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#### Security is based on a desire to control and manage---its ontological precepts attempt to render everything knowable and hence predictable---means that random variation in IR ensures aggression and enemy creation---the impact is mass war and violence---vote neg to reprogram our ontological presuppositions

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This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper **bedrock of modern reason** that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but **the apparently solid ground of the real itself**. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: **ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained** as it is.

I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form.

I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: **a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning**, **that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being**, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here **we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state)**. When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to **quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation** either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context **violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion**, at limited cost and with limited impact -- **it permeates being.**

This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which **humans are merely utilitarian instruments** for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather **turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction**. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21

What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action.

The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, **instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning**. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including **other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects**. In Heidegger's terms, **technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being**. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22

The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.

The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. **The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time**, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State

In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the **limitless resort to strategic violence** without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28

The conceptual template for such an image of national security state can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, with his influential conception of the political community as a tight unity of sovereign and people in which their bodies meld with his own to form a 'Leviathan', and which must be defended from enemies within and without. His image of effective security and sovereignty was one that was intolerant of internal difference and dissent, legitimating a strong state with coercive and exceptional powers to preserve order and sameness. This was a vision not merely of political order but of existential identity, set off against a range of existential others who were sources of threat, backwardness, instability or incongruity.29 It also, in a way set out with frightening clarity by the theorist Carl Schmitt and the philosopher Georg Hegel, exchanged internal unity, identity and harmony for permanent alienation from other such communities (states). Hegel presaged Schmitt's thought with his argument that individuality and the state are single moments of 'mind in its freedom' which 'has an infinitely negative relation to itself, and hence its essential character from its own point of view is its singleness':

Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others...this negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something external.30

Schmitt is important both for understanding the way in which such alienation is seen as a definitive way of imagining and limiting political communities, and for understanding how such a rigid delineation is linked to the inevitability and perpetuation of war. Schmitt argued that the existence of a state 'presupposes the political', which must be understood through 'the specific political distinction...between friend and enemy'. The enemy is 'the other, the stranger; and it sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible'.31 The figure of the enemy is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.32 Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist:

Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict...to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.33

Schmitt links this stark ontology to war when he states that the political is only authentic 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to the whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship...in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction'.34 War, in short, is an existential condition:

the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.35

Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.36

When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification.

This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in **terms of the distinction between friend and enemy**; because **the very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat**, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) **This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry**, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. **We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable**. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action.

Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.38 Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues that:

...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury...39

**Identity**, even more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare (or, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanisation of the other, by mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide). However anathema to a classical realist like Morgenthau, for whom prudence was a core political virtue, these have been influential ways of defining national security and defence during the twentieth century and persists into the twenty-first. They infused Cold War strategy in the United States (with the key policy document NSC68 stating that 'the Soviet-led assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and ... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere')40 and frames dominant Western responses to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and like groups (as Tony Blair admitted in 2006, 'We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we didn't. We chose values.')41 It has also become influential, in a particularly tragic and destructive way, in Israel, where memories of the Holocaust and (all too common) statements by Muslim and Arab leaders rejecting Israel's existence are mobilised by conservatives to justify military adventurism and a rejectionist policy towards the Palestinians.

On the reverse side of such ontologies of national insecurity we find pride and hubris, the belief that martial preparedness and action are vital or healthy for the existence of a people. Clausewitz's thought is thoroughly imbued with this conviction. For example, his definition of war as an act of policy does not refer merely to the policy of cabinets, but expresses the objectives and will of peoples:

When whole communities go to war -- whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples -- the reason always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.42

Such a perspective prefigures Schmitt's definition of the 'political' (an earlier translation reads 'war, therefore, is a political act'), and thus creates an inherent tension between its tendency to fuel the escalation of conflict and Clausewitz's declared aim, in defining war as policy, to prevent war becoming 'a complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence'.43 Likewise his argument that war is a 'trinity' of people (the source of 'primordial violence, hatred and enmity'), the military (who manage the 'play of chance and probability') and government (which achieve war's 'subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone') merges the existential and rationalistic conceptions of war into a theoretical unity.44

The idea that national identities could be built and redeemed through war derived from the 'romantic counter-revolution' in philosophy which opposed the cosmopolitanism of Kant with an emphasis on the absolute state -- as expressed by Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bismarkian Realpolitik and politicians like Wilhelm Von Humbolt. Humbolt, a Prussian minister of Education, wrote that war 'is one of the most wholesome manifestations that plays a role in the education of the human race', and urged the formation of a national army 'to inspire the citizen with the spirit of true war'. He stated that war 'alone gives the total structure the strength and the diversity without which facility would be weakness and unity would be void'.45 In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel made similar arguments that to for individuals to find their essence 'Government has from time to time to shake them to the very centre by war'.46

The historian Azar Gat points to the similarity of Clausewitz's arguments that 'a people and a nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction' to Hegel's vision of the ethical good of war in his Philosophy of Right.47 Likewise Michael Shapiro sees Clausewitz and Hegel as alike in seeing war 'as an ontological investment in both individual and national completion...Clausewitz figures war as passionate ontological commitment rather than cool political reason...war is a major aspect of being.'48

Hegel's text argues that war is 'a work of freedom' in which 'the individual's substantive duty' merges with the 'independence and sovereignty of the state'.49 Through war, he argues,

the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so the corruption in nations would be the product of a prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace.50

Hegel indeed argues that 'sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is a substantial tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal duty...if the state as such, if its autonomy, is in jeopardy, all its citizens are duty bound to answer the summons to its defence'.51 Furthermore, this is not simply a duty, but a form of self-realisation in which the individual dissolves into the higher unity of the state:

The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of mind is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualise this end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality. This form of experience thus contains the harshness of extreme contradictions: a self-sacrifice which yet is the real existence of one's freedom; the maximum self-subsistence of individuality, yet only a cog playing its part in the mechanism of an external organisation; absolute obedience, renunciation of personal opinions and reasonings, in fact complete absence of mind, coupled with the most intense and comprehensive presence of mind and decision in the moment of acting; the most hostile and so most personal action against individuals, coupled with an attitude of complete indifference or even liking towards them as individuals.52

A more frank statement of the potentially lethal consequences of patriotism -- and its simultaneously physical and conceptual annihilation of the individual human being -- is rarely to be found, one that is repeated today in countless national discourses and the strategic world-view in general. (In contrast, one of Kant's fundamental objections to war was that it involved using men 'as mere machines or instruments'.53) Yet however bizarre and contradictory Hegel's argument, it constitutes a powerful social ontology: an apparently irrefutable discourse of being. It actualises the convergence of war and the social contract in the form of the national security state.

Strategic Reason and Scientific Truth

By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which **all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features.**

These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55

Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56

At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony:

For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58

Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. **This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought**. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, **was to condemn hundreds of thousands** **more to die** in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of **a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty**. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61

We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said:

...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62

This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has **deep roots in modern thought**, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65

Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66

Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68

We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam:

For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69

There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70

And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the **Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy**. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation.

Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology

If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed:

...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71

By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture:

We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72

Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment **now threatened its total and absolute destruction**. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon.

Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75

Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good.

Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth.

Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather **technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy**. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77

This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind **demands that 'nature reports itself** in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes **trapped within its logic**. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where **he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve**. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. **In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter.**

This tells us much about the enduring power of crude instrumental versions of strategic thought, which relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical strategies that see, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, force as an 'instrument of policy short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that figures like the Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy, and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.79 In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'.80 Similarly a retired Israeli army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land.'81

Conclusion: Violent Ontologies or Peaceful Choices?

I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to **place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies** that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82

In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed **reifies) antagonisms**. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that **exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming**, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of **hegemonic forms of knowledge** about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it **drives out every other possibility of revealing**...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but **by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence**. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from **calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then **preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.

But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for **a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing**. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.

When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this **cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought**, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90

**This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning'** as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

### DA

#### Obama’s PC is high and key to fiscal cliff negotiations---it’s not assured and GOP opposition’s likely but overcome-able

Kimberly Atkins 11-8, Boston Herald columnist, “Prez returns to D.C. with more clout,” 11/8/12, http://bostonherald.com/news/columnists/view/20221108prez\_returns\_to\_dc\_with\_more\_clout

When President Obama returned yesterday to the White House, he brought with him political capital earned in a tough re-election fight as well as a mandate from voters — which means bold changes and bruising fights could lie ahead. ¶ The first agenda item is already waiting for him: reaching an agreement with lawmakers to avert the looming fiscal cliff. GOP lawmakers have previously shot down any plan involving tax increases. Obama’s win — based in part on a message of making the wealthiest Americans pay more — may already be paying dividends.¶ In remarks at the Capitol yesterday, House Speaker John Boehner seemed to acknowledge the GOP has to take a different tack than the obstructionism that has marred progress in the past.¶ “The president has signaled a willingness to do tax reform with lower rates. Republicans have signaled a willingness to accept new revenue if it comes from growth and reform,” Boehner said. “Let’s start the discussion there.” ¶ Obama’s fresh political clout could extend to longer term fiscal policies beyond the fiscal cliff, though don’t expect GOP pushback to vanish. House Republicans still have plenty of fight in them. ¶ Comprehensive immigration reform — designed to smooth the path to citizenship while also strengthening the nation’s borders — also will be high on the president’s priority list. But unlike in his first term, when such a plan got little more than lip service in the face of staunch GOP opposition, Obama’s 3-to-1 support from Latinos on Election Day gives him the incentive to get it done. It also robs Republicans, who learned firsthand that dwindling support from Hispanics and other minority groups is costing them dearly, of any reason to stand in the way. ¶ An influx of new female voices in the Senate could also make Obama’s next four years the “Term of the Woman,” putting a new focus on equal pay and reproductive rights. ¶ U.S. Sen. Patty Murray of Washington state, who chairs the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, told reporters yesterday that having a historically high 20 women in the Senate in January won’t just mean more attention to women’s issues. She said the Senate will function better overall with “great women who have really strong voices” on board, such as U.S. Sen.-elect Elizabeth Warren. “There is no stronger advocate for middle-class Americans,” Murray said of Warren. ¶ None of this, of course, will be a cakewalk, but unlike his first term, Obama will have more power to push back.

#### plan links

Bill Sweet 12, Editor of IEEE Spectrum, a publication of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 3/2/12, “Are Renewable Energy Credits Excessively Expensive?,” http://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/renewables/are-renewable-energy-credits-excessively-expensive

The Manhattan Institute, a public policy research outfit with a free-market and somewhat libertarian orientation, has issued a report arguing that renewable energy credits (RECs) represent an excessively expensive way of addressing environmental concerns and promoting green technology. The REC is a device employed by the 29 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico that have adopted renewable portfolio standards, sometimes with special "carve-outs" for solar energy. Grid participants unable to meet mandated targets for renewable generation purchase tradeable credits from those that can, where a single REC represents one MWh of green energy delivered. Thus, the REC is a means of delivering subsidies to producers of green energy that are paid for by producers of dirty energy.

The REC, and even perhaps some of the purposes the REC is meant to serve, is not popular among the kinds of people who write for the Manhattan Institute. As they see it—and arguably they are right—the REC is a poorly concealed substitute for a carbon emissions credit, which in turn is a poorly concealed substitute for a carbon tax. Nevertheless, the Manhattan Institute has a record of producing serious work that is respected by people who do not necessarily share the institute's general point of view. This latest report, "The High Cost of Renewable Energy Mandates," by Robert Bryce, deserves attention as a first stab at assessing the overall costs to consumers of RECs.

Basically Bryce compares the costs of electricity in states that have renewable energy mandates with costs in states that do not and finds that rates have gone up much more in states that do have such mandates. "The gap is particularly striking in coal-dependent states—seven such states with RPS mandates saw their rates soar by an average of 54.2 percent between 2001 and 2010, more than twice the average increase experienced by seven other coal-dependent states without mandates," reports Bryce. Though he devotes detailed attention to certain states such as California, Oregon and Washington, he does not try to disentangle the precise mix of reasons that have produced higher rates in states with portfolio standards, and nor does he claim to.

Bryce notes that tightening regulation of coal generating plants and higher expenditures on power transmission also have been major factors in driving up electricity costs. Citing figures from the Edison Electric Institute, Bryce says that "member companies spent over $55 billion on transmission projects between 2001 and 2009. Another $61 billion will likely be spent on transmission projects from 2010 through 2021."

However superficial, the Manhattan Institute report suggests worryingly that the costs of promoting wind and especially solar energy may start catching up with policy-makers and produce a political backlash, as we have been witnessing in Europe.

#### Going over the fiscal cliff causes a second great depression

Morici 8/7 Peter, PhD, is a "recognized expert on economic policy and international economics." He is a Professor of International Business at the R.H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland. "Fix fiscal cliff now or face next Great Depression," 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/08/07/fix-fiscal-cliff-now-or-face-next-great-depression/

President Obama and Republicans are engaging in dangerous brinksmanship. Putting off a political solution to the looming “fiscal cliff” until after the election **risks a** second Great Depression.¶ Without a compromise by January, $400 billion in mandatory spending cuts and more than $100 billion in tax increases will immediately go into effect. **With our economy only growing by only $300 billion annually, such a shock would thrust it into a prolonged contraction.**

#### Global economic crisis causes nuclear great-power war

Mead 9 – Walter Russell Mead, the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2-4, 2009, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2

If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush.¶ It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy.¶ All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. ¶ Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong.¶ But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives.¶ So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies.¶ As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again.¶ None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises.¶ Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born?¶ The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

### 1NC CP

#### The United States Department of Defense should offer procurement contracts funded through up-front appropriations for small modular nuclear reactors to be owned by the Department of Defense, and located on military bases in the United States that lack power purchase agreements for electricity generated by utility-owned small modular nuclear reactors.

#### The United States Federal Government should facilitate joint operation and management of DOD-owned small modular reactors by DOD and the Department of Energy, and should remove limitations on per-project allocations of operation and maintenance funding for bases with DOD-owned small modular reactors.

#### Solves the case---DOD procurement contracts accelerate SMR commercialization---spills over to widespread adoption

CSPO 10 – Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University, June 2010, “FOUR POLICY PRINCIPLES FOR ENERGY INNOVATION & CLIMATE CHANGE: A SYNTHESIS,” http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/files/Synthesis.pdf

Government purchase of new technologies is a powerful way to accelerate innovation through increased demand (Principle 3a). We explore how this principle can be applied by considering how the DoD could purchase new nuclear reactor designs to meet electric power needs for DoD bases and operations.

Small modular nuclear power reactors (SMRs), which generate less than 300 MW of power (as compared to more typical reactors built in the 1000 MW range) are often listed as a potentially transformative energy technology. While typical traditional large-scale nuclear power plants can cost five to eight billion dollars, smaller nuclear reactors could be developed at smaller scale, thus not presenting a “bet the company” financial risk. SMRs could potentially be mass manufactured as standardized modules and then delivered to sites, which could significantly reduce costs per unit of installed capacity as compared to today’s large scale conventional reactor designs.   
It is likely that some advanced reactors designs – including molten salt reactors and reactors utilizing thorium fuels – could be developed as SMRs. Each of these designs offers some combination of inherently safe operation, very little nuclear proliferation risk, relatively small nuclear waste management needs, very abundant domestic fuel resources, and high power densities – all of which are desirable attributes for significant expansion of nuclear energy.

Currently, several corporations have been developing small nuclear reactors. Table 2 lists several of these companies and their reactor power capacities, as well as an indication of the other types of reactor innovations that are being incorporated into the designs. Some of these technologies depend on the well-established light water reactor, while others use higher energy neutrons, coolants capable of higher temperature operation, and other innovative approaches. Some of these companies, such as NuScale, intend to be able to connect as many as 24 different nuclear modules together to form one larger nuclear power plant. In addition to the different power ranges described in Table 2, these reactors vary greatly in size, some being only 3 to 6 feet on each side, while the NuScale reactor is 60 feet long and 14 feet in diameter. Further, many of these reactors produce significant amounts of hightemperature heat, which can be harnessed for process heating, gas turbine generators, and other operations.

One major obstacle is to rapid commercialization and development are prolonged multi-year licensing times with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Currently, the NRC will not consider a reactor for licensing unless there is a power utility already prepared to purchase the device. Recent Senate legislation introduced by Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) has pushed for DOE support in bringing down reactor costs and in helping to license and certify two reactor designs with the NRC. Some additional opportunities to facilitate the NRC licensing process for innovative small modular reactors would be to fund NRC to conduct participatory research to get ahead of potential license applications (this might require ~$100million/year) and potentially revise the current requirement that licensing fees cover nearly all NRC licensing review costs.

One option for accelerating SMR development and commercialization, would be for DOD to establish SMR procurement specifications (to include cost) and agree to purchase a sufficient amount of SMR’s to underwrite private sector SMR development. Of note here may be that DARPA recently (3/30/10) issued a “Request for Information (RFI) on Deployable Reactor Technologies for Generating Power and Logistic Fuels” 2 that specifies may features that would be highly desirable in an advanced commercial SMR. While other specifications including coproduction of mobility fuel are different than those of a commercial SMR power reactor, it is likely that a core reactor design meeting the DARPA inquiry specifications would be adaptable to commercial applications. While nuclear reactors purchased and used by DOD are potentially exempt from many NRC licensing requirements 3 , any reactor design resulting from a DOD procurement contract would need to proceed through NRC licensing before it could be commercially offered. Successful use of procured SMR’s for DOD purposes could provide the knowledge and operational experience needed to aid NRC licensing and it might be possible for the SMR contractor to begin licensing at some point in the SMR development process4.

