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### Adv 1

#### CONTENTION 1: Mobile Marines

#### Mobile SMRs allow the Marines to reduce logistics tail---other energies fail

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Operational Vulnerability. Operational energy use represents a second serious vulnerability for the U.S. military. In recent years, the military has become significantly more effective by making greater use of technology in the field. The price of this improvement has been a vast increase in energy use. Over the last 10 years, for instance, the Marine Corps has more than tripled its operational use of energy. Energy and water now make up 70 percent of the logistics burden for troops operating in forward locations in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This burden represents a severe vulnerability and is costing lives. In 2006, troop losses from logistics convoys became so serious that Marine Corps Major General Richard Zilmer sent the Pentagon a “Priority 1” request for renewable energy backup.11 This unprecedented request put fuel convoy issues on the national security agenda, triggering several high-level studies and leading to the establishment of the Power Surety Task Force, which fast-tracked energy innovations such as mobile power stations and super-insulating spray foam. Currently, the Marine Corps is considering a goal of producing all nonvehicle energy used at forward bases organically and substantially increasing the fuel efficiency of vehicles used in forward areas.¶ Nevertheless, attempts to solve the current energy use problem with efficiency measures and renewable sources are unlikely to fully address this vulnerability. Wind, solar, and hydro generation along with tailored cuts of energy use in the field can reduce the number of convoys needed to supply troops, but these measures will quickly reach limits and have their own challenges, such as visibility, open exposure, and intermittency. Deploying vehicles with greater fuel efficiency will further reduce convoy vulnerability but will not solve the problem.¶ A strong consensus has been building within planning circles that small reactors have the potential to significantly reduce liquid fuel use and, consequently, the need for convoys to supply power at forward locations. Just over 30 percent of operational fuel used in Afghanistan today goes to generating electricity. Small reactors could easily generate all electricity needed to run large forward operating bases. This innovation would, for instance, allow the Marine Corps to meet its goal of self sufficient bases. Mobile reactors also have the potential to make the Corps significantly lighter and more mobile by reducing its logistics tail.¶ Another way that small reactors could potentially be used in the field is to power hydrogen electrolysis units to generate hydrogen for vehicles.12 At forward locations, ground vehicles currently use around 22 percent imported fuel. Many ground transport vehicles can be converted to run on hydrogen, considerably reducing the need for fuel convoys. If the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are indicative of future operations, and fuel convoys remain a target for enemy action, using small reactors at forward locations has the potential to save hundreds or thousands of U.S. lives.

#### Marine SMRs key to battlefield mobility and stealth

Schaffer and Chang 9 Marvin Baker, Adjunct staff Member at the RAND Corporation and Ike, independent consultant, “Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat”, issue 52, 1st quarter 2009, PDF Online

In this article, we introduce the concept of survivable, non–fossil fuel powerplants that can be transported to remote theaters of operation. Our rationale arises from a sense of urgency for countering two emerging threats facing land forces today: the increasing cost and vulnerability of fossil fuel extraction, refining, and distribution systems; and worldwide proliferation of highly accurate weapons launched at long standoff ranges. Our vision spotlights nuclear energy for expeditionary U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces as opposed to sea and air because the Navy is already largely nuclear and because substantial Air Force fuel improvements face unresolved technology issues.¶ Our notion of land force energy survivability derives from mobility and stealth. Mobility is key in that it permits evasion of attack by coordinate-guiding weapons. Mobility also allows serving widely dispersed forces without reliance on extended power grids, fixed storage facilities, and processing plants. To complement mobile energy, we focus on land vehicles that use hydrogen fuel and electricity for power.¶ Transportable, mobile powerplants permit manufacture of hydrogen in theater and recharging of vehicular batteries in the field. We envision transportability by ship, barge, cargo aircraft, or airship, and theater mobility by tractor trailer truck, railroad flatcar, cargo aircraft, or airship.¶ Modern armies require copious amounts of energy to conduct their operations. Energy is consumed as fuel for a variety of vehicles and as electricity for illumination, communication, computing, food processing, and environmental heating and cooling. Modern military forces also are more often called upon to provide humanitarian relief in the form of electricity for civilian populations. Taken together, these energy demands argue for affordable, reliable, and survivable power under combat stress and emergency conditions.¶ The outlook, however, is not promising regarding any of these issues. Due to dwindling reserves of reliable, inexpensive oil and competing worldwide demand, fuel costs have already begun to skyrocket, and responsible economists and geologists predict that they will go significantly higher. Moreover, proliferation of guided bombs and missiles threatens to make stationary refineries, powerplants, storage vessels, generators, and power grids prime targets with low expected survivability in future regional conflicts.¶ Overwhelming reliance on foreign oil poses an additional dilemma. The entire national security system, including the political leadership, military forces, and Intelligence Community, relies on fossil fuel to operate. With 95 percent of proven oil reserves controlled outside of North America, 1 this poses a national risk that is monotonically increasing.¶ To an alarming extent, then, the future has already arrived. Intensive study, planning, and early action to resolve this dilemma are warranted.¶ Motivation¶ The debilitating economic impact of $100+ per barrel for oil and $4+ per gallon for gasoline on the U.S. civilian population is well known. Such prices undermine military operations as well. U.S. forces currently consume 340,000 barrels of oil daily, 1.5 percent of all the oil used in the country. 2 In 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) energy bill was $13.6 billion, 25 percent higher than the year before. Petroleum costs have subsequently increased more than 50 percent. In its latest budget request, the White House added a $2 billion surcharge for rising fuel costs. It is conceivable that in coming decades, petroleum and natural gas will be so expensive that fuel will impinge on vehicular-intensive training exercises and on the acquisition of advanced equipment.¶ The U.S. military must find a viable substitute for fossil fuel. Fuel abundance is critical on the battlefield since it enables maneuverability. It is well recognized that lack of fuel can impose severe limitations on operations. There are numerous historical examples:¶ - George Patton’s 1944 drive for Germany stalled because Dwight Eisenhower had to divert fuel to British forces under Bernard Montgomery.¶ - As a consequence of interdiction in the Mediterranean Sea, German forces under Erwin Rommel literally ran out of gas in their 1943 North Africa campaign.¶ - The 1944 drive by U.S. forces up the Rhone Valley in France was slowed by fuel shortages.¶ - The Luftwaffe was grounded late in World War II due to lack of fuel.¶ - Because of fuel scarcity, German pilots were sent into combat in the last 9 months of World War II with only a third of the training hours actually required.¶ Wartime survivability of infrastructure for fuel extraction, manufacturing, and distribution has reached a critical state with the worldwide proliferation of satellite guided standoff missiles and bombs. As a case in point, Russia recently introduced the Kh-38MK air-to-surface missile. It uses GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System) satellite navigation, equivalent to global positioning system (GPS) with accuracy of better than 35 feet, and has a standoff range of 25 miles. 3 More ominously, threats with longer range also exist, typically 5,000 to 8,000 miles for intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 700 miles for cruise missiles, and 400 miles for short-range ballistic missiles. 4 Currently, most of these systems employ comparatively inaccurate inertial guidance, but many are being upgraded to satellite navigation with performance equivalent to the Kh-38MK.¶ Since attack missile warheads have damage areas of 5,000 to 7,500 square feet, we can estimate the benefits of random movement for a mobile reactor. Calculations are summarized in figure 1, in which damage probability is plotted against displacement. When the displacement is 0, the damage probability is more than 0.9. However, when the displacement is 600 feet or more, the damage probability is less than 0.009 for either warhead extreme.¶ Clearly, mobility acts as a powerful countermeasure against coordinate-guiding munitions. Recent history reinforces the premise:¶ - During the first Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), the only Iraqi Scud missiles that survived the U.S. air assault were of the mobile (wheeled) variety. These missiles later rained on Tel Aviv and Saudi Arabia.¶ - A 1991 study by Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak revealed the challenge of targeting mobile targets: “Efforts to suppress Iraqi launches of Scud missiles during Desert Storm ran into problems. Mobile launchers proved remarkably elusive and survivable. Objects targeted were impossible to discriminate from decoys (and clutter) with radar and infrared sensors.”5¶ - In the 2006 war in Lebanon, the Israeli air force could not stop more than 1,000 Hizballah truck-mobile rockets from striking Israeli urban areas.¶ Abundance of fuel is critical for success in big and small wars. U.S. forces in Iraq consume 1,680,000 gallons daily. The famous flanking maneuver during Operation Desert Storm burned 4.5 million gallons of fuel per day. After 5 days of combat, the maneuver required 70,000 tons of fuel.¶ 6 Prudence dictates development of abundant military power sources that are survivable, independent of petroleum, and require little fixed infrastructure to serve dispersed forces.

#### Mobility’s key to overall deterrence and all conflict de-escalation

Hickins 9 COLONEL KENNETH, United States Army, March 30, “STRATEGIC MOBILITY: FORGOTTEN CRITICAL REQUIREMENT OF THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494718

As I stated at the beginning of the paper, Strategic Mobility has not been fixed and is the weakest link in the strategic chain of getting the right forces, to the proper place in space and time in order to allow the Combatant Commander to either deter, deescalate, or decisively defeat an adversary. I believe I have shown that the 2006 QDR which stated, “Extensive investments in cargo transportability, strategic lift, and prepositioned stocks over the past decade have yielded military forces capable of responding to a broad spectrum of security challenges worldwide”, 41 is at best misleading and at worst wishful thinking of the highest order. ¶ Eighty percent of all countries border on the coast, 80 percent of the world’s capitals lie within 350 miles of the coast, and 95 percent of all the world’s population lives within 500 miles of the coast. 42 Currently, the United States cannot move significant ground forces to a crisis area in a timely manner. The recent National Security Strategy states that either Host Nation or an Allied Nation APODs and SPODs will be used to quickly move forces into the crisis area. An examination of past and potential crisis areas reveal most border the world’s oceans and are in remote, unimproved areas of the world: Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Yemen, Myanmar, Pakistan, India, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, China, Korea, Taiwan, Georgia, Sudan, East Timor, Venezuela, and Cuba. Half of these countries sit astride strategic waterways that would impact the United States and our Allies.¶ If the United States would have to engage any of these countries militarily, the Combatant Commander would need all the assets that the Mobility Triad has in order to respond to any and all contingencies. If the United States wants to continue to provide the world with political, economic, informational, and military leadership it will need to have the ability to flow military forces into the numerous trouble spots throughout the world.¶ The United States cannot afford to rely on possible Host Nation or Allied Nation support. Nor can it rely on limited air transport and slow sealift to get our forces quickly to the crisis area. The United States must quit paying lip service to the shortfalls in our Strategic Mobility Triad and leverage the available technology and create a truly interdependent and complimentary Mobility Triad that is a critical requirement for any operational and strategic success.

#### Mobile energy security’s key to mission effectiveness

Voth 12 Jeffrey M, President of Herren Associates leading a team of consultants advising the federal government on issues of national security, energy and environment, health care and critical information technology infrastructure, George Washing University Homeland Security Policy Institute, “In Defense of Energy – A Call to Action”, April 11, <http://securitydebrief.com/2012/04/11/in-defense-of-energy-a-call-to-action/>

Last month, the Pentagon released its widely anticipated roadmap to transform operational energy security. As published in a World Politics Review briefing, energy security has become a strategic as well as an operational imperative for U.S. national security. As tensions continue to escalate with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, it has become clear that the U.S. military urgently requires new approaches and innovative technologies to improve fuel efficiency, increase endurance, enhance operational flexibility and support a forward presence for allied forces while reducing the vulnerability inherent in a long supply-line tether. Assured access to reliable and sustainable supplies of energy is central to the military’s ability to meet operational requirements globally, whether keeping the seas safe of pirates operating off the coast of Africa, providing humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters in the Pacific or supporting counterterrorism missions in the Middle East. From both a strategic and an operational perspective, the call to action is clear. Rapid employment of energy-efficient technologies and smarter systems will be required to transform the military’s energy-security posture while meeting the increasing electric-power demands required for enhanced combat capability. As recently outlined by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey, “Without improving our energy security, we are not merely standing still as a military or as a nation, we are falling behind.”

#### Loss of mission effectiveness results in nuclear war in every hotspot

Kagan and O’Hanlon 7 Frederick, resident scholar at AEI and Michael, senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April 2007, http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424\_Kagan20070424.pdf

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, Sino Taiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

#### Marine mobility’s key to effective response in Afghanistan, Pakistan and protecting SLOCs

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Preparing for Greater Challenges ¶ The transitions in the world’s economic and power structure laid out above provide clear indications of the Corps’ likely future role and the frugal calculus that is required to avoid further depleting national resources. The Corps must continue to be an expeditionary force capable of operating across the spectrum of war, but likely developments suggest key areas of focus. Afghanistan will require small wars skills in the near term, which must be retained to deal with the effects of socioeconomic transition kindled into proxy wars by regional powers or transnational movements. Additionally, the Corps will continue to have equity in theater functional and contingency plans, especially humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and noncombatant evacuation operations. State collapse in Pakistan has been highlighted as a likely scenario in the near term, which would call on many of the above skills,14 but beyond securing nuclear material, strategic calculus dictates an extremely cautious approach to what would be a much more taxing entanglement than either Iraq or Afghanistan. Looking past these requirements, the Corps must orient itself on the challenge in the Indo-Pacific, which requires a frugal, truly expeditionary, and adaptive force capable of operating in the face of robust and asymmetric threats. In particular, the antiaccess threats and multiple chokepoint straits in the region require a Corps capable of establishing and defending advanced bases near key ports and sea lanes, operating in a distributed and maneuverable manner in high-threat environments, and maintaining the tempo of its operations in the face of jamming and defeat of communications and intelligence systems, including space-based systems. While other Services will seek high-end technological solutions, the Marine Corps should pursue intelligent capabilities and doctrines more likely to be sustainable over time and in the face of future conflict. ¶ The Nation and the Corps can best maintain access, build equity, and gain insight into the region through security cooperation and engagement over the next 5 to 10 years. Near the end of that period, small wars capabilities will likely be called for again as regional powers seek to gain influence by proxy in lower end conflicts. America, however, should judiciously avoid staking her prestige on state-building projects based on the ideology of democracy promotion. Involvement and objectives should be carefully circumscribed to serve key interests and conserve power for more significant challenges on the horizon. ¶ The likelihood of significant conflict will begin to rise somewhere around 2020, growing into midcentury. The United States will face the proliferation of strategic antiaccess weapons to regional powers and precision antiship and improved surface-to-air missile systems to virtually all threat states and many nonstate actors. While China is pursuing late-generation capabilities and attempting to expand her influence across the theater, strategists recognize that they are still well behind American capabilities. For this reason, influential analysts promote an emphasis on “informationalized” and space weapons to create a nonlinear and “noncontact” threat well past the first island chain, as well as “attack capabilities for battle operations on exterior lines.” This line of thinking seeks to outflank American air capabilities by building a “powerful navy that possesses relative space superiority,”15 while attacking air bases with ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers with the recently fielded Dong-Feng-21D (CSS–5 Mod–4) “carrier killer” missile system. For full effect, these systems require integration with over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems that, once combined and fielded in sufficient numbers, pose a significant threat to U.S. assets in the Pacific and may overwhelm antiballistic missile defenses through sheer numbers. While some analysts feel these threats currently fall short of their advertised capabilities, the fielding of the CSS–5 Mod–4 was “much earlier than expected,”16 giving China years to improve before conflict is likely. What’s more, China need not achieve global parity with the United States to achieve its regional goals. ¶ In the face of likely threats and threat intentions, the Corps should focus on several capabilities. The antiaccess missile threat demands the ability to distribute forces, particularly aviation assets and naval support facilities, to multiple forward locations in the case of conflict. The Corps must be prepared to secure, defend, and operate from austere advanced bases, continuing to develop operational maneuver and distributed operations capabilities in order to project and disperse combat power. This capability must include the rapid movement of aviation assets and their ability to operate on short, unimproved, and rapidly repaired runways without ponderous support requirements. The importance and channelized nature of SLOCs in the Indo-Pacific requires a focus on rapidly securing their land flanks, particularly in straits and in the face of mobile surface-to-air and antiship missiles and swarming small boat tactics with the possibility of suicide attacks. When considering such threats, the Corps and the Nation should recognize that the kamikaze threat was swarming and asymmetric, but the stakes of the conflict merited accepting it. Finally, the Corps must account for the defense of islands and straits against future, if less capable, amphibious threats.

#### Pakistan collapse cause global nuclear conflict

Pitt 9 William, a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence”, 5/8/09, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world.The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spinesof those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

#### Afghan instability causes nuclear war

Carafano 10 James Jay is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe,” Jan 2 <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/>

We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.

#### Afghan collapse on brink—2014 will see total disintegration

IWPR 2/5--Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Existential Fears in Afghanistan, Abdol Wahed Faramarz, 2013, ARR Issue 448, http://iwpr.net/report-news/existential-fears-afghanistan

As the end date for the NATO combat troop presence approaches, some experts in Afghanistan fear their country will not withstand external pressures and could even disintegrate. ¶ Last month, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, a former central banker who now heads the commission in charge of the security transition, told a private Afghan TV station that the next ten years would be a massive challenge.¶ "We face dangers to the survival of our nationhood in 2014,” he said in a January 5 interview. “Our neighbours, as well as some international commentators and others who do not hold us in high esteem, are waiting for a collapse."¶ In January, Afghanistan’s former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh, issued dire predictions about his country’s post-2014 future. In interviews for the BBC in English and Pashtu, he warned of immediate threats posed by Pakistan and Iran.¶ Interviewed by the BBC’s Frank Gardner, Saleh said the West would “regret it one day” if it failed to “persuade, pressure or convince Pakistan to give up extremist militancy as tool for promotion of its foreign policy”.¶ For Afghans, he said, the result would be that “a lot of us will be killed, perhaps hundreds of thousands of people displaced. There will be images of an Afghanistan sinking into chaos, an Afghanistan not able to provide services for its population.”¶ Some politicians like parliamentarian Mohammad Hussein Fahimi argue that the influence of both Tehran and Islamabad already extends far inside Afghanistan, into the heart of government. Fahimi told IWPR that this leverage allowed these states to press home their advantage whenever they sensed that the Afghan leadership was vacillating.¶ Apart from the continuing Taleban insurgency, local analysts point to internal strains within central institutions including government, parliament and the security forces, with many politicians still more attached to old political and ethnic allegiances than to the nation state.¶ For some, the future is beginning to look alarmingly like the civil war period of the early 1990s.¶ Abdul Latif Pedram, leader of the National Congress Party, fears a resurgence in warlords reigning over mini-states within Afghanistan and engaging in conflict with neighbouring factions.¶ "Increasing tribal, ethnic, factional and regional prejudice presents a major risk that our nationhood will be destroyed,” he said. “Whenever Afghan politicians, rulers and leaders appear before the media, they mask their true faces behind talk of national unity, and behind claims that the Afghans are one united nation with no ethnic differences among them. But when they return to their homes, they talk of tribe and tribalism, race and racism."

