# NU LV Cards---Wake Rd 8

## 1AC – Same as Wake Rd 5

# 2AC

## Heg

### AT: Heg Bad

#### US engagement and reintervention are inevitable---it’s only a question of making it effective---the plan prevents failed engagement that triggers their turns

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In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit. Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued. To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure. Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help? Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate? The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.

### Russia Turn

#### US contains Russian aggression- Other countries want US protection

Kagan 12 **–** senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution (Robert “The world America Made”)

What role the United States played in hastening the collapse of the Soviet system will always be a subject of contention. Undoubtedly, it played some role, both in containing the Soviet empire militarily and in out performing it economically and technologically. Nor was the turn to democracy throughout eastern Europe primarily America’s doing. The peoples of the former Warsaw Pact nations had long yearned for liberation from the Soviet Union, which also meant liberation from communism. They wanted to join the rest of Europe, which offered an economic and social model that was even more attractive than that of the United States. That they uniformly chose democratic forms of government, however, was not simply the aspiration for freedom or comfort. It also reﬂected the desires of eastern and central European peoples to place themselves under the American security umbrella. The strategic, the economic, the political, and the ideological were thus inseparable. Those nations that wanted to be part of NATO, and later the European Union, knew they stood no chance if they did not present democratic credentials. These democratic transitions, which turned the third wave into a democratic tsunami, need not have occurred had the world been conﬁgured differently. The fact that a democratic, united, and prosperous western Europe was even there as a powerful magnet to its eastern neighbors was due to American actions after World War I.

### Institutions Turn

#### US military commitment critical to institutions

Brookes 8 (Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. He is also a member of the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might”, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1102.cfm>

I hope we can all agree that NATO was a critical element in the security of Europe during the Cold War. In fact, I would argue that American military power was a sine qua non of NATO's success during the Cold War. Today, the likelihood of a major war in Europe is thankfully just about nil, but troubling issues such as Bosnia and Kosovo have required American military participation--and leadership. But what about the resurgence of Russia on the edges of NATO and the European Union? Which direction will Moscow take in the years to come? It's not fully clear, but some of the signs are quite ominous. We do know that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has promised a nearly 30 percent increase in the Russian defense budget for 2009 for reasons that can only be associated with a desire by Moscow to exert increasing leverage in its traditional sphere of influence--and perhaps beyond. We also know Russia has conducted more ballistic missile tests this year than any year since the end of the Cold War. We further know that the Kremlin has planted a flag on the seabed at the North Pole, asserting claims to an area the size of France, Germany, and Italy combined--an area which may hold one-third of the world's total undiscovered energy reserves. Russian action in Georgia and threats against Ukraine aren't comforting, either. Considering the weak defense spending in Europe, who will be able to stand up to this new Russia if necessary? I would suggest that, absent American military might, NATO--or any future European defense force--might be little more than a paper tiger in the shadow of the Russian bear.

## Solvency

#### SMRs are safe and could be ready by 2015

Hise 9 Phaedra, Popular Mechanics, "Mini Reactors Show Promise for Clean Nuclear Power's Future", December 18, www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/nuclear/4273386

Higher fuel prices and increased carbon emissions have been giving nuclear energy a boost. So far this year, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has received licensing requests for 19 new nuclear power plants. That number could increase exponentially, along with the number of suitable sites for a plant, if the NRC approves a brand-new design for portable modular units developed at Oregon State University.¶ Interest in minireactors has grown over the past few years, according to Felix Killar at the Nuclear Energy Institute. "They're simple and robust, with safety features to allow a country without nuclear expertise to gradually put in small plants, and get people trained and familiar with them before moving into more complex plants." But small-scale plants could prove useful in the United States, too, particularly in areas where residents must now rely on diesel generators for electricity. Toshiba is reportedly working on a small-scale design for Galena, Alaska. But NuScale Power, the startup spun from Oregon State, is the first American company to submit plans to the NRC, which regulates all domestic nuclear power plants.¶ The plant's design is similar to that of a Generation III+ "light water" reactor, but the size is unusual. "The whole thing is 65 ft. long," explains Jose Reyes, head of the nuclear engineering department at Oregon State and a co-founder of NuScale Power. The reactor unit of NuScale's containment unit is 14 ft., compared to a Westinghouse AP1000, a standard current design, which is about 120 ft. in diameter. It has to be built and serviced on-site, but NuScale's units could be manufactured at the factory, then shipped on a rail car or heavy truck to any location and returned for refueling.¶ As in modern reactors, the containment shell acts as a heat exchanger, Reyes explains. The water closest to the core is vented into the outer shell as steam, where it condenses and drips into the cooling pool, which is recirculated to cool the core. The whole unit sits below grade, without telltale cooling towers. The reactor doesn't use pumps to circulate the water if the unit overheats, which means it needs no external power to cool down. That's a "passive safety" feature that protects the unit from electrical sabotage.¶ The new unit can be manufactured cheaply, with standard turbines from General Electric, for example, rather than custom-made parts. Because the steel reactor vessel is only 9 ft. in diameter, it can be made entirely in the U.S., rather than relying on Japan Steel Works, the only manufacturer who can cast today's one-piece, 25-ft.-plus reactor vessels.¶ Each 45-megawatt electrical unit would generate enough power for about 45,000 homes. By comparison, plants operated today generate 1000 to 1700 megawatts, according to NRC spokesman Scott Burnell. "You can't take an AP1000, a large base-load reactor, and put it down where there's no grid to support it. A smaller design could be useful in a remote setting."¶ Large utilities could also use smaller units to their advantage, according to Reyes. Instead of shutting down an entire plant to replace fuel, as happens today, the utility could build a modular plant and then shut down only the unit affected.¶ NuScale has built and tested a one-third-scale unit that uses electrical heat to simulate a nuclear core. After the design is presented to the NRC on July 24, NuScale will spend the next year and a half testing it. They will then submit a final report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which can spend two or three years reviewing documentation before approval. If all goes according to schedule, Reyes estimates, the minireactors could start to go on line in 2015.