Potential purchase of small modular nuclear reactors would be a powerful but proven way in which government procurement of new energy technologies could encourage innovation. Public procurement of other renewable energy technologies could be similarly important.

### REC DA

#### Energy obtained through PPAS doesn’t count towards mandates that force DOD to increase reliance on renewables---causes renewable energy credit purchases to make up the difference

GAO 9 – Government Accountability Office, December 2009, “Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Address Challenges in Meeting Federal Renewable Energy Goals,” <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10104.pdf>

As we explained earlier in this report, DOD expects to rely increasingly on alternative financing approaches to meet the renewable energy goals. For DOD to effectively implement these approaches, the department will require energy management staff who have the relevant expertise for implementing the approaches. However, because we found that the services and their installations’ staff often lack expertise in developing alternative financing approaches, DOD may by limited in its ability both to use these approaches to develop renewable energy projects and to do so in a manner that adequately protects the government’s financial resources committed to these approaches.

According to DOD officials, in most cases, private developers are generally interested in partnering with DOD in order to sell the projects’ unbundled energy or associated renewable energy certificates to a third party. These officials explained that the generally accepted business model for these types of approaches includes a renewable energy resource on or near DOD land that is harnessed by a project financed, built, and operated by thirdparty developer that then sells the unbundled energy to DOD or other customers and typically retains ownership of the project’s renewable energy certificates.48

However, under such approaches, DOD often would neither consume the renewable energy nor retain the renewable energy certificates. When DOD does not consume the renewable energy, a developer would provide some other form of compensation for the use of the renewable resource on DOD land. For example, in the largest renewable energy project on DOD land, DOD does not consume the energy but instead receives financial compensation based on the sale of the project’s energy. If DOD neither consumes the renewable energy nor retains the renewable energy certificates, a serious challenge may be posed to DOD’s ability to meet the renewable energy goals. That occurs because, according to DOE’s guidance on implementation of the 2005 Act and the 2007 Executive Order—guidance designed to preserve the integrity of the renewable energy certificate market—for an agency to count a project’s renewable energy toward these goals, the project must meet two requirements. First, the renewable energy must be produced and used on-site at a federal agency or the renewable energy must be produced by a project owned by a federal agency but installed on private property. Second, the agency must retain or replace the renewable energy certificates associated with the energy produced. In addition, as we discussed earlier, unlike DOE, DOD has not issued guidance that provides a clear explanation of its methodology for calculating progress toward the fiscal year 2025 goal under the 2007 Defense Authorization Act, including DOD’s definition of “consumption” and the treatment of renewable energy certificates in that context.

#### DOD ownership of the project solves the case and avoids REC purchases

Loni Silva 12, J.D., The George Washington University Law School, Summer 2012, “THE PROBLEMS WITH USING RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES TO MEET FEDERAL RENEWABLE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS,” Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 4

The best way to address the problems with FEMP’s REC interpretation is to render the use of RECs to meet EPAct 2005 and EO 13423 obsolete. RECs should only be used as a short-term, stop-gap solution to meet the renewable energy requirements. 139 The long-term goal should be for agencies to consume bundled renewable energy produced on or near agency installations.

Consuming renewable energy would eliminate the current problems with FEMP’s REC interpretation. First, consuming renewable energy would eliminate the problem with best value because, unlike RECs, renewable energy responds to and fulﬁlls agencies’ actual energy needs. 140 For Joe, the energy manager, the ability to use renewable energy means that he would not need to spend part of his energy budget on a commodity that does not address his actual energy needs. 141

Second, consuming renewable energy would eliminate the problems with transparency and accountability. 142 Because the policies plainly require agencies to consume renewable energy, complying by consuming renewable energy, rather than purchasing RECs, would be transparent. 143 Moreover, because this method of compliance is transparent and allows a clear view of what the Government is doing in response to the requirements of the policies, it allows the Government to be held accountable. 144

Third, consuming renewable energy produced at on-site facilities would further the policies’ goal of developing on-site renewable energy facilities. 145 Having facilities on or near agency property would provide power to the installation in case the grid is attacked or fails. 146 It would also promote the energy independence, security, and sustainability of both the Federal Government and the nation as a whole by developing new renewable energy facilities. 147

Developing new renewable energy facilities on or near agency installations would allow agencies to consume renewable energy, rather than RECs. 148 Of course, not all locations are able to support a renewable energy facility. 149 However, because the policy requirements are agency-wide rather than installation speciﬁc, agencies can build facilities at installations with available land, increasing renewably energy production to compensate for installations where the lack of available land or other factors makes facility development impossible. 150

#### Defense budget---REC reliance doubles energy costs---plan buys electricity and then buys redundant RECs

GAO 9 – Government Accountability Office, December 2009, “Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Address Challenges in Meeting Federal Renewable Energy Goals,” <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10104.pdf>

When DOD consumes the unbundled energy from a project built at a federal facility and does not retain the certificate—as is the case with one of the largest renewable energy projects on DOD land—DOD has two options: to not count the energy toward the renewable energy goals or to obtain new renewable energy certificates to replace those retained by the private developer. 49 If DOD plans to count the energy toward the goals, it would need to choose the second option, since under DOE guidance, DOD would need to consume the energy and own renewable energy certificates in order to count the energy toward the renewable energy goals. If DOD chose to purchase replacement renewable energy certificates, then it would generally pay a higher price for the energy consumed because DOD would need to purchase two products—the renewable energy and the replacement certificates. In short, while alternative financing approaches supplement DOD’s appropriated funding and cost DOD less up front, if DOD intends to count projects’ energy toward the renewable energy goals, 50 DOD generally faces additional costs to purchase replacement certificates.

#### That destroys the budget

DOD Energy Blog 10 – “Making the Numbers: From Energy Goals to Business Cases,” 9/14/10, http://dodenergy.blogspot.com/2010/09/making-numbers-from-energy-goals-to.html

At a time when America is recovering from an energy disaster on our shores, the DoD is taking bold, measurable steps toward energy conservation and efficiency as well as creating a portion of their energy needs from renewable sources. The Department of Defense is taking these audacious measures because they provide for energy security, reduce cost and improve the environment. Oh, and they have to, by law.

In the past five years, DoD, the Executive Branch and Congress have issued dozens of policies, Executive Orders, and mandates requiring the Department to reduce energy demand and produce more of their energy from renewable and alternative sources for the billions of square feet of installation real estate owned.

The Congressional Research Service’s Anthony Andrews published an excellent report (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40111.pdf) In February 2009 on the Departments policies and spending in regard to energy. In the report, there is a comprehensive review of “energy conservation legislation and Executive Orders that apply to the Department of Defense, directives and instructions to the military departments and agencies on implementing the legislation and orders, Defense spending on facility energy over the last decade, annual Defense appropriations that fund energy-conservation improvements, and Defense energy conservation investments.”.

For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005) required “that the federal government offset its electric energy consumption with an increasing percentage of “renewable energy” from 3% starting in 2005 to not less than 7.5% by 2013 and each fiscal year thereafter.”. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 requires “a 30% energy reduction in federal buildings by 2015 relative to a 2005 baseline.”. Executive Order 13423 amplified this stating that all federal agencies would reduce the production of greenhouse gases by a “reduction of energy intensity (3% annually through the end of FY2015, and 30% by the end of FY2015, relative to each agency’s baseline energy use in FY2003).”. So, 30% reduction in energy by 2015, relative to 2003 and production of 7.5% of that energy from renewables.

Here’s where it gets fun. In the same report it states that DoD consumption in FY2007 was 218,062 billion BTUs (BBTUs). It has steadily come down from FY2003 number of 242,240 BBTUs. Based on this report I have done a couple of back of the envelop calculations. By the way, I did not graduate in the bottom hundred in my class, but I knew all of those guys by their first names, so check the math.

Averaging the reductions since FY1999, we should anticipate a reduction of about 6,300 BBTUs annual. That reduction will achieve the 30% reduction required by 2015 in EO13423. That’s only 31,500 BBTUs to go. But the question is – and I think we all know the answer – have we already picked all the low hanging fruit? To compute the renewable energy required by 2013 in EPACT 2005 let’s use that 6,300 BBTUs reduction assumption. By 2013 the total energy requirement for DOD should be 179,193 BBTUs. In 2009 DoD reported that 2.9% of its energy was derived from renewable energy and/or renewable energy credits. Given that, by 2013 DoD will have to produce 7,512 BBTUs from renewable energy. That equates to 2,200 Gigawatt-hours of production. In the past DoD has used renewable energy credits to meet RE goals. With shrinking budgets, this may not be an option. Those same budgets will probably not be able to afford the 2.2 Terawatt-hours of capacity, much less the 31,500 BBTUs of energy conservation.

#### Accountability---DOD REC purchases destroy agency accountability and transparency

Loni Silva 12, J.D., The George Washington University Law School, Summer 2012, “THE PROBLEMS WITH USING RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES TO MEET FEDERAL RENEWABLE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS,” Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 4

The second problem with RECs is that using them to meet EPAct 2005 and EO 13423 requirements implicates transparency and accountability. 101 EPAct 2005 and EO 13423 require agencies to consume renewable energy and neither policy indicates that purchasing RECs qualiﬁes as consuming renewable energy. 102 Rather, the FEMP guidance introduces the concept of allowing RECs to meet the policy requirements: “For purposes of the EPAct 2005 and EO 13423 Requirements, purchases of RECs are treated the same as renewable energy purchases.” 103

FEMP’s interpretation allowing RECs to satisfy the policy requirements violates the spirit of transparency because it provides an obscure way for agencies to meet the requirements. Transparency requires that “government business is conducted in an . . . open manner.” 104 If the policies themselves stated that their renewable energy requirements could be met with RECs, there would be no transparency concerns because the methods of compliance would be apparent on the face of the policies. 105 Instead, the policies only describe compliance through use of renewable energy—they never mention RECs. 106 Yet agencies can comply by using RECs because FEMP’s REC interpretation subsequently allows RECs to be treated as renewable energy. 107 The FEMP guidance allows a method of compliance one would not expect from the face of the statute, and this implicates signiﬁcant transparency concerns. This lack of transparency means that accountability is also sacriﬁced. 108 A taxpayer cannot know from the face of the statute that agencies can use RECs.109 A taxpayer is therefore less likely to hold the Government accountable.

#### Causes foreign policy catastrophes

Norman J. Ornstein 6, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; and Thomas E. Mann, the W. Averell Harriman Chair and Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, November/December 2006, “When Congress Checks Out,” Foreign Affairs

The making of sound U.S. foreign policy depends on a vigorous, deliberative, and often combative process that involves both the executive and the legislative branches. The country's Founding Fathers gave each branch both exclusive and overlapping powers in the realm of foreign policy, according to each one's comparative advantage -- inviting them, as the constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin has put it, "to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."

One of Congress' key roles is oversight: making sure that the laws it writes are faithfully executed and vetting the military and diplomatic activities of the executive. Congressional oversight is meant to keep mistakes from happening or from spiraling out of control; it helps draw out lessons from catastrophes in order to prevent them, or others like them, from recurring. Good oversight cuts waste, punishes fraud or scandal, and keeps policymakers on their toes. The task is not easy. Examining a department or agency, its personnel, and its implementation policies is time-consuming. Investigating possible scandals can easily lapse into a partisan exercise that ignores broad policy issues for the sake of cheap publicity.

### China Adv

#### No chance of war

**TT 11**—official website of the Philadelphia Trumpet newsmagazine (The Trumpet, Taiwan’s Strides Toward China Accelerate, http://www.thetrumpet.com/?q=7808.6407.0.0)

Ma = Taiwanese PM

Ma explained that since people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share common ancestry, they should build mutual trust and dispel their disagreements. Their common culture, Ma said, should give Taiwan and China the wisdom to find satisfactory solutions to their quarrels.

And **the thawing tensions extend far beyond words.**

On January 3, Taiwanese media reported that Taipei has scrapped its plans to deploy its powerful new “Thunder 2000″ rocket system on islands near mainland China. Analysts believe Beijing could respond by reducing its battery of Taiwan-aimed missiles.

Two weeks earlier, Beijing and Taipei signed deals regarding drug development and disease outbreaks, the latest in a **long string of agreements** between the two sides.

On January 4, China and Taiwan tightened their economic ties by implementing a pivotal phase of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ecfa) called the “early harvest program.” Under the deal, China has cut tariffs on 539 Taiwanese products and Taiwan has reduced duties for 267 Chinese goods. By 2013, all of the duties on those goods will come down to zero.

Also on the same day, in an indication of strengthening cultural ties, Taiwan’s Education Ministry announced that the island’s universities will admit their first batch of Chinese students this year.

#### Status quo solves grid cyber vulnerability

Paul Clark 12, MA Candidate, Intelligence/Terrorism Studies, American Military University; Senior Analyst, Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/12, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” http://blog.havagan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Risk-of-Disruption-or-Destruction-of-Critical-U.S.-Infrastructure-by-an-Offensive-Cyber-Attack.pdf

An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are "a high priority target for military and insurgents" and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has "increased vulnerability across the board" (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been "honed over many years of practical application" now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary and specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the electrical grid is also enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010: as a result the public and private sector are working together in an "unprecedented effort" to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).

#### Status quo solves islanding---the military figured out their advantage and fixed it

Michael Aimone 9-12, Director, Business Enterprise Integration, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), 9/12/12, Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk.1

Standby Power Generation

Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission critical activities on base largely through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition, each installation has standby generators in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the generators are primed and ready to work, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power generators and support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

#### DOD is adopting smart microgrids as quickly as possible---solves islanding

Michael Aimone 9-12, Director, Business Enterprise Integration, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), 9/12/12, Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf

Although the Department will continue to maintain its fleet of on-site and mobile backup generators, we are moving aggressively to adopt next generation microgrids. Advanced microgrids, combined with on-site energy generation (e.g., solar or geothermal) and energy storage, offer a more robust and cost effective approach to ensuring installation energy security than the current solution (backup generators). Although microgrid systems are in use today, they are relatively unsophisticated, with limited ability to integrate renewable and other distributed energy sources, little or no energy storage capability, uncontrolled load demands, and “dumb” distribution that is subject to excessive energy losses. By contrast, we envision advanced (or “smart”) microgrids as local power networks that can utilize distributed energy, manage local energy supply and demand, and operate seamlessly both in parallel to the grid and in “island” mode.

Advanced microgrids are a “triple play” for DoD’s installations: First, they will facilitate the incorporation of renewable and other on-site energy generation. Second, they will reduce installation energy costs on a day-to-day basis by allowing for load balancing and demand response—i.e., the ability to curtail load or increase on-site generation in response to a request from the grid operator. Third, and most importantly, the combination of on-site energy and storage, together with the microgrid’s ability to manage local energy supply and demand, will allow an installation to shed non-essential loads and maintain mission-critical loads if and when the grid goes down.

#### No US intervention

**Sollenberger 10**, student at the Johns Hopkins University, graduate Swarthmore and analyst, [Matthew, spring, “Challenging US Command of the Commons:Evolving Chinese defense technologies as a threat to American hegemony?”, <http://bcjournal.org/2010/challenging-us-command-of-the-commons/>]

The advancement of Chinese military capabilities in the areas of information warfare, anti-access measures, and strategic nuclear forces has substantially altered the strategic environment surrounding a US-China conflict, particularly in the Chinese littoral theaters. By hampering US intelligence gathering and communication assets and using anti-access measures, China could delay a US military response to a possible confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. Given the Chinese-Taiwanese balance of forces, which has tilted significantly against Taiwan in the last years, any delay in the US response to such a crisis could allow China to achieve its unification goals militarily and present the US with a fait accompli. Meanwhile, China’s enhanced capability to inflict substantial damage on US military and civilian assets at different levels of escalation has increased the costs of a potential military conflict between the US and China and thus, may reduce the readiness of US decision-makers to intervene in favor of Taiwan – particularly given China’s evolving ability to withstand US nuclear coercion and deny the US potential benefits from escalation. China has thus effectively challenged US command of the commons, contesting US military power in several key areas. By definition, this erodes one of the pillars of hegemony, namely unrivaled military prowess.

### Leadership

#### Plan causes massive IAEA overstretch---only SMRs link---turns prolif

Dr. Edwin Lyman 11, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, July 14, 2011, Testimony Before the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, “An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors,” http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear\_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf

The distributed deployment of small reactors would also put great strains on existing licensing and inspection resources. Nuclear reactors are qualitatively different from other types of generating facilities, not least because they require a much more extensive safety and security inspection regime. Similarly, deployment of individual small reactors at widely distributed and remote sites around the world would strain the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its ability to adequately safeguard reactors to guard against proliferation, since IAEA inspectors would need to visit many more locations per installed megawatt around the world. Maintaining robust oversight over vast networks of SMRs around the world would be difficult, if feasible at all.

#### Tech diffusion’s already happened, but prolif is glacially slow

Jacques E.C. Hymans 12, Assistant Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California, May/June 2012, “Botching the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 3

"TODAY, ALMOST any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion.

Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb. And only one of the six states that failed -- Iraq -- had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years.