#### Marines independently key to overall US power projection

Hagee 4 General Michael W, Commandant of the Marine Corps, "Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Concerning Posture", February 10, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/posture\_feb04.pdf

The Navy-Marine Corps team continues to play a critical role in the Global War On Terrorism and in the establishment of stability and security throughout the world. During this past year, the Marine Corps, both active and reserve, was engaged in operations from Afghanistan, to the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Liberia, the Georgian Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines. Most prominent in highlighting the value and power of the Nation’s naval expeditionary capability was the Marine Corps’ participation in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Success in this operation underscored the unique contributions of our multidimensional naval dominance, our expeditionary nature, our flexibility to deal with complex situations and challenges, and the adaptability of our forces and individuals in order to defeat the challenges posed by adaptive, asymmetric enemies and long-term threats. ¶ Early last year, the I Marine Expeditionary Force deployed a combat ready force of almost 70,000 Marines and Sailors in less than 60 days using the full array of our complementary power projection capabilities. Forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) again demonstrated their proven value for immediate response. Eleven strategically located Maritime Prepositioned Force ships were unloaded in 16 days to provide the equipment and sustainment for two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. A seven ship amphibious force from each coast embarked a total of 11,500 Marines, Sailors, and their equipment and within thirty days these fourteen ships began to arrive and offload in Kuwait. Strategic sea and air lift was also vital to our success in this effort. Exploiting the operational speed, reach, and inherent flexibility of seapower, the Navy-Marine Corps team achieved a rapid buildup of sustained warfighting power that was combat ready to support U.S. Central Command on 1 March 2003. ¶ Closely integrated with our joint and coalition partners, as well as Special Operations Forces, the I Marine Expeditionary Force provided the Combatant Commander with a potent combined arms force comprising a balance of ground, aviation, and combat service support elements all coordinated by a dynamic command element. This teamwork – the product of demanding and realistic Service and joint training – presented a multi-dimensional dilemma for the Iraqi regime’s forces and loyalists. It also greatly increased the range of options available to our leadership as they addressed each unique and complex situation. The integration of the 1st United Kingdom Division within the I Marine Expeditionary Force provides outstanding lessons for achieving merged coalition capabilities and consistent goals in the future. ¶ The combat power of I Marine Expeditionary Force generated an operational tempo that our enemy could not match. With short notice that operations would commence early, the Marines and their joint and coalition partners rapidly secured key strategic objectives. The I Marine Expeditionary Force then engaged in 26 days of sustained combat operations. Using the tenets of maneuver warfare, they executed four major river crossings, fought ten major engagements, and destroyed eight Iraqi divisions before stopping in Tikrit – almost 500 miles inland. In support of Joint Special Operations Forces Northern Iraq, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit inserted a Marine-Air Ground Task Force from the Eastern Mediterranean into Northern Iraq – almost 1,200 miles distance. The sustained resources of the Marine force, which were derived primarily from our seaborne logistics, provided us unrivaled advantages. While our logistics were stretched by the operational commanders, our combat service support units demonstrated flexibility and resourcefulness. ¶ Highlighting the expeditionary mindset of Marines, our combined arms force successfully operated in desert, urban, swamp, and rural environments while effectively conducting combat, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations – at times simultaneously. Marines also demonstrated the ability to re-task and reorganize to conduct unanticipated missions like the taking of the city of Tikrit. Following major combat operations, I Marine Expeditionary Force assumed responsibility for security and stability in five Central Iraq provinces until they were relieved of the last province by coalition forces this past September. Flexibility and adaptability are key characteristics of an expeditionary force, and they are critical advantages that we must seek to optimize for the future, particularly in this era of global uncertainty. ¶ Recent operations also emphasize the increased importance of access to key regions for projecting our Nation’s power. With global interests, the United States must retain the capability to secure access as needed. Power projection from the sea greatly increases the range of options available to avert or resolve conflicts. A credible naval forcible-entry capability is critical to ensure that we are never barred from a vital national objective or limited to suboptimal alternatives.

#### Extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7 <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we **stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's** sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably **the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured**, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the **guardian of globalization**, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But the world did not keep sliding down that **path of perpetual war**. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by **ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the **international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a **profound and persistent reduction in** battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

### Adv 2

#### CONTENTION 2: RAPID RESPONSE

#### Mobile SMRs spur effective desalination and disaster relief

Pfeffer and Macon 2 Robert A, physical scientist at the Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency in Springfield, Virginia, working on nuclear weapons effects, a graduate of Trinity University and has a master's degree in physics from The Johns Hopkins University and William A, project manager at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, formerly the acting Army Reactor Program Manager at the Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, "Nuclear Power: An Option for the Army's Future", Jan 16 2002 is last date modified, [www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct01/MS684.htm](http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct01/MS684.htm)

The idea of using nuclear power to produce synthetic fuels, originally proposed in 1963, remains feasible today and is gaining significant attention because of recent advances in fuel cell technology, hydrogen liquefaction, and storage. At the same time, nuclear power has become a significant part of the energy supply in more than 20 countries—providing energy security, reducing air pollution, and cutting greenhouse gas emissions. The performance of the world's nuclear power plants has improved steadily and is at an all-time high. Assuming that nuclear power experiences further technological development and increased public acceptance as a safe and efficient energy source, its use will continue to grow. Nuclear power possibly could provide district heating, industrial process heating, desalination of seawater, and marine transportation.¶ Demand for cost-effective chemical fuels such as hydrogen and methanol is expected to grow rapidly. Fuel cell technology, which produces electricity from low-temperature oxidation of hydrogen and yields water as a byproduct, is receiving increasing attention. Cheap and abundant hydrogen eventually will replace carbon-based fuels in the transportation sector and eliminate oil's grip on our society. But hydrogen must be produced, since terrestrial supplies are extremely limited. Using nuclear power to produce hydrogen offers the potential for a limitless chemical fuel supply with near-zero greenhouse gas emissions. As the commercial transportation sector increasingly moves toward hydrogen fuel cells and other advanced engine concepts to replace the gasoline internal combustion engine, DOD eventually will adopt this technology for its tactical vehicles.¶ The demand for desalination of seawater also is likely to grow as inadequate freshwater supplies become an urgent global concern. Potable water in the 21st century will be what oil was in the 20th century—a limited natural resource subject to intense international competition. In many areas of the world, rain is not always dependable and ground water supplies are limited, exhausted, or contaminated. Such areas are likely to experience conflict among water-needy peoples, possibly prompting the deployment of U.S. ground forces for humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, or armed intervention. A mobile desalination plant using waste heat from a nuclear reactor could help prevent conflicts or provide emergency supplies of freshwater to indigenous populations, and to U.S. deployed forces if necessary.¶ Promising Technology for Tomorrow¶ Compact reactor concepts based on high-temperature, gas-cooled reactors are attracting attention worldwide and could someday fulfill the role once envisioned for the energy depot. One proposed design is the pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR) being developed by Eskom in South Africa. Westinghouse, BNFL Instruments Ltd., and Exelon Corporation currently are supporting this project to develop commercial applications.¶ A similar design is the remote site-modular helium reactor (RS-MHR) being developed by General Atomics. If proven feasible, this technology could be used to replace retiring power plants, expand the Navy's nuclear fleet, and provide mobile electric power for military or disaster relief operations. Ideally, modular nuclear power plants could be operated by a small staff of technicians and monitored by a central home office through a satellite uplink.¶ The technology of both the PBMR and the RS-MHR features small, modular, helium-cooled reactors powered by ceramic-coated fuel particles that are inherently safe and cannot melt under any scenario. This results in simpler plant design and lower capital costs than existing light water reactors. The PBMR, coupled with a direct-cycle gas turbine generator, would have a thermal efficiency of about 42 to 45 percent and would produce about 110 megawatts of electricity (MWe). The smaller RS-MHR would produce about 10 to 25 MWe, which is sufficient for powering remote communities and military bases. Multiple modules can be installed on existing sites and refueling can be performed on line, since the fuel pebbles recycle through the reactor continuously until they are expended. Both designs also feature coolant exit temperatures high enough to support the thermochemical water-splitting cycles needed to produce hydrogen.¶ For military applications, RS-MHR equipment could be transported inland by truck or railroad, or single modules could be built on barges and deployed as needed to coastal regions. The Army's nuclear reactor on the barge Sturgis, which provided electric power to the Panama Canal from 1968 to 1976, demonstrated the feasibility of this concept. In fact, the military previously used several power barges (oil-fired, 30-MWe power plants) during World War II and in Korea and Okinawa as emergency sources of electric power.¶ Research teams around the world also are examining other reactor concepts based on liquid-metal-cooled reactor systems with conventional sodium or lead-alloy coolants and advanced water-cooled systems. The Department of Energy (DOE) is supporting research and development of innovative concepts that are based on ultra-long-life reactors with cartridge cores. These reactors would not require refueling, and they could be deployed in the field, removed at the end of their service life, and replaced by a new system. The proposed international reactor innovative and secure (IRIS) design, funded by DOE's Nuclear Energy Research Initiative, would have a straight burn core lasting 8 years and may be available by 2010. Based on increasing costs of fossil fuels, a growing consensus that greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced, and a growing demand for energy, there is little doubt that we will continue to see significant advances in nuclear energy research and development.¶ Nuclear power is expected to grow in the 21st century, with potential benefits applicable to the military. Small, modular nuclear power reactors in mobile or portable configurations, coupled with hydrogen production and desalination systems, could be used to produce fuel and potable water for combat forces deployed in remote areas and reduce our logistics requirements. Assuming the inevitability of hydrogen fuel replacing fossil fuels, a clearly defined objective that was missing in 1966 now exists.¶ The partnership between DOD and the former AEC to develop Army nuclear reactors contributed to the technology of both military and small commercial power plants. This historical relationship should be renewed based on recent technological advances and projected logistics requirements. DOD logistics planners should reconsider military applications of nuclear power and support ongoing DOE research and development initiatives to develop advanced reactors such as RS-MHR, IRIS, and others. For the Army to fight and win on tomorrow's distant battlefields, nuclear power will have to play a significant role.

#### Disasters are inevitable and getting worse---mobility’s key to mitigate effects

Johnstone 8 L Craig, Ambassador and UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, "Planning for the Inevitable, the Humanitarian Consequences of Climate Change", 2008 is last date cited, www.unhcr.org/49256c492.pdf

Coping with the unpredictable is perhaps even more of a challenge. Here to there is a lack of government capacity which needs to be addressed as well as substantial financial needs. We need to put in place better mechanisms for predicting storms, floods and droughts. And when the predictions are in hand we need to able to communicate them effectively. It is instructive that much of the loss of life in the great South Asian Tsunami could have been avoided if an alert system had been in place to inform coastal residents of the impending catastrophe which was knowable in many areas a full six hours before the Tsunami struck. So too, in Myanmar that the country was going to be hit by an exceptional storm was known two days before it hit. Much more could have been done. The technologies are there; they need to be harnessed. ¶ But beyond early warning we need contingency plans in place that have been preapproved by governments. We need national institutions in place that are capable of responding quickly in carrying out the contingency plans. We cannot have a situation like in Myanmar when a government fails to recognize the extent of its emergency needs or like in the U.S. where government institutions were not up to the measure of the formidable tasks brought on by recent hurricanes. ¶ And we need a level of international emergency response that goes far beyond what we have today. Stocks must be available and pre-positioned. Transportation plans must be mobilizable on a moment’s notice. What we have done in UNHCR over the past year to build our current capability must be multiplied twenty fold if we are to be in a position to respond. ¶ And, we will need better means of international coordination and cooperation. We have a beginning in some of the recent efforts undertaken within the UN at achieving improved coordination, such as the Cluster process. But, we need to build on these efforts, de-bureaucratize them, and exercise and game the various contingencies. ¶ Finally we are going to have to mobilize the resources necessary to achieve both sides of the humanitarian need, the developmental and migratory needs that will stem from predictable consequences of climate change, and the emergency response needed to cope with dramatic events likely to take place. In this regard the Adaptation Fund called for under the Kyoto Protocol needs to be augmented and funded at a level that will enable it to deal with both dimensions of the humanitarian crisis wrought by global climate change. If the first priority of the Poznan and Copenhagen conferences is to get agreement on the steps necessary to prevent further environmental deterioration, the second priority should be to mitigate the consequences we already know to be inevitable. Full funding of an augmented Adaptation Fund is critical to this latter goal. ¶ I will leave you with a final observation. We speak about the humanitarian consequences of global climate change as though we are dealing with a future possibility. Far from it, this is not a possibility or even a probability, this is a certainty. And, this is not about the future, this is about NOW. The impact of changing weather is daily upon us and growing in intensity. In the past twenty years the incidence of major storms had doubled from 200 to 400 a year. Disasters caused by flooding have risen from 50 to 200 during that period and the damage is more extensive than previously. Today we deal with conflicts in Darfur and Somalia and elsewhere in which changing climate is one of the causes. The facts speak for themselves and lend a new urgency to the issue. The future of which we speak in this conference is upon us. And like the crisis, the response is not for future years, it is for now.

#### Inadequate response to disasters results in disease outbreak

Aljunid et al 12 Syed, Professor of Health Economics and Senior Research Fellow at UNU International Institute for Global Health, Kouadio Koffi Isidore, Postdoctoral Fellow at United Nations University International Institute for Global Health, Taro Kamigaki, Assistant Professor, at the Department of Virology of Tohoku University Graduate School of Medicine, Karen Hammad, Australian emergency nurse and Lecturer at the School of Nursing and Midwifery, Flinders University and Hitoshi Oshitani, Professor of Virology at Tohoku University Graduate School of Medicine, "Preventing and controlling infectious diseases after natural disasters", March 13, United Nations University, unu.edu/publications/articles/preventing-and-controlling-infectious-diseases-after-natural-disasters.html#info

Beyond damaging and destroying physical infrastructure, natural disasters can lead to outbreaks of infectious disease. In this article, two UNU-IIGH researchers and colleagues review risk factors and potential infectious diseases resulting from the secondary effects of major natural disasters that occurred from 2000 to 2011, classify possible diseases, and give recommendations on prevention, control measures and primary healthcare delivery improvements.¶ Over the past few decades, the incidence and magnitude of natural disasters has grown, resulting in substantial economic damages and affecting or killing millions of people. Recent disasters have shown that even the most developed countries are vulnerable to natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 and the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Global population growth, poverty, land shortages and urbanization in many countries have increased the number of people living in areas prone to natural disasters and multiplied the public health impacts.¶ Natural disasters can be split in three categories: hydro-meteorological disasters, geophysical disasters and geomorphologic disasters.¶ Hydro-meteorological disasters, like floods, are the most common (40 percent) natural disasters worldwide and are widely documented. The public health consequences of flooding are disease outbreaks mostly resulting from the displacement of people into overcrowded camps and cross-contamination of water sources with faecal material and toxic chemicals. Flooding also is usually followed by the proliferation of mosquitoes, resulting in an upsurgence of mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria. Documentation of disease outbreaks and the public health after-effects of tropical cyclones (hurricanes and typhoons) and tornadoes, however, is lacking.¶ Geophysical disasters are the second-most reported type of natural disaster, and earthquakes are the majority of disasters in this category. Outbreaks of infectious diseases may be reported when earthquake disasters result in substantial population displacement into unplanned and overcrowded shelters, with limited access to food and safe water. Disease outbreaks may also result from the destruction of water/sanitation systems and the degradation of sanitary conditions directly caused by the earthquake. Tsunamis are commonly associated with earthquakes, but can also be caused by powerful volcanic eruptions or underwater landslides. Although classified as geophysical disasters, they have a similar clinical and threat profile (water-related consequences) to that of tropical cyclones (e.g., typhoon or hurricane).¶ Geomorphologic disasters, such as avalanches and landslides, also are associated with infectious disease transmissions and outbreaks, but documentation is generally lacking.¶ After a natural disaster¶ The overwhelming majority of deaths immediately after a natural disaster are directly associated with blunt trauma, crush-related injuries and burn injuries. The risk of infectious disease outbreaks in the aftermath of natural disasters has usually been overemphasized by health officials and the media, leading to panic, confusion and sometimes to unnecessary public health activities.¶ The prolonged health impact of natural disasters on a community may be the consequence of the collapse of health facilities and healthcare systems, the disruption of surveillance and health programmes (immunization and vector control programmes), the limitation or destruction of farming activities (scarcity of food/food insecurity), or the interruption of ongoing treatments and use of unprescribed medications.¶ The risk factors for increased infectious diseases transmission and outbreaks are mainly associated with the after-effects of the disasters rather than to the primary disaster itself or to the corpses of those killed. These after-effects include displacement of populations (internally displaced persons and refugees), environmental changes and increased vector breeding sites. Unplanned and overcrowded shelters, poor water and sanitation conditions, poor nutritional status or insufficient personal hygiene are often the case. Consequently, there are low levels of immunity to vaccine-preventable diseases, or insufficient vaccination coverage and limited access to health care services.¶ Phases of outbreak and classification of infectious disease¶ Infectious disease transmission or outbreaks may be seen days, weeks or even months after the onset of the disaster. Three clinical phases of natural disasters summarize the chronological public health effects on injured people and survivors:¶ Phase (1), the impact phase (lasting up to to 4 days), is usually the period when victims are extricated and initial treatment of disaster-related injuries is provided.¶ Phase (2), the post-impact phase (4 days to 4 weeks), is the period when the first waves of infectious diseases (air-borne, food-borne, and/or water-borne infections) might emerge.¶ Phase (3), the recovery phase (after 4 weeks), is the period when symptoms of victims who have contracted infections with long incubation periods or those with latent-type infections may become clinically apparent. During this period, infectious diseases that are already endemic in the area, as well as newly imported ones among the affected community, may grow into an epidemic.¶ It is common to see the international community, NGOs, volunteers, experts and the media leaving a disaster-affected zone usually within three months, when in reality basic sanitation facilities and access to basic hygiene may still be unavailable or worsen due to the economic burden of the disasters.¶ Although it is not possible to predict with accuracy which diseases will occur following certain types of disasters, diseases can be distinguished as either water-borne, air-borne/droplet or vector-borne diseases, and contamination from wounded injuries.¶ Diarrhoeal diseases¶ The most documented and commonly occurring diseases are water-borne diseases (diarrhoeal diseases and Leptospirosis). Diarrhoeal diseases cause over 40 percent of the deaths in disaster and refugee camp settings. Epidemics among victims are commonly related to polluted water sources (faecal contamination), or contamination of water during transportation and storage. Outbreaks have also been related to shared water containers and cooking pots, scarcity of soap and contaminated food, as well as pre-existing poor sanitary infrastructures, water supply and sewerage systems.

