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#### The central question of the debate is how we respond to anxiety---energy production is a dangerous palliative that gives us the allusion of control by affirming our mastery over nature and distracting us from our consumptive practices---ensures serial policy-failure

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Why psychoanalysis? On the face of it, it seems frankly irrelevant. Surely it is the basic sciences of geology, ecology, biology, and climatology that we need, combined with various hi-tech engineering? Yes and no. The science informing us of the risks and possible technical solutions has run far ahead of our psychological state. We are not yet at the point emotionally of being able to clearly grasp the threat, and act accordingly. We need to ask why this issue, despite its current prominence, fails to ignite people's motivation for the major changes science tells us is necessary. This concerns not only the 'public' but the academy and the psychoanalytic community. In spite of the fact that Harold Searles was already writing in 1960 that psychoanalysts need to acknowledge the psychological importance of the non-human environment, until very recently his colleagues have almost entirely ignored him.

In this section we explore some of the theories with which we may be able to construct a psychoanalysis of ecology. Fuller elaboration will involve incorporating approaches from the sciences of complexity and ecology, and Deleuze and Guattari's 'geophilosophy' or 'ecosophy', which itself emerged in critical dialogue with psychoanalysis and complexity theory. However, we first need to explore the ecological potential within psychoanalysis itself, as without the latter's methods and theories for unmasking hidden motivations and phantasies, this investigation will not be able to proceed.

Renee Lertzman (2008), one of the first psychoanalytically informed social scientists to engage with the ecological crisis, describes a common surreal aspect of our everyday responses to 'eco-anxiety', the experience of flipping through a newspaper and being suddenly confronted with:

the stop-dead-in-your-tracks, bone-chilling kind of ecological travesties taking place around our planet today ... declining honey bees, melting glaciers, plastics in the sea, or the rate of coal plants being built in China each second. But how many of us actually do stop dead in our tracks? Have we become numb? ... if so, how can we become more awake and engaged to what is happening?

Environmental campaigners have become increasingly frustrated and pessimistic. Even as their messages spread further and further, and as scientists unite around their core concerns, there is an alarming gap between increasingly firm evidence and public response. The fact that oil companies donate millions to climate 'sceptic' groups doesn't help (Vidal 2010). Nor does the fact that eight European companies which are together responsible for 5-10 per cent of the emissions covered in the EU emissions trading system (Bayet, BASF, BP, GDF Suez, ArcelorMittal, Lafarge, E.ON, and Solvay) gave $306,100 to senatorial candidates in the 2010 United States midterm elections who either outright deny climate change ($107,200) or pledge they will block all climate change legislation ($240,200), with the most flagrant deniers getting the most funds (Goldenberg 2010; Climate Action Network 2010). These are the same companies that campaign against EU targets of 30 per cent reductions in emissions using current inaction in the United States as a justification, while claiming their official policy is that climate change is a major threat and they are committed to doing all they can to help in the common cause of dealing with the danger (for the full report see Climate Action Network 2010).

Recent opinion polls show climate scepticism is on the rise in the UK as well. In February 2010 a BBC-commissioned poll by Populus (BBC 2010a, 2010b) of 1,001 adults found that 25 per cent didn't think global warming was happening, a rise of 8 per cent since a similar poll in November 2009. Belief that climate change was real fell from 83 per cent to 75 per cent, while only 26 per cent believed climate change was established as largely man-made compared with 41 per cent in November. A third of those agreeing climate change was real felt consequences had been exaggerated (up from a fifth) while the number of those who felt risks had been understated fell from 38 per cent to 25 per cent (see Figure 3). According to Populus director M. Simmonds, 'it is very unusual ... to see such a dramatic shift in opinion in such a short period ... The British public are sceptical about man's contribution to climate change and becoming more so' (BBC 2010a).

Most remarkable here is the discrepancy between public and expert opinion. According to the chief scientific advisor at the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Professor Robert Watson: 'Action is urgently needed ... We need the public to understand that climate change is serious so they will change their habits and help us move towards a low-carbon economy.' Why this shift? Whilst the poll took place with the background of heavy snow and blizzards in the UK, always a convenient backdrop to climate sceptic jokes, the BBC (2010a) article focused on a high-profile story concerning stolen emails alleging scientific malpractice at the University of East Anglia (UEA). While this was a very serious accusation, no mainstream scientific body seriously imagines it changes in any real way the overall science, and yet this is not how the public perceived it.

Subsequently, the UK Parliament's Commons Science and Technology Committee completed its investigation into the case (BBC 2010c). The MPs' committee concluded there was no evidence that UEA's Professor Phil Jones had manipulated data, or tried 'to subvert the peer review process' and that 'his reputation, and that of his climate research unit, remained intact' (BBC

2010c). The report noted that 'it is not standard practice in climate science to publish the raw data and the computer code in academic papers' and that 'much of the data that critics claimed Prof Jones has hidden, was in fact already publicly available' (BBC 2010c) but called strongly for a greater culture of transparency in science. The report concluded that it 'found no reason in this unfortunate episode to challenge the scientific consensus that global warming is happening and is induced by human activity' (BBC 2010c).

This story was followed closely by another in January 2010 when the IPCC admitted a mistake concerning the timetable of Himalayan glacial melting. In such a lengthy report of over 3 000 pages, produced from the combined efforts of the world scientific community on a topic with as many variables as climate change, it is unsurprising some estimates need revising. Undoubtably there will be more revisions in the future, some major. It is important to emphasize that for the world's scientists the overall picture has not been affected, but public perception is completely different, with triumphant claims of proof 'it is all made up'. No doubt many sceptics will use the Parliamentary committee's report as further evidence of an institutional cover-up.

The important psychological point is that people are ready for such events, indeed eager for it - the psychosocial equivalent of a sandpile in a state of self-organized criticality (Palombo 1999; Bak 1994), when a single grain can cause a major avalanche cascading through the whole system. Understanding such subtle shifts, and the often unconscious motivations behind them, is where psychoanalysis perhaps more than any other discipline has a lot to offer. As Lertzman (2008) writes:

What if the core issue is more about how humans respond to anxiety? ... [Environmental problems ... conjure up anxieties that ... we are done for, and nothing can really be done ... To help me understand more, I turn to Freud ... because I have found few others who speak as eloquently, and sensitively about what humans do when faced with anxiety or anxiety-provoking news.

Freud, civilization, nature and the dialectic of the Enlightenment

Is Freud really relevant to understanding our current crisis? While he was very much engaged in relating psychology to social issues, from war to racism, group psychology and the discontents of civilization (Freud 1913a, 1915, 1921, 1927, 1930), he was writing during a period when the possibility that human activities could bring the Earth's ecosystems to the brink of collapse would have been hard to contemplate. Romanticism may have complained about 'unweaving rainbows' and industry's 'dark satanic mills', but by Freud's day this could be seen as Luddite anti-progress talk, especially for those working within the Weltangschung of science and the Enlightenment to which Freud (1933) pinned his psychoanalytic flag. However, much of our current bewildering situation can be understood as rooted in part in a world view that was at its zenith during Freud's day and, as Lertzman (2008) suggests, in our responses to anxiety. In addition, Freud did offer us some crucial reflections on our relationship with nature:

The principle task of civilization, its actual raison d'etre, is to defend us against nature. We all know that in many ways civilization does this fairly well already, and clearly as time goes on it will do it much better. But no one is under the illusion that nature has already been vanquished; and few dare hope that she will ever be entirely subdued to man.

(Freud 1927: 51)

Here we can see an interesting ambivalence in Freud's rhetorical style, which perhaps unwittingly captures two crucial aspects of our civilization's relationship to 'Nature' and thus begins to open up a psychoanalytic approach to ecology. First, he depicts a series of binary oppositions typical for his era, and not so different in our own: human versus nature, man versus woman and (more implicitly) order versus chaos. Here we find the classic tropes of the Enlightenment, modernity, patriarchy, industrialism and capitalism, which Jungian ecopsychologist Mary-Jane Rust (2008) calls the myths we live by. The myths she is referring to in particular are the 'myth of progress' and the 'myth of the Fall'. She argues that in order to create a sustainable future, or indeed any future, we need to find other stories, other myths, through which to live our lives, to rethink how we have fallen and what it means to progress. Freud's work suggests that Western culture views civilization as a defence against nature, and against wildness, inner and outer, but as Rust (2008: 5) writes, at 'this critical point in human history we most urgently need a myth to live by which is about living with nature, rather than fighting it.' Thus, according to Rust,

we find ourselves ... between stories (Berry 1999), in a transitional space ... of great turbulence, with little to hold onto save the ground of our own experience. Our therapeutic task ... is to understand how these myths still shape our internal worlds, our language, and our defences ... [S]omewhere in the midst of 'sustainability' ... lies an inspiring vision of transformation ... We need to dig deep, to re-read our own myths as well as find inspiration from the stories of others.

(ibid.)

The myth of progress enters the climate change debate in calls for geo-engineering and Utopian techno-fixes such as putting thousands of mirrors in space, and in the dismissal of even gentle questioning of current economic models of unlimited growth. We will later look at Harold Searles' (1972) approach to our fascination with technology and its role in the current crisis. Returning to Freud, however, there is, as always, another side, an implicit awareness that the feeling of mastery civilization gives us is in many ways a dangerous illusion. Behind our need for mastery lies our fear and trembling in the face of the awesome power of mother nature.

There are the elements which seem to mock at all human control: the earth, which quakes and is torn apart and buries all human life and its works; water, which deluges and drowns everything in turmoil; storms, which blow everything before them ... With these forces nature rises up against us, majestic, cruel and inexorable; she brings to our mind once more our weakness and helplessness, which we thought to escape through the work of civilization.

(Freud 1927: 15-16)

Here is the other side of Freud's writing on the relation between 'Nature' and 'Civilization', with humanity portrayed as a weak and helpless infant in awe and fear of a mighty and terrible mother. The lure and horror of matriarchy lie behind the defensive constructs of patriarchal civilization, just as Klein's paranoid-schizoid fears of fragmentation, engulfment, and annihilation lie behind later castration threats (Hinshelwood 1991).

With each new earthquake or flood, nature erupts into culture -similar to Kristeva's (1982) description of the eruption of the 'semiotic' into the 'symbolic' - and we are thrown back into a state of terror. The 'illusion' in the title of Freud's 1927 essay The Future of an Illusion was meant to refer to how religion arose to deal with these anxieties. However, the structural function of the myth of progress, while undoubtably more successful in terms of practical benefits, can also be included here. In these words of Freud we have already a deep understanding, albeit largely implicit, of our own current crisis: a relationship to nature based on a master-slave system of absolute binaries, and an attempt to maintain an illusory autonomy and control in the face of chaos.

There is often a tension in Freud, between the celebration of Enlightenment values found in works such as The Future of an Illusion (1927) and the more Romantic Freud who won the Goethe prize and constantly emphasized the elements Enlightenment rationality leaves out such as jokes, dreams, slips and psychological symptoms. Thus, as well as being a perfect example of the Enlightenment with its call to make the unconscious conscious and give the 'rational' ego greater power over the wilds of the id, psychoanalysis also provides a serious challenge to this way of thinking. There will always be something beyond our control. We are not, and never can be, masters in our own house, and the core of who we are is irrational, and often frightening. Marcuse (1998) touched on a similar tension when declaring Freud's (1930) Civilization and Its Discontents both the most radical critique of Western culture and its most trenchant defence. Psychoanalysis, as always, is exquisitely ambivalent.

Ultimately, for Freud, both the natural world and our inner nature are untamable and the most we can hope for are temporary, fragile, anxious compromises between competing forces (Winter & Koger 2004). The chaos of nature we defend against is also the chaos of our inner nature, the wildness in the depths of our psyche. Civilization does not only domesticate livestock but also humanity itself (Freud & Einstein 1933: 214). However, attempts to eliminate the risk have in many ways dangerously backfired, comparable to the ways that the historical programmes aiming to eliminate forest fires in the United States have led to far bigger and more uncontrollable fires taking the place of previously smaller and more manageable ones (Diamond 2006: 43-47).

The control promised by the Enlightenment, the power of the intellect to overcome chaos (environmental and emotional), is therefore at least partly a defensive and at times dangerous illusion. In our age of anxiety, with the destruction of civilization threatened by nuclear holocaust, ecosystemic collapse, bioweapons and dirty bombs, Freud's warning is more relevant than ever:

Humans\* have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man ... hence comes a large part of their current unrest, their unhappiness and their mood of anxiety.

(Freud 1930: 135)

Freud's binaries 'masculine/Enlightenment/control/autonomy' versus 'feminine/nature/chaos/dependency' also lead us to consider what Gregory Bateson (2000: 95) called the 'bipolar characteristic' of Western thought, which even tries 'to impose a binary pattern upon phenomena which are not dual in nature: youth versus age, labor versus capital, mind versus matter - and, in general, lack[s] the organizational devices for handling triangular systems/ In such a culture, as with the child struggling to come to terms with the Oedipal situation, 'any "third" party is always regarded ... as a threat' (ibid.).

Deleuze and Guattari describe such dualistic forms of thinking using the ecological metaphor of the tree with its fork-branch patterns (although they would not use the term metaphor): 'Arborescent systems are hierarchical systems with centers of signifiance and subjectification ... an element only receives information from a higher unit, and only receives a subjective affection along preestablished paths' (Deleuze & Guattari 2003a: 16). However, Freud's 'arborescent' system of binaries can also show us the way out, capturing the psychological bind we are now in. As Deleuze and Guattari (2003a: 277) write: 'The only way to get outside the dualisms is ... to pass between, the intermezzo.' Deconstructing these dualisms allows us to think about how our destructive urge to dominate and control is connected to our fear of acknowledging dependency on this largest of 'holding environments', the ultimate 'environment mother' (Winnicott 1999,1987).

#### Technological management is an expression of the death drive---causes projection of our fears onto the human and non-human world to justify their annihilation---turns and outweighs the case

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Here there are echoes of Freud's (1916) idea of 'anticipatory mourning' and the associated attacks and spoiling that we will study below (see p. 72). However, for Searles the natural world is not just a space for externalizing our conflicts. Rather, a healthy relationship to the non-human environment is essential for human psychological well-being. Furthermore, one consequence of our alienation from nature is an omnipotent longing for fusion with our technology, and a powerful anxiety should this fully occur.

Over recent decades we have come from dwelling in an outer world in which the living works of nature either predominated or were near at hand, to dwelling in an environment dominated by a technology which is wondrously powerful and yet nonetheless dead ... [T]his technology-dominated world [is] so alien, so complex, so awesome, and so overwhelming that we have been able to cope with it only by regressing, in our unconscious experience ... to a degraded state of nondifferentiation from it ... [T]his 'outer' reality is psychologically as much a part of us as its poisonous waste products are part of our physical selves.

(Searles 1972: 368)

The further we are alienated from nature, the more we are driven into primitive regressive identification and omnipotent fascination with our technology, a powerful positive feedback loop. The inner conflict between our human and non-human selves, and our animal and technological natures, is projected onto the environment, further rupturing the relationship and leading to a spiral of destructiveness as we 'project this conflict upon, and thus unconsciously foster, the war in external reality between the beleaguered remnants of ecologically balanced nature and \*(hu)man's technology which is ravaging them' (ibid.).

Here we are in Klein's paranoid-schizoid world, with a primitive ego unable to differentiate between good and bad mother. While ecologists portray a good eco-mummy doing battle with bad techno-mummy, things are not so simple. As we have seen, civilization (and its technology) is a defence, a 'good mother' to protect us from capricious and uncaring mother nature (Freud 1930), but, as Searles suggests, we are supposed to accept that 'our good mother is poisoning us' (Searles 1972: 369).

For Searles (1972), behind both nuclear danger and ecological catastrophe lies the raw destructiveness Kleinians link to Thanatos, or what Erich Fromm (1992) understands in terms of necrophilia. Searles (1972: 370) argues that at this level of functioning we project 'our own pervasive, poorly differentiated and poorly integrated murderousness, bora of our terror and deprivation and frustration, upon the hydrogen bomb, the military-industrial complex, technology.' We may find the slow, more controllable death from pollution preferable to 'sudden death from nuclear warfare' or we might yearn for the quick relief of a nuclear blast to the 'slow strangulation' of environmental devastation (Searles 1972: 370). Living with such apocalyptic threats leads to a kind of ultimate version of the defence Anna Freud (1936) described as identification with the aggressor.

At an unconscious level we powerfully identify with what we perceive as omnipotent and immortal technology, as a defense against intolerable feelings of insignificance, of deprivation, of guilt, of fear of death ... Since the constructive goal of saving the world can be achieved only by one's working, as but one largely anonymous individual among uncounted millions ... it is more alluring to give oneself over to secret fantasies of omnipotent destructiveness, in identification with the forces that threaten to destroy the world. This serves to shield one from the recognition of one's own guilt-laden murderous urges, experienced as being within oneself, to destroy one's own intrapersonal and interpersonal world.

(Searles 1972: 370)

In this view, we are seeing a kind of repetition on a planetary level of an early intrapsychic anxiety situation. In childhood 'a fantasied omnipotence protected us against the fUll intensity of our feelings of deprivation, and now it is dangerously easy to identify with seemingly limitless technology and to fail to cope with the life-threatening scarcity of usable air, food, and water on our planet' (ibid.). Unfortunately our technological powers have outstripped our emotional maturity, and the omnipotent phantasies of infancy now have a frightening objectivity. In place of a religion we no longer believe in, or hopes for future generations we no longer have meaningful contact with, we identify with our immortal, inanimate technology.

In this realm of omnipotent fantasy ... mother earth is equivalent to all of reality ... a drag ... to our yearnings for unfettered omnipotence ... It may be not at all coincidental that our world today is threatened with extinction through environmental pollution, to which we are so strikingly apathetic, just when we seem on the threshold of technologically breaking the chains that have always bound our race to this planet of our origin. I suspect that we collectively quake lest our infantile omnipotent fantasies become fully actualized through man's becoming interplanetary and ceasing thereby to be man ... [W]e are powerfully drawn to suicidally polluting our planet so as to ensure our dying upon it as men, rather than existing elsewhere as ... gods or robots ... [T]he greatest danger lies neither in the hydrogen bomb ... nor in the more slowly lethal effect of pollution ... [but] in the fact that the world is in such a state as to evoke our very earliest anxieties and at the same time to offer the delusional 'promise' ... of assuaging these anxieties, effacing them, by fully externalizing and reifying our most primitive conflicts ... In the pull upon us to become omnipotently free of human conflict, we are in danger of bringing about our extinction.

(Searles 1972: 371-372)

#### These pathologies distort not only how we respond to crisis but also why and to which crises---as such, your primary role is to investigate the aff’s psychological investment in energy production as an exercise in reprogramming our position in a non-linear and inevitably chaotic world.

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The metaphor of an acrobat on a high wire referred to by Bateson (2000: 506) is particularly apt for us now. The acrobat, in order not to fall, requires maximum freedom to 'move from one position of instability to another.' This is the paradox of order and disorder that we discussed in Chapter 11. In our current ecological crisis we must face the possibility that achieving the freedom and flexibility that we need to survive requires a fundamental re-examination of many of the basic coordinates of our lives, and some of our most cherished theories. In analyzing the rise and fall of past civilizations, we find that a 'new technology for the exploitation of nature or a new technique for the exploitation of other men ... gives elbow room or flexibility' but that 'the using up of that flexibility is death' (Bateson 2000: 503).