International security experts have been unable to convincingly explain this remarkable trend. The first and most credible conventional explanation is that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has prevented a cascade of new nuclear weapons states by creating a system of export controls, technology safeguards, and on-site inspections of nuclear facilities. The NPT regime has certainly closed off the most straightforward pathways to the bomb. However, the NPT became a formidable obstacle to would-be nuclear states only in the 1990s, when its export-control lists were expanded and Western states finally became serious about enforcing them and when international inspectors started acting less like tourists and more like detectives. Yet the proliferation slowdown started at least 20 years before the system was solidified. So the NPT, useful though it may be, cannot alone account for this phenomenon.

#### No rapid prolif---dangerous states are terrible at proliferating

Jacques E.C. Hymans 12, Assistant Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California, 4/16/12, “North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/134657

The dismal failure of North Korea's April 13 long-range missile test -- it broke into pieces after 81 seconds [1] of flight time -- has also exposed the poverty of standard proliferation analyses. In the days leading up to the test, most commentators apparently took Pyongyang's technological forward march for granted. Even the more sober voices [2] evinced little doubt that this test would go at least as well as the country's 2009 effort, which managed to put a rocket into flight for about fifteen minutes before it malfunctioned. Meanwhile, other technical experts regaled readers with tales of the "emerging" [3] bona fide North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile [4]force, which might soon be able to target the continental United States. And there were renewed calls for the United States and its East Asian allies to embrace the "Israeli option" [5]: pre-emptive military strikes against North Korean strategic weapons facilities. The actual results of the test, however, demonstrate that the analysts' nightmare scenarios were hardly more credible than North Korea's own propaganda volleys.

To be sure, a single technical failure need not condemn an entire strategic weapons program. Pyongyang's missile mishap, however, was not a lone failure; it was merely the latest in a long line of botched strategic weapons tests. The country's long-range missile test record [7] is frankly pathetic: a total failure in 2006, a partial failure in 2009, and a total failure in 2012. (A 1998 test of a medium-range missile that had been jerry-rigged to fly a longer distance was also a partial failure.) And its nuclear test record is almost as bad: a virtual fizzle [8] in 2006, and a very modest blast at best [9] in 2009.

Amazingly, the assumption that Pyongyang already owns the very weapons that it has consistently failed to demonstrate has long driven U.S. policy. The Clinton administration's North Korea diplomacy was based on the belief that there was a "better than even chance" [10] that Pyongyang had built the bomb. The George W. Bush administration then ripped up the Clinton-era policy because it thought that the North Koreans had cheated [11] and built even more bombs than Clinton realized. Most recently, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has gone so far as to state that "we know" [12] that Pyongyang possesses "between one and six nuclear weapons," creating the impression that new leader Kim Jong Un could give the order to take out Seoul or Tokyo at any time. Given Washington's blind certainty about the North Korean menace, it is little wonder that few analysts anticipated its latest belly flop.

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted [13] that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb [14]" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### No impact to heg

Maher 11---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

#### DOD pursuit of SMRs sends a global signal of impending U.S. military aggression---turns heg

Terrence P. Smith 11, program coordinator and research assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at the CSIS, February 16, 2011, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations,”” http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations

The report repeatedly emphasizes the point that “DOD’s “’first mover’ pursuit of small reactors could have a profound influence on the development of the industry,” and cautions that “if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies.” The U.S. nonproliferation agenda, if there is one, stands in opposition to this line of thinking. Pursuing a nuclear technology out of the fear that others will get it (or have it), is what fueled the Cold War and much of the proliferation we have seen and are seeing today. It is a mentality I think we should avoid.

I do not mean to say this report ignores the risks. In fact they explicitly say, “We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors.” For example it says,

Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors.

The report also points out that “from a financial perspective, small reactors represent substantial losses in economies of scale.”

These issues, which were briefly mentioned, hardly seem like small potatoes. The reports answer to the issues raised: “making reliable projections about these reactors’ economic and technical performance while they are still on paper is a significant challenge,” and “Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple.”

On the other hand, the report argues, “failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD.” “First, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries.”

Yes these are important issue for a business stand, but I don’t find them to be the primary concern.

The reactors are purely for energy purposes, but in a world that seems to be growing tired of U.S. military intervention, the idea of ensuring our ability to do so through the proliferation of mobile nuclear reactors will hardly quell any hostile sentiment. In addition, it can only add fire to the “nuclear = good” flame. So, while even under best case scenario, the reactors are completely proliferation proof and pose no direct threat to the nonproliferation cause (ignoring the spreading of nuclear tech and knowledge in general), I have a tough time seeing how it helps.

The report concludes that the DoD “should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors.” Since the 1970s, the report says, “in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well.” For now, the plans for small nuclear reactors are “unfortunately,” for the most part, “caught between the drawing board and production.”

My point is, maybe that is where they should stay.

#### Global expansion of enrichment capability is the only way nuclear power can solve climate change---the plan reverses that

Sharon Squassoni 9, Director and Senior Fellow of the Proliferation Prevention Program at CSIS, 3/25/9, “Nuclear Power: How Much More?,” http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=176&rid=2

The amount of nuclear capacity required to make a signification contribution to global climate change mitigation is so large that it would inevitably be widely distributed across the globe. Such a distribution would have particular implications for nuclear proliferation. However, projected distributions of nuclear energy out to 2050 are extremely speculative. The industry itself does not engage in such projections, and countries that set nuclear energy production goals have a history of widely missing long-range targets, such as China and India. The discussion below considers a hypothetical distribution of nuclear energy for 2050, based on the 2003 MIT Study. [12]

Scenario III, shown in Figure 7, uses the “High 2050” scenario in Appendix 2 (“Global Electricity Demand and the Nuclear Power Growth Scenario”) of the 2003 MIT study, The Future of Nuclear Power. Although this is not a distribution designed to achieve optimal CO2 reductions, it is expansion at a level significant enough (1500 GWe) to have an effect on CO2 emissions. This would mean a fourfold increase from current reactor capacity.

The MIT study used an underlying assumption that the developed countries would continue with a modest annual increase in per capita electricity use and the developing countries would move to the 4000 kWh per person per year benchmark if at all feasible (the 4000 kWh benchmark being the dividing line between developed and advanced countries). Electricity demand was then pegged to estimated population growth. Finally, it was assumed that nuclear energy would retain or increase its current share of electricity generation. The least-off developing countries were assumed in the MIT study not to have the wherewithal for nuclear energy. It should be noted that MIT’s 2050 projection was “an attempt to understand what the distribution of nuclear power deployment would be if robust growth were realized, perhaps driven by a broad commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and a concurrent resolution of the various challenges confronting nuclear power’s acceptance in various countries.” A few countries that the MIT High 2050 case included but are not included here are countries that currently have laws restricting nuclear energy, such as Austria.

Implications for Uranium Enrichment

A fourfold expansion of nuclear energy would entail significant new production requirements for uranium enrichment as shown in Figure 8 and possibly, reprocessing. The MIT study anticipated that 54 states would have reactor capacities that could possibly justify indigenous uranium enrichment. If a capability of 10 GWe is considered the threshold at which indigenous enrichment becomes cost-effective, more than 15 additional states could find it advantageous to engage in uranium enrichment.

Figure 9 depicts what the geographic distribution of enrichment capacity might look like, based on the development of 10 GWe or more of reactor capacity. Of course, some states – such as Australia or Kazakhstan – might opt to enrich uranium regardless of domestic nuclear energy capacity, choosing to add value to their own uranium exports. In addition, states may choose to take the path of the UAE, which has formally renounced domestic enrichment and reprocessing in its domestic law, despite aspiring to reach 10 GWe of capacity. Ultimately, these decisions lie very much in the political realm, and can be reversed.

#### Extinction

Flournoy 12 – Citing Feng Hsu, PhdD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center, Don FLournoy, PhD and MA from UT, former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University, former Associate Dean at SUNY and Case Institute of Technology, Former Manager for Unviersity/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications, Ohio University, “Solar Power Satellites,” January 2012, Springer Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 )

#### U.S. primacy isn’t key to peace---their data is flawed

Christopher Preble 10, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, August 3, 2010, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?,” online: <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions.

But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

### Solvency

#### Military SMRs fail---more dangerous and costly than big reactors

Matthew Baker 12, Adjunct Junior Fellow at the American Security Project, 1/22/12, “Do Small Modular Reactors Present a Serious Option for the Military’s Energy Needs?,” http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/do-small-modular-reactors-present-a-serious-option-for-the-militarys-energy-needs/

The speakers at the DESC briefing suggested a surge is needed in SMR production to combat a major vulnerability in America’s national security: possible attacks to the power grid. Such attacks could cause blackouts for over a year according to Congressman Bartlett, leading to blackouts never before experienced in the United States. In such an event the U.S. military would still need to function 24/7. Current predictions made by the DESC suggest that up to 90% of the US military’s energy needs could be supplied by SMRs.

Congressman Bartlett also pointed out that current military bases such as Guam – which is fueled by the transport of diesel – are extremely vulnerable should the energy transport system be disrupted. Fuel supplies are even more unstable in Afghanistan, where one out of every twenty-four convoys results in a casualty. According to Congressman Bartlett, SMRs could make such bases energy self-sufficient.

Unfortunately all the hype surrounding SMRs seems to have made the proponents of SMR technology oblivious to some of its huge flaws.

Firstly like large reactors, one of the biggest qualms that the public has to nuclear is problems associated with nuclear waste. A more decentralized production of nuclear waste inevitably resulting from an increase in SMRs production was not even discussed. The danger of transporting gas into some military bases in the Middle East is already extremely volatile; dangers of an attack on the transit of nuclear waste would be devastating.

Secondly, SMRs pose many of the same problems that regular nuclear facilities face, sometimes to a larger degree. Because SMRs are smaller than conventional reactors and can be installed underground, they can be more difficult to access should an emergency occur. There are also reports that because the upfront costs of nuclear reactors go up as surface area per kilowatt of capacity decreases, SMRs will in fact be more expensive than conventional reactors.

Thirdly, some supporters of SMR technology seem to have a skewed opinion of public perception toward nuclear energy. Commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, William C. Ostendorff, didn’t seem to think that the recent Fukushima disaster would have any impact on the development on SMRs. Opinion polls suggest Americans are more likely to think that the costs of nuclear outweigh its benefits since the Fukushima disaster. For SMRs to be the philosopher’s stone of the military’s energy needs the public needs to be on board.

The DESC’s briefing did illustrate the hype that the nuclear community has surrounding SMRs, highlighting some pressing issues surrounding the military’s energy vulnerability. But proponents of SMRs need to be more realistic about the flaws associated with SMRs and realize that the negative impacts of nuclear technology are more costly than its benefits.

#### No chance of SMRs ever being commercially viable---negative learning means problems and cost overruns will only cascade and get worse

Thomas B. Cochran 12, member of the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council, was a senior scientist and held the Wade Greene Chair for Nuclear Policy at NRDC, and was director of its Nuclear Program, 5/30/12, “NRDC’s Perspectives on the Economics of Small Modular Reactors,” http://www.ne.doe.gov/smrsubcommittee/documents/NRDC%20Presentation%205-30-12.pptx

BROAD CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS ON SMRs

In formulating conclusions and recommendations, there must be a full account of the wide range of unknowns and uncertainties, and difficult questions posed that require further analysis and resolution before large public sums are committed to an SMR industrialization strategy.

The history of DOE is littered with DD&E programs for reactors that never found a home in the commercial marketplace, and thus there was never a return on the investment for US taxpayers or humanity at large.

Our presentation has focused on the sensitivity of the U. of Chicago EPIC model’s projected SMR economic viability in the US context to modest variations in assumptions for industrial learning rates, LEAD unit direct costs, required contingency funds, and the future levelized cost of natural gas combined cycle generation.

But the range of SMR uncertainties extends well beyond variations in this narrow set of modeled parameters, and includes the following 12 issues:

Not all learning curve cost reductions derive from the same source, or occur uniformly over time. They are both time dependent and technology specific, and thus difficult to forecast accurately unless the details of the technology and production processes involved are already well understood. Early in the production cycle, sharp cost reductions can be expected going from the early LEAD units comprising the first plant to the next 6-12 FOAK plants built on an assembly line. But after these reductions, the rate of cost improvements could well decelerate or even disappear altogether, not only because of the law of diminishing returns to further capital investment at a given level of production, but also because “learning” works both ways, sometimes uncovering design or production defects that require increased costs to remedy.

The “negative learning” evident in the highly centralized and relatively standardized French nuclear program, is most likely the result of increased knowledge of, and required attention to, nuclear safety and quality control issues with each succeeding large LWR variant. A similar pattern could recur with SMRs.

Another source of uncertainty is the reliability of component supplier and system vendor cost projections – the well known problem in noncompetitive markets of companies offering “buy-in” prices to the government and any commercial customers to get them “hooked,” in the belief that either prices can be raised later, or costs recovered through the sale of larger numbers of components and systems than are actually represented in the forecast market demand.

Will international competition at the system vendor level help or inhibit the kind of dramatic cost reductions that are needed to make SMR’s a viable factor in mitigating global climate change? If several significantly different SMR designs, each with their own customized supply chains, are dividing-up limited domestic and international markets, how does any one vendor reach the stage of “commoditizing” production of the various constituent components in its plant, thereby significantly reducing its cost?

This process of wringing out cost in the production of components in turn requires reductions in the cost of the capital equipment needed to mass produce these commodity components, which reduction (in required capital cost per unit output) has been the real source of final product cost reductions in the electronics and solar PV and many other industries. What evidence is there that SMR reactor vessels, for instance, will cost less to produce per kilowatt of capacity than those produced for large LWR’s?

Is significant price competition among suppliers of key components, each susceptible of incorporation in multiple SMR designs – in place of a unique supply chain for each design -- also needed to achieve long term economies in the manufacture of SMR components.

What is the evidence for the proposition that nuclear-safety-grade steel forgings, concrete, pumps, piping, welds, wiring, and instrumentation will be appreciably cheaper in the future than they are now, and if not, what does the alleged cost-reducing “learning” actually consist of? The argument appears to be that the direct labor costs of integrating these components will be less, and achieved more rapidly, in a factory environment than at a construction site. But even if this is assumed to be true to some extent, given that the direct materials costs-per-kilowatt must increase when you build five or six reactors to achieve the same output as one large one, what § Marked 17:45 § evidence is there that the required labor-hours-per-kilowatt-of-capacity will go in the opposite direction, and far enough to more than offset the increased materials costs per kilowatt?

What is the evidence that staffing and O&M will be cheaper for six 200 MW units rather than one 1200 MW unit, and if it is not cheaper, where will the necessary offsetting cost reductions be found, such that the levelized SMR electricity cost is within an acceptable price range for future low carbon resources

Are current SMR vendor cost projections predicated on implicit assumptions linking prospective SMR “passive safety” improvements to streamlining and relaxation of current commercial LWR safety requirements that dictate costly requirements for emergency planning , operator staffing, and maintenance and inspection of safety related systems and components .

Could the longer proposed refueling interval (e.g. five years), intended to reduce O&M costs, create new safety issues in certain accident scenarios and actually add to costs by reducing the total energy output of the reactors?

A key question to consider is whether, in light of the above concerns, a nationally-focused SMR DD&E and deployment effort even makes sense. Is it plausible to believe that working on their own, DOE and a few U.S. vendors can development the SMR hardware, identify a sufficiently large customer base, finance the sale, and economically construct a large fleet of SMRs. As we have noted, at least in the near to medium term, the “coal replacement” market for SMR’s seems implausible in the light of competition from natural gas (although this could change over a longer time period), and the capital costs of constructing reactors in the U.S..

Are there national policies, such as carbon taxation and stricter environmental regulation of natural gas, that are REQUIRED accompaniments of an SMR deployment strategy, the absence of which makes the whole enterprise, at least on a national basis, appear hopeless?

To avoid yet another failed DOE reactor development program that spends a billion or more of the taxpayers money and then grinds to a halt for want of any economically rational deployment strategy, the panel and DOE must seriously consider these questions before committing additional resources in pursuit of SMR development.

#### Negative learning jacks the nuclear industry---they’re going all-in on large LWRs now---switching and eating escalating costs destroys them

Gabriel Nelson 9-24, E&E Reporter, and Hannah Northey, 9/24/12, “DOE funding for small reactors languishes as parties clash on debt,” http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3

The industry's future hangs in the balance. A new U.S. nuclear power plant has not come online since 1996, and the 104 reactors in the U.S. fleet are all scheduled to retire over the next several decades.

Already, the government has lent its support to the AP1000 from Westinghouse, a new design for a large reactor that won approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in December, but the design has yet to produce the "nuclear renaissance" sought by the industry. Two reactors in Georgia and two in South Carolina are under construction so far, though more could follow if those power plants are successfully built.

Experts continue to argue whether the small modular reactor approach will really reduce costs, but supporters have won the day for now, and DOE has embraced a statistical model that says the new power plants will get cheaper as more of them are built.

Critics say that is the opposite of what has happened with past nuclear reactors. There's a term for it in the scholarly literature: "negative learning," as one researcher put it when trying to explain why the cost of building a new reactor roughly tripled in France over two decades as the French government devotedly invested more and more into their construction.

"It's an idea. People think it's neat. And they try to think of an excuse for why they should do it," said Edwin Lyman, a senior scientist at the anti-nuclear Union of Concerned Scientists. "But there are a lot of disadvantages. They haven't really come up with a good argument for why moving to smaller reactors would be economical."