#### They have the personnel

Robitaille 12 George E, Department of Army Civilian, March 21, "Small Modular Reactors: The Army’s Secure Source of Energy?", [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561802](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561802)

Section 332 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), “Extension and Expansion of Reporting Requirements Regarding Department of Defense Energy Efficiency Programs,” requires the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the cost and feasibility of a policy that would require new power generation projects established on installations to be able to provide power for military operations in the event of a commercial grid outage.28 A potential solution to meet this national security requirement, as well as the critical needs of nearby towns, is for DoD to evaluate SMRs as a possible source for safe and secure electricity. Military facilities depend on reliable sources of energy to operate, train, and support national security missions. The power demand for most military facilities is not very high, and could easily be met by a SMR. Table 1 provides the itemized description of the annual energy requirements in megawatt of electricity (MWe) required for the three hundred seventy four DoD installations.29 DoD History with SMRs The concept of small reactors for electrical power generation is not new. In fact, the DoD built and operated small reactors for applications on land and at sea. The U.S. Army operated eight nuclear power plants from 1954 to 1977. Six out of the eight reactors built by the Army produced operationally useful power for an extended period, including the first nuclear reactor to be connected and provide electricity to the commercial grid. 30 The Army program that built and operated compact nuclear reactors was ended after 1966, not because of any safety issues, but strictly as a result of funding cuts in military long range research and development programs. In essence, it was determined that the program costs could only be justified if there was a unique DoD specific requirement. At the time there were none.31 Although it has been many years since these Army reactors were operational, the independent source of energy they provided at the time is exactly what is needed again to serve as a secure source of energy today. Many of the nuclear power plant designs used by the Army were based on United States Naval reactors. Although the Army stopped developing SMRs, the Navy as well as the private sector has continued to research, develop, and implement improved designs to improve the safety and efficiency of these alternative energy sources. The U.S. Navy nuclear program developed twenty seven different power plant systems and almost all of them have been based on a light water reactor design.32 This design focus can be attributed to the inherent safety and the ability of this design to handle the pitch and roll climate expected on a ship at sea. To date, the U. S Navy operated five hundred twenty six reactor cores in two hundred nineteen nuclear powered ships, accumulated the equivalent of over six thousand two hundred reactor years of operation and safely steamed one hundred forty nine million miles. The U.S. Navy has never experienced a reactor accident.33 All of the modern Navy reactors are design to use fuel that is enriched to ninety three percent Uranium 235 (U235) versus the approximate three percent U235 used in commercial light water reactors. The use of highly enriched U235 in Navy vessels has two primary benefits, long core lives and small reactor cores.34 The power generation capability for naval reactors ranges from two hundred MWe (megawatts of electricity) for submarines to five hundred MWe for an aircraft carrier. A Naval reactor can expect to operate for at least ten years before refueling and the core has a fifty year operational life for a carrier or thirty to forty years for a submarine.35 As an example, the world’s first nuclear carrier, the USS Enterprise, which is still operating, celebrated fifty years of operations in 2011.36 The Navy nuclear program has set a precedent for safely harnessing the energy associated with the nuclear fission reaction. In addition, the Navy collaborates with the private sector to build their reactors and then uses government trained personnel to serve as operators. Implementing the use of SMRs as a secure source of energy for our critical military facilities will leverage this knowledge and experience.

#### SMRs prevent meltdowns---passive cooling

Worthington 11 David, contributing editor for SmartPlanet, December 18, "Small nuclear reactors: America’s energy future?", www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/small-nuclear-reactors-americas-energy-future/11412

The SMR addresses the greatest perceived danger - nuclear meltdowns – a threat that has loomed since the dawn of the nuclear era. It doesn’t require active cooling systems to prevent a meltdown, and would theoretically shut down safely without any outside intervention.¶ Traditional active cooling systems at large scale reactors utilize water pumps and back-up power systems to control residual or decay heat after a reaction is stopped. An external power source and/or coolant are eventually necessary within a matter of days.¶ Recent third generation+ reactor designs incorporate passive cooling technologies with traditional active cooling techniques, but that approach only buys more time until there’s meltdown conditions.¶ Several reactors at Tokyo Electric Power’s Fukushima plants melted down when diesel back-up systems failed and mainland power lines were destroyed in the wake of twin natural disasters. It was reliant on active cooling, and its engineers hadn’t envisioned a tsunami striking far inland.¶ A module reactor’s passive cooling system could theoretically survive that scenario, and non-water cooling systems could further increase margins of safety.¶ “The concept is these could go on almost indefinite periods in passive manner with no intervention relative to the cooling of core and decay/residual heat. Potentially, it could never require any additional intervention,” Rus said.

## T

### 2AC T – Financial Incentive

#### C/I – Financial incentives induce behaviors---that includes plan

Webb 93 – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.¶ By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive *effects* which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and *ad hoc* industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### Precision---our definition’s from the DoE

Waxman 98 **–** Solicitor General of the US (Seth, Brief for the United States in Opposition for the US Supreme Court case HARBERT/LUMMUS AGRIFUELS PROJECTS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1998/0responses/98-0697.resp.opp.pdf)

2 On November 15, 1986, Keefe was delegated “the authority, with respect to actions valued at $50 million or less, to approve, execute, enter into, modify, administer, closeout, terminate and take any other necessary and appropriate action (collectively, ‘Actions’) with respect to Financial Incentive awards.” Pet. App. 68, 111-112. Citing DOE Order No. 5700.5 (Jan. 12, 1981), the delegation defines “Financial Incentives” as the authorized financial incentive programs of DOE, “including direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase agreements, price supports, guaranteed market agreements and any others which may evolve.” The delegation proceeds to state, “[h]owever, a separate prior written approval of any such action must be given by or concurred in by Keefe to accompany the action.” The delegation also states that its exercise “shall be governed by the rules and regulations of [DOE] and policies and procedures prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate(s).” Pet. App. 111-113.