#### New deadly disease outbreaks are inevitable

CDC Foundation 12 --- “How CDC Saves Lives By Controlling REAL Global Disease Outbreaks,” http://www.cdcfoundation.org/content/how-cdc-saves-lives-controlling-real-global-disease-outbreaks

Serious, deadly contagious disease outbreaks can and do happen. CDC investigates new contagious diseases—averaging one new contagion per year. These new contagious diseases can emerge right here or only a plane-ride away from here.¶ It’s not just new diseases that threaten the United States. Some diseases long thought controlled in the United States, like tuberculosis, can reemerge and be more deadly than ever.

#### Disease causes extinction---no burnout

**Torrey and Yolken 5** E. Fuller and Robert H, Directors Stanley Medical Research Institute, 2005, Beasts of the Earth: Animals, Humans and Disease, pp. 5-6

The outcome of this marriage, however, is not as clearly defined as it was once thought to be. For many years, it was believed that microbes and human slowly learn to live with each other as microbes evolve toward a benign coexistence wit their hosts. Thus, the bacterium that causes syphilis was thought to be extremely virulent when it initially spread among humans in the sixteenth century, then to have slowly become less virulent over the following three centuries. This reassuring view of microbial history has recently been challenged by Paul Ewald and others, who have questioned whether microbes do necessarily evolve toward long-term accommodation with their hosts. Under certain circumstances, Ewald argues, “Natural selection may…favor the evolution of extreme harmfulness if the exploitation that damages the host [i.e. disease] enhances the ability of the harmful variant to compete with a more benign pathogen.” The outcome of such a “marriage” may thus be the murder of one spouse by the other. In eschatological terms, this view argues that a microbe such as HIV or SARS virus may be truly capable of **eradicating the human race**.

#### Disaster diplomacy solves terrorism by preventing instability

IFPA 9 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, January 1, "Finding the Right Mix: Disaster Diplomacy, National Security, and International Cooperation", www.ifpa.org/research/researchPages/DisasterDiplomacySRF.php

Foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations—ranging from carefully planned medical aid and community development projects to emergency responses in the wake of earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, and other natural disasters overseas—have become an increasingly prominent part of America’s diplomatic repertoire, and one in which its military forces are playing an ever more central role. Beyond their obvious humanitarian benefits, moreover, these operations can yield significant strategic value for the United States, as well as for its allies and coalition partners. Among other benefits, they can help eliminate sources of instability that terrorists and other irregular adversaries could exploit. They can also help build or restore cooperative military ties that may prove useful in other mission areas, provide regional powers with the chance to demonstrate new-found military capabilities in a non-provocative manner, and, perhaps most importantly, establish goodwill in areas where it had been latent at best. As a result, such operations can be vital tools for winning the “battle for hearts and minds” in areas where anti-American and/or anti-Western attitudes more generally have taken or could take root.¶ For these and related reasons, rising interest in HA/DR operations is also shared by U.S. allies and other partner states, especially in Europe and the Asia-Pacific area. As a result, the opportunities are ripe to advance disaster relief and other civil support missions as more potent tools of U.S. foreign policy that could be wielded unilaterally or in concert with like-minded nations. The key to success in either case is to achieve a greater unity of effort and a better division of labor among the diverse mix of civilian and military, national and international, and public and private sector entities that must work together as a team to execute such operations. This requires, in turn, a keener understanding of what unique skills and capabilities the military can bring to HA/DR efforts, how to ensure that these same skills and capabilities are ready and available where and when needed, and how to maximize their overall impact and contribution in the context of an interagency, civil-military, whole-of-government strategy.

#### Terrorism causes extinction

Hellman 8(Martin E, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING, THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

#### **Water wars coming and cause conflict**

Chellaney 13--Brahma, interviewed by Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, "Interview: Author Discusses Asia's Water Woes", Jan. 24, professor at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research, http://www.rferl.org/content/asia-water-woes/24882816.html

Brahma Chellaney, a professor at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research, has sounded alarms about the potential for conflict over water resources in Asia. ¶ In his award-winning book, "Water: Asia's Next Battleground," Chellaney argues that Asia has less freshwater per capita than any other continent, but is both guzzling and polluting its resources at an ever-increasing rate.¶ RFE/RL correspondent Courtney Brooks speaks with Chellaney about where the potential conflicts lie.¶ RFE/RL: What are some of the hotspots for water disputes in Asia and how do you see the situation evolving?¶ Brahma Chellaney: I see water becoming an increasingly divisive issue in large parts of Asia -- the Middle East, Central Asia, and [the] Caucasus, for example. I see water stress being a driver of conflict.¶RFE/RL: You mention in your book that battle lines in Afghanistan tend to follow the lines of water courses. What exactly does that mean? Can you give me some examples?¶ Chellaney: Afghanistan and Yemen are examples where internal conflicts are being waged along hydrological lines. Where waterways run those lines of water courses tend to be the lines separating feuding parties because the object of control in the feud is control of a water source.¶ And in Afghanistan we are finding that in some parts where scarcity is acute the control of wells and streams has become a source of conflict by itself. Warlords have emerged that can be called water warlords, whose basic job is to maintain control over a source of water. These are warlords with militias, and they are controlling sources of water for their community or for their province and such kind of overt use of force to assert control over a source of water is found in Afghanistan more than any other country.¶ RFE/RL: And the situation in Central Asia?¶ Chellaney: Water is the most divisive issue in Central Asia. Along with unsettled borders, water has become an even more explosive issue. Because you have in some parts of Central Asia borders that are not clearly demarcated and therefore the issue of water sharing and transnational water resources, their delineation. These issues are compounding the interstate and intrastate competition [and] the struggle for water.¶ Water is clearly, of all issues, the one that carries the highest risk of destabilizing Central Asia.¶Water is clearly, of all issues, the one that carries the highest risk of destabilizing Central Asia. And also, Central Asia is a very water-scarce region, and therefore the struggle is over scarce resources. The only countries that actually have the water resources are the small upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, [which are] small and powerless against the main users of water -- the countries located downstream: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.’

#### Especially in China, Egypt, and Pakistan --- goes nuclear

NPR 10 (NPR citing Steven Solomon who has written for The New York Times, BusinessWeek, The Economist, Forbes, and Esquire. He has been a regular commentator on NPR’s Marketplace, and has appeared as a featured guest on the late Tim Russert’s CNBC show, NPR’s Talk of the Nation, Bloomberg TV, and on many other news shows. He has addressed the World Affairs Council, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and university forums, author of *Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and Civilization and The Confidence Game*, 1/3/10, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122195532)

Just as wars over oil played a major role in 20th-century history, a new book makes a convincing case that many 21st century conflicts will be fought over water. In Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power and Civilization, journalist Steven Solomon argues that water is surpassing oil as the world's scarcest critical resource. Only 2.5 percent of the planet's water supply is fresh, Solomon writes, much of which is locked away in glaciers. World water use in the past century grew twice as fast as world population. "We've now reached the limit where that trajectory can no longer continue," Solomon tells NPR's Mary Louise Kelly. "Suddenly we're going to have to find a way to use the existing water resources in a far, far more productive manner than we ever did before, because there's simply not enough." One issue, Solomon says, is that water's cost doesn't reflect its true economic value. While a society's transition from oil may be painful, water is irreplaceable. Yet water costs far less per gallon — and even less than that for some. "In some cases, where there are large political subsidies, largely in agriculture, it does not [cost very much]," Solomon says. "In many cases, irrigated agriculture is getting its water for free. And we in the cities are paying a lot, and industries are also paying an awful lot. That's unfair. It's inefficient to the allocation of water to the most productive economic ends." At the same time, Solomon says, there's an increasing feeling in the world that everyone has a basic right to a minimum 13 gallons of water a day for basic human health. He doesn't necessarily have an issue with that. "I think there's plenty of water in the world, even in the poorest and most water-famished country, for that 13 gallons to be given for free to individuals — and let them pay beyond that," he says. Solomon says the world is divided into water haves and have-nots. China, Egypt and Pakistan are just a few countries facing critical water issues in the 21st century. In his book he writes, "Consider what will happen in water-distressed, nuclear-armed, terrorist-besieged, overpopulated, heavily irrigation dependent and already politically unstable Pakistan when its single water lifeline, the Indus river, loses a third of its flow from the disappearance from its glacial water source."

#### Middle East war causes World War 3

The Earl of Stirling 11, hereditary Governor & Lord Lieutenant of Canada, Lord High Admiral of Nova Scotia, & B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History; M.A. in European Studies, “General Middle East War Nears - Syrian events more dangerous than even nuclear nightmare in Japan”, http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nears-syrian.html

Any Third Lebanon War/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both side quickly as both sides know the stakes and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater Israel' domination of the entire Middle East. It will be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli thermonuclear warheads against Arab and Persian populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of the Northern Hemisphere. However, the first use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground facilities including both nuclear sites and governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited strikes also likely early-on in Syrian territory.¶ The Iranians are well prepared to launch a global Advanced Biological Warfare terrorism based strike against not only Israel and American and allied forces in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British, French, German, Italian, etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based genetically engineered 'super killer viruses' that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as vectors. There are very few defenses against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population until all of the different man-made viruses (and there could be dozens or even over a hundred different viruses released at the same time) have 'burned themselves out'. This could kill a third of the world's total population.¶Such a result from an Israeli triggered war would almost certainly cause a Russian-Chinese response that would eventually finish off what is left of Israel and begin a truly global war/WWIII with multiple war theaters around the world. It is highly unlikely that a Third World War, fought with 21st Century weaponry will be anything but the Biblical Armageddon.

#### [ ] Water scarcity causes wars in Asia

Priyadarshi 12 Nitish, lecturer in the department of environment and water management at Ranchi University in India, “War for water is not a far cry”, June 16, <http://www.cleangangaportal.org/node/44>

Water stress is set to become Asia’s defining crisis of the twenty-first century, creating obstacles to continued rapid economic growth, stoking interstate tensions over shared resources, exacerbating long time territorial disputes, and imposing further hardships on the poor. Asia is home to many of the world’s great rivers and lakes, but its huge population , pollution and exploding economic and agricultural demand for water make it the most water-scare continent on a per capita basis. Many of Asia’s water sources cross national boundaries, and as less and less water is available, international tensions will rise. The poor management of river basins, environmentally unsustainable irrigation practices, an overuse of groundwater, and the contamination of water sources have all helped aggravate Asian water woes. The over exploitation of subterranean water in the large parts of the Asia has resulted in a rapidly falling groundwater saturation level- known as the water table. In the Gangetic delta, wells have tapped into naturally occurring arsenic deposits, causing millions of people in Bangladesh, and Eastern India including Jharkhand and Bihar to be exposed to high levels of poisonous arsenic in drinking water and staple agricultural products like rice. In some Asian coastal areas, the depletion of groundwater has permitted saline seawater to flow in to replace the freshwater that has been extracted. The Ganga, which is virtually synonymous with Indian civilisation, is dying. Pollution, over-extraction of water, emaciated tributaries and climatic changes are killing the mighty river, on whose fecund plains live one in 12 people of this planet. The Ganga basin makes up almost a third of India's land area and its rich soil is home to millions of people. However, indiscriminate extraction of water with modern tube wells from the river as well as its basin, coupled with the damming of its tributaries for irrigation, have seriously reduced its flow. Climate change has added to the threat. Rivers are the lifeblood of the Bangladesh economy and social life. Its cultural life is also deeply related to rivers. It is extremely unfortunately that its three main rivers, Ganges-Padma, Brahmaputra-Jamuna and Surma-Meghna are dying. As per a survey of the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB), there are three hundred and ten rivers in Bangladesh. Out of these fifty-seven are border rivers, the condition of one hundred and seventy five is miserable, and sixty five are almost dead. Eighty percent of the rivers lack proper depth. The latest study reveals that one hundred and seventeen rivers are either dead or have lost navigability . Such rivers/canals include Brahamaputra, Padma, Mahananda, Gorai, Meghna, Titas, Gomati, Kushiara, Dhaleswari, Bhairab, Sitalksha, Turag etc. As per a report of BWDB, India is controlling the water of 57 rivers along with the Farakka barrage. Because of inadequate facilities for dredging, these rivers have become canals. Additionally, India has withdrawn water of several rivers including Surma, Kushiara and Mahananda. Sluice gates have been constructed on the rivers Senoa, Jamuna, Panga, Pan, Hatoori and Sui (situated near Panchagarh). Apart from the scourge of Farakka barrage, a new dam, named Tipaimukh dam, is under construction in India. Asia will continue to have the world’s largest number of people without basic or adequate access to water. The Asian water sector is plagued by serious problems, including inadequate infrastructure and poor system maintenance, financially strapped utilities, low-cost recovery, growing pollution, watershed degradation, and unsustainable groundwater extraction. Owing to leaks and system inefficiencies, a sizable portion of the water supply is lost before reaching the consumer. As water distress intensifies and global warming accelerates, local, national, and interstate disputes over water are likely to become endemic in Asia. Water, for its part, could trigger increased conflicts within and between states, and open new political disputes in Asia. Water shortages, likely to be aggravated by fast-rising use and climate change, pose a potential threat to political stability, economic modernization, public health, food security, and internal cohesion in a number of Asian states. A study of Asia’s biggest rivers-the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Yangtze, the Yellow, and the Ganges-by different experts has found that the “ upstream snow and ice reserves of these basins-important in sustaining seasonal water availability- are likely to be affected substantially by climate change,” although the extent of impact will vary from basin to basin.

#### [ ] Asian war goes nuclear---no defense

C. Raja Mohan 13, distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, March 2013, Emerging Geopolitical Trends and Security in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the People’s Republic of China, and India (ACI) Region,” background paper for the Asian Development Bank Institute study on the Role of Key Emerging Economies, <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2013/10737.pdf>

Three broad types of conventional conflict confront Asia. The first is the prospect of war between great powers. Until a rising PRC grabbed the attention of the region, there had been little fear of great power rivalry in the region. The fact that all major powers interested in Asia are armed with nuclear weapons, and the fact that there is growing economic interdependence between them, has led many to argue that great power conflict is not likely to occur. Economic interdependence, as historians might say by citing the experience of the First World War, is not a guarantee for peace in Asia. Europe saw great power conflict despite growing interdependence in the first half of the 20th century. Nuclear weapons are surely a larger inhibitor of great power wars. Yet we have seen military tensions build up between the PRC and the US in the waters of the Western Pacific in recent years. The contradiction between the PRC’s efforts to limit and constrain the presence of other powers in its maritime periphery and the US commitment to maintain a presence in the Western Pacific is real and can only deepen over time.29 We also know from the Cold War that while nuclear weapons did help to reduce the impulses for a conventional war between great powers, they did not prevent geopolitical competition. Great power rivalry expressed itself in two other forms of conflict during the Cold War: inter-state wars and intra-state conflict. If the outcomes in these conflicts are seen as threatening to one or other great power, they are likely to influence the outcome. This can be done either through support for one of the parties in the inter-state conflicts or civil wars. When a great power decides to become directly involved in a conflict the stakes are often very high. In the coming years, it is possible to envisage conflicts of all these types in the ACI region. ¶ Asia has barely begun the work of creating an institutional framework to resolve regional security challenges. Asia has traditionally been averse to involving the United Nations (UN) in regional security arrangements. Major powers like the PRC and India are not interested in “internationalizing” their security problems—whether Tibet; Taipei,China; the South China Sea; or Kashmir—and give other powers a handle. Even lesser powers have had a tradition of rejecting UN interference in their conflicts. North Korea, for example, prefers dealing with the United States directly rather than resolve its nuclear issues through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN. Since its founding, the involvement of the UN in regional security problems has been rare and occasional.¶ The burden of securing Asia, then, falls squarely on the region itself. There are three broad ways in which a security system in Asia might evolve: collective security, a concert of major powers, and a balance of power system.30 Collective security involves a system where all stand for one and each stands for all, in the event of an aggression. While collective security systems are the best in a normative sense, achieving them in the real world has always been difficult. A more achievable goal is “cooperative security” that seeks to develop mechanisms for reducing mutual suspicion, building confidence, promoting transparency, and mitigating if not resolving the sources of conflict. The ARF and EAS were largely conceived within this framework, but the former has disappointed while the latter has yet to demonstrate its full potential. ¶ A second, quite different, approach emphasizes the importance of power, especially military power, to deter one’s adversaries and the building of countervailing coalitions against a threatening state. A balance of power system, as many critics of the idea point out, promotes arms races, is inherently unstable, and breaks down frequently leading to systemic wars. There is growing concern in Asia that amidst the rise of Chinese military power and the perception of American decline, many large and small states are stepping up their expenditure on acquiring advanced weapons systems. Some analysts see this as a structural condition of the new Asia that must be addressed through deliberate diplomatic action. 31 A third approach involves cooperation among the great powers to act in concert to enforce a broad set of norms—falling in between the idealistic notions of collective security and the atavistic forms of balance of power. However, acting in concert involves a minimum level of understanding between the major powers. The greatest example of a concert is the one formed by major European powers in the early 18th century through the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of Napoleonic France. The problem of adapting such a system to Asia is the fact that there are many medium-sized powers who would resent any attempt by a few great powers to impose order in the region.32 In the end, the system that emerges in Asia is likely to have elements of all the three models. In the interim, though, there are substantive disputes on the geographic scope and the normative basis for a future security order in Asia.

[ACI = ASEAN, China, India]

#### Mobile military SMRs prevent water wars

Pfeffer and Macon 1 Robert A, United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, and William A, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Military Applications of Nuclear Power", xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/21317662/49832714/name/Military+applications+of+nuclear+power+A+think+piece.pdf

The demand for desalination of seawater is also likely to grow, as inadequate freshwater supplies become an urgent global concern. Potable water in the 21st century will be what oil was in the 20th century - a limited natural resource subject to intense international competition. In many areas of the world, rain is not always dependable and ground water supplies are limited, exhausted, or contaminated. Such areas are likely to experience conflict among water-needy peoples, possibly prompting the deployment of U.S. ground forces for humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, or armed intervention. A mobile power plant could help prevent conflicts or provide emergency supplies of fuel and potable water to indigenous peoples and deployed ground forces.