Like the patient stuck on a local optima that we discussed in Chapter 12, unable or unwilling to cross the threshold to a more adaptive peak, entire species, and civilizations, have in the past found themselves in dangerous dead ends and unable to change. These dead ends include those within the ecology of mind, ways of thinking and being that become pathological if they fail to evolve along with the constantly shifting relations in the constitution of natural and social ecosystems. Ecopsychoanalysis, which draws on the tools and ideas of nonlinear science, understands that our world is governed by nonlinear dynamics, to the extent that the prediction and control promised by Enlightenment rationality will always remain to some degree illusory. Instead, we need to engage with the creativity of the Earth, and follow the lines of flight we uncover, exploring 'the potential for self-organization inherent in even the humblest forms of matter-energy' (DeLanda 2005:273).

Our species has experienced such severe existential threats before. One of the most extreme examples was an evolutionary bottleneck which molecular biology shows us occurred approximately 70,000 years ago, when the human species was down to the last few thousand individuals or even less. Geological evidence suggests that this near extinction may have been linked to the Toba supervolcano in Indonesia, whose eruption triggered sudden climate change with major environmental impacts (Dawkins 2004). We do not know how we emerged from that particular crisis, or how close we may have come to extinction at various other times in our history.

We might reflect on these experiences as applying to the whole species an idea that Winnicott (1974: 104) once discussed in terms of the fear of breakdown in individual psychoanalysis. For Winnicott, this fear refers to a breakdown that has already occurred, but it was a catastrophe which took place before there was yet a subject to folly experience it with a reflective consciousness. At the risk of anthropocentrism, we might do well to consider Dennett's (2003: 267) point that in many ways we do occupy a unique position in the history of the Earth, as 'wherever lineages found themselves on local peaks of the adaptive landscape, their members had no way of so much as wondering whether or not there might be higher, better summits on the far side of this valley or that.'

Despite all the defensive reasons to not know which we explored in Chapters 4-7. we are, to some extent at least, becoming conscious of the enormity of the danger which confronts us. Today we are forced to think in these complex terms, to wonder about other valleys and other peaks on the plane of immanence, our virtual realm of possibility, to find a path through the current deadlock. As we saw in Part I of this book, these are difficult times. As Bateson (2000: 495) writes, the 'massive aggregation of threats to (hu)man(kind) and his ecological systems arises out of errors in our habits of thought at deep and partly unconscious levels.'

The contribution of psychoanalysis is precisely to help us to overcome such errors through investigating their unconscious roots. Ecopsychoanalysis recognizes the need for a radical questioning of our theories, whether psychoanalytic, philosophical, scientific or political, and the corresponding ways of living individually and collectively that they make possible and reflect. However, it does so through a respectful engagement with the best that our various traditions have to offer, entering into uncanny new symbioses, making these disciplines strange to themselves not in order to destroy them but to make them more vital and alive.

Despite the gravity of our situation, there are 'patches of sanity still surviving in the world' (Bateson 2000: 495), ideas in the ecology of mind worth exploring, helping us to construct a new alpha function we can only hope is capable of dreaming at the precipice. This book has sought to uncover what some of the components of this might be, focusing in particular on the constructive synergy between psychoanalysis, complexity theory, ecology, and the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. Ecopsychoanalysis wonders whether it is precisely in the very severity of the desperate ecological situation we face that a great opportunity lies for re-imagining the human, our societies, and our place in the world. It is in the ecopsychological spirit of nurturing hope while facing despair that this book was written.

However, there is no 'big Other' (Zizek 2007) to guarantee our success, or even our future existence. In a chaotic world without certainty, ecopsychoanalysis can turn to the experimental pragmatics of Deleuze and Guattari (2003a: 161): 'Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers ... find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times.'

Assumptions according to which we have long lived our lives collapse as we begin to feel the disturbing effects of the hyperobject of climate change on the ecology of mind. Ecopsychoanalysis itself can be viewed as a hyperobject in that it does not yet fully exist. It should not be seen as an end state but a process of becoming, a work in progress, a meshwork emerging at the interstices of the three ecologies, and the elaboration of an alpha function that is able to think and dwell in our new uncanny home. As Bateson (2000: 512) writes, 'we are not outside the ecology for which we plan - we are always and inevitably a part of it. Herein lies the charm and the terror of ecology.' Ecopsychoanalysis can never occupy an outside from which to explore and engage with the new strange ecology(s), but is always already extimate with it (Lacan 1992: 139).

For all its chaos, because of all its chaos, the world is still a place of wonder, and we can only hope that we find ways of staying in it at least a little while longer. The nonlinearity and chaos of nature, and the forms of thinking required to sustain our relationship to it beyond the limited horizons of our experience, are both frightening and liberating. Yet, despite the anxiety, guilt and terror that climate change forces us to face, this moment of crisis can also offer us an opportunity for a more open vision of ourselves, as subjects, as societies, and as a species among the interconnected life systems of the Earth.

#### Don’t be blackmailed by their threat of immediate consequences---actomania in the face of environmental apocalypse not only requires a fantasy of natural manipulation but it actively blinds us to a reconfiguration of our consumptive practices

Swyngedouw 6 Erik, Dept of Geography, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University “Impossible “Sustainability” and the Post-Political Condition,” Forthcoming in: David Gibbs and Rob Krueger (Eds.) Sustainable Development, <http://www.liv.ac.uk/geography/seminars/Sustainabilitypaper.doc>

This chapter seeks to destabilise some of the most persistent myths about nature, sustainability and environmental politics. First, I shall argue that there is no such thing as a singular Nature around which a policy of ‘sustainability’ can be constructed. Rather, there are a multitude of natures and a multitude of existing or possible socio-natural relations. Second, the obsession with a singular nature that requires ‘sustaining’ is sustained by an apocalyptic imaginary that forecloses asking serious political questions about possible socio-environmental trajectories, particularly in the context of a neo-liberal hegemony. Third, and most importantly, I shall argue that environmental issues and their political ‘framing’ contribute to the making and consolidation of a post-political and post-democratic condition, one that actually forecloses the possibility of a real politics of the environment. I conclude with a call of a politicization of the environment, one that is predicated upon the recognition of radically different possible socio-environmental futures and the proliferation of new socio-environmental imaginaries.

1. The Question of Natures

“Nature does not exist” … or …When vegetarians will eat meat!

The Guardian International reported recently (13th August 2005) how a University of Maryland scientist had succeeded in producing “cultured meat”. Soon, he said, “it will be possible to substitute reared beef or chicken with artificially grown meat tissue. It will not be any longer necessary to kill an animal in order to get access to its meat. We can just rear it in industrialised labs”. A magical solution, so it seems, that might tempt vegetarians to return to the flock of animal protein devotees, while promising yet again (after the failed earlier promises made by the pundits of pesticides, the green revolution and now genetic engineering and GM products) the final solution for world hunger and a more sustainable life for the millions of people who go hungry now. Meanwhile, NASA is spending circa US$ 40 million a year on how to recycle wastewater and return it to potable conditions, something that would of course be necessary to permit space missions of long duration, but which would be of significant importance on earth as well. At the same time, sophisticated new technologies are developed for sustainable water harvesting, for a more rational use of water, or a better recycling of residual waters, efforts defended on the basis of the need to reach the Millennium Development Goals that promise, among others, a reduction by half of the 2.5 billion people that do not have adequate access to safe water and sanitation.

In the mean time, other ‘natures’ keep wrecking havoc around the world. The Tsunami disaster comes readily to mind, as do the endless forest fires that blazed through Spain in the summer of 2005 during the country’s driest summer since records started, killing dozens of people and scorching the land; HIV continues its genocidal march through Sub-Saharan Africa, summer heat waves killed thousands of people prematurely in 2004 in France. In 2006, Europeans watched anxiously the nomadic wanderings of the avian flue virus and waits, almost stoically, for the moment it will pass more easily from birds to humans. While all this is going on, South Korea’s leading bio-tech scientist, Hwang Woo Suk proudly presented, in August 2005, the Seoul National University Puppy (SNUPPY) to the global press as the first cloned dog (a Labrador) while a few months later, in December 2005, this science hero was forced to withdraw a paper on human stem cells from Science after accusations of intellectual fraud (later confirmed, prompting his resignation and wounding South-Korea’s great biotech dream). In the UK, male life expectancy between the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ areas is now more than 11 years and the gap is widening with life expectancy actually falling (for the first time since the second world war) in some areas . Tuberculosis is endemic again in East London, obesity is rapidly becoming the most seriously lethal socio-ecological condition in our fat cities (Marvin and Medd, 2006), and, as the ultimate cynical gesture, nuclear energy is again celebrated and iconized by many elites, among whom Tony Blair, as the world’s saviour, the ultimate response to the climatic calamities promised by continuing carbon accumulation in our atmosphere while satisfying our insatiable taste for energy.

This great variety of examples all testify to the blurring of boundaries between the human and the artificial, the technological and the natural, the non-human and the cyborg-human; they certainly also suggest that there are all manner of ‘natures’ out there. While some of the above examples promise ‘sustainable’ forms of development, others seem to stray further away from what might be labelled as sustainable. At first glance, Frankenstein meat, cyborg waters and stem cell research are exemplary cases of possibly ‘sustainable’ ways of dealing with apparently important socio-environmental problems while solving significant social problems (animal ethics and food supply on the one hand, dwindling freshwater resources or unsustainable body metabolisms on the other). Sustainable processes are sought for around the world and solutions for our precarious environmental condition are feverishly developed. Sustainability, so it seems, is in the making, even for vegetarians.

Meanwhile, as some of the other examples attest, socio-environmental processes keep on wrecking havoc in many places around the world. ‘Responsible’ scientists, environmentalists of a variety of ideological stripes and colours, together with a growing number of world leaders and politicians, keep on spreading apocalyptic and dystopian messages about the clear and present danger of pending environmental catastrophes that will be unleashed if we refrain from immediate and determined action. Particularly the threat of global warming is framed in apocalyptic terms if the atmospheric accumulation of CO2 (which is of course the classic ‘side effect’ of the accumulation of capital in the troposphere) continues unheeded. Table 1 collects a sample of some of the most graphic recent doomsday media headlines on the theme. The world as we know it will come to a premature end (or be seriously mangled) unless we urgently reverse, stop, or at least slow down global warming and return the climate to its status quo ante. Political and regulatory technologies (such as the Kyoto Protocol) and CO2 reducing techno-machinery (like hybrid cars) are developed that would, so the hope goes, stop the threatening evolution and return the earth’s temperature to its benevolent earlier condition. From this perspective, sustainability is predicated upon a return, if we can, to a perceived global climatologic equilibrium situation that would permit a sustainable continuation of the present world’s way of life.

So, while one sort of sustainability seems to be predicated upon feverishly developing new natures (like artificial meat, cloned stem cells, or manufactured clean water), forcing nature to act in a way we deem sustainable or socially necessary, the other type is predicated upon limiting or redressing our intervention in nature, returning it to a presumably more benign condition, so that human and non-human sustainability in the medium and long term can be assured. Despite the apparent contradictions of these two ways of ‘becoming sustainable’ (one predicated upon preserving nature’s status quo, the other predicated upon producing new natures), they share the same basic vision that techno-natural and socio-metabolic interventions are urgently needed if we wish to secure the survival of the planet and much of what it contains. But these examples also show that ‘nature’ is not always what it seems to be. Frankenstein meat, dirty water, bird - flue virus symbiosis, stem cells, fat bodies, heat waves, tsunamis, hurricanes, genetic diversity, CO2, to name just a few, are radically different things, expressing radically different natures, pushing in radically different directions, with radically different consequences and outcomes, and with radically different human/non-human connectivities. If anything, before we can even begin to unpack ‘sustainability’, the above examples certainly suggest that we urgently need to interpolate our understandings of ‘nature’, revisit what we mean by nature, and, what we assume ‘nature’ to be.

Surrendering Nature – Indeterminate natures

Slavoj Žižek suggests in Looking Awry that the current ecological crisis is indeed a radical condition that not only constitutes a real and present danger, but, equally importantly, “questions our most unquestionable presuppositions, the very horizon of our meaning, our everyday understanding of ‘nature’ as a regular, rhythmic process” (Zizek, (1992) 2002: 34). It raises serious questions about what were long considered self-evident certainties. He argues that this fundamental threat to our deepest convictions of what we always thought we knew for certain about nature is co-constitutive of our general unwillingness to take the ecological crisis completely serious. It is this destabilising effect that explains “the fact that the typical, predominant reaction to it still consists in a variation of the famous disavowal, “I know very well (that things are deadly serious, that what is at stake is our very survival), but just the same I don’t really believe, … and that is why I continue to act as if ecology is of no lasting consequence for my everyday life” (page 35). The same unwillingness to question our very assumptions about what nature is (and even more so what natures might ‘become’) also leads to the typical obsessive reactions of those who DO take the ecological crisis seriously. Žižek considers both the case of the environmental activist, who in his or her relentless and obsessive activism to achieve a transformation of society in more ecologically sustainable ways expresses a fear that to stop acting would lead to catastrophic consequences. In his words, obsessive acting becomes a tactic to stave off the ultimate catastrophe, i.e. “if I stop doing what I am doing, the world will come to an end in an ecological Armageddon”. Others, of course, see all manner of transcendental signs in the ‘revenge of nature’, read it as a message that signals our destructive intervention in nature and urge us to change our relationship with nature. In other words, we have to listen to nature’s call, as expressed by the pending environmental catastrophe, and respond to its message that pleas for a more benign, associational relation with nature, a post-human affective connectivity, as a cosmopolitical “partner in dialogue”. While the first attitude radically ignores the reality of possible ecological disaster, the other two, which are usually associated with actors defending ‘sustainable’ solutions for our current predicament, are equally problematic in that they both ignore, or are blind to the inseparable gap between our symbolic representation (our understanding) of Nature and the actual acting of a wide range of radically different and, often contingent, natures. In other words, there is – of necessity – an unbridgeable gap, a void, between our dominant view of Nature (as a predictable and determined set of processes that tends towards a (dynamic) equilibrium – but one that is disturbed by our human actions and can be ‘rectified’ with proper sustainable practices) and the acting of natures as an (often) unpredictable, differentiated, incoherent, open-ended, complex, chaotic (although by no means unordered or un-patterned) set of processes. The latter implies the existence not only of many natures, but, more importantly, it also assumes the possibility of all sorts of possible future natures, all manner of imaginable different human-non human assemblages and articulations, and all kinds of different possible socio-environmental becomings.

The inability to take ‘natures’ seriously is dramatically illustrated by the controversy over the degree to which disturbing environmental change is actually taking place and the risks or dangers associated with it. Lomborg’s The Sceptical Environmentalist captures one side of this controversy in all its phantasmagorical perversity (Lomborg, 1998), while climate change doomsday pundits represent the other. Both sides of the debate argue from an imaginary position of the presumed existence of a dynamic balance and equilibrium, the point of ‘good’ nature, but one side claims that the world is veering off the correct path, while the other side (Lomborg and other sceptics) argues that we are still pretty much on nature’s course. With our gaze firmly fixed on capturing an imaginary ‘idealised’ Nature, the controversy further solidifies our conviction of the possibility of a harmonious, balanced, and fundamentally benign ONE Nature if we would just get our interaction with it right, an argument blindly (and stubbornly) fixed on the question of where Nature’s rightful point of benign existence resides. This futile debate, circling around an assumedly centred, known, and singular Nature, certainly permits -- in fact invites -- imagining ecological catastrophe at some distant point (global burning (or freezing) through climate change, resource depletion, death by overpopulation). Indeed, imagining catastrophe and fantasising about the final ecological Armageddon seems considerably easier for most environmentalists than envisaging relatively small changes in the socio-political and cultural-economic organisation of local and global life here and now. Or put differently, the world’s premature ending in a climatic Armageddon seems easier to imagine (and sell to the public) than a transformation of (or end to) the neo-liberal capitalist order that keeps on practicing expanding energy use and widening and deepening its ecological footprint.

### Warming Adv

#### other countries doing nuclear solves the aff in the SQ

#### SMRs don’t solve warming---they take too long and trade off with renewable tech that’s closer to viability

Arjun Makhijani 10, President of the Institute for Energy & Environmental Research, Ph.D. in engineering (specialization: nuclear fusion) from the University of California at Berkeley; and Michele Boyd, former director of the Safe Energy Program at Physicians for Social Responsibility, September 2010, “Small Modular Reactors,” http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/small-modular-reactors-no.pdf

Efficiency and most renewable technologies are already cheaper than new large reactors. The long time—a decade or more—that it will take to certify SMRs will do little or nothing to help with the global warming problem and will actually complicate current efforts underway. For example, the current schedule for commercializing the above-ground sodium cooled reactor in Japan extends to 2050, making it irrelevant to addressing the climate problem. Relying on assurances that SMRs will be cheap is contrary to the experience about economies of scale and is likely to waste time and money, while creating new safety and proliferation risks, as well as new waste disposal problems.

#### No chance of SMRs ever being commercially viable---negative learning means problems and cost overruns will only cascade and get worse

Thomas B. Cochran 12, member of the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council, was a senior scientist and held the Wade Greene Chair for Nuclear Policy at NRDC, and was director of its Nuclear Program, 5/30/12, “NRDC’s Perspectives on the Economics of Small Modular Reactors,” http://www.ne.doe.gov/smrsubcommittee/documents/NRDC%20Presentation%205-30-12.pptx

BROAD CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS ON SMRs

In formulating conclusions and recommendations, there must be a full account of the wide range of unknowns and uncertainties, and difficult questions posed that require further analysis and resolution before large public sums are committed to an SMR industrialization strategy.

The history of DOE is littered with DD&E programs for reactors that never found a home in the commercial marketplace, and thus there was never a return on the investment for US taxpayers or humanity at large.

Our presentation has focused on the sensitivity of the U. of Chicago EPIC model’s projected SMR economic viability in the US context to modest variations in assumptions for industrial learning rates, LEAD unit direct costs, required contingency funds, and the future levelized cost of natural gas combined cycle generation.

But the range of SMR uncertainties extends well beyond variations in this narrow set of modeled parameters, and includes the following 12 issues:

Not all learning curve cost reductions derive from the same source, or occur uniformly over time. They are both time dependent and technology specific, and thus difficult to forecast accurately unless the details of the technology and production processes involved are already well understood. Early in the production cycle, sharp cost reductions can be expected going from the early LEAD units comprising the first plant to the next 6-12 FOAK plants built on an assembly line. But after these reductions, the rate of cost improvements could well decelerate or even disappear altogether, not only because of the law of diminishing returns to further capital investment at a given level of production, but also because “learning” works both ways, sometimes uncovering design or production defects that require increased costs to remedy.

The “negative learning” evident in the highly centralized and relatively standardized French nuclear program, is most likely the result of increased knowledge of, and required attention to, nuclear safety and quality control issues with each succeeding large LWR variant. A similar pattern could recur with SMRs.

Another source of uncertainty is the reliability of component supplier and system vendor cost projections – the well known problem in noncompetitive markets of companies offering “buy-in” prices to the government and any commercial customers to get them “hooked,” in the belief that either prices can be raised later, or costs recovered through the sale of larger numbers of components and systems than are actually represented in the forecast market demand.

Will international competition at the system vendor level help or inhibit the kind of dramatic cost reductions that are needed to make SMR’s a viable factor in mitigating global climate change? If several significantly different SMR designs, each with their own customized supply chains, are dividing-up limited domestic and international markets, how does any one vendor reach the stage of “commoditizing” production of the various constituent components in its plant, thereby significantly reducing its cost?

