of whether we want it to be or not. Denying this is the intellectual equivalent of closing one's eyes while driving down the highway. Car crashes do not happen just because one believes they do; they often happen even when we wish them not to. Facts are facts, independently of us. This is why things happen that surprise us. It is why science has been the process of establishing the truth about nature without regard for our preconceptions. It is why babies have to learn: they are discovering the world "out there." Things in reality have real properties and exert causal powers without regard for us and our knowledge of them. Ayn Rand summed up this attitude to reality as the principle of the primacy of existence.
"The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists," wrote Ayn Rand in "The Metaphysical versus the Man-Made," "i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity. The epistemological corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists—and that man gains knowledge by looking outward." Consciousness (i.e., the mind) is in essence a faculty of awareness. We are aware of the world around us through sense-perceptions, of course, but even in our abstract and theoretical knowledge we function primarily through identification of how things are. To give a simple example, we decide whether to say "that is a yellow house," but we know that what makes that statement knowledge, rather than hot air, is whether or not it identifies a house that really is yellow.

### Framework --- AT: Language Indeterminate

#### No impact – even if words mean different things, our interpretation can enact a précising function that creates communicative consensus

Garth Kemerling, professor of philosophy at Newberry College, 1997

 <http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm>

We've seen that sloppy or misleading use of ordinary language can seriously limit our ability to create and communicate correct reasoning. As philosopher [John Locke](http://www.philosophypages.com/ph/lock.htm) pointed out three centuries ago, the achievement of human knowledge is often hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. Needless controversy is sometimes produced and perpetuated by an unacknowledged ambiguity in the application of key terms. We can distinguish disputes of three sorts: Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not some specific proposition is true. Since the people engaged in a genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, each of them can propose and assess logical arguments that might eventually lead to a resolution of their differences. Merely [verbal disputes](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/v.htm#verbal), on the other hand, arise entirely from ambiguities in the language used to express the positions of the disputants. A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people involved arrive at an agreement on the meaning of their terms, since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief. Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that's been discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully by appropriate methods of reasoning. We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve them whenever we can. Kinds of Definition The most common way of preventing or eliminating differences in the use of languages is by agreeing on the [definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/d2.htm#def) of our terms. Since these explicit accounts of the meaning of a word or phrase can be offered in distinct contexts and employed in the service of different goals, it's useful to distinguish definitions of several kinds: A [lexical definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/l5.htm#lexi) simply reports the way in which a term is already used within a language community. The goal here is to inform someone else of the accepted meaning of the term, so the definition is more or less correct depending upon the accuracy with which it captures that usage. In these pages, my definitions of technical terms of logic are lexical because they are intended to inform you about the way in which these terms are actually employed within the discipline of logic. At the other extreme, a [stipulative definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/s9.htm#stip) freely assigns meaning to a completely new term, creating a usage that had never previously existed. Since the goal in this case is to propose the adoption of shared use of a novel term, there are no existing standards against which to compare it, and the definition is always correct (though it might fail to win acceptance if it turns out to be inapt or useless). If I now decree that we will henceforth refer to Presidential speeches delivered in French as "glorsherfs," I have made a (probably pointless) stipulative definition. Combining these two techniques is often an effective way to reduce the [vagueness](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/v.htm#vag) of a word or phrase. These [precising definitions](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/p7.htm#prec) begin with the lexical definition of a term but then propose to sharpen it by stipulating more narrow limits on its use. Here, the lexical part must be correct and the stipulative portion should appropriately reduce the troublesome vagueness. If the USPS announces that "proper notification of a change of address" means that an official form containing the relevant information must be received by the local post office no later than four days prior to the effective date of the change, it has offered a (possibly useful) precising definition.

#### Indeterminacy is better than the alternative – ratifying a coherent framework must precede deliberation or else all debate is meaningless

Paul Saurette, PhD Johns Hopkins, 2000 International Journal of Peace Studies 5:1

The problem of concepts -- what they are, where they are located, how we create/discover them -- has always been close to the heart of philosophy and extends deep into the sciences and social sciences.  Within IR, this concern has generally been located in the sphere of methodology and it remains crucial to the various behaviourist - positivist - empiricist - traditionalist debates.  All but the most stubborn empiricists accept that concepts influence our thinking, the validity of studies and the utility of certain perspectives. It is not surprising, then, that some of the most heated debates in the history of IR (and international law) have focused on the proper place, method and definition of certain key concepts such as sovereignty, war, human rights, anarchy, institutions, power, and international. If all concepts are equally created, however, some become represented and treated as more equal than others. There are, in fact, different layers of conceptual understanding and degrees of articulability and these render certain concepts more or less subject to question.8 In any debate, certain understandings are shared by its participants and certain concepts must be common for communication to occur.  These concepts become the foundational layer of the debate, rarely being raised for consideration, but profoundly shaping the contours of the debate.  There have been two traditionally philosophical responses to this.  The first, more familiar to mainstream IR, might be seen as the empiricist and positivist response in which the importance of this layer is minimized and its concepts represented as 'preliminary assumptions', 'term variables', or 'operative definitions' -- voluntarily accepted concepts that are hypothetically and tentatively accepted for their heuristic value.  Because many empiricists and positivists accept an understanding of language and thought as transparent and instrumental, they generally assume that, with enough effort, all of our fundamental assumptions and concepts can be clarified and their consequences known -- allowing for, if not truthful representation, then at least useful manipulation.  While this has perhaps been the prevalent view within English philosophy since the scientific revolution, a second approach, what has been called the continental tradition of philosophy, has consistently challenged these premises.  From this perspective, Kant's definition of the project of philosophy as the search for the transcendental conditions of thought and morality is the paradigmatic challenge to the English tradition of empiricism. According to Kant (and shifting him into the language of this essay), there exist certain natural preconditions -- transcendental fields -- of thought that allow us to make sense of experience.  And while some of these necessary preconditions (categories and concepts) can be traced and categorized, others, such as the constitutive and regulative Ideas, cannot be known with the same theoretical rigor.  On this view, the concepts (Ideas) of this deep layer of shared understandings (experience) are not  transparent and available to examination.  Even those we can represent cannot be manipulated and reconfigured.  Far from being heuristic devices of our own making, they are the necessary and universal conditions of possibility for any experience and understanding.

#### Even if there is no absolute truth, consensus can create common understanding

Yale Ferguson, professor of IR at Rutgers, and Richard Mansbach, professor of IR at Iowa State 2002 “International Relations and the “Third Debate,” ed. Jarvis)

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

### AT: Predictability Bad---2NC

Breaking down predictability is self-defeating and impossible---creativity inevitably depends upon constraints, the attempt to wish away the structure of predictability collapses the very structure their aff depends on---it’s better to retain predictability and be creative within it

Armstrong 2K – Paul B. Armstrong, Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Winter 2000, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 211-223

Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking. 8 Iser shares Lyotard's concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a world of heterogeneous language games is to limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotard's endorsement of the "sublime"--the pursuit of the "unpresentable" by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and smashing the limits of existing paradigms--is undermined by contradictions, however, which Iser's explication of play recognizes and addresses. The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Iser's sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new games, this crossing of boundaries depends on and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes. [End Page 220]

The radical presumption of the sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual reciprocity of Iserian play.

Iser's notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser's analysis of "regulatory" and "aleatory" rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, "permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own" (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and open-ended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity.

### \*\*\*Framework --- AT: Calculative Decisionmaking Bad

#### 1 --- Political calculation is necessary and inevitable --- endorsing Derridian politics leaves us incapable of making these narrow decisions coherently

Jack Reynolds, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Tasmania, Australia, 2006, Theory & Event, Vol. 9, No. 3