### 1AC – Plan

#### The United States Executive branch should acquire electricity from mobile small modular nuclear reactors in the United States for the Marine Corps.

### 1AC – Solvency

#### CONTENTION 3: SOLVENCY

#### The Marines should lead from the front with SMR deployment---it ensures base security and desalination

Butler 11Lt. Col. Glen Butler, USMC, NORAD Strategy, Policy, and Plans Directorate, Security Cooperation Integration Branch, Chase Prize Essay Winner for this Article, 18 Mar 2011, Marine Corps Gazette, Not Green Enough, “Why the Marine Corps should lead the environmental and energy way forward and how to do it”, http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/not-green-enough \*\*\*Edited: Footnote included\*\*\*

Consider Nuclear Power¶ On 16 March 1979, The China Syndrome opened in theaters across the country, depicting a fictitious story about a reporter witnessing an accident at the Ventanna nuclear plant outside Los Angeles and the subsequent evil plot to suppress the truth. Twelve days later the Three Mile Island partial core meltdown in Pennsylvania helped propel The China Syndrome to theatrical success and permanently scarred the American psyche. The nail in the nuclear energy coffin was the nuclear disaster 7 years later at Chernobyl, in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.17 But despite these stains on the nuclear power industry, the time has never been better for the Marine Corps (and Navy) to dive in than now. Here’s why.¶ First, the political climate, though still tenuous, is shifting to favorable, with the change coming from the top down. During his 27 January 2010 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama echoed themes from his campaign trail by clearly voicing his intention to include nuclear power in American’s playbook of energy security options.18 Similarly, as the Department of Energy’s (DoE’s) Secretary of Energy, Steven Chu has articulated similar sentiments, declaring that “President Obama and I are committed to restarting the nuclear industry in the United States.”19 Many other political leaders and policymakers indeed support a true “nuclear renaissance,”20 and the growing momentum stands a chance to bury the ghosts of Chernobyl once and for all.¶ Second, with our well-replicated but limited pursuit of the standard renewable energies,21 we’re putting all energy eggs in one basket, a vessel unlikely to hold a sufficient load for success. Currently pursued renewable energy sources do have limitations.22 More importantly, with military installations relying almost exclusively on external sources for energy, and those sources largely unpredictable, unsecured, and reliant on foreign-based oil,23 if energy security is truly a national security issue, then nuclear power should be considered. Solar demonstrations at Miramar and Barstow are not enough.¶ Third, nuclear technology today has advanced well beyond the days of Three Mile Island. Specifically, small modular reactors (SMRs) offer great potential to safely and effectively provide energy island/net zero capabilities to Marine Corps and Navy installations across the country.24¶ SMRs have relatively low plant cost, can replace aging fossil plants, and do not emit greenhouse gasses. Some are as small as a “hot tub” and can be stored underground, dramatically increasing safety and security from terrorist threats.25 Encouragingly, in fiscal year 2010 (FY10) the DoE allocated $0 to the U.S. SMR Program; in FY11, they’ve requested $38.9 million. This funding is to support two main activities—public/private partnerships to advance SMR designs and research and development and demonstrations. According to the DoE’s website, one of the planned program accomplishments for FY11 is to “collaborate with the Department of Defense (DoD) . . . to assess the feasibility of SMR designs for energy resources at DoD installations.”26 The Marine Corps should vigorously seek the opportunity to be a DoD entity providing one platform for this feasibility assessment.27¶ Fourth, SMR technology offers the Marine Corps another unique means to lead from the front—not just of the other Services but also of the Nation, and even the world.28 This potential Pete Ellis moment should be seized. There are simple steps we could take,29 and others stand ready to lead if we are not.30 But the temptation to “wait and see” and “let the others do it; then we’ll adopt it” mentality is not always best. Energy security demands boldness, not timidity.¶ To be fair, nuclear technology comes with challenges, of course, and with questions that have been kicked around for decades. An April 1990 Popular Science article asked, “Next Generation Nuclear Reactors—Dare we build them?” and included some of the same verbiage heard in similar discussions today.31 Compliance with National Environment Policy Act requirements necessitates lengthy and detailed preaction analyses, critical community support must be earned, and disposal challenges remain. Still, none of these hurdles are insurmountable.32¶ Yet despite the advances in safety, security, and efficiency in recent years, nuclear in the energy equation remains the new “n-word” for most military circles. And despite the fact that the FY10 National Defense Authorization Act called on the DoD to “conduct a study [of] the feasibility of nuclear plants on military installations,” the Office of the Secretary of Defense has yet to fund the study.33¶ Fifth, the cumbersome, bureaucratic certification process of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), often enough to scare away potential entrepreneurs and investors, is not necessarily a roadblock to success. The NRC is “responsible for licensing and regulating the operation of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States.” Military installations offer unique platforms that could likely bypass an extended certification process. With established expertise and a long safety record in nuclear reactor certification, operations, training, and maintenance, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program comprises the civilian and military personnel who:¶ . . . design, build, operate, maintain, and manage the nuclear-powered ships and the many facilities that support the U.S. nuclear-powered naval fleet.”34¶ Bypassing the NRC and initiating SMR experimentation under ADM Hyman Rickover’s legacy umbrella of naval reactors could shorten the process to a reasonable level for Marine and naval installations.35¶ Finally, Marine Corps-SMR technology opens the pathway for related endeavors and synergetic undertakings. The Army has several smart and influential individuals poised to partner in nuclear energy endeavors, and our naval brethren enjoy a long history of nuclear reactor expertise. Partnerships and enhanced use leases to support SMR deployments should be leveraged.36 As the collective military expertise in SMR technology grows, additional capabilities, such as expeditionary and vehicular power sources, could be explored. And related technologies, such as hybrid/electric vehicle power storage and recharging facilities and water desalination plants, could collocate with nuclear plants on installations to both use the energy.37

#### Military should take the lead---key to overcome barriers for mobile reactors

Andres and Breetz 11 Richard B, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University and Hanna L, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February, "Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications", www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf

The preceding analysis suggests that DOD should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors. This new technology has the potential to solve two of the most serious energy-related problems faced by the department today. Small reactors could island domestic military bases and nearby communities, thereby protecting them from grid outages. They could also drastically reduce the need for the highly vulnerable fuel convoys used to supply forward operating bases abroad. The technology being proposed for small reactors (much of which was originally developed in U.S. Government labs) is promising. A number of the planned designs are self-contained and highly mobile, and could meet the needs of either domestic or forward bases. Some promise to be virtually impervious to accidents, with design characteristics that might allow them to be used even in active operational environments. These reactors are potentially safer than conventional light water reactors. The argument that this technology could be useful at domestic bases is virtually unassailable. The argument for using this technology in operational units abroad is less conclusive; however, because of its potential to save lives, it warrants serious investigation. Unfortunately, the technology for these reactors is, for the most part, caught between the drawing board and production. Claims regarding the field utility and safety of various reactors are plausible, but authoritative evaluation will require substantial investment and technology demonstration. In the U.S. market, DOD could play an important role in this area. In the event that the U.S. small reactor industry succeeds without DOD support, the types of designs that emerge might not be useful for the department since some of the larger, more efficient designs that have greater appeal to private industry would not fit the department’s needs. Thus, there is significant incentive for DOD to intervene to provide a market, both to help the industry survive and to shape its direction. Since the 1970s, in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well. If DOD leads as a first mover in this market—initially by providing analysis of costs, staffing, reactor lines, and security, and, when possible, by moving forward with a pilot installation—the new technology will likely survive and be applicable to DOD needs. If DOD does not, it is possible the technology will be unavailable in the future for either U.S. military or commercial use.

#### Mobile nuclear can power the military---tech is feasible now

Schaffer and Chang 9 Marvin Baker, Adjunct staff Member at the RAND Corporation and Ike, independent consultant, “Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat”, issue 52, 1st quarter 2009, PDF Online

Since there are currently 33 combat infantry and armor/cavalry brigades, we propose to field 100 reactors and 100 electrolysis units including spares. These mobile facilities would replace traditional Forward Area Refueling Points (FARPs). Descriptively, we call them "nuclear FARPs." The mobility concept is to move the nuclear FARP every day or so under battlefield conditions. These will be movements of hundreds of feet by road. Movement between FARPs, however, would be by C-5A/B or by airship. (15) Such procedures, admittedly needing refinement, underlie the survivability of a nuclear FARP. ¶ We assume air and space superiority conditions that preclude the use of enemy manned aircraft and unmanned combat air vehicles. That leaves only long-range satellite- and terrain-guided missiles as viable methods of standoff attack. (16) Mobility ensures survivability against such fixed-coordinate missiles. Note that it will be necessary to shield the heat signature produced by the reactors; otherwise, they will be vulnerable to heat-seeking guidance. Thermal shielding can be achieved with overhead canvas and blowers to disperse heat peripherally. Overhead canvas would also enable a degree of camouflage. ¶ The U.S. Army has had extensive experience with transportable reactor technology. From 1968 to 1976, a 45-MW nuclear reactor on the barge Sturgis provided power for the Panama Canal community. (17) Other portable nuclear reactors were operated in Wyoming, Greenland, and Antarctica. ¶ It may also be possible to provide fleetwide monitoring of the reactors and electrolysis units by satellite to permit cost-saving, manpower-efficient troubleshooting. ¶ Strategic Implications ¶ Strategic implications of a mobile and survivable fleet of vehicles independent of fossil fuels would be profound. They include: ¶ \* fielding combat vehicles with affordable, self-sufficient sources of abundant fuel that do not contribute to atmospheric pollution ¶ \* providing fuel to a dispersed fleet in a survivable, sustainable manner ¶ \* eliminating vulnerable in-theater, singlepoint, fixed-location sources of fuel manufacture and distribution ¶ \* diminishing the logistic footprint associated with hauling fuel tonnages over thousands of miles to supply an operating theater military force ¶ \* developing a mobile testbed for modular nuclear-powered electricity to provide alternatives for the fossil fuel crisis now gripping the world economy ¶ \* providing a means to supply low-cost power in support of humanitarian missions around the world. ¶ The cost of fossil fuels combined with the low survivability of fixed extraction, refining, and distribution systems puts the Army's land-based fleet of combat vehicles in jeopardy for future conflicts. The Army should define a new fleet of vehicles powered by a combination of electricity and hydrogen. Preferably, this fleet would be energized by theater-mobile nuclear reactors and theater-mobile hydrogen manufacturing facilities. Appropriate technology for these vehicles, reactors, and manufacturing facilities is just beginning to become available commercially. ¶ Electrically powered vehicles with military potential are not currently available but may become practical in a decade or so. However, fuel cell-powered vehicles, hydrogen-powered vehicles, and hybrids are all approaching commercial viability. Military versions can be expected in the 2010-2020 timeframe. The Army needs to define its requirements and plan for the future fleet in terms of survivability, affordability, and independence of fuel sources. ¶ Mobile nuclear reactors in several varieties can be postulated. They weigh 90 to 100 tons and can be transported on a C-5A/B transport aircraft or a Walrus-type airship derivative and locally on a flatbed truck. They produce power of 4.5 to 5 MW, sufficient to provide hydrogen and electricity to fuel about 400 vehicles daily. One appropriate type of hydrogen manufacturing facility is a high-temperature electrolysis unit. It also can be made mobile and can be powered by a mobile nuclear reactor. ¶ The general benefits of the mobile fueling system postulated are profound and revolutionary. They provide for: ¶ \* a lighter, more mobile military ¶ \* streamlined logistics ¶ \* more ammunition resulting from reduced fuel tonnage ¶ \* minimized energy supply chain ¶ \* energy with national self-sufficiency ¶ \* reduced energy infrastructure ¶ \* sustainability ¶ \* increased survivability ¶ \* increased affordability ¶ \* greater tactical efficiency. ¶ Detailed planning for the new land vehicle fleet is needed. It should include specifications for land vehicles, mobile reactors, mobile hydrogen manufacturing facilities, and transport aircraft, airships, and trucks. A concept of operations needs to be developed in accordance with military standards. ¶ Mobile, affordable, and reliable power sources based on nuclear power have the potential to permit viable operations of the Army for the foreseeable future. The concept warrants extensive study by the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army.

#### SMRs avoid nuclear downsides

Ringle 10 John, Professor Emeritus of Nuclear Engineering at Oregon State University, "Reintroduction of reactors in US a major win", November 13, robertmayer.wordpress.com/2010/11/21/reintroduction-of-reactors-in-us-a-major-win/

Small nuclear reactors will probably be the mechanism that ushers in nuclear power’s renaissance in the U.S.¶ Nuclear plants currently supply about 20 percent of the nation’s electricity and more than 70 percent of our carbon-free energy. But large nuclear plants cost $8 billion to $10 billion and utilities are having second thoughts about how to finance these plants.¶ A small modular reactor (SMR) has several advantages over the conventional 1,000-megawatt plant:¶ 1. It ranges in size from 25 to 140 megawatts, hence only costs about a tenth as much as a large plant.¶ 2. It uses a cookie-cutter standardized design to reduce construction costs and can be built in a factory and shipped to the site by truck, railroad or barge.¶ 3. The major parts can be built in U.S. factories, unlike some parts for the larger reactors that must be fabricated overseas.¶ 4. Because of the factory-line production, the SMR could be built in three years with one-third of the workforce of a large plant.¶ 5. More than one SMR could be clustered together to form a larger power plant complex. This provides versatility in operation, particularly in connection with large wind farms. With the variability of wind, one or more SMRs could be run or shut down to provide a constant base load supply of electricity.¶ 6. A cluster of SMRs should be very reliable. One unit could be taken out of service for maintenance or repair without affecting the operation of the other units. And since they are all of a common design, replacement parts could satisfy all units. France has already proved the reliability of standardized plants.¶ At least half a dozen companies are developing SMRs, including NuScale in Oregon. NuScale is American-owned and its 45-megawatt design has some unique features. It is inherently safe. It could be located partially or totally below ground, and with its natural convection cooling system, it does not rely on an elaborate system of pumps and valves to provide safety. There is no scenario in which a loss-of-coolant accident could occur.

#### DOE funding SMRs now---more to come

Holly 12 Derrill, ECT Staff Writer, "DOE Advances Small Nuclear Reactors", 12/6, [www.ect.coop/power-supply/power-plants/doe-funds-small-nuclear-reactors-project/50667](http://www.ect.coop/power-supply/power-plants/doe-funds-small-nuclear-reactors-project/50667)

The Department of Energy has agreed to help fund a small modular nuclear reactor design backed by a consortium that includes several generation and transmission electric cooperatives.¶ After reviewing several proposals, DOE selected a project led by Bechtel Corp., Babcock & Wilcox and the Tennessee Valley Authority. The mPower Consortium was formed in in 2010 to support the Generation mPower small modular nuclear reactor design. The consortium includes investor-owned FirstEnergy, TVA, and 13 G&Ts.¶ The lead companies have proposed deployment of up to five 180 megawatt Babcock & Wilcox mPower reactors at TVA’s abandoned Clinch River Breeder Reactor site in Oak Ridge, Tenn.¶ “DOE will match future engineering and design development, design certification and licensing activities up to a cap of $452 million,” said Sandra Byrd, vice president of member and public relations for Little Rock-based Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. “Although the mPower design is already far along, it still requires more testing and the design certification documents have to be developed and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for approval.”¶ Plans call for the consortium to submit documentation to NRC by December 2013. An early site permit and a construction and operating license application will also be developed for submission over the next year.¶ “This will be the first time that a small nuclear design has been submitted to NRC for review and approval,” said Byrd, adding that commercial operation could begin between 2020 and 2022. Successful deployment of the technology is expected to lead to development of nuclear power plants roughly one-third the size of existing facilities, and DOE plans to issue additional funding opportunities.¶ “More is obviously better. Different designs may lend themselves to different utility operating situations,” said Byrd. Co-ops supported proposals from three of the four companies that sought consideration under the initial DOE cost-sharing grant.¶ Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. is among mPower Consortium backers also supporting the NexStart SMR Alliance led by Westinghouse and investor-owned Ameren Missouri. Springfield, Mo.-based Associated Electric Cooperative is also supporting the group.

# 2AC

## Rapid Response

### Flow

#### Desal doesn’t turn case---nuclear’s better than squo fossil fuels and no impact

Khamis 9 I, IAEA, A global overview on nuclear desalination, Int. J. Nuclear Desalination, Vol. 3, No. 4

As desalination and water reuse expansion in the Middle East and the world continues at a rapid pace, these innovations must be integrated into the next generation of water facilities. The integrated nuclear energy systems would lead to considerably lower power and water costs than the corresponding coal-based systems. When external costs for different energies are internalised in power and water costs, the relative cost differences are considerably increased in favour of the nuclear systems. Financial analysis further confirms these conclusions (Nisan et al., 2007; Wade, 2001). Integrated seawater desalination systems are likely to be deployed intensively in the future in view of the very high demands for water and electrical energy in many regions of the world. A future desalination strategy based uniquely on the utilisation of fossil-fuelled systems is not sustainable because of the high carbon footprint from both power generation and desalination. At the moment, the only solution to reduce the carbon footprint of integrated desalination systems appears to be by utilising nuclear and renewable energies (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2008b).

## CP

### Brazil Consult CP

#### DoD already established its recommendations for SMR adoption

King 11 Marcus King, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf

Recognizing nuclear power as a potential benefit to Department of Defense (DoD) facilities, Congress directed the DoD, in section 2845 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2010, to “conduct a study to assess the feasibility of developing nuclear power plants on military installations” [12]. Specifically, the study is to consider the following topics:¶ • Options for construction and operation¶ • Cost estimates and the potential for life-cycle cost savings¶ • Potential energy security advantages¶ • Additional infrastructure costs¶ • Effect on the quality of life of military personnel¶ • Regulatory, state, and local concerns¶ • Effect on operations on military installations¶ • Potential environmental liabilities¶ • Factors that may impact safe colocation of nuclear power plants on military installations¶ • Other factors that bear on the feasibility of developing nuclear power plants on military installations.¶ To meet this requirement, the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, DUSD(I&E), asked CNA to conduct this feasibility study. The CNA effort was directed by a steering group consisting of representatives from DUSD (I&E), each of the military departments, DOE, NRC, and DOE Labs. This report documents our analysis and findings.