This process of wringing out cost in the production of components in turn requires reductions in the cost of the capital equipment needed to mass produce these commodity components, which reduction (in required capital cost per unit output) has been the real source of final product cost reductions in the electronics and solar PV and many other industries. What evidence is there that SMR reactor vessels, for instance, will cost less to produce per kilowatt of capacity than those produced for large LWR’s?

Is significant price competition among suppliers of key components, each susceptible of incorporation in multiple SMR designs – in place of a unique supply chain for each design -- also needed to achieve long term economies in the manufacture of SMR components.

What is the evidence for the proposition that nuclear-safety-grade steel forgings, concrete, pumps, piping, welds, wiring, and instrumentation will be appreciably cheaper in the future than they are now, and if not, what does the alleged cost-reducing “learning” actually consist of? The argument appears to be that the direct labor costs of integrating these components will be less, and achieved more rapidly, in a factory environment than at a construction site. But even if this is assumed to be true to some extent, given that the direct materials costs-per-kilowatt must increase when you build five or six reactors to achieve the same output as one large one, what evidence is there that the required labor-hours-per-kilowatt-of-capacity will go in the opposite direction, and far enough to more than offset the increased materials costs per kilowatt?

What is the evidence that staffing and O&M will be cheaper for six 200 MW units rather than one 1200 MW unit, and if it is not cheaper, where will the necessary offsetting cost reductions be found, such that the levelized SMR electricity cost is within an acceptable price range for future low carbon resources

Are current SMR vendor cost projections predicated on implicit assumptions linking prospective SMR “passive safety” improvements to streamlining and relaxation of current commercial LWR safety requirements that dictate costly requirements for emergency planning , operator staffing, and maintenance and inspection of safety related systems and components .

Could the longer proposed refueling interval (e.g. five years), intended to reduce O&M costs, create new safety issues in certain accident scenarios and actually add to costs by reducing the total energy output of the reactors?

A key question to consider is whether, in light of the above concerns, a nationally-focused SMR DD&E and deployment effort even makes sense. Is it plausible to believe that working on their own, DOE and a few U.S. vendors can development the SMR hardware, identify a sufficiently large customer base, finance the sale, and economically construct a large fleet of SMRs. As we have noted, at least in the near to medium term, the “coal replacement” market for SMR’s seems implausible in the light of competition from natural gas (although this could change over a longer time period), and the capital costs of constructing reactors in the U.S..

Are there national policies, such as carbon taxation and stricter environmental regulation of natural gas, that are REQUIRED accompaniments of an SMR deployment strategy, the absence of which makes the whole enterprise, at least on a national basis, appear hopeless?

To avoid yet another failed DOE reactor development program that spends a billion or more of the taxpayers money and then grinds to a halt for want of any economically rational deployment strategy, the panel and DOE must seriously consider these questions before committing additional resources in pursuit of SMR development.

#### Reject their Palley ev---he’s an SMR hack who discounts alternatives and refuses to acknowledge structural problems that make reliance on SMRs worse for warming

Dennis Riches 12, Professor of Social Innovation at Seijo University, formerly Lecturer at Tokyo University of Technology, 2/17/12, “The (False?) Promise of Small Modular Reactors,” <http://nf2045.blogspot.com/2012/02/false-promise-of-small-modular-reactors.html>

Palley’s assessment of alternatives is hard to dispute. He notes that there is no oil, coal or gas shortage. There are enough of these sources to last a few more centuries, but the problem is that ecosystems will collapse from global warming before these resources are gone. We have to stop using them soon, and it is not just a matter of cutting back. We have to get carbon dioxide emissions close to zero to avoid the worst outcome.

Renewable energy sources have severe shortcomings as well. Water behind hydroelectric dams contains rotting vegetation which spews out the greenhouse gas methane. There isn’t enough space to put wind farms in the places where they are needed. The solar energy striking the earth is finite. It has to be used to grow plants, which sequester carbon and feed people, so there is a limit on how much solar energy can be used to produce electricity or biofuels. Geothermal sites contain greenhouse gases and toxins, and there are difficulties in finding sites close to populations that need energy. Finally, sequestering greenhouse gases in underground storage is utterly unrealistic. In short, there is no solution except SMRs, apparently.

The most fascinating argument that Palley presents is in his discussion of the black swan, civilization-ending massive solar flare which would knock out power grids all over the world. He uses this as an argument for breaking up large, interconnected grids into local isolated grids powered by SMRs. This could save the world from a complete, prolonged blackout. Such a flare actually occurred in 1859 and it caused fires, and destruction of the small telegraph grid that was in place at the time. No one knows for sure how a recurrence would effect electricity grids now. After sufficiently scaring the life out of his readers, he may not have wanted to associate this disaster with its effect on nuclear power plants. He conveniently omits mention of this long blackout leading to hundreds of nuclear power plants running out of fuel for backup cooling systems, after which they would go into meltdowns. Fukushima X 400 (or 400 Chernobyls, as this report explains it).

Palley’s argument becomes suspect when the reader notices that the sharp, critical eye he has for every other energy alternative is not applied to SMRs, or even to conventional nuclear power plants. A few moments of research on the Internet turns up numerous articles that raise safety concerns about these new nuclear power plants, and Palley gives very short shrift to the known extent of radiological contamination from various accidents. The health consequences of Chernobyl are given less than a page, and what is written is just a pat repetition of the big lie that I’ve covered in previous posts. These omissions begin to seem quite disingenuous by the end of the book.

The physicist Michio Kaku voiced criticisms of SMRs in a short interview on CNN. He conceded that these power plants might be used in remote communities, but he felt it was extremely unrealistic to think that they could provide a city like Chicago, let alone the whole world, with all its requirements. As one power plant could supply energy to 20,000 homes, it is inconceivable that Chicago would have dozens of these plants throughout the city. He notes too that even though the spent fuel would not have a potential to be turned into nuclear bombs, it would still be high level nuclear waste that posed a risk of mishandling or sabotage in the form of a dirty bomb.

A more thorough critique was written by Arjun Makhijani and Michele Boyd in a report for The Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and Physicians for Social Responsibility. They point out that the low cost estimates of SMRs may be underestimated, as every proposal for new technology tends to be. Mass production of numerous SMRs could be more expensive than the building and maintenance of fewer large plants. There will be thousands of sites that need to be secured, monitored, staffed, and serviced when recalls are required. The existence of thousands of sites also complicates retrieval of waste and decommissioning.

The makers of SMRs also propose that these reactors could be used in developing countries, but many such places are unstable and they lack an educated workforce that can handle this advanced technology.

Makhijani and Boyd also cover the details of different proposed types of SMRs. The ones based on sodium cooling are particularly worrisome considering the history of accidents and delays with this technology (for background, refer to the Fermi I reactor accident near Detroit, and the expensive, unproductive monster that is the Monju reactor in Japan). They point out that one of the many problems of the pebble bed reactor design (which a German company gave up on a long time ago) is that the uranium it uses is more enriched than what is used now in light water reactors. How is this less of a proliferation risk? Finally, the thorium reactors don’t produce the same bomb making material as light water reactors, but they still produce fissile Uranium 233 isotopes.

Worst of all, the SMRs may be a false promise that deflects attention away from the need to reduce population and consumption, and improve efficiency. Palley himself admitted that endless growth and thirst for more energy is the root of the problem, but he doesn’t acknowledge that the proliferation of thousands of SMRs would only feed this endless desire for more energy and lead to more population growth.

The flaw in the logic may be right in the title of Palley’s book: The Answer. There seems to be a faulty assumption that there has to be an answer. The thinking goes that if it is not a, b, c, d or e, then it must be f. People involved in the energy debate often choose their favorite answer, ignore its flaws and defend it at all costs. Meanwhile, they demolish the arguments for all other alternatives. This process ignores the possibility that there may be no answer. The universe doesn’t care if we go the same way as the dinosaurs. If there is an answer, it remains elusive.

#### Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats---also causes political apathy which turns case

Buell 3Frederick—cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books, *From Apocalypse To Way of Life,* pages 185-186

Looked at critically, then, crisis discourse thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a **political liability** almost as much as an asset. It calls up a **fierce and effective opposition** with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too **vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also **exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters** and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “total solution” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “final solution.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into inhumanist authoritarianism; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, **people need to delink from nature** and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to **further indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “total solution.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode;** eco-authoritarianism was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

#### Tipping points theory is wrong---zero data can reliably identify specific tipping points

Andrew C. Revkin 9, senior fellow at Pace University's Pace Academy for Applied Environmental Studies, has taught at Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism and the Bard College Center for Environmental Policy, March 29, 2009, “Among Climate Scientists, a Dispute Over ‘Tipping Points’,” The New York Times, online: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/weekinreview/29revkin.html?\_r=1&pagewanted=print

But the idea that the planet is nearing tipping points — thresholds at which change suddenly becomes unstoppable — has driven a wedge between scientists who otherwise share deep concerns about the implications of a human-warmed climate.

Environmentalists and some climate experts are increasingly warning of impending tipping points in their efforts to stir public concern. The term confers a sense of immediacy and menace to potential threats from a warming climate — dangers that otherwise might seem too distant for people to worry about.

But other scientists say there is little hard evidence to back up specific predictions of catastrophe. They worry that the use of the term “tipping point” can be misleading and could backfire, fueling criticism of alarmism and threatening public support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

“I think a lot of this threshold and tipping point talk is dangerous,” said Kenneth Caldeira, an earth scientist at Stanford University and the Carnegie Institution and an advocate of swift action to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. “If we say we passed thresholds and tipping points today, this will be an excuse for inaction tomorrow,” he said.

While studies of climate patterns in the distant past clearly show the potential for drastic shifts, these scientists say, there is enormous uncertainty in making specific predictions about the future.

In some cases, there are big questions about whether climate-driven disasters — like the loss of the Amazon or a rise in sea levels of several yards in a century — are even plausible. And even in cases where most scientists agree that rising temperatures could lead to unstoppable change, no one knows where the thresholds lie that would set off such shifts.

#### No impact---mitigation and adaptation will solve---no tipping point or “1% risk” args

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### No extinction from climate change

NIPCC 11 – the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, an international panel of nongovernment scientists and scholars, March 8, 2011, “Surviving the Unprecedented Climate Change of the IPCC,” online: http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will **increase by 2-4°C** and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2 will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)."

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have **happened before**, in terms of both **magnitude and rate of change** (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have **remained remarkably resilient** (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases **thrived** (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a **sound scientific basis** for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the **vast data resource** that we can exploit in fossil records."

Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by **greater than 4°C within 60 years**, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is **very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions** due to a warming world."

In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some **caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions** of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates **remarkable biotic resilience** to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

### Heg Adv

#### Status quo solves grid cyber vulnerability

Paul Clark 12, MA Candidate, Intelligence/Terrorism Studies, American Military University; Senior Analyst, Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/12, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” http://blog.havagan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Risk-of-Disruption-or-Destruction-of-Critical-U.S.-Infrastructure-by-an-Offensive-Cyber-Attack.pdf

An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are "a high priority target for military and insurgents" and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has "increased vulnerability across the board" (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been "honed over many years of practical application" now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary and specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the electrical grid is also enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010: as a result the public and private sector are working together in an "unprecedented effort" to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).

#### DOD pursuit of SMRs sends a global signal of impending U.S. military aggression---causes a backlash to heg that proves policy failure

Terrence P. Smith 11, program coordinator and research assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at the CSIS, February 16, 2011, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations,”” http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations

The report repeatedly emphasizes the point that “DOD’s “’first mover’ pursuit of small reactors could have a profound influence on the development of the industry,” and cautions that “if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies.” The U.S. nonproliferation agenda, if there is one, stands in opposition to this line of thinking. Pursuing a nuclear technology out of the fear that others will get it (or have it), is what fueled the Cold War and much of the proliferation we have seen and are seeing today. It is a mentality I think we should avoid.

I do not mean to say this report ignores the risks. In fact they explicitly say, “We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors.” For example it says,

Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors.

The report also points out that “from a financial perspective, small reactors represent substantial losses in economies of scale.”

These issues, which were briefly mentioned, hardly seem like small potatoes. The reports answer to the issues raised: “making reliable projections about these reactors’ economic and technical performance while they are still on paper is a significant challenge,” and “Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple.”

On the other hand, the report argues, “failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD.” “First, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries.”

Yes these are important issue for a business stand, but I don’t find them to be the primary concern.

The reactors are purely for energy purposes, but in a world that seems to be growing tired of U.S. military intervention, the idea of ensuring our ability to do so through the proliferation of mobile nuclear reactors will hardly quell any hostile sentiment. In addition, it can only add fire to the “nuclear = good” flame. So, while even under best case scenario, the reactors are completely proliferation proof and pose no direct threat to the nonproliferation cause (ignoring the spreading of nuclear tech and knowledge in general), I have a tough time seeing how it helps.

The report concludes that the DoD “should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors.” Since the 1970s, the report says, “in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well.” For now, the plans for small nuclear reactors are “unfortunately,” for the most part, “caught between the drawing board and production.”

My point is, maybe that is where they should stay.

#### Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy---the most secure nation on earth sees threats to empire everywhere, which legitimizes constant violence---you have an obligation to place the structural violence that hegemony invisibilizes at the core of your decision calculus

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By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.

I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5

Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”?

We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6

Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history.

Paranoia

Even the paranoid have enemies.

—Donald Rumsfeld

Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8

Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal.

Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty?

A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11

The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution.

—C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians”

The barbarians have declared war.

—President George W. Bush

C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the grand antagonism of the United States and the USSR evaporated like a quickly fading nightmare. The cold war rhetoric of totalitarianism, Finlandization, present danger, fifth columnist, and infiltration vanished. Where were the enemies now to justify the continuing escalation of the military colossus? “And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?” By rights, the thawing of the cold war should have prompted an immediate downsizing of the military; any plausible external threat had simply ceased to exist. Prior to 9/11, General Peter Schoomaker, head of the US Army, bemoaned the enemy deficit: “It’s no use having an army that did nothing but train,” he said. “There’s got to be a certain appetite for what the hell we exist for.” Dick Cheney likewise complained: “The threats have become so remote. So remote that they are difficult to ascertain.” Colin Powell agreed: “Though we can still plausibly identify specific threats—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like that—the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain.” Before becoming president, George W. Bush likewise fretted over the post–cold war dearth of a visible enemy: “We do not know who the enemy is, but we know they are out there.” It is now well established that the invasion of Iraq had been a long-standing goal of the US administration, but there was no clear rationale with which to sell such an invasion. In 1997 a group of neocons at the Project for the New American Century produced a remarkable report in which they stated that to make such an invasion palatable would require “a catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.” 12

The 9/11 attacks came as a dazzling solution, both to the enemy deficit and the problem of legitimacy, offering the Bush administration what they would claim as a political casus belli and the military unimaginable license to expand its reach. General Peter Schoomaker would publicly admit that the attacks were an immense boon: “There is a huge silver lining in this cloud. . . . War is a tremendous focus. . . . Now we have this focusing opportunity, and we have the fact that (terrorists) have actually attacked our homeland, which gives it some oomph.” In his book Against All Enemies, Richard Clarke recalls thinking during the attack, “Now we can perhaps attack Osama Bin Laden.” After the invasion of Afghanistan, Secretary of State Colin Powell noted, “America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind we could not have dreamed of before.” Charles Krauthammer, for one, called for a declaration of total war. “We no longer have to search for a name for the post-Cold War era,” he declared. “It will henceforth be known as the age of terrorism.” 13

#### Hegemonic retrenchment’s key to avoid great power war

Nuno P. Monteiro 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40

From the perspective of the overall peacefulness of the international system, then, no U.S. grand strategy is, as in the Goldilocks tale, “just right.”116 In fact, each strategic option available to the unipole produces significant conflict. Whereas offensive and defensive dominance will entangle it in wars against recalcitrant minor powers, disengagement will produce regional wars among minor and major powers. Regardless of U.S. strategy, conflict will abound. Indeed, if my argument is correct, the significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades will continue for as long as U.S. power remains preponderant.

From the narrower perspective of the unipole’s ability to avoid being involved in wars, however, disengagement is the best strategy. A unipolar structure provides no incentives for conflict involving a disengaged unipole. Disengagement would extricate the unipole’s forces from wars against recalcitrant minor powers and decrease systemic pressures for nuclear proliferation. There is, however, a downside. Disengagement would lead to heightened conflict beyond the unipole’s region and increase regional pressures for nuclear proliferation. As regards the unipole’s grand strategy, then, the choice is between a strategy of dominance, which leads to involvement in numerous conflicts, and a strategy of disengagement, which allows conflict between others to fester.

In a sense, then, strategies of defensive and offensive dominance are self-defeating. They create incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to bolster their capabilities and present the United States with a tough choice: allowing them to succeed or resorting to war in order to thwart them. This will either drag U.S. forces into numerous conflicts or result in an increasing number of major powers. In any case, U.S. ability to convert power into favorable outcomes peacefully will be constrained.117

This last point highlights one of the crucial issues where Wohlforth and I differ—the benefits of the unipole’s power preponderance. Whereas Wohlforth believes that the power preponderance of the United States will lead all states in the system to bandwagon with the unipole, I predict that states engaged in security competition with the unipole’s allies and states for whom the status quo otherwise has lesser value will not accommodate the unipole. To the contrary, these minor powers will become recalcitrant despite U.S. power preponderance, displaying the limited pacifying effects of U.S. power.

What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”120

At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level of conflict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major powers and the magnitude of the conflicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system.

Finally, my argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.”121 By putting other states in extreme self-help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid being involved in wars. If the unipole fails to exercise restraint, other states will develop their capabilities, including nuclear weapons—restraining it all the same.122 Paradoxically, then, more relative power does not necessarily lead to greater influence and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect, unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint.

#### Their obsession with scientific quantification of IR is narcissism in the face of inevitable uncertainty---their studies are not neutral, but rather are deeply political---variables like peace, power, and the state are taken for granted to cherry pick theories that conform to pre-conceived cultural notions---the aff institutionalizes the false distinction between facts and values which makes ongoing structural violence and conflict inevitable because they don’t fit into neat data sets---they commodify the suffering of other which kills value to life---use the ballot as an emancipatory tool to promote positive peace

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Other peace researchers have attempted to find the sources of violence through a critical analysis of existing social, economicsystems.Understandingthe meaning ofpower in a hierarchical system is important in a criticalpeace research tradition. The analysis of structural sources of repressionand exploitationisconsidered asthe first step toward eliminating the root causes of violent conflict. Thus the emancipatory goal of peace research is associated with looking for obstacles to structural changes and exploring strategies to overcome them. Peace research has to serve the policy goal of transforming a world full of violence.

This chapter discusses how a theory building process in peace research has been influenced by epistemological debates between the proponents of behavioralists and their critics in social science. In the first part, the author briefly explains the modes of inquiry for theory building. The majority of the chapter, however, looks at such issues as values, critical pedagogy, and holistic approaches in understanding the nature of peace and conflict.

 The Emergence of Peace Research

Some argue that the history of peace studies has no geographic boundaries. It can be traced back hundreds and even thousands of years. Gold mines of ideas about peace were presented by philosophers in the early period of human civilization. Discussion about how to understand peace has been developed in various cultures. The study of peace and conflict in modern social science traditions originates in the 19th century. In Karl Marx's work, theoretical efforts were made to discover the structural sources of conflict in human history. Such sociologists as August Comte attempted to find general theories on social order and conflict. Social processes of conflict were understood in terms of organismic analogies. Max Weber analyzed the links between an individual actor's behavior and patterns of collective action.