To summarise these various different texts then, Derrida insists that incalculable ethical absolutes (eg. justice) need to be put to work in contingent political calculations that are irretrievably context bound (eg. law). What is needed is a mutual contamination of the political and the ethical that might be termed 'ultra-political'. I think that this analysis, and in fact the ultra-political emphasis of all of Derrida's work, is exactly right, but some important questions remain. **How does Derrida think that we should calculate**, accepting his suggestion that we must? **There is very little indication** of this in his work. Although he regularly insists that there is no pure ethics, no pure justice, **any hint as to what kinds of political calculations are better or worse than others is left opaque**. Except in the most general terms, Derrida does not engage with the key theories of distributive justice and of political calculations in the narrow sense. While he does discuss the different ways in which we might attempt to add up or calculate equality (eg. according to number, according to merit, etc.), there is little consideration of the relative merits of these different kinds of addition, some of which may be more apt in a contemporary context of globalisation (mondialisation) than others.¶ Furthermore, this acknowledged necessity of political calculation is also treated in a far more derogatory way than the ethical absolutes that undergird and orient his work. In Rogues, for example, Derrida endorses the Husserlian distinction between rigour and exactitude, the latter being more calculative and lesser (R 132). In this text, he also reaffirms that he is on the side of chance and the incalculable (R 5), what in Politics of Friendship he terms the 'perhaps' (PF 28), because he doesn't want to reduce democracy to a program or procedural system of calculations, as we will see Rawls might be accused of. In fact, Derrida also discusses why he generally eschews principles and axioms (or lexical orderings, such as Rawls' famous principles of justice as fairness), suggesting that such principles favour the calculative application of programmatic rules (R 142). It is **for this reason that he continues to insist on the 'to come', the open-ended and the incalculable**, and advocates 'postulations' instead of axioms (the former avoids a comparable and calculable scale of values and evaluations).¶ Moreover, while Derrida regularly uses political terms in his recent work, invoking democracy, the 'new International', justice, etc., arguably **these terms have become deprived of their content in such a way as to become ethical absolutes**. Consider, for example, the notion of a democracy 'to come'. Derrida's emphasis upon the democracy that is (and must be) yet to come, means that **his vision of democracy is divested of content, calculability, and at least some of its normative force.** It also needs to be noted that it is Derrida's general contention that it is precisely that which disrupts calculation and which renders the application of any kind of formula impossible, which is just. For him, justice can never arrive in the 'present', but is constitutively 'to come' and forever futural – this is another way of saying that justice is non-negotiable and undeconstructible. Such suggestions are part and parcel of his deconstructive practices, which, above all, affirm the new, the messianic, the wholly other, justice, the impossible, and the future, terms that play a closely related structural role in his work. According to Derrida's own definitions of politics and ethics in both Rogues and 'Ethics and Politics Today', however, **these kinds of affirmations constitute an ethical injunction more than a political one**, as they are primarily about the non-negotiable and the absolute, notwithstanding that the point of his work is to allow this ethical affirmation to be at work within the political.¶ Interestingly, in an essay titled 'The Deconstruction of Actuality', Derrida also acknowledges that his own recent focus upon unconditional hospitality in texts like Of Hospitality, and absolute forgiveness in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, is apolitical in a certain sense (N 101). His point behind drawing attention to these kind of unconditional ethical horizons that are at work in the concepts of hospitality and forgiveness, is that a politics of hospitality that is purely about calculation and negotiation is a politics that loses all reference to justice. It is merely a machinic system and his point is that we need to ensure that these ideas of absolute hospitality and the like must infect the gritty realities of conditional hospitality, which is eminently susceptible of political calculation and manipulation. At the same time, it is not enough just to shout, for example, that John Howard's border protection policy in Australia's territorial waters is wrong and that a non-negotiable ethics demands that everyone be let in to the country. That is literally impossible on Derrida's view, but what is needed is a softening of the political calculations and a recognition of the importance of this demand of absolute hospitality that sustains and augments any actual occurrences of hospitality, rather than the covering over of that demand. As politically insightful as such a position is, **Derrida is reluctant to go** any **further and specify the kinds of political negotiation of these absolute demands which might be better or worse than other kinds of negotiation**10. Certain ethico-political stances are ruled out by him (a pure politics of calculation and a pure ethics of the incalculable are both ruled out), **but what is left is a wide expanse in the middle within which we must calculate and with which he won't help us much**11. In that respect, we need to supplement Derrida's valuable but somewhat moralistic insistence that justice is incalculable, for example, **with a more detailed examination of the merits and problems of myriad different kinds of political calculations (politics in the narrower sense) that Derrida himself acknowledges are** necessary and inevitable. This is where the **calculative ambitions of much analytic political philosophy becomes important,** whether it be utilitarianism or the liberalism of Rawls that we will now examine (at the same time, Rawls' work also shows us the risks associated with any such turn to calculability – most obviously the threat of engendering a normative moralism and becoming what Derrida would reproach as a 'knight of good conscience').

### Framework --- AT: Constraints = Violent

#### No impact to our type of exclusion

Richard Terdiman 7, Professor of Literature and History of Consciousness at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Determining the Undetermined: Derrida's "University Without Condition" Eighteenth-Century Studies 40.3 (2007) 425-441

Perhaps that fact has a relatively simple explanation. We might say that people living in situations of absolutist censorship and repression, as under the ancien régime, will have a livelier sense of the material constraints—Diderot clapped in Vincennes prison; Voltaire exiled to England; Rousseau oscillating nervously between France, England, and Geneva; Sade in the Bastille and in Charenton—that represent peremptory examples of tyranny's domination.16 Conversely, today—in the advanced democracies at least—the mechanisms of opposition and control tend to be less sovereign or unanswerable than were the overtly repressive apparatuses of the Enlightenment period.17

It would be naive to think that attempts by governments in the advanced democracies to subvert or repress academic and intellectual freedom are not occurring regularly. While such interference bears some resemblance to limitations on individual or collective freedom in the Enlightenment period, and while in many countries the situation of civil liberties has suffered a perceptible deterioration since [End Page 430] 9/11, it would be an exaggeration to equate their severity with what regularly and almost unanswerably occurred under the ancien régime. Through material experience, people in the eighteenth century probably knew more about the conditions constraining the exercise of intellectual freedom than we do today. They studied them because they had to. Determination was for them a palpable and singularly aversive reality, consequently one upon whose functioning they reflected intricately. Perhaps then it's no surprise that Enlightenment discourses on the functioning of power—typically in articles in the Encyclopédie that intricately traced its mechanisms in all the areas of life—captured its operation with greater acuteness, and that their arguments for the establishment of intellectual freedom rang out with greater resonance, than similar discourses in our own period.

# Case

## 1NC

### ATC

#### The ecological crunch is coming---overwhelming scientific evidence proves an impending environmental crisis risks extinction

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 4-6

This impending crisis is caused by the accelerating damage to the natural environment on which humans depend for their survival. This is not to deny that there are other means that may bring catastrophe upon the earth. John Gray for example5 argues that destructive war is inevitable as nations become locked into the struggle for diminishing resources. Indeed, Gray believes that war is caused by the same instinctual behavior that we discuss in relation to environmental destruction. Gray regards population increases, environmental degradation, and misuse of technology as part of the inevitability of war. War may be inevitable but it is unpredictable in time and place, whereas environmental degradation is relentless and has progressively received increasing scientific evidence. Humanity has a record of doomsayers, most invariably wrong, which has brought a justifiable immunity to their utterances. Warnings were present in The Tales of Ovid and in the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, and in more recent times some of the predictions from Thomas Malthus and from the Club of Rome in 1972, together with the “population bomb” of Paul Ehrlich, have not eventuated. The frequent apocalyptic predictions from the environmental movement are unpopular and have been vigorously attacked.

So it must be asked, what is different about the present warnings? As one example, when Sir David King, chief scientist of the UK government, states that “in my view, climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today, more serious than the threat of terrorism,”6 how is this and other recent statements different from previous discredited prognostications? Firstly, they are based on the most detailed and compelling science produced with the same scientific rigor that has seen humans travel to the moon and create worldwide communication systems. Secondly, this science embraces a range of disciplines of ecology, epidemiology, climatology, marine and fresh water science, agricultural science, and many more, all of which agree on the nature and severity of the problems. Thirdly, there is virtual unanimity of thousands of scientists on the grave nature of these problems. Only a handful of skeptics remain.

During the past decade many distinguished scientists, including numerous Nobel Laureates, have warned that humanity has perhaps one or two generations to act to avoid global ecological catastrophe. As but one example of this multidimensional problem, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that global warming caused by fossil fuel consumption may be accelerating.7 Yet climate change is but one of a host of interrelated environmental problems that threaten humanity. The authors have seen the veils fall from the eyes of many scientists when they examine all the scientific literature. They become advocates for a fundamental change in society. The frequent proud statements on economic growth by treasurers and chancellors of the exchequer instill in many scientists an immediate sense of danger, for humanity has moved one step closer to doom.

Science underpins the success of our technological and comfortable society. Who are the thousands of scientists who issue the warnings we choose to ignore? In 1992 the Royal Society of London and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences issued a joint statement, Population Growth, Resource Consumption and a Sustainable World,8 pointing out that the environmental changes affecting the planet may irreversibly damage the earth’s capacity to maintain life and that humanity’s own efforts to achieve satisfactory living conditions were threatened by environmental deterioration. Since 1992 many more statements by world scientific organizations have been issued.9 These substantiated that most environmental systems are suffering from critical stress and that the developed countries are the main culprits. It was necessary to make a transition to economies that provide increased human welfare and less consumption of energy and materials. It seems inconceivable that the consensus view of all these scientists could be wrong. There have been numerous international conferences of governments, industry groups, and environmental groups to discuss the problems and develop strategy, yet widespread deterioration of the environment accelerates. What is the evidence?

The Guide to World Resources, 2000 –2001: People and Ecosystems, The Fraying Web of Life10 was a joint report of the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Environment Program, the World Bank, and the World Resources Institute. The state of the world’s agricultural, coastal forest, freshwater, and grassland ecosystems were analyzed using 23 criteria such as food production, water quantity, and biodiversity. Eighteen of the criteria were decreasing, and one had increased (fiber production, because of the destruction of forests). The report card on the remaining four criteria was mixed or there was insufficient data to make a judgment. In 2005, The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report by 1,360 scientific experts from 95 countries was released.11 It stated that approximately 60 percent of the ecosystem services that support life on earth—such as fresh water, fisheries, and the regulation of air, water, and climate—are being degraded or used unsustainably. As a result the Millennium Goals agreed to by the UN in 2000 for addressing poverty and hunger will not be met and human well-being will be seriously affected.

#### This means a transition to environmental authoritarianism’s coming now---solves extinction

Mark Beeson 10, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918

The environment has become the defining public policy issue of the era. Not only will political responses to environmental challenges determine the health of the planet, but continuing environmental degradation may also affect political systems. This interaction is likely to be especially acute in parts of the world where environmental problems are most pressing and the state's ability to respond to such challenges is weakest. One possible consequence of environmental degradation is the development or consolidation of authoritarian rule as political elites come to privilege regime maintenance and internal stability over political liberalisation. Even efforts to mitigate the impact of, or respond to, environmental change may involve a decrease in individual liberty as governments seek to transform environmentally destructive behaviour. As a result, ‘environmental authoritarianism’ may become an increasingly common response to the destructive impacts of climate change in an age of diminished expectations.