### T – Acquire

#### Acquiring is T

US Code 3 Legal Information Institute, “41 USC § 131 – Acquisition”, November 24, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/41/131?quicktabs_8=1#quicktabs-8>

In division B, the term “acquisition”—¶ (1) means the process of acquiring, with appropriated amounts, by contract for purchase or lease, property or services (including construction) that support the missions and goals of an executive agency, from the point at which the requirements of the executive agency are established in consultation with the chief acquisition officer of the executive agency; and¶ (2) includes—¶ (A) the process of acquiring property or services that are already in existence, or that must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated;¶ (B) the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs;¶ (C) solicitation and selection of sources;¶ (D) award of contracts;¶ (E) contract performance;¶ (F) contract financing;¶ (G) management and measurement of contract performance through final delivery and payment; and¶ (H) technical and management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency requirements by contract.

## K

### AT: Anthro K

#### Abandoning human values leaves us unable to act and causes extinction

Ketels 96 (Violet B, Associate Professor of English at Temple University, “‘Havel to the Castle!’ The Power of the Word,” 548 Annals 45, November, Sage)

In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence.¶ We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," **though death may be the end of it—**only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual**, of genuine peace for mankind at large**.2¶ In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience.¶ "Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills,"3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content,"\* monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge.5¶ Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the humanist soul,"6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts."7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue.¶ Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now.¶ The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face.8¶ Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying. ¶ Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety?¶ Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [hasj Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvokc as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389!9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle—by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo.... Kosovo is the Serbian-ized history of the Flood—the Serbian New Testament."10¶ A cover of Siiddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited."¶ We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, regimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and appa-rat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity."12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

#### Representing human impacts is necessary to environmental ethics

Plumwood 2 (Val, PF PHILOSOPHY - UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, Environmental Culture: The ecological crisis of reason, PG. 138-40)

Recognition, prudence and survival But by providing reasons for considering nature based on human prudence, are we not perpetuating the verv human-centredness and instrumentalism we should seek to combat, considering nature only in relation to our own needs and as means to meet those needs? This issue reveals another major area of difference between the cosmic model implying elimination of human bearings and the liberation model of human-cent redness of the sort I have given. Only in the confused account of anthropocentrismas cosmic anthropocentrism is it essential to avoid anything which smacks of human bearings and preferences in the interests of pursuing superhuman detachment. On the liberation account of human-centred ness, there is no problem or inconsistency in introducing some prudential considerations to motivate change, or to show why, for example, human-centredness is not benign and must lead to damaging consequences for humankind. To gain a better understanding of the role of prudence in the kinds of changes that might be required, let us return to the marital example of Bruce and Ann. Let us suppose that instead of leaving right away, Ann persuades Bruce to try a visit to a marriage counsellor to see if Bruce can change enough to save their relationship. (We will have to assume that Bruce has some redeeming features I have not described here to explain why Ann considers it worthwhile going to all this trouble). After listening to their stories, the counsellor diagnoses Bruce as a textbook case of egocentrism, an individual version of the centredness structure set out above. Bruce seems to view his interests as somehow radically separate from Ann's, so that he is prepared to act on her request for more consideration only if she can show he will get more pleasure if he does so, that is, for instrumental reasons which appeal to a self-contained conception of his interests. He seems to see Ann in instrumental terms not as an independent person but as someone defined in tenus of his own needs, and claims it is her problem if she is dissatistied or miserable. Bruce sees Ann as there to service his needs, lacks sensitivity to her needs and does not respect her independence or agency. 24 Bruce, let us suppose, also devalues the importance of the relationship, denies his real dependency on Ann, backgrounds her services and contribution to his lite, and seems to be completely unaware of the extent to which he might suffer when the relationship he is abusing breaks down. Bruce, despite Ann's warnings, does not imagine that it will, and is sure that it will all blow over: after a few tears and tantrums Ann will come to her senses, as she has always done before, according to Bruce. Now the counsellor, June, takes on the task of pointing out to Bruce that his continued self-centredness and instrumental treatment of Ann is likely to lead in short order to the breakdown and loss of his relationship. The counsellor tries to show Bruce that he has underestimated both Ann's determination to leave unless there is change, as well as the sustaining character of the relationship. June points out that he may, like many similar people the counsellor has seen, sutler much more severe emotional stress than he realises when Ann leaves, as she surely will unless Bruce changes. Notice that June's initial appeal to Bruce is a prudential one; June tries to point out to Bruce that he has misconceived the relationship and to make him understand where his real interests lie. There is no inconsistency here; the counsellor can point out these damaging consequences of instrumental relationship for Bruce without in any way using, endorsing or encouraging instrumental relationships. In the same way, the critic of human-centredness can say with perfect consistency, to a society trapped in the centric logic ofthe One and the Other in relation to nature, that unless it is willing to give enough consideration to nature's needs, it too could lose a relationship whose importance it has failed to understand, has systematically devalued and denied - with, perhaps, more serious consequences for survival than in Bruce's case. The account of human-centredness I have given, then, unlike the cosmic account demanding self-transcendence and self-detachment, does not prohibit the use of certain forms of prudential ecological argument, although it does suggest certain contexts and qualifications for their use. In the case of Ann and Bruce, June the counsellor might particularly advance these prudential reasons as the main reasons for treating Ann with more care and respect at the initial stages of the task of convincing Bruce of the need for change. Prudential arguments need not just concern the danger of losing the relationship. June may also try to show Bruce how the structure of egocentrism distorts and limits his character and cuts him off from the main benefits of a caring relationship, such as the sense of the limitations ofth~ self and its perspectives obtained by an intimate encounter with someone else's needs and reality. Prddential arguments of all kinds for respect are the kinds of arguments that are especially useful in an initial context of denial, while there is still no realisation of that there is a serious problem, and resistance to the idea of undertaking work for change. In the same way, the appeal to prudential considerations of ecological damage to humans is especially appropriate in the initial context of ecological denial. where there is still no systematic acknowledgement of human attitudes as a problem, and resistance to the idea of undertaking substantial social change. Although reasons of advantage or disadvantage to the self cannot be the only kinds of considerations in a framework which exhibits genuine respect for the other, the needs of the self do not have to be excluded at any stage from this process, as the fallacious view of prudence as always instrumental and egocentric suggests.