#### And it recommended against being an early adopter—proves the CP can’t establish a bureaucratic consensus for the plan

King 11 Marcus King, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf

The most significant risk for SMR power plants is associated with being an early adoptor of new technology. From a DoD perspective, economic feasibility depends on negotiating arrangements for the project that ensure DoD is not responsible for FOAK expenses. Having contractor owners and operators would reduce operating risks associated with being an early adoptor. If partners can’t be found who are willing to bear the FOAK and early adoptor risks then DoD should not undertake such a project. The recent MOU between DOE and DoD identifies a framework for cooperation and partnership for sharing risks associated with this type of project.

#### Consultation will fail – countries will demand too many concessions

Rubin 9 (Trudy Rubin, columnist for the Philadelphia Inquirer, "Fine rhetoric; weak policy: CLinton and OBama may harbor unrealistic hopes of global cooperation, 7/23/9)

Instead, she said, the United States will attempt to strengthenoldalliances in Europe and Asia, and it will encourage new global powers, such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and Turkey, to work together on shared problems. These include non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism, economic growth, and climate change. "We will lead by inducing greater cooperation," Clinton said, and by promoting "a multi-partner world." If this sounds jargony to you, I sympathize. Many of the ideas in the speech come from academia, such as the "smart power" concept of Harvard professor Joe Nye. He argues that America needs to make the best use of all available tools \_ economic, diplomatic, innovative, etc. \_ in our foreign policy. (Nye held senior posts in Bill Clinton's administration and was Hillary's pick for ambassador to Japan; the Obama White House chose someone else.) Another source of ideas was Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former dean at Princeton University and now director of policy planning at the State Department. She has written a book, A New World Order, on the importance of global networks to foreign policy. But it's not the jargon in Clinton's speech that worries me. Nor do I question the wisdom of seeking more cooperation in a world where many of the most pressing threats cut across borders, and where the United States can no longer afford to go it alone. What disturbs me is that Obama and Clinton may nourish inflated hopes about the degree of cooperation they can elicit from other countries. In his first six months on the job, Obama has done a fine job of tamping down anti-U.S. feelings abroad. But warm feelings won't necessarily translate into joint action on the ground. A couple of cases in point: On Iran, a key reason Obama has been pursuing talks, despite the current internal crisis, is to court world opinion. Should good-faith diplomacy fail to halt Tehran's suspect nuclear activities, other nations will be more likely to join in a policy of much tougher sanctions against Iran. Similarly, Obama sought a new nuclear accord with Russia partly to woo Moscow and other states into joining our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. However, Moscow, which is selling Iran a nuclear reactor, has shown no indication that it is willing to get tougher with Tehran. Nor is it clear whether key European countries are willing to jeopardize lucrative business interests in Iran. Meantime, despite North Korea's nuclear naughtiness, China has not substantially toughened its approach to Pyongyang. This doesn't mean Obama shouldn't use his global popularity to push for greater cooperation on key issues. But achieving such cooperation will be tough, even with putative allies (as Clinton found in India when she raised global-warming issues). Global partners may balk or demand more concessions than the president is willing to make. And other countries won't necessarily view global threats the way we do. A "multi-partner world" may be desirable, but it's not inevitable, and it won't be a panacea. The term **may suffice as a concept, but as a policy framework, it falls short.**

#### b) Should isn’t mandatory

Taylor and Howard 5 - Resources for the Future, Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa (Michael and Julie, “Investing in Africa's future: U.S. Agricultural development assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa”, 9/12, <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf>)

Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more targeted: plant biotechnology research and development ($25 million), the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), women’s leadership capacity ($15 million), the International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3 million), and clean water treatment ($2 million). Interestingly, in the wording of the bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with only two of these eight earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount available. The difference between *shall* and *should* may have legal significance—one is clearly mandatory while the other is a strong admonition—but it makes little practical difference in USAID’s need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of its ability.

c) Res comp is bad – leads to word pics out of the resolution. The aff should not have to defend resolved  
Webster’s 2K (Guide to Grammar and Writing, <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>)

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### Consultation doesn’t spillover

Kissinger 4 [Henry - former Secretary of State, Newsweek, November 8, p. lexis]

Across the Atlantic, leaders have been concentrating on transferring national sovereignty to new European institutions. This involves a host of technicalities and legal issues which are both arcane and elusive for most Americans. More fundamentally, the United States conducts its policies as the sovereign states of Europe did in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. The European nations having invented the concept of the nation-state are now in the process of seeking to abandon their sovereignty to a European Union not yet possessing the traditional attributes of the state. They find themselves in a halfway house between their history and a future still in the process of evolving. All this has generated a witches' brew of mutual misunderstandings. In America, critics describe European attitudes as fainthearted, querulous and, on occasion, duplicitous. In Europe the media (and too many political figures) revel in descriptions of America's racial tension, the death penalty, differences over the environment and mistreatment of prisoners as if aberrations reflected the ultimate meaning of the United States. Shifting their priority from the Atlantic alliance to the U.N. Security Council, Europeans feel no special obligation to support U.S. policy, on occasion actively opposing it. These conditions cannot be removed by consultation on any one individual issue, and require a fundamental change of attitude on both sides of the Atlantic. The nations bordering the North Atlantic need to ask themselves the fundamental question that has always underpinned the alliance--that is, what will the allies do for the relationship beyond the international consensus reflected at the United Nations? Much of European debate today implies that the answer is "very little." To subject common military action to prior approval of the Security Council is incompatible with the very concept of alliance, which implies a special set of obligations. It spells the ultimate disintegration of a world order with the Atlantic partnership as its centerpiece. The Atlantic relationship, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character. The United States and Europe should be prepared to do things for each other in the sphere beyond the immediate dictates of national interest and without insisting on universal consensus.

#### Consultation causes delays – kills solvency

Grieb 2 (Kenneth J. Grieb is Professor and Coordinator of International Studies at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh. His is a author of several books dealing with Modern Latin American and United States Diplomatic History -- Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy – available via: <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_gx5215/is_2002/ai_n19132358>.)

International relations involve negotiations between the governments of nation-states, which are conducted by their executive branches under the auspices of their heads of government. Since each state is sovereign, agreement is reached only when the parties involved in an issue reach unanimous agreement among themselves. Those nations that do not agree with the consensus among the participants do not sign the resulting agreement and hence are not bound by its provisions. Diplomatic negotiations are difficult and time-consuming, since all those involved must agree on every aspect and word of the agreement. When the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 amid the tensions following the Second World War, over 1,400 separate votes were required before the full declaration was adopted. Achieving unanimous consensus requires extensive, constant, and precise communications between the heads of government of the nations involved. Such communications are conducted through a variety of representatives. The number and types of such representatives have proliferated throughout history and in particular during the twentieth century, when rapid communications increased the need for speedy and ongoing contacts. The end of colonialism during the second half of the twentieth century meant that many more nations and peoples were involved in global and regional issues.

## K

### 2AC Security K

#### Perm do the plan and all non-competitive parts of the alt – the state coopts the alt

McCormack 10 (Tara, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 59-61)

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of ‘emancipatory’ security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and ‘blindness’ to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to ‘protect’ and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, ‘if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed’ (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

#### Prior questions fail and paralyze politics

Owen 2 (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Threats real and not constructed—rational risk assessment goes aff

**Knudsen 1**– PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a **misleading conception of threat**, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena **do not occur simultaneously** to large numbers of politicians, and **hardly most of the time**. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they **refer to 'real' phenomena** now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that **urgent action may be required**. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because **situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back** and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

#### Desecuritization is not emancipatory---it’s worse for every tangible impact they isolate

Nunes 7 – Joao Reis Nunes, Marie Curie Fellow and Ph. D. Candidate in International Politics at University of Wales, Aberystwyth, September 2007, “Politics, Security, Critical Theory: A Contribution to Current Debates on Security,” online: <http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Nunes-joaonunes-politicssecuritycriticaltheory.pdf>

Yet, not all of the proponents of CSS would agree that security is something that needs to be ‘unmade’. In Fact, one of the theoreticalapproaches cited by the manifesto as an important inspiration—the Welsh School – has consistently argued that security is something that needs to be archived, promoted, and not replaced by something else. The manifesto has solved this contradiction by arguing that, in the Welsh School, security is ‘distinguished from order and power and redefinged as inclusive of individuals’ (2006:456). This is a fairly accurate view of the Welsh School’s understanding of the value of security; however, a deeper investigation of security-politics nexus implicit in this approach is needed, so that the debate is able to conceive viable theoretical alternatives to the predominant views described above.

Security and politics in the Welsh School

Several questions spring to mind when one faces the work of the Welsh School from the standpoint of other critical approaches. One of the most pressing is: why security? Why focus on such a loaded and manifestly dangerous term, a term that has been so often instrumentalized with the objective of justifying highly questionable practices? Can it be that the different critical approaches are talking about the same things, but with different names? Take the focus of the Welsh School on emancipation, for example (Booth 1991 and 1999a, Wyn Jones 2005): can it be placed on the same level of desecuritization, as Aradau (2004) has suggested? To use the words of the c.a.s.e. manifesto, can the politics of normality (desecuritization) and the politics of normativity (emancipation) be seen as two alternative or complementary pathways to ‘unmaking security’?

It is consensual to argue that both of these strands definitely wish to ‘unmake security’, if by security one means an exceptionalist domain of violent and exclusionary practices. However, there are reasons as to why the Welsh School does not wish to get rid of the term ‘security’ – and that is why desecuritization cannot lead to emancipation. For the Welsh School, security in itself has an important normative value that needs to be maintained. This understanding of the value of security is intrinsically connected with an account of security-politics nexus that is at odds with the understandings that have achieved particular importance in the field.

It must be said that the Welsh School has not engaged systematically with its own theoretical assumptions regarding the security-politics nexus. This reluctance results from a particularly pragmatic approach to the ‘realities’ of security. Booth defined traditional approaches as a form of self-deception, an ‘escape from the real’ (1995:105), and even a ‘theology’ and a set of ‘rites’ (1999b:45). As a consequence, CSS must aim at ‘engag[ing] comprehensively with the real’ (2004:8), that is, it must take into account the ‘real lives in real places in that real world which academic international relations realists disregard’ (1995:123).

This comprehensive engagement is connected with a normative commitment to confront the materiality of what Booth terms ‘human wrongs’, ‘facts’ that dominate politics in a global scale and that can be said to constitute the ‘subject-matter’ of security studies: ‘The subject-matter consists of flesh (which is fed or famished) and blood (which is wet and messy, and hot or cold), and people living lives comfortably and securely, or enduring them against the wall, like a dog’ (1995:105).

The crude emotion present in this description of what security studies ‘is all about’ must not be mistaken for poetic idealism: Booth has been quite consistent in his efforts to pin down security studies to a particular materiality, thereby eschewing a purely discursive critique of security. Williams (1999) has noted that the version of CSS put forward by Booth claims to be “better’ than others because of its improved ‘realism’, that is, its ability to engage with the factuality of human wrongs. This is why Booth, to the obvious disappointment of other critical security theorists who wish to put into question notions of reality and reason, consistently describes his approach as more realistic and rational that the others14.

[CSS=Critical Security Studies]

### AT: V2L

#### “No value to life” doesn’t outweigh---prioritize existence because value is subjective and could improve in the future

Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

## DA

### Nuclear/Incentives Now

#### Nuclear revival now

Silverstein 2/20 Ken, Forbes, "Despite Difficulties, Nuclear Energy Will Regain Strength", 2013, [www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/02/20/despite-difficulties-nuclear-energy-will-regain-strength/](http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/02/20/despite-difficulties-nuclear-energy-will-regain-strength/)

The Japanese nuclear accident in March 2011 may have knocked out the sector’s wind. But the industry now says that it has regained its momentum. Here in the United States, five new plants are expected to be operational by the end of the decade while internationally, 70 such facilities are planned.¶ Nuclear energy advocates are still battling the same longtime foes. But the industry feels that once the new plants with modern safeguards get up and running, those facilities will prove their value. The harder sell, right now, is the financial justification. Why spend $10-$15 billion to build a new nuclear facility when market conditions now favor combined-cycle natural gas plants that are much cheaper and easier to permit?¶ “The long-term fundamentals continue to support this technology,” says Marvin Fertel, chief executive of the Nuclear Energy Institute, before Wall Street analysts. He adds that the average capacity factor — a measurement of operational efficiency — has been about 90 percent for the past decade. Further, the uranium to fuel those reactors is plentiful while the environmental impact is relatively benign.¶ The utilities with active construction efforts are Southern Company, Scana Corp. and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Southern Co. and its partners are building two new units where two other other nuclear reactors now reside. The total price tag is estimated at $14 billion. Of that, the partnership will snag an $8 billion loan guarantee while it puts up $6 billion of its money.

### 2AC China DA

#### US is cooperating---not zero sum

The Economist 3-6, “Cleaning up,” 3-6-13, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/03/renewable-energy>

A CASUAL glance at the business headlines might suggest that China’s renewable-energy industry is an unstoppable juggernaut. Over the past decade, Chinese firms have used supportive government policies and lavish subsidies to leapfrog to the top of the world’s wind and solar industries. This has prompted political backlashes overseas—especially in America, where Chinese exporters have faced anti-dumping duties and worse.¶ So China must hold a massively large trade surplus in clean energy with America, right? Quite the opposite, finds a striking report titled “Advantage America” released on March 6th. The two countries traded about $6.5 billion in solar, wind and smart-grid technology and services in 2011—and America sold $1.63 billion more of such kit to China than it imported from there. The analysis was done by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), an industry publisher, and funded the Pew Charitable Trusts, a charity.¶ More surprising is the fact that America’s lead was maintained in all three categories studied by the boffins: solar, wind and smart energy technologies (see chart). One important explanation for this is that while China has strengths in large-scale assembly and mass manufacturing, it lacks the innovation to come up with high-value inputs. So American ingenuity is required to supply Chinese factories with such things as polysilicon and wafers for photovoltaic cells, and the fibreglass and control systems used in wind turbines.¶ The resulting picture is one that is reflective of the broader US-China relationship beyond trade. The two countries, though often appearing at loggerheads, are actually best seen in symbiosis. As Michael Liebreich of BNEF puts it in the report’s foreword, “the United States and China…are not so much competing as they are interdependent**.”**

#### No SMR exports

Al Fin 12, energy columnist for Oil Price – an online energy markets magazine, “Small Modular Reactors: Slugging it Out”, February 28, <http://alfin2300.blogspot.com/2012/02/small-modular-reactors-slugging-it-out.html>

More, France and Russia are at the forefront of SMR development, and Argentina is also making an effort to develop a workable SMR design. It is also likely that China will turn to SMRs for both electrical generation and process heat, as the Middle Kingdom grows and improves its nuclear industry capability. The UK may also help in the early stages of SMR development, by assisting the development of early PRISM reactors.¶ Getting past the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's design licensing hurdle will cost hundreds of millions of dollars for each entry in the SMR race. That will require deep pockets, and a huge staff to interface with NRC bureaucrats. Clearly the US government -- for all its lip service to the future of the US economy -- is not in a tremendous hurry to help develop this revolutionary technology.¶ It is going to be a long uphill battle.

#### Trade barriers unique to reactor components mean the US can’t export

ITA 11 – International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, February 2011, “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors,” http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf

Some U.S. suppliers also note that the United States currently levies tariffs between 3.3 percent and 5.2 percent on key nuclear reactor components, but the tariffs are currently suspended in some cases (specifically for reactor pressure vessels and steam turbine generators that were ordered before July 31, 2006). Tariffs around the world, particularly in the European Union and South Korea, are higher on such components. Coupled with significant foreign government support, foreign suppliers can more easily enter the U.S. market, while U.S. manufacturers face a significant trade barrier in key foreign markets.

#### Nuclear not key to Chinese soft power

The Economist 12

The Economist, Mar 10th 2012, “Bandwagons and busts,” http://www.economist.com/node/21549094

By nuclear standards, this is a big deal; China will add more nuclear capacity in those ten years than France has in total. But for China itself it is less big; nuclear will go from generating less than 2% of the country's electricity to less than 5%. Ming Sung, who works for the Clean Air Task Force, an American think-tank in Beijing, points out that China is not betting on nuclear; it is betting on everything that offers an alternative to coal. China consumes half the world's annual coal output, and has the supply problems, dirty air and huge death toll (hundreds of thousands a year from respiratory diseases) that go with it. Junda Lin of the China Greentech Initiative points out that the 2020 target for nuclear has to be seen in the context of a 200GW target for wind and an extra 100GW of hydropower. The idea is to try everything and see what works best.