#### Deconstructive ethics are inherently anti-authoritarian---embracing the 1AC’s critique of logocentrism entails a fundamental critique of authority that breaks down hierarchical political institutions

Saul Newman 1, senior lecturer in politics at Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2001, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-authoritarianism and the dislocation of power, p. 128-131

In any case, for Derrida, justice performs a deconstructive displacing of law. For a decision to be just, Derrida argues, for it to account for the singularity denied by law, it must be different each time. It cannot be the mere application of the rule—it must continually reinvent the rule. Therefore, justice conserves the law because it operates in the name of the law; but, at the same time, suspends the law because it is being continually reinterpreted.405

Justice, moreover, exists in an ethical realm because it implies a freedom and a responsibility for one’s own actions.406 Justice is the experience of the impossible because it always exists in a state of suspension and undecidability. It is always incalculable: the promise of something yet to come, which must never be completely grasped because then it would cease to be justice and become law. As Derrida says: “There is an avenir for justice and there is no justice except to the degree that some event is possible which, as an event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations.”407 Justice is an “event” that opens itself to the other, to the impossible: its effects are always unpredictable because it cannot be determined, as law can and is, by an a priori discourse. It is an excess that overflows from law and cannot be grasped by it. Justice functions as an open, empty signifier: its meaning or content is not predetermined.

So justice occupies an ethical ground that cannot be reduced to law or political institutions, and it is for this reason that justice opens up the possibility for a transformation of law and politics.408 My critique of the place of power in political philosophy has been aimed at precisely this: a transformation of politics, particularly the politics of resistance. This transformation, though, is not an absolute destruction, but rather a refounding of political and legal discourse in a way that unmasks their lack of legitimate ground and, thus, leaves them open to continual and unpredictable reinterpretation. The classical political discourse of emancipation, for instance, should not be rejected but, rather, reformulated in this manner. While the Enlightenment ideal of emancipation has the potential for becoming a discourse of humanist domination—we have seen this in the experience of anarchism—it can also become a discourse of liberation if it can be un-moored from its humanist foundations and refounded as a nonplace. As Derrida says:

Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities. But beyond these identified territories of juridico-politicization on the grand political scale, beyond all self-serving interpretations . . . other areas must constantly open up that at first seem like secondary or marginal areas.409

One could argue that because poststructuralism abandons the humanist project, it denies itself the possibility of using the ethical-political content of this discourse for resistance against domination. In other words, it has thrown the baby out with the bath water. Because Derrida, on the other hand, does not rule out the Enlightenment-humanist project, he does not deny himself the emancipative possibilities contained in its discourses. Nor should the antiauthoritarian project deny itself these possibilities. Perhaps, as we shall see later on, the ethical-political content of anarchism itself, which is derived from Enlightenment-humanism, can be adopted by the anti-authoritarian argument— that is, if it can be freed from the humanist foundations which limit it to certain forms of subjectivity. Derrida suggests that we can do precisely this: we can free the discourse of emancipation from its essentialist foundations, thereby expanding it to include other political identities and struggles hitherto regarded as of little importance. In other words, the discourse of emancipation can be left structurally open, so that its content would no longer be limited or determined by its foundations. The Declaration of the Rights of Man, for instance, may be expanded to encompass the rights of women and even animals.410 The logic of emancipation is still at work today, although in different forms and represented by different struggles.

The question of rights reflects upon the differences between deconstructive politics and the revolutionary political logic of anarchism. Both strategies have a notion of political rights and a form of emancipatory struggle on the basis of these rights. The difference is, though, that anarchism sees these rights as essential and founded in natural law, while the politics of deconstruction would see these rights as radically founded: in other words, these rights are without stable foundations and, therefore, their content is not prefixed. This leaves them open to a plurality of different political articulations. This logic of a radical refounding based on a lack will become clearer later. As we have seen, however, the anarchist discourse of rights is founded upon a stable human essence. We have also seen the way in which these rights are strictly determined by this human essence: they remain rights limited by the figure of man and are denied to any form of subjectivity outside this conception. Stirner’s notion of the un-man, as a subjectivity excluded by man, was a reaction to this oppressive humanist logic. A deconstructive analysis questions this idea of natural, inalienable rights. Derrida, for instance, in his critique of liberal social contract theory, suggests that these “natural” rights are actually constituted discursively through the social contract and that, therefore, they cannot claim to be natural.411 These rights, then, are displaced from the social to the natural realm, and the social is subordinated to the natural, just as writing is subordinated to speech. As Derrida argues in his critique of Rousseau, the social is the supplement that threatens, and at the same time is necessary for, the identity of the natural: the idea of natural rights can only be formulated discursively through the contract. There is no pure natural foundation for rights, then, and this leaves them open to change and reinterpretation. They can no longer remain inscribed within human essence and, therefore, can no longer be taken for granted. If they are without firm foundations, we cannot always assume that they will continue to exist: they must be fought for, and in the process they will be reformulated by these struggles.

Deconstructive An-archy

It is through this deconstructive logic that political action becomes an-archic. An-archic action is distinguished here from anarchist action, which is, as we have seen, political action governed by an original principle such as human essence or rationality. While it is conditioned by certain principles, an-anarchic action is not necessarily determined or limited by them. An-archic action is the possible outcome of a deconstructive strategy aimed at undermining the metaphysical authority of various political and philosophical discourses. Reiner Schurmann defines an-archic action as action without a “why?”412 However, my deconstructive notion of an-archy might be somewhat different: it may be defined as action with a “why?”—action that is forced to account for itself and question itself, not necessarily in the name of a founding principle, but in the name of the deconstructive enterprise it has embarked upon. In other words, anarchic action is forced to account for itself, just as it forces authority to account for itself. It is this self-questioning that allows political action to resist place, to avoid becoming what it opposes. So this notion of an-archism may be a way of advancing the anti-authoritarian political project embarked upon by the classical anarchists. An-archism seeks to make this anti-authoritarian project account for itself, making it aware of the essentialist and potentially dominating categories within its own discourse. Moreover, it seeks, through the logic of deconstruction, to free the anti-authoritarian project from these categories that inevitably limit it. It therefore expands the anarchist critique of authority by pushing it beyond its own limits, and allowing it to reinvent itself. Derrida’s unmasking of the authority and hierarchy which continues to inhabit western thought, as well as his outlining of various strategies to counter it, have made this an-archist intervention possible.

Derrida occupies a number of crucial terrains, then, in the anti-authoritarian argument. His unmasking and deconstruction of the textual authority of logocentric philosophy has allows us to criticize, using the same logic, the political institutions and discourses which are based on this authority. The logic that he employs here is important for the perspective of our argument: it questions the purity and closure of any identity. A pure identity of resistance, an uncontaminated point of departure is denied because it is always contaminated by the identity it excludes. Using this logic, then, the identity of the human subject in anarchist discourse is contaminated by the identity of power. Derrida also forces anti-authoritarian thought to resist oppositional thinking, to operate outside the binary structures which have hitherto imprisoned it within the pernicious logic of place.

#### Breaking down elite control of energy policy is suicidal---destroys the capacity of centralized government to respond to climate change and environmental degradation

Mark Beeson 10, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918

Yet, whatever we may think about Asia's authoritarian regimes, we need to recognise that they have frequently been associated with a (generally successful) historical pattern of development that has prioritised the economic over the political, and that this model may continue to have appeal and potential efficacy (Beeson 2007b). The possibility that the state will, for better or worse, remain at the centre of attempts at environmental management is recognised by some scholars (Meadowcroft 2005), but even some of the most sophisticated analyses of the state's role seem overwhelming Eurocentric, highly abstract and not terribly helpful in explaining current or likely future political and environmental outcomes in places like Southeast Asia. For example, Eckersley's (2004, p. 178) belief that there is ‘the potential for a vibrant public sphere and innovative discursive procedures to lift the horizons of not only democratic opinion formation but also democratic will-formation beyond the territorially bounded community of citizens’, has little obvious resonance with the history of much of Southeast Asia [emphasis in original]. The reality is that the Philippines, the country with arguably the most vibrant civil society in Southeast Asia, also has one of the most appalling environmental records (Fahn 2003, p. 117).

Even in ‘developed’ industrial democracies with long traditions of political pluralism and arguably more effective civil societies, it has long been recognised that the exercise of effective ‘green’ agency is highly problematic and faces fundamental problems of mobilisation, organisation and collective action. The – perhaps understandable – suspicion of traditional politics, hierarchy and political authority has often rendered green parties politically ineffective (Goodin 1992). Even if we recognise the changes that have taken place in the social structures and even consciousness of many Western societies (Carter 2007), the reality on the ground in much of Southeast Asia and China is very different. Quotidian reality becomes especially important when we consider the potential efficacy of deliberative democracy, which some see as a way of resolving political conflicts over the environment.

Although deliberative democracy has been described as ‘the currently hegemonic approach to democracy within environmental thinking’ (Arias-Maldonado 2007, p. 245), it has little obvious relevance to the situation in East Asia. While there is much that is admirable about the central precepts of deliberative democracy (see Bohman 1998), its underlying assumptions about the circumstances in which political activity actually occur are strikingly at odds with the lived reality outside North America and Western Europe. This merits emphasis because for some writers rational, informed discourse is central to sustainable environmental management and the resolution of the competing interests that inevitably surround it (Hamilton and Wills-Toker 2006). And yet, as the very limited number of studies that actually examine environmental politics under authoritarian rule demonstrate, the reality is very different and the prospects for the development of progressive politics are very limited (Doyle and Simpson 2006). Even if we assume that political circumstances do actually allow for a politically unconstrained and informed discussion of complex issues, as Arias-Maldonado (2007, p. 248) points out, ‘the belief that citizens in a deliberative context will spontaneously acquire ecological enlightenment, and will push for greener decisions, relies too much on an optimistic, naive view of human nature, so frequently found in utopian political movements’.