## CP

### HGTRs CP

#### SMRs include HTGRs --- they wouldn’t be the ones to come online but the CP forces them to be

Ioannis N. Kessides 12, Lead Economist in the World Bank's Development Research Group, and Vladimir Kuznetsov, Consultant, the World Bank, 2012, “Small Modular Reactors for Enhancing Energy Security in Developing Countries,” Sustainability, Vol. 4, No. 8, p. 1806-1832

Small modular reactors can be classified according to the reactor technology and coolant. They include [5]:

 Pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Designs based on light water reactor technologies are similar to most of today’s large pressurized water reactors and as such they have the lowest technological risk. Several are considered to be very close to commercial deployment. Still these designs incorporate innovative technologies and novel components to achieve simplicity, improved operational performance, and enhanced safety. They are typically less than 300 MW(e) and could be used to replace older fossil-fired power stations of similar size.

 Gas cooled reactors (mostly high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs)). These designs provide broad flexibility in application and in the utilization of the fuel. One of the key advantages of HTGRs is the high outlet coolant temperatures compared to conventional reactors. Core outlet temperatures can range from around 650 °C to 1000 °C for very advanced reactors—these high operating temperatures allow for greater thermal efficiencies. The HTGR can be used with either steam cycle or gas turbine generating equipment, and as a source of high temperature process heat. High reactor outlet temperatures can also drive endothermic reactions to produce hydrogen. Fuel cycle options include: (i) low enrichment, where enriched uranium fuel is burned and Pu is recycled; (ii) Th-233, where enriched uranium and Th is burned and U-233 (and U-235) is recycled; (iii) Pu utilization in Th -U-233, where Pu and Th fuel is burned and Pu and U-233 is recycled [6].

 Sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs). The SFR design features a fast-spectrum, sodium-cooled reactor and a closed fuel cycle. It is designed for efficient management of high-level wastes—in particular the management of plutonium and other actinides. The reactor’s key safety features include a long thermal response time, increased margin to coolant boiling, a primary system that operates near atmospheric pressure, and an intermediate sodium system between the radioactive sodium in the primary system and the water and steam in the power plant.

 Lead and Lead-bismuth cooled fast reactors (LFRs). The LFR design features a fast-spectrum lead or lead/bismuth eutectic liquid-metal-cooled reactor and a closed fuel cycle. Since it operates in the fast-neutron spectrum, it has has excellent materials management capabilities. The LFR can also be used as a burner to consume actinides from spent LWR fuel and as a burner/breeder with thorium matrices. An important feature of this design is the enhanced safety that results from the choice of molten lead as a relatively inert coolant. It does not react with water or air exothermically and, therefore, the reactor needs no intermediate heat transport system. In terms of sustainability, lead is abundant and hence available, even in case of deployment of a large number of reactors. More importantly, as with other fast systems, fuel sustainability is greatly enhanced by the conversion capabilities of the LFR fuel cycle.

#### HTGR’s are infeasible – 50 years of failure proves

Steve Thomas 9, 6-22, “The demise of the pebble bed modular reactor,” Bulletin of the A.S., http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-demise-of-the-pebble-bed-modular-reactor

All the major countries involved in designing reactors, including the United States, Germany, France, Japan, and Britain, have put serious time and effort into developing high-temperature, gas-cooled reactors such as the PBMR. Despite more than 50 years of trying, however, no commercial-scale design has been produced. Yet China and South Africa have found the allure of pebble bed technology irresistible, as if it were an "unpolished gem" waiting to be developed, regardless of the consistent engineering problems it has had since the beginning. South Africa took a particularly aggressive approach, believing that it could develop a commercial-size PBMR design without even operating a prototype. If the PBMR is proved to be fundamentally flawed, as indicated in the Jülich report, South Africa's $980 million investment in the project will be seen in hindsight as wasteful, one that the country, plagued with many more pressing and basic problems, could ill afford. PBMR Ltd. is now exploring all possibilities to develop new markets for its reactor, and to collaborate on technology development, to replace the government's funding for the project that it will lose next year. For example, following its February 2009 announcement, PBMR Ltd. negotiated a technology cooperation agreement with China's PBMR developers including Tsinghua University's Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology and Chinergy Co. Ltd. The South African project's appalling budget and time over-runs and the company's inability to complete a finished design may scare away other potential new customers and investors, leaving China the world's largest investor in PBMR-based reactor designs.