The impulse for studying peace and conflict systematically was fomented in the early 20th century. The experiences of World War I led to the realization that given the enormous costs to human well-being, solutions have to be found to prevent war at both an intellectual and policy level. Research on the processes leading to an armed conflict was supported by efforts to examine socio-psychological and economic conditions. In addition, changes in the perceptions of political leaders were regarded as important in the transformation of an international system.

Peace research after World War II was influenced by the emergence of international relations as a new scientific endeavor to investigate problems between states.          The course of peace research was also determined by the possibilities of nuclear war along with fierce political, ideological and military confrontations between Soviet led socialist bloc countries and Western alliances in the global arena as well as the devotion of resources to preparing for a war which would annihilate human civilization. The opposition to Vietnam War generated critical thinking about national foreign policy agendas, and it expanded theoretical perspectives and research areas to be investigated.

The evolution of peace and conflict research since the 1970s has been characterized by inter-disciplinary understanding of violence and conflict at various social levels. Such social science and humanity fields as psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, history, literature, linguistics, and geography brought new concepts and methodological innovations. It was essential to adopt experiential research methods as well as traditional scientific methods to explain the causes of violence at individual and group levels as well as international. The study of social phenomena is stimulated by intellectual challenges that derive from continuing and new sets of problems. The involvement of various disciplines in the development of peace research was inevitable with the realization that peace cannot be achieved by one particular approach. Peace research has to rely on diverse methodological traditions given its disciplinary goals and the complexities of subject matters.

Modes of Social Inquiry

In a positivist mode of inquiry, social knowledge emerges from emulating the procedures of natural sciences. There is a clear distinction between facts and values. Efforts for new theoretical departures remain valid only if concrete empirical research programs are developed. A theory needs to be verified by the process of operationalizing and testing hypotheses. Research should be freed from non-empirical claims of individual conviction and conscience. In dealing with the complexity of empirical phenomena, theory ought to explain and predict the trend of events

Contrary to that, hermeneutics is based onthe analysis ofthe meanings which humanbeingsattach to their actions. The study of mind is different from that of nature. Analysis should reveal social constraints and promote cultural understanding.The goal of research isenlightenment andemancipation.The values and priorities of goals tend to be diverse across social groups and classes. What is rational changes across time and space. Rationalities are intersubjective in the sense that they can only be really examined from within the experiences of social groups which are the object of research.

Critical theory methodology identifies forms of conflict and patterns of development which could lead to the transformation of a world order. There is no over-arching ahistorical structure. Explanation of the prospects forchange requires analysis of the connections betweenmodes ofproduction and hierarchicalpoliticalstructures (Cox, 1996). The scope of theinquiryalsofocuses on adistorted ideological accountof social relationsby a hegemonic class.

In a postmodern vein, problems in different social locations and histories are interpreted by multiple minds and knowledge rather than meta-narratives (Seidman, 1994:5). Speculation is the most open form of inquiry. Humanity cannot be studied througha legislative reason which is helpful in producing general theories. The social world is fragmented into a multitude of communities and cultural traditions. The role of a social analyst is to mediate between different social worlds and to interpret unfamiliar cultures (Sediman, 1994:14). Resolving major theoretical differences is not desirable nor feasible.

Scientific Approaches to Peace Research

The early endeavor to establish a peace science originates in mathematical modelling of dynamics of arms races (Richardson, 1960). Quantitative studies of conflict behavior in the 1960s was affected by the revolution of behavioral sciences. Theoretical development was believed to be promoted by the collection of raw data, highly deductive propositions, and empirical verification. Formal models supported by statistical analysis were expected to explain both behavioral and structural characteristics of violent conflict.

The motivation behind scientific research was that ideas for creating a peaceful world would emerge from theories on human behavior and institutions verified by empirical methods. Hypothesis building would help researchers observe cooperative and conflictual patterns of behavior under different circumstances. Order in international relations could be analyzed in terms of such variables as distribution of power and patterns of interaction between political units (Kaplan, 1957; Modelski, 1978). Perceptions and cognition of decision makers and group processes are important variables in scientific approaches to research on war decision making. Regularities in human behavior were conceptualized and generalized in the studies of the Korean War decision making and the Cuban Missile Crisis.(Allison, 1971; Paige, 1968)

Scientific orientation has paid a great deal of attention to data collection and representation of the data through a modelling process. Simulation, gaming techniques have been utilized in developing a causal model of violent conflict (Guetzkow and Alger, 1963; Singer and Small, 1972). Later the interaction of economic, social, political and environmental systems was studied by world modelling approaches (Bremer, 1987). Methodological rigor and precision were sought in systematic observation of the problems of violence and other types of human sufferings.

The Critique of Behavioral Sciences

The behavioralist traditions of peace research have been criticized for being too empiricist.(Galtung, 1975) Quantitative analysis is not able to reveal intentional aspects of behavior in a specific context. Developing peace research requires a framework for synthesis in integrating different sets of issues. While collecting data on manifest violence, arms races and military coups is critical to the development of empirical theories (SIPRI, 1996), research design has to be guided by appropriate theoretical frameworks. The ability to think aboutand discusskeyresearchquestions stems from conceptual development of issuesto be studied.

Ignoring normative questions would not helpfind alternative visions. Conditions for building peace are not dealt with in behavioral researchtraditions. Statistical dataand empirical findings are themselvesdo not offer strategies for creatingapeaceful world. The uncertainty of politics would not be removed bypurescientific analysisof human behavior. According to some observers in peace studies, the efforts to find regularities have been pursued "to the point ofeliminating individual creativity and responsibilitymay well mire us in cyclic determinism."(Forcey, 1989:13) Critics of the positivist paradigm attribute the reductionist character ofcontemporary thoughtto the drive for controlof nature.

The critique of behavioral sciences coincides with a "critique of conscience" in the academic community. Conscience dictates feelings, moral stances, and a concern for truth and justice. The desire for value explicit inquiry stems from the fact that human behavior would not be investigated without references to social collectivity in historical contexts. Overall, the normative starting point of peace research has to be anchored in the agreement that peace is the object of the quest.(Broadhead, 1997:2) The utility of any research methods could be evaluated in terms of the way they are compatible with the general goal of a disciplinary focus.

Holistic Approaches

Some researchers suggest that peace studies should start from holism as the framework.(Smoker and Groff, 1996) Knowledge about general human experiences of conflict helps interpret specific events. Given their abstract nature, however, theories may not correspond with the facts and events which they seek to explain. The meanings of events are set up within a context of wholes. The intellectual transformation is necessary for developinga paradigm ofpeace. The achievement of peace should be a holistic goal of research.

Holistic versions of theories project the flow of alternative images of reality. There are different theoretical explanations about how and why to go to war. The plurality of theories ought not to be regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge which will eventually lead to one true grand theory. Universally applicable knowledge is not produced by piecemeal theory building efforts. There seems to be consensus thatpeace research must not be limited toconventionalempirical methods.Extended historical perspectives illustrate what is important in understanding conditions for peace. The evaluation of research findings needs a yardstick for examining their relevance.The incorporation of emancipatory cognitive interest would help suggest theories for a peaceful world. More holistic approaches can be encouraged by hermeneutic philosophy of science.

Reasoning needs to be combined with experiences in understanding the holistic pictures of social relations. The outcome inthe real world is not easily deduced from abstractly modeled relationships. In considering difficulties for justification of inducing wholes from parts, the ultimate validity of the big pictures is elusive.Theories which can be positively verifiable does not necessarily mean that they are true. Realities in peaceand conflictdo not last long enough to be subject to comprehensive, systematic and effective empiricalassaults on them. Explanation can be based on intuitive understanding of long and varied experiences. There are various ways to observe the world, including historical interpretations.Different perceptions of social relationships result from the process of formation and transformation of images and symbols.

Peace studies may belong to the same category as history and critical sociology in terms of its methods to study an object. In contrast with economics,many factors related to structural violencesuch as political repression and economic exploitationcannot beeasilyunderstood without socio-historical contexts. Distinctions between independent and dependent variables are artificial. Understanding the outcome of an event would be enhanced by clarifying the specific goals of actors.

Emancipatory Projects

Direct criticism of sovereign state power may be based on questioningthe mode ofanalysis to construct linear histories. Social and political boundaries cannot be imposed especially when truth and meanings are in doubt. Sovereign claims are used to shape human loyalties, but the forms of identities are not any more certain. Resolving differences of opinion about the legitimacy of state institutions is not possible within clearly defined and demarcated areas of research. Thus emancipatory projects oppose intellectualand socialclosurewhich does not tolerate diversity.

In a poststructural approach, language anddiscourse shape politicsand social institutions.(Bannet, 1993) A normative social space is located in the process of assigning meanings to opposing phenomena. Binary opposition have contributed to thecreation of linguistic andsocial hierarchies.(Seidman, 1994:18) Poststructuralism aims to disturb the dominant binary meanings that function to perpetuate social and political hierarchies. Deconstructionism is the method to be deployed. This involves unsettling and displacing the binary hierarchies. The goal of a deconstructionist strategy is to create a social space which favors autonomy. This process is tolerant of difference and ambiguity.(Seidman, 1994:19) Thehistorically contingent origin and political roleofbinaryhierarchies are uncoveredby deconstructionism.

Instead of being instruments of bureaucratic social control, human studies should serve emancipatory aims. Society is imagined less as a material structure, organic order, or social system than as a construction rooted in historically specific discursive practices. Communities serve as texts whose symbols and meanings need to be translated. Interpretative knowledge promotes diversity, expands tolerance, and legitimates difference as well as fosters understanding and communication (Seidman, 1994:14-5)

People'sperceptions about the world rely on their social and cultural milieu. The goal ofemancipation has nothing to do with science. Legitimation arises from their own linguistic practice and communicational interaction. As long as social science serves as the instrument of a disciplined society, truth is produced by power.(Foucault, 1967) All knowledge claims are moves in a power game. Social science can contribute to emancipation by widening and deepening our sense of community. If meanings rest with communities, knowledge can have a specific role in promoting human solidarity.(Waever, Ole, 1996:171)

Value Issues

Even in a conventional mode of inquiry,values are not always consideredseparate from analysis. The accumulation of more data and testing hypotheses may reveal a trend in the arms race. However, the ultimate analytical goal should be not only explanatory but also prescriptive. The goals of peace research are defined in terms ofbroadhuman interests which arenot dealt with by a state-centric paradigm.Humandimensions ofsecurity can bemore easilyunderstood in value paradigms. This paradigm shift requires a more focus on non-state centric actors, ranging from individuals to supranational institutions. The bias toward a more inclusive concept of global society as opposed to the exclusionary state can be justified in terms of a goal oriented research.

Each discipline is governed by certainsets ofassumptionsand rulesthatdetermine its approaches to knowledge and acceptable methods(Forcey, 1989:11). Peace andconflict studies have been developed byvalue-guided research paradigms. Multidimensional concepts of security explain the importance of economic equity and ecological protection. Core theories have been established around negative and positive peace. Peace has become a more inclusive concept. The underlying assumptions ofpositive peace have value implications forthe satisfaction ofbasic needs. Peaceful conditions include freedom from oppression and social justice beyond the absence of violence. The impact of povertyand economic exploitationon conflict can be empirically understood. However, their major form of inquiry ought to be dialectic. While peace and conflict studies need to be as objective as possible, it cannot succumb to the academic prejudice of total dissociation from the object of study. The starting point for peace research may be found in the ideals of social transformation through knowledge.

Efforts have been made to find a universal standard in Western societies which have a great deal of similarity in their cultural backgrounds. However, this standard may not apply to the non-Western societies because of their different value concepts. Therefore, it should be recognized that there is no universal value in the first place and that different values of peace exist in various parts of the world. We must conceptualize peace in terms of cultural expectations which various groups of people possess.

If normative pluralism is accepted, peace research must find the interactions between value expectations. It is also necessary to examine the role of different peace values in social change. The acceptance of diverse approaches to peace can co-exist with the recognition of common goals of peace research and education such as human development. Research ought to focus not only on different patterns of peacelessness prevailing in the world but also on the linkage which exists among them.

Participatory Research and Empowerment

Participatory projects are important in an organized effort of endogenous peace learning. It affects the sense of control over the world by the marginalized. Peace research can serve the survival needs specific to the grassroots level. Action research is part of a feedback process in learning those who are the object of study. The situations in local communities should be considered in terms of basic human need values.

The needs of people can be identified by integrating research and practice. Researchers should not arbitrarily define peace in their judgement but build an interactive relationship with those who are exposed to violence and are living under the condition of peacelessness. The mode of inquires for empowerment maximizes the possibilities for reflection, creativity, and full participation of all engaged in the study. Action results from interpretations and assessments of choices.

If the overall intent of peace research is to develop the well-informed public, research should be incorporated into a personal, inward, and interactive process. Research and learning are a holistic process of integrating social experiences and knowledge. The task of peace research should be the analysis of the social process through which peace can be achieved.

Critical Pedagogy and Cultural Theory

Critical pedagogy deals withsuch issues ashow knowledge canbe used tochange society. The Brazilian educator Paulo Freire criticizes a traditional method of learning which does not reflect local reality. He explains that the process of awakening people to the power of theirownquestioning.(Freire, 1996) It can be used to explore a model fortransforming society. Culture is not just a by‑product of how a society organizes its social and productive relationships. It is a vital instrument for generating the insights and energy needed to transform those relationships.

Cultural energy is a key element for mobilizing the social action that drives successful grassroots projects. It motivates social action among individuals, groups, communities, and even nations. It is generated by common people through everyday creative expression in work and entertainment. The presence or absence of cultural energy makes the difference in whether a project for social change can be launched, sustained, and expanded. Cultural energy is a powerful force in the creation and reinforcement of a group's solidarity, organizational efficiency, participation, and volunteer spirit.

This cultural theory has been applied to the explanation of a positive linkage between culture and development as well as between tradition and change. Generations of social and economic oppression and the concentration of power in a sovereign state system have made it difficult for many indigenous peoples in the Third World to survive on their own. Some found their survival strategy in the regeneration of their culture and identity. They attempt to achieve political and economic autonomy through culture‑based development.

The culturally motivated development projects helped Indians in the Ecuador highland make impressive strides since the 1970s. For more than two decades streams of national and international organizations offered relief aid, but there were no prospects for change. Typically the outside assistance was organized by the representatives of white collar professionals whose social and cultural backgrounds are far removed from those of local people. Successful grassroots initiatives sprang from a group of individuals, many of whom were born in indigenous villages. They formed an Educational Fair to promote cultural revitalization and self‑help efforts. The group encouraged community members to identify their difficulties and consider possible solutions. Two means for doing this were socio-dramas and puppet shows. This process produced a collective recognition of how the problem was rooted within the local reality.

Many of these communities have joined together to form federations that sponsored their own cultural revitalization efforts. Later they were integrated with training, production, health, and other development activities. By allowing them to examine their culture from within, participatory research provided the Sikunai Indians in Ecuador with a powerful tool for problem solving that unleashed the latent creativity in their own culture. Thus the community became a laboratory for discovering and multiplying locally available resources for development. In many indigenous communities, there is a common source of energy driving grassroots development. Cultural projects often began with local voices responding to local needs.

Goals of Peace Research

Peace research can be both a process of discovering knowledge about peace and a process of promoting peace. Research about peace helps define important issues in understanding conditions for peace. The potential for change can be increased by the realization of human capacity and value expectation. Thus it becomes important to identify the actors who could be either obstacles to or supporters of peace in various sectors of society. Peace research may focus on the different roles of various actors ranging from military industries and multi-national corporations of industrialized countries to peasants in the Third world villages. All of those actors are enclosed within a system of interdependency. The impact of these actors on political, economic, and cultural transformations, however, would be different.

Research for peace enhances a liberating experience that motivates an individual to seek changes for realizing peace. Research is a process whereby knowledge is created through a transformative experience. Therefore, the goal of peace studies is to develop alternative ways of promoting empowerment through action oriented research. For this purpose, peace research may include experiential learning which involves researchers directly in the phenomenon being studied. Field research, role plays, games, and participation in real events such as peace movements could be important methods of observation.

The goals of research areas equally important as ormore important than the processes and methods of inquiry. Peace has been often breached under the name of peace.Thus the establishment ofa normative paradigm has been criticalin peace studies. The value concept affectsthe issues which peace research should deal with. It also has an impact onthe method of selecting a subject and constructing a theory. The causes of violence can not be confirmed in an objective form unless a universally relevant measurement exists. Structural violence embedded in society may not be recognizedat allby those who take only a negative peace approach. Therefore,the definition of peace can not be made without a value judgementon how people achieve their physical and spiritual well-being.

Conclusion

Efforts to study peace more systematically are ascribed to modern social science traditions. As political and ideological differences become a less significant element, peace research may need to shiftits analysis moretohuman rights violations, political repression,unequal distributionof wealth,andother causes ofhuman sufferings. Data gathering on repression and poverty still remains a very important task in peace research. However, too muchemphasis on rigorousquantitative theorybuilding effortswould not help findcreativesolutions to problems which humanity facesat the present time and in the future.

### S

#### Large-scale SMR deployment causes extinction

Gar Smith 11, Editor Emeritus of the Earth Island Journal, Summer 2011, “Don’t Mini-mize the Dangers of Nuclear Power,” Earth Island Journal, http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/eij/article/dont\_mini-mize\_the\_dangers\_of\_nuclear\_power/

The radiation from Japan’s crippled Fukushima Daiichi reactors poisoned farmlands, contaminated the sea, and sent invisible mists of radiation wafting around the world. The latest – and it’s just the latest – atomic accident has raised new concerns about the risks of nuclear energy. But still the question remains: Are we wise enough to finally understand that nuclear reactors are a fool’s technology?

Earth Island Institute founder David Brower initially believed that “atomic energy could be a safe alternative to damming all our rivers for power.” But Dave soon realized – earlier than most – that “the risk presented by these lethal wastes is like no other risk, and we should not be expected to accept it.” Despite the industry’s glib assurances, nuclear power has never been a safe or foolproof technology. For evidence of that fact, let’s review a few of the major nuclear accidents of the Atomic Age.

United Kingdom (1957): Windscale reactor fire contaminates 35 workers. Radioactive cloud covers Northern Europe and causes at least 200 cases of cancer.

Soviet Union (1957): Radioactive explosion at Mayak reprocessing site forces evacuation of 10,000 people. Radiation contributes to deaths of 200.

USA (1975): Alabama’s Browns Ferry plant catches fire and burns for seven hours with two reactors running. Meltdown feared as fire destroys controls.

USA (1979): Partial core meltdown at Three Mile Island. Radiation released. Thousands evacuated.

USA (1981): California’s San Onofre plant closed for 14 months to repair 6,000 leaking steam tubes. During restart, plant catches fire, knocking out one of two back-up generators.

United Kingdom (1983): Beaches near Sellafield (formerly Windscale) nuclear processing plant closed due to radiation contamination.

Soviet Union (1986): Chernobyl explosion. World’s worst nuclear accident – so far. Estimates of associated deaths run from 9,000 to nearly one million people.

Japan (1997): Chain reaction at Tokaimura reprocessing plant exposes 37 workers and surrounding neighborhoods to radiation.

Japan (1999): Two workers killed at Tokaimura during unplanned chain reaction.

Japan (2004): Steam explosion kills four at Mihama reactor.