In much of East Asia, the population may not have the luxury or capacity even to engage in these sorts of discursive practices, while the absence of effective democracy in much of the region stands as a continuing obstacle to achieving anything approximating deliberative democracy. Even more problematically in the long-run, there is no compelling evidence that democracy of any sort will necessarily promote good environmental outcomes (Neumayer 2002), or that rising living standards will inevitably deliver a sustainable environment (Dinda 2004). On the contrary, there is evidence to suggest that in the initial phases at least, ‘democratisation could indirectly promote environmental degradation through its effect on national income’ (Li and Reuveny 2006, p. 953). In other words, even the best of all outcomes – rising living standards and an outbreak of democracy – may have unsustainable environmental consequences that may prove to be their undoing in the longer-term. In such circumstances, ideas about possible ways of reorganising societies to lessen their impact on the natural environment may not find sufficient support to make them realisable or effective. As Lieberman (2002, p. 709) points out, ‘an idea's time arrives not simply because the idea is compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political circumstances favor it’. In much of Southeast Asia and China the forces supporting environmental protection are comparatively weak and unable to overcome powerful vested interests intent on the continuing exploitation of natural resources.

In short, predominantly Western concerns with ‘thick cosmopolitanism’ and the hope that a ‘metabolistic [sic] relationship with the natural environment’ might bind us to strangers (Dobson 2006, p. 177), seem bizarrely at odds with lived experience where climate change is already profoundly undermining sociability within national frameworks, let alone between them (Raleigh and Urdal 2007). The sobering reality would seem to be that ‘… as the human population grows and environmental damage progresses, policymakers will have less and less capacity to intervene to keep damage from producing serious social disruption, including conflict’ (Homer-Dixon 1991, p. 79).

#### Criticizing elitism and capitalism is woefully insufficient---the aff’s faith in bottom-up change delays the transition and only authoritarian coercion can resolve environmental decline fast enough---their deliberative ethic is founded on an ontology of abundance

Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 20-21

If these changes are necessary - the downgrading, curtailment and reconceptualisation of democracy, liberties, and justice, as well as the raising to primacy of integrity and ecological virtue - how are the necessary changes to come about? Value change represents the best 'long-term' hope but the ecological crisis is not a 'long-term' problem. These changes have to be introduced quickly and before there has been time to inculcate value shifts in the population. The downgrading of rights and liberties has to be achieved through policy and institutional change, even while the question of a long-term change of values is also addressed. For both these tasks what is required is political leadership and the institution of the state.

The immediate problem lies in the collective action problem that arises in respect of the looming ecological constraints on economic activity and the potential collapse of the global commons. The end of the 'golden age' of material abundance, as we slide back down the other side of 'Hubbert's pimple’ will bring about intense competition for scarce resources. To understand politics under these circumstances, we have to turn back to Hobbes and Burke, the political philosophers who conceptualised life under conditions of scarcity, and also to Plato, commended for his healthy mistrust of democracy.

For Ophuls a crucial element of political philosophy is the definition of reality itself; political philosophy carries within it an ontologieal component which sets out the foundations of political possibility. The contemporary West he sees as defined by the 'philosophers of the great frontier' Locke, Smith, and Marx. These are the political philosophers of abundance. For Locke the proviso of always leaving 'as much and as good' for others in appropriation could always be met even when there was no unappropriated land left, as the productivity of the land put to useful work would always create better opportunities for those coming later. Smiths 'invisible hand' thesis was also dependent upon the assumption that the material goods would always be available for individual to accomplish their own economic plans. For Marx the 'higher phase' of communist society arrives 'after the productive forces have... increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly' (Marx, 1970: 19). For Ophuls these are all the political philosophies of abundance. Ecological crisis, however, returns us to the Hobbesian struggle of all against all (Heilbroner, 1974: 89). With ecological scarcity we return to the classical problems of political theory that 400 years of abnormal abundance has shielded us from (Ophuls, 1977: 164). Both liberalism and socialism represent the politics of this 'abnormal abundance' and with the demise of this period we return to the eternal problems of politics.

Hobbes, then, is seen as the political philosopher of ecological scarcity avant la lettre. 'Hardin's "logic of the commons" is simply a special version of the general political dynamic of Hobbes' "state of nature"' (Ophuls, 1977; 148). Competition over scarce resources leads to conflict, even when all those involved realise that they would be collectively better off if they could co-operate, 'to bring about the tragedy of the commons it is not necessary that men be bad, only that they not be actively good' (Ophuls, 1977: 149). It is this Hobbesian struggle that may impose 'intolerable strains on the representative political apparatus that has been historically associated with capitalist societies' (Heilbroner, 1974: 89). Coercion is seen as the solution (and it is hoped, although as we have seen not for terribly good reasons, that this coercion can be agreed democratically), and the appropriate agent of this solution is the state. The transition from abundance to scarcity will have to be centralised and expert-controlled, and it is unlikely that 'a steady state polity could be democratic' (Ophuls, 1977: 162). As we shall see in the following paragraphs, this faith in the ability of the state to institute centralised controls that would be obeyed by its citizens is one of the areas that has attracted fierce criticism from contemporary green political theorists.

#### Only top-down, centralized imposition of constraints on freedom can guarantee planetary survival---their ethic will inevitably fail to improve ecological outcomes---an accelerating crisis makes authoritarianism inevitable, and the worse the environment gets, the worse the constraints on freedom will be

Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 14-15

In terms of the first of these points, that our democratic choices reflect a narrow understanding of our immediate interests and not an enlightened view of our long-term welfare, the case is made by Ophuls. He claims that we are now 'so committed to most of the things that cause or support the evils' with which he is concerned that 'we are almost paralysed; nearly all the constructive actions that could be taken at present... are so painful to so many people in so many ways that they are indeed totally unrealistic, and neither politicians nor citizens would tolerate them' (Ophuls, 1977: 224).4 Environmentally friendly policies can be justifiably imposed upon a population that 'would do something quite different if it was merely left to its own immediate desires and devices' (Ophuls, 1977: 227): currently left to these devices, the American people 'have so far evinced little willingness to make even minor sacrifices... for the sake of environmental goals' (Ophuls, 1977: 197). Laura Westra makes a similar argument in relation to the collapse of Canadian cod fisheries, which is taken to illustrate a wider point that we cannot hope to 'manage' nature when powerful economic and political interests are supported by 'uneducated democratic preferences and values' (Westra, 1998: 95). More generally reducing our 'ecological footprint' means 'individual and aggregate restraints the like of which have not been seen in most of the northwestern world. For this reason, it is doubtful that persons will freely embrace the choices that would severely curtail their usual freedoms and rights... even in the interests of long-term health and self-preservation.” (Westra, 1998: 198). Thus we will require a 'top-down' regulatory regime to take on 'the role of the "wise man" of Aristotelian doctrine as well as 'bottom-up' shifts in values (Westra, 1998: 199). Ophuls also believes that in certain circumstances (of which ecological crisis is an example) 'democracy must give way to elite rule' (1977: 159) as critical decisions have to be made by competent people.

The classic statement of the collective action problem in relation to environmental phenomena was that of Hardin (1968). The 'tragedy' here refers to the "remorseless working of things' towards an 'inevitable destiny' (Hardin, 1968: 1244, quoting A. N. Whitehead). Thus even if we are aware of where our long-term, enlightened interests do lie, the preferred outcome is beyond our ability to reach in an uncoerced manner. This is the n-person prisoners' dilemma, a well established analytical tool in the social analysis of collectively suboptimal outcomes. A brief example could be given in terms of an unregulated fishery. The owner of trawler can be fully aware that there is collective over-extraction from the fishing grounds he uses, and so the question arises of whether he should self-regulate his own catch. If he fishes to his maximum capacity, his gain is a catch fractionally depleted from what it would be if the fisheries were fully stocked. If the 'full catch' is 1, then this catch is 1 - £, where £ is the difference between the full stock catch and the depleted stock catch divided by the number of fishing vessels. If the trawlerman regulates his own catch, then he loses the entire amount that he feels each boat needs to surrender, and furthermore he has no reason to suppose that other fishermen would behave in a similar fashion, in fact he will expect them to benefit by catching the fish that he abjures. In the language of game theory he would be a 'sucker', and the rational course of action is to continue taking the maximum catch, despite the predictable conclusion that this course of action, when taken by all fishermen making the same rational calculation, will lead to the collapse of the fishery. Individual rationality leads to severely suboptimal outcomes. Under these circumstances an appeal to conscience is useless, as it merely places the recipient of the appeal in a 'double-bind'. The open appeal is 'behave as a responsible citizen, or you will be condemned. But there is also a covert appeal in the opposite direction; 'If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons' (Hardin, 1968: 246). Thus the appeal creates the imperative both to behave responsibly and to avoid being a sucker.

In terms of democracy, what this entails is that, in general, we have to be prepared to accept coercion in order to overcome the collective action problem.5 The Leviathan of the state is the institution that has the political power required to solve this conundrum. 'Mutual coercion, mutually agreed on" is Hardin's famous solution to the tragedy of the commons. Revisiting the 'tragedy' argument in 1998, Hardin held that '[i]ts message is, I think, still true today. Individualism is cherished because it produces freedom, but the gift is conditional: The more population exceeds the carrying capacity of the environment, the more freedoms must be given up' (Hardin, 1998: 682). On this view coercion is an integral part of politics: the state coerces when it taxes, or when it prevents us from robbing banks. Coercion has, however, become 'a dirty word for most liberals now' (Hardin, 1968: 1246) but this does not have to be the case as long as this coercion comes about as a result of the democratic will. This however, requires overcoming the problems raised by the likes of Ophuls and Westra, that is, it is dependent upon the assumption that people can agree to coerce each other in order to realise their long-term, 'enlightened' self-interest. If they cannot, and both the myopic and collective action problem ecological objections to democracy arc valid, then this coercion may not be 'mutually agreed upon' but rather imposed by Ophuls' ecological 'elite' or Westra's Aristotelian 'wise man'. Under these circumstances there seems to be no hope at all for a reconciliation of ecological imperatives and democratic decision-making: we are faced with a stark choice, democracy or ecological survival.