#### HTGRs cause massive spikes in helium demand

Mark Haynes 12, President, Concordia Power, 7/20/12, “Helium: Supply Shortages Impacting our Economy, National Defense and Manufacturing,” Congressional Documents and Publications, p. lexis

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Mark Haynes, I am President of Concordia Power, a small company that works with the NGNP Industry Alliance. The NGNP Industry Alliance is comprised of a number of major companies including Dow Chemical, ConocoPhilips, Entergy, AREVA, Westinghouse, SGL Group, Graftech, Mersen, Toyo Tanso, Ultra-Safe Nuclear, Technology Insights and the Petroleum Technology Alliance Canada.

Our Alliance’s purpose is to help ensure the commercialization of High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors (HTGRs) as an extremely important energy option for the future. HTGRs, which are helium cooled, are unique in both their very high outlet temperatures and their intrinsic safety characteristics. Although these reactors will include multiple safety features, they will require no active or passive safety systems or operator intervention to ensure the safety of the public. Taken together, these characteristics make HTGRs not only very desirable electric power generators with extraordinarily high efficiency and safety, but they also allow HTGRs to be co-located with major industrial and extraction facilities where their high temperature output can substitute for the very large amounts of fossil fuels these facilities currently consume in the production of process heat.

In addition, HTGRs can also play an unmatched role in greatly improving the efficiency and environmental performance of converting coal or other indigenous carbon sources to liquid fuels with an extremely small carbon footprint. As explained in more detail later in this testimony, a relatively conservative estimate is that in North America, there is a market for 600 or more HTGR modules in this century. To the point of this hearing, the unique characteristics of helium are key to making this technology possible.

I believe it’s correct to say that our invitation to testify here today does not relate to any particular expertise we might have with regard to either the Federal Helium Reserve or the current helium markets. Rather, our presence here relates more to the fact that HTGRs are a unique and important example of an emerging energy technology that is very dependent on a reliable and affordable supply of helium in the future.

Why Helium is Important to HTGRs

Helium coolant is a key element of HTGR design. Helium has four characteristics that make it a superior reactor coolant:

- It is chemically inert in the HTGR process. Hence, during reactor operations, extraordinary event or interruption by natural cause (as a flood or earthquake) or a human error or equipment event that affects the plant normal operations, it does not corrode reactor internals nor does it contribute to the spread of significant amounts of radioactive particles around the plant or the environment;

- It is itself “invisible” to radiation: it does not become radioactive in the course of cooling the reactor core and the reactivity of the core is not impacted by its presence or non-presence. This second characteristic is an important added safety feature in the event of even its complete loss from the reactor core in an accident; and

- It is always in a gaseous phase at any temperature in the core. This ensures that in an extraordinary accident event there is no extreme pressure conditions created, such as can occur in a light water reactor where the flashing of coolant water into steam requires a very robust containment in the event of a loss of coolant.

- It is an efficient heat transport fluid. This allows a more economical design and efficient plant operation. It is also important to note that the other materials (graphite and ceramic coated fuel) are also non-corrosive and very chemically compatible with helium. This combination of materials is stable at extremely high temperatures. So, in a worst-case scenario loss of helium accident, the reactor core structure remains stable and the fuel stays well within its design limits. This is additional insurance that a Fukushima-type scenario cannot happen with an HTGR.

Helium Use and HTGRs

Although it is difficult to predict with precision how much helium will be required in the future for HTGRs, our Alliance, in concert with the Idaho National Laboratory estimates that in North America, there could be a future demand for several hundred 600 Megawatt thermal modules. This includes meeting needs in petrochemical production, refining, liquid fuel production, electric power generation and other markets.

Each reactor module in a fleet of HTGRs would require an initial inventory of helium when it enters service as well as replenishment helium during subsequent years of operation for the helium consumed each year in the supporting auxiliary equipment. The initial operating inventory for each of these 600 MWt modules would be approximately 2000 kg of helium. The annual need for makeup helium is assumed to be 10% of the operating inventory which is the upper design limit. So the annual helium requirement for a whole fleet of HTGRs is the total of the initial inventory required for new modules going into service plus the makeup supply for the existing modules already in service. As the first HTGRs are deployed, the initial inventory requirement governs the HTGR fleet helium consumption. But as the fleet grows, the makeup supply for the existing fleet quickly dominates the helium demand

### Nuclear Inevitable

#### Nuclear power’s inevitable globally---it will be unsafe and cause proliferation absent renewed US leadership

Loudermilk 11—Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University (Micah, Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs, www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375)

Reactor safety itself notwithstanding, many argue that the scattering of small reactors around the world would invariably lead to increased proliferation problems as nuclear technology and know-how disseminates around the world. Lost in the argument is the fact that this stance assumes that US decisions on advancing nuclear technology color the world as a whole. In reality, regardless of the US commitment to or abandonment of nuclear energy technology, **many countries** (notably China) **are blazing ahead** with research and construction, with 55 plants currently under construction around the world—though Fukushima may cause a temporary lull.¶ Since Three Mile Island, the US share of the global nuclear energy trade has declined precipitously as talent and technology begin to concentrate in countries more committed to nuclear power. On the small reactor front, more than 20 countries are examining the technology and the IAEA estimates that 40-100 small reactors will be in operation by 2030. Without US leadership, new nations seek to acquire nuclear technology **turn to countries other than the US who may not share a deep commitment to reactor safety and nonproliferation objectives**. **Strong US leadership globally on nonproliferation requires a vibrant American nuclear industry.** This will enable the US to set and enforce standards on nuclear agreements, spent fuel reprocessing, and developing reactor technologies.