Sweden (2006): Short circuit disables emergency power at Forsmark reactor. Catastrophic core meltdown barely averted.

France (2008): Tricastin nuclear facility accidentally releases 18,000 liters of irradiated water.

And that’s just a partial list. The problem with nuclear power is simple: It’s too complex. When things go wrong – as they inevitably do, because humans are fallible – the consequences can be deadly.

The Fukushima disaster has severely hobbled the atomic industry’s hopes for a big-ticket nuclear renaissance. So the American Nuclear Society has proposed a mini-renaissance based on “Small Modular Reactors,” or SMRs. Cheaper, quicker to build, and small enough to fit in a garage, SMRs could power homes, factories, and military bases. South Carolina’s Savannah River National Laboratory hopes to start building SMRs at a New Mexico plant and is taking a lead role in a GE-Hitachi demonstration project.

Even as Japanese engineers were working to contain the radiation risks at Fukushima, an international SMR conference in South Carolina in April attracted representatives from Westinghouse, AREVA, GE, the International Atomic Energy Agency, China National Nuclear Corp., Iraq Energy Institute, the US Army, and many US utilities.

But SMRs still depend on designs that generate intense heat, employ dangerous materials (highly reactive sodium coolant), and generate nuclear waste. SMRs also retain all the risks associated with supplying, maintaining, safeguarding, and dismantling large nuclear reactors – only now those risks would be multiplied and decentralized.

The planet can’t afford nuclear energy – be it mega or mini. As Dave Brower observed 30 years ago: “Is the minor convenience of allowing the present generation the luxury of doubling its energy consumption every 10 years worth the major hazard of exposing the next 20,000 generations to this lethal waste?

“We are at the edge of an abyss and we’re close to being irrevocably lost,” Dave warned. “As the Welshman Allen Reese puts it: ‘At the edge of the abyss, the only progressive move you can make is to step back.’”

#### Military SMRs fail---more dangerous and costly than big reactors

Matthew Baker 12, Adjunct Junior Fellow at the American Security Project, 1/22/12, “Do Small Modular Reactors Present a Serious Option for the Military’s Energy Needs?,” http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/do-small-modular-reactors-present-a-serious-option-for-the-militarys-energy-needs/

The speakers at the DESC briefing suggested a surge is needed in SMR production to combat a major vulnerability in America’s national security: possible attacks to the power grid. Such attacks could cause blackouts for over a year according to Congressman Bartlett, leading to blackouts never before experienced in the United States. In such an event the U.S. military would still need to function 24/7. Current predictions made by the DESC suggest that up to 90% of the US military’s energy needs could be supplied by SMRs.

Congressman Bartlett also pointed out that current military bases such as Guam – which is fueled by the transport of diesel – are extremely vulnerable should the energy transport system be disrupted. Fuel supplies are even more unstable in Afghanistan, where one out of every twenty-four convoys results in a casualty. According to Congressman Bartlett, SMRs could make such bases energy self-sufficient.

Unfortunately all the hype surrounding SMRs seems to have made the proponents of SMR technology oblivious to some of its huge flaws.

Firstly like large reactors, one of the biggest qualms that the public has to nuclear is problems associated with nuclear waste. A more decentralized production of nuclear waste inevitably resulting from an increase in SMRs production was not even discussed. The danger of transporting gas into some military bases in the Middle East is already extremely volatile; dangers of an attack on the transit of nuclear waste would be devastating.

Secondly, SMRs pose many of the same problems that regular nuclear facilities face, sometimes to a larger degree.

Because SMRs are smaller than conventional reactors and can be installed underground, they can be more difficult to access should an emergency occur. There are also reports that because the upfront costs of nuclear reactors go up as surface area per kilowatt of capacity decreases, SMRs will in fact be more expensive than conventional reactors.

Thirdly, some supporters of SMR technology seem to have a skewed opinion of public perception toward nuclear energy. Commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, William C. Ostendorff, didn’t seem to think that the recent Fukushima disaster would have any impact on the development on SMRs. Opinion polls suggest Americans are more likely to think that the costs of nuclear outweigh its benefits since the Fukushima disaster. For SMRs to be the philosopher’s stone of the military’s energy needs the public needs to be on board.

The DESC’s briefing did illustrate the hype that the nuclear community has surrounding SMRs, highlighting some pressing issues surrounding the military’s energy vulnerability. But proponents of SMRs need to be more realistic about the flaws associated with SMRs and realize that the negative impacts of nuclear technology are more costly than its benefits.

#### DOD reactors won’t be exempt from NRC licensing requirements---DOD won’t pursue exemption because they’d have to self-regulate the reactors---means the plan can’t solve for a decade

Marcus King et al 11, Associate Director of Research, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, et al., March 2011, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf

The most basic licensing issue relates to whether NRC will have jurisdiction over potential nuclear reactor sites or whether DoD could be self-regulating. Our conversations with NRC indicate it is the only possible licensing authority for reactors that supply power to the commercial grid. However, DOE and DoD are authorized to regulate mission critical nuclear facilities under Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act. There is some historical precedent for DoD exercising this authority. For example, the Army Nuclear Program was granted exception under this rule with regard to the reactor that operated aboard the Sturgis barge in the 1960s and 1970s [44].

It seems unlikely that DoD would pursue exemption under Section 91b in the future. 10 Regulating power plants is a function that lies beyond DoD's core mission. The Department and the military services are unlikely to have personnel with sufficient expertise to act as regulators for nuclear power plants, and it could take considerable time and resources to develop such expertise. Without NRC oversight DoD would bear all associated risks.

The time required to obtain design certification, license, and build the next generation of nuclear plants is about 9 to 10 years. After the first plants are built it may be possible to reduce the time required for licensing and construction to approximately 6 years [45].

The timeline for certification, licensing, and construction projected by DOE for a small nuclear power plant based on an SMR is shown in figure 5 [46].

## 2NC

### Solvency

#### Reactor costs go up as size goes down---first of a kind costs are uniquely expensive---more than current large reactors

Thomas B. Cochran 12, member of the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council, was a senior scientist and held the Wade Greene Chair for Nuclear Policy at NRDC, and was director of its Nuclear Program, 5/30/12, “NRDC’s Perspectives on the Economics of Small Modular Reactors,” http://www.ne.doe.gov/smrsubcommittee/documents/NRDC%20Presentation%205-30-12.pptx

In the US, the capital cost/kW of SMRs are high and the cost of natural gas is low. The market for SMRs would be far more attractive in countries where capital costs are lower and natural gas prices are higher.

Nuclear Power Costs per Kilowatt Increase as Power Decreases:

Materials cost per kilowatt of a reactor goes up as the size goes down because the reactor surface area per kilowatt of capacity, which dominates materials cost, goes up as reactor size is decreased;

Cost per kilowatt of secondary containment, as well as independent systems for control, instrumentation, and emergency management, increases as size decreases;

Cost per kilowatt also increases if each reactor has dedicated and independent systems for control, instrumentation, and emergency management;

First-of-a-Kind (FOAK) SMRs will be Considerably More Expensive than Large Nuclear Plants, which in Turn are Not Competitive with Combined-Cycle Natural Gas Plants at Current Natural Gas Prices.

#### Chicken-egg---no investors ‘till it’s proven, no proof ‘till there’s investors

Nick Cunningham 12, Policy Analyst for Energy and Climate at the American Security Project, October 2012, “Small Modular Reactors: A Possible Path Forward for Nuclear Power,” http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200087%20-%20Small%20Modular%20Reactors.pdf

The nuclear industry has maintained a high performance standard with its fleet of large light water reactors, and SMRs would need to demonstrate the same high performance. However, as with any new technology, SMRs have no track record to prove their performance. The industry lacks a credible demonstration project that would inform future projects and inspire confidence.36 SMRS need to demonstrate advantages over conventional plants, including advantages in cost, safety and flexibility.

Looking forward, this creates a "chicken and egg" problem. In order to bring costs down, nuclear vendors will need a high-tech manufacturing facility to mass produce small reactors. However, in order to justify the construction of such a facility, the industry estimates it will need to book dozens of orders upfront. It cannot book these orders without proof of cost, safety and performance. Industry leaders are hesitant to be the "first-mover" in an uncertain market, and governments are reluctant to provide incentives or invest in unproven products.

K

#### reframing solves all of their motivation offense---we can reconstitute our relationship to the environment through ethical and local justifications

Deudney 99 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT JOHNS HOPKINS, 1999 “ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY A CRITIQUE,” CONTESTED GROUNDS, ED. DEUDNEY & MATTHEW, P. EBOOK

Fortunately, environmental awareness need not depend upon co-opted national security thinking. Integrally woven into ecological concerns are a powerful set of interests and values—most notably human health and property values, religions and ethics, and natural beauty and concern for future generations. Efforts to raise awareness of environmental problems can thus connect directly with these strong, basic, and diverse human interests and values as sources of motivation and mobilization. Far from needing to be bolstered by national security mindsets, a "green" sensibility can make strong claim to being the master metaphor for an emerging postindustrial civilization. Instead of attempting to gain leverage by appropriating national security thinking, environmentalists can gain much more political leverage by continuing to develop and disseminate this immensely rich and powerful worldview.

Earth Nationalism

Transposing existing national security thinking and approaches to environmental politics is likely to be both ineffective, and to the extent effective, counterproductive. But the story should not end with this negative conclusion. Fully grasping the ramifications of the emerging environmental problems requires a radical rethinking and reconstitution of many of the major institutions of industrial modernity, including the nation. The nation and the national, as scholars on the topic emphasize, are complex phenomena because so many different components of identity have become conflated with or incorporated into national identities. Most important in Western constructions of national identity have been ethnicity, religion, language, and war memories. However, one dimension of the national—identification with place—has been underappreciated, and this dimension opens important avenues for reconstructing identity in ecologically appropriate ways. Identification with a particular physical place, what geographers of place awareness refer to as "geopiety" and "topophilia," has been an important component of national identity.35 As Edmund Burke, the great philosopher of nationalism, observed, the sentimental attachment to place is among the most elemental widespread and powerful of forces, both in humans and in animals. In the modern era the nation-state has sought to shape and exploit this sentimental attachment.

With the growth of ecological problems, this sense of place and threat to place takes on a new character. In positing the "bioregion" as the appropriate unit for political identity, environmentalists are recovering and redefining topophilia and geopiety in ways that subvert the state-constructed and state-supporting nation. Whether the bioregion is understood as a particular locality defined by ecological parameters, or the entire planet as the only naturally autonomous bioregion, environmentalists are asserting what can appropriately be called "earth nationalism." 36 This construction of the nation has radical implications for existing state and international political communities. This emergent earth nationalism is radical both in the sense of returning to fundamental roots, and in posing a fundamental challenge to the state-sponsored and defined concept of nation now hegemonic in world politics. It also entails a powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection as the practice of national security.

#### AND, this proves that their representations only mobilize nationalism for war

Deudney 91 Daniel, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, GoogleBooks, 24-26

Another motive for speaking of environmental degradation as a threat to natural security is rhetorical: to make people respond to environmental threats with a sense of urgency. But before harnessing the old horse of national security to pull the heavy new environmental wagon, one must examine its temperament. The sentiments associated with national security are powerful because they relate to war. Historian Michael Howard has observed: "Self-consciousness as a Nation implies, by definition, a sense of differentiation from other communities, and the most memorable incidents in the group memory usually are of conflict with, and triumph over, other communities. It is in fact very **difficult to create national self-consciousness without a war**."' If the emotional appeals of national security can somehow be connected to environmental issues, then it is also possible that other, less benign associations may be transferred. Yet the national security mentality engdenders an enviable sense of urgency, and a corresponding willingness to accept great personal sacrifice. Unfortunately, these emotions may be difficult to sustain. Crises call for resolution, and **the patience of a mobilized populace is rarely long**. A cycle of arousal and somnolence is unlikely to establish permanent patterns of environmentally sound behavior, and “crash” solutions are often bad ones. For example, the energy crisis of the 1970s spawned such white elephants as the proposed synfuels program, the “energy mobilization board,” and a Byzantine system of price controls. Finally, the “nation” is not a concept waiting to be defined, but is instead profoundly linked to war and “us against them” thinking. The stronger the nationalism, the stronger the distinction between friend and foe. In contrast, in the environmental sphere “we”—not “they”—are the “enemy.” Existing groups of opponents in world politics do not match the causal lines of environmental degradation. In fail, intense nationalism conflicts with the globalism that has been one of the most important insights of environmentalism. Thinking of the environment as a national security problem risks undercutting the sense of world community and common fate that may be necessary to solve the problem. If pollution is seen as a threat to national security, there is also a danger that the citizens of one country will resent the pollution from other countries more than the pollution created by their fellow citizens. U.S. citizens, for example, could become much more concerned about deforestation in Brazil than about reversing centuries of North American deforestation. This could increase international tensions, make international agreements more difficult to achieve, and divert attention from solving internal problems. Taken to an absurd extreme—as national security threats sometimes are—seeing environmental degradation in a neighboring country as a national security threat could trigger various types of **intervention and imperialism**. Instead of linking national security to the environment, environmentalists should emphasize that global ecological problems call into **question the** nation-**state and its privileged status** in world politics. Ecological decay is not a threat to national security, but it challenges the utility of thinking in national terms.

### FW/Perm/Alt

#### We don’t need an alternative besides our framework of analysis---the fantasy will reveal itself as long as we continue asking questions to expose their concealment of the lack---in other words, it’s your job to confuse and frustrate them via a refusal to partake in their politics---this crushes the permutation

Dean 6Jodi, Prof of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2006, Zizek’s Politics. Xviii-xx

Žižek emphasizes that Lacan conceptualized this excessive place, this place without guarantees, in his formula for “the discourse of the analyst” (which I set out in Chapter Two). In psychoanalysis, the analyst just sits there, asking questionsfrom time to time. She is some kind of object or cipher onto which the analysand transfers love, desire, aggression, and knowledge. The analysand, in other words, proceeds through analysis by positing the analyst as someone who knows exactly what is wrong with him and exactly what he should do to get rid of his symptom and get better. But, really, the analyst does not know. Moreover, the analyst steadfastly refuses to provide the analysand with any answers whatsoever. No ideals, no moral certainty, no goals, no choices. Nothing. This is what makes the analyst so traumatic, Žižek explains, the fact that she refuses to establish a law or set a limit, that she does not function as some kind of new master.7 Analysis is over when the analysand accepts that the analyst does not know, that there is not any secret meaning or explanation, and then takes responsibility for getting on with his life. The challenge for the analysand, then, is freedom, autonomously determining his own limits, directly assuming his own enjoyment. So, again, the position of the analyst is in this excessive place as an object through which the analysand works through the analytical process. Why is the analyst necessary in the first place? If she is not going to tell the analysand what to do, how he should be living, then why does he not save his money, skip the whole process, and figure out things for himself? There are two basic answers. First, the analysand is not self-transparent. He is a stranger to himself, a decentered agent “struggling with a foreign kernel.”8 What is more likely than self-understanding, is self-misunderstanding, that is, one’s fundamental misperception of one’s own condition. Becoming aware of this misperception, grappling with it, is the work of analysis. Accordingly, second, the analyst is that external agent or position that gives a new form to our activity. Saying things out loud, presenting them to another, and confronting them in front of this external position concretizes and arranges our thoughts and activities in a different way, a way that is more difficult to escape or avoid. The analyst then provides a form through which we acquire a perspective on and a relation to our selves. Paul’s Christian collectives and Lenin’s revolutionary Party are, for Žižek, similarly formal arrangements, forms “for a new type of knowledge linked to a collective political subject.”9 Each provides an external perspective on our activities, a way to concretize and organize our spontaneous experiences. More strongly put, a political Party is necessary precisely because politics is not given; it does not arise naturally or organically out of the multiplicity of immanent flows and affects but has to be produced, arranged, and constructed out of these flows in light of something larger. In my view, when Žižek draws on popular culture and inserts himself into this culture, he is taking the position of an object of enjoyment, an excessive object that cannot easily be recuperated or assimilated. This excessive position is that of the analyst as well as that of the Party. Reading Žižek as occupying the position of the analyst tells us that it is wrong to expect Žižek to tell us what to do, to provide an ultimate solution or direction through which to solve all the world’s problems. The analyst does not provide the analysand with ideals and goals; instead, he occupies the place of an object in relation to which we work these out for ourselves. In adopting the position of the analyst, Žižek is also practicing what he refers to as “Bartleby politics,” a politics rooted in a kind of refusal wherein the subject turns itself into a disruptive (of our peace of mind!) violently passive object who says, “I would prefer not to.”10 Thus, to my mind, becoming preoccupied with Žižek’s style is like becoming preoccupied with what one’s analyst is wearing. Why such a preoccupation? How is this preoccupation enabling us to avoid confronting the truth of our desire, our own investments in enjoyment? How is complaining that Žižek (or the analyst) will not tell us what to do a way that we avoid trying to figure this out for ourselves?11 Reading Žižek in terms of an excessive object also means seeing his position as analogous to the formal position of the Party. Here it tells us that rather than a set of answers or dictates, Žižek is providing an intervention that cuts through the multiplicity of affects and experiences in which we find ourselves and organizes them from a specific perspective. As we shall see, for Žižek, this perspective is anchored in class struggle as the fundamental antagonism rupturing and constituting the social. So again, he does not give us an answer; he does not know what we should do, but his thought provides an external point in relation to which we can organize, consider, and formalize our experiences as ideological subjects.

### Nuclear SOE

#### Expansion of nuclear energy as a security strategy displaces environmental impacts onto the periphery and makes structural violence inevitable---they set up the US as the arbiter of international energy and spreads technology to some for the purpose of excluding others---creates an international nuclear state of exception.

Kaur 11 Dr. Raminder Kaur is Senior Lecturer in University of Sussex, "A ‘Nuclear Renaissance’, Climate Change and the State of Exception" London The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 2011 www.dianuke.org/a-‘nuclear-renaissance’-climate-change-and-the-state-of-exception/

In Jaitapur, we have already seen how the local village Panchayats (representative self-governance bodies) are gagged and overruled to clear way for Areva’s nuclear power park. Ironically, India’s nuclear deal with the US was touted as a deal between world’s oldest and biggest democracies. Read below Dr. Raminder Kaur’s brilliant analysis on how nuclear discourse becomes totalizing, more so when it meets the official discourses on climate change.

Increasingly, nation-states such as China, France, Russia, Britain and India are promoting the nuclear option: firstly, as the main large-scale solution to developing economies, growing populations, and increasing demands for a consumer-led lifestyle, and secondly, in order to tend to environmental concerns of global warming and climate change.[i] India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, speaking at a conference of atomic scientists in Delhi, for instance, announced a hundred-fold increase to 470,000 megawatts of energy that could come from Indian nuclear power stations by 2050. He said, ‘This will sharply reduce our dependence on fossil fuels and will be a major contribution to global efforts to combat climate change, adding that Asia was seeing a huge spurt in “nuclear plant building” for these reasons (Ramesh 2009).The Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster of March 2011 has, for the time being at least, dented some nation-state’s nuclear power programmes. In India, however, the government has declared that it has commissioned further safety checks whilst continuing its nuclear development as before.