To build a large nuclear plant with two reactors that produce more than 1,000 megawatts apiece, a power company now needs about $11.7 billion, according to a paper that Robert Rosner of the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago and Stephen Goldberg of Argonne National Laboratory submitted to DOE late last year.

That is nearly an entire year's revenue for the average U.S. nuclear utility, making it a "bet the farm" risk for any one of these companies, as the credit rating agency Moody's has warned. Historically, most companies that have built a nuclear plant have had their credit downgraded -- sometimes more than once -- during construction.

#### DOD reactors won’t be exempt from NRC licensing requirements---DOD won’t pursue exemption because they’d have to self-regulate the reactors---means the plan can’t solve for a decade

Marcus King et al 11, Associate Director of Research, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, et al., March 2011, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf

The most basic licensing issue relates to whether NRC will have jurisdiction over potential nuclear reactor sites or whether DoD could be self-regulating. Our conversations with NRC indicate it is the only possible licensing authority for reactors that supply power to the commercial grid. However, DOE and DoD are authorized to regulate mission critical nuclear facilities under Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act. There is some historical precedent for DoD exercising this authority. For example, the Army Nuclear Program was granted exception under this rule with regard to the reactor that operated aboard the Sturgis barge in the 1960s and 1970s [44].

It seems unlikely that DoD would pursue exemption under Section 91b in the future. 10 Regulating power plants is a function that lies beyond DoD's core mission. The Department and the military services are unlikely to have personnel with sufficient expertise to act as regulators for nuclear power plants, and it could take considerable time and resources to develop such expertise. Without NRC oversight DoD would bear all associated risks.

The time required to obtain design certification, license, and build the next generation of nuclear plants is about 9 to 10 years. After the first plants are built it may be possible to reduce the time required for licensing and construction to approximately 6 years [45].

The timeline for certification, licensing, and construction projected by DOE for a small nuclear power plant based on an SMR is shown in figure 5 [46].

#### PPA fails

Jeffrey Marqusee 12, Executive Director of the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) at the Department of Defense, March 2012, “Military Installations and Energy Technology Innovation,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Energy%20Innovation%20at%20DoD.pdf

There is an extensive literature on the impediments to commercialization of these emerging energy technologies for the building infrastructure market. 82 A key impediment (and one found not just in the building market) is that energy is a cost of doing business, and thus rarely the prime mission of the enterprise or a priority for decision makers. In contrast to sectors such as information technology and biotechnology, where advanced technologies often provide the end customer with a new capability or the ability to create a new business, improvements in energy technology typically just lower the cost of an already relatively low-cost commodity (electricity). As a result, the market for new technology is highly price sensitive, and life-cycle costs are sensitive to the operational efficiency of the technology, to issues of maintenance, and to the estimated lifetime of the component. Thus, a first user of a new energy technology bears significantly more risk while getting the same return as subsequent users.

A second impediment is the slow pace of technological change in the U.S. building sector: it takes years, if not decades, for new products to achieve widespread use. One reason for this is that many firms in the industry are small; they lack the manpower to do research on new products, and they have limited ability to absorb the financial risks that innovation entails.

A third impediment to the widespread deployment of new technologies arises from the fragmented or distributed nature of the market; decisions are usually made at the individual building level, based on the perceived return on investment for a specific project.

The structural nature of decision making and ownership can be a significant obstacle to technological innovation in the commercial market:

n The entity that bears the up-front capital costs is often not the same as the one that reaps the operation and management savings (this is known as the “split incentives” or “principal agent” problem).

n Key decision makers (e.g., architecture and engineering firms) face the liabilities associated with operational failure but do not share in the potential savings, creating an incentive to prefer reliability over innovation.

n Financing mechanisms for both energy efficiency (by energy service companies using an ESPC) and distributed and renewable energy generation (through PPA and the associated financing entities) require high confidence in the long-term (decade-plus) performance of the technology, and thus investors are unwilling to put capital at risk on new technologies.

Other significant barriers to innovation include a lack of information, which results in high transactional costs, and an inability to properly project future savings. As the National Academy of Sciences has pointed out, the lack of “evidence-based” data inhibits making an appropriate business case for deployment. 83 The return on the capital investment is often in terms of avoided future costs. Given the limited visibility of those costs when design decisions are being made, it is often hard to properly account for them or see the return. This is further exacerbated by real and perceived discount rates that can lead to suboptimal investment decisions.

Finally, the lack of significant operational testing until products are deployed severely limits the rapid and complete development of new energy technologies. The impact of real-world conditions such as building operations, variable loads, human interactions, and so forth makes it very difficult to optimize technologies, and specifically inhibits any radical departure from standard practice. These barriers are particularly problematic for new energy efficiency technologies in the building retrofit market, which is where DoD has the greatest interest. In addition to these barriers, which are common across DoD and the commercial market, DoD has some unique operational requirements (security and information assurance issues) that create other barriers.

## 2NC

### AT: Do Both---2NC

#### base power demand is relatively low, and the reactors funded by the plan would be sufficient to power entire bases and then some---no room for the CP’s reactors

Andres and Breetz 11 - Richard B Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University; and Hanna L Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 2011, "Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications", www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf

Unlike other alternative sources of energy, small reactors have the potential to solve DOD’s vulnerability to grid outages. Most bases have relatively light power demands when compared to civilian towns or cities. Small reactors could **easily support bases’ power demands** separate from the civilian grid during crises. In some cases, the reactors could be designed to produce enough power not only to supply the base, but also to provide critical services in surrounding towns during long-term outages.

### AT: Do the CP

#### Appropriated funds and PPA are distinct

Jeffrey Marqusee 12, Executive Director of the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) at the Department of Defense, March 2012, “Military Installations and Energy Technology Innovation,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Energy%20Innovation%20at%20DoD.pdf

Decisions on implementing these technologies will be made in a distributed sense and involve tens of thousands of individual decision makers if they are ever to reach large-scale deployment. These are the energy technologies that DoD installations will be buying, either directly through appropriated funds or in partnership with third-party financing through mechanisms such as Energy Saving Performance Contracts (ESPCs) or Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). In the DOE taxonomy shown above, these distributed installation energy technologies cover the demand space on building and industrial efficiency, portions of the supply space for clean electricity when restricted to distributed generation scale, and a critical portion in the middle where microgrids and their relationship to energy storage and electric vehicles reside.

### UQ

#### DOD reducing reliance on REC purchases now

FT 12 – Federal Times, 7/22/12, “Agencies buying energy credits to meet mandates,” http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20120722/FACILITIES02/307220006/Agencies-buying-energy-credits-meet-mandates

But some agencies are trying to buck the trend and reduce their reliance on RECs.

The Interior Department said it plans to build more renewable energy projects and purchase fewer RECs.

For example, the National Park Service plans to install solar panels on top of its visitor station at Assateague Island, in Berlin, Md.

“We anticipate a reduced reliance on RECs to meet mandated renewable energy goals,” spokesman Drew Malcomb said.

The Defense Department intends to buy fewer RECs and instead invest money in on-site projects.

“It takes money to buy RECs, and you are not creating any new capacity. You are just spending money to meet a goal,” Dorothy Robyn, deputy undersecretary of Defense for installations and environment, said in an interview.

Robyn is confident DoD will get there without paying for credits. “We are in a position to generate renewable energy on our own installations,” she said.

Pentagon spokeswoman Melinda Morgan said the department does not track how much it spends on credits each year.

In 2011, DoD decided to scale back its purchase of RECs, despite having a goal to obtain 5 percent of its facilities’ energy needs from renewable energy sources. It achieved only 3.1 percent after reducing its purchase of credits from 440,000 to 248,000 megawatt hours, Robyn said.

#### Alternative financing means project developers retain the renewable energy credits---that’s what makes alternatively-financed projects profitable for private developers---means that none of the energy produced can be counted towards the renewable percentage mandates

Loni Silva 12, J.D., The George Washington University Law School, Summer 2012, “THE PROBLEMS WITH USING RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES TO MEET FEDERAL RENEWABLE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS,” Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 4

FEMP’s REC interpretation frustrates the EPAct 2005 and EO 13423 goal of developing on-site renewable energy facilities. FEMP’s REC interpretation requires agencies to retain or retire RECs to qualify towards the EPAct 2005 and EO 13423 requirements. 123 This means that the agency must “hand in” the REC for it to count toward the policy requirements. If the agency produces renewable energy on-site but sells the REC, the energy consumed cannot be counted toward the policy goals. 124 The reasoning behind the REC retention requirement is that the RECs represent the “bragging rights” of the renewable energy and if the agency does not hold the RECs, it cannot claim to be using renewable energy to meet the policy requirements. 125

Though FEMP’s REC retention requirement is logical, it discourages the development of on-site renewable energy facilities. A common way for a federal agency to develop an on-site renewable energy facility is through an alternative ﬁnancing agreement such as a power purchase agreement (PPA) with a third-party developer. 126 Federal agencies frequently use the PPA format because it allows them to develop on-site renewable energy facilities without incurring up-front capital costs. 127 With a PPA, a third-party developer installs a renewable energy system on agency property under an agreement that the agency will purchase the power generated by the system. 128 The agency pays for the system through these power payments over the life of the contract, so there is no up-front capital required from the agency. 129 The third-party developer “owns, operates, and maintains the system for the life of the contract.” 130 The beneﬁts are mutual: the agency gets an on-site renewable energy facility and the third-party developer gets a guaranteed buyer for the energy it produces. 131

Under a PPA, the third-party developer often retains ownership of the RECs. 132 RECs provide an extra stream of revenue for the third-party developer and are often the factor that makes the facility a proﬁtable project for the developer to undertake. 133 Developers retain ownership of the RECs from the facility so that they can sell them to utilities (to meet RPS requirements), private companies (to market themselves as “green”), or individuals. 134 For example, the developer of the Nellis Air Force Base PV array, formerly the largest photovoltaic (PV) array in America, 135 sells all the RECs to Nevada Power for the state RPS. 136

FEMP’s REC retention requirement discourages alternative ﬁnancing agreements like PPAs. Because FEMP requires that the agency retain or retire RECs to count energy towards the policy requirements, agencies that build on-site under a PPA that gives ownership of the REC to the third-party developer—as is the case with Nellis Air Force Base—are not able to count any of the energy produced towards the policy requirements. 137 Without gaining ownership of the REC, or if RECs have a low market value, many third-party developers may be unwilling to undertake the development of renewable energy facilities, and without access to this alternative ﬁnancing arrangement, agencies may not be able to afford to develop on-site. 138 The FEMP requirement that agencies retain the RECs strongly discourages agencies from making these kinds of alternative ﬁnancing arrangements with developers, which prevents on-site development of renewable energy facilities.

Grid

#### DOD is massively increasing efforts to ensure operational continuity---means zero risk of mission interruption during a significant commercial grid outage

Michael Aimone 9-12, Director, Business Enterprise Integration, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), 9/12/12, Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf

Chairman Lungren and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I was asked to address the question of how the Department of Defense (DoD) would operate during a significant outage of the commercial electric power grid.

Although today’s hearing is focused on the prospect of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event, such an event is only one scenario for a grid outage. DoD is heavily dependent on the commercial electric power grid. The Department has two closely coordinated sets of activities that focus on the need to maintain critical mission activities in the event of a commercial grid outage. One set of activities, led by DoD’s office of homeland defense, is part of the Department’s explicit “mission assurance strategy.” The other set of activities, focused on the Department’s fixed installations and led by its Installations and Environment office, falls under DoD’s “facility energy strategy.”

Mission Assurance Strategy

The Department has long had a major focus on mitigating risks to high priority DoD facilities and infrastructure and the critical global missions they support. Toward that end, DoD recently adopted an explicit Mission Assurance Strategy, which is focused on ensuring operational continuity in an all-hazard threat environment.

This strategy entails a two-track approach. Track I includes "in-house" mitigation efforts-- activities that the Department can execute largely on its own. A key element is DoD’s Defense Critical Industry Program (DCIP)—an integrated risk management program designed to secure critical assets, infrastructure and key resources for our nation. DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) work closely together as part of DCIP. Under Track I of the Mission Assurance Strategy, DCIP will continue to update the list of DoD's most critical assets and target them for special mitigation efforts through DoD’s budget and other internal processes.

Track II of our Mission Assurance Strategy tackles the many challenges to DoD mission execution that require external collaboration with partners such as the Department of Energy (DOE), DHS and industry. Given that DoD mission execution relies heavily upon the energy surety of the communities surrounding our installations, Defense Industrial Base facilities spread across entire regions, and on private sector infrastructure that will collapse without electricity, this two-track approach can help meet the challenges to DoD mission assurance that lie far beyond our military bases.

#### DOD’s aware of grid reliance risks and doing everything they can to resolve it

Paul Stockton 11, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, 5/31/11, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, The Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, http://policy.defense.gov/portals/11/Documents/hdasa/ASD(HDASA)\_HECC-EPS\_053111.pdf

The Department of Defense fully recognizes the strategic importance of mitigating the growing risks to the commercial electric power grid, and therefore, the Department is taking affirmative steps internally and externally. Senior leaders are re-focusing some of the Department’s energy security efforts.

Although there are steps the Department can and should take on its own to improve resilience and continuity of operations, achieving more comprehensive electric grid security to ensure critical Department of Defense missions is not something the Department of Defense can do acting alone. Meeting and securing the Department of Defense’s critical electric power needs in an interdependent and increasingly complex risk environment requires a broad scope of collaborative engagement between government and industry stakeholders whose roles and responsibilities in power grid security and resiliency are distributed and shared. While there are maintenance and on-site power surety efforts that need some new focus, for the Department of Defense to succeed in this challenge, leadership and support from industry representatives and interagency partners at various levels of government are imperative.

The Department of Defense is collaborating with the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and industry representatives, namely the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, in these matters. For example, we are planning to develop a combined kinetic and cyber threat-based scenario for the U.S. electric power grid that could be applied on a regional scale throughout the country and be used to support the development of a new system "design basis" for building additional resilience in the U.S. electric power grid. We are also working with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation on planning a case study of a military installation for analysis, paired up with the local utility provider to determine what can be done in the short-term to mitigate electric power vulnerabilities and risks. The Department is also participating in exercises such as the recent National Level Exercise-11 exercise and upcoming Departments of Homeland Security, Energy and Defense sponsored Secure Grid 2011 and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s GridEx 2011.

These partnerships will help the Department of Defense achieve greater energy grid security and resiliency and help mitigate the risks to critical Department of Defense installations and facilities of commercial power outages.

Department of Defense Efforts Underway

The Department of Defense is making organizational changes and capability improvements that address electric power reliability and security issues and that enable better risk-informed decision-making and investments.

This year the Department of Defense submitted a report to Congress under Section 335 of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. Section 335 requires the Department to submit an annual report to Congress on efforts to mitigate the risks posed to Department of Defense mission critical installations, facilities, and activities by extended power outages resulting from failure of the commercial electricity supply or grid and related infrastructure. Congress enacted Section 335 of the National Defense Authorization Act in response to the publication of a 2008 Report by the Defense Science Board on the Department of Defense Energy Strategy, titled “More Fight, Less Fuel.” The report found that “critical national security and homeland defense missions are at an unacceptably high risk of extended outage from failure of the [commercial electrical power] grid” upon which Department of Defense overwhelmingly relies for its electrical power supplies.1

I would like to highlight several Department of Defense initiative that serve to foster improvements in electric grid security.

#### This includes explicit efforts to island bases

Paul Stockton 11, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, 5/31/11, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, The Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, http://policy.defense.gov/portals/11/Documents/hdasa/ASD(HDASA)\_HECC-EPS\_053111.pdf

I initiated a series of regional Energy Security Case Studies in January 2010 to address the policy and technical issues necessary to mitigate the risks of longterm electric power outages to clusters of Department of Defense and Defense Industrial Base sites. The Energy Grid Security Executive Council provides oversight of this effort. The case studies are consistent with requirements under Section 335 of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act and a 2008 Defense Science Board Report recommendation that the Department of Defense take actions to “island” installations from the commercial electric power grid.2

The case studies are an attempt to analyze the impact of an extended power outage and the potential range of feasible Department of Defense and interagency solutions, much like an analysis of alternatives. The studies are intended to help set the stage for defining the size and scope of the issue and to help facilitate the requirements process. They will help define where Department of Defense’s prudent investments should end and where commercial and civil authorities, responsibilities and investments should begin. The case studies approach is designed to provide greater electric power security to a region by separating key elements of generation and distribution infrastructure from the grid as an independent operating unit or “island”. The island would be capable of generating and distributing electric power if the grid (outside the region) is disrupted for either short or extended periods of time.

The first of three Case Studies was initiated in May 2010 in the Norfolk, Virginia region. The Navy’s Dahlgren Mission Assurance Division completed the assessment phase (the first of three phases) for the Norfolk case study on May 13 th . The Norfolk Region Assessment Phase recommended two risk mitigation approaches for operating electrical systems in support of the identified critical Department of Defense missions for extended electrical power outages.

The two mitigation approaches identified include working with the local utility to establish a load management schematic to ensure both critical Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense assets (such as life safety and supporting infrastructure) have sustained stable power in the event the load exceeds available generation. The study also recommends a second approach that separates the mission critical functions, those identified during the mission analysis, from the commercial grid and establishes separate microgrids using an integrated network of back-up generators on the installation. This enable Department of Defense to manage the load and generation within the microgrids, ensure constant and stable power to critical Department of Defense missions and reduce the overall load in the region providing the utility provider with additional flexibility stabilizing the grid and providing power to the community. Pursuing both mitigation approaches optimizes management of electric power for critical Department of Defense missions, supporting infrastructure and broader community needs. There are several potential options for finding a balance between commercially-generated and government-generated power on the installations that will be explored.