## DA

### 2AC Fiscal Cliff DA

#### Won’t pass

Surowiecki 11/10 James, The New Yorker, THE CASE AGAINST A “GRAND BARGAIN,” 11-10-12, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/11/the-case-against-a-grand-bargain.html

Yet for all the talk about how a grand bargain is in the works, it’s far from obvious that anyone, even the small bipartisan group of senators that’s supposedly working to come up with a plan, would be able to craft a long-term budget agreement that could pass a conservative-dominated House of Representatives and a Democratic Senate, much less do so in a matter of only weeks. The most obvious, and seemingly unbridgeable, chasm is between President Obama’s insistence that any agreement will have to include higher tax rates for the wealthiest Americans and Speaker Boehner’s insistence that **raising rates on anyone is a non-starter**. But there are similarly deep ideological divides over Social Security and Medicaid, and, to a lesser extent, over defense spending. It’s not that compromise on these issues is impossible. It’s just that it’s unlikely that Congress will be able to do in six weeks what it hasn’t been able to do in many years.

#### Executive military action shields

Davenport 12 Coral, energy and environment correspondent for National Journal, Prior to joining National Journal in 2010, Davenport covered energy and environment for Politico, and before that, for Congressional Quarterly. In 2010, she was a fellow with the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting. From 2001 to 2004, Davenport worked in Athens, Greece, as a correspondent for numerous publications, including the Christian Science Monitor and USA Today, covering politics, economics, international relations and terrorism in southeastern Europe. She also covered the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, and was a contributing writer to the Fodor’s, Time Out, Eyewitness and Funseekers’ guidebook series. Davenport started her journalism career at the Daily Hampshire Gazette in Northampton, Massachusetts, after graduating from Smith College with a degree in English literature. National Journal, 2/10, White House Budget to Expand Clean-Energy Programs Through Pentagon, ProQuest

The White House believes it has figured out how to get more money for clean-energy programs touted by President Obama without having it become political roadkill in the wake of the Solyndra controversy: **Put it in the Pentagon**. While details are thin on the ground, lawmakers who work on both energy- and defense-spending policy believe the fiscal 2013 budget request to be delivered to Congress on Monday probably won't include big increases for wind and solar power through the Energy Department, a major target for Republicans since solar-panel maker Solyndra defaulted last year on a $535 million loan guarantee. But they do expect to see increases in spending on alternative energy in the Defense Department, such as programs to replace traditional jet fuel with biofuels, supply troops on the front lines with solar-powered electronic equipment, build hybrid-engine tanks and aircraft carriers, and increase renewable-energy use on military bases. While Republicans will instantly shoot down requests for fresh spending on Energy Department programs that could be likened to the one that funded Solyndra, many support alternative-energy programs for the military. "I do expect to see the spending," said Rep. Jack Kingston, R-Ga., a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, when asked about increased investment in alternative-energy programs at the Pentagon. "I think in the past three to five years this has been going on, but that it has grown as a culture and a practice - and it's a good thing." "If Israel attacks Iran, and we have to go to war - and the Straits of Hormuz are closed for a week or a month and the price of fuel is going to be high," Kingston said, "the question is, in the military, what do you replace it with? It's not something you just do for the ozone. It's strategic." Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who sits on both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said, "I don't see what they're doing in DOD as being Solyndra." "We're not talking about putting $500 million into a goofy idea," Graham told National Journal . "We're talking about taking applications of technologies that work and expanding them. I wouldn't be for DOD having a bunch of money to play around with renewable technologies that have no hope. But from what I understand, there are renewables out there that already work." A senior House Democrat noted that this wouldn't be the first time that the **Pentagon has been utilized to advance policies that wouldn't otherwise be supported**. "They did it in the '90s with medical research," said Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., ranking member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. In 1993, when funding was frozen for breast-cancer research programs in the National Institutes of Health, Congress boosted the Pentagon's budget for breast-cancer research - to more than double that of the health agency's funding in that area. **Politically, the strategy makes sense**. Republicans are ready to fire at the first sign of any pet Obama program, and renewable programs at the Energy Department are an exceptionally ripe target. That's because of Solyndra, but also because, in the last two years, the Energy Department received a massive $40 billion infusion in funding for clean-energy programs from the stimulus law, a signature Obama policy. When that money runs out this year, a request for more on top of it would be met with flat-out derision from most congressional Republicans. Increasing renewable-energy initiatives at the Pentagon can also help Obama advance his broader, national goals for transitioning the U.S. economy from fossil fuels to alternative sources. As the largest industrial consumer of energy in the world, the U.S. military can have a significant impact on energy markets - if it demands significant amounts of energy from alternative sources, it could help scale up production and ramp down prices for clean energy on the commercial market. Obama acknowledged those impacts in a speech last month at the Buckley Air Force Base in Colorado. "The Navy is going to purchase enough clean-energy capacity to power a quarter of a million homes a year. And it won't cost taxpayers a dime," Obama said. "What does it mean? It means that the world's largest consumer of energy - the Department of Defense - is making one of the largest commitments to clean energy in history," the president added. "That will grow this market, it will strengthen our energy security." Experts also hope that Pentagon engagement in clean-energy technology could help yield breakthroughs with commercial applications. Kingston acknowledged that the upfront costs for alternative fuels are higher than for conventional oil and gasoline. For example, the Air Force has pursued contracts to purchase biofuels made from algae and camelina, a grass-like plant, but those fuels can cost up to $150 a barrel, compared to oil, which is lately going for around $100 a barrel. Fuel-efficient hybrid tanks can cost $1 million more than conventional tanks - although in the long run they can help lessen the military's oil dependence, Kingston said Republicans recognize that the up-front cost can yield a payoff later. "It wouldn't be dead on arrival. But we'd need to see a two- to three-year payoff on the investment," Kingston said. Military officials - particularly Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, who has made alternative energy a cornerstone of his tenure - have been telling Congress for years that the military's dependence on fossil fuels puts the troops - and the nation's security - at risk. Mabus has focused on meeting an ambitious mandate from a 2007 law to supply 25 percent of the military's electricity from renewable power sources by 2025. (Obama has tried and failed to pass a similar national mandate.) Last June, the DOD rolled out its first department-wide energy policy to coalesce alternative and energy-efficient initiatives across the military services. In January, the department announced that a study of military installations in the western United States found four California desert bases suitable to produce enough solar energy - 7,000 megawatts - to match seven nuclear power plants. And so far, those **moves have met with approval from congressional Republicans**. Even so, any request for new Pentagon spending will be met with greater scrutiny this year. The Pentagon's budget is already under a microscope, due to $500 billion in automatic cuts to defense spending slated to take effect in 2013. But even with those challenges, clean-energy spending probably won't stand out as much in the military budget as it would in the Energy Department budget. Despite its name, the Energy Department has traditionally had little to do with energy policy - its chief portfolio is maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal. Without the stimulus money, last year only $1.9 billion of Energy's $32 billion budget went to clean-energy programs. A spending increase of just $1 billion would make a big difference in the agency's bottom line. But it would probably be easier to tuck another $1 billion or $2 billion on clean-energy spending into the Pentagon's $518 billion budget. Last year, the Pentagon spent about $1 billion on renewable energy and energy-efficiency programs across its departments.