Whilst the ‘carbon lobby’, including the fossil-fuels industries, stand to gain by undermining the validity of global warming, it appears that the ‘nuclear lobby’ benefits enormously from the growing body of evidence for human-based global warming. This situation has led to a significant nuclear renaissance with the promotion of nuclear power as ‘clean and green energy’. John Ritch, Director General of the World Nuclear Association, goes so far as to describe the need to embrace nuclear power as a ‘global and environmental imperative’, for ‘Humankind cannot conceivably achieve a global clean-energy revolution without a huge expansion of nuclear power’ (Ritch nd). To similar ends, India’s Union Minister of State for Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, remarked, ‘It is paradoxical that environmentalists are against nuclear energy’ (Deshpande 2009). With a subtle sleight of hand, nuclear industries are able to promote themselves as environmentally beneficial whilst continuing business-as-usual at an expansive rate.

Such global and national views on climate change are threatening to monopolise the entire environmentalist terrain where issues to do with uranium and thorium mining, the ecological costs of nuclear power plant construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning, the release of water coolant, and the transport and storage of radioactive waste are held as subsidiary considerations to the threat of climate change. Basing much of my evidence in India, I note how the conjunction of nuclear power and climate change has lodged itself in the public imagination and is consequently in a powerful position, creating a ‘truth regime’ favoured both by the nuclear lobby and those defenders of climate change who want more energy without restructuration of market-influenced economies or changes in consumerist lifestyle. The urgency of climate change discourses further empower what I call the ‘nuclear state of exception’ which, in turn, lends credence to the veracity of human-centric global warming.

The Nuclear State of Exception

Although Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) work on the normalisation of exceptional state practice has been much cited, it would appear that Robert Jungk anticipated some of his main axioms. Jungk outlines how the extraordinary, as it pertains to the state’s possession of nuclear weapons and the development of atomic industries since the mid-1940s, became the ordinary (Jungk 1979: 58). When associated with nuclear weapons, the state operates under the guise of a paradigm of security which promises ‘peace’ in terms of a nuclear deterrence to other countries, and also legitimates the excesses of state conduct whilst abrogating citizens’ rights in the name of ‘national security’. Jungk adds that, in fact, state authoritarianism applied to all nation-states with nuclear industries: ‘Nuclear power was first used to make weapons of total destruction for use against military enemies, but today it even imperils citizens in their own country, because there is no fundamental difference between atoms for peace and atoms for war’ (Jungk 1979: vii). The inevitable spread of technological know-how through a range of international networks and the effects of the US’ ‘atoms for peace’ program in the 1950s led to a greater number of nations constructing institutions for civilian nuclear power, a development that was later realised to enable uranium enrichment for the manufacture of weapons.

Due to the indeterminacy between atoms for peace and atoms for war, the nuclear industries began to play a key part in several nations’ security policies, both externally with reference to other states, and also internally with reference to objectors and suspected anti-national contingents. Jungk notes ‘the important social role of nuclear energy in the decline of the constitutional state into the authoritarian nuclear state’ by focusing on a range of indicators, including a report published by the American National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice in 1977 which suggested that:

in view of the ‘high vulnerability of technical civilization’, emergency legislation should be introduced making it possible temporarily to ignore constitutional safeguards without previous congressional debate or consultation with the Supreme Court. (1979: 135)

The bio-techno-political mode of governance encapsulates subjects into its folds such that it becomes a ‘technical civilisation’ – a civilisation that, although promising favourable aspects of modernity to the populace and development for the country, is also to be accompanied by several risks to human and environmental safety that propel states including democracies further towards authoritarianism. ‘Big science’ – that is, science that is centralised or at least circumscribed by the state – and the bureaucracies surrounding it play a critical part in the normalisation of the state of exception, and the exercise of even more power over their citizens.

Jungk elaborates on the routinisation of nuclear state violence, epistemological, juridical and physical:

Such measures will be justified, not as temporary measures made necessary by an exceptional emergency … but by the necessity of providing permanent protection for a perpetually endangered central source of energy that is regarded as indispensable. A nuclear industry means a permanent state of emergency justified by a permanent threat. (1979: 135)

This permanent state of emergency with respect to anything nuclear applies to restrictions on citizens’ freedom, the surveillance and criminalisation of critics and campaigners, the justification of the mobilisation of thousands of policemen and sometimes military to deal with peaceful demonstrators against nuclear power, and a hegemony on ‘truth-claims’ where the nuclear industries are held as the solution to growing power needs whilst advancing themselves as climate change environmentalists. In this way, power structures and lifestyles need not be altered where nuclear power becomes, ironically, a powerful mascot of ‘clean and green’ energy.

In India, the capitalist modality of the nuclear state was exacerbated by the ratification of the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement in 2008, a bilateral accord which enables those countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to provide material and technology for India’s civilian nuclear operations even though it is not a signatory to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. This has led to an expansion of the nuclear industries in the country where the limited indigenous resources of uranium could then be siphoned into the nuclear weapons industries. The imposition of the nuclear state hand-in-hand with multinational corporations in regions such as Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu (with the Russian nuclear company, Atomstroyexport), Haripur in West Bengal (with the Russian company, Rosatom) or Jaitapur in Maharashtra (with the French company, Areva), without due consultation with residents around the proposed nuclear power plants, has prompted S. P. Udayakumar (2009) to recall an earlier history of colonisation describing the contemporary scenario as an instance of ‘nucolonization (nuclear + colonization)’.

The Indian nuclear state, with its especial mooring in central government, has conducted environmental enquiries primarily for itself – and this so in only a summary fashion. In a context where the Ministry of Environment and Forests can override the need for an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report for the first two nuclear reactors at Koodankulam in 2001, saying that the decision was first made in the 1980s before the EIA Notification Act (1994); or where the Supreme Court of India can dismiss a petition against the construction of these reactors simply by saying: ‘There is no reason as to why this court should sit in appeal over the Governmental decision relating to a policy matter more so, when crores of rupees having [sic] been invested’ (cited in Goyal 2002), then there is a strong basis upon which to consider the Indian state as a whole as a nuclearised state – that is, a state wherein matters relating to nuclear issues are given inordinate leeway across the board. The nuclear enclave consisting of scientists, bureaucrats and politicians, is both the exception to and the rule that underpins the rest of state practice. So even though we may be talking about a domain of distinct governmental practice and political technology as encapsulated by the notion of a nuclear state, it is evident that its influence spreads beyond the nuclear domain in a discourse of nuclearisation through state-related stratagems which have become increasingly authoritarian and defence-orientated since the late 1990s. In a nutshell, discourses about the urgency of climate change, global warming, nuclear power and defence have converged in a draconian and oppressive manner that now parades itself as the necessary norm for the nation.

### AT blight

#### Individual not gov

**du Preez 89—**prof emeritus, psychology, U Cape Town. (Peter, Blight's Recent Articles, Political Psychology, 10;3, JSTOR, AMiles)

The big mistake is that psychologists look at governments as though they were persons or agents. This comes out most clearly in Blight's argu- ments against the application of Deutsch's (1983) work on malignant spirals in which each deterrent threat leads to an escalating threat. Blight argues that cooperative and malignant spirals may well be produced by trust and mistrust between persons, but not between sovereign nations (Blight, 1987, p. 18). Governments act on the basis of interests, not on the basis of motives or psychological factors. He cites George Kennan: "Government is not an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the na- tional society it represents; not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience" (Blight, 1987, p. 18).

There are two large difficulties with this formulation. First, persons take on the various roles of government and act as they think they ought to act in these roles, interpreting them and bringing to bear all the resources and failings they might have. We may cite a prescriptive role definition, but this has to be interpreted and enacted by a particular person. The definition of rationality (serving the national interest and avoiding moral impulses) and the definition of performance (behaving as persons in their positions are sup- posed to behave) do not obliterate psychodynamics. We may define homo economicus and homo sociologicus-the ideal calculator and the ideal role taker-but we cannot expect any dynamic individual to fit these exactly or ideal- ly. In fact, psychodynamic analysis is never the analysis of persons in the abstract, but always of persons in roles and situations, whether as parents, teachers, farm- ers, or whatever. The roles change the behavior; persons change the roles.

The second thing that is wrong with Blight's grounds for rejecting Deutsch is his own practice. After telling us that governments or nations are not persons he invites us to focus on a phenomenological study of leaders in crisis situations. There is nothing wrong with this except that **it doesn't agree with his rejection of psychology**. Presumably, phenomenology is the phenomenology of persons and not abstractions, or "governments." He urges us to "try to get inside the thinking of its key participants" and comments on Rusk's analysis of crisis behavior that "personality, perception, even psy- chophysiology, and especially learning - these all veritably leap from Rusk's retrospective analysis" (1987, p. 27). **When we look at the ways in which per- sons assess risks, experience fear, or imagine responses, we are in the realms of psychology**. We discover that **government is made up of people** (playing specialized roles) and that these people have interests as well as motives. As Stein (1987, p. 690) observes, policies emerge from the depths and are only later rationalized. To reject the contributions of psychologists because poli- cy makers think their problems are exclusively rational is, therefore, a poor reason for doing so. It is true that problem solving in the crisis may be ex- perienced as purely rational decision making, but the assumptions on which that decision making is based, the interests which are served, and the definition of events which lead to the crisis will each have to be analyzed multifactoral- ly, to include psychological variables.

### AT: Falsification

#### Falsification is an epistemically bankrupt standard---all theories of knowledge definitionally require axiomatic tautologies and then proceed with different methods of verification

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It is not always easy to see if a statement or series of statements functions as a tautology. Before analysis, circular statements often appear to be empirical descriptions. Moreover, empirical descriptions can come to function as a priori tautologies or definitions. Statements can function as definitions that in a sense set out what we mean by the empirical verification they purport to offer. For example, in exploring the nature of "language games," Wittgenstein asks the following question: If under "normal conditions" water boils at 100°C, is this statement true on empirical grounds or does it function as a definition of what water is? Or, in some sense, as both? Clearly, if under normal conditions, we were to heat a clear liquid and find that it did not boil at one hundred degrees, we would have good reason to suspect that it was not water. By definition. But what if we had some water that did not boil at one hundred degrees, would we be facing a theoretical or an empirical dilemma? In historical terms, it seems that our statement about water once functioned as an empirical description: this description was part of the work undertaken to quantify nature. But today it is more accurate to say that the statement functions as a definition, or as a tautology that goes to make up our worldview. It is one of the many definitions that we use to define what we mean by water and, in turn, to define many relationships involving water, heat, and identities quantifying the world. Tautologies, or definitions, are tools we use to bring order to the world and what we find in the world.

Definitions are part of knowledge, but the crucial issue for any theory is to set forth the criteria for how definitions are used in making models and applying them. Use is meaningful only if rules can be given that link the definition to a context. Context imposes the constraints of verification. Science or knowledge in any meaningful sense demands rules for verification. Verification is an issue, however, that is rarely brought up by literary theorists. It is a bit as if literary theorists had all read the philosopher of science Karl Popper and, having found they cannot meet his demands that they offer criteria for falsifying their models, had decided that verification is a pseudoissue for the humanities or social sciences. But modern epistemology hardly makes of falsification the only criterion for verification. Popper rejected evolution as a scientific theory on the grounds that there are no adequate grounds for falsifying it. Given this absurdity, it is reasonable to argue that if everything speaks for a model, there is no need to find something to speak against it. But something must speak for it.

There is no single set of criteria for verification. Paleontology, neurology, and quantum mechanics cannot have exactly the same criteria for verification. In some sciences the nature of their models demand, minimally, for verification the reproduction of the same results by more than one researcher under the same conditions (recall the recent comedy of trying to duplicate the low-temperature fusion of hydrogen atoms in several laboratories). Falsification can play an important role in this type of verification. But disciplines like astrophysics and paleobiology work in areas in which reproduction of results or falsification are largely pseudoissues because they are not possible. My point is, then, that each individual science—or form of knowledge—has its own protocols for confirmation or falsification of its results, even if ideally the universal applicability of procedures is a demand of science. One ideal goal of science is to formulate a testable hypothesis and therewith confirm a model that admits of universal application. In practice, each individual discipline must finally resort to various types of confirmation based on the rationality of their inquiry. They must content themselves with what the pragmatic philosopher Bas C. Van Fraassen calls the empirical adequacy of their results and recognize what the logician Willard Quine calls the possibility that multiple models may offer adequate explanations of the same empirical phenomena.1

#### It’s falsifiable, but even if not it’s irrelevant [explain] – also good AT: “but social sciences are a good heuristic model”

Dean 5 COLIN LESLIE DEAN, BSC, BA, B.LITT(HON) ,MA, B.LITT(HON), MA, MA(PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES), "THE IRRATIONAL AND ILLOGICAL NATURE OF SCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE DEMARCATIONOF SCIENCE AND NON-SCIENCE IS A PSEUDO PROBLEM" gamahucherpress.yellowgum.com/books/psychoanalysis/THE\_IRRATIONAL\_AND\_ILLOGICAL\_NATURE\_OF\_SCIENCE\_AND\_PSYCHOANA.pdf

Grunbaum, in 1984, published a book which took issue with the positivist attack upon the un-falsifiablity of psychoanalysis Grunbaum " argues that, although perhaps more difficult to study than in the physical sciences, cause-effect principles apply just as strongly in psychology as in physics. He also shows that many psychoanalytical postulates are falsifiable ..." A, Bateman, & J, Holmes claim that repression, unconscious awareness, identification and internalization are scientifically proven. Now despite Grunbaum's apparent demonstration of the falsifablity of psychoanalysis some theorists claim that the external validation of psychoanalysis is doomed to fail. These theorists follow Ricoeur in claiming a hermeneutic understanding of psychoanalysis. They claim that instead of a correspondence with reality, as being the criteria upon which to assess psychoanalysis, they claim that ". internal coherence and narrative plausibility as the basis for settling disputes."

Thus we see there are those, like Grunbaum, who argue that psychoanalysis can be tested against the facts of reality and potentially its postulates can be falsified by reality. On the other hand there are those, like Ricoeur, who advocate a hermenutical approach where it is not a correspondence with reality that matters but whether the psychoanalytic theory is internally consistent and its interpretations or narratives satisfying or not. A theory is falsifiable, in the correspondence theory of 'truth' if it does not agree with reality. In the coherence theory of 'truth' a theory is falsifiable ifit is inconsistent in terms of the system. I will argue that both criteria are flawed and lack epistemological support.

In this regard we see that the debate on the falsifiablity of psychoanalysis is a debate between correspondence and coherence theorists. Now the correspondence and coherence theories of 'truth' are philosophically flawed. I will show how they are flawed and lack epistemological support. What I will draw from this is my claim that it does not matter whether psychoanalysis is falsifiable or not either in terms of the correspondence or coherence theories of 'truth' because both lack epistemological support.

A way of looking at a theory is to see at as a set of statements which say something about a state of affair about reality. Under this viewpoint the issue is what is the relation between the statement and reality that makes it 'true' or 'false'. O'Hear notes 'true' statements correspond or picture reality . But the problem with this is that " how can a statement- something linguistic - correspond to a fact or state of affairs. Certainly it cannot be a replica of a state of affairs , nor does it fit with it in the way a nut might be said to correspond with a nut. Further, even if we could make some sense of a simple affirmative factual statement .... There are considerable problems with knowing just what it is other statements are supposed to correspond to." What about negative statements that say something is not or does not exist? What aboutcounterfactural statements? Do mathematical and moral statements correspond to something in reality? Are there universal statements that correspond to reality?

The correspondence theory of 'truth' that sees statements as corresponding to reality is thus problematic. The problems are such that, as O'Hear notes " ... the correspondence relation are simply shadowy reflections of statements we regard as true for other reasons rather than as generally mind-independent realities." When we realize that there is no non-conceptual view about reality we realize that even 'reality' is a value-laden conceptual laden term. As some argue all theory is value laden there are no facts uncontaminated by epistemological, metaphysical, other theories, and ontological views. The result of all this is to undermine the claims of the correspondence theory such that "... there is something futile in thinking that what we know is achieved by direct access to a mind-independent reality, which would suggest that a naive correspondence view of truth, at least, is likely to be able to give us little guidance in our actual inquiries and researches." We shall see that the coherence theory of 'truth' fares no better in guiding our research or acessing our actual statements about 'truth' or falsidity.

In the coherence theory of 'truth' the criteria of 'truth' is that a statement does not contradict other statements. O'Hear notes that "systems here are regarded as being governed by nothing more mysterious than normal relations of implication and contradiction." But as has been pointed out it is quite easy to avoid contradiction by dropping inconsistent statements . If a statement is inconsistent with theory or observation we can just drop either the theory or observational statement. Also many scientific theory suffer from empirical counter-evidence which we nevertheless still accept. What happens when two or more theories i.e. Kleinian, Lacanian, Freudian, ego-psychology etc, are lets say coherent but contain mutually contradictory statements in regard to each other. In other words what about the situation when theories are coherent but contradict each other. O'Hear points out " that many would regard this as a conclusive objection to the coherence theory of truth, for surely whether a statement is true or not depends on the facts and not on the systems we are using to interpret the facts." But here is the big problem. We showed above that facts are themselves value conceptual laden. The correspondence theory of 'truth' in fact is not epistemologically or metaphysically etc neutral- we see the facts through other theories. But we have just seen that in seeing the facts through other theories assumes that the theories are coherence, but coherence theories of 'truth' as we have seen are epistemologically flawed.

Thus we see that epistemologically both the correspondence and coherence theories of 'truth' are flawed. This to my mind say that it does not matter whether psychoanalysis is falsifiable. Whether it is, or is not is based upon a particular theory of 'truth' that has no epistemological support. Now regardless of these philosophical investigations I will show that in terms of each theory there is evidence that even though their criteria are not met for some theories these theories are still used with ongoing validity. This evidence will also lend weight to my claim that it does not matter whether psychoanalysis is falsifiable or not, it can still have validity.

There are examples from physics where correspondence with reality has not resulted in the abandonment of the theory. A theory has been falsified yet nevertheless it is still used. A classic example is that of Newtonian physics. Newtonian prediction of black-body radiation failed -this was left to quantum physics to do. Also Newtonian physics failed to predict the motion of three bodies in combined gravitational motion i.e. planets . Kuhn points out that no one denied that Newtonian physic was not as science because it could not predict the speed of sound, or Newton's laws of gravitation failed to predict and account for the perigee of the moon or the motion of the moon; as he states " no one seriously questioned Newtonian theory because of the long recognized discrepancies between predictions from the theory and both the speed the speed of sound and the motion of Mercury." Thus we see that even if psychoanalysis is falsified in terms of the correspondence theory of 'truth ,the case of Newtonian physics shows us that it need not matter in the least. In this regard there is truth in Freud's provocative idea, when he states, " even if psychoanalysis showed itself as unsuccessful in every other form of nervous and psychical disease as it does in delusions, it would still remain completely justified as an irreplacable instrument of scientific research. It is true that in that case we should not be in a position to practice it." Now even in science and mathematics there are un-falsifiable entities but this does not stop them being used in those disciplines.

At the very core of science and mathematics there are un-falsifiable entities. Such things as matter, the mathematical point, anti-matter force etc. are unfalsifiable. Freud notes the presence of un-falsiable objects in psychoanalysis when he states " too it will be entirely in accord with our expectations if the basic concepts and principles of the new science (instincts, nervous energy, etc) remain for a considerable time no less indeterminate than those of the older sciences (force, mass, attraction, etc)." Thus we see that even if psychoanalysis is not falsifiable, in terms of the correspondence theory of 'truth'. just like in mathematics and science, it does not matter for a theories validity. The coherence theory of 'truth's says that if a theory or statement is inconsistent then it is false. But there are examples where this is the state of affairs but nevertheless the theories are still used.