#### No impact to clean tech---not key to Chinese economy

Robin Mills 3-12, Foreign Policy, “Who's Winning the Great Energy Rat Race?”, http://www.realclearenergy.org/2013/03/12/who039s\_winning\_the\_great\_energy\_rat\_race\_252196.html

DUBAI — It is a shift as momentous as the U.S. eclipse of Britain's Royal Navy or the American economy's surpassing of the British economy in the late 19th century.¶ According to preliminary figures reported this week, China has overtaken the United States as the world's largest net oil importer. Nearly 6 million barrels per day flowed into the United States in December -- the lowest figure since February 1992 -- while Chinese imports jumped to 6.12 million barrels per day. The United States had held the top spot since 1972, just before the oil crises and stagflation of the 1970s.¶ The exact figure is not so important: Monthly estimates are volatile, Chinese imports peak during the winter, and the United States is still a much bigger gross importer of crude oil (it exports ever larger amounts of refined products). But China will clearly move into a consistent lead during this year, or next.¶ Americans may not like to be second in anything, but this news actually affirms the superiority of the U.S. energy model over China's. The United States is consistently employing new technology to produce more energy in ways that are increasingly environmentally friendly. Beijing's growing weight in world oil markets, meanwhile, should not be a matter of pride, but of concern. China's rising dependency on energy imports doesn't make the country stronger -- it makes China more vulnerable to forces beyond the country's control.¶ Nevertheless, this is the latest in a series of milestones that illustrate the economic rise of the Middle Kingdom. In 2006, it passed the United States as the world's largest carbon dioxide emitter. In 2010, it became the world's leading energy user. Its ravenous appetite for resources makes it the biggest consumer of coal, iron ore, aluminum, copper, gold, wheat, rice, meat, and many other commodities. In the next few years, China will overtake the United States as the world's largest economy -- if it has not already done so.¶ China's growth has been the largest single factor in the record oil prices over the last decade. That has led to a host of geopolitical consequences: the economic boom in the Persian Gulf, the empowering of authoritarian leaders from Russia's Vladimir Putin to Venezuela's late Hugo Chávez, economic stress in developed countries, rising food and fuel prices, and a new push for breakthrough energy technologies such as shale oil and gas, as well as wind and solar power.¶ The United States is setting energy milestones of its own. Its drop in imports is partly due to an anemic economy, which has resulted in dwindling consumption, tighter mileage standards, and an incentive for efficiency spurred by high prices. More important, however, is the U.S. boom in production, driven by the breakthrough in hydraulic fracturing, which has unlocked oil from shale deposits in North Dakota and south Texas -- with Louisiana, California, Ohio, and others to come -- and revived production from oil fields.¶ The Wall Street Journal also contended this week that the United States moved ahead of a different kingdom: The newspaper said the country became the world's largest liquid-fuel producer in November, surpassing Saudi Arabia. The calculation is a bit dubious, as it depends on throwing everything -- crude oil, biofuels, propane, other extracts from natural gas, gains from refinery processing -- into the bucket. Beyond the hype, however, the United States is set to become the world's biggest oil producer by 2017 and will begin exporting large quantities of liquefied natural gas (LNG).¶ North America, with Canada supplying the United States, might be a net oil exporter as early as 2020, according to Citigroup's veteran oil watcher, Ed Morse -- though that seems optimistic. Renewable energy has also boomed, and greenhouse gas emissions have dropped.¶ China's strategic purchases have, with rare exceptions, not improved its energy security. They have also landed it in political trouble abroad. After financing and arming Khartoum during Sudan's civil war, China suffered a backlash when the pipeline from newly independent South Sudan -- where most of its fields lie -- was cut over border and transit-fee disputes. Now Chinese state companies are buying stakes in American shale projects, which the United States should welcome despite some attempts to raise spurious national security concerns.¶ At the same time, China has tussled over speculatively oil-rich islands in the East China and South China seas with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and others, encouraging its neighbors to turn to the United States for protection. Beijing also continues to worry over long energy supply lines from the Persian Gulf and West Africa. However it solves this problem, it also must heed the fact that pollution is increasingly a hot-button political issue. In the city of Guangzhou, for example, the lungs of people in their 40s have turned black from coal smoke.¶ Can China repeat the United States' success? It is thought to have massive shale gas resources of its own and probably shale oil too. It also plans to use natural gas vehicles to cut oil consumption, has tougher mileage standards than the United States, and is working on electric vehicles, synthetic fuels, and renewable energy. But Beijing still has a long way to go. It does not even have a real energy ministry -- though a "super-ministry" is said to be in the works -- meaning policy responsibility is scattered across the government.

### 2AC Immigration DA

#### Won’t pass

Altman 3/20 [Alex Altman, Washington correspondent for TIME, “Four Hurdles That Could Block Immigration Reform,” http://swampland.time.com/2013/03/20/four-hurdles-that-could-block-immigration-reform/]

The next few months offer the best chance in a generation for the two parties to solve a problem that has bedeviled Congress like few others. Both sides agree the U.S. immigration system is broken. Both would seem to gain from a deal that clears a pathway out of legal oblivion for the nation’s 11 million illegal immigrants. Support is building for a landmark pact. But while negotiations are progressing in both the House and Senate, an agreement is a long way off. As the talks grow more detailed, obstacles to a deal may begin to emerge:¶ Problem #1: The Gang of Eight¶ The first snag lurks in the Senate, where the so-called Gang of Eight has huddled privately since the election in hopes of hammering out a bill. Members have crafted a set of measures that would create a pathway to citizenship for the nation’s estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants within about 13 years while requiring them to register with federal authorities, pay back taxes and fines, learn English and undergo background checks. The deal, both sides agree, would also beef up border security and determine how the future flow of immigrants will be regulated to match the needs of the economy.¶ The Gang’s closed conclaves have been marked by Vatican-style secrecy, often a sign of progress in a town where silence is rare. The Gang’s members – Republicans Marco Rubio, Lindsey Graham, John McCain and Jeff Flake, and Democrats Chuck Schumer, Dick Durbin, Bob Menendez and Michael Bennet – have, by all accounts, developed a rapport. “You can tell by the tone of their voices,” says an elected Democrat briefed on the progress of the private talks.¶ But the broad themes are the easy part. The full bill will stretch to hundreds of pages, each peppered with detailed provisions that could spike it. Members bring clashing political imperatives and ideologies to the talks. Rubio, for example, is trying to repair the GOP’s tattered image with Hispanic voters without sparking a backlash among the movement conservatives he’d need in a presidential bid. Graham, who faces a probable primary challenge in 2014, has a habit of basking in the bipartisan spotlight before bolting when negotiations intensify. The measure of the Gang of Eight’s success isn’t whether they are aligned at the start of their talks. It’s whether they are all aligned at the end.¶ Problem #2: The Lobbyists¶ A few years ago, an impasse between the leaders of the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO helped scupper an immigration-reform bill backed by President George W. Bush. At that time, business and labor could not agree on how many visas to grant low skilled workers who make the construction, agriculture and hotel and restaurant industries hum. The Chamber wanted cheap labor, but didn’t want workers to stay; unions were concerned about protecting citizens’ jobs. Soon after, reform collapsed.¶ This time the two groups have nurtured an unlikely alliance. “There has been a sea change,” says a labor source close to the discussions. Nudged by Graham and Schumer, the two lobbies released a set of shared principles, including one stating that Americans should get “first crack” at available jobs and that businesses should have the flexibility to hire to meet the demands of the market. But history could repeat itself again. The two sides call for a new federal agency charged with setting visa levels, but they have yet to agree on who’s eligible or how the new bureau will work. The issue of future flow has been a stubborn sticking point before. And it is as easy to imagine conservatives balking at efforts to create a new government agency as it is to foresee unions drawing a line at a small number of foreign workers.¶ Problem #3: House Republicans¶ Even if Senate negotiators can come up with a package to get 60 votes in the upper chamber, “the question continues to be, how does it get through the House?” says Frank Sharry, an expert on immigration reform. As in the Senate, a bipartisan cluster of eight representatives from across the ideological spectrum have been secretly meeting for months. Congressman Luis Gutierrez, an Illinois Democrat who has long been a leader on immigration reform, is full of praise for the new tack taken by his Republican counterparts. But, he acknowledges, “You still have to put those votes on the board, and that’s going to be a real, real test in the House of Representatives.”¶ For their part, Republicans say the party’s old dogma, which held that illegal immigrants should self-deport and then go to the back of the line, is not viable policy. Even many immigration hard-liners say they want to help shape comprehensive reform. “It’s time for us to belly up to the bar,” says Ted Poe, the Texas Republican who chairs the House immigration reform caucus. But for conservatives, amnesty remains a dirty word. “A bill that’s basically amnesty, that says you’re here and you’re going to be a citizen — those two things are not going to come out of this conservative House,” says Poe. Even citizenship is charged enough that Republican Senator Rand Paul, who gave a speech March 19 backing a path to legalization for undocumented immigrants, avoided using the term. Many House Republicans, including several in the Judiciary Committee through which a bill must pass, have a long history of antipathy to amnesty, and only a grassroots rebellion to fear as next year’s primaries approach.¶ Then there is the reality that even if Republicans were to be widely supportive of amnesty, very few of those new citizens are likely to abandon the Democratic Party anytime soon. “Republicans face a choice: do they ditch their principles and go all out in a failing attempt to outpander Democrats?” asks Rosemary Jenks, director of government relations at NumbersUSA, which advocates for lower immigration levels. “It’s becoming very clear to Republicans in Congress that this is not going to get them the Hispanic vote.”¶ Problem #4: The Democrats¶ Little discussed but also looming is the possibility that Democrats drag their feet on reform. Liberals will balk if the path to citizenship is too long or too onerous, or if enforcement provisions are too rigid. Many conservatives also suspect that Democratic power brokers, despite their daily hammering of Republicans to get moving on immigration reform, would privately prefer to keep the issue as a cudgel than actually pass a law. Barack Obama “wants to make a bill come out of the Senate that is so far out there that it would never pass, so that he can blame us for not being compassionate and use the issue to take back the House in 2014,” says a House Republican. Even some liberals see this as a plausible scenario. “There’s always a lingering doubt in my mind,” admits one House Democrat. Obama knows that putting his fingerprints on the deal is an easy way to kill it; when a draft of his proposal leaked in the press, he called Republican negotiators individually to apologize. But if negotiations in Congress bog down, he may not be so hands off.¶ By all accounts, negotiators are making genuine progress toward a landmark deal that builds on a foundation laid during its last fumbled attempts. But lawmakers still have to thread a bill through a thicket of obstacles in a bitterly divided Congress. Sources close to the negotiations say they expect both chambers to introduce legislation in early April, giving Congress several months to haggle out a pact before members scatter for their summer recess. It sounds like plenty of time, but it’s not. Immigration will have to jockey for attention this spring with gun control, budgets and a potential grand bargain on tax and entitlement reform. Meanwhile, the human cost of the political stalemate is high. Each day, 1,400 undocumented immigrants are deported.

#### Won’t pass---border security

Byron York 3-27, Chief Political Correspondent - The Washington Examiner, “Border security in exchange for immigration reform? Napolitano says no deal.” 3-27-13, http://washingtonexaminer.com/border-security-in-exchange-for-immigration-reform-napolitano-says-no-deal./article/2525505

Republicans working to craft a comprehensive immigration reform bill say there is one rock-bottom requirement for any deal: The border must be secure, and proven to be secure, before any path to citizenship is created for the millions of immigrants currently in the country illegally. That is the one non-negotiable GOP demand. And on Tuesday, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano flatly rejected it.¶ “Relying on one thing as a so-called trigger is not the way to go,” Napolitano told a breakfast meeting of journalists. Asked about her department’s recent revelation that it will not produce a long-promised method of measuring border security, known as the Border Condition Index, Napolitano said, “We’re confident that the border is as secure as it’s ever been. But there’s no one number that captures that.” Without a way to measure border security, many Republican reform advocates say, there’s no way to go forward with a reform agreement.¶ Napolitano’s comments were one more bit of evidence, if Republicans needed any, that the Obama administration does not intend to make enhanced border security a precondition of immigration reform. “Every position and action the administration takes is consistent with the idea that they have no desire to accomplish immigration security,” said one GOP Senate aide who spoke on condition of anonymity.¶ “One of the challenges in crafting any reform is that the American people do not have confidence in this administration’s willingness to enforce current immigration law,” said Alex Conant, spokesman for Marco Rubio, the Republican senator and Gang of Eight member who has staked considerable political capital on the negotiations. “Senator Rubio and several members of the immigration working group share these concerns, and it’s reflected in the solution they are trying to craft. Our legislation will include real security triggers to make sure out borders are secured.”¶ Added Conant: “Senator Rubio will not support any legislation that does not include real security triggers to make sure our borders are secured.”¶ As for Napolitano, another aide said, “I wonder if she’s freelancing, or carrying a message from the White House.” At Tuesday’s White House briefing, spokesman Jay Carney was asked that very question, and while he spoke at length without saying anything definitive, Carney appeared to suggest that President Obama agrees with Napolitano. From the transcript:¶ QUESTION: Secretary Napolitano said today that triggers are not necessary before comprehensive immigration reform. So what does the White House do to convince those on the other side? Since there are no reliable metrics about border security, what will you do to convince them that the border is secure enough for immigration and a path to citizenship to begin?¶ MR. CARNEY: Well, I think the question is excellent, and I would note that what Secretary Napolitano has said — Secretary Napolitano has said that the Department of Homeland Security measures progress using a number of metrics to make sure we are putting our resources where they will have the most impact. And I think that while there are different ways to look at this issue, the fact is, by a host of measures, there has been great improvement in our border security.¶ Certainly the facts are there when it comes to the resources that have been applied to border security — the doubling of border security agents, as well as the other metrics that you will often hear Secretary Napolitano or others discuss. So we look at a variety of measures.¶ And I think you can look at what this President has committed to and the record on border security since he came into office to evaluate his assertion that border security is a vital element of comprehensive immigration reform. That has been his position, and it continues to be. And I would note — and this is something that has been acknowledged by important members of the Senate, Republican members — the progress that has been made on this very important issue, border security. Much of — the last time comprehensive immigration reform was essentially abandoned, some of the issues — the principal reason for that was because of concerns about border security. And many of the metrics that were put forward then have been met — the goals and the targets that were said to have to be achieved before we could move forward have been met.¶ But this is an ongoing issue. This is an ongoing concern, and it’s an ongoing project of this administration. And it will certainly be an important part of immigration reform.¶ QUESTION: Do you — does the White House oppose commissions or certain triggers before a path to citizenship can begin?¶ MR. CARNEY: What we have said and I’ll say today is that we are not going to judge the bill before it’s been written. And we are working with the senators who are in the Gang of Eight as they make progress, and they’ve made considerable progress, and that is worth noting. Senator Schumer just the other day talked about where they are in that process and the progress that they’ve been making, and we were heartened by that.¶ But as the President said yesterday, we have to keep pushing. We have to make sure that we follow through on this progress, and that that progress leads to a bill that has bipartisan support and that can be signed by this President. And we’re not there yet. Progress is being made. It’s being made in the Senate, which is where the President hoped it would be made. And we are very much monitoring that process and engaging in that process. But it’s not done yet, and I don’t want to prejudge a bill that hasn’t been written.¶ QUESTION: But if I could just press you on it, it does appear as though that Secretary Napolitano did today prejudge. She said the triggers are not necessary. Does the White House agree with that assessment?¶ MR. CARNEY: I think what she was saying — and the assessment we do agree with — is that there are a variety of metrics by which you can measure, and we do measure, progress on border security. And these are metrics that others use to measure border security, including Democrats and Republicans in the Senate and beyond the Senate, beyond the Congress.¶ So we’re working with Congress on this, with the Senate on this. Progress has been made. Border security is one of the key principles that the President has put forward that has to be part of comprehensive immigration reform. He has demonstrated his seriousness on this issue, as has Secretary Napolitano. But it is something that we’re — it’s not a done project. We have to continue working on it.¶ Cut through all the verbiage, and Carney seemed to say precisely what Napolitano said: If Republicans demand that tougher border enforcement be a precondition for comprehensive immigration reform, they can forget about making a deal, now or ever.

#### Perez nomination pounds the link

NPR 3-27-13, Carrie Johnson, “Obama's Labor Nominee Faces GOP Opposition Over His Role In A Supreme Court Case”, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/03/27/175513560/obamas-labor-nominee-faces-gop-opposition-over-his-role-in-a-supreme-court-case

Thomas Perez, the president's nominee to lead the Department of Labor and a high-profile Latino advocate for civil rights, is scheduled for a Senate confirmation hearing April 18. **But behind-the-scenes wrangling over his nomination, and his controversial role in a Supreme Court case, is already well under way.**¶ House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Darrell Issa, R-Calif., and the ranking GOP member on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Charles Grassley, are investigating what they call a quid pro quo deal that may have cost the federal Treasury as much as $180 million.¶ The GOP lawmakers are upset by the appearance that the Justice Department used inappropriate reasons to stay out of a whistle-blower lawsuit that claimed the city of St. Paul, Minn., had misused funds it got from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Under the False Claims Act, the Justice Department can intervene in such cases and support whistle-blowers, which often leads to victories or settlements that return millions of dollars to the U.S. Treasury.¶ Under the GOP theory, the Justice Department declined to throw its weight into that whistle-blower case as part of an improper deal with St. Paul, Minn. What's the other end of the alleged quid pro quo? That would be St. Paul agreeing to withdraw its bid for Supreme Court review in a separate case that put at risk a major legal tool the federal government uses in civil rights and housing discrimination cases.¶ In the case, Magner v. Gallagher, St. Paul asked the Supreme Court to consider the government's use of the so-called disparate impact theory, which allows lawsuits to proceed under the Fair Housing Act if people can prove a practice has a statistically significant negative impact on minorities, rather than specific bad acts involving individual landlords. That theory has been a frequent target of political conservatives and some members of Congress, and its supporters fear if the issue gets to the Supreme Court, it could be invalidated there.¶ Republican lawmakers have demanded more answers from Perez, the assistant attorney general for civil rights, and others in the Justice Department who may have played a role in that decision, which they consider a "dubious bargain."¶ Grassley told reporters earlier this month, "It's hard to believe that the president would nominate somebody at the heart of a congressional investigation and so deeply involved in a controversial decision to make a shady deal with the city of St. Paul, Minn."¶ New documents indicate Perez and other top DOJ officials have spent hours talking to members of Congress behind closed doors this month about that arrangement.¶ Perez told investigators in an eight-hour session on March 22 that the St. Paul case heading to the Supreme Court last year "caught my attention and was a source of concern."¶ In the first explanation of his role in the case, Perez said the dispute headed toward the Supreme Court presented some bad facts, and "because bad facts make bad law, this could have resulted in a decision that undermined our ability...to protect victims of housing and lending discrimination." He told lawmakers he reached out to people in Minnesota and found out they were interested in getting the Justice Department to stay out of a separate whistle-blower case that could cost the state money.¶ Perez said he reached out inside the Justice Department for ethics advice and told lawmakers he learned "there would be no concerns so long as I had permission" from counterparts in the civil unit handling the whistle-blower case and that "there was no prohibition on linking matters."¶ He added that he learned former Vice President Walter Mondale, who played a role in sponsoring the Fair Housing Act in Congress, and who had close ties to the mayor of St. Paul, was going to reach out regarding the Supreme Court case and its effects on civil rights enforcement as well.¶ "I believe then, and I believe now, that the result achieved here was in the best interests of the United States," he said.¶ Justice Department officials have turned over 1,500 pages of documents about the controversy, **but that's unlikely to satisfy Republicans on Capitol Hill.**

#### Gun control pounds

WaPo 3-28, “Obama, pushing gun-control agenda, says ‘shame on us if we’ve forgotten’ Newtown,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-pushing-gun-control-agenda-says-shame-on-us-if-weve-forgotten-newtown/2013/03/28/e2060b54-97be-11e2-b68f-dc5c4b47e519\_story.html

President Obama delivered a **forceful** and emotional **plea** to lawmakers Thursday to pass his **gun-control agenda**, saying “shame on us if we’ve forgotten” the elementary school massacre in Newtown, Conn.¶ Frustrated by the slow pace of progress on Capitol Hill, Obama urged passage of universal background checks and other gun-control measures while flanked by mothers of shooting victims in the East Room of the White House. He also repeatedly invoked the Dec. 14 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School as a cause for action.¶ “Less than 100 days ago that happened,” Obama said. “And the entire country was shocked. And the entire country pledged we would do something about it and this time would be different. Shame on us if we’ve forgotten. I haven’t forgotten those kids. Shame on us if we’ve forgotten.”¶ Obama — who spoke alongside Vice President Biden, the administration’s point person on guns — **is attempting to pressure wavering lawmakers** in advance of an expected **Senate vote next month** on his guns agenda. He urged Americans to “raise your voices and make yourselves unmistakably heard” so that lawmakers “don’t get squishy.”¶ “We need everybody to remember how we felt 100 days ago and make sure that what we said at that time wasn’t just a bunch of platitudes, that we meant it,” Obama said.¶ But **the fate of gun legislation** on Capitol Hill **is murky amid GOP opposition and wavering among conservative Democrats.** Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), widely viewed as a 2016 presidential contender, announced Thursday that he was joining three other Senate GOP conservatives — Ted Cruz (Texas), Mike Lee (Utah) and Rand Paul (Ky.) — in **threatening to filibuster** Democratic gun-control legislation.