#### Impact is gradual and will be resolved later

Chait 11/8—NY Mag (Jonathan, Erskine Bowles Bids to Spoil Obama Second Term, nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/11/erskine-bowles-bids-to-spoil-obama-second-term.html)

That is totally false.¶ Going over the fiscal cliff and then doing nothing for another year would mean a huge tax hike and spending cut. But waiting until January would mean extremely gradual tax increases and spending cuts, ones that would not even begin to take place immediately, because Obama has the ability to delay their implementation. And even after they're implemented, the effect would be gradual, and could subsequently be canceled out. It’s like saying if you go three weeks without food you’ll die so if dinner isn’t on the table at 6 o'clock sharp terrible consequences will follow.¶ The reason many liberals want to wait until January is that it would make a deal much easier to strike, and ensure that the result is on more liberal terms. Once the entire Bush tax cuts have expired, President Obama would no longer have to pry revenue out of tax-hating Republicans. He’ll have all the revenue he wants and more. He could offer them a tax cut. He’ll likewise have huge defense cuts to bargain away.

#### SMR expansion solves growth

MSCR 11 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration Manufacturing and Services Competitiveness Report, February 2011, “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors”, http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf

A primary advantage of SMRs is in their production. Their small size means that they do not need the ultra-heavy forged components that currently can be made only by Japan Steel Works and Doosan Heavy Industries in South Korea.7 In most of the current U.S. SMR designs, the reactor pressure vessels and other large forgings could be supplied by **domestic vendors**, which would create U.S. jobs and potential exports of SMR components to international customers. In addition, most SMR designs allow for factory manufacturing, which could potentially provide opportunities for cost savings, for increased quality, and for more efficient production. Those attributes mean that **SMRs could be a** significant source of economic growth **in the United States.**

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#### Financial incentives are a transfer of economic resources or market creation

EIA 1 (Renewable Energy 2000: Issues and Trends, Report prepared by the US Energy Information Administration, “Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy”, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/renewables/06282000.pdf)

Over the years, incentives and mandates for renewable energy have been used to advance different energy policies, such as ensuring energy security or promoting environmentally benign energy sources. Renewable energy has beneficial attributes, such as low emissions and replenishable energy supply, that are not fully reflected in the market price. Accordingly, governments have used a variety of programs to promote renewable energy resources, technologies, and renewable-based transportation fuels.1 This paper discusses: (1) financial incentives and regulatory mandates used by Federal and State governments and Federal research and develop- ment (R&D),2, 3 and (2) their effectiveness in promoting renewables. A financial incentive is defined in this report as providing one or more of the following benefits: • A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively; • Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or, • Creating or expanding a market for producers. The intended effect of a financial incentive is to increase the production or consumption of the good or service over what it otherwise would have been without the incentive. Examples of financial incentives are: tax credits, production payments, trust funds, and low-cost loans. Research and development is included as a support program because its effect is to decrease cost, thus enhancing the commercial viability of the good(s) provided.4 Regulatory mandates include both actions required by legislation and regulatory agencies (Federal or State). Examples of regulatory mandates are: requiring utilities to purchase power from nonutilities and requiring the incorporation of environmental impacts and other social costs in energy planning (full cost pricing). Another example is a requirement for a minimum percentage of generation from renewable energy sources (viz., a “renewable portfolio standard,” or, RPS). Regulatory mandates and financial incentives can produce similar results, but regulatory mandates generally require no expenditures or loss of revenue by the Government.

#### Energy production incentives include military procurement

FITZPATRICK 85 - ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSERVATION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (Donna, HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY CONSERVATION AND POWER OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, “RENEWABLE ENERGY INCENTIVES,” 6/20, Congressional Universe (full pdf download))

In addition, various Federal incentives for energy conservation and renewable energy have played a role. These have taken many forms. ¶ At the center of the Government's commitment is the Department of Energy's funding of research and development, which will provide a technology base for the realization of the various energy options and additional support to the innovative capacity of the private sector. ¶ Other Department of Energy activities which serve as incentives for conservation and renewable energy include our activities in support of the Renewable Energy Industry Development Act of 1983, which assists the domestic renewable energy industry in penetrating international markets, the Federal Energy Management Program, which facilitates the adoption of these technologies by Federal agencies, the National Energy Innovation Awards Program, and our Technology Transfer and Information Programs. ¶ In addition to these DOE efforts, a number of other Federal incentives assist the conservation and renewable energy industries. For example, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act provides access to the utility markets, while the Military Construction Authorization Act provides a powerful stimulus to incorporation of renewable and conservation technologies into military facilities. Other Federal programs which serve as incentives to the development and deployment of these technologies include the various loan, loan guarantee, grant, and innovative financing programs administered by numerous Federal agencies, and technical and institutional support to government agencies, utilities and professional societies.