### Tech Good

#### Tech optimism based on empirical research is good---prefer specific experts

Krier 85 James E., Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, “The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 3; December 1985, pp. 405-429

A technological optimist is not simply a person with unqualified enthusiasm about technological promise. Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was an enthusiast, but he was not a technological optimist as the term is currently used. Saint-Simon, rather, was a utopian who happened to attach his vision to technocratic expertise.4 He was the forefather of Technocracy, an active utopian movement in the 1930s and one not entirely dead even today.5 Technological optimists are not utopians, but something less - let us say quasi-utopians, after a recent usage (applied to himself) of Robert Dahl's.6 Unlike any self-respecting pure utopian, quasi-utopians (and technological optimists) seek not perfection but tolerable imperfection, tolerable because it is better than anything else they consider attainable though not nearly as good as lots of alternatives that can be imagined. But technological optimists are also something more than mere believers, or faddists, or techniks.7 Their views are rigorously formulated, grounded in an apparent reality, based on knowledge and experience, and artfully defended. There are no crazies among the best of the optimists; they are conservative, respected experts who command enormous authority. They have a very specific position namely, "that exponential technological growth will allow us to expand resources ahead of exponentially increasing demands."8 This is the precise meaning of technological optimism as a term of art.

#### Tech thought is inevitable

Kateb 97 George, Professor of politics at Princeton, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_/ai\_19952031

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity--and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives--would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence. As for our generation and the indefinite future, many of us are prepared to say that there are many things we wish that modern science did not know or is likely to find out and many things we wish that modern technology did not know how to do. When referring in 1955 to the new sciences of life, Heidegger says We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us (1966, p. 52). The implication is that it is less bad for the human status or stature and for the human relation to reality that there be nuclear destruction than that (what we today call) genetic engineering should go from success to success. To such lengths can a mind push itself when it marvels first at the passions, drives, and motives that are implicated in modern technology, and then marvels at the feats of technological prowess. The sense of wonder is entangled with a feeling of horror. We are past even the sublime, as conceptualized under the influence of Milton's imagination of Satan and Hell. It is plain that so much of the spirit of the West is invested in modern technology. We have referred to anger, alienation, resentment. But that cannot be the whole story. Other considerations we can mention include the following: a taste for virtuosity, skill for its own sake, an enlarged fascination with technique in itself, and, along with these, an aesthetic craving to make matter or nature beautiful or more beautiful; and then, too, sheer exhilaration, a questing, adventurous spirit that is reckless, heedless of danger, finding in obstacles opportunities for self-overcoming, for daring, for the very sort of daring that Heidegger praises so eloquently when in 1935 he discusses the Greek world in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1961, esp. pp. 123-39). All these considerations move away from anger, anxiety, resentment, and so on. The truth of the matter, I think, is that the project of modern technology, just like that of modern science, must attract a turbulence of response. The very passions and drives and motives that look almost villainous or hypermasculine simultaneously look like marks of the highest human aspiration, or, at the least, are not to be cut loose from the highest human aspiration.

#### The alt provides no basis for distinguishing between good and bad technology – evaluating consequences on a case-by-case bases solves blind faith in tech while avoiding the alt’s reflexive rejection

Schafer 9 [Arthur Schafer, Director of the Centre for Professional and Applied Ethics, University of Manitoba, Jan 1 2009, Review of *The End of Ethics In A Technological Society,* http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/departments/philosophy/ethics/media/End\_of\_Ethics\_In\_A\_Technological\_Society.pdf]

In the book under review, Lawrence E. Schmidt and Scott Marratto reject holus bolus the Enlightenment faith in reason and progress and seem personally affronted by Bacon’s aphorism that “knowledge is power”. 1 On the technophilia-technophobia spectrum, they fall near the extreme end of the technophobia pole. Whereas Enlightenment philosophes were confident that the advance of modern science would make our world more reasonable, humane and prosperous, Schmidt & Marratto deny that that scientific knowledge brings progress in any form. They do concede at one point that “we cannot turn off the lights and live in the dark.” [p.xiv] Nevertheless, they advocate a “clear and absolute” set of limits “to what human beings may ethically do to themselves, to other human beings or to the environment (nature)” [p.xiv] and they appear to reject most, if not all, of what technology has to offer. Readers who seek rational criteria with which to evaluate the moral acceptability of new technologies will find little more on offer than vague platitudes. ¶ The authors argue at length that liberal (consequentialist) theories cannot offer “any solutions to the moral dilemmas that we face in the technological society”. [p.166] Instead, they ask the reader to accept a “supersensuous, supernatural, or metaphysically transcedent good”. [p.166] The supernatural, they insist, will provide all the answers we need. Disappointingly, however, when it comes to the crunch they fold their tents and slink away into the night. “It has not been our purpose in this book … to argue for the superiority of transcendental moral realism.” [p.166] Readers who prefer evidence and arguments to dogma are unhelpfully referred to Real Ethics by John Rist. Perhaps Schmidt and Marratto ought to have held up on publishing their thoughts until they were prepared to offer some kind of reasoned justification for their position. At all events, they either can’t or won’t tell us how to draw a reasonably defensible moral dividing line between good and bad technologies.¶ According to the religious traditionalism favoured by the authors, the universe is part of God’s benevolent creation, and human beings are assigned a starring role in the cosmic drama. Since no scientific worldview can offer similar assurances, science appears bleak and pessimistic. In place of religion’s flattering assumption that heavenly bodies exist as human adornments, science informs us that planet earth is merely one of many planets in a solar system that is merely one of innumerable solar systems in a galaxy that is merely one among billions of galaxies. Thus, science makes it difficult to hang onto the comforting notion that humankind is at the centre of the universe. Worse, biological science tells us that humanity has gradually evolved from a series of animal ancestors over a period lasting millions of years. This doesn’t fit well with such religious claims as that the earth is less than ten thousand years old and that God created humankind at one fell swoop and in His own image. ¶ In other words, if one accepts the perspective of physics and evolutionary biology then the theologians’ “orderly universe” [p.165] vanishes. If humanity is the product of evolutionary natural selection acting on random heritable variations then appeals to Human Nature as the absolute foundation for ethics will be stripped of their normative force. If there is no divine blueprint then we can no longer denounce scientific developments on the grounds that they are “unnatural” attempts to “play God”. Science is subversive precisely because it undermines traditional appeals to Natural Law of the sort favoured by Schmidt and Marratto.¶ This largely explains why the authors are highly critical of modernity. They see modern ethics as amounting to no ethics at all. That’s because modern ethics denies that the meaning of life can be read off from Nature. According to modernism– secular, liberal and humanistic - there is no meaning of life waiting “out there” to be discovered. Progress is possible but first we have to decide what we mean by “progress”. For today’s secular humanist, progress is usually defined, minimally, as a reduction in pain and suffering for human beings and other sentient creatures. To achieve this, we are obliged to use science and technology in order better to understand ourselves and the world in which we live. The overarching goal is to make life a little less terrible for each succeeding generation. On this secular view, it is we (rather than God) who must work out what it means for a life to go well or badly. Since we are alone in the universe, it is we who must ultimately decide what is to count as meaning and purpose.¶ Against this secular approach to ethics, Schmidt and Marratto advocate that we view the universe sub specie aeternitatis. They cling unshakeably to their conviction that the universe is ordered according to a (divine) blueprint, designed and brought into existence by a benevolent creator. Once we discover the harmonious design that pervades the universe, we will then also have discovered the key to “objective” ethics. Unlike scientific investigation and experimentation, which merely reveal the nature of the physical world, the doctrine of Natural Law promises to reveal how we should live.¶ Here’s an example of how the debate plays out. The world’s first “test tube baby”, Louise Brown, was born thirty years ago, in 1978. It would be no exaggeration to say that this event generated a widespread sense of moral panic. Doomsayers abounded, eager to announce that the technology employed by Doctors Edwards and Steptoe was the beginning of the end of human civilization. Religious leaders and some bioethicists stepped smartly to the microphone in order to anathematize IVF technology as profoundly “unnatural”; scientists were accused of “playing God”. Inevitably, the fearful image of Dr. Frankenstein was invoked. To “manufacture” a baby in this way was an unparalleled act of hubris. If IVF technology were not immediately banned it would quickly destroy the mystery of sex, procreation, and childbirth. Marriages would crumble, sex would cease or would lose its significance and respect for the sanctity of human life would erode. We were, it was claimed, on the slippery slope to a dystopic “brave new world”. The only way to avoid these dire consequences would be to impose a world-wide ban on IVF. Eighteen years later, with the cloning of Dolly the sheep, a second moral panic generated similar fearful predictions.¶ On a consequentialist approach, by contrast, one investigates the facts pertaining to any new technology and then attempts to do a careful balancing of the likely benefits and harms before deciding whether individuals should be permitted to make their own decisions about adopting or rejecting the technology. Admittedly, predicting and assessing the likely future consequences of our decisions, both individual and collective, is no easy task. But this much is clear: the doomsayers were wildly wrong in their fearful predictions about the negative consequences of IVF. Louise Brown is today a well-functioning young woman and some 100,000 childless couples have been able to give birth to children. Not such a big deal, you might think.