#### DOD’s rolling out micro-grids now---they’ll solve current problems with renewables

Paul Stockton 11, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, 5/31/11, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, The Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, http://policy.defense.gov/portals/11/Documents/hdasa/ASD(HDASA)\_HECC-EPS\_053111.pdf

At Twenty Nine Palms, a Marine base in the Mojave Desert, we are demonstrating new micro-grid technology—a system of self-generated electricity and intelligent controls that can be operated independently if the commercial grid goes down. Micro-grids improve energy efficiency, make it easier to incorporate solar and wind power, and ensure power can be directed to facilities that need it most. Most importantly, they reduce the vulnerability of our power supplies to disruption.

The remote base in the Mojave Desert serves a population of more than 27,000 military and civilian personnel who facilitate large scale training and exercises. The austere conditions, limited infrastructure and continuity of operations place a heavy demand on the base’s electrical infrastructure. The California base sustains its mission with over 10MW of power generated on site by a 2MW solar photovoltaic farm, 1MW of solar photovoltaic shading, a 0.5MW fuel cell and a 7.2 MW Cogeneration plant. The base is tying together its disparate electrical infrastructure in an optimal way while serving as a test bed for new technologies through various Department of Defense initiatives including the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program. The centerpiece of the facilities electrical infrastructure integration is being implemented to demonstrate how microgrids will serve as an important component of the Smart Grid.

Key features of the Twentynine Palms microgrid include centralized supervisory control, distributed metering and a secure wireless network to create a self-contained system capable of unplugging from the utility grid. The microgrid is a smart power distribution system that both manages and optimizes the flow of electricity around the base. The microgrid is particularly adept at dealing with the variability of intermittent renewable energy generation, combining it with energy storage and ensuring power quality and reliability. Additionally, the microgrid addresses the demand side of the energy system and sheds loads when needed.

Demonstration projects like the Twentynine Palms microgrid aim to increase energy security on Department of Defense installations, while reducing energy consumption and managing electricity usage more effectively. Many military installations, like Twentynine Palms, will serve as examples of how communities and campuses can develop their own microgrids. Remote communities in particular will look to facilities like Twentynine Palms for insights and best practices.

### Prolif

#### No impact to prolif---every actor has an incentive to overstate the impact

Robert Farley 11, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, 11/16/11, “Over the Horizon: Iran and the Nuclear Paradox,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10679/over-the-horizon-iran-and-the-nuclear-paradox

But states and policymakers habitually overestimate the impact of nuclear weapons. This happens among both proliferators and anti-proliferators. Would-be proliferators seem to expect that possessing a nuclear weapon will confer “a seat at the table” as well as solve a host of minor and major foreign policy problems. Existing nuclear powers fear that new entrants will act unpredictably, destabilize regions and throw existing diplomatic arrangements into flux. These predictions almost invariably turn out wrong; nuclear weapons consistently fail to undo the existing power relationships of the international system.

The North Korean example is instructive. In spite of the dire warnings about the dangers of a North Korean nuclear weapon, the region has weathered Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation in altogether sound fashion. Though some might argue that nukes have “enabled” North Korea to engage in a variety of bad behaviors, that was already the case prior to its nuclear test. The crucial deterrent to U.S. or South Korean action continues to be North Korea’s conventional capabilities, as well as the incalculable costs of governing North Korea after a war. Moreover, despite the usual dire predictions of nonproliferation professionals, the North Korean nuclear program has yet to inspire Tokyo or Seoul to follow suit. The DPRK’s program represents a tremendous waste of resources and human capital for a poor state, and it may prove a problem if North Korea endures a messy collapse. Thus far, however, the effects of the arsenal have been minimal.

Israel represents another case in which the benefits of nuclear weapons remain unclear. Although Israel adopted a policy of ambiguity about its nuclear program, most in the region understood that Israel possessed nuclear weapons by the late-1960s. These weapons did not deter Syria or Egypt from launching a large-scale conventional assault in 1973, however. Nor did they help the Israeli Defense Force compel acquiescence in Lebanon in 1982 or 2006. Nuclear weapons have not resolved the Palestinian question, and when it came to removing the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, Israel relied not on its nuclear arsenal but on the United States to do so -- through conventional means -- in 2003. Israeli nukes have thus far failed to intimidate the Iranians into freezing their nuclear program. Moreover, Israel has pursued a defense policy designed around the goal of maintaining superiority at every level of military escalation, from asymmetrical anti-terror efforts to high-intensity conventional combat. Thus, it is unclear whether the nuclear program has even saved Israel any money.

The problem with nukes is that there are strong material and normative pressures against their use, not least because states that use nukes risk incurring nuclear retaliation. Part of the appeal of nuclear weapons is their bluntness, but for foreign policy objectives requiring a scalpel rather than a sledgehammer, they are useless. As a result, states with nuclear neighbors quickly find that they can engage in all manner of harassment and escalation without risking nuclear retaliation. The weapons themselves are often more expensive than the foreign policy objectives that they would be used to attain. Moreover, normative pressures do matter. Even “outlaw” nations recognize that the world views the use of nuclear -- not to mention chemical or biological -- weapons differently than other expressions of force. And almost without exception, even outlaw nations require the goodwill of at least some segments of the international community.

Given all this, it is not at all surprising that many countries eschew nuclear programs, even when they could easily attain nuclear status. Setting aside the legal problems, nuclear programs tend to be expensive, and they provide relatively little in terms of foreign policy return on investment. Brazil, for example, does not need nuclear weapons to exercise influence in Latin America or deter its rivals. Turkey, like Germany, Japan and South Korea, decided a long time ago that the nuclear “problem” could be solved most efficiently through alignment with an existing nuclear power.

Why do policymakers, analysts and journalists so consistently overrate the importance of nuclear weapons? The answer is that everyone has a strong incentive to lie about their importance. The Iranians will lie to the world about the extent of their program and to their people about the fruits of going nuclear. The various U.S. client states in the region will lie to Washington about how terrified they are of a nuclear Iran, warning of the need for “strategic re-evaluation,” while also using the Iranian menace as an excuse for brutality against their own populations. Nonproliferation advocates will lie about the terrors of unrestrained proliferation because they do not want anyone to shift focus to the manageability of a post-nuclear Iran. The United States will lie to everyone in order to reassure its clients and maintain the cohesion of the anti-Iran block.

None of these lies are particularly dishonorable; they represent the normal course of diplomacy. But they are lies nevertheless, and serious analysts of foreign policy and international relations need to be wary of them.

Nonproliferation is a good idea, if only because states should not waste tremendous resources on weapons of limited utility. Nuclear weapons also represent a genuine risk of accidents, especially for states that have not yet developed appropriately robust security precautions. Instability and collapse in nuclear states has been harrowing in the past and will undoubtedly be harrowing in the future. All of these threats should be taken seriously by policymakers. Unfortunately, as long as deception remains the rule in the practice of nuclear diplomacy, exaggerated alarmism will substitute for a realistic appraisal of the policy landscape.

Economic power not key to hegemony and not zero-sum—competitiveness theory is flawed and the US will stay on top

Dr. Subhash Kapila 10 is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst and the Consultant for Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group and a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College with a Masters in Defence Science and a PhD in Strategic Studies., “21st Century: Strategically A Second American Century With Caveats,” June 26, http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006263919/21st-century-strategically-a-second-american-century-with-caveats.html

Strategically, the 20th Century was decidedly an American Century. United States strategic, military, political and economic predominance was global and undisputed. In the bi-polar global power structure comprising the United States and the Former Soviet Union it was the United States which globally prevailed. The 20th Century's dawn was marked by the First World War which marked the decline of the old European colonial powers, noticeably Great Britain. The Second World War marked the total eclipse of Great Britain and other colonial powers. The United States replaced Great Britain as the new global superpower. The 20th Century's end witnessed the end of the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Former Soviet Union as the United States strategic challenger and counter-vailing power. On the verge of the new millennium the United States strode the globe like a colossus as the sole global super power. With a decade of the 21st Century having gone past, many strategic and political analysts the world over have toyed with projections that United States global predominance is on the decline, and that the 21st Century will not be a second American Century. Having toyed, with such projections, these analysts however shy away from predicting whose century the 21st Century will strategically be? The trouble with such projections is that they are based predominantly on analyses of economic trends and financial strengths and less on detailed analyses of strategic and military strengths, and more significantly strategic cultures. Presumably, it is easier for such analysts to base trends on much quoted statistical data. Strategic analysis of global predominance trends is a more complex task in the opinion of the Author, as it cannot be based on statistical data analysis. Global predominance trends need unravelling of strategic cultures of contending powers, the reading of national intentions and resolve and the inherent national strengths and willpower demonstrated over a considerable time span of half-centuries and centuries. Crisply put, one needs to remember that in the 1980's, **Japan and Germany as "economic superpowers" could not emerge as global superpowers**. Hence global predominance **calls for more than economic strengths**. The United States getting strategically bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan in the first decade of the 21st Century has not led to any noticeable decline in American global predominance. Despite Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States **reigns supreme globally** even in East Asia where China could have logically challenged it. More significantly, and normally forgotten, is the fact that the off-quoted shift of global and economic power from the West to East was facilitated by United States massive financial direct investments in China, Japan, South Korea and India. China quoted as the next superpower to rival the United States would be economically prostate, should the United States surgically disconnect China's economic and financial linkages to the United States. More significantly, while examining the prospects of the 21st Century as a "Second American Century" it must be remembered that besides other factors, that out of the six multipolar contenders for global power, none except China have shown any indications to whittle down US global predominance. Even China seems to be comfortable with US power as long as it keeps Japan in check. This Paper makes bold to assert that **the 21st Century would be a Second American Century** despite China's challenge and the strategic distractions arising from the global Islamic flash-points.

### Unilateralism DA---2NC

#### Only our offense is unique---China won’t oppose U.S. leadership now, but perception of a return to unilateral militarism inspires anti-hegemonic challenge

Larson & Shevchenko 10 – Deborah Welch Larson, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Alexei Shevchenko, Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fullerton, Spring 2010, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4, p. 63-95

Against this backdrop of mutual recognition of status, there is little evidence that China is engaging in social competition with the United States. Some observers have suggested that China is using regional multilateral organizations to undermine U.S influence and alliance systems in Asia.131 On the other hand, these regional bodies are informal, consensus based, and impose no commitments. Most members also want to maintain good relations with the United States.132 China has increased its defense budget by double digits over the past two decades, but its military acquisitions and spending levels do not indicate that it aspires to be a peer competitor with the United States. China’s military acquisitions (submarines, fighter aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles) appear to be aimed at deterring Taiwan from declaring independence and at deterring, delaying, or denying U.S. support for the island. China does not have global power projection capabilities, as indicated by its lack of aircraft carriers or long-range bombers.133

The need for social cooperation in dealing with rising powers is illustrated by tensions in Sino-Japanese relations despite burgeoning economic ties. China and Japan have never been great powers at the same time and have not learned to respect the other’s status as an equal. Since the mid-1990s, Sino- Japanese relations have been embroiled over symbolic issues such as Japanese textbooks’ treatment of Japan’sWorldWar II atrocities, whether Japanese leaders should issue a written apology, and Japanese politicians’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese war criminals are interred. Chinese nationalism exploded with Japan’s 2004–05 campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. More than 40 million Chinese signed an online petition opposing Japan’s application, citing its failure to atone for itsWorldWar II atrocities. In April 2005, news that the Japanese education ministry had approved a new revisionist textbook provoked violent protests against Japanese citizens and property across China. Chinese authorities initially made no attempt to control the disturbances, even though Japan was China’s second-largest trading partner and a major source of foreign investment.134

In sum, China has increasingly taken on a more activist, constructive world role that includes increased support for multilateralism, a policy that has reassured other states, enhanced China’s global role, and increased its relative status. Nevertheless, the United States must remain attentive to China’s status concerns, because Beijing is increasingly sensitive about its relative position and role in international gatherings such as the newly important G-20 and to the U.S. naval presence in Chinese coastal waters, claiming the area as part of its sphere of influence.135

#### Unilateralism collapses the legitimacy of U.S. leadership---that’s the vital internal link to making hegemony effective

Finnemore 9 – Martha Finnemore, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, January 2009, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1

Legitimacy is, by its nature, a social and relational phenomenon. One’s position or power cannot be legitimate in a vacuum. The concept only has meaning in a particular social context. Actors, even unipoles, cannot create legitimacy unilaterally. Legitimacy can only be given by others. It is conferred either by peers, as when great powers accept or reject the actions of another power, or by those upon whom power is exercised. Reasons to confer legitimacy have varied throughout history. Tradition, blood, and claims of divine right have all provided reasons to confer legitimacy, although in contemporary politics conformity with [End Page 61] international norms and law is more influential in determining which actors and actions will be accepted as legitimate. 9

Recognizing the legitimacy of power does not mean these others necessarily like the powerful or their policies, but it implies at least tacit acceptance of the social structure in which power is exercised. One may not like the inequalities of global capitalism but still believe that markets are the only realistic or likely way to organize successful economic growth. One may not like the P5 vetoes of the Security Council but still understand that the United Nations cannot exist without this concession to power asymmetries. We can see the importance of legitimacy by thinking about its absence. Active rejection of social structures and the withdrawal of recognition of their legitimacy create a crisis. In domestic politics, regimes suffering legitimacy crises face resistance, whether passive or active and armed. Internationally, systems suffering legitimacy crises tend to be violent and noncooperative. Post-Reformation Europe might be an example of such a system. Without at least tacit acceptance of power’s legitimacy, the wheels of international social life get derailed. Material force alone remains to impose order, and order creation or maintenance by that means is difficult, even under unipolarity. Successful and stable orders require the grease of some legitimation structure to persist and prosper.10

The social and relational character of legitimacy thus strongly colors the nature of any unipolar order and the kinds of orders a unipole can construct. Yes, unipoles can impose their will, but only to an extent. The willingness of others to recognize the legitimacy of a unipole’s actions and defer to its wishes or judgment shapes the character of the order that will emerge. Unipolar power without any underlying legitimacy will have a very particular character. The unipole’s policies will meet with resistance, either active or passive, at every turn. Cooperation will be induced only through material quid pro quo payoffs. Trust will be thin to nonexistent. This is obviously an expensive system to run and few unipoles have tried to do so.

#### Expanding U.S. capabilities causes over-estimation of our interests---that causes unipolar revisionism and war

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

As the previous paragraphs indicate, a central challenge for scholars (and policymakers) is to understand actors’ preferences and the intensity with which they are held. Morgenthau’s textbook (but not many of his other writings) 27 may have talked about the national interest as though it was clear and unchanging, but one does not have to be a constructivist to know that this is wrong. For all the centrality of the question of how the national interest is defined, our knowledge is relatively sparse, however. What is most relevant here is the proposition, widely accepted if not completely verified, that the interests a country defines as extremely important if not vital tend to expand as its power does. Winston Churchill got to the heart of the matter:

When nations or individuals get strong they are often truculent and bullying, but when they are weak they become better mannered. But this is the reverse of what is healthy and wise. I have always been astonished, having seen the end of these two wars, how difficult it is to make people to understand the Roman wisdom, ‘Spare the conquered and confront the proud’ … The modern practice has too often been, ‘Punish the defeated and grovel to the strong.’ 28

This means that a state’s use of force may not decline as it gains a particularly advantaged position in the international system, which helps explain some of the puzzling trends to which I will turn in the next section. It is not only that such a state has the ability to bully others, but also that the state’s conception of its needs grow in a way that will create new conflicts. In the case of the US today, this effect is magnified by perceptions of both the threat from terrorism and the opportunity to make a better world. Contrary to what one might expect, then, the American position as the sole superpower leads it to behave at least as much as a revolutionary state as one that is seeking to maintain the status quo, often arguing that it is acting preventatively. 29

Bismarck’s famous labeling of preventive war as suicide for fear of death assumes that the war will be disastrous for the state. When it believes otherwise, preventive wars may make more sense, and because there are few guarantees in international politics and fears often loom larger than hopes, it is difficult to put bounds on what acts should be undertaken in the name of prevention. One thing is clear, however: because powerful states are, by definition, in a relatively advantageous position, they are prone to take strong preventative actions. Because they are well off, many changes are likely to hold at least the potential for harm. Modern psychology indicates that losses hurt more than gains of the same magnitude gratify, 30 and states that have gained a powerful position find more values, positions and territory worth fighting for. It is not only aggressors and evil states which find that the appetite grows with the eating. These impulses are more likely to be acted on because their great power gives these states confidence that the costs of acting now are reasonably low. So it is not entirely surprising that the US and the UK adopted a strong notion of prevention in overthrowing Saddam Hussein in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Although much remains in dispute about their objectives and perceptions, there is significant evidence that both governments were deeply concerned, not with existing ties between terrorists and Saddam, but with the danger that they would be brought to fruition later and that Saddam could eventually provide terrorists with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), even if he did not have them in 2003. 31 A middle-level official in the Bush administration went so far as to tell me that while he thought Saddam was sensible enough not to engage in such an adventure, whoever succeeded him might be bolder. To many of us, these fears seemed farfetched and the estimates of the likely costs of invasion as under-weighted as the fears of the future were exaggerated, but at least decision-makers could not have been accused of looking only to the short run, and the discussion showed how great power can lead to great fears and a very broad conception of interest.