#### DoD acquisition can includes procurement and alt financing---meets their T arg

Swoyer 12 Thomas, the president of Infinity Development Partners, “The DoD Continues To Embrace Renewable Energy,” http://www.gcxmag.com/gcx/article.asp?magarticle\_id=869

Currently, the DoD uses five primary procurement tools to acquire renewable energy projects. The first method uses appropriated funds authorized by Congress. It is a direct procurement whereby the government uses its own funds to acquire renewable technologies and issues contracts to companies to install the equipment, and in some cases, operate the equipment. For instance, the government has purchased renewable energy and Renewable Energy Certificates from utilities, an effort which is on the decline. The method fails to meet energy security requirements established in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, as well as the intent of Executive Order 13423. ¶ The use of appropriated funds is certainly one of the fastest and simplest ways for the DoD to acquire renewable energy, however; with a future of limited budgets, this method of procurement will see limited use in the future. ¶ Another method of procurement relies primarily on private sector capital, which can be broken into the following four categories: ¶ \* Energy Savings Performance Contracts: In ESPC projects, the contractor is responsible for providing all the capital necessary to implement the energy savings project proposed by or accepted by the government. In this contractual scenario, the majority of the risk is placed on the government. While the private contractor is responsible for providing and securing the financing for the project, the financing is secured to government payments based on estimated savings versus a base year of cost. Use of ESPC contracts is on the rise after a memorandum was issued in August 2011 by the Council on Environmental Quality supporting the use of ESPC and UESC (outlined below) contracts. ¶ \* Utility Energy Service Contracts: UESC projects allow a federal agency to take advantage of project financing from a utility that serves them. The agency and the utility can enter into a contract allowing the utility to pay for energy efficiency, renewable energy and water savings projects to be repaid by that agency. ¶ \* Power Purchase Agreements: PPAs are becoming more common in federal energy purchases as they allow the agency to purchase power directly from a power generator. The power can be generated on private or public lands. The basis of the contract is that a power generator agrees to provide a specific amount of power to the government for a specific price. The development of the power generating facility is then totally the responsibility of the bidder. The Navy has been using this method for several years and most recently, the Army plans to use this method through the release of a Multiple Award Task Order Contract by the Army Corps of Engineers. This contract will allow individual companies to bid on different projects utilizing different technologies and to sell that power to the government. ¶ \* Enhanced Use Leasing: EUL projects are growing in numbers but remain one of the more complex procurement structures. EUL projects provide great flexibility for the government but to date, only the DoD and U.S. Veterans Administration use it widely. The EUL authorities allow the DoD and VA to lease parcels of property under their control for periods of up to 50 years and in the case of the VA, up to 99 years. The property can be used for the development of renewable energy assets with some of the power being sold to the government and the rest being sold to “the grid.” EULs remain complex projects with nearly all the risk being placed on the project developer. Yet, given the immense power needs of the federal government, the ability to individually procure projects and the ability to leverage very large amounts of private capital, EUL will become an increasingly popular tool with the government. ¶ These procurement methods are all in use to differing degrees. Currently, the federal government's budget process is putting pressure on all agencies to reduce spending. As spending declines, direct investment in renewable energy by federal agencies also declines. However, development of renewable energy projects is rapidly on the rise through the use of alternative financing mechanisms like ESPCs, UESCs, PPAs and EULs. Continued use of these contract vehicles gives the federal government a powerful set of tools with which to custom design the proper renewable energy portfolio that is right for them, as well as spur investment in new technologies. In the coming years, procurement methods that leverage private capital will see increased growth through widespread use.

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### Life Good

#### Defending life allows humans the freedom to act --- it is ontologically rooted in natality

Vatter 6 (Miguel, es profesor adjunto ordinario del Instituto de Ciencia Política de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, NATALITY AND BIOPOLITICS IN HANNAH ARENDT, Revista de Ciencia Política/ Volumen 26/ Nº2/ 137-159, (http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-090X2006000200008&script=sci\_arttext)\

Arendt calls natality, defined as the fact that **each human life begins with birth**, the "central category of political thought" (Arendt, 1958: 9). "Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into action" (Arendt, 1958: 177). The human capacity to act freely is said to be "**ontologically** rooted" in this "fact of **natality**" (Arendt, 1958: 177). There is something very puzzling about identifying the root of human freedom in the condition of natality. Why should birth, of all things, condition human beings to live freely? The puzzlement only gets more troublesome if one considers that Arendt appears to argue, throughout her work, that action, and so politics, are not biologically conditioned1. For Arendt, it is labor, not political action, which reflects the dependency of human beings on biological processes that are not under their control, and that they experience as necessity2. But if Arendt's political thought is so "anti-biological", then why does she root human freedom in birth? Unless one comes to terms with this paradox, the sense of Arendt's political thought will remain unclear. This essay tries to resolve the puzzle by arguing that through her concept of natality, Arendt seeks to reconnect the essence of human freedom to biological life so as to gain a new aim for politics. Politics should no longer depend on the reduction of life to the sphere of necessity, as has been the case through-out the main tradition of western political thought (Arendt, 2005: 40-92). Instead, **politics should be thought of as the freedom of life itself.**