### Science Good

#### Scientific knowledge is best because it subjects itself to constant refinement based on empirical evidence

Hutcheon 93—former prof of sociology of education at U Regina and U British Columbia. Former research advisor to the Health Promotion Branch of the Canadian Department of Health and Welfare and as a director of the Vanier Institute of the Family. Phd in sociology, began at Yale and finished at U Queensland. (Pat, A Critique of "Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA", http://www.humanists.net/pdhutcheon/humanist%20articles/lewontn.htm)

The introductory lecture in this series articulated the increasingly popular "postmodernist" claim that all science is ideology. Lewontin then proceeded to justify this by stating the obvious: that scientists are human like the rest of us and subject to the same biases and socio-cultural imperatives. Although he did not actually say it, his comments seemed to imply that the enterprise of scientific research and knowledge building could therefore be no different and no more reliable as a guide to action than any other set of opinions. The trouble is that, in order to reach such an conclusion, one would have to ignore all those aspects of the scientific endeavor that do in fact distinguish it from other types and sources of belief formation.¶ Indeed, if the integrity of the scientific endeavor depended only on the wisdom and objectivity of the individuals engaged in it we would be in trouble. North American agriculture would today be in the state of that in Russia today. In fact it would be much worse, for the Soviets threw out Lysenko's ideology-masquerading-as-science decades ago. Precisely because an alternative scientific model was available (thanks to the disparaged Darwinian theory) the former Eastern bloc countries have been partially successful in overcoming the destructive chain of consequences which blind faith in ideology had set in motion. This is what Lewontin's old Russian dissident professor meant when he said that the truth must be spoken, even at great personal cost. How sad that Lewontin has apparently failed to understand the fact that while scientific knowledge -- with the power it gives us -- can and does allow humanity to change the world, ideological beliefs have consequences too. By rendering their proponents politically powerful but rationally and instrumentally impotent, they throw up insurmountable barriers to reasoned and value-guided social change.¶ What are the crucial differences between ideology and science that Lewonton has ignored? Both Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have spelled these out with great care -- the former throughout a long lifetime of scholarship devoted to that precise objective. Stephen Jay Gould has also done a sound job in this area. How strange that someone with the status of Lewontin, in a series of lectures supposedly covering the same subject, would not at least have dealt with their arguments!¶ Science has to do with the search for regularities in what humans experience of their physical and social environments, beginning with the most simple units discernible, and gradually moving towards the more complex. It has to do with expressing these regularities in the clearest and most precise language possible, so that cause-and-effect relations among the parts of the system under study can be publicly and rigorously tested. And it has to do with devising explanations of those empirical regularities which have survived all attempts to falsify them. These explanations, once phrased in the form of testable hypotheses, become predictors of future events. In other words, they lead to further conjectures of additional relationships which, in their turn, must survive repeated public attempts to prove them wanting -- if the set of related explanations (or theory) is to continue to operate as a fruitful guide for subsequent research.¶ This means that science, unlike mythology and ideology, has a self-correcting mechanism at its very heart. A conjecture, to be classed as scientific, must be amenable to empirical test. It must, above all, be open to refutation by experience. There is a rigorous set of rules according to which hypotheses are formulated and research findings are arrived at, reported and replicated. It is this process -- not the lack of prejudice of the particular scientist, or his negotiating ability, or even his political power within the relevant university department -- that ensures the reliability of scientific knowledge. The conditions established by the community of science is one of precisely defined and regulated "intersubjectivity". Under these conditions the theory that wins out, and subsequently prevails, does so not because of its agreement with conventional wisdom or because of the political power of its proponents, as is often the case with ideology. The survival of a scientific theory such as Darwin's is due, instead, to its power to explain and predict observable regularities in human experience, while withstanding worldwide attempts to refute it -- and proving itself open to elaboration and expansion in the process. In this sense only is scientific knowledge objective and universal. All this has little relationship to the claim of an absolute universality of objective "truth" apart from human strivings that Lewontin has attributed to scientists.¶ Because ideologies, on the other hand, do claim to represent truth, they are incapable of generating a means by which they can be corrected as circumstances change. Legitimate science makes no such claims. Scientific tests are not tests of verisimilitude. Science does not aim for "true" theories purporting to reflect an accurate picture of the "essence" of reality. It leaves such claims of infallibility to ideology. The tests of science, therefore, are in terms of workability and falsifiability, and its propositions are accordingly tentative in nature. A successful scientific theory is one which, while guiding the research in a particular problem area, is continuously elaborated, revised and refined, until it is eventually superseded by that very hypothesis-making and testing process that it helped to define and sharpen. An ideology, on the other hand, would be considered to have failed under those conditions, for the "truth" must be for all time. More than anything, it is this difference that confuses those ideological thinkers who are compelled to attack Darwin's theory of evolution precisely because of its success as a scientific theory. For them, and the world of desired and imagined certainty in which they live, that very success in contributing to a continuously evolving body of increasingly reliable -- albeit inevitably tentative -- knowledge can only mean failure, in that the theory itself has altered in the process.

## 1NR

### U---Authoritarianism Inevitable

#### Environmental decline makes the transition to authoritarianism inevitable---the only question is whether it can be effective

Mark Beeson 10, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918

The conclusions that emerge from the following discussion are necessarily impressionistic, speculative and rather dispiriting. The empirical evidence upon which such inferences depend is, by contrast, more and more compelling and unequivocal. There is little doubt that the natural environment everywhere is under profound, perhaps irredeemable stress. Parts of Southeast Asia and China are distinctive only in having already gone further than the most of the West in the extent of the degradation that has already occurred (see Jasparro and Taylor 2008). The only issue that remains in doubt is the nature of the response to this unfolding crisis. The extent of the problem, the seemingly implacable nature of the drivers of environmental decline, the limited capacity for action at the national level and the region's unimpressive record of cooperation and environmental management do not inspire confidence. Consequently, the prospects for an authoritarian response become more likely as the material base of existence becomes less capable of sustaining life, let alone the ‘good life’ upon which the legitimacy of democratic regimes hinges.

#### The environmental crisis will collapse democracy---embracing deliberation now causes delayed response that ensures extinction

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 153-156

As we have said, it is not too difficult to see how this present regime of global capitalism and liberal democracy will end: It will end through ecological necessity. Nature will take humanity by the throat and confront it with the biospherical damage that it has done. It is most unlikely in our opinion that some form of spontaneous, unorganized democratic groundswell will awaken the masses to their fates before it is too late. Rather any such resistance to the system must come from an organized vanguard, unafraid to ultimately rule in the name of the common good. These new philosopher kings feature what we call the “authoritarian alternative” discussed earlier.

### AT: Ecological Authoritarianism Doesn’t Solve

#### Environmental authoritarianism would be super-effective

Charles Daniel 12, University of Leeds, Summer 2012, “To what extent is democracy detrimental to the current and future aims of environmental policy and technologies?,” POLIS Journal, Vol. 7, <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/charles-daniel.pdf>

Whilst not completely discrediting democracy, the previous chapter certainly highlights a number of shortcomings in the reality of the continued pursuit of consumerist tendencies through a culture based on liberalism and individuality. The evidence suggests that there needs to be a higher level of adaptability from modern states and a move away from the pursuit of the values of modernity, however difficult a concept this may be to accept. Despite its clear political shortcomings, is it possible that an authoritarian approach may be the most logical and efficient system to tackle the challenges of the environment?

As stated previously in the introduction, the reference to ‘authoritarianism’ should not be perceived in its traditional expression but rather in a more hybrid and rational sense. The best reference point for this is to be found in Robert Scalapino’s model of ‘soft authoritarianism’. He defines this as controlled political life, where freedom of speech is limited, yet those in power accept ‘the existence of a civil society outside the state’ (Scalapino 1993: 74). It also combines a market-orientated system with a paternalistic social order that persuades rather than coerces (Roy 1994). Scalapino’s model, it should be noted, is centred on defining the nature of Asian political models, such as those used by Singapore and to an extent China, rather than a historical western expression of authoritarianism. Francis Fukuyama, who regarded it as the most serious competitor to liberal democracy, furthered Scalapino’s discussion on soft authoritarianism. He emphasised the cultural relativity of this mode of government, as a result of its grounding in historical values and regarded it as the primary explanation for Asia’s continued economic dominance. As he put it:

‘The Asian experience has forced people in the West to confront weaknesses in their own societies in a way that none of the other ideological alternatives has. Only Asians have been able to master the modern technological world and create capitalist societies competitive with those of the West - indeed, some would argue, superior in many ways. This alone is enough to suggest that Asia's relative share of global power will increase steadily. But Asia also poses an ideological challenge.’ (Fukuyama 1995: 61)

For Fukuyama, the Asian political grounding in Confucian values of loyalty and obedience to authority combined with historical experience, has allowed soft authoritarianism to build a system that will arguably be considered as a more popular mode of government over democracy in Far Eastern political culture. Whilst Western societies attempt to cultivate their democratic values from an ideological grounding that in turn produces institutions, civil society and culture, Asian models are orientated in a reverse structure, putting primacy on cultural experience and teachings (Fukuyama 1995). The essence of Asian society is therefore not centered on individual rights and freedom but rather on a deeply ingrained moral code and communitarian ethics. The difficulty however, as Fukuyama highlights, is that soft authoritarianism is culturally relative and therefore would be difficult to transfer to western societies as a viable alternative to democracy. However when it comes to environmental issues, there is no reason to suggest that soft authoritarianism cannot be used as a political reference point for policy decisions, even amongst Western governments. For, contained within soft authoritarianism lies transferable principles, the most compelling one being trust and obedience in authoritative bodies to carry out policies for the long-term benefit of the community, rather than the short-term interest of the individual. If democracy is to be considered a failing political system in the context of an over-developed society, then this well articulated form of government does pose an interesting alternative.