#### Infrastructure rules pound

Katie Fahrenbacher 3-15, “Obama starts unveiling his plans for climate change, clean energy,” 3/15/13, http://gigaom.com/2013/03/15/obama-starts-unveiling-his-plans-for-climate-change-clean-energy/

President Obama called for stronger action on climate change and support of clean energy research during his State of the Union speech, and now he’s showing his cards for how he might carry that out. On Friday Obama is expected to propose funneling $2 billion worth of federal leases for oil and gas companies into research and deployment of cleaner vehicles, reports the New York Times. At the same time, Bloomberg reports that Obama could also use a law from the Nixon-era to tell federal agencies that they need to consider climate change impacts before approving infrastructure projects like oil pipelines. ¶ The moves show how Obama is getting creative at a time when Congress isn’t likely to approve budget increases for clean energy support, or other policies like a cap and trade program or carbon tax. The stimulus package, which injected some $90 billion into clean energy projects and incentives, has largely been spent or the funds expired, so clean energy companies and projects are facing a steep drop in federal support in 2013. ¶ Yet, many will note that the moves are piece meal and not as aggressive as Obama originally proposed when he first ran for office. And some of Obama’s concessions to the natural gas and oil industry will likely anger environmentalists and some clean energy advocates. The Washington Post reports that the Obama administration plans to rewrite its proposal to regulate greenhouse emissions using the Environmental Protection Agency, making the proposal weaker and potentially delaying regulations. ¶ The proposal for using $2 billion in federal leases will emerge over the coming weeks. Obama brought up this plan in the State of the Union speech, calling it an Energy Security Trust that will drive new research and technology to shift our cars and trucks off oil for good. Obama said “If a non-partisan coalition of CEOs and retired generals and admirals can get behind this idea, then so can we.” ¶ The use of the infrastructure law is a new idea, and will no doubt prove controversial. A manufacturing association told Bloomberg that the notion had them “freaked out.” The law originally was used to protect water, air and soil from infrastructure projects that could have negative environmental effects.

#### Executive military action shields

Davenport 12 Coral, energy and environment correspondent for National Journal, Prior to joining National Journal in 2010, Davenport covered energy and environment for Politico, and before that, for Congressional Quarterly. In 2010, she was a fellow with the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting. From 2001 to 2004, Davenport worked in Athens, Greece, as a correspondent for numerous publications, including the Christian Science Monitor and USA Today, covering politics, economics, international relations and terrorism in southeastern Europe. She also covered the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, and was a contributing writer to the Fodor’s, Time Out, Eyewitness and Funseekers’ guidebook series. Davenport started her journalism career at the Daily Hampshire Gazette in Northampton, Massachusetts, after graduating from Smith College with a degree in English literature. National Journal, 2/10, White House Budget to Expand Clean-Energy Programs Through Pentagon, ProQuest

The White House believes it has figured out how to get more money for clean-energy programs touted by President Obama without having it become political roadkill in the wake of the Solyndra controversy: **Put it in the Pentagon**. While details are thin on the ground, lawmakers who work on both energy- and defense-spending policy believe the fiscal 2013 budget request to be delivered to Congress on Monday probably won't include big increases for wind and solar power through the Energy Department, a major target for Republicans since solar-panel maker Solyndra defaulted last year on a $535 million loan guarantee. But they do expect to see increases in spending on alternative energy in the Defense Department, such as programs to replace traditional jet fuel with biofuels, supply troops on the front lines with solar-powered electronic equipment, build hybrid-engine tanks and aircraft carriers, and increase renewable-energy use on military bases. While Republicans will instantly shoot down requests for fresh spending on Energy Department programs that could be likened to the one that funded Solyndra, many support alternative-energy programs for the military. "I do expect to see the spending," said Rep. Jack Kingston, R-Ga., a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, when asked about increased investment in alternative-energy programs at the Pentagon. "I think in the past three to five years this has been going on, but that it has grown as a culture and a practice - and it's a good thing." "If Israel attacks Iran, and we have to go to war - and the Straits of Hormuz are closed for a week or a month and the price of fuel is going to be high," Kingston said, "the question is, in the military, what do you replace it with? It's not something you just do for the ozone. It's strategic." Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who sits on both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said, "I don't see what they're doing in DOD as being Solyndra." "We're not talking about putting $500 million into a goofy idea," Graham told National Journal . "We're talking about taking applications of technologies that work and expanding them. I wouldn't be for DOD having a bunch of money to play around with renewable technologies that have no hope. But from what I understand, there are renewables out there that already work." A senior House Democrat noted that this wouldn't be the first time that the **Pentagon has been utilized to advance policies that wouldn't otherwise be supported**. "They did it in the '90s with medical research," said Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., ranking member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. In 1993, when funding was frozen for breast-cancer research programs in the National Institutes of Health, Congress boosted the Pentagon's budget for breast-cancer research - to more than double that of the health agency's funding in that area. **Politically, the strategy makes sense**. Republicans are ready to fire at the first sign of any pet Obama program, and renewable programs at the Energy Department are an exceptionally ripe target. That's because of Solyndra, but also because, in the last two years, the Energy Department received a massive $40 billion infusion in funding for clean-energy programs from the stimulus law, a signature Obama policy. When that money runs out this year, a request for more on top of it would be met with flat-out derision from most congressional Republicans. Increasing renewable-energy initiatives at the Pentagon can also help Obama advance his broader, national goals for transitioning the U.S. economy from fossil fuels to alternative sources. As the largest industrial consumer of energy in the world, the U.S. military can have a significant impact on energy markets - if it demands significant amounts of energy from alternative sources, it could help scale up production and ramp down prices for clean energy on the commercial market. Obama acknowledged those impacts in a speech last month at the Buckley Air Force Base in Colorado. "The Navy is going to purchase enough clean-energy capacity to power a quarter of a million homes a year. And it won't cost taxpayers a dime," Obama said. "What does it mean? It means that the world's largest consumer of energy - the Department of Defense - is making one of the largest commitments to clean energy in history," the president added. "That will grow this market, it will strengthen our energy security." Experts also hope that Pentagon engagement in clean-energy technology could help yield breakthroughs with commercial applications. Kingston acknowledged that the upfront costs for alternative fuels are higher than for conventional oil and gasoline. For example, the Air Force has pursued contracts to purchase biofuels made from algae and camelina, a grass-like plant, but those fuels can cost up to $150 a barrel, compared to oil, which is lately going for around $100 a barrel. Fuel-efficient hybrid tanks can cost $1 million more than conventional tanks - although in the long run they can help lessen the military's oil dependence, Kingston said Republicans recognize that the up-front cost can yield a payoff later. "It wouldn't be dead on arrival. But we'd need to see a two- to three-year payoff on the investment," Kingston said. Military officials - particularly Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, who has made alternative energy a cornerstone of his tenure - have been telling Congress for years that the military's dependence on fossil fuels puts the troops - and the nation's security - at risk. Mabus has focused on meeting an ambitious mandate from a 2007 law to supply 25 percent of the military's electricity from renewable power sources by 2025. (Obama has tried and failed to pass a similar national mandate.) Last June, the DOD rolled out its first department-wide energy policy to coalesce alternative and energy-efficient initiatives across the military services. In January, the department announced that a study of military installations in the western United States found four California desert bases suitable to produce enough solar energy - 7,000 megawatts - to match seven nuclear power plants. And so far, those **moves have met with approval from congressional Republicans**. Even so, any request for new Pentagon spending will be met with greater scrutiny this year. The Pentagon's budget is already under a microscope, due to $500 billion in automatic cuts to defense spending slated to take effect in 2013. But even with those challenges, clean-energy spending probably won't stand out as much in the military budget as it would in the Energy Department budget. Despite its name, the Energy Department has traditionally had little to do with energy policy - its chief portfolio is maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal. Without the stimulus money, last year only $1.9 billion of Energy's $32 billion budget went to clean-energy programs. A spending increase of just $1 billion would make a big difference in the agency's bottom line. But it would probably be easier to tuck another $1 billion or $2 billion on clean-energy spending into the Pentagon's $518 billion budget. Last year, the Pentagon spent about $1 billion on renewable energy and energy-efficiency programs across its departments.

#### SMRs are popular

Nelson and Northey 12 Gabriel and Northey, energy and environment reports for Greenwire, “DOE funding for small reactors languishes as parties clash on debt,” <http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3>

It's not just wind and solar projects that are waiting for federal help as Congress duels over the importance of putting taxpayer dollars on the line for cutting-edge energy projects. Some of the nation's largest nuclear power companies are anxious to hear whether they will get a share of a $452 million pot from the Department of Energy for a new breed of reactors that the industry has labeled as a way to lessen the safety risks and construction costs of new nuclear power plants. The grant program for these "small modular reactors," which was announced in January, would mark the official start of a major U.S. foray into the technology even as rising construction costs -- especially when compared to natural-gas-burning plants -- cause many power companies to shy away from nuclear plants. DOE received four bids before the May 21 deadline from veteran reactor designers Westinghouse Electric Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co., as well as relative newcomers Holtec International Inc. and NuScale Power LLC. Now the summer has ended with no announcement from DOE, even though the agency said it would name the winners two months ago. As the self-imposed deadline passed, companies started hearing murmurs that a decision could come in September, or perhaps at the end of the year. To observers within the industry, it seems that election-year calculations may have sidelined the contest. "The rumors are a'flying," said Paul Genoa, director of policy development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, in an interview last week. "All we can imagine is that this is now caught up in politics, and the campaign has to decide whether these things are good for them to announce, and how." Small modular reactors do not seem to be lacking in political support. The nuclear lobby has historically courted both Democrats and Republicans and still sees itself as being in a strong position with key appropriators on both sides of the aisle. Likewise, top energy officials in the Obama administration have hailed the promise of the new reactors, and they haven't shown any signs of a change of heart. DOE spokeswoman Jen Stutsman said last week that the department is still reviewing applications, but she did not say when a decision will be made.

#### Rubio loves nuclear power

Luimbe 12 November 20, "Rubio wants more nuclear energy, doesn't believe in radiocarbon dating", www.luimbe.com/blog/2012/11/20/rubio-wants-more-nuclear-energy-doesnt-believe-in-radio-carbon-dating/

Rubio on nuclear energy:¶ I support a comprehensive energy plan that encourages nuclear energy, exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and environmentally safe leasing of oil and natural gas fields in the outer continental shelf and on federally owned lands with oil shale in the West. As senator, I will stand for policies that make us more energy efficient, less reliant on foreign sources of oil, create jobs and ease the burden on family budgets.¶ source: Marco Rubio on Energy & Oil.

#### Rubio’s key to immigration

Drucker and Trygstad 1/30 David M and Kyle, "Rubio Must Sell Immigration Changes to GOP, Grass Roots", 2013, www.rollcall.com/news/rubio\_must\_sell\_immigration\_changes\_to\_gop\_grass\_roots-222044-1.html?pos=hftxt

The fate of an immigration overhaul rests almost exclusively with Sen. Marco Rubio, the Florida Republican whose star power with conservatives is crucial to moving a bill through Congress.¶ President Barack Obama retains veto power, and Democrats hold the Senate floor. But no comprehensive immigration changes are likely to pass Congress without the healthy support of House Republicans. And Florida’s junior senator, perhaps more than any other Republican serving in Washington today, has the political credibility and communication skills to sell such complicated, sensitive legislation to skeptical conservative members, grass-roots voters and influential media commentators.¶ Rubio’s position is all the more unique because congressional Democrats and Obama need him, too, and appear to realize his importance to the legislative endgame.¶ Republicans warn that Obama and congressional Democrats could sink Washington’s immigration policy rewrite by attaching controversial social provisions or watering down the border enforcement and security measures included in the bipartisan Senate framework that Rubio helped negotiate. The Florida lawmaker has said he’ll pull his support from any bill if that occurs, and Republicans say comprehensive policy changes will fail to garner meaningful GOP support without Rubio’s backing.¶ “If Rubio signals any mistrust or misgivings, the whole thing collapses,” GOP pollster Brock McCleary said.

#### Obama has no PC

Matt Vespa 3-22, “CBS Political Director Now: Obama Shouldn't Agitate GOP; Back in January: 'Go For The Throat,' Mr. President,” 3-22-13, Read more: <http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/matt-vespa/2013/03/22/180-turn-cbs-political-director-says-obama-shouldnt-agitate-gop-said-go-#ixzz2Ol8hnbXg>

http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/matt-vespa/2013/03/22/180-turn-cbs-political-director-says-obama-shouldnt-agitate-gop-said-go-#ixzz2Ol8Ovmun

What happened in the interim? First, the president and the Democrats lost the sequester battle. Second, polling shows Americans tend to support the substance of Republican economic policies, even as the party label itself is, at present, not popular.¶ This, coupled with the hyperbolic scenarios related to the sequestration cuts, have allowed Republicans to highlight the real pork, such as the studying of duck genitalia, to slam the president lamenting over the closure of White House tours. Indeed, even self-described lefties are starting to lose confidence in Obama. In a recent Washington Post/ABC poll, the president saw liberals lose confidence in him over handling the economy over Republicans by fourteen points! Women’s support of his economic agenda slipped an equally bad twelve points since December.¶ Perhaps Dickerson was part of the liberal crowd that felt the president, fresh off his reelection, has a mandate, but was wholly illusory. ¶ Don't look for Dickerson's colleagues in the liberal media to examine this stunning reversal. Doing so would highlight that Obama fatigue is slowly but surely setting in, not just in Washington but in the hinterland. The president won a second term, but he lacks the political capital to set the agenda on his terms. He **cannot negotiate from a position of strength** because he has none. Dickerson now sees it, and surely others in the media do as well. The question is when will the media start to note openly that the emperor has no clothes.

#### PC’s not key to immigration

Hirsh 2/7 Michael, chief correspondent for National Journal, previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, has appeared many times as a commentator on Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, and National Public Radio, has written for the Associated Press, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Harper’s, and Washington Monthly, and authored two books, "There's No Such Thing as Political Capital", 2013, [www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207](http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207)

Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all.

#### Winner’s win

Hirsh 2/7 Michael, chief correspondent for National Journal; citing Ornstein, a political scientist and scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and Bensel, gov’t prof at Cornell, "There's No Such Thing as Political Capital", 2013, [www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207](http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207)

But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.¶ Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”

#### Loss of PC still results in high-skill reform

Yglesias 1/15 Matthew, Slate, 2013, How the GOP Can Roll Obama on Immigration, www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/01/15/immigration\_reform\_will\_obama\_get\_rolled.html

Of the major policy issues under discussion in Washington, "immigration reform" stands out for having unusually undefined content. For the major immigration-advocacy groups, the goal is clear, a comprehensive bill that includes a path to citizenship for the overwhelming majority of unauthorized migrants already living in the United States. But many other aspects of immigration law are in the mix as part of a proposed deal, and it seems to me that there's a fair chance that a nimble Republican Party could essentially roll the Democratic coalition and pass an "immigration reform" bill that doesn't offer the path Latino advocacy groups are looking for.¶ Elise Foley has the key line from her briefing on the administration's thinking about immigration, namely that a piecemeal approach "could result in passage of the less politically complicated pieces, such as an enforcement mechanism and high-skilled worker visas, while leaving out more contentious items such as a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants."¶ And indeed it could. But how can they stop it? The last House GOP effort to split the high-tech visas question from the path to citizenship question was an absurd partisan ploy. If Republicans want to get serious about it they should be able to make it work. The centerpiece would be something on increased immigration of skilled workers. That's something the tech industry wants very much, it's a great idea on the merits, and few influential people have any real beef with it. High tech visas will easily generate revenue to pay for some stepped-up enforcement. Then instead of adding on a poison pill so Democrats will block the bill, you need to add a sweetener. Not the broad path to citizenship, but something small like the DREAM Act. Now you've got a package that falls massively short of what Latino groups are looking for, but that I think Democrats will have a hard time actually blocking. After all, why would they block it? It packages three things—more skilled immigration, more enforcement, and help for DREAMers—they say they want. Blocking it because it doesn't also do the broad amnesty that liberals want and conservatives hate would require the kind of fanaticism that is the exact opposite of Obama's approach to politics.

### AT: Latin American Relations

#### Latin American relations inevitably low under Obama

Mark Weisbrot 12-18 is co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, DC. He is also President of Just Foreign Policy, “Obama signals four more years of bad relations with Latin America”, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/20121218123136470626.html>

President Obama went too far in throwing gratuitous insults at President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela on Friday, in an interview in Miami. By doing so, he not only offended the majority of Venezuelans, who voted to re-elect their president on October 7, but even many who did not. Chavez is fighting for his life, recovering from a difficult cancer operation; in Latin America, as in most of the world, this wholly unnecessary vilification of Chavez by Obama is a breach not only of diplomatic protocol but also of ordinary standards of civility.¶ Perhaps even more importantly, Obama's ill-timed aspersions sent an unpleasant message to the rest of the region. While Obama can get away with anything in the major media outlets, you can be sure that his remarks were noticed by the presidents and foreign ministries of Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and others. The message was clear: Expect four more years of the same failed, Cold War policies toward Latin America that President George W Bush championed and Obama continued in his first term. ¶ These presidents see Chavez as a close friend and ally, someone who has helped them and the region; like millions of Venezuelans they are praying for his recovery. They also see Washington as responsible for the bad relations between the US and Venezuela (as well as the hemisphere generally), and these unfortunate remarks are additional confirmation. At the 2012 Summit of the Americas, Obama found himself as isolated as George W Bush was at the notorious 2005 summit. It was a sea change from the 2009 Summit, where everyone - including Chavez - greeted Obama warmly and saw in him the potential for a new era of US-Latin American relations.

# 1AR

# CP

### Conditionality Bad

#### Multiple conditional worlds are a reason to reject the team – 2AC strategy has been skewed and it’s key to set a precedent

#### Our Counter interpretation solves their offense – one conditional world preserves neg flex and allows logical reversion to the status quo without creating contradictory worlds.

#### Our offense outweighs –

#### Advocacy skills are the foundation of debate – they overly privilege tactical maneuvering over substantive clash - eliminates in depth discussions of CP’s as the Neg constantly shifts strategies

#### Destroys Logical Decision Making – multiple worlds force late developing debates where the judge cannot evaluate costs of the plan when options exist outside of a CP or the Squo.

#### Eliminates 2AC Offense – multiple contradictory positions preclude the best 2AC responses to any one position. – Link turns search for Best Policy Option

<<:30>>

AT: Neg Flex 🡪 Neg flex is arbitrary, we solve, and it promotes worse debate

AT: All Args Condo 🡪 Conditional worlds are distinct than other args - they’re advocacies and change the world of Aff offense

AT: Neg Bias 🡪 Bias has shifted too far in favor of the Neg – they get process CP’s, K’s, multiplanked Counterplans, floating PIC’s etc. - the block overcomes any Aff bias.

# K

### AT: V2L

#### VTL doesn’t outweigh

Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

### FW

We need to use the language of nuclear experts to challenge them --- solves co-option

J. Michael Hogan 94, Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences at Pennsylvania State University, The Nuclear Freeze Campaign: Rhetoric and Foreign Policy in the Telepolitical Age, pg. 6-7

Most former freeze activists retain at least some faith in the democratic process. According to Solo, the freeze campaign at least *began* a long process of “educating” the public, and for a time it successfully **transformed “the issues and the** language used by politicians**” to facilitate discussion of nuclear issues**, breaking from “the dominant discourse of arms control and the cold war.” But just as this “war of ideas” was beginning to bear fruit, according to Solo, “the movement narrowed its agenda, which in turn constrained its educational program and confined its politics.” Concerned with answering its right-wing critics and remaining “respectable” among “political and arms control elites,” freeze advocates began defending the initiative on “technical grounds**,”** thereby straying from their “original goal of breaking out of arms control ‘negotiations as usual’ and challenging the new militarism.” For Solo, the lesson is clear: that in order “to develop a mass base” with “potential to develop political power without being co-opted,” peace activists must “promote political literacy **with a dynamic education strategy** that recognizes the peculiarities of our culture and language and does not overlook the continuing impact of television on our political life as a nation.”

#### Federal government technocratic discussion has implications outside debate

Crist 4 (Eileen, Professor at Virginia Tech in the Department of Science and Technology, “Against the social construction of nature and wilderness”, Environmental Ethics 26;1, p 13-6, http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/againstsocialconstruction.pdf)

Yet, constructivist analyses of "nature" favor remaining in the comfort zone of **zestless agnosticism** and **noncommittal meta-discourse**. As David Kidner suggests, this intellectual stance may function as a mechanism against facing the devastation of the biosphere—an undertaking long underway but gathering momentum with the imminent bottlenecking of a triumphant global consumerism and unprecedented population levels. Human-driven extinction—in the ballpark of Wilson's estimated 27,000 species per year—is so unthinkable a fact that choosing to ignore it may well be the psychologically risk-free option.¶ **Nevertheless, this is the** opportune **historical** moment **for** intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences **to join forces with** conservation **scientists** in order **to** help **create the consciousness shift and** policy changes **to stop this irreversible destruction. Given this outlook, how** students in the human sciences **are** trained **to regard scientific knowledge, and what kind of** messages percolate to the public from the academy **about the nature of scientific findings,** matter immensely. The "agnostic stance" of constructivism toward "scientific claims" about the environment—a stance supposedly mandatory for discerning how scientific knowledge is "socially assembled"[32]—is, to borrow a legendary one-liner, **striving to interpret the world at an hour that is pressingly calling us to change it.**

### AT: Technocracy Bad

#### Engagement with technocracy is more effective than passive rejection

Jiménez-Aleixandre 2, professor of education – University of Santiago de Compostela, and Pereiro-Muñoz High School Castelao, Vigo (Spain) (Maria-Pilar and Cristina, “Knowledge producers or knowledge consumers? Argumentation and decision making about environmental management,” International Journal of Science Education Vol. 24, No. 11, p. 1171–1190)

If science education and environmental education have as a goal to develop **critical thinking and** to promote **decision making**, it seems that the acknowledgement of a variety of experts and expertise is of relevance to both. **Otherwise citizens could be unable to challenge a common view** that places economical issues and technical features over other types of values or concerns. As McGinn and Roth (1999) argue, citizens should be prepared to participate in scientific practice, to be involved in situations where science is, if not created, at least used. The assessment of environmental management is, in our opinion, one of these, and citizens do not need to possess all the technical knowledge to be able to examine the positive and negative impacts and to weigh them up. The identification of instances of scientific practice in classroom discourse is difficult especially if this practice is viewed as a complex process, not as fixed ‘steps’. Several instances were identified when it could be said that students acted as a knowledge-producing community in spite of the fact that the students, particularly at the beginning of the sequence, expressed doubts about their capacities to assess a project written by experts and endorsed by a government office. Perhaps these doubts relate to the nature of the project, a ‘real life’ object that made its way into the classroom, into the ‘school life’. As Brown et al. (1989) point out, there is usually a difference between practitioners’ tasks and stereotyped school tasks and, it could be added, students are not used to being confronted with the complexity of ‘life-size’ problems. However, as the sequence proceeded, **the students assumed the role of experts**, exposing inconsistencies in the project, offering alternatives and discussing it with one of its authors. The issue of expertise is worthy of attention and it needs to be explored in different contexts where the relationships among technical expertise, values hierarchies and possible biases caused by the subject matter could be unravelled. One of the objectives of environmental education is to **empower people with the capacity of decision making**; for this purpose the acknowledging of multiple expertise is crucial.

### AT: Disease Link

#### Critiques of disease reps are wrong

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The second major critique of relevance is securitisation's **emphasis on linguistic speech acts** as the main vehicle for identifying and validating cases of securitisation. Like others, we argue that an **overly linguistic rule-generating approach to determining securitisation marginalises** the ways in which the audience responds **to, and resists or ignores, securitising attempts** by the state, or an international organisation. As Balzacq notes, **securitisation is perhaps better understood as a ‘strategic (pragmatic) practice** that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction’.23 Balzacq's aim is to relocate securitisation away from speech act theory, which he believes is theoretically unsuited to dealing comprehensively with the audience-centred nature of the construction process.24 The debate about domestic context and securitisation fundamentally relates to the question of audience acceptance – an important part of how securitisation is identified and validated.25 Vuori has been interested in examining how the securitisation framework's dichotomy of ‘normal’ and ‘special’ (or security) politics functions in non-democratic contexts.26 He notes that the definition of ‘audience acceptance’ in the Copenhagen school's work on securitisation is left ‘undefined’.27 He argues that understanding the dynamics of securitisation in non-democratic political orders – via his empirical work on China – is crucial if securitisation theory is to be a theory about security discourse formation. Like Wilkinson, he argues securitisation has a bias towards democratic decision-making systems and that it is tempting to believe that ‘special politics’ is not applicable to non-democratic systems because ‘there are no democratic process to begin with’.28 On the contrary, he argues that non-democratic systems also need to justify and participate in securitising rhetoric, because the desire for political legitimacy is a common factor across both democratic and non-democratic systems.29 Furthermore, recent work on securitisation in Asia suggests that it is difficult to define the location of ‘normal’ political practice in post-colonial states.30 Separating ‘security’ politics from ‘normal’ politics is problematic when they appear at times to be mutually constitutive.31 Vuori, for example, criticises the category of ‘special’ politics, asserting that, what this ‘special’ kind of politics means has ‘largely been left undefined’ by the Copenhagen School.32 He usefully suggests that special politics has conceptual utility in non-democratic systems, in that it does not necessarily have to represent securitisation in terms of ‘breaking rules’ (read democratic ones); but rather that in totalitarian socialist systems such as China and Vietnam, ‘struggle and antagonistic contradiction among enemies can sometimes be considered “normal” politics, or politics following the “rules”’.33 Furthermore, his use of Kluver's work on the three different audiences for propaganda in China can tentatively identify different audiences in Vietnam for application in our case analysis. These are: ‘(1) officials for whom official language is a game and a tool for social impact, (2) intellectuals for whom official language is a tool of aggression and defence, and (3) the masses for whom official languages is transformatory, it legitimates and delegitimates different forms of action.’34 Although we analyse security discourses around infectious disease and not party propaganda, these categorisations help to differentiate between audience types within Vietnam's authoritarian domestic political structure, which is markedly different from that analysed in the democratising, transitional state of Indonesia. In sum, this brief review has illustrated that when considering the securitisation of international health discourses in domestic contexts, one must take into account local factors which impact on the process of securitisation. Here, critiques of securitisation methodology illustrate two points. Firstly, that caution must be paid to how securitisation proceeds in non-democratic systems; in terms of the ability and capacity of citizens to understand and then ‘accept’ securitising rhetoric, but also in analysing the motives that elites have in securitising disease. Secondly, **emphasis on the speech act alone to identify and validate health securitisation omits other potentially useful sources of action/resistance**. These are in addition to other contextual factors, such as geo-political considerations and state-periphery relations, which in turn are interconnected to methods of internal state communication and control. The discussion of ‘normal’ and ‘security’ politics suggests that attempts to locate and ‘prove’ that international health norms have been securitised face considerable complexity in the face of the above factors. The WHO and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) are the two primary international organisations charged with providing technical advice and assistance to avian influenza affected countries. Additionally, the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN), whose technical laboratories are located primarily in a small number of developed states and which is coordinated by the WHO, provides the scientific support and surveillance infrastructure for monitoring the spread of the disease.35 Importantly, the surveillance aspect of this network primarily relies upon the cooperation of member states in notifying the WHO or OIE when outbreaks in either humans or animals occur.36 This network, along with the WHO and OIE more generally, form the basis of the international community's assistance and coordination network for avian influenza. Although a number of discourses operate within global health governance,37 the WHO and GISN have recently seen a marked shift in the rhetoric which guides their response to infectious disease emergencies, such as pandemic influenza. With its roots in earlier debates surrounding human security, and spurred on by the securitisation of HIV/AIDS in the late 1990s and the emergence of SARS in 2002, the securitisation of infectious disease emergencies has become one of the dominant features of global health governance.38 The 2007 World Health Report, entitled A Safer Future: Global Public Health Security in the 21st Century, entrenches the link between the language of security and the practice of public health within the global health governance agenda.39 Focusing on emerging microbial threats and catastrophic disasters it embraces security language, a threat assessment methodology and even a ‘security aesthetic’ (see, for instance, the stamped stencil motif throughout the report, reminiscent of military intelligence reports). The creation of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) in 2002, coupled with an expansion of the powers of the WHO under the revised International Health Regulations of 2005, have also been suggested as key signs of increasing securitisation.40 Accompanying this change in the global health governance discourse have been similar shifts in the national policies of many developed nations to incorporate a significant security dimension into their health initiatives.41 These developments amongst the international community have been of critical importance in generating a strong link between infectious disease and security amongst a wider cross-section of policy practitioners than was previously the case. Few **accounts have analysed how this discourse has been operationalised in countries affected by an epidemic that threatens international public healt**h.42 To address this gap, we evaluate the response of Vietnam and Indonesia, to the outbreak of H5N1 influenza amongst their poultry. In analysing to what degree, and which, domestic factors account for variance in response to the securitisation of global public health, we examine bureaucratic and community resistance, core-periphery relations and socio-political discourses as variables that impact on the state's capacity and motivation to securitise infectious disease. Vietnam and Indonesia provide useful contexts in which to interrogate the universality of the construction of security issues as is usually modelled in the paradigmatic version of securitisation studies. Neither case is a liberal democratic state of the type frequently present in European securitisation studies. In this sense, they provide a good opportunity to test some of the theoretical critiques and innovations enumerated above. It should be noted that by focusing on Southeast Asian states we do not deny that the process of constructing security in Western democratic states could be similarly fraught and contested. Nor should this article be viewed as an exhaustive study of securitisation in non-democratic contexts. We therefore merely view the following cases as suggestive of theoretical silences which studies of securitisation in non-democratic, transitional and non-Western contexts must be careful to examine. From a methodological point of view, Indonesia and Vietnam provide fertile ground for comparison of moves to securitise infectious disease. Both are developing countries with high growth economies and large populations, the demographics of which are changing from largely agrarian to urbanised societies.43 Both have significant poultry sectors and a history of subsistence farming using poultry as a basis.44 Most importantly, **both nations have been, at differing times, the epicentre of human and avian cases of H5N1 influenza**.45 Therefore, the threat which they faced from avian influenza, although it peaked at different times, can be said to be roughly similar for the purposes of a macro level political discussion. For a study which seeks to interrogate the ‘facilitating conditions’ of political legitimacy, audience acceptance and claims to ‘securityness’, the **comparability of the threat faced by the two polities is important.** Equally important is that the states under consideration have some important differences in their political structure and processes, the role of civil society and the media, and the domestic and international legitimacy of their leaders. We do not claim to make definitive causal statements about the relationship between such variables and the degree and nature of H5N1 securitisation during the period under analysis. Rather, by investigating these ‘non-threat facilitating conditions’ we provide empirical evidence on the fraught nature of securitising processes outside the Western-democratic state, and outline future avenues for research on the securitisation of infectious disease in those environments. Throughout the case studies, speech acts, resource allocations, administrative changes, policy ‘action’, and audience ‘reaction’ are used as indicators of the process of securitisation. This approach does not seek to provide proof that avian influenza has, or has not been securitised ‘successfully’; rather it places the securitising moves (or lack thereof) of the government against the role of political structures and audience reactions in influencing the overall outcome of health securitisation. Vietnam Since 2003, Vietnam has suffered two major outbreaks of the H5N1 virus in humans, corresponding to the northern hemisphere winter and spring.46 The first, occurring in the first few months of 2004, resulted in 23 human cases of the disease. The second, occurring from late 2004 until the middle of 2005, resulted in a further 62 cases. From December 2005, Vietnam reported no cases of human infection for almost two years, before a small number of isolated cases since July 2007. Importantly, while the human cases form the nexus of concern for the WHO and GISN, the epidemic has a far greater reach amongst Vietnam's poultry industry and domestic waterfowl. Vietnam's traditional agricultural system is uniquely suited to sustained, and sometimes undetectable, transmission of the H5N1 virus amongst birds.47 Not surprisingly, outbreaks amongst poultry have been a regular feature of Vietnam's provinces since 2003, even when no new human cases were emerging. At one point, 20 per cent of the country's poultry were slaughtered in an effort to control the disease – a massive blow to the short-term economic stability of rural agricultural areas, where 80 per cent of Vietnam's population resides.48 The Vietnamese government's response to the outbreak of avian influenza started slowly. In 2003, as the first sporadic cases of H5N1 influenza appeared, provincial governments struggled to identify the disease and notify central and international authorities.49 Likely to a combination of deliberate bureaucratic obfuscation and a lack of capacity, the response to these initial avian and human outbreaks in disparate provinces was sluggish and pursued through an under-resourced public health apparatus.50 However, **once the gravity and scale of the outbreak became apparent** – and impossible to quarantine from the oversight of international organisations – in January 2004, **efforts to securitise the disease were swift**. Chairing a Politburo-level National Steering Committee on Avian Influenza, **the Prime Minister demanded that the epidemic be contained** by the end of February through a widespread culling programme, which would involve ‘all State apparatuses and administrative bodies of all levels’.51 From this point forward, the Vietnamese central government's rhetoric and the tone of its response remained remarkably consistent. **From 2004 until 2008 security language was frequently invoked, comparatively large budgetary allocations were made** and the central government reinforced its control by limiting resistance to emergency measures. **Its cooperation with the WHO** and OIE, although occasionally plagued by capacity constraints, **was also consistently good**.52 In the context of an ongoing and severe avian epidemic, the government's domestic rhetoric surrounding bird flu since February 2004 has been highly securitised, and focused on placing the economic wellbeing of the Vietnamese state as the referent object. In May 2005, after multiple bouts of culling in infected areas, the Vietnamese government began an extraordinary effort to vaccinate all 212 million poultry in the country against H5N1 subtypes with a view to minimising the economic impact of the outbreaks.53 However, despite the initiation of this effort, avian epidemics continued to occur in the northern and southern river deltas in late 2005. The response to these avian epidemics is indicative of the types of securitising moves which were made. Throughout this period, newspaper articles about the poultry farms affected by the virus and the government's control efforts appeared daily; variously referring to avian influenza as an ‘imminent danger’, a ‘deadly threat’ to Vietnam, or even a ‘global threat’.54 Such pronouncements underscored the government's desire to ‘mobilise the entire political system’ in the ‘fight against the H5N1-virus’.55 High pressure statements were followed by regulations and directives,56 including one from the Prime Minister which sought to mobilise the state, its security forces, its citizens and every resource available against the threat: The formulation and implementation of such urgent action plans (against bird flu) must be considered an unexpected and urgent task of Party committees and administrations of all levels and a duty of each citizen and, therefore, the strength of the whole political system should be mobilized for this task […] To take initiative in making all necessary preparations and mobilizing every resource to prevent and combat the type-A (H5N1) influenza among humans […] the Ministry of Health, concerned ministries and branches and localities shall guide all medical units and establishments (even the army and police forces) from the central to provincial, municipal, district and communal levels.57 Typical of the media statements and directives during subsequent avian outbreaks in 2006 and 2007, such language was indicative of the Vietnamese government's conviction that ‘the fight against bird flu is an uninterrupted war’.58 **The urgency with which the government sought to act is,** in our view, **a product of the avian epidemic's potential to impact** negatively upon the legitimacy of the government amongst both international and domestic audiences. The 2002 and 2003 SARS epidemic taught the Vietnamese government valuable lessons about its ability control information flows to the international community and consequently control its image as a good-faith actor in the global public health sphere. In particular, the praise it received for openly and competently controlling the epidemic stood in strong contrast to the opprobrium over China's evasiveness.59 This resonates with the empirical evidence suggesting that, although Vietnamese officials tried to quietly deal with the initial, small-scale avian outbreaks in mid-2003, **they began cooperating with the WHO and international community at the point at which the outbreaks became a national (and hence potentially international) problem**. Reinforcing this logic was the need to appear competent to avoid severe consequences for the tourism industry and foreign direct investment.