## 1NR

### econ i/l

#### Power plants don’t create enough jobs

Tucker 8/16/12 – the author of Terrestrial Energy: How Nuclear Power Will Lead the Green Revolution and End America's Energy Odyssey (William, “Nuclear’s Problem — Too Much Energy, Not Enough Jobs,” Nuclear Townhall, <http://www.nucleartownhall.com/blog/william-tucker-nuclear%E2%80%99s-problem-%E2%80%94-too-much-energy-not-enough-jobs/>)

So there you have it. America’s energy future is a contest between coal and wind. Which can create more jobs? If you think there’s a better option, you don’t have a place at the table. And that’s where nuclear stands today. Sure, there may be questions about potential accidents and the effects of radiation, but the real problem is this: Nuclear is so energy intensive that it doesn’t produce enough jobs to create a political constituency. ¶ Why does coal still have such enormous political clout? The answer is simple. It requires so much mining and transportation of raw material that hundreds of thousands of workers – whole states, in fact – become involved in the task. ¶ There are now 1300 coal mines in 27 states employing 88,000 workers. More than half a dozen of these states identify themselves as “coal states” – West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Colorado and Wyoming just fir a start. The state with the biggest coal reserves – Montana – hasn’t really started developing them yet. Next to farming, coal mining is most widely entrenched resource-based industry in the country. ¶ There is good reason for all this job creation. A1000-MW coal plant must be resupplied by a 110-car unit train arriving every 30 hours. Almost half the railroad freight in the U.S. is coal. Economists say there’s a real question of whether the railroads actually own the coal companies or the coal companies own the railroads. In any case, all this produces huge work forces with powerful labor union backing.¶ Wind energy works the same way. Because each giant 45-story windmills produces only about 2 MW, thousands upon thousands will be required to produce electricity in commercial quantities. This creates a huge work force. The American Wind Energy Association claims 90,000 employees in the wind industry with more than 4,000 in California, Texas, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania and North Dakota. Building out the transmission lines to carry this electricity to population centers will eventually employ thousands more. Wind is nothing if not labor intensive.¶ So how does nuclear do by comparison? According to the Uranium Producers of America, there are 13 uranium mines in the U.S. employing 1635 people. Their annual output was 16, 000 tons of uranium oxide – the equivalent of two coal trains leaving the Powder River Basin (where one now departs every eight minutes). Our domestic production of uranium has actually been suppressed over the last two decades because we have been using former Soviet weapons material for half our fuel in the Megatons to Megawatts program, although the pace may pick up when the treaty expires next year. ¶ Worldwide there are only 46 uranium mines – as opposed to 450 coal mines in Kentucky alone. Recently the Russians have proposed supplying the entire world out of one uranium mine in Siberia. Nuclear’s great energy density has one glaring weakness – there is no possibility of building a huge mining and transport constituencies that can support the technology.¶ Uranium does require reprocessing and there are major facilities in Kentucky and Ohio. But even those hardly constitute more than a ripple in the two states’ economies. Traditionally, the only places where nuclear has gained a political foothold is those states that have national laboratories. New Mexico’s Democratic Senator Pete Domenici was long a leading supporter because of the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, which hosts Oak Ridge and the Tennessee Valley Authority, has now picked up the mantle. But Tennessee is much more involved in the auto industry and there is no “nuclear state” to match the half-dozen coal states.¶ Well then, what about the 104 reactors that operate around the country? Don’t they generate some political support? The average reactor employs about 650 people and is extremely popular in its home territory. Bisconti Research has found that support for nuclear increases to around 85 percent in communities that host reactors. But this support tends to be highly localized and reactors create little ancillary employment. Replacing the fuel rods, for instance, requires only six tractor trailers arriving once every 18 months. ¶ Illinois gets almost half its electricity from nuclear and even Barack Obama was known to say a few nice things about it while he was Senator from Illinois. But most states with large nuclear complexes are equally committed to coal. Even in a state that is highly dependent on nuclear, the work force is so small as to be inconsequential. Vermont gets 60 percent of its electricity form Vermont Yankee, yet its efforts to close down the reactor have generated very little pushback. Vernon, the tiny town of 2,000 that supplies all this energy, is 100 percent in favor of keeping the reactor. But its interests are completed swamped by 623,000 other Vermonters who only get clean, cheap energy from nuclear and think they can do the same by covering the green mountains with 45-story windmills.¶ The only place where nuclear has built a true constituency is in the South. This is partly because of the many military veterans in the region, since a large portion of the nuclear workforce has come up through the Nuclear Navy. South Carolina is probably the most pro-nuclear state in the country with Georgia and Tennessee also strongly in favor. It is no accident that the four new reactors licensed for construction will be built in Georgia and South Carolina. Areva is also completing its plutonium recycling plant at the Savannah River Site. But all these states are pretty much locked up for Republicans and have very little impact at the national level.¶ So nuclear’s weakness is plain to see. It does very poorly at creating the kind of widespread employment that builds political constituencies. It is only good at producing energy.

#### The economic collapse will be huge and last a decade

Carinci 11/2 Jennifer is a writer at Yahoo Finance, citing Jay Timmons, president & CEO of the National Association of Manufacturers. “Economic Shock From Fiscal Cliff Will Last Over a Decade: U.S. Manufacturers,” 2012, http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/economic-shock-fiscal-cliff-last-over-decade-warns-181646611.html

"If we fall off the fiscal cliff, or as I call it 'an abyss' because you have no idea what's below, what our report shows is about a **13% cumulative falloff of Gross Domestic P**roduct between now and 2015; that's huge," says Timmons. "We're also talking about hundreds of thousands of jobs lost or not created, and we're talking obviously about a tremendous amount of investment that won't occur."¶ NAM foresees the impact of going over the cliff immediate and long lasting, with a recession starting in early 2013, dramatically slowed growth into 2014, 10% loss in household income, and up to 6 million jobs lost.¶ Here are the projected annual levels for GDP and Unemployment:¶ 2013: GDP 0.2% / Unemployment Rate 10.2%¶ 2014: GDP 1.0% / Unemployment Rate 11.4%¶ "What I think is most frightening, particularly if you look at what history teaches us about other economies that have gone through this same type of a shock like Japan thirty years ago, our report shows that **it will take the better part of a decade**, after 2015, **to come out of the shock** that we'd find ourselves in."

#### Fiscal cliff is the largest threat to the economy---spreads globally

Morcroft 9/27 Greg is a writer for the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch, citing Fitch Ratings. “Fiscal cliff biggest global economic threat: Fitch,” 2012, http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-09-27/economy/34113959\_1\_fiscal-cliff-global-economy-domestic-threats

NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- **The U.S. fiscal cliff is the biggest near-term threat to the** global economy, Fitch Ratings said on Thursday in a report published online. "While it is not our base case, the dramatic fiscal tightening implied by the fiscal cliff could tip the U.S. and possibly the global economy into recession. At the very least it would be likely to **halve the rate of global growth** in 2013," the report said. The analysts said if the legally-mandated cuts due to kick in at the beginning of 2013 go off on schedule it would trim 2 percentage points off Fitch's 2.3% U.S. GDP estimate for 2013. If that happens, Fitch said the domestic threats would include lower U.S. price and wage inflation and heightened risk of deflation, and the impact on commodity prices. "As domestic demand fell, U.S. imports would drop faster than exports, and the resulting improving trade balance would need to be matched by deterioration in trading partners' balances, causing growth to slow," the analysts concluded.

### yes awr

#### Global war

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.

First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.

Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4

Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write:

The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)

Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.

Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

### 2NC Will Pass

#### Fiscal cliff will pass --- the GOP will cave on tax revenue and there’s potential for bipartisan cooperation with Obama’s leadership----that’s Atkins

#### Their uniqueness doesn’t assume a sustained Obama push which overcomes current barriers to passage

#### Fiscal cliff deal to avert recession likely but not guaranteed --- prefer S&P analysts

MoneyNews 11-9-12, “S&P: 15% Chance US Will Drop Off Fiscal Cliff,” http://www.moneynews.com/StreetTalk/S-P-Fiscal-Cliff-us/2012/11/09/id/463470

Standard & Poor's said it sees an **increasing chance** that the U.S. economy will go over the so-called fiscal cliff next year, though policymakers will probably compromise in time to avoid that outcome.

Analysts at the credit rating agency now see about a 15 percent chance that political brinkmanship will push the world's largest economy over the fiscal cliff.

"The most likely scenario, in our view, is that policymakers **reach sufficient political compromise in time to avoid most, if not all, potential economic effects** of the cliff," S&P analysts wrote.

The automatic spending cuts coupled with significant tax increases in January could take an estimated $600 billion out of the U.S. economy and **push it into recession,** according to the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office's assessment of the fiscal cliff.

#### Will pass---Obama has momentum and the upper-hand

Cohen 11/9 Tom is a writer for CNN. “Obama calls on House to pass tax hikes for wealthy,” 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/09/politics/obama-fiscal-cliff/index.html?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn\_allpolitics+%28RSS%3A+Politics%29&utm\_content=Google+Reader

Washington (CNN) -- Flush with **re-election vigor**, President Barack Obama called Friday for House Republicans to immediately pass a bill already approved by the Senate to extend current tax rates for middle class Americans while allowing a tax hike for wealthier citizens.¶ In his first public comments since winning Tuesday's vote, Obama expressed openness to negotiate with Congress on how to deal with pending tax hikes and spending cuts that create the so-called fiscal cliff facing the economy at the end of the year.¶ However, he also repeated a longstanding demand from well before the election that Republican opponents to any kind of tax increase relent to the will of the White House and the Senate, and now the American people as well, on letting tax rates increase on income over $250,000.¶ Nobody in either party wants the middle class, identified as families making less than $250,000 a year, to see taxes increase at the end of the year when lower rates set during the administration of former President George W. Bush will expire, Obama said.¶ "That makes no sense. It would be bad for the economy," he told a White House gathering of what aides described as middle class Americans. "Let's extend middle class tax cuts right now. Let's do that right now. That one step would give millions of families, 98% of Americans, 97% of small businesses, the certainty that they need going into the new year."¶ Noting the Senate previously passed a bill to extend the tax cuts to the middle class, but not income over $250,000, Obama said "all we need is action from the House."¶ "I've got the pen," he said, reaching into his pocket to hold one up as the crowd applauded. "I'm ready to sign the bill right away. I'm ready to do it."¶ The president also announced he invited congressional leaders from both parties to the White House next week to launch talks on finding a solution to the fiscal cliff, as well as consensus on how to strike a comprehensive deal to reduce the nation's chronic federal deficits and debt.¶ While offering to consider unspecified reforms to costly entitlement programs sought by Republicans, Obama' s initial salvo in what will be a long and tough negotiation signaled **he was unwilling to back down** on the tax issue that was a central theme of his election campaign.¶ "Our job now is to get a majority in Congress to reflect the will of the American people," the president said.¶ Obama and House Speaker John Boehner are positioned as the lead negotiators in a showdown between Democrats and Republicans over the issue identified by voters as a top priority: reducing the chronic federal deficits and debt considered a threat to economic prosperity and national security.¶ Boehner, R-Ohio, signaled a willingness to deal on Friday but also maintained hard-line GOP opposition to any tax increase.¶ "Raising tax rates will slow down our ability to create the jobs everyone says they want," Boehner said at a news conference, noting that higher taxes on the wealthy will hit small business owners.¶ But he also said that "everything on the revenue side and on the spending side has to be looked at."¶ Boehner called on Obama to take the lead in offering a workable plan that Republicans can accept but stopped short of providing details, saying: "I don't want to limit the options available to me or limit the options that might be available to the White House."¶ Asked if tea party conservatives or others in his caucus might oppose an agreement they don't like, Boehner responded: "When the president and I have been able to come to an agreement, there has been no problem in getting it passed here in the House."¶ Obama was scheduled to deliver a statement on the economy at the White House later on Friday.¶ **Boehner's hand was weakened by the election results** Tuesday that returned Obama to the White House, broadened the Democratic majority in the Senate and slightly narrowed the Republican majority in the House.¶ Pawlenty: Fiscal cliff can be solved Consequences of failing to compromise¶ Retiring GOP Rep. Steve LaTourette of Ohio told CNN that a poll commissioned by centrist Republicans showed that voters wanted Congress to fix the nation's fiscal problems rather than cling to political orthodoxy.¶ "They didn't send the same bunch back to town in this election because they love what they're doing," LaTourette said. "They sent him back because they don't trust either side, but they do expect them to get this thing done."¶ While the result was another split Congress like the current session that has become a symbol of legislative dysfunction, both sides have signaled a possible new openness to an agreement that was unreachable in the past two years.¶ In the final days of the campaign, Vice President Joe Biden referred to private talks with members of Congress on the pending fiscal impacts of expiring tax cuts and mandatory budget cuts. This week, Boehner called on Obama to work with him to complete a comprehensive deficit reduction agreement -- the "grand bargain" that eluded them last year.

#### Passage is likely---Obama’s push will get it done---Republicans agree

Montgomery and Goldfarb 11/6 Lori and Zachary are writer for the Washington Post. “Fresh from reelection, president finds himself on edge of ‘fiscal cliff’,” 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/fiscal-cliff-clock-starts-in-earnest-as-election-fades-to-background/2012/11/06/c4dfde6e-27b2-11e2-b2a0-ae18d6159439\_story.html

President Obama returns to Washington from the campaign trail Wednesday to face an epic year-end battle over taxes and spending that could ultimately tame the national debt and advance his ambitions for a second term.¶ The president, who won reelection late Tuesday, must now confront the “fiscal cliff,” nearly $500 billion in automatic tax hikes and spending cuts set to take effect in January that could throw the nation back into recession.¶ If Obama can engineer a compromise to avert the cliff with the freshly reelected Republican House, he could set the stage for progress on other second-term priorities, including immigration reform, climate change and investments in education and manufacturing. Such a compromise could also infuse fresh energy into an economic recovery that has suffered from uncertainty over the future of federal budget policies.¶ “Getting a deal on long-term fiscal soundness is paramount to move forward and to see the economy really keep improving,” said Bill Daley, Obama’s former chief of staff. It will also “give confidence that the political system can address a major issue.”¶ With Congress scheduled to return to Washington next week for a post-election legislative session**, policymakers will have just 49 days to reach consensus**. At stake is the fate of dozens of expiring tax breaks — including lower rates for all taxpayers adopted during the George W. Bush administration — and deep cuts to the Pentagon and other agency budgets.¶ Obama has threatened to veto legislation to avert the cliff that extends the Bush tax rates for the wealthy. After a campaign focused heavily on that pledge, Democrats say **the president is prepared to draw a firm line in the sand**, even if it means letting one of the largest tax hikes in U.S. history take effect on Jan. 1.¶ “Republicans face a choice, and the choice is theirs,” said Rep. Chris Van Hollen (Md.), the senior Democrat on the House Budget Committee. “If they want to drive off the fiscal cliff, that means they want to go into January demanding that people like Mitt Romney get a bonus tax break or nobody gets any tax relief.”¶ Despite the risks to the economy — and the potential disruption to the 2012 tax filing season — Democrats see a clear advantage to going over the cliff. In January, once the Bush tax cuts have expired, Democrats would be free to draft their own plan to cut taxes for the middle class, but not the wealthy, and dare Republicans to reject it.¶ “If you allow all the tax rates to revert, you’re talking about raising $5 trillion over 10 years,” Van Hollen said. “So Republicans will have to choose: Do they prefer $5 trillion in [new] revenue? Or something in the range of $2 trillion?” The latter revenue figure is the target amount set by the independent fiscal commission led by Democrat Erskine Bowles and former GOP senator Alan K. Simpson of Wyoming.¶ Obama’s most recent budget request called for more than $1.5 trillion in new revenue over the next decade, primarily by raising rates and limiting the value of deductions on annual income over $250,000. In the coming days, Democrats say, Obama is likely to launch a concerted public relations campaign in support of his budget plan, continuing his call for a “balanced approach” to debt reduction.¶ Republicans have long resisted any increase in taxes, and conservatives say they will not bend, even if it means letting tax rates rise across the board.¶ “It’s a difficult position to be in,” acknowledged Rep. Jim Jordan (R-Ohio), chairman of the conservative Republican Study Committee. “But just two years ago, the American people sent 65 new Republicans to the House of Representatives. And they said, ‘Don’t go there and compromise with Barack Obama. Go there and stop him.’ ”¶ House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) took a similar stand late Tuesday after voters returned a Republican majority in the House. By renewing the GOP majority, he said during an event in Washington, “the American people have . . . made clear that there is no mandate for raising tax rates.”¶ Still, **faced with a** determined **Democratic president**, many Republicans on Capitol Hill and elsewhere say the GOP will have **few options but to compromise**.¶ ¶ “I love what John Boehner is saying, but **I have a hard time believing Republicans won’t cave**,” said GOP tax lobbyist Kenneth J. Kies. To resist Obama, “you have to be prepared to shoot the hostages. You have to be prepared to let it all expire. And it takes a lot of courage to do that.”