#### Authoritarianism key to solve extinction, Singapore proves it’s feasible

Stephan Ortmann 9, Research Fellow, Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong, 9/25/09, “Environmental Governance under Authoritarian Rule: Singapore and China,” https://www.dvpw.de/fileadmin/docs/Kongress2009/Paperroom/2009VglDiktatur-pOrtmann.pdf

Even though today the consensus argues that democracy is preferable over authoritarianism, some authors continue to claim that an authoritarian form of government would be better able to protect the environment. The most recent formulation of this argument comes from Shearman and Smith (2007) who maintain that mankind can only survive the environmental crisis if it gives up personal liberties, an argument that has been made by many others (for instance: Beck 1997). In their opinion, the main fault of democracy is its link to capitalism and the main goal must be a nogrowth economy because that is the only way mankind can survive. While Shearman and Smith recognize the fact that existing authoritarian regimes have performed worse than democracies, they envision an authoritarian meritocracy that can achieve the goals democracies have thus far failed to accomplish. In their opinion, an ideal political system would be governed by an “altruistic, able, authoritarian leader, versed in science and personal skills” (Ibid. p. 13) who could possibly overcome the existing environmental crisis. This argument is partially based on the author's perceptions of Singapore, a self-proclaimed meritocracy ruled by a small technocratic elite. They assert that “a Singapore system could be developed to drive vital environmental outcomes in the interests of humanity” (Ibid., p. 126). Let us now turn to Singapore in order to first understand whether that assertion is true and secondly whether this “model” can be adapted to other countries. With other words, is it possible to achieve some general form of environmental governance under authoritarian rule which is superior to the democratic alternative?

3. Singapore, the authoritarian garden city

Singapore, a small city-state in Southeast Asia with roughly 4.7 million inhabitants and an area of 274 square miles (710 square kilometers), epitomizes the authoritarian technocracy that some environmentalists such as Shearman and Smith have envisaged in their writings. The city-state recruits its leaders solely from the highest achieving scholars. Education is a central concern of the leadership, which considers technocratic decisions superior to other forms of decision making. It is therefore not surprising that Singapore's democracy has been hollowed § Marked 19:42 § out, leaving only procedures to generate a certain degree of electoral legitimacy for the ruling party.

The city-state has been labeled the “Garden City” because it combines beautiful natural gardens with clean air that is incomparable to other cities in Asia and rivals places in Europe (unless, of course, there are massive forest fires in Indonesia). The government has been instrumental in developing and steering the environmental programs since the country's independence in 1965. In that same year, the government introduced the Green City Concept, which provided for the large scale planting of trees and scrubs. The Singapore Government has been intent on protecting drinking water reservoirs, reclaiming waste water, and most recently also recycling. The government is the principal agent driving the agenda on environmental protection. For instance, it conducts a yearly campaign called the Keep Singapore Green and Clean Campaign to educate people to become more environmentally conscious. Former Prime Minister and founding father Lee Kuan Yew took credit for this result when he asserted in 1995: “Singapore today is a verdant city, where abundant greenery softens the landscape. This was no accident of nature. It is the result of a deliberate 30-year policy, which required political will and sustained effort to carry out” (qt. in: CLAIR, 2001). Savage and Kong (1993: 38) also argue that Singapore's success is due to “[e]nlightened elites and decision makers and firm government (which) are the only ways to ensure the successful management and sustenance of viable urban ecosystems.”

At the same time, Singapore's environmental protection efforts have been achieved through “regulation and direct controls using legal and fiscal measures” (Kong, 1994: 5). In effect this means that the government is willing and capable to exact high penalties for violators. This has earned the city-state the reputation of a “fine city.” Of course these fines do not primarily punish those who violate environmental rules but rather target a wide range of unacceptable behavior, such as eating and drinking on the MRT, Singapore's subway, or the failure to flush a toilet. Nevertheless, the government has become known for its successful implementation of its laws and regulations, which can be attributed to the strong administrative centralization in this relatively small city-state and a largely effective legal system.

### AT: Democracy Solves

#### They can’t win they solve:

#### 1) Their participation in deliberative forums is disempowering and exacerbates power differentials within communities---turns the whole case and means decisions are worse than they’d be with no deliberation at all

Tina Nabatchi 7, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs and a Faculty Research Associate at the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration at Syracuse University, 2007, Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy, p. 66-67

As noted earlier, one of the strongest arguments in favor of deliberative democracy is that such participation has intrinsic benefits for citizens. Not all agree with this assertion. Some scholars argue that the inverse is true, that participation can injure citizens, causing them to feel frustrated and to perceive personal inefficacy and powerlessness.

Real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, can exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many issues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 191).

Advocates of deliberative democracy argue that "[w]hen people come into contact with those who are different, they become better citizens, as indicated in their values and behavior" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 232); however, to get the full benefits of associational involvement, the groups must be diverse. The logic here is straightforward - to experience the benefits of deliberation, one must hear a variety of viewpoints. Despite this argument, social psychology research indicates that it is difficult to get people involved in heterogeneous groups, and that when they do join such a group, they tend to interact with groups members who are similar to them (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005; Sunstein, 2003).

#### 2) The plan is a worse abuse of centralization---the overwhelming majority of people want to have less involvement in politics, not more---the aff paradoxically forces people into a deconstructive system they don’t want

Tina Nabatchi 7, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs and a Faculty Research Associate at the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration at Syracuse University, 2007, Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy, p. 64-65

Not all scholars agree that deliberative democracy has such benefits; in fact, many see a distinct dark side to deliberative democracy. On a practical note, some scholars point to the high the transaction costs for participants in deliberative forums and suggest that these costs may outweigh the potential benefits of participation for citizens and policy makers (e.g., Huntington, 1975). For citizens, transaction costs may include time, money (e.g., lost wages or child care costs), and otherwise forgoing more preferable activities (Rydin and Pennington, 2000). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) articulate this issue well:

The last thing people want is to be more involved political decisionmaking; they do not want to provide much input to those who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know all the details of the decisionmaking process. Most people have strong feelings on few if any of the issues the government needs to address and would much prefer to spend their time in non-political pursuits.

Moreover, "securing broad-based, meaningful deliberation on contentious issues from ordinary citizens, most of whom have little desire to engage in public policy discussions, is next to impossible no matter how creative the contrived forum may be" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 228). Following this argument, the lack of political participation among Americans may in fact not be a bellwether of democratic crisis, but rather a sign of widespread content and satisfaction with the status quo (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Macedo et ah, 2005). In fact some scholars argue that many of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy (Huntington, 1975: 113).

#### 3) Elite control is inevitable---only a stable transition to eco-authoritarianism causes elite governance based on environmental principles of sustainability for everyone---solves all their elitism impacts

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 131-134

It is foolish to attempt to sketch any detailed model of what an ecologically sustainable authoritarian government would be like. We cannot anticipate the full scope of the environmental damage to which the planet will be subjected before humans wake up, if they do so at all. However some broad generalizations can be made at this point in history.

We propose that any sustainable society, even if it takes the form of a group of tribes living in a state depicted by the Mad Max/Road Warrior movies will be centered around ecology rather than economics. Concerns will be biologically based rather than consumption based. This will become the necessity. Recognizing the move to conflict and war for environmental resources (chapter 3) we emphasize the need for structures that utilize peaceful mechanisms. However attractive to us as near primates, the guerrilla methods of The Monkey Wrench Gang29 must be denounced.

We advocate a form of governance by authoritarianism abhorrent to liberal thinkers. But society is already managed by the hidden hand of the financial elite, and freedom is illusory and diminishing. Little can be done about the fact that we, the ordinary people, will wear chains, as we have always done. But perhaps the type of chains and how tightly they bind us can be influenced by our thinking.

We commence with a description of the elites that we don’t want; it is then possible to see the flip side of this character. Government today is primarily influenced by economic policies and modes of thought and is executed by the elected politician who with very few exceptions has emerged as adept at working corrupt party machines. Those who out- maneuver their colleagues to gain leadership are reluctant to leave and often begin the inevitable moves to authoritarianism. They are universally poorly regarded by the electors, and it is worthwhile to quote the insightful remarks of that brilliant iconoclastic writer and political commentator H.L. Mencken (1880–1956) who observed that politicians

seldom if ever get there [into power] by merit alone, at least in democratic states. Sometimes, to be sure, it happens, but only by a kind of miracle. They are chosen normally for quite different reasons, the chief of which is simply their power to impress and enchant the intellectually underprivileged . . . Will any of them venture to tell the plain truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about the situation of the country, foreign or domestic? Will any of them refrain from promises that he knows he can’t fulfill—that no human being could fulfill? Will any of them utter a word, however obvious, that will alarm and alienate any of the huge pack of morons who cluster at the public trough, wallowing in the pap that grows thinner and thinner, hoping against hope? Answer: maybe for a few weeks at the start . . . But not after the issue is fairly joined, and the struggle is on in earnest . . . they will divest themselves from their character as sensible, candid and truthful men, and become simply candidates for office, bent only on collaring votes.30

Hans-Hermann Hoppe in his book Democracy: The God that Failed develops Mencken’s critique of democracy in this respect.31 He says that democratic popular elections make it impossible (difficult, we believe) for good and decent people to rise to the top. Much like a pot of boiling water containing impurities, the scum will rise to the top. And as we have seen, they do so. Hoppe, with his typical tough turn of phrase, laments that under democracy the leaders are increasingly bad and sadly only “rarely assassinated.”32

The democratic system itself attracts to politics those people who are the most unsuitable for government. We should add that most authoritarian systems are also defective in this respect. The ruling elites typically first obtain power by violence, usually in the midst of the breakdown of democracy. An oppressive state machine is then set up and perpetuated by megalomaniac types who lust for power as a mode of personal advancement.

Have we set ourselves an insurmountable problem? Who are to be new elites? In capitalist society, where money and self-promotion rule, they are invisible. Since we wish to avoid self-selection, how are they to be drafted into service? Intellectualism alone is not sufficient, for in the past century the intellectual has succumbed to the hymns of tyranny as often as the rest of us.33

Perhaps we could commence by identifying those leaders in history who were humble and worked for the common good. Yes, there were some who did not fit the selfish mores of society. We crucified them, ignored them, burned them, or, in modern times, shot them. Jesus Christ, Buddha, Socrates, St. Francis of Assisi, Dali Lama, and Gandhi. The difficulty of the task indicates the inadequacies of humankind.