## 1NR

#### Status quo solves islanding---the military figured out their advantage and fixed it

Michael Aimone 9-12, Director, Business Enterprise Integration, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), 9/12/12, Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk.1

Standby Power Generation

Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission critical activities on base largely through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition,

each installation has standby generators in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the generators are primed and ready to work, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power generators and support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

#### All our offense is unique---the U.S. will embrace retrenchment now but embracing the ideology of hegemony is an alibi to maintain primacy

Christopher Layne 12, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, January 27, 2012, “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing,” online: http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405

Although cloaked in the reassuring boilerplate about American military preeminence and global leadership, in reality the Obama administration’s new Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) is the first step in the United States’ adjustment to the end of the Pax Americana—the sixty-year period of dominance that began in 1945. As the Pentagon document says—without spelling out the long-term grand-strategic implications—the United States is facing “an inflection point.” In plain English, a profound power shift in international politics is taking place, which compels a rethinking of the U.S. world role.

The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The best indicators of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago.

The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be replaced by a multipolar international system. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency.

Two terms not found in the DSG are “decline” and “imperial overstretch” (the latter coined by the historian Paul Kennedy to describe the consequences when a great power’s economic resources can’t support its external ambitions). But, although President Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta may not admit it, the DSG is the first move in what figures to be a dramatic strategic retrenchment by the United States over the next two decades.

This retrenchment will push to the fore a new U.S. grand strategy—offshore balancing. In a 1997 article in International Security, I argued that offshore balancing would displace America’s primacy strategy because it would prove difficult to sustain U.S. primacy in the face of emerging new powers and the erosion of U.S. economic dominance. Even in 1997, it was foreseeable that as U.S. advantages eroded, there would be strong pressures for the United States to bring its commitments into line with its shrinking economic base. This would require scaling back the U.S. military presence abroad; setting clear strategic priorities; devolving the primary responsibility for maintaining security in Europe and East Asia to regional actors; and significantly reducing the size of the U.S. military. Subsequent to that article, offshore balancing has been embraced by other leading American thinkers, including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble and Robert Pape.

To be sure, the proponents of offshore balancing have differing ideas about its specifics. But they all agree that offshore balancing is based on a common set of core strategic principles.

● Fiscal and economic constraints require that the United States set strategic priorities. Accordingly, the country should withdraw or downsize its forces in Europe and the Middle East and concentrate is military power in East Asia.

● America’s comparative strategic advantages rest on naval and air power, not on sending land armies to fight ground wars in Eurasia. Thus the United States should opt for the strategic precepts of Alfred Thayer Mahan (the primacy of air and sea power) over those of Sir Halford Mackinder (the primacy of land power).

● Offshore balancing is a strategy of burden shifting, not burden sharing. It is based on getting other states to do more for their security so the United States can do less.

● By reducing its geopolitical and military footprint on the ground in the Middle East, the United States can reduce the incidence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism directed against it. Islamic terrorism is a push back against U.S. dominance and policies in the region and against on-the-ground forces in the region. The one vital U.S. interest there—safeguarding the free flow of Persian Gult oil—can be ensured largely by naval and air power.

● The United States must avoid future large-scale nation-building exercises like those in Iraq and Afghanistan and refrain from fighting wars for the purpose of attaining regime change.

Several of these points are incorporated in the new DSG. For example, the new strategy document declares that the United States “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” The document also states the United States will “rebalance [its] military investment in Europe” and that the American military posture on the Continent must “evolve.” (The Pentagon’s recent decision to cut U.S. ground forces in Europe from four brigades to two is an example of this “evolution.”) Finally, implicitly rejecting the post-9/11 American focus on counterinsurgency, the strategy document says that with the end of the Iraq war and the winding down of the conflict in Afghanistan, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”

The DSG reflects the reality that offshore balancing has jumped from the cloistered walls of academe to the real world of Washington policy making. In recent years the U.S. Navy, the Joint Staff and the National Intelligence Council all have shown interest in offshore balancing as an alternative to primacy. Indeed, in his February 2011 West Point speech, then defense secretary Robert Gates made two key points that expressed a clear strategic preference for Mahan over Mackinder. First, he said that “the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements—whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere.” Second—with an eye on the brewing debate about intervention in Libya—he declared that “any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.” In plain English, no more Eurasian land wars. The subsequent Libyan intervention bore the hallmarks of offshore balancing: The United States refused to commit ground forces and shifted the burden of military heavy lifting to the Europeans.

Still, within the DSG document there is an uneasy tension between the recognition that economic constraints increasingly will impinge on the U.S. strategic posture and the assertion that America’s global interests and military role must remain undiminished.

This reflects a deeper intellectual dissonance within the foreign-policy establishment, which is reluctant to accept the reality of American decline. In August 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed a “New American Moment;” reaffirmed the U.S. responsibility to lead the world; and laid out an ambitious U.S. global agenda. More recently, Mitt Romney, a leading contender for the Republican presidential nomination, declared that the twenty-first century “must be an American century” and that “America is not destined to be one of several equally balanced global powers.” These views are echoed by foreign-policy scholars who refuse to acknowledge the reality of decline or embrace a theory of “painless decline” whereby Pax Americana’s norms and institutions will survive any American retrenchment.

But, American “exceptionalism” notwithstanding, the United States is not exempt from the historical pattern of great-power decline. The country needs to adjust to the world of 2025 when China will be the number-one economy and spending more on defense than any other nation. Effective strategic retrenchment is about more than just cutting the defense budget; it also means redefining America’s interests and external ambitions. Hegemonic decline is never painless. As the twenty-first century’s second decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The central strategic preoccupation of the United States during the next two decades will be its own decline and China’s rise.

#### Retrenchment doesn’t cause conflict, lashout, or draw-in---all their studies are wrong

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. The central issue is whether prompt retrenchment is desirable or probable. Some pessimists counsel that retrenchment is a dangerous policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert Kagan, for example, warns, "A reduction in defense spending . . . would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun."1 Robert Kaplan likewise argues, "Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on being more of an offshore balancer. . . . While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities."2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3

Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic [End Page 7] about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, "Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations' identity and place in world politics. More than most, America's foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States' hegemonic role."5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, "The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress."6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7

These arguments have grim implications for contemporary international politics. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades.8 Yet, if the pessimists are correct, politicians and interests groups in the United States will be unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments. Perceptions of weakness and declining U.S. credibility will encourage policymakers to hold on to burdensome overseas commitments, despite their high costs in blood and treasure.9 Policymakers in Washington will struggle to retire from profitless military engagements and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.

First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.

Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.

Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

#### no trans wars

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, November/December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6

In fact, far from auguring chaos abroad and division at home, a policy of prudent retrenchment would not only reduce the costs of U.S. foreign policy but also result in a more coherent and sustainable strategy. In the past, great powers that scaled back their goals in the face of their diminishing means were able to navigate the shoals of power politics better than those that clung to expensive and overly ambitious commitments. Today, a reduction in U.S. forward deployments could mollify U.S. adversaries, eliminate potential flashpoints, and encourage U.S. allies to contribute more to collective defense-all while easing the burden on the United States of maintaining geopolitical dominance. A policy of retrenchment need not invite international instability or fuel partisan rancor in Washington. If anything, it could help provide breathing room for reforms and recovery, increase strategic flexibility, and renew the legitimacy of U.S. leadership.

#### Best data proves unipolar systems are four times more war-prone than multipolar alternatives---reject their impact ev because it lacks a quantitative methodology

Nuno P. Monteiro 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40

How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher.47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful.48

#### A grand strategy of primacy requires the unipole to freeze the global distribution of power---causes prolif, counter-balancing, and war

Nuno P. Monteiro 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power.60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples.

To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions.61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.”62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions.63

Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conflict but at the price of their external autonomy.64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to benefit greatly from being part of the unipolar system.65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor.66

Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole.

The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conflict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers.67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973.68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable.69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning.

In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor.70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist.71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities.72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme self-help.

There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufficient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The first two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing.

To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons

.73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers.

Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt.

The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security.74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue.

#### status gap doesn’t solve war

Nuno P. Monteiro 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40

Specifically, I show how, in addition to wars between major and minor powers and to wars among the latter, two other types of war are likely to be prevalent in a unipolar world. First, and resulting from either of the dominance strategies, are wars pitting the sole great power against minor powers. Second, and stemming from a disengagement strategy, are major power wars. My theory explores the different mechanisms leading to each type of war.

My theory therefore differs from Wohlforth’s in two key aspects. First, Wohlforth believes that power preponderance in a unipolar system is so marked that the expected costs of balancing are always prohibitive. Consequently, every state in the system will bandwagon with the unipole, making it impossible for the latter to be involved in wars. In contrast, I show that some states face lower costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning. They are therefore more likely to become recalcitrant minor powers, with whom the sole great power is likely to go to war even when implementing a defensive-dominance strategy.

Second, Wohlforth assumes that the unipole will always implement a strategy of defensive dominance: it will not engage in offensive revisionism, nor will it disengage from the world. I show how both offensive dominance and disengagement are plausible strategic options for the unipole and then extrapolate the types of conflict that each is likely to produce. Specifically, offensive dominance (like its defensive variant) is likely to pit the unipole against recalcitrant minor powers. Disengagement, for its part, brings with it the possibility of wars between major powers.

The basic intuition behind my argument is straightforward. In bipolarity and multipolarity, alliance blocs allow disputes involving minor powers to be aggregated into broader great-power tensions. A dispute involving a great power and a lesser state tends to provoke a response by the latter’s great power sponsor, producing a confrontation between two great powers.52 Likewise, disputes between lesser states often elicit the intervention of each side’s great power ally, again resulting in great power confrontation. These aggregation mechanisms, however, are not possible in unipolarity because there is no potential great power sponsor for a state threatened by the unipole—or by another state aligned with it. Thus, although unipolarity dampens great power competition, it produces competition between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers and, when the unipole disengages from the world, among major and minor powers.

An emerging unipole is likely to implement a (defensive or offensive) dominance strategy, for two reasons. First is geopolitical inertia. Unipolarity is likely preceded by either bipolarity or multipolarity, both of which foster alliances with major and minor powers.53 These alliances are likely to carry on into a unipolar world. As a result, an emerging unipole is likely to continue to engage in international affairs, at least through a strategy of defensive dominance—as reflected in the metaphors of a global policeman or night watchman often used to describe U.S. strategy throughout the 1990s. Second, a temptation to reengineer the system may lead the unipole to opt for a strategy of offensive dominance. Unipolarity minimizes structural constraints on grand strategy, and the unipole is likely to see in offensive dominance an opportunity to extract maximum benefits from its preponderance of power.54 These two reasons support dominance—be it defensive or offensive—as the strategy of choice for a unipole in a newly born unipolar system.55

After an initial period of dominance, however, the unipole may move toward a disengagement strategy. Two incentives may encourage such a shift. First, the wars into which either dominance strategy is likely to drag the unipole may overextend its capabilities. The unipole will increasingly see disengagement as allowing it to replenish its power. Second, the costs of such wars will rise cumulatively over time, possibly leading to the gradual emergence of domestic opposition to the unipole’s chosen strategy. My argument is not that the unipolar structure of the system predetermines such a shift, but rather that the maintenance of a dominance strategy is not predetermined by unipolarity either.

Furthermore, the unipole does not need to follow one of these strategies globally. It could pursue offensive dominance in one region, defensive dominance in another, and disengagement from yet another. For instance, between 1990 and 2001, the United States implemented a strategy of defensive dominance everywhere except in Africa, from which it largely disengaged after withdrawing from Somalia in 1994. Between late 2001 and 2005, when the Bush Doctrine was in full force, the United States shifted to an offensive-dominance strategy in the Middle East, toppling regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, while maintaining its defensive dominance in Europe and East Asia and remaining largely disengaged from Africa.56

This diversity of strategic options available to the unipole highlights the predictive limits of structural theory. Waltz famously argued that a theory of international politics, not being a theory of foreign policy, was ill equipped to predict how particular states would act.57 As other scholars have noted, “Polarity is at best a necessary part of an explanation rather than a sufficient explanation.”58 A full causal account of any conflict would have to take into consideration, beyond structural incentives, the unit-level decisions that lead to a breakdown in the bargaining process. Accordingly, my theory does not predict which states will become involved in conflicts in a unipolar world. Structures, however, provide incentives. In Waltz’s formulation, they “shape and shove.”59 Thus, a unipolar structure makes some states more prone to involvement in conflicts and encourages certain paths toward war. The path taken depends on the unipole’s strategy.

The extant view on unipolar peace presupposes that the unipole will consistently implement a strategy of defensive dominance. The next section shows how this strategy is likely to generate significant conflict.

**The underlying assumption of this argument is wrong—the most recent scientific evidence proves human’s aren’t predisposed to strive for social status—this is an argument that they cannot simply kick—they’ve invoked a model of how the world works that creates a self-fulfilling prophecy—turns the case and causes extinction**

**Rifkin 10** [Jeremy Rifkin MA Tufts, Senior Lecturer @ Wharton University, 1-11-10 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/the-empathic-civilization\_b\_416589.html]

The problem runs deeper than the issue of finding new ways to regulate the market or imposing legally binding global green house gas emission reduction targets. **The real crisis lies in the set of assumptions about human nature** that governs the behavior of world leaders--assumptions that were spawned during the Enlightenment more than 200 years ago at the dawn of the modern market economy and the emergence of the nation state era. The Enlightenment thinkers--John Locke, Adam Smith, Marquis de Condorcet et. al.--took umbrage with the Medieval Christian world view that saw human nature as fallen and depraved and that looked to salvation in the next world through God's grace. They preferred to cast their lot with the idea that human beings' essential nature is rational, detached, autonomous, acquisitive and utilitarian and argued that individual salvation lies in unlimited material progress here on Earth. The Enlightenment notions about human nature were reflected in the newly minted nation-state whose raison d'être was to protect private property relations and stimulate market forces as well as act as a surrogate of the collective self-interest of the citizenry in the international arena. Like individuals, nation-states were considered to be autonomous agents embroiled in a relentless battle with other sovereign nations in the pursuit of material gains. It was these very assumptions that provided the philosophical underpinnings for a geopolitical frame of reference that accompanied the first and second industrial revolutions in the 19th and 20th centuries. These beliefs about human nature came to the fore in the aftermath of the global economic meltdown and in the boisterous and acrimonious confrontations in the meeting rooms in Copenhagen, **with potentially disastrous consequences for the future of humanity and the planet.** If human nature is as the Enlightenment philosophers claimed, then we are likely doomed. It is impossible to imagine how we might create a sustainable global economy and restore the biosphere to health if each and every one of us is, at the core of our biology, an autonomous agent and a self-centered and materialistic being. **Recent discoveries in brain science and child development, however, are forcing us to rethink these long-held shibboleths** about human nature. Biologists and cognitive neuroscientists are discovering mirror-neurons--the so-called empathy neurons--that allow human beings and other species to feel and experience another's situation as if it were one's own. We are, it appears, the most social of animals and seek intimate participation and companionship with our fellows. Social scientists, in turn, are beginning to reexamine human history from an empathic lens and, in the process, discovering previously hidden strands of the human narrative which suggests that human evolution is measured not only by the expansion of power over nature, but also by the intensification and extension of empathy to more diverse others across broader temporal and spatial domains. The growing scientific evidence that we are a fundamentally empathic species has profound and far-reaching consequences for society, and may well determine our fate as a species. What is required now is nothing less than a leap to global empathic consciousness and in less than a generation if we are to resurrect the global economy and revitalize the biosphere. The question becomes this: what is the mechanism that allows empathic sensitivity to mature and consciousness to expand through history? The pivotal turning points in human consciousness occur when new energy regimes converge with new communications revolutions, creating new economic eras. The new communications revolutions become the command and control mechanisms for structuring, organizing and managing more complex civilizations that the new energy regimes make possible. For example, in the early modern age, print communication became the means to organize and manage the technologies, organizations, and infrastructure of the coal, steam, and rail revolution. It would have been impossible to administer the first industrial revolution using script and codex. Communication revolutions not only manage new, more complex energy regimes, but also change human consciousness in the process. Forager/hunter societies relied on oral communications and their consciousness was mythologically constructed. The great hydraulic agricultural civilizations were, for the most part, organized around script communication and steeped in theological consciousness. The first industrial revolution of the 19th century was managed by print communication and ushered in ideological consciousness. Electronic communication became the command and control mechanism for arranging the second industrial revolution in the 20th century and spawned psychological consciousness. Each more sophisticated communication revolution brings together more diverse people in increasingly more expansive and varied social networks. Oral communication has only limited temporal and spatial reach while script, print and electronic communications each extend the range and depth of human social interaction. By extending the central nervous system of each individual and the society as a whole, communication revolutions provide an evermore inclusive playing field for empathy to mature and consciousness to expand. For example, during the period of the great hydraulic agricultural civilizations characterized by script and theological consciousness, empathic sensitivity broadened from tribal blood ties to associational ties based on common religious affiliation. Jews came to empathize with Jews, Christians with Christians, Muslims with Muslims, etc. In the first industrial revolution characterized by print and ideological consciousness, empathic sensibility extended to national borders, with Americans empathizing with Americans, Germans with Germans, Japanese with Japanese and so on. In the second industrial revolution, characterized by electronic communication and psychological consciousness, individuals began to identify with like-minded others. Today, we are on the cusp of another historic convergence of energy and communication--a third industrial revolution--that could extend empathic sensibility to the biosphere itself and all of life on Earth. The distributed Internet revolution is coming together with distributed renewable energies, making possible a sustainable, post-carbon economy that is both globally connected and locally managed. In the 21st century, hundreds of millions--and eventually billions--of human beings will transform their buildings into power plants to harvest renewable energies on site, store those energies in the form of hydrogen and share electricity, peer-to-peer, across local, regional, national and continental inter-grids that act much like the Internet. The open source sharing of energy, like open source sharing of information, will give rise to collaborative energy spaces--not unlike the collaborative social spaces that currently exist on the Internet. When every family and business comes to take responsibility for its own small swath of the biosphere by harnessing renewable energy and sharing it with millions of others on smart power grids that stretch across continents, we become intimately interconnected at the most basic level of earthly existence by jointly stewarding the energy that bathes the planet and sustains all of life. The new distributed communication revolution not only organizes distributed renewable energies, but also **changes human consciousness.** The information communication technologies (ICT) revolution is quickly extending the central nervous system of billions of human beings and connecting the human race across time and space, allowing empathy to flourish on a global scale, for the first time in history. Whether in fact we will begin to empathize as a species will depend on how we use the new distributed communication medium. While distributed communications technologies-and, soon, distributed renewable energies - are connecting the human race, what is so shocking is that no one has offered much of a reason as to why we ought to be connected. We talk breathlessly about access and inclusion in a global communications network but speak little of exactly why we want to communicate with one another on such a planetary scale. What's sorely missing is an overarching reason that billions of human beings should be increasingly connected. Toward what end? The only feeble explanations thus far offered are to share information, be entertained, advance commercial exchange and speed the globalization of the economy. All the above, while relevant, nonetheless seem insufficient to justify why nearly seven billion human beings should be connected and mutually embedded in a globalized society. The idea of even billion individual connections, absent any overall unifying purpose, seems a colossal waste of human energy. More important, making global connections without any real transcendent purpose risks a narrowing rather than an expanding of human consciousness. But what if our distributed global communication networks were put to the task of helping us re-participate in deep communion with the common biosphere that sustains all of our lives? The biosphere is the narrow band that extends some forty miles from the ocean floor to outer space where living creatures and the Earth's geochemical processes interact to sustain each other. We are learning that the biosphere functions like an indivisible organism. It is the continuous symbiotic relationships between every living creature and between living creatures and the geochemical processes that ensure the survival of the planetary organism and the individual species that live within its biospheric envelope. If every human life, the species as a whole, and all other life-forms are entwined with one another and with the geochemistry of the planet in a rich and complex choreography that sustains life itself, then we are all dependent on and responsible for the health of the whole organism. Carrying out that responsibility means living out our individual lives in our neighborhoods and communities in ways that promote the general well-being of the larger biosphere within which we dwell. The Third Industrial Revolution offers just such an opportunity. If we can harness our empathic sensibility to establish a new global ethic that recognizes and acts to harmonize the many relationships that make up the life-sustaining forces of the planet, we will have moved beyond the detached, self-interested and utilitarian philosophical assumptions that accompanied national markets and nation state governance and into a new era of biosphere consciousness. We leave the **old world of geopolitics behind** and enter into a new world of biosphere politics, with new forms of governance emerging to accompany our new biosphere awareness. The Third Industrial Revolution and the new era of distributed capitalism allow us to sculpt a new approach to globalization, this time emphasizing continentalization from the bottom up. Because renewable energies are more or less equally distributed around the world, every region is potentially amply endowed with the power it needs to be relatively self-sufficient and sustainable in its lifestyle, while at the same time interconnected via smart grids to other regions across countries and continents. When every community is locally empowered, both figuratively and literally, it can engage directly in regional, transnational, continental, and limited global trade without the severe restrictions that are imposed by the geopolitics that oversee elite fossil fuels and uranium energy distribution. Continentalization is already bringing with it a new form of governance. The nation-state, which grew up alongside the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, and provided the regulatory mechanism for managing an energy regime whose reach was the geosphere, is ill suited for a Third Industrial Revolution whose domain is the biosphere. Distributed renewable energies generated locally and regionally and shared openly--peer to peer--across vast contiguous land masses connected by intelligent utility networks and smart logistics and supply chains favor a seamless network of governing institutions that span entire continents. The European Union is the first continental governing institution of the Third Industrial Revolution era. The EU is already beginning to put in place the infrastructure for a European-wide energy regime, along with the codes, regulations, and standards to effectively operate a seamless transport, communications, and energy grid that will stretch from the Irish Sea to the doorsteps of Russia by midcentury. Asian, African, and Latin American continental political unions are also in the making and will likely be the premier governing institutions on their respective continents by 2050. In this new era of distributed energy, governing institutions will more resemble the workings of the ecosystems they manage. Just as habitats function within ecosystems, and ecosystems within the biosphere in a web of interrelationships, governing institutions will similarly function in a collaborative network of relationships with localities, regions, and nations all embedded within the continent as a whole. This new complex political organism operates like the biosphere it attends, synergistically and reciprocally. This is biosphere politics. The new biosphere politics transcends traditional right/left distinctions so characteristic of the geopolitics of the modern market economy and nation-state era. The new divide is generational and contrasts the traditional top-down model of structuring family life, education, commerce, and governance with a younger generation whose thinking is more relational and distributed, whose nature is more collaborative and cosmopolitan, and whose work and social spaces favor open-source commons. For the Internet generation, "quality of life" becomes as important as individual opportunity in fashioning a new dream for the 21st century. The transition to biosphere consciousness has already begun. All over the world, a younger generation is beginning to realize that one's daily consumption of energy and other resources ultimately affects the lives of every other human being and every other creature that inhabits the Earth. The Empathic Civilization is emerging. A younger generation is fast extending its empathic embrace beyond religious affiliations and national identification to include the whole of humanity and the vast project of life that envelops the Earth. But our rush to universal empathic connectivity is running up against a rapidly accelerating entropic juggernaut in the form of climate change. Can we reach biosphere consciousness and global empathy in time to avert planetary collapse?

#### Violence down is game over---it proves that the SQ generates UQ for a move away from the liberal ontology of warfare---BUT, the aff creates a telos peace enforced through liberal violence---their evidence just proves that voting negative to refuse to partake in a self-fulfilling system of scenario-planning solves the case better by elevating non-violence as a priori---only a risk the aff naturalizes a more sanitized violence by overdetermining peace---they literally cannot win the debate

Dalby 11 Simon Dalby, Carleton University "PEACE AND GEOPOLITICS: IMAGINING PEACEFUL GEOGRAPHIES" Nov 2011 http-server.carleton.ca/~sdalby/papers/PEACEFUL\_GEOGRAPHIES.pdf

This paper suggests this focus on war and violence has to be read against rapidly shifting geographies and the recent general trend of reduced violence in human affairs. Whether this is the promise of the liberal peace, a transitory imperial pax, something more fundamental in human affairs, or a temporary historical blip remains to be seen, but substantial empirical analyses do suggest that violence is declining (Human Security Report 2011). This stands in stark contrast to realist assertions of war as the human condition as well as to repeated warnings about the supposed dangers to international order of rising Asian powers. Likewise the remilitarization of Anglo-Saxon culture since 9/11 has suggested that warring is a routine part of modern life. But the nature of war has changed in some important ways even if contemporary imperial adventures in peripheral places look all too familiar to historians. Peace, all this crucially implies, is a matter of social processes, not a final Telos, a resolution of the tensions of human life, nor a utopia that will arrive sometime. In Christian terms the aspirational "Kingdom of God" is a work in progress.

Nick Megoran (2011) in particular has suggested that the geography discipline needs to think much more carefully about peace making and the possibilities of non-violence as modes of political action. The key question is focused on in the Megoran's pointed refusal to accept the simplistic dismissal of the efficacy of non-violence given the obvious prevalence of violence. The point of his argument is that non-violence is a political strategy in part to respond to violence, to initiate political actions in ways that are not hostage to the use of force. In doing so, especially in his discussion of resistance to Nazi policies in Germany during the war, Megoran (2011) underplays the important points about legitimacy as part of politics, and likewise hints at the important contrast between non-violence as a strategic mode of political action. Implied here is that while war may be politics by other means, to gloss the classic Clausewitzian formulation, non¬violence is politics too. But politics plays in the larger geopolitical context, and this must not be forgotten in deliberations concerning the possible new initiatives geographers might take in thinking carefully about disciplinary contributions to peace research and practice.

Contemporary social theory might point to Michel Foucault, and the argument drawn from his writings that politics is the extension of war rather than the other way round. Given the interest in biopolitics and geogovernance within the discipline these matters are obviously relevant but the connection to peace needs to be thought carefully beyond formulations that simply assume it as the opposite of wars (Morrissey 2011). This is especially the case given the changing modes of contemporary warfare and the advocacy of violence as an appropriate policy in present circumstances. The modes of warfare at the heart of liberalism suggest that the security of what Reid and Dillon (2009) call the biohuman, the liberal consuming subject, involves a violent series of practices designed to pacify the world by the elimination of political alternatives. The tension here suggests an imperial peace, a forceful imposition of a state of non-war. In George W. Bush's terms justifying the war on terror, a long struggle to eliminate tyranny (Dalby 2009a). Peace is, in this geopolitical understanding, what comes after the elimination of opposition. In late 2011 such formulations dominated discussions of the death of Colonel Gadaffi in Libya.

The dramatic transformation of human affairs in the last couple of generations do require that would-be peaceful geographers look both to the importance of non-violence and simultaneously to how global transformations are changing the landscape of violence and social change, all of it still under the threat of nuclear devastation should major inter-state war occur once again. The re-emergence of non-violence as an explicit political strategy, and in particular the use of Gene Sharp's (1973) ideas of non-violent direct action in recent events pose these questions very pointedly. Geographers have much to offer in such re-thinking that may yet play their part in a more global understanding of how interconnected our fates are becoming and how inappropriate national state boundaries are as the premise for political action in a rapidly changing biosphere.

But to do so some hard thinking is needed on geopolitics, and on how it works as well as how peace-full scholarship might foster that which it desires. Linking the practical actions of non-violence from Tahrir Square to those of the Occupy Wall Street actions, underway as the first draft of this paper was keyboarded, requires that we think very carefully about the practices that now are designated in terms of globalization. Not all this is novel, but the geopolitical scene is shifting in ways that need to be incorporated into the new thinking within geography about war, peace, violence and what the discipline might have to say about, and contribute to, non-violence as well as to contestations of contemporary lawfare (Gregory 2006).

Whether the delegitimization of violence as a mode of rule will be extended further in coming decades is one of the big questions facing peace researchers. The American reaction to 9/11 set things back dramatically, an opportunity to respond in terms of response to a crime and diplomacy was squandered, but the wider social refusal to accept repression and violence as appropriate modes of rule has interesting potential to constrain the use of military force. The professionalization of many high technology militaries also reduces their inclination to involve themselves in repressing social movements, although here Mikhail Gorbachev's refusal to use the Red Army against dissidents in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s remains emblematic of the changes norms of acceptable rule that have been extended in the last few generations.

Geopolitics has mostly been about rivalries between great powers and their contestations of power on the large scale. These specifications of the political world focus on states and the perpetuation of threats mapped as external dangers to supposedly pacific polities. Much geopolitical discourse specifies the world as a dangerous place, hence precisely because of these mappings, one supposedly necessitating violence in what passes for a realist interpretation of great powers as the prime movers of history (Mearsheimer 2001). Geopolitical thinking is about order and order is in part a cartographic notion. Juliet Fall (2010) once again emphasizes the importance of taken for granted boundaries as the ontological given of contemporary politics. Politics is about the cartographic control of territories, as Megoran (2011) too ponders regarding the first half of the twentieth century, but it also about much more than this, despite the fascination that so many commentators have with the ideal form of the supposedly national territorial state. Part of what geographers bring to the discussion of peace is a more nuanced geographical imagination than that found in so much of international studies (Dalby 2011a).

On the other hand much of the discussion of peace sees war as the problem, peace as the solution. Implied in that is geopolitics as the problem, mapping dangers turns out to be a dangerous enterprise insofar as it facilitates the perpetuation of violence by representing other places as threats to which our place is susceptible. But this only matters if this is related to the realist assumptions of the inevitability of rivalry, the eternal search for power as key to humanity's self-organisation and the assumption that organized violence is the ultimate arbiter (Dalby 2010). Critical geopolitics is about challenging such contextualizations, and as such its relationships to peace would seem to be obvious, albeit as Megoran (2011) notes mostly by way of a focus on what Galtung (1969, 1971) calls negative peace. Given the repeated reinvention of colonial tropes in contemporary Western political discourse such critique remains an essential part of a political geography that grants peoples "the courtesy of political geography" (Mitchell and Smith 1991). Undercutting the moral logics of violence, so frequently relying on simplistic invocations of geographical inevitability, to structure their apologetics, remains a crucial contribution.

Both the practical matters of recent history and the scholarly contributions by geographers do not allow simple binary distinctions of peace and war to be used as the premise of either scholarship or political practice. History and scholarship suggest rather that peace is what comes after war; the relationship is temporal, stages in matters of violence, geography and reorganizing facts on the ground. Historically in the era of European warfare, coincident with the rise of modernity, that many people hope is now near its end, peace was that which was imposed by the victors, who in turn were the most powerful in whatever contest was followed by a "peace". Much recent geographical scholarship suggests that post conflict re-construction is a mode of peace building literally (Kirsch and Flint 2011). But those of us who would challenge war as a human institution, or think about non-violence as a strategy for a better world, will not be satisfied with a geography that is concerned only to pick up the pieces and reconfigure them after they have been shattered by the latest round of organized violence.

The key points are that reconstruction is a violent transformation of society, a world where frequently neo-liberal globalization is seen as the imposition of social forms that will not resist its logics. Hence peace is what victors impose, an imperial peace that may eventually be quite welcome to those who benefit from the new arrangements. Is peace then post-war? Perhaps it can be understood in these terms. But the corollary is the equally important point that peace is also frequently what comes before the next war. The normal human situation these days is a matter of non-war, but it is far from clear where security is enforced that this is more than a limited form of negative peace. Without large-scale de-militarization then peace is just what happens between wars. But given this then one additional key point that geographers interested in war need to pay attention to is the matter of how peace fails, how conflict escalates and how geography matters in these processes (Flint et al 2009). Peacekeeping is frequently about geographical separation as the Orwellian names for contemporary walls in terms of lines of peace have it. But there is much more geographical thinking to be done about these matters and the scales of interactions across supposedly peaceful borders, not least where what matters most is state security and its ordering principles rather than local interactions across frontiers. This is so not least because of the marked current trend to build fences around states as the supposed solution to numerous security challenges (Jones 2011).

Putting matters into historical context also suggests that war is not what it used to be, at least not after the events of the 1940s. Negative peace is about preventing conflict; non¬violence is about political strategies to delegitimise violence, to challenge the human norms of behavior that allow cultures of violence. It is important to link this to the issues of what are now called lawfare (Morrissey 2011), the use of law as power and coercion to set the rules of social and political life too. This has been a key part of the US strategy for a long time; shaping institutions to the benefit of the US economy as been what much of international relations has been about, but the larger benefits of constraining conflict are part of the larger process that international law struggles to legitimize. Rules of conduct matter in the international system and the wide-scale repudiation of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrated this point clearly.

The United Nations effectively made war illegal although the number of ways round that formal restriction has been considerable. War departments were renamed defence departments the world over, and policing, surveillance, spying as well as military action became increasingly reconfigured in terms of security. The United Nations executive committee however was named the Security Council not the Peace Council, and the rhetoric ever since has suggested that peace has to be conjoined with security, with the latter not the former paramount. Apparently peace without security isn't worth bothering about. It's peace and security. Which suggests that war is perhaps the opposite of security as well as of peace. But perhaps security is to be contrasted to violence instead? All of which requires careful conceptual thinking about the current geopolitical borders.

Crucial, but unremarked upon by many political geographers, is the simple fact that there is now widespread agreement that borders between states are fixed finally (Zacher 2001). Demarcation disputes, and no doubt some very interesting arguments about changing coastal boundaries as sea levels rise in coming decades will continue, but the territorial fixity assumption has changed one fundamental facet of warfare between states. Given the importance of territorial disputes historically as a cause of wars this point is important. So too is the finding that it matters greatly how these disputes are handled. Treated as "realist" matters of power politics territorial matters are more likely to lead to war than if diplomacy and conflict resolution are taken seriously (Vasquez and Henehan

2011).

The exceptions here do seem to prove the rule: Palestine and Kashmir are two flashpoints where attempts to move borders, or at least the refusal to accept their imposition, are key to continued violence. Fixing geographical borders removes one major historical cause of interstate warfare. Territorial aggrandizement is now mostly a thing of the past, as the reconstruction of Bosnia and the refusal to change antecedent boundaries illustrates, albeit very painfully. The title of Gearoid O'Tuathail and Carl Dahlman's (2011) book is Bosnia Remade, not Bosnia Removed, and that matters in terms of how politics is now literally mapped. This norm matters greatly and the importance of agreement on frontiers and their delimitation tragically continues in the southern areas of what until recently was the singular state of Sudan in particular.

CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES

While there is optimism over the territorial covenant on both the small scale and the very large scale the fixity of boundaries has not prevented either the violence of what Mary Kaldor (2006) called the new wars after the cold war, nor imperial adventures by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and other metropolitan states. Indeed looking at the macro-scale patterns of imperial power the question is whether current Middle East warring is but the latest phase of "Anglosphere" imperial violence (Megoran 2009). Robert Fisk's (2006) subtitle to his huge book on the region is blunt in posing the matter as the conquest of the Middle East. Understanding the United States and the United Kingdom, with various settler colonies as extensions of an Anglosphere suggests only that the patterns of conquest, and indirect but violent rule have shifted to another region of the planet, from North America in the eighteenth century to South Asia and then Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, finally now the pattern is extended to the Middle East in the latter part of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. This shifting pattern of Anglosphere violence is the updated logic of Kevin Phillips (1997) argument about the Cousin's Wars as key to the rise of British and subsequently American power. Thus focusing on the specific geographies of the war on terror is a useful antidote to the hugely exaggerated claims of Islamic threats as a global phenomenon invoking the need for an American lead world war (Podhoretz 2007).

But elsewhere violence has followed resources, at least to the sources of valuable ones and oil in particular (Le Billon and Cervantes 2009). Mary Kaldor's (2006) analysis of the new wars suggests both that globalization matters in terms of the patterns of connection that fuel and fund violence, and also in that the role of political violence is often about control of population and economic assets rather than a matter of territorial control. Militias and gangs, as well as would be micro-nationalists are not the warring entities of nation states in violent competition invading each other's territories; they are more diffuse arrangements, something more analogous to medieval geographies rather than the violent interactions of discrete clearly demarcated modern states. This is not unrelated to the imposition of the cartography of the territorial covenant, even if it has generated whole new categories of geopolitics, of ungoverned areas and regional peripheral regions where violence persists, and drones, interventions and mercenaries are commonplace.

Over the last few decades the potential for major power warfare seems to have lessened, whatever about great power interventions in peripheral places. The global economy has, of late, required much greater cooperation between political elites. The looming crises of climate change that make unilateral action less efficacious, suggest the possibilities of less confrontational assumptions as the premise in geopolitics. While resource wars get headlines, much of environmental politics is about cooperation and treaty-making rather than warfare (Dinar 2011). Much of the contemporary violence that grabs the attention of headline writers is matters of conflict, competition and rivalry but it is not the classical war Clausewitz pointed to as the contest between two autonomous combatants in a struggle of wills fought until one forces the other to concede. Much of this might fit into his categories of small wars, but that in itself is significant if it supports the contention that great powers have given up the use of major war, if not police actions, as policy.

## 2NR

structural violence outweighs

Hintjens 7 [Helen Hintjens is Lecturer in the Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales, “MDF Understanding Development Better,” http://udb.global-connections.nl/sites/udb.global-connections.nl/files/file/2923317.051%20-%20Position%20Paper%20Helen%20Hintjens.pdf]

From Johan Galtung, famous Norwegian peace ‘guru’, still alive and heads up TRANSCEND University on-line, has been working since 1960s on showing that violence is not OK. His Ghandian approach is designed to convince those who advocate violent means to restore social justice to the poor, that he as a pacifist does not turn a blind eye to social injustices and inequality. He **extended therefore our understanding of what is violent**, coercion, force, to include the economic and social system’s **avoidable injustices**, deaths, inequalities. Negative peace is the absence of justice, even if there is no war. Injustice causes **structural violence** to health, bodies, minds, damages people, and **must therefore be resisted (non-violently**). Positive peace is different from negative (unjust and hence violent) peace. Positive peace requires actively combating (struggling peacefully against) social injustices that underpin structural violence. Economic and social, political justice have to be part of peacebuilding. This is the mantra of most NGOs and even some agencies (we will look later at NGO Action Aid and DFID as examples). Discrimination has to end, so does the blatant rule of money, greater equality is vital wherever possible. All of this is the opposite of neo-liberal recipes for success, which in Holland as in Indonesia, tolerate higher and higher levels of social inequality in the name of efficiency. **Structural violence kills far more people than warfare** – for example one estimate in DRC is that **4 million people have been killed in** **war** since 1998, but NGOs estimate that an additional **6 million people have died in DRC since then, from disease, displacement and hunger,** bringing the total to an unthinkable 10 million of 90 million est. population. “Since there exists far more wealth in the world than is necessary to address the main economic causes of structural violence, **the real problem is one of priorities**”…p. 307 “**Structural violence…is neither natural nor inevitable**”, p. 301 (Prontzos).