#### Will pass---momentum---Boehner will compromise---PC is key

Chicago Tribune 11/7 “Obama wins but 'fiscal cliff' looms,” 2012, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/chi-obama-fiscal-cliff-20121107,0,7326267.story?page=1

Even before Obama gets to his second inaugural on Jan. 20, he must deal with the threatened "fiscal cliff." A combination of automatic tax increases and steep across-the-board spending cuts are set to take effect in January if Washington doesn't quickly reach a budget deal. Experts have warned that the economy could tip back into recession without an agreement.¶ The top Democrat in Congress called Wednesday for a quick solution to Washington's "fiscal cliff" in an upcoming post-election session of Congress.¶ At the same time, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said that asking wealthier people to pay higher taxes needs to be part of any solution to the government's budget woes.¶ The Nevada Democrat told reporters in Washington he's "not for kicking the can down the road" and that any solution should include higher taxes on "the richest of the rich."¶ The fiscal cliff is the one-two punch of expiring Bush-era tax cuts and across-the-board spending cuts to the Pentagon and domestic programs that could total $800 billion next year, based on Congressional Budget Office estimates.¶ "The vast majority of the American people &#8212; rich, poor, everybody agrees &#8212; the richest of the rich have to help a little bit," Reid said.¶ A **rejuvenated Obama** still confronts a re-elected House GOP majority that stands in powerful opposition to his promise to raise tax rates on upper-bracket earners, although House Speaker John **Boehner**, R-Ohio, **has left the door open for** other forms of new revenue as part of **a deal** totackle the spiraling national debt.¶ "The American people have also made clear that there is no mandate for raising tax rates," Boehner said Tuesday night. "What Americans want are solutions that will ease the burden on small businesses, bring jobs home, and let our economy grow. **We stand ready to work** with any willing partner &#8212; Republican, Democrat, or otherwise &#8212; who shares a commitment to getting these things done."¶ The Ohio Republican is scheduled to address the issue Wednesday afternoon.¶ Reid also said he anticipates addressing the need to increase the government's borrowing cap early next year and not in the post-election session of Congress.¶ Newly elected Democrats signaled they want compromise to avoid the fiscal cliff.¶ Sen.-elect Tim Kaine, a former Virginia governor who defeated Republican George Allen, said on NBC's "Today" show that voters sent a message they want "cooperative government." But he also says the election results show that the public doesn't want "all the levers in one party's hands" on Capitol Hill.¶ From Massachusetts, Elizabeth Warren said on "CBS This Morning" that those who voted for her opponent, Republican Sen. Scott Brown, expressed a desire for lawmakers to work together. She says: "I heard that loud and clear."¶ Obama repeated his campaign slogan of moving "forward" repeatedly in a victory speech early Wednesday in his hometown of Chicago.¶ "We will disagree, sometimes fiercely, about how to get there," he said. "As it has for more than two centuries, progress will come in fits and starts. It's not always a straight line. It's not always a smooth path. By itself, the recognition that we have common hopes and dreams won't end all the gridlock, or solve all our problems, or substitute for the painstaking work of building consensus, and making the difficult compromises needed to move this country forward. But that common bond is where we must begin."¶ Former **Obama** adviser Anita Dunn told "CBS This Morning" that the president made it clear in his acceptance speech that he **will be reaching out,** and she warned GOP House leaders, representing Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin, to keep in mind that their voters also wanted to keep Obama.¶ "Clearly there's a lot of momentum and a lot of incentive for people to work together to really find answers to the challenges," she said.¶ One of those lawmakers Dunn was referring to was GOP vice presidential nominee Paul Ryan, the Wisconsin congressman who said Wednesday that he plans to return as House Budget Committee chairman. He'll be involved in negotiations with the White House over fiscal policy, while keeping an eye on a possible presidential run in 2016.¶ Even though the tea party lost some ground with defeat of some of the movement-backed incumbents, Obama still will have to deal with a large faction of those lawmakers in the House and Senate. Republican Ted Cruz, who handily won his race for a Senate seat in Texas with tea party support, said he plans on compromising only if Obama does the same.

#### Boehner’s relaxing his hard stance

Caldwell 11/8 Leigh Ann Caldwell is a reporter for CBS News. “Top Democrat: Boehner's "fiscal cliff" remarks "a good first step",” 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250\_162-57547214/top-democrat-boehners-fiscal-cliff-remarks-a-good-first-step/

As Washington turns its attention from the elections to the "fiscal cliff," a top Democratic senator said today that he is "heartened" by the remarks of House Speaker John Boehner about his willingness to increase revenue as part of deficit negotiations, calling it "a good first step."¶ "I was heartened, very heartened by the tone that Speaker Boehner showed yesterday in his remarks," said Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., according to The Hill newspaper. "He basically said the president won the election and he should lead. He basically said that he is open to revenues, which many in his own party disagree with." ¶ In a speech on Capitol Hill Wednesday, **Boehner** said he **is willing to work with** President **Obama** and his Democratic colleagues in the Senate **to avert the "fiscal cliff,"** which is a series of automatic budget cuts and tax hikes set to go into effect at the beginning of the year that would alter the structure of the economy too quickly, analysts say. Boehner said Congress should use the pending "fiscal cliff" as an opportunity for a down payment on broader budget reform to be enacted next year.¶ The House Speaker also signaled a slight shift from his previous position, Boehner also said he is "willing to accept some additional revenues" in a broader deficit reduction agreement that included tax reform.¶ "You can't expect the Speaker to turn on a dime in 24 hours and embrace everything, higher taxes, higher taxes on the wealthy, but I think privately that he's seen the handwriting on the wall and it makes me very hopeful that we can do something big in the next month and a half. **It's a good first step,**" Schumer said at a breakfast with reporters Thursday.

#### GOP will cave, but arm twisting is key

Macke 11/7 Jeff is a writer for Yahoo Finance, citing David Lutz, managing director of ETF trading at Stifel Nicolaus. “Obama Re-Elected! Now About That Fiscal Cliff…” 2012, http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/obama-elected-now-fiscal-cliff-135809296.html

Lutz isn't expecting what he calls a "grand deal" but he does think the real horse trading and bargaining is going to begin now that the election is settled. He thinks the **Republicans are likely to give ground**, bringing higher taxes into play, but both sides will give a little bit to push the deadline back, if not come to a real resolution prior to the December 31st unofficial deadline.

#### Reelection gave Obama a mandate---he’ll use influence to forge a compromise

Hunter and Tiron 11/7 Kathleen and Roxana are writers at Bloomberg. “Obama Faces Pressure to Lead on ‘Fiscal Cliff’ After Win,” 2012, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-07/obama-faces-pressure-to-lead-on-fiscal-cliff-after-win.html>

President Barack Obama’s victory positions him to **claim a mandate** for pushing a proposal through Congress that would let tax cuts expire for top earners and avert $1.2 trillion in automatic spending reductions.¶ Obama now must decide how to contend with opposition from congressional Republicans who demand a tax-cut extension for all income levels.¶ Obama defeated Republican Mitt Romney to win a second term that will begin with the same balance of power in Congress: Democrats controlling the Senate and Republicans holding the majority in the House. Republicans were counting on a Romney victory or a Senate takeover to improve their negotiating posture.¶ Emboldened by the election results, Obama “will offer a brand-new plan of his own,” Steve Bell, senior director of the Economic Policy Project at the Bipartisan Policy Center, said in an interview.¶ Bell said one option the Obama administration is considering is pushing anew for a “balanced” plan to cut as much as $100 billion in spending as a deficit-reduction down payment while letting the George W. Bush-era tax cuts expire for top earners.¶ “In the coming weeks and months, I am looking forward to reaching out and working with leaders of both parties to meet the challenges we can only solve together: reducing our deficit; reforming our tax code; fixing our immigration system; freeing ourselves from foreign oil,” Obama said in his victory speech early today.¶ Call to Leaders¶ The president spoke by telephone with the Democratic and Republican leaders of the House and Senate after his victory. He told them the “message” sent by voters yesterday was that both parties “need to put aside their partisan interests and work with common purpose,” according to a White House statement.¶ Congressional aides have previously said that lawmakers in both parties are discussing fallback plans for $60 billion to $100 billion in deficit reduction.¶ Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, a Montana Democrat, said this week that he expected Obama to call on Congress soon after the election to pass a deficit-reduction plan that includes revenue increases and spending cuts.¶ “There’s a mandate for a balanced approach, and that means it’s got to be a combination of revenue and cuts,” former Representative Tom Perriello, a Virginia Democrat, said in an interview. He said he would like to see Obama “put a very bold plan out there.”¶ Taxes, Entitlements¶ Unless Congress acts, automatic spending cuts, known as sequestration, will begin in January and the Bush tax cuts will expire Dec. 31. Obama and congressional Democrats want to let the tax cuts expire for top earners, while Republicans advocate extending them for all income levels. The spending reductions and tax increases, amounting to $607 billion in 2013, are known as the “fiscal cliff.”¶ To help bring Republicans to the table, Obama also may propose “minor changes” to entitlement programs, such as a temporary change in the formula used to calculate annual benefit adjustments, Bell said.¶ “Obama will certainly be very proactive,” he said.¶ A big question is the degree to which Republicans will back off from their opposition to tax increases.¶ House Defense¶ “For two years, our majority in the House has been the primary line of defense for the American people against a government that spends too much, taxes too much and borrows too much when left unchecked,” House Speaker John Boehner, who was one of the leaders Obama spoke with, said yesterday at an election event in Washington. “With this vote, the American people have also made clear that there is no mandate for raising tax rates.”¶ Boehner indicated before the election that the House may be willing to pass short-term legislation to make time for broader talks on reducing the deficit and averting automatic spending cuts over the next decade.¶ “The American people re-elected the president, and re- elected our majority in the House,” Boehner of Ohio said in a statement. “If there is a mandate, it is a mandate for both parties to find common ground and take steps together to help our economy grow and create jobs, which is critical to solving our debt.”¶ Boehner Statement¶ The speaker plans to make a statement on the fiscal cliff at 3:30 p.m. Washington time today, according to an e-mailed statement issued by his staff. He’ll make the statement after holding a conference call with House Republicans to discuss the fiscal cliff and the election results, according to a House Republican leadership aide, who spoke on condition of anonymity about the private meeting.¶ Eric Ueland, chief of staff to former Senator Bill Frist when the Tennessee Republican was majority leader, said Obama “has a responsibility to step forward quickly and express his specific interest in what he wants to see happen in December and then let Congress react to that.”¶ Ueland said Obama’s victory increases pressure on him to reach across the aisle.¶ “While he’ll have the ability to argue that he received an endorsement of his positions, he also has the responsibility of working with the Republicans in the House and Senate,” Ueland said.¶ Some congressional Republicans, especially in the Senate, have said they may be willing

to consider eliminating some tax breaks to help pay for eliminating automatic cuts to defense programs.

#### Even if it won’t pass now, Obama will eventually be able to convince the GOP

Brown and Samuelsohn 11/7 Carrie and Darren are writers at Politico. “President Obama sees voter mandate on taxes,” 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83502.html

If Obama doesn’t sense any flexibility on taxes, he will dust off a strategy that helped him win the payroll tax cut fight last year, according to Democrats familiar with White House thinking. When Republicans refused for weeks to renew the popular break, Obama pressured Congress from the outside, taking his case to voters through rallies, a Twitter campaign and White House events. As their poll numbers plummeted, **Republican leaders folded**.¶ The White House sees room for a similar approach. With the popular position on taxes, Obama could travel the country and **hammer Republicans** as intractable protectors of the wealthy. Once polling shows Obama with an edge on the issue, Republicans will relent, eager to cut their losses and move on.

#### Obama leadership will get it done---Boehner agrees

Sherman 11/7 Jake is a writer for Politico. “Boehner ‘ready to be led’ on taxes,” 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83495.html

With Mitt Romney still picking up the pieces of his battered campaign in Boston, the speaker began readying his colleagues and official Washington that the House Republican Conference is ready to negotiate with Obama to reform the nation’s Tax Code and entitlement structure, a move that could set the tone for months of hand-wringing, but ultimately intense negotiations.¶ And in what’s sure to become hotly discussed in conservative circles, Boehner said he’s willing to accept new federal revenues from a “fairer, simpler, cleaner Tax Code.” Such talk of new revenues may cause some on the right to recoil but has long been a part of Boehner’s position.¶ In an 11-minute speech in the historic Rayburn Room on the House side of the Capitol, Boehner expressed hope about a deal with Obama, but his words also reflect private concerns about being outmaneuvered by the newly reelected president. It was the opening gambit for an all-consuming debate over deficits, debts, taxes and entitlements that will stretch well into next year.¶ “This will take time,” Boehner said, reading from a teleprompter. “But if we’re all striving for a solution, **I’m confident we can get there. Mr. President, this is your moment. We’re ready to be led,** not as Democrats or Republicans, but as Americans. We want you to lead — not as a liberal or a conservative, but as the president of the United States of America. We want you to succeed. Let’s challenge ourselves to find the common ground that has eluded us.”¶ Boehner likened the deal he’s seeking to the 1986 agreement between Speaker Tip O’Neill and Ronald Reagan, and he mentioned the two figures by name.

#### Will pass---Sandy

Bloomberg 11/6 Kasia Klimasinska and Tom Keene. “Sandy May Spur Fiscal Cliff Accord, BNP’s Lawson Says,” 2012, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-06/sandy-may-spur-fiscal-cliff-accord-bnp-s-lawson-says.html>

Sandy, the Atlantic superstorm that hit the Northeast U.S. last week, may lead to a congressional compromise that would avoid the fiscal cliff, said Jeremy Lawson, senior U.S. economist at BNP Paribas SA.¶ The U.S. is facing more than $600 billion of federal spending cuts and tax increases that will kick in automatically at the start of next year unless Congress acts.¶ Congress created the spending cuts in August 2011 as part of an agreement to raise the federal debt ceiling and reduce future budget deficits. Hitting the cliff would probably reverse U.S. economic growth and put the world’s largest economy back into recession, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said on Aug. 22.¶ “Neither party really wants to see tax increases,” Lawson said in an interview with Tom Keene and Sara Eisen on Bloomberg Television’s “Surveillance” today. “Hurricane Sandy provides maybe a mechanism by which they can sort of fall back, compromise, find a way to sort of push the cliff off.”¶ Lawson also said that “hopefully,” once the election results are clear, Congress and the president can reach a longer-term agreement over deficit and debt reduction.¶ ‘Soothing Balm’¶ “Sandy may provide a soothing balm to political discord over the fiscal cliff regardless of who wins the presidency,” Lawson said in an Oct. 31 report. “The hurricane provides cover for both Republicans and Democrats to compromise, avoid the fiscal cliff, and perhaps even provide aid to states to repair damaged infrastructure.”

### punt

#### Kicking the deadline still triggers the impact

Tett 8/19 Gillian is the US managing editor of the Financial Times. “Fiscal brinkmanship is the real US threat,” 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/33d4c42c-e854-11e1-8ffc-00144feab49a.html#axzz243Y6TYSG

But amid all this hand-wringing, there is another, more subtle – but more likely – threat that ought to worry investors. If the first scenario is an unrestrained plunge, then this second is the fiscal equivalent of bungee jumping. There seems little chance of a bipartisan fiscal deal before the November 6 election and it is anyone’s guess whether a deal can emerge during Congress’s lame duck session (before the start of the next presidential term in January). But even without such a deal, most Washington observers believe a reprieve will emerge just before – or after – January 1. Washington might tiptoe to the edge of that fiscal cliff, in other words, or even appear, temporarily, to go over the edge; but if history is any guide, a last-minute compromise will then pull the situation back. What really looms, then, is a period of brinkmanship, stop-start crises and fiscal swings of the sort that might spook even a professional bungee jumper.¶ Does this matter? Diehard optimists might insist not. After all, Washington has experienced plenty of this before. Its structure of government, with all those checks and balances, almost encourages it. Last summer, for example, the federal government flirted with a technical default on its bonds because Congress could not agree to extend the last debt ceiling – until there was a reprieve. In the spring, parts of the government even briefly shut down because no budget was passed. Similar shutdowns also occurred in 1995 and 1996 under President Bill Clinton, as well as in some states.¶ There is little evidence that this brinkmanship caused lasting economic damage. Precisely because it has occurred before, government agencies have become good at coping. Indeed, some officials insist – somewhat optimistically – that the next bout of brinkmanship might actually be less traumatic than before. Democrats and Republicans have now been discussing – or arguing about – fiscal issues for two years, the argument goes, and while there has been no deal, it has clarified the contours of the debate and opened channels of communication. The so-called “gang of six senators” who tried – and failed – to broker a bipartisan fiscal compromise last year, for example, are now talking again in an enlarged group (known as “the gang of eight” or “gang of 40”). That might enable a deal to be reached quickly – if a crisis struck. “Everyone knows we have to deal with this,” insists one senior administration official.¶ **Nevertheless, what makes the current situation potentially more costly than before is not just the degree of political polarisation, but the wider climate of market unease. With business and consumer confidence already low and sapping economic growth, it is a bad moment for stop-start crises**, particularly if drawn out over a long time. Yet, unfortunately, this extended brinkmanship is exactly what markets now appear to expect. A recent survey by Citigroup, for example, suggests that nine out of 10 equity analysts think the US government will deal with the cliff by delaying the fiscal tightening measures temporarily, thus deferring the hard decisions until late 2013. It seems likely that brinkmanship could breed even more brinkmanship further down the road.¶ Perhaps this is better than going over a cliff but, if nothing else, stop-start crises tend to produce suboptimal budget decisions. Or, as Rob Portman, the Republican senator from Ohio, recently commented: “The threat of government shutdowns bullies lawmakers into approving poorly drafted, budget-busting spending bills.” More perniciously, the worse this brinkmanship becomes, the more it tends to erode market trust, creating the risk of an eventual accident that sparks a market panic in Treasuries or other asset classes. As the president of a regional Federal Reserve bank observes: “If you are going to go bungee jumping, again and again, you had better hope that the rope will hold.” Investors – and politicians – take note.’

#### Delaying the deal still triggers the econ impact

[Also AT: non-unique – perception of deal already freaking people out]

CSM 11-9 --- Christian Science Monitor, “Obama talks 'fiscal cliff.' Why the urgency to reach deal sooner, not later?” 11-9-12,

<http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/1109/Obama-talks-fiscal-cliff.-Why-the-urgency-to-reach-deal-sooner-not-later>

Those are the basic reasons. But here’s an important piece of the economics behind the cliff: When a deal gets done may be just as important as what deal gets done.¶ If the dealmaking process **takes too long**, the **impact** of the fiscal cliff on the nation's **economic growth** will be **much larger**, economists at Bank of America Merrill Lynch wrote in an October analysis. "The decision process will matter as well as the outcome," they conclude. ¶ The economists looked at various scenarios for how to deal with the cliff. Going across their grid were three options for what lawmakers might do – resulting in either a small, medium, or large cliff that the economy falls over. Reaching a deal that leaves only a "small" cliff could allow the economy to post decent growth. Doing less to address the cliff – allowing some tax hikes and spending cuts to occur – would weaken the pace of growth. (In all three scenarios, Congress would do something, not nothing, about the cliff.)¶ But here's where the timing issue enters in.¶ The economists also considered three scenarios for the bargaining process in Washington: one in which a fix is fully crafted and takes effect on Jan. 1, one in which Congress takes a multistage approach (delaying most of the cliff for a few months and then crafting a permanent deal in the new year), or a retroactive fix, in which the economy goes fully over the cliff in January, and then Congress attempts to reverse many of the effects after the fact.¶ In the analysis by Bank of America Merrill Lynch, led by economist Ethan Harris, **delay proves costly to the economy**. Regardless of the cliff's size (the small, medium, or large scenarios), **economic growth could be negative during the first half of next year if Congress deals with the issue retroactively.**¶"At one extreme, if the whole cliff is resolved before year-end and the [spending] cuts are modest, the economy survives largely unscathed," growing at a 2.5 percent pace in the first half of 2013, Mr. Harris and his team write. "At the other extreme, going over the Cliff for two months ... results in a mild recession," even if a medium-size effort to reduce the cliff is enacted retroactively.¶ Taking **no action at all would be even worse**, many economists say. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that unemployment would jump to 9.1 percent next year in that case.¶ The coming changes to fiscal policy can affect the economy in a few important ways.¶ First, even before the cliff arrives **there's an uncertainty factor** that can delay things like business hiring, investment, and even consumer spending. So far, it appears that a potential end of Bush-era tax rates has not caused consumers to adjust their behavior much. But **that could change if going "over the cliff" starts to appear likely.** Businesses may have already started adjusting their behavior, wary of a slowdown in the economy in the new year.

#### Punting collapses the economy---market perception---specifically triggers debt downgrade

Barno 11/7— retired Lieutenant General of the United States Army. Master’s in National Security and Strategic Studies from Georgetown University—Dr. Nora Bensahel is Deputy Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security—AND Joel Smith and Jacob Stokes; Research Assistants at the Center for a New American Security (Brace Yourself, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/07/brace\_yourself?page=full)

However, the effects of a delay would differ from those of a grand bargain in one significant regard: **the potential market reaction**. Financial markets may react poorly if the deficit reduction measures enacted in the Budget Control Act of 2011 are delayed without having reached a bigger deal, because it would signal that Washington lacks the political will to solve its fiscal problems. Both Fitch Ratings and Moody's Investor Services have warned of a **credit downgrade** if Congress and the president do not reach an agreement that prevents the country from going off the fiscal cliff, increases the U.S. debt ceiling, and creates a plan for reducing the budget deficit and stabilizing the federal debt. As former Senators Sam Nunn and Pete Domenici wrote in October, "Absent more constructive action, simply postponing when we go over the cliff could hurt business confidence, worry investors and lead to another disruptive debate over raising the debt ceiling."

**That collapses the global economy**

**Goldwein 11** (Marc, senior policy analyst for the fiscal policy program at the New America Foundation and former Associate Director of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Atlantic, 8/11, Drawing a AAA-Road Map for Post-Downgrade America, <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/08/drawing-a-aaa-road-map-for-post-downgrade-america/243463/>)

Rather than going up, interest rates have actually fallen a bit since the rating downgrade. This is not inconsistent with what has happened to other AAA-downgraded countries, where interest rate effects have generally been quite small. ... Okay, Panic a Little If rating downgrades don't augur immediate crises, they tend to indicate trouble on the horizon. Of the 10 other countries that have been downgraded from AAA, eight experienced further downgrades and five have still never recovered their AAA rating. Deeper downgrades have been associated with interest rate spikes, and the fact that both S&P and Moody's have us on a negative outlook suggests that more downgrades could be in our future. What are the consequences of **further downgrades?** The most direct one could be higher interest rates, as investors insist on a risk premium. Even a 0.1 percent increase in interest rates would mean an additional $130 billion in government spending on interest over the next 10 years that we would have to offset in hiring taxes or fewer investments to meet the same debt goal. A 0.7% increase in interest rates would be enough to erase all of the gains from the recent debt deal. In addition, higher interest rates could reverberate throughout the market, impacting everything from mortgages to small business loans - and ultimately leading to something economists call "crowd out," where fewer dollars go into growth-driving investments. The biggest concern, though, should be that these **rating downgrades could advance the day of a fiscal crisis.** Atsome point, if we don't make some changes, **investors will lose confidence** in our nation's ability to make good on its debt. When that occurs, it is possible we could experience a global economic crisis akin to the financial crisis of 2009, **except with no one available to bail out the U.S.** government. It's Not About the Money The United States has a higher burden of gross debt than any other AAA-rated country in the world. We're also the only country besides Finland to expect our debt share to grow through 2016. Our entitlement programs are growing uncontrollably as a result of an aging population and rapid health care cost growth - structural problems that make it difficult to deal with our debt.

### thumpers

just lists things on the agenda --- our 1nc ev says it’s his top priority

#### Obama’s investing his PC in fiscal cliff now---it’s top of the docket

Kumar 11/9 Nikhil is a writer at The Independent. “President Obama's first business of new term: avert a fiscal cliff,” 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/president-obamas-first-business-of-new-term-avert-a-fiscal-cliff-8301360.html

Fresh from an electoral triumph, President **Obama began to spend some of his newly-accumulated political capital** last night with a public call for Congress to avert the looming "fiscal cliff".¶ Flanked by Vice-President Joe Biden in the East Room of The White House, the President said: "Now that those of us on the campaign trail have had a chance to get a little sleep, it's time to get back to work... The American people vote for action, not for politics as usual."¶ He added: "**I've put forward a detailed plan** that allows us to make... investments while reducing our deficit by $4 trillion over the next decade."¶ While he went on to signal his openness to compromise, and to new ideas, Mr Obama, well aware of election exit polls that showed most Americans agreed with the imposition of a greater burden on the better-off, dealt head-on with the Republican opposition to higher taxes on those earning more than $250,000-a-year (£157,000).

#### It’s top of the agenda---nothing else comes before it

Espo 11/8 David is a writer for the Associated Press. “AVERTING ‘FISCAL CLIFF’ MOVES TO TOP OF AGENDA,” 2012, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:6H1SIjsXWsoJ:www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/nov/08/tp-averting-fiscal-cliff-moves-to-top-of-agenda/+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

AVERTING ‘FISCAL CLIFF’ MOVES TO TOP OF AGENDA¶ WASHINGTON — One day after a bruising, mixed-verdict election, President Barack Obama and Republican House Speaker John Boehner both pledged Wednesday to seek a compromise to avert looming spending cuts and tax increases that threaten to plunge the economy back into recession.¶ Added Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev.: “Of course” an agreement is possible.¶ While all three men spoke in general terms, Boehner stressed that Republicans would be willing to accept higher tax revenue under the right conditions as part of a more sweeping attempt to reduce deficits and restore the economy to full health.¶ While the impending “fiscal cliff” **dominates** the postelection agenda, the president and Republicans have other concerns, too.¶ Obama is looking ahead to top-level personnel changes in a second term, involving three powerful Cabinet portfolios at a minimum.¶ And Republicans are heading into a season of potentially painful reflection after losing the presidency in an economy that might have proved Obama’s political undoing. They also have fallen deeper into the Senate minority after the second election in a row in which they lost potentially winnable races by fielding candidates with views that voters evidently judged too extreme.

#### Fiscal cliff comes before anything else

Pace 11/8 Julie is a writer for the Associated Press. “Change coming to Obama’s team, but first priority is ‘fiscal cliff’,” 2012, http://durangoherald.com/article/20121108/NEWS03/121109559/-1/s

Big changes are coming to President Barack Obama’s administration – just not right away.¶ **The White House is making the nation’s high-stakes fiscal crisis its top priority coming out of the election,** underscoring the vital importance of averting severe year-end tax increases and spending cuts, not just for the economy but in setting the tone for Obama’s second term.

#### It’s top of the docket

Neibauer 11/7 Michael is a staff reporter at the Washington Business Journal. “Attention turns to sequestration in lame duck,” 2012, http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/blog/fedbiz\_daily/2012/11/attention-turns-to-sequestration-in.html

For President Barack Obama, there’s no time for a second honeymoon. **His attention, and that of Congress, will turn immediately to the awaiting fiscal crisis,** which threatens Virginia, D.C. and Maryland with the loss of 450,000 jobs and tens of billions of dollars of labor income.¶ The 2011 Budget Control Act, aka sequestration, will take effect Jan. 2 unless a deal is reached beforehand. It calls for $1.2 trillion in federal cuts over 10 years — $110 billion the first year — split evenly between defense and nondefense spending. Toss in the Dec. 31 expiration of the Bush-era tax cuts, and you’ve got the “fiscal cliff” many experts say will topple the economy.

### PC Key

#### PC is key

Gotlieb and Kergin 11/7 Allan and Michael are writers for The Globe and Mail. “America’s cliff is Canada’s priority,” 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/the-us-electorate-has-spoken-sort-of/article5032433/

President Barack Obama has eked out a slim popular vote majority. This slender margin is not reflected in his somewhat stronger numbers in the Electoral College, an 18th-century holdover that brought George W. Bush to power in 2000 despite Al Gore's 545,000 plurality.¶ Interesting to the political scientist, perhaps, but more worrying for Canadians seeking concerted governance from their southern neighbour is the split in Congress between the Senate and the House of Representatives. The narrow Democratic majority in the Senate mirrors the divide with the stronger Republican House majority that has bedevilled Washington over the past two years and prevented any progress toward confronting the crippling U.S. deficit overhang.¶ Which brings us to the edge of the Congress mandated "fiscal cliff": dramatic rises in taxes, accompanied by large cuts in expenditures, half of which come from national defence. Termed a "suicide pact," and never intended to be implemented, Congress passed legislation designed to force reluctant politicians to make tough budget choices. This fiscal “abyss” arrives Jan. 1, unless Mr. **Obama can use his replenished political capital to muscle a compromise with the lame-duck Congress.**

#### Obama’s pushing and he needs to arm twist Congress---everyone agrees

Davis 11/7 Julie and Mike Dorning. “Obama Success on Fiscal Cliff May Hinge on Congress Ties,” 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-07/obama-success-on-fiscal-cliff-may-hinge-on-better-congress-ties

President Barack Obama, his re- election victory sealed, is reaching out to congressional leaders to revive bipartisan deficit-reduction negotiations whose failure was a defining disappointment of his first term.¶ **His chances of success, say Republicans and Democrats, depend on Obama’s willingness** in his second term **to build a rapport he has lacked with lawmakers** from both parties and **take a stronger role** than he has to date in steering negotiations on sweeping changes to entitlements, taxes and spending.¶ “He’s simply going to have to take a more active and forceful role,” said Democratic strategist Jim Manley, a former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada. “He never got involved in the nitty-gritty of the legislative process. In light of the hyper-partisanship that still surrounds Capitol Hill, he’s going to have to change, and he’s going to have to take more of a lead in breaking the logjam.”¶ There are already indications that Obama is ready to do so. The president, who said in his Nov. 6 victory speech that he was “looking forward to reaching out and working with leaders of both parties to meet the challenges we can only solve together,” spoke yesterday by telephone with the top congressional Democratic and Republican leaders of the House and Senate.

#### Capital’s key to deal success --- compromise is possible

JIM MCTAGUE 11-10, “Obama and the Cliff: What He Can Do Now,” 11-10-12, <http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748703728004578105080119247220.html?mod=BOL_twm_fs#articleTabs_article%3D1>

Winning re-election may have been the easy part. President Barack Obama now faces the monumental task of working with GOP leaders and a gridlocked Congress to avoid the looming fiscal cliff. Can he pull it off? While a short-term fix looks entirely doable, a real solution will require the president to change some of his ways.¶ For starters, Obama must stand up for his positions and not leave as much to Congress as he did with other major legislation, including the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation and his own economic-stimulus package. The latter plan was the most glaring example of his tendency to punt, with Congress turning it into little more than a pork package.¶ It's time to be a true leader. "Almost every big decision ever made in Washington has started with executive leadership," says former Michigan Governor John Engler, president of the powerful Business Roundtable.¶ To succeed, Engler and others say, the president will need both a detailed deficit-cutting plan and the determination to sway both parties in Congress. ¶ There were signs last week that both the president and House Speaker John Boehner were ready to put aside some partisan differences and steer clear of the cliff, the year-end combination of tax hikes and spending cuts that threaten the economy.¶ Both talked about compromise. Boehner acknowledged that the federal government needs more revenue to reduce its mountain of debt. Obama said that he was open to new ideas and would meet with leaders of both parties to get some.

### AT: Agencies Don’t Link

doesn’t assume RECs which are perceived as Obama pushing a Cap and trade in disguise---means he uniquely gets blamed

#### Agencies don’t shield and no risk of a turn---Obama is velcro and will only get blamed---no credit

**Nicholas & Hook 10** Peter and Janet, Staff Writers---LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack **Obama is made of Velcro.¶** Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become **ensnared in blame**.¶ Hoping to **better insulate Obama**, White House aides have sought to **give other Cabinet officials a higher profile** and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public.¶ **But Obama remains the colossus of his administration** — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.¶ The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape¶ What's **not sticking to Obama** is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. **Political dividends** from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill **have been fleeting**.¶ Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll.¶ "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations."¶ Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate while seeming above the fray in his own administration.¶ Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of his administration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants.¶ Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he reminded Americans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug the hole.¶ "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said.¶ But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what government could accomplish.¶ Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal."¶ Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise.¶ A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus of the White House for a full year.¶ At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improved lives in concrete ways.¶ Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shape and more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross domestic product would be about 6.5% lower.¶ Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when something bad doesn't materialize.¶ Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in.¶ "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit.¶ **Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible**. Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. **Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss**.¶ But **the Obama administration is about one man**. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. **No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate**. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end.¶ So, **more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him**. He has opined on virtually everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding.¶ Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday, he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times.¶ "Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said in an interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen."¶ A new White House strategy is to forgo talk of big policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestible pieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller parts that may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions.¶ But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda.

#### Obama will be blamed for agency action

Wallison 3 Resident Fellow @ A.E.I. “A Power Shift No One Noticed”, AEI Online, 1-1, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15652/pub\_detail.asp

To be sure, the president had appointed the chairman and the other members of the SEC, but that in itself would not make him blameworthy unless one assumed that he was also directly responsible for how the SEC acted before, and after, the scandals erupted. That is the nub of the important but largely unnoticed change that has occurred: the unchallenged assumption on the part of **all parties**--in Congress, in the media, among the public, and even in the White House itself--that the president was **fully accountable for an agency** that has always been viewed as independent.¶ The significance of this change in the grand government scheme of things can **hardly be overstated**. Without legislation or judicial decision, the president has suddenly become **electorally responsible** for the decisions of bodies that were considered to be within the special purview of Congress, susceptible only to congressional policy direction. Of course, this functional revolution did not give the president any new powers with respect to the independent regulatory agencies. But the **die is now cast**. The way the American people look at the president's responsibilities apparently is changing, and that will affect the **attitude of Congress**. If the American people believe that the president should be responsible for the actions of the SEC, it will be **difficult to convince them otherwise**. Significantly, since Harvey Pitt's resignation as SEC chairman in November, the media have routinely referred to the president's choice to head the SEC, investment banker William H. Donaldson, as a member of the Bush "economic team."

### AT: Intrinsicness

#### The disad is intrinsic---announcement of the plan necessarily would cause backlash.

#### ci you’re a policy analyst deciding to do the plan --- proves it is intrinsic b/c FG not in your ambit means that pol costs are relevant

#### Intrinsicness is a voting issue---makes the aff a moving target and kills all neg link ground because the USFG could take action to solve almost any disad.

**Politics disads are good:**

* **Key to current events education that’s useful immediately and promotes political engagement**
* **They’re a vital neg generic on this topic because there’s no limiting word in the resolution**
* **Most real world---politicians must always assess political consequences of advocating any bill---the real inherent barrier to the plan is political opposition**

#### Counter-interpretation---they get topical intrinsicness---otherwise they’ve proven the resolution insufficient which means you still vote negative.