Let us take the question a stage further. Are there any individuals, not interested in self-aggrandizement and accumulation of material assets, who have broad intellectual, scientific, and social managerial skills to lead humanity through the environmental crisis? By definition, they have not placed their head above the parapet to join the scramble of economic rationalism. Such persons of integrity and learning have been sought for centuries. Aristotle referred to them as aristocracy. This meant ”the best,” as interpreted by Graham in The Case Against the Democratic State.34 They were those with the abilities and attitudes of mind to be entrusted with government. The sixteenth century philosopher Etienne de la Boetie said in his treatise, The Politics of Obedience, the following:

There are always a few, better endowed than others . . . These are in fact the men who, possessed of clear minds and farsighted spirit, are not satisfied, like the brutish mass, to see what is at their feet, but rather look about them, behind and before, and even recall the things of the past in order to judge those of the future, and compare both with their present condition. These are the ones who, having good minds of their own, have further trained them by study and learning. Even if liberty had finally perished from the earth, such men would invent it. For them slavery has no satisfaction, no matter how well disguised.35

Both de la Boetie and Hoppe are primarily concerned with the preservation of freedom of the individual, this being the core value in their systems. But for us freedom is not the most fundamental value and is merely one value among others. Survival strikes us as a much more basic value. Now our proposal is that since fighters for freedom are always likely to arise, the probability of fighters for life and survival arising must be as great if not greater. This will be especially so if the opportunity is provided for such ecowarrior/philosophers to develop and be nurtured in special institutions called “real universities” or academies. At present our leaders are primarily trained in institutions that perpetuate and legitimate our environmentally destructive system. The conventional university trains narrow, politically correct thinkers who ultimately become the economic warriors of the system. Our proposal is to counter this by an alternative framework for the training and complete education of a new type of person who will be wise and fit to serve and to rule. Unlike the narrowly focused economic rationalist universities of today, the real university will train holistic thinkers in all of the arts and sciences necessary for tough decision making that the environmental crisis confronts us with. These thinkers will be the true public intellectuals with knowledge well grounded in ecology. Chapter 9 will describe in more detail how we might begin the process of constructing such real universities to train the ecowarriors to do battle against the enemies of life. We must accomplish this education with the dedication that Sparta used to train its warriors. As in Sparta, these natural elites will be especially trained from childhood to meet the challenging problems of our times.

Government in the future will be based upon (or incorporate, depending on the level of breakdown of civilization) a supreme office of the biosphere. The office will comprise specially trained philosopher/ecologists. These guardians will either rule themselves or advise an authoritarian government of policies based upon their ecological training and philosophical sensitivities. These guardians will be specially trained for this task.

### AT: Relation to Other Solves

#### They can’t win an impact that matters---constant deconstructive criticism precludes a conception of the overall common good---freedom to live according to self-defined values ends up harming everyone---only embracing coercion in the name of the environment accords the highest possible relation to the other

Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 17-18

In seeking lo challenge what they see as widely accepted and deeply held values in contemporary societies, the eco-authoritarians seek to both promote a new set of values and recontest or downgrade existing ones on the grounds that they are harmful to the prospects of ecological survival. The fundamental divide here is between a politics of the right and a politics of the good. Eco-authoritarians see liberalism (as a manifestation of the politics of the right) as being a transient phenomenon crucially dependent upon the temporary conditions of material abundance ushered in by the fossil fuel age. Liberalism is a function of the material conditions that make it possible and is parasitic upon unsustainable economic policies. When the tragedy of the commons strikes, then 'the concept of inalienable rights, the purely self-defined pursuit of happiness, liberty as maximum freedom of action, and laissez-faire all become problematic1 (Ophuls, 1977: 152). As an account of the rights embedded in liberal ideology this is itself a contestable account, but it illustrates the way in which liberal democracy is understood in this body of literature. The problem lies in the rights that are granted which allow us to live according to our self-defined values. Westra also holds that the proliferation, under conditions of liberal democracy, of individual and aggregate rights is undesirable from an environmental point of view (1998: 57). The choices we make under these conditions are not constrained by a conception of the common good, and so can be harmful to all (Westra, 1998: 155). Hardin focuses on one particular right, that of procreation - it is ‘painful' to have to deny, categorically, the claim embodied in the UN Declaration on Human Rights that 'any choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else' (1968: 1246). Nonetheless it is the case that to 'couple the concept of the freedom to breed with.. .an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action' (1968: 1246).

So, the kinds of 'basic liberties' that would be constitutionally entrenched in, say, a Rawlsian liberal society in order to ensure people the right to choose their own form of life are seen on this view as profoundly problematic in terms of their ecological consequences. Abrogating these rights may violate the liberal conception of justice, but 'injustice is preferable to total ruin' (Ophuls, quoting Hardin, 1977: 148). Justice, anyway, is one of the political concepts for which a move away from the liberal definition is suggested as explained later in this chapter. Against the politics of the right the eco-authoritarians recommend a virtue politics based upon a conception of the common good. Against the liberal desire to allow people to choose their own values, ‘wisdom’ tells us that not all values are equal and that virtue matters in life (Ophuls, 1977: 237). Virtue here entails recognising the necessity of living life according to 'ecological values' and being prepared to abandon or reconfigure those values that are not conducive to the end of sustainability. Westra offers the overarching value of (ecological) 'integrity' as the embodiment of this politics of the common good. This in turn is defined in terms of ecosystem health, resilience, the optimum potential for speciation and development, and the non-constraint of non-human nature by the actions of human beings (see Westra, 1998: 7-8). Integrity 'demands' that approximately one-third of the earth's surface be left in a wild and unmanaged state. The value of integrity is taken to embody the good of all, and so is uncompromising in its prescription of infinite, non-negotiable value to life (§ Marked 19:45 § 1998: 12). Integrity serves to ground the precautionary principle, which should be mandatory in public policy7 Integrity is 'more basic' than justice, and is an anti-democratic principle (1998: 9) because democratic choices are inadequate when it comes to realising the principle (1998: 222). The principle is rendered 'compatible' with the idea of right simply by being recast in terms of a right, the fundamental and trumping 'right' to integrity, which is taken to operate at both a micro (organism) and macro (species, ecosystem) level. Only such a principle can protect people from unchosen harm, whereas democracy can inflict unchosen harms, or at least the risk of such harms, onto defeated minorities.

As a manifestation of the common good it behoves all of us to live according to the principle of ecological integrity, and to the extent that we do not embrace this principle voluntarily, those in authority will have to force it upon us, rather in the fashion of the forced administration of anti-psychotic medicines. The Aristotelian 'wise man' referred to above will have the task of running a top-down regulatory regime - 'the "top-down" regulatory and public policy aspect will have to be prescribed by an interdisciplinary team of biologists, ecologists, political scientists, medical specialists and philosophers with a strong traditional moral basis' (1998: 198-9). Given our poor habits of making democratic decisions that are not underpinned by conceptions of the common good (1998: 155), of choosing leaders for the 'wrong' reasons and making decisions on the basis of uninformed preferences, we have to accept the imperative to downgrade the value of democracy and accept more authoritarian forms of public rule. This downgrading of the value of democracy is common across this literature, although at times it seems in tension with the projection of mutual coercion mutually agreed upon, which implies a democratically legitimated move towards authoritarian forms of government.

### Impact Calc---2NC

#### The 1AC precludes effective centralized responses to a worsening global environmental crisis that risks the extinction of humanity as well as the total destruction of the biosphere and countless other species---overwhelming scientific evidence confirms that we’ve got a short window of time to take direct, concerted actions to move society back within the margin of ecological sustainability---that’s Shearman.

#### This vastly outweighs the case---preserving existence by definition has to come before any other value---worsening environmental crisis turns all of their impacts, but embracing eco-authoritarianism unites humanity and solves all war

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 85-86

Our position differs from Wolff and other anarchists also insofar as we reject the principle of autonomy, the foundation belief of liberalism. It is the argument of this work that liberalism has essentially overdosed on freedom and liberty. It is true that freedom and liberty are important values, but such values are by no means fundamental or ultimate values. These values are far down the list of what we believe to be core values based upon an ecological philosophy of humanity: survival and the integrity of ecological systems. Without such values, values such as freedom and autonomy make no sense at all. If one is not living, one cannot be free. Indeed liberal freedom essentially presupposes the idea of a sustainable life for otherwise the only freedom that the liberal social world would have would be to perish in a polluted environment.

The issue of values calls into question the Western view of the world or perhaps more specifically the viewpoint that originates from Anglo Saxon development. It is significant that the “clash of civilizations” thinking espoused by Samuel Huntington, a precursor of the neoconservatives, has generated much debate and support. Huntington’s analysis involves potential conflict between “Western universalism, Muslim militancy and Chinese assertion.”18 The divisions are based on cultural inheritance. It is a world in which enemies are essential for peoples seeking identity and where the most severe conflicts lie at the points where the major civilizations of the world clash. Hopefully this viewpoint will be superseded, for humanity no longer has time for the indulgence of irrational hates. The important clash will not be of civilizations but of values. The fault line cuts across all civilizations. It is a clash of values between the conservatives and the consumers. The latter are well described in this book. They rule the world economically, and their thinking excludes true care for the future of the world. The conservatives at present are a powerless polyglot of scientists, environmentalists, farming and subsistence communities, and peoples of various religious faiths, including a minority of right-wing creationists who think that God wishes the world to be cared for. They recognize the environmental perils and place their banishment as the preeminent task of humanity. The fight for minds, not liberal democracy, will determine the future of the world’s population. If conservative thought prevails it may unite humanity in common cause and heal the cultural fault lines.

## 2NR

### Extinction Outweighs

#### Extinction outweighs

Bostrum 12 (Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.

Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.

Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why?

Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

### AT: V2L

#### Value to life is subjective --- life is a prerequisite

Lisa Schwartz, Chair at the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis, 2002

“Medical Ethic: A Case Based Approach” Chapter 